Continental Steel vs Montano
to the May 2007 elections. During the time she had been residing in
ISSUE: Is civil personality necessary to determine death?
FACTS: Hortillano is an employee and union member in Continental
Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel). Hortillano’s wife
gave birth prematurely and the female fetus died during labor. Hortillano
applied for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) that Continental Shelf had with the union of
Hortillano. His Paternal Leave was granted but the Bereavement Leave
and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent was denied by
Continental Shelf arguing death of an unborn child was not
contemplated by the CBA because an unborn child does not have civil
personality. Continental Steel argued that according to Articles 40, 41,
and 42 of the Civil Code, only one with civil personality can die.
RULING: The SC held that death is defined as the cessation of life. Life
does not equate to civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Limbona vs COMELEC
ISSUE: 1) What is the requirement to acquire domicile by choice;
2) Is the domicile of one spouse considered the domicile of the other.
FACTS: In 2007, Limbona and her husband both filed for Certificate of
Candidacy as Mayor in Pantar Lanao del Norte. Disqualification cases
was filed against them for not complying with the 1-year residency
requirement. (It was alleged that they only became residents of Pantar on
November 2006 because the husband was still a Barangay Chairman in
Rapasun, Marawi until that time.) Limbona argues that she was actually
residing and was physically present in Pantar for almost two years prior
Pantar, she associated and mingled with residents there, giving her ample
time to know the needs, difficulties, aspirations, and economic potential
of the municipality. This, she said, is proof of her intention to establish
permanent residency there and her intent to abandon her domicile
in Marawi City. She also claims that, even as her husband was Punong
Barangay in Rapasun, Marawi City, he never abandoned Pantar as his
hometown and domicile of origin. Limbona claims that the performance
of her husband’s duty in Rapasun did not prevent the latter from having
his domicile elsewhere.
RULING: 1) In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. A persons
domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be
deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a
change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period
of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at
the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. The Court did not
find any evidence that would suggest that the intention of Limbona and
her husband to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. In fact,
Limbona was not even a registered voter there.
2) According to Art. 68 of the Family Code, “The husband and wife
are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.” Art. 69 provides that “The
husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one
spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the
exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not
compatible with the solidarity of the family.”
The Court ruled that considering that Limbona failed to show that she
maintained a separate residence from her husband, and as there is no
evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family
Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience.