PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

(OUTLINE)
Art. 2 – EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS (Bar Q-1990)
-When a law does not provide for its effectivity, it shall take effect after the
expiration of the 15-day period following the completion of its publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation (as amended by EO No. 200-June 18,
1987).
-The phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” solely refers to the 15-day period
and not to the requirement of publication.
-If the law provides for a different period, shorter or longer than the 15-day
period, then such shorter or longer period, as the case may be, shall prevail.
Tañada vs. Tuvera
146 SCRA 448
Must all laws be published and what must be published?
-Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
Non-publication means violation of the due process clause guaranteed by the
Constitution.
-All statutes, including those of local application and private laws or laws that
name a public place in favor of a favored individual or laws that exempt an
individual from certain prohibitions or requirement, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity. EO 200 allows the publication of laws in a
newspaper of general circulation due to erratic releases of the Official Gazette and
of its limited readership.
- The word “LAW” in Article 2 of the NCC includes CIRCULARS and
REGULATIONS which prescribe penalties. Publication is required to apprise the
public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on
the persons affected thereby.
Must decisions of the SC be published to be binding?
-The SC held in the case of De Roy vs. CA (157 SCRA 757) that “there is no law
requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court”. (As laid down in the case of Habaluyas, Inc. vs.
Japzon, 138 SCRA 46, the 15-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. In the case at bar, the parties filed a motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. At the time of the filing
of the motion however, the Habaluyas decision has yet to be published.)
-Ordinances are governed by the Local Government Code.
Art. 3 - IGNORANCE OF THE LAW (85, 96)
-Covers all domestic laws but only applies to mandatory or prohibitive laws not
on permissive or suppletory laws.
-Foreign laws are likewise excluded because we do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws as well as judgments/decisions rendered by their courts. These are factual
matters that must be pleaded and proved before our courts in the absence of which it is
presumed that their laws are the same as our laws (principle of processual
presumption). The principle of processual presumption is also known as presumed-
identity approach (Orion Savings Bank v. Suzuki 740 S 345).
-Not applied with equal force to minors, they occupy a privilege position before
our laws. Neither would this apply to laws susceptible of 2 or more interpretations.
Art. 4- PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAWS as a general rule.
Reason: Retroactivity is frowned upon because 1) it imposes a new duty; 2)
creates a new obligation; and 3) attaches a new disability in respect to transaction already
past.

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 Exceptions: 1. If the laws are remedial in nature.
Atienza vs Brillantes, Jr.
243 SCRA 32
Brillantes’ prior marriage was celebrated in 1965 without the requisite license so
when he married de Castro in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in good faith
that he was capacitated to marry. Accordingly, Art. 40 does not apply as his prior
marriage was governed by the New Civil Code which does not require any court decree
of nullity if void ab initio.
SC held: Article 40 of the Family Code applies to remarriages entered into after
the effectivity of the Family Code regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides
Article 256 of the same Code is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
vested rights. Article 40 is a rule of procedure and Brillantes has not shown any vested
right that was impaired by the application of Art. 40.
Casupanan and Capitulo vs Laroya
August 26, 2002- Lawyers Review/September 30, 2002
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect
considering the well-settled rule that –
“ x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of the passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.”
CANCIO vs. ISIP
November 12, 2002
-The modes of enforcement of the civil liabilities are provided for in the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Though the assailed order of the trial court was issued on
March 20, 1998, the said Rules, which took effect on December 1, 2000, must be given
retroactive effect in the instant case considering that statutes regulating the procedure of
the court are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage.
EXCEPTION to the EXCEPTION: The SC held in:
CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL (expressly provides for prospectivity despite being a rule of
procedure) December 16, 2008
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages does not apply to
cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is
within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became
effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in application.
CHENG vs. SY 592 SCRA 155 (July 7, 2009)
-The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does
not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the
retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is
that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
Other exceptions:
2. Penal laws favorable to the accused provided he is not a habitual delinquent.
3.Curative laws. 4. Emergency laws. 5. Laws creating new rights. and 6. Tax laws.
- May amendments of statutes be given retroactive operation?
CAROLINO v. SENGA, et.al. 756 S 55 (PERALTA)
FACTS: Carolino retired from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in
1976 pursuant to RA 340 and started receiving his pension but was stopped in March
2005. In a letter reply, Carolino was informed that his loss of Philippine citizenship
caused the deletion of his name in the list of the AFP pensioners’ payroll effective March
5, 2005.
The termination of Carolino’s pension was done pursuant to Disposition Form
dated October 29, 2004, which was approved by the Chief of Staff and made effective in
January 2005. In the said Disposition Form, the AFP Judge Advocate General opined that
under the provisions of Sections 4,5, and 6 of RA 340, retired military personnel are

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disqualified from receiving pension benefits once incapable to render military service as a
result of his having sworn allegiance to a foreign country. It also mentioned that
termination of retirement benefits of pensioner of the AFP could be done pursuant to the
provisions of PD 1638 which provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated
upon such loss. It being in consonance with the policy consideration that all retirement
laws inconsistent with the provisions of PD No. 1638 are repealed and modified
accordingly.
HELD: Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. It is said that law looks to the future
only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that
effect to some legal provisions, that all statutes are to be construed as having only
prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language
used; and that every doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect. These principles
also apply to amendments of statutes.
PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive application,
nor the same may be implied from its language. In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638
clearly provides that the decree shall take effect upon its approval. Since the said PD, as
amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation from service of military
personnel, it should apply to those who were in the service at the time of its approval.
Conversely, PD No. 1638 is not applicable to those who retired before its effectivity in
1979. The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in
force with regard to all the rights that had accrued prior to its amendment.
Carolino did not retire under PD No. 1638 as he retired under RA 340.
Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a
vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due process clause. Carolino acquired
vested right to the payment of his retirement benefits which must be respected and cannot
be affected by the subsequent enactment of PD No. 1638 which provides that loss of
Filipino citizenship terminates benefits. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable
title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations after
the right has vested.
Article 6. Waiver (04)
Requirements of a valid waiver: 1. the waiving party must actually have the right
he is renouncing or it must be in existence at the time of the waiver;
2. he must have the full capacity to make the waiver;
3. the waiver must be clear and unequivocal;
4. the waiver must not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
good customs or prejudicial to a 3rd person with a right recognized by law; and
5. when formalities are required for its validity such as an express condonation of
a debt the formalities must be complied with.
GUY vs. CA
502 SCRA 151 (September 15, 2006)
- To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms
do not explicitly and clearly evince intent to abandon a right. In this case, there was no
waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver does not state with clarity the
purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an
educational plan for her minor daughters “by way of financial assistance and in full
settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of
the late Rufino Guy Susim.” The document did not specifically mention minors’
hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of
successional rights.
- Moreover, assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of the
children, such waiver will not bar the latter’s claim. Any inheritance left to minors or
incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or

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guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
-Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards
without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of
property that must pass the court’s scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward.
- Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment
of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which
waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
Article 9- In case of silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of laws – no judge shall decline
to render judgment. Applies only civil cases not to criminal proceedings because of the
principle that “there is no crime when there is no law punishing it (nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine lege).
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
Silverio successfully underwent sex reassignment surgery and petitioned the court
that his name be changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely and that his sex shall also be
changed from male to female to reflect the result of said surgery.
The Republic opposed the same alleging that there is no law allowing the change
of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
Issue: May the trial court apply Article 9 of the Civil Code on the ground of
equity?
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “no judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of
the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this
case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a
person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court
has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot
enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-
equal branch of government, Congress.
Art. 15 –ADHERENCE TO NATIONALITY THEORY
(75,78,81,83,87,95,97,98,99,02,03,04, 05)
RENVOI DOCTRINE – where the conflict rules of the forum (ex. Philippines)
refer to a foreign law (ex.USA), and the latter refers it back to the internal law, the law of
the forum (Philippine law) shall apply (Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95).
TRANSMISSION THEORY – if the foreign law refers to a 3 rd country, the laws
of said country should govern; this situation is a variety of the renvoi doctrine (ex. If B, a
nationality of Canada who is a resident of the Philippines and has properties in
Switzerland dies, his estate shall be governed by the laws of Canada based on Article 15
but if the laws of Canada states that it is the law of the place where the property is
situated that will be applied then the laws of the 3rd country will govern in the distribution
of his estate.)
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
39 SCRA 139
Is Article 15 applicable to aliens who are married to Filipino citizens?
-Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law (Cf. Art. 26 (2)
Family Code).

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 Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
174 SCRA 653
-Reiterated the Van Dorn decision.
-In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law in the matter of
status of persons.
Garcia a.k.a. Grace Garcia- Recio vs. Recio
October 2, 2001
-A marriage between 2 Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained
abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
-But a divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce
decree, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient. Under Rule 132 Sections 24 and 25, a writing or document
may be proven as public record of a foreign country by either (1) official
publication of the writing or document or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document.
QUITA vs. CA – 300 SCRA 406
Fe and Arturo were married in 1941. After the relationship turned sour Fe went to
the US and in 1954 obtained a decree of absolute divorce. Fe got married thrice. In 1972,
Arturo died intestate. Fe is now claiming her right over the estate of the deceased spouse.
The SC remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether the second
marriage of the spouse during the subsistence of the first marriage was contracted before
or after her changed of citizenship. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen
at the time of her 1st divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and Fe could very well
lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
ELMAR O. PEREZ vs. CA, CATINDIG
January 27, 2006
Filipino spouses Tristan and Lily decided to separate from each other and upon
advice of a friend obtained a divorce from the Dominican Republic. On July 14, 1984,
Tristan married Elmar in the State of Virginia, USA. Elmar later on learned that the
divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic dissolving the marriage of
Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan
was void under Philippine law. When confronted, Tristan assured her that he would
obtain an annulment of his marriage with Lily. In 2001, he filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Lily.
Elmar then filed a motion for leave to file intervention claiming that she has an
interest in the matter in litigation that was granted by the lower court.
Issue: Does Elmar have a legal interest in the annulment case between Tristan and
Lily?
SC: Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in
litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain
or lose by direct legal operation and effect of judgment. Such interest must be actual,
direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant.
The claim of petitioner, that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17
years vests her the requisite legal interest, lacks merit. Under the law, she was never the
legal wife of Tristan hence her claim of legal interest has no basis. When they got married
in 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree obtained by Tristan
and Lily from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them.
It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he/she was married here or abroad,
initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually

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becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not
recognize such absolute divorce.
When Tristan and Lily got married in 1968, their marriage was governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950. In Tenchavez vs.
Escano we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (RA No.
386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in the country.
SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS
February 6, 2007
Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. His 1 st marriage
was terminated when his wife died leaving behind 6 children. Five years later Felicisimo
married Mary Lee, an American citizen with whom he had 1 child. The marriage ended
when Mary Lee divorced Felicisimo. The decree of absolute divorce was granted in
December 1973. He then contracted his 3 rd marriage in June 1974 with Felicidad. When
he died, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate and prayed that letters of administration be issued to her.
Two of the children of the 1st marriage filed a motion to dismiss citing as ground, among
others, that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death was still legally married to
Mary Lee. Petitioners (Felicisimo’s heirs) cited Articles 15 and 17 (3) of the NCC in
stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
SC: In resolving the issue, there is no need to retroactively apply the provisions of
the FC, particularly Article 26 (2) as there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to rule in the
affirmative.
In the light of the ruling in Van Dorn, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. The divorce
decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA. In Garcia vs. Recio, the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of
its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
official of the Philippines who is stationed in the foreign country where the document is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, USA, she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated
text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was
done in accordance with said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
LAVADIA v. HEIRS of JUAN LUCES LUNA GR#171914 July 23, 2014
SC: Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule
adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the
1st marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a
foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code,
which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality

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rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although
living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty.
Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
NOVERAS v. NOVERAS GR #188289, August 20, 2014
David and Leticia resided in California, USA after their marriage on December 3,
1988 in Quezon City. They eventually acquired American citizenship. During their
marriage, they acquired properties in the Philippines and in the USA. Upon learning that
David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed for divorce that was granted by the
California court plus custody of their 2 children and all their properties in California. On
August 8, 2005, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property before
the RTC of Baler, Aurora.
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that
cover their legal and personal status are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage,
the parties are divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by
the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on June 24, 2005. Under their law,
the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved. And since the parties did not submit any
proof of their national law re. the spouses’ property regime, in accordance with the
doctrine of processual presumption, then Philippine law shall apply.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The
required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on
divorce were not presented.
SC: The trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of
marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, the Court stated that: “The starting
point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
laws do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.” Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment my be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact
under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of
Court.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. CA, the Court relaxed the requirement on
certification where the Court held that “petitioner therein was clearly an American citizen
when she secured the divorce and that divorced is recognized and allowed in any of the
States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.” In this case
however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did
with respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a
different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino
citizens in the Philippines.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still
legally married in the Philippines.
Art. 16 -law governing real and personal property is the law of the place where the
property is situated exception – in cases of succession it is the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration par. (2) (76,77,84,85,86,89,91,95,98,01,02,04).
ORION SAVINGS BANK v. SUZUKI 740 S 345 (BRION)
FACTS: Japanese national Suzuki bought the condo unit of Mr. Kang, a Korean
national, as well as Kang’s parking slot. Kang thereafter made several representations
with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession

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of Alexander Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer, for safekeeping. Despite several demands
Kang filed to deliver the documents and, who later left the country. Even if the titles are
clean, Orion thru Perez refused to surrender the titles.
Suzuki then filed a complaint for specific performance against Kang and Orion.
One of the grounds raised by Orion is that the sale between Kang and Suzuki is void
because under Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with
the consent of both spouses. It presented to the court a “Certification from the Embassy
of the Republic of South Korea” to prove the existence of the Korean law.
HELD: It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively
subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is found in the
very nature of the property – its immobility.
Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real are determined by
what is known as lex loci rei sitae, which alone can prescribe the mode by which a title
can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost.
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to
an immovable, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective
to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae,
even though under the law of his domicile and the law of the place where the instrument
is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.
On the other hand, property relations between the spouses are governed
principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law.
In the present case, Orion failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal
ownership of the property. It merely attached a “Certification from the Embassy of the
Republic of South Korea” to prove the existence of Korean law. This certification does
not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no
showing that it was properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the International Law doctrine
of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. That the
foreign law is the same as Philippine law.
Under Philippine law, the phrase “Yung Sam Kang ‘married to’ Hyun Sook
Jung” is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang.
DEL SOCORRO v. VAN WILSEM 744 S 516 (PERALTA)
Does a foreign national have the obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law?
FACTS: Del Socorro married Van Wilsem in Holland but the marriage was
terminated by virtue of a divorce decree issued by the Court of Holland. At the time, their
common child Roderigo was about 18 months old. Mother and child then returned to the
Philippines and settled in Cebu City. Wilsem allegedly promised to give support to the
child in the amount of 250 Guilder or about P17,500.00 but it never came.
Subsequently, Wilsem came to the Philippines and remarried. He stayed together
with his new wife in Pinamungahan, Cebu and established a catering business.
Del Socorro later filed a complaint against Wilsem for violation of Section 5, par.
E (2) of RA 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
She invoked Article 195, Family Code which provides the parent’s obligation to
support his child, that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation
to Article 26 of the same Code, Wilsem is not excused from complying with his
obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
Wilsem contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner
that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. He also added that by
reason of the divorce decree, he is not obligated to give petitioner any financial support.
HELD: Del Socorro cannot rely on Article 195 of the Family Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the Civil Code
stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provision of the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that
they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.

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 Since respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to
his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. While Wilsem pleaded the laws
of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he
never proved the same.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national of the Netherlands in his
favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing compliance
therewith.
Art. 17 par. (1) – Doctrine of Lex Loci Celebrationis
(75,77,78,81,85,91,93,95,96,98,02,03)
(2) - Rule respecting Prohibitive Laws
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
15 SCRA 355
May our courts recognize a decree of divorce validly obtained abroad by spouses
who are Filipino citizens?
-The SC applied par. 3 of Article 17.
-For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign
decree of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation
of the declared public policy of the State, specially in view of the third paragraph
of Article 17 of the Civil Code.
-The court also applied Article 15 of the same Code.
Article 19 – Golden Rule of the Civil Code (81)
Globe Mackay Cable Radio Corp. vs. CA
176 SCRA 778
-This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the
employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in
which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom.
FAR EAST BANK (FEBTC), NOW BANK OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS,
vs. PACILAN, JR.
465 SCRA 372
Facts: Pacilan’s current account was closed by FEBTC on the ground that
his account was “improperly mishandled”. This was due to Pacilan’s issuance of 4 checks
to different persons with an aggregate of amount of P7,410.00 but the balance of his
current deposit was only P6,981.43 resulting to the dishonor of Check No. 2434886.
Pacilan then complained in writing to the bank about the closure of his account and when
he did not receive any reply from FEBTC he sued the bank for damages. He alleged that
the closure of his account was unjustified inasmuch as he immediately deposited the
following day an amount sufficient to fund the check. Moreover, the closure exposed him
to criminal prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The indecent haste that
attended the closure of his account was patently malicious and intended to embarrass
him. He alleged that he is a prominent and respected leader in the civic and banking
communities (as cashier of Prudential Bank). The alleged malicious acts of the bank
besmirched his reputation and caused him “social humiliation, wounded feelings,
insurmountable worries and sleepless nights.”
Held: The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a
legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision.

9
The law always presumes good faith and any person who seeks to be awarded damages
due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with
ill motive.
- Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It
refers to a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that
partakes the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
Malice is bad faith or bad motive.
- In the case at bench, the facts as found by the court a quo and the appellate
court, do not establish that, in the exercise of this right, FEBTC committed an
abuse thereof. Specifically, the 2nd and 3rd elements for abuse of rights are not
attendant in the present case. The evidence presented by the bank negates the
existence of bad faith or malice on its part in closing Pacilan’s account on
April 4, 1988 because on said date the same was already overdrawn. Further,
it was shown that in 1986, the current account of Pacilan was overdrawn 156
times due to his issuance of checks against insufficient funds. In 1987, the said
account was overdrawn 117 times for the same reason. Again, in 1988, 26
times. There were also several instances when Pacilan issued checks
deliberately using a signature different from his specimen signature on file
with bank. All these circumstances taken together justified the bank’s closure
of Pacilan’s account on April 4, 1988 for “improper handling.”
UYPITCHING et al vs. QUIAMCO (December 6, 2006)
Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso surrendered to Quiamco a red Honda XL- 100
motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration as settlement of their civil
liability. Quiamco asked for the original certificate of registration but the 3 never came
back to see him again. He parked the motorcycle in an open space in his business
establishment – visible and accessible to the public. It turned out however that Gabutero
bought the motorcycle on installments secured by a chattel mortgage from Ramas
Uypitching Sons, Inc. that was managed by Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. The
mortgage indebtedness was assumed by Davalan but stopped the payments in 1982 and
told the corporation’s collector that the motorcycle had been “taken by Quiamco’s men”.
Nine years later, Uypitching accompanied by policemen went to Avesco (the business
establishment of Quiamco) to recover the motorcycle. While the leader of the police team
P/Lt. Vendiola asked for Quiamco, Uypitching paced back and forth uttering “Quiamco is
a thief of a motorcycle.” Unable to find Quiamco, and upon Uypitching’s instructions and
over the objection of Quiamco’s clerk, they took the motorcycle. Uypitching then filed a
criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law but was
dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor. Later, Quiamco filed an action for
damages against Uypitching.
SC: Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner
corporation’s exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle
preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default.
They are clearly mistaken. True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged
property to enable to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a
well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a
mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on
foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a
preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire
legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead Uypitching descended on Quiamco’s
establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a
search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure, Uypitching even
mouthed a slanderous statement. No doubt, the corporation, acting thru Uypitching
blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the
prejudice of Quiamco. Their acts violated the law as well as public morals, and
transgressed the proper norms of human relations. This basic principle of human relations

10
is embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code. Also known as the “principle of abuse of
rights”, it prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty
and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or
the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure
another. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken was not only
attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover
the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to Quiamco. The precipitate
act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in
accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established.
Thus, the totality of petitioners’ actions showed a calculated design to embarrass,
humiliate and publicly ridicule Quiamco.
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. (CCCI), DAPAT, et. al. vs. ELIZAGAQUE
January 18, 2008
In 1996, Elizagaque filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership.
The price of a proprietary share was around P5 million, Unchuan however, offered to sell
a share for only P3.5 million but Elizagaque bought the share of a certain Butalid for only
P3 million. Elizagaque’s application for proprietary membership was deferred twice by
the board and eventually, disapproved his application. Elizagaque wrote the Board thrice
for reconsideration but no reply was ever made by CCCI. In 1998, Elizagaque filed a
complaint for damages against CCCI.
SC: A unanimous vote of the directors is required pursuant to the amendment
made in Section 3 © of its articles. Obviously, the board has the right to approve or
disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be
exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human
Relations provide restrictions.
In rejecting respondent’s application for membership, the petitioners violated the
rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of social order. Petitioners’
committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondent’s application.
The amendment to Section 3 © of CCCI’s amended by-laws requiring the
unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on
the application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon
was the original provision of Section 3 © which was silent on the required number of
votes needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member. The explanation that
the amendment was not printed on the application form due to economic reasons, is
flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being extremely significant, was
introduced way back in 1978 or almost 20 years before Elizagaque filed his application.
It cannot be fathomed why such a prestigious and exclusive golf country club whose
members are affluent, did not have enough money to cause the printing of an updated
application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his
application was disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the
Board members was required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry
whether there was an objection to his application, petitioners apparently ignored him. At
the very least, they should have informed him why his application was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance
with the proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible. Petitioners’ disapproval of respondent’s application is characterized
by bad faith as found by both the trial and appellate courts.
As to petitioners’ reliance on damnum absque injuria or damage without injury,
suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy vs. Gutierrez (351SCRA731), we
held that this principle does not apply when there is an abuse of a person’s right, as in this
case.

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CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC. vs. CLEMENTE, JR. 585 SCRA 300 (April 16,
2009)
Clemente became a delinquent member of the club due to his failure to pay his
monthly dues for more than 60 days. The demand letters that were sent to his mailing
address were returned with the postal note that the address had been closed. A 3 rd and
final demand was again sent to Clemente in the same postal address were the 1 st 2
demand letters were sent. Clemente’s share was later sold through auction.
SC: Bad faith on Calatagan’s part is palpable. As found by the CA, Calatagan
very well knew that Clemente’s postal box to which it sent its previous letters had been
closed, yet it persisted in sending that final letter to the same postal box.
It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had provided his
residential address along with residence and office telephone numbers.
The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code under the Chapter on Human Relations. These provisions
enunciate a general obligation under the law for every person to act fairly and in good
faith towards one another. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that
obligation in its treatment of its members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every
person honestly and in good faith extends even to its shareholders or members, even if
the latter find themselves contractually bound to perform certain obligations to the
corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be the charter of dehumanization.
ARDIENTE v. JAVIER, et.al. GR# 161921 July 17, 2013 701 S 389
Water disconnection by Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) at the instance
of the former owner Ardiente without notice to the buyer Pastorfide due to failure of the
latter to pay the water bill and also the transfer of the COWD account in their name in
violation of their Memorandum of Agreement.
SC: It is true that it is within petitioner’s right to ask and even require Pastorfide
to cause the transfer of the former’s account with COWD to the latter’s name pursuant to
their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to
cause the disconnection of the spouse’s water supply. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for
damages to the injured party will attach. In the present case, the intention to harm was
evident on the part of the petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of
respondent’s water supply without warning or informing the latter of such request.
SESBRENO v. CA, VISAYAN ELECTRIC CO. (VECO), et.al. 720 S 57
FACTS: Sesbreno was one of VECO’s customers under the metered service contract they
had entered into in March 1982. One of the stipulations found in paragraph 9 of the
contract is the continuing authority from its clients as consumers of the violation of
contract (VOC) inspectors employed by VECO to enter their premises at all reasonable
hours to conduct an inspection of the meter without being liable for trespass to dwelling.
On May 11, 1989, the VOC inspectors conducted a routine inspection of the
houses at La Paloma Village including that of Sesbreno. The inspectors found Sesbreno’s
meter, which was located at the garage, turned upside down. They took photographs of it
and in the presence of Sebreno’s maid Baledio, one Chuchie Garcia and one Peter
Sebreno, they removed said meter and replaced it with a new one. Plaintiff was in his
office at that time and no one called to inform him of the inspection. The VOC team then
asked and received Garcia’s permission to enter the house itself to examine the kind and
number of appliances and light and fixtures in the household and determine its electrical
load. Afterwards, Garcia signed the Inspection Division Report with notice that it would
be subjected to laboratory tests. She also signed the Load Survey Sheet that showed the
electrical load of Sebreno.
Sesbreno sued VECO and VOC inspectors for damages contending that the
inspection of his residence by the VOC team was unreasonable search for being carried
out without a search warrant and for being allegedly done with malice or bad faith.
SC: The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended to as a
restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement. It is to be
invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State power.

12
In People v. Marti (193 S 57,67) it said: If the search is made upon the request of the law
enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case
at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of the private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the main premises only
after finding the meter turned upside down, hanging and its disc not rotating. Their doing
so would enable them to determine the unbilled electricity consumed by his household.
The circumstances justified their decision, and their inspection of the main premises as a
continuation of the authorized entry.
Balicha’s (a member of the Philippine Constabulary) presence and participation in
the entry did not make the inspection a search by an agent of the State within the ambit of
the guaranty. He was part of the team by virtue of his mission order authorizing him to
assist and escort the team during its routine inspection. Consequently, the entry into the
main premises of the house by the VOC team did not constitute a violation of the
guaranty.
The CA correctly observed that the inspection did not zero in on Sesbreno’s
residence because the other houses within the area were similarly subjected to the routine
inspection. This, we think, eliminated any notion of malice or bad faith. Clearly, Sesbreno
did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents were not guilty of abuse of
rights.
Art. 20 – Acts Contrary to Law (78,03)
Art. 21 –Acts Contrary to Morals (75,81,82,96)
1) Wassmer vs. Velez
12 SCRA 648
-Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set
a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite different. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.
2) Tanjanco vs. CA and Santos
18 SCRA 994
-No case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff, a woman of
adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts
of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion, for had she been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one
year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage.
BUENAVENTURA vs. CA & ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA,
March 31, 2005
Is the aggrieved spouse in a marriage declared void by reason of
psychological incapacity of the other spouse entitled to moral and exemplary
damages under article 21 of the New Civil Code?
SC: It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must
willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and
hence done in complete freedom. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party
because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of
acts as willful. By declaring Noel as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility
of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of
moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the

13
 marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice
by a party who had knowledge of his/her disability and yet willfully concealed the
same.
ACI PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COQUIA
559 SCRA 300 (July 14, 2008)
The appellate court’s citation of Article 21 is misplaced not only because of the
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties which bars the application of this
provision, but more importantly because we cannot deem ACI to have acted fraudulently
or in bad faith.
Art. 22 – Unjust Enrichment
FILINVEST LAND v. NGILAY 684 S 119
The sale of a homestead before the expiration of the 5-year prohibitory period
following the issuance of the homestead patent is null and void. The rule is settled that
the declaration of nullity of a contract which is void ab initio operates to restore things to
the state and condition in which they were found before the execution thereof. Allowing
respondents to keep the amount received from the petitioner is tantamount to judicial
acquiescence to unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists “when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience. There is unjust enrichment under
Article 22 of the Civil Code when 1) a person is unjustly benefited, and 2) such benefit is
derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there
is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it.
GONZALO v. TARNATE, JR. 713 S 224 (January 15, 2014) (BERSAMIN)
Gonzalo and Tarnate were found to be in pari delicto by the court when they
knowingly entered into a void contract and as such no affirmative relief of any kind will
be given to one against the other.
Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid.
An accepted exception arises when its application contravenes well-established public
policy. In this jurisdiction public policy is defined as “that principle of the law which
holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has the tendency to be
injurious to the public or against the public good.”
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc. (532 S 74), when
a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience.” The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the
State. It is well to note that Article 22 “is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for
the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of social order;
designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience;
guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end
that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice.”
Art. 26 – (77) – Acts though not constituting a criminal offense but may produce a
cause action for damages, prevention and other relief.
CASTRO vs. PEOPLE
559 SCRA 676 (July 23, 2008)
Castro, assistant headmaster of Reedly International School (RIS), was informed
thru phone that Tan, the parent of the child dismissed by RIS but whose dismissal was
overturned by Dep-Ed, was planning to sue the officers of RIS in their personal
capacities. Before they hung up, Castro told the caller: “Okay, you too, take care and be
careful talking to [Tan], that’s dangerous.” Sued, he was found guilty by the MeTC of
Grave Oral Defamation.
The SC however, enunciated that “At most Castro could have been liable for
damages under Article 26 (3) of the Civil Code. As an educator, he is supposed to be a
role model for the youth. As such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his
due and honesty and good faith.”

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Art. 27 –Liability of Public Officers
Ledesma vs. CA and Delmo
160 SCRA 449
-Ledesma, then President of the West Visayas College, was adjudged liable for
damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code for failure to graduate a student with
honors. Ledesma’s behavior relative to Miss Delmo’s case smacks of
contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. It cannot be disputed
that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal that was brought about by
Ledesma’s neglect of duty and callousness.
CAMPUGAN v. TOLENTINO, JR. 752 S 254 (BERSAMIN)
May the Register of Deeds be held liable under Article 27, Civil Code if it cancels
an annotation in the title such as an affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis pendens
without a court order and would it be sufficient to hold the Register of Deeds
administratively liable?
FACTS: Campugan alleged that the Register of Deeds of Quezon City connived
and conspired with their lawyer and the lawyer of the other party resulting to the
cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and notice of lis pendens without a court
order over a residential lot she and her brother allegedly inherited from their late parents.
The cancellation was the effect of the amicable settlement they and the other party
had earlier entered into to end a dispute whereby it was agreed that complainants would
sell the property and the proceeds thereof would be equally divided between the parties,
and the complaint and the counterclaim would be withdrawn respectively by the
complainants and the defendants.
HELD: Section 10 of PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) enumerates the
general duties of the Register of Deeds as follows: “x x x. It shall be the duty of the
Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. X x x .”
The aforementioned duty is ministerial in nature. A purely ministerial act or duty
is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall
be performed, such duty is discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor the exercise of
judgment.
Art. 40 – 41 Civil Personality (81,86,91,99,03)
What determines personality (Art. 40) and its exception and the requisites in order
that the exception may apply (Art. 41).
QUIMIGUING v. ICAO GR No. 26795 July 13, 1970
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article of
the Civil Code. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted), even if the
child is only “en ventre de sa mere,” even as yet unborn may receive donations prescribed
by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent is his testament may
result in preterition of a forced heir, even if such child should be born after the death of
the testator (Article 854, Civil Code).
It is thus clear that the lower court’s theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code
(now Article 195 of the Family Code) declaring support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children “does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn,” violates
Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of
Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes favorable to it” adds further “provided it be born later
with the conditions specified in the following article” (i.e. that the foetus be alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb). This proviso, however, is not a

15
condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of
Article 40 would entirely useless and ineffective.”
CONTINENTAL STEEL v. MONTANO GR No. 182836 October 13, 2009
- While the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who
acquired juridical personality could die.
- Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before she/he could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
- The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such
that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil
personality, as Continental avers. Without such qualification then child
shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn
fetus in the mother’s womb.
JURIDICAL CAPACITY:
Art. 37 – Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of juridical relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, is the
power to the acts with legal effect, is acquired may be lost.
- Thus, an unborn child has juridical capacity but does not have capacity
to act.
Arts. 38 – 39 – Limitations to ones capacity to act
Arts. 40, 41 and 42 – What determines personality
- For civil purposes, the requisites for a foetus to be considered born
- What extinguishes civil personality
Art. 43 – If there is a doubt as to who died first involving persons who are called to
succeed each other; the person alleging the death of one prior to the other has the burden
of proof and in the absence of proof it is presumed that they died at the same time and
there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other. Applies only in cases of
succession between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, all other
cases apply presumption of survivorship under the Rules of Court. Ex. Between a parent
and a child. (98,99,00)
Ex. (2000 Bar) – Cristy and her late husband Luis had 2 children, Rose aged 10
and Patrick, 12 years old. One summer, her mother-in-law, aged 70, took the 2 children
with her on a boat trip to Cebu. Unfortunately, the vessel sank en route, and the bodies of
the 3 were never found. None of the survivors ever saw them on the water. On the
settlement of her mother-in-law’s estate, Cristy filed a claim for a share of her estate on
the ground that the same was inherited by her children from their grandmother in
representation of their father, and she inherited the same from them. Will her action
prosper? Ans. No, her action will not prosper. Since there was no proof as to who died
first, all the 3 are deemed to have died at the same time and there shall be no transmission
of rights from one to another, applying Article 43 of the NCC. The survivorship provision
of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the problem. It applies only to those
cases where the issue involved is not succession.
(1998 Bar) – Jaime, aged 65, and his son Willy, 25 years old and married to
Wilma, died in a plane crash. There is no proof as to who died 1 st. Jaime had a life
insurance policy with his wife Julia, and his son, Willy, as the beneficiaries. Can Wilma
successfully claim that ½ of the proceeds should belong to Willy’s estate? Ans. Yes,
Wilma can invoke the presumption of survivorship and claim that ½ of the proceeds
should belong to Willy’s estate, as the dispute does not involve succession. Under this
presumption, the person between the ages of 15 and 60 years is deemed to have survived
one whose age was over 60 at the time of their deaths. The estate of Willy endowed with
juridical personality stands in place and stead of Willy, as beneficiary.

ARTS. 44 TO 47

16
 44 – Who are juridical persons:
1. State and its political subdivision;
2. Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or
purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law; and
3. Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose.
45 – Law that governs these juridical persons:
a. 1 and 2 are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.
b. Private corporations are governed by laws of general application.
c. Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code.
46 – Rights and obligations of juridical persons:
1. Acquire and possess property of all kinds.
2. Bring criminal or civil actions.
3. Enter into obligations.
ARTICLES 50 – 51 DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
50 – Domicile of a natural person for the exercise of his civil rights and
fulfillment of civil obligations shall be the place of his habitual residence.
- DOMICILE – means permanent home and has 2 requisites:
1. The fact of residing or personal presence in a particular place.
2. The intention to remain in said place permanently (animus
manendi).
Distinction between DOMICILE and RESIDENCE:
DOMICILE is a legal or juridical relation, which can exist without
actually living in the place while RESIDENCE is a material fact, that is,
connoting the physical presence of a person in a place.
RESIDENCE however, when used in election, suffrage and naturalization
laws, means “DOMICILE” (political or legal residence) which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in the place coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention (Arevalo vs. Quilatan 116 S 700).
Thus, a man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another
(Koh vs. CA 70 S 298).
51 – DOMICILE OF JURIDICAL PERSONS:
- are generally fixed in the law creating or recognizing them. If it is
not fixed then the domicile is the place where their legal representation is
established or where they exercise their principal functions.
FAMILY CODE
Executive Order No. 209 (August 3, 1988)
I. MARRIAGE
Art. 1 – definition of marriage
- A special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlement may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided
by this Code.
Art. 2 – Essential Requisites:
1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female;
and
2. Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
-One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the

17
union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual).
Art. 3 – Formal Requisites of Marriage (96)
1. Authority of the solemnizing officer;
2. A valid marriage license except a. marriages in articulo mortis;
b. parties residing in remote places;
c. Muslim marriages and marriages of
members of other ethnic cultural
communities;
d. ratification of marital cohabitation.
3. A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of at least 2 witnesses of legal age.
- Hence, no marriages by proxy under our jurisdiction.
Cases: Republic vs. CA and Castro
236 SCRA 257
Facts: Husband personally attended to the processing of the documents
relating to their application for a marriage license. The marriage lasted only 4 months. It
was discovered by the wife that no marriage license was issued by the LCR of Pasig City
who certified to that effect. In her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the wife
presented as evidence the certification issued by the LCR of Pasig City. The SC held that:
-A certificate of “due search and inability to find” unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion issued by the local civil registrar is sufficient proof that
no marriage license is issued to the contracting parties.
-“Secret marriage” – a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a
civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either of both of the contracting parties.
Sevilla vs. Cardenas
497 SCRA 428 (July 31, 2006)
Whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan
stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of
the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage null and void ab initio.
Facts: Jaime Sevilla filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Carmelita Cardenas on the ground that he never applied for a marriage license from any
Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing
officer. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal
on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he
never applied for any marriage license. As proof, he presented 3 certifications that have,
more or less, the same contents as the first, issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Rizal that reads:
“TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this
Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number 2990792, we exert all
effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our force locating
the above problem.
San Juan, MetroManila
March 11, 1994
(SGD) RAFAEL ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar”
SC: The certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state
that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in
the register despite diligent search.
Note that the first 2 certifications bear the statement that “hope and understand
our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.” It could
easily be implied from the said statement that the Office of the Civil Registrar could not
exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No.

18
2770792 due to its “loaded work.” Likewise, both certifications failed to state with
absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued. This implication is confirmed
by the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, who stated that they could not locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in
charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person
was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of
the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. Given
the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not
exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been
entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official functions by the LCR in
issuing certifications is effectively rebutted.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of
Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar,
that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to
search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that the absence of the same also
means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. Semper praesumitor
pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.
NOLLORA, JR. v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 191425 09/07/2011
Nollora first contracted marriage with Jesusa in 1999 then in 2001 he contracted
another marriage with Rowena whom he married twice- first in accordance with Catholic
rites and the second, in accordance with Muslim rites. Sued for bigamy, he claimed that
he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted he
first marriage with Jesusa. As a convert, he is entitled to marry 4 wives as allowed under
the Muslim or Islam belief. He presented as proofs a Certificate of Conversion where it
stated that Nollora allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 and a duly
approved Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992.
He was not aware why in his marriage contract with Jesusa it was indicated he
was ‘Catholic Pentecostal’ when she was aware that he was already a Muslim convert at
the time of their marriage. While in his marriage contract with Rowena, the religion
indicated was ‘Catholic’ because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the
society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was ‘single’
despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage secret.
HELD: Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that “in case
of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance
with Muslim Law or this Code, the Family Code or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu
of the Civil Code shall apply.” Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue. Neither is
the claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Regardless
of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for bigamy.
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is
“single”. Both of Nollora’s marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although
the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one’s religion in the marriage certificate is not
an essential for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora’s liability for
bigamy. His false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these
omissions.
Art. 4 – Effect of Absence, Defect, or Irregularity (96,99)
Absence – renders the marriage void.
Defect in any of the essential requisites– annullable.
Irregularity – valid but may subject person responsible for irregularity to criminal,
civil and/or administrative sanction.
In MORIGO vs. PEOPLE (422 SCRA376) where the parties merely signed the
marriage contract without the presence of the solemnizing officer and no actual marriage
ceremony took place, the SC held that the 1st element of bigamy as a crime requires that
the accused must have been legally married. In the case at bar, legally speaking Morigo
was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no 1st marriage to speak of. Under the

19
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the 2 were never
married “from the beginning”. The contract of marriage is null, it bears no legal effect.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract on their own bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which Morigo might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
SYED AZHAR ABBAS v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS G.R. No. 183896 01/30/13
Syed, a Pakistani, married to Gloria, a Filipino, was sued by the latter for bigamy
as he allegedly contracted another marriage with a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura
during the existence of the previous marriage. He subsequently filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage due to absence of a marriage license.
Syed presented as proof a certification issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite that reads in part: “Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in
favor of Mr. Arlindo Gelatado and Miss Myrna Mabilangan on January 19, 1993.
“No Marriage License was appear (sic) to have been issued to MR. SYED
AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA GOO on January 8, 1993. xxx.”
On appeal, the CA give credence to Gloria’s argument that the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted and thus, the said certification could
not be accorded probative value. It further ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Syed had admitted to having signed
the marriage contract and that the parties comported themselves as husband and wife.
That Syed only instituted the petition after Gloria filed a case against him for bigamy.
SC: In the case of Carino v. Carino, following the case of Republic v. CA, it was
held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of
Carino further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove
that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.
Gloria had failed to discharge the burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is
no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was simple irregularity
in the marriage that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was
presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to
Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
All the evidenced cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a
valid marriage license.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN, JR. GR#201061 July 3, 2013 700 S 702
Sally, to appease her father who is against her relationship with Bangayan,
brought the latter to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
contract. When the relationship ended, Bangayan brought an action for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage on the ground that his marriage with Sally was bigamous as he has
a prior subsisting marriage with Azucena.
SC: The marriage between Sally and Benjamin “was made only in jest” and a
“simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected
social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her
parents seen as Chinese conservatives.” In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
As it was established that no marriage license was issued to them, the marriage
was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
“inexistent and void from the beginning.”
For bigamy to exist, the 2nd or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was
really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed the purported marriage

20
contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the NSO. In short, the marriage between the parties did not exist
even if they lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
REPUBLIC v. ALBIOS GR#198780 October 16, 2012 707 S 584
Albios married American Fringer in October 2004 in Mandaluyong City. On
December 6, 2006, Albios filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived
as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. Her marriage is
one in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio. She contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship and paid Fringer US$2,000.00.
ISSUE: IS A MARRIAGE, CONTRACTED FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF
ACQURING AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP IN CONSIDERATION OF US$2,000.00,
VOID AB INITIO ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF CONSENT?
SC: The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing particular benefits. In the
US, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire
specific benefits, have been referred to as “limited purpose” marriages. A common
limited purpose marriage is one entered solely for the legitimization of a child. Another,
which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. But is a marriage
declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally
void and inexistent.
Under Article 2 of the FC (consent being an essential requisite of marriage), for
consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence solemnizing
officer. A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of
the FC. Consent must also be conscious and intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature
and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired
their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
The marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. They have an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allowing
Albios to acquire American citizenship.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the FC is to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into
in accordance with law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into
for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as acquisition of
American citizenship. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided for by law.
Neither can the marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under
Article 45 (3) of the FC. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code
may constitute fraud. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Albios had made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her
marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
institution.
Instances of irregularity that would not affect the validity of marriage as enunciated
by the SC in the case of Alcantara vs. Alcantara 531 SCRA 466 (August 28, 2007):

21
 1. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties.
2. Issuance of a marriage license despite absence of publication or prior
to the completion of the 10-day period for publication.
Liability of Public Officers
Cosca vs. Palaypayon, Jr.
237 SCRA 249
-The judge in the case at bar solemnized the marriage without a marriage license,
did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates, no dates placed in the marriage
contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not
furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being
sent any copy of the marriage contract.
-As the solemnizing officer, he is responsible for the irregularity and under Article
4(3) of the Family Code the judge shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.
-In Aranes vs. Occiano (380 SCRA 402) the SC held citing Navarro vs.
Domatoy 259 SCRA 129 where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is
contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability.
Art. 5 – re. Age of parties to the marriage (1989, 2006); Article 7 (06)- those authorized
to solemnize marriages (enumeration is exclusive) 1. Incumbent members of the judiciary
within the court’s jurisdiction; 2. Priest, rabbi, imam or minister of any church or
religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil
registrar general; 3. Only in marriages in articulo mortis (awareness of an impending
death) – ship captain or airplane chief whether crew members or passengers and military
commander of a unit in the absence of the chaplain during military operation whether the
parties are members of the military or civilians; 4. Consul-general, vice consul or consul -
only between Filipinos residing or sojourning abroad; and 5. Mayors by virtue of the
Local Government Code effective January 1, 1992 (99); Article 8 –place where the
ceremony shall be held (89); Article 10- authority of consul-general, vice consul, or
consul to solemnize marriages between Filipino citizens abroad but the contracting
parties are not exempt from the license requirement as Article 10 states that the issuance
and duties of the LCR as well as that of the solemnizing officer shall be performed by the
said consular official (94); Art. 14-necessity of parental consent if one or both
contracting parties are between the ages of 18 & 21 no parental consent – voidable (99).
Art. 21 – Requirement when either or both parties are foreigners
Garcia a.k.a. Grace Garcia-Recio vs. Recio
October 2, 2001
-Is failure to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of
a substantial requisite voiding the marriage? The Supreme Court held that legal
capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would
have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of the respondent, had he duly
presented it in court.
-SC also ruled that compliance with Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code is
not necessary; Philippine personal laws no longer bound respondent Recio after
he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Art. 26- Validity of marriages celebrated abroad subject to certain exceptions (89, 92, 96,
99,05,06)
GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE GARCIA-RECIO vs. RECIO
October 2, 2001
 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the
Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the

22
 divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry.”
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS IYOY
470 SCRA 508 (September 21, 2005)
Crasus and Fely’s marriage ended when the latter left for the United States in
1984. In 1985, Fely divorced her husband and contracted a subsequent marriage with an
American. In 1988, she obtained American citizenship. She now claimed that her
marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her
status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality.
Is the argument tenable?
SC: As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein
one of the married couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its
plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of
Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen. At the time she filed for divorce she was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, she was
still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until
now, do not allow and recognize divorce Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from Crasus.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
October 5, 2005 (2012 Bar)
Issue: Given a valid marriage between 2 Filipino citizens, where one party is
later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him
or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Facts: Cipriano and Lady Myros were married in 1981. They had 2 children. In
1986 Lady Myros left for the United States, obtained American citizenship and in 2000
obtained a decree of divorce and married one Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter, filed
a petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. The
Republic thru the OSG contends that the cited provision is not applicable to the instant
case because it applies only to a valid mixed marriage; that is, between a Filipino citizen
and an alien.
Held: On its face, Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation presented by
the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 Quita vs. Court of Appeals. The
Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that par. 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the literal purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the spirit of the law.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of par. 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

23
GERBERT R. CORPUZ v. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and the SOLGEN
GR No. 186571 – August 11, 2010
Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen acquired Canadian citizenship married Filipino
Daisylyn in January 2005. He divorced Daisylyn in December 2005 when he found out
that Daisylyn was having an affair with another man. The divorce decree took effect on
January 8, 2006. Two years later, Corpuz wanted to marry another Filipino in the
Philippines and had the Canadian divorce decree registered on his and Daisylyn’s
marriage certificate in the Pasig City Civil Registry. Informed by the National Statistics
Office that his marriage still subsists despite registration of the decree and to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court.
Gerbert then filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and /or
declaration of marriage as dissolved. Daisylyn manifested that she also desires to file a
similar case but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. The RTC ruled
that Gerbert is not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. Only the Filipino spouse can avail
of the remedy, under the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 FC, in order for him/her to remarry
under Philippine law.
SC: Essentially, the 2nd par. of Article 26 of the FC provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered
as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the 2nd par. of Article 26 of
the FC, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be
of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a
mode of severing the marital bond. The inclusion of the 2 nd par. in Article 26 provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his/her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the 2nd par. of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law. The foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
rules on evidence together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not
kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.
While Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity, he failed to include a copy of the Canadian
law on divorce. It remanded to the lower court because of Daisylyn’s conformity with the
petition.
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, et.al.
GR # 196049 June 26, 2013 700 S 69
In 2004, Japanese national Fujiki married Filipino Marinay but inasmuch as the
marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s parents, the latter was unable to bring Marinay to
Japan. The parties then lost contact with each other. Without her first marriage dissolved,
Marinay, in 2008 married Japanese Maekara who brought Marinay to Japan. But due to
alleged physical abuse committed by Maekara, she left him and contacted Fujiki. In 2010,

24
Fujiki helped Marinay in obtaining a judgment from a Japan family court declaring her
marriage with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On January 14, 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC for “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage). The RTC denied the petition on the ground that only “the
husband or the wife”, in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to
declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
SC: The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a foreign citizen
of a foreign country. Neither would the rule that only the husband or the wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage apply “if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy” (Juliano-Llave v. Republic).
- A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public
policy and other mandatory laws. Citing Article 15 of the Civil Code, the
SC held that “this is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law.
Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of foreign judgment affecting ist
citizens, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.”
- There is no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines
has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35 (4) of the FC. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48 (b) of the Rules.
- Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of
the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
- Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay.
- Article 35 (4) of the FC, which declares bigamous marriages void from
the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, which penalizes bigamy.
Art. 31-Marriage Articulo mortis –(95)
Art. 34 – Legal Ratification of marital cohabitation – (02)
Niñal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000)
-The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of the celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no 3rd party was involved at
any time within the 5 years of continuity—that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire 5 years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse.

25
 -The 5-year cohabitation should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid
under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract.
-Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party, that is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible and any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.
- In the case at bar, the SC applied Article 76 of the Civil Code, the subsequent
marriage having been celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ
354 SCRA 1
-The Supreme Court enumerated the requisites that must concur in order that the
provision on legal ratification shall apply:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be
present at the time of the marriage (underscoring supplied);
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived
together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to
marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no
legal impediment to their marriage.
-In the case at bench, the SC held that the absence of the legal impediment is only
required at the time of the celebration of the marriage no longer during the entire
5-year period of cohabitation.
De Castro vs. De Castro 545 SCRA 162 (February 13, 2008)
The parties applied for a marriage license but forgot about it. The license expired
so parties executed an Affidavit of Cohabitation in lieu of the license.
SC: Falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity. The false
affidavit has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT vs. JOSE A. DAYOT
550 SCRA 435 (March 28, 2008)
Jose and Felisa were married in November 1986 and in lieu of a marriage license,
the parties executed a sworn affidavit attesting, among others, that both of them being
unmarried lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years. It turned out that the
statement is a complete falsity for they started living together barely 5 months before the
celebration of their marriage.
Issue: Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties
have in truth fallen short of the minimum 5-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of marriage license.
SC: For the exception in Article 76 of the Civil Code to apply, it is a sine qua non
thereto that a man and a woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years.
- The Civil Code in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of
5 years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of
Article 76 is precise.
-The minimum requisite of 5 years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in
the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this
material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory
requirement, but one that partakes of a mandatory character.
- To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
allow circumvention of the law.
- The falsity of the allegation in the sworn statement relating to the period
of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for marriage license, cannot
be a mere irregularity, for it refers to the quintessential fact that the law

26
 precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under
oath. If the essential matter in the sworn statement is a lie, then it is
merely a scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there
was no affidavit at all.
Effect if parties to a subsequent marriage lied before the solemnizing officer
and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least 5 years
before their marriage vis-à-vis to the crime of bigamy.
LEONILA SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE 763 S 55 (SERENO)
FACTS: Leonila and Nicanor, four months after their marriage on July 29,
1997, were sued for the crime of bigamy. The former pleaded not guilty, the latter,
however, escaped. While it was established that Leonila had prior knowledge of
Nicanor’s marriage with Estela Galang, she raised the defense that she cannot be
held liable for the crime because her marriage with Nicanor was void for having
been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the FC, which provides an
exemption from the marriage license requirement if the parties have actually lived
together as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to the marriage. In her case,
Leonila asserted that she and Nicanor had not lived together as husband and wife
for 5 years prior to the marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage
license effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal
from bigamy.
HELD: We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a
bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our
penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual’s deliberate
disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between
spouses. In Tenebro v. CA, we had the occasion to emphasize that the State’s penal
laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals “to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to
thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.”
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of
feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime.
For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.
They themselves perpetrated a false certificate of marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on
their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at
least 5 years prior their marriage. Leonila married Nicanor knowing fully well tht
they had not complied with the 5-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34
of the Family Code. It would be the height of absurdity to allow petitioner to use
her illegal act to escape criminal liability.
Article 36 – Psychological Incapacity- (93,97,02,06[2Qs])
- based on Canon 1095 of the Canon Law.
CASES:
1) Santos vs. CA
January 4, 1995
-What constitutes psychological incapacity- should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as expressed by Art. 68 of the Family Code include their mutual
obligation to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
-Intendment of law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity”
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
-Psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
-Did not meet standards required - the incapacity must be characterized by a)
gravity- the party would be incapable of carrying out the duties required in
marriage, b) juridical antecedence – it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although overt manifestations may emerge only after the

27
marriage, and c) incurability or if otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.
2) Ching Ming Tsoi vs. CA
January 16, 1997
-One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”
-In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
-An ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
3) Republic v. CA and Molina
February 13, 1997
-No clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an “incapacity”. It
appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations.
-SC laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36.
-Root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.
-Made definite and clear as to what are the essential marital obligations of
marriage (Articles 68-71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code).
4) Marcos vs. Marcos
343 SCRA 755
- The personal or medical or psychological examination of respondent is
not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. The
totality of evidence presented may serve as basis of the determination of
the merits of the petition.
- The guidelines in the Molina case incorporate the three basic
requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v CA:
“psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do
not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically
or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
- Although this court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is no showing
that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable. The behavior of respondent can be attributed to
the fact that he had lost his job and was unemployed for 6 years.
- And because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law,
this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation in
Molina. Petitioner has not faithfully observed them. She failed to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in Molina.
5) Hernandez vs. CA and Hernandez
December 8, 1999
-Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which made

28
 respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state, and not merely due to respondent’s youth and self-conscious feeling of
being handsome.
- Expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of
spouse’s psychological incapacity, if only to show, that it existed at the time of the
marriage.
6) REPUBLIC vs. DAGDAG
351 SCRA 425
-May a spouse be declared psychologically incapacitated based on the following
grounds?
1. would disappear for months;
2. if with his family, often drunk and in such a state forced the wife to
have sexual intercourse, in case of refusal beats the wife; and
3. had been unheard of since last disappearance although rumored to
have escaped from jail.
-In Republic vs. Molina, the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Taking into
consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with
Guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since
no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband.
7.) PESCA vs. PESCA
356 SCRA 588
- In 1994 wife filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 because of the alleged emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility of her cruel and violent husband. A habitual drinker who,
when advised to stop, would beat, slap and kick her. Prior to the filing of
the case, petitioner was battered black and blue that led to the
imprisonment of respondent for 11 days.
- Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.
- The phrase “psychological incapacity,” borrowed from Canon law, is an
entirely novel provision in the statute books, and, until the relatively
recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped
jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court
has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally given
the procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying
cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity.
Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos. At all events petitioner
utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
her husband, let alone at the time of the solemnization of the marriage,
so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage.
- The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the of the family that the State cherishes
and protects (Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
DEDEL vs. CA
421 SCRA 461
Sharon is an immature wife and mother and had extramarital affairs with several
men one of whom she ran away with and had 2 children with him. She was also confined
once in a hospital for treatment by a clinical psychiatrist. During the trial, a doctor
testified that Sharon was suffering from anti-social personality disorder exhibited by her
blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity
for remorse. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of anti-social

29
personality disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
Held: Sharon’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or
psychologically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It
appears that Sharon’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely to her youth, immaturity or sexual
promiscuity.
TENEBRO vs. CA
423 SCRA 272
What is the effect of a judicial declaration of nullity of a 2 nd or subsequent
marriage on the individual’s criminal liability for bigamy?
Veronico married Leticia on April 10, 1990. Sometime 1991 Veronico informed
Leticia that he was previously married to Hilda in 1986. He then left the former to live
with the latter. When Veronico contracted another marriage in 1993 with one Nilda,
Leticia filed a complaint for bigamy. Convicted. On appeal he argued that the declaration
of nullity of the 2nd marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date on which the 2nd marriage was celebrated.
Held: A declaration of nullity of the 2 nd marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is absolutely of no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned. As
a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of Veronico’s valid
marriage to Hilda, Veronico’s marriage to Leticia would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of Leticia’s psychological incapacity or capacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of
this 2nd marriage is not per se an argument of the avoidance of the criminal liability for
bigamy. Although the judicial declaration of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not
without legal effects, Article 54 states that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is
therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal
laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that
each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
JARILLO vs. PEOPLE 601 SCRA 236 (September 29, 2009).
Jarillo contracted marriages twice. Her defenses were 1.) her marriage with
Alocillo was null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to Loretta Tillman
at the time of their marriage; and 2.) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and
void for lack of a valid marriage license. While the case was pending appeal, Jarillo’s
marriage to Alocillo was declared void under Article 36. She now invoked said
declaration as a ground for the reversal of her conviction.
SC: The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of Jarillo’s marriage to Alocillo
cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment Jarillo
contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared
null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
Neither would a judicial declaration of nullity of Jarillo’s marriage to Uy make any
difference. A plain reading of Article 149 of the Revised Penal Code, would indicate that

30
the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

REPUBLIC vs. HAMANO

May 20, 2004
Are the norms laid down by the SC in Santos and Molina cases applicable to
marriages where one of the parties to the marriage and alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated is a foreigner?
SC: We find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We
cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.
-The SC in this case reiterated the complete guidelines, as stated in the Molina
case, in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and
bar with emphasis on (2) thereof i.e. “The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
-In the case at bar, the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that
Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities.
Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would greatly
helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done through expert witness. This Lolita did
not do.
-As we held in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical illness.
LEONILO ANTONIO vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES
G. R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Barely 4 years after the marriage, Antonio filed a petition to have his marriage to
Marie Ivonne declared null and void under Article 36. As manifestations of the wife’s
alleged psychological incapacity, Antonio claimed that respondent persistently lied about
herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other
events or things. In support of his petition, he presented Drs. Abcede, a psychiatrist, and
Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that they
observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or
pathological. They concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her essential marital obligations. During the pendency of the case, the
Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the catholic marriage of the
parties that was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal with
modification stating that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. That
respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. The
Roman Rota of the Vatican upheld the findings of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal.
SC: Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity “is a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.” Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against
marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36
do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote
wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Molina established the
guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under

31
Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and
the guidelines therein operate as the general rules.
We find the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina. First.
Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden by proving the psychological incapacity
of his spouse. Apart from his testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations on his wife’s behavior. He also presented 2 expert witnesses from the field of
psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to
psychological incapacity. Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. Dr.
Lopez concluded that respondent “is a pathological liar that she continues to lie and loves
to fabricate about herself. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent,
the Court had already held in Marcos vs. Marcos that personal examination of the subject
by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have
clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of the marriage. She
fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It should be noted
that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to
induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
the respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s
witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling
lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them were revelatory
of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be
unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic
meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting.
One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or
emotional commitments. Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the
essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article
68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity. It is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit
to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Sixth.
The CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage
was annulled by the Catholic Church. Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of
Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. Evidently, the conclusion of psychological
incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Church
rulings will hold sway if they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of
the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated
respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the
rulings of the Catholic Church on the matter would have diminished persuasive value.
Seventh. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the
incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by petitioner.
Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals,
which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological
incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract
marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
NOTE: Compare the facts of ANTONIO and NAJERA cases and the decision rendered
by the SC in each case.
NAJERA vs. NAJERA 591 SCRA 542 (July 3, 2009)
Digna prayed that her marriage with Eduardo be declared void by reason of the
alleged psychological incapacity of Eduardo to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage. In support of her petition she presented Dr. Gates who testified
that Eduardo is afflicted with Borderline Personality Disorder as marked by his pattern of

32
instability in his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive
tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo’s psychological impairment as traced to
his parent’s separation, aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult
life, antedates his marriage to Digna. Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances
(alcohol and marijuana), known to cause irreparable damage organically, and the manifest
worsening of his violent and abusive behavior across time render his impairment grave
and irreversible.
Likewise, during the pendency of the petition, Digna also filed a petition for
annulment of her marriage before the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church based on psychological incapacity under Canon 1095. And twelve (12)
days before the decision of the appellate court was issued, the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal declared her marriage annulled stating that “the husband-
respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract.” The trial court decreed
only the legal separation of the spouses, but not the annulment of their marriage. The CA
affirmed the lower court’s decision.
SC: The totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily
prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity
was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable.
As found by the CA, Gates’ conclusion that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her
personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and
unreliable.
The evidence presented by Digna in regard to the physical violence or grossly
abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondent’s abandonment of
petitioner without justifiable cause for more than 1 year are grounds for legal separation
only.
The basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is not the 3rd paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a
psychological nature, but the 2nd paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who
suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.
Hence, even if, the factual basis of the decision of the National Matrimonial
Tribunal is similar to the facts established by Digna before the trial court, the decision of
the former court is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent.
REPUBLIC vs. CUISON-MELGAR
486 SCRA 177
-Reiterated the decisions rendered in Santos vs. CA – that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.
-Subsequently, the Court laid down in Republic vs. Molina the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36.
- In Marcos vs. Marcos, the Court later clarified that that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the
totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
- In this case, Norma failed to establish the fact that at the time they were
married, Eulogio was suffering from a psychological defect that in fact
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and
its concomitant responsibilities. In fact, Norma admitted that her marital
woes started only after the birth of their 1 st born and when Eulogio lost
his job. It was alleged that Eulogio is a habitual alcoholic, refuses to look
for a job after he was dismissed from work, every so often goes to her

33
 office, utters unwholesome remarks against her and then drags her home
because of his unbearable jealousy and had abandoned the family.
- Further, no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was not
cognizant of the basic marital obligations as outlined in Articles 68 to 72,
220, 221 and 225.
- While an actual medical, psychiatric, or psychological examination is
not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an
expert witness would have strengthened Norma’s claim of Eulogio’s
alleged psychological incapacity. Norma’s omission to present one is
fatal to her position, there can be no psychological incapacity where
there is absolutely no showing that the “defects” were already present at
the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
PEREZ-FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS
495 SCRA 396 (July 17, 2006)
- The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for nullity of
marriage under Art. 36 of the FC, refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is
a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or
isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders,
there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage (Santos vs. CA). It is for this reason that the Court relies
heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained.
- In the case at bar, their problems began when petitioner started doubting
respondent’s fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the
calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and
corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations.
- Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that
respondent has a mixed personality disorder called “schizoid”, and why
he is the “dependent and avoidant type.” The doctor’s statement lacks
specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation.
Inputs about respondent’s problematic history were all supplied by
petitioner herself, hence self-serving. Petitioner likewise failed to prove
that respondent’s supposed psychological illness or mental malady
existed even before the marriage.
- Respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-
house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during
epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of
support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than
his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition
but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
ZAMORA vs. CA 515 SCRA 19 (February 7, 2007)
-reiterated its ruling in Santos, Molina and Marcos.
-the case of Santos v. CA did not specifically mention that the presentation of
expert opinion is a vital and mandatory requirement in filing a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage. Even in the subsequent case of Republic v. CA (also known as the
Molina case), examination of the person by a physician in order for the former to be
declared psychologically incapacitated was likewise not considered a requirement. What

34
is important, however, as stated in Marcos v. Marcos, is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. If the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
REPUBLIC vs. TANYAG-SAN JOSE 517 SCRA 123 (February 28, 2007)
-SC cited its ruling in Santos, Molina and Ferraris.
-Doctor Tayag’s conclusion about Manolito’s psychological incapacity was based
on the information supplied by Laila which she found to be “factual”. Undoubtedly, the
doctor’s conclusion is hearsay. It is “unscientific and unreliable”.
Dr. Tayag’s psychological report does not even show that the alleged anti-social
disorder of Manolito was already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is
incurable. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor did it
identify its root cause.
Manolito’s alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on his being jobless
and a drug user, as well as his inability to support his family and his refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. His state or condition or
attitude has not been shown, however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on some
incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition.
NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR., vs. CYNTHIA NAVARRO
521 SCRA 121 (April 13, 2007)
Petitioner claims that the marriage was dysfunctional, destructive, and
reconciliation was out of the question because he would go insane if he were to go back
to his wife. That she was not supportive of his career, and marriage counseling did not
work. He also alleged that if they quarreled, she refused to have sex with him and would
tell him to look for other women.
- SC reiterated decision in Santos vs. CA on characteristics of
psychological incapacity, the guidelines laid in Republic vs. CA (also
known as the Molina case- Zamora vs. CA) and elucidated that;
- 1. Spouses’ frequent squabbles and respondent’s refusal to sleep with
petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute psychological
incapacity;
- 2. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty”,
“refusal”, or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations, it
is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage; and
- 3. Their bickerings and arguments even before their marriage and
respondents scandalous outbursts in public, at most, show their
immaturity and immaturity does not constitute psychological incapacity.
PARAS v. PARAS 529 SCRA 81 (August 2, 2007)
May factual findings in a disbarment case be considered conclusive in a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 where the husband was suspended
from the practice of law because of immorality and abandonment of his own family?
-Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class
of their own. They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably
govern the third and vice versa.
Accordingly, one’s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’s
unfitness as a husband or vice versa. The disposition in a disbarment case cannot be
conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. In the disbarment case, “the
real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such.” On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage based on psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether
the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders
him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants.

35
 The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its
origin in Molina. In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos, the Court clarified that the above
Guideline does not require that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage. What
is important is “the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition.”
While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa,
such as sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate
support given to the children are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the records
showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other words,
the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
There is no evidence that Justo’s “defects” were present at the inception of
the marriage. His “defects” surfaced only in the latter years when these events took
place; their 2 children died; he lost in the election; he failed in his business ventures and
law practice; and he felt the disdain of his wife and family. Surely, these circumstances
explain why Rosa filed the present case only after almost 30 years of their marriage.
Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justo’s “defects” are
incurable or grave.
RENNE ENRIQUE BIER vs. MA. LOURDES A. BIER and REPUBLIC
547 SCRA 123 (February 27, 2008)
3 years after the marriage, petitioner found out that respondent is no longer the
spouse he knew and married. She became aloof towards him and began to spend more
time with her friends than with him, refusing even to have sexual relations with him for
no apparent reason. She became an alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She also neglected her
husband’s needs and upkeep of the home, and became an absentee wife.
SC: If a petition for nullity based on psychological incapacity is to be given due
course, its gravity, root cause, incurability and the fact that it existed prior to or at the
time of celebration of the marriage must always be proved.
-This must be strictly complied with as the granting of a petition for nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.
- Even if Molina was never meant to be a check list of the requirements in
deciding cases involving Article 36 of the Family Code, a showing of the
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the party’s
psychological incapacity and its existence at the inception of the
marriage cannot be dispensed with.
- Even if Marcos relaxed the rules such that the personal examination of
the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated by a psychiatrist or
a psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of
the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the totality of
evidence must still prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity. Failure in this regard
will spell failure of the petition.
HALILI vs. SANTOS-HALILI
551 SCRA 576 (April 16, 2008)
Petitioner alleged that he is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential
marital obligations to respondent. That after the wedding they never lived together as
they continued to live with their respective parents although they maintained their
relationship. The marriage was never consummated and that they are constantly fighting.
SC: Although petitioner was able to establish his immaturity the same hardly
constitutes sufficient cause for declaring the marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. It must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability.

36
 Their not having lived together in one roof does not necessarily give rise to the
conclusion that one of them was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that he and respondent had
difficulty getting along with each other as they constantly fought over petty things.
However, there was no showing of the gravity and incurability of the psychological
disorder supposedly inherent in petitioner, except for the mere statement or conclusion to
that effect in the psychological report which report dismally failed to prove petitioner’s
alleged was grave enough and incurable to bring about his disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
SC reiterated its ruling in the Santos and Molina cases.
HALILI vs. SANTOS-HALILI 589 SCRA 25 (June 9, 2009)
The SC reversed its earlier denial of Lester Halili’s petition citing the ruling it
held in the case of Te vs. Te (G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009).
Lester is suffering from dependent personality disorder by reason of petitioner’s
dysfunctional family life.
He had a very abusive and domineering father. The mother was very unhappy and
the children never had an affirmation. Wife and children were practically robots so Lester
grew up without self-confidence, very immature and somehow not truly understanding
what it meant it to be a husband, and what it meant it to have a real family life. Hence,
Lester’s personality disorder was grave, incurable and existing at the time of the
marriage.
NILDA NAVALES vs. REYNALDO NAVALES
556 SCRA 272 (June 27, 2008)
-The totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo is insufficient to sustain a finding
that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated.
-The psychological report which concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an
emotionally immature individual, has a borderline personality, has strong sexual urges
which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, etc., etc. is
insufficient to establish Nilda’s psychological incapacity. It lacked specificity, it failed to
show the root cause of Nilda’s psychological incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that
there was a “natal or supervening disabling factor” or an “adverse integral element” in
Nilda’s character that effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby
complying with, the essential marital obligations, and that her psychological or mental
malady existed even before the marriage.
- The standards used by the Court in assessing sufficiency of
psychological reports may be deemed very strict, but that is only proper
in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.
REPUBLIC vs. LYNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO
556 SCRA 711 (June 30, 2008)
Lynette is married to Martini, a seaman, whom she alleged to be suffering from
psychological incapacity being a “mama’s boy” that will endanger the integrity of the
marriage because instead of establishing a permanent relationship with the wife the
husband-defendant would remain dependent on his family. The clinical psychologist
concluded that Martini shows immature personality disorder, dependency patterns, and
self-centered motives
-The mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities”
does not constitute psychological incapacity. Nor does the failure of the parties to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
-It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or
incapable of meeting their duties and responsibilities due to some psychological (not
physical) illness, which insensitivity or incapacity should have been existing at the time
of the celebration of the marriage even if it becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

37
 -How the doctor arrived at the conclusion, after interviewing Lynnette and
considering her deposition, that such personality disorders of Martini had been existing
since Martini’s adolescent years has not been explained.
-While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her
psychologically incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must be “medically
or clinically identified.” There must thus be evidence to adequately establish the same.
There is none such in the case at bar, however.
DIMAYUGA-LAURENA vs. CA 566 SCRA 154 (September 22, 2008)
Ma. Darlene and Jesse were married on December 19, 1983 and had 2 children. In
1993, Darlene filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jose. She alleged that
the latter’s psychological incapacity was manifested by his infidelity, utter neglect of his
family’s needs, irresponsibility, insensitivity and tendency to lead a bachelor’s life.
During the trial Darlene claimed that the root of Jose’s incapacity was his homosexuality
(during their honeymoon, they were accompanied by a 15-year old boy, and that he had
feminine tendencies).
-SC reiterated Santos and Molina decisions. Santos on the 3 characteristics while
Molina – on the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. In the case
at bar, both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioner failed to satisfy the
guidelines in the Molina case. Sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence,
homosexuality, or moral pressure to compel one to change religious affiliation, and
abandonment are grounds for legal separation but not for declaring a marriage void.
In Marcos vs. Marcos, the court ruled that if the totalities of the evidence
presented are enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, there is no need to
resort to the actual medical examination of the person concerned. While the examination
by a physician of a person to declare him psychologically incapacitated is not required,
the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified.
Darlene failed to prove that respondent’s psychological incapacity was existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. In sum, the totality of the evidence failed to show
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was grave,
incurable, and existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE vs. ROWENA TE
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009
Edward met Rowena in a gathering. 3 months after their 1 st meeting, Rowena
asked Edward that they eloped but he refused. She persisted and so they went to Cebu but
Edward’s P80,000.00 lasted only a month. Unable to find jobs, they decided to return to
Manila. Rowena went to live in her uncle’s house while Edward returned to his parents’
home. Edward however, was forced to live with Rowena and her uncle because she kept
on telephoning him, threatening that she would commit suicide if Edward would not live
with her. On April 23, 1996, they got married and continued to stay in her uncle’s house
where Edward was treated like a prisoner, as he was not allowed to go out
unaccompanied. Her uncle showed him his guns and warned not to leave Rowena. When
he was able to call home, a brother suggested that they stay at their parents’ home and
live with them. Rowena instead suggested that Edward should get his inheritance so they
can live on their own. When he relayed this to his father, the latter got mad and told him
that he would be disinherited and insisted that he must go home. Edward escaped.
After knowing that Edward does not have any money, she stopped tormenting him
and informed him that they should live separate lives.
The clinical psychologist who examined Edward found both parties are
psychologically incapacitated. Edward’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification
of dependent personality disorder, and Rowena’s that of the narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder. Yet despite said findings, the CA reversed the earlier ruling of the
lower court that granted the petition.
SC: The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case
basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had,
somehow been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in
Molina. The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people
who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality

38
anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina
has become a straitjacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court in applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence
or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations
of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To
indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage. We are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina.
And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder. By the very nature of article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.
Hernandez v. CA emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no
requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented as enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot
assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such
as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people. He
is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Respondent’s affliction with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations. Her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and
her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society. She is
impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with threats of
blackmail and of committing suicide.
TING vs. VELEZ-TING 582 SCRA 694 (March 31, 2009)
Did the SC abandon the Molina Doctrine in view of its ruling in TE vs. TE?
SC: Far from abandoning Molina, We (SC) simply suggested the relaxation of the
stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages inasmuch as
“to require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited
psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They
adversely affect access to justice for poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces
where these experts are not available. The need for the examination of the party or parties
by a psychologist or psychiatrist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be
determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.”

39
 But if the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrist tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged
psychological incapacity then, such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly,
be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
MARIETTA C. AZCUETA v. REPUBLIC GR. No. 180668 (May 26, 2009)
Marietta married Rodolfo 2 months after their 1 st meeting. The marriage lasted
only for 4 years and subsequently Marietta filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36. She alleged that Rodolfo was emotionally immature,
irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the
essential responsibilities and duties of a husband. He never bothered to look for a job and
instead relied upon his mother for financial assistance including the payment of rentals of
the room they were occupying. He pretended that he found a job but when confronted as
Marietta discovered that he really did not actually get a job and the money he gave her
(which was supposedly his salary) came from his mother, he cried like a child and told
the wife that he did it so she would stop nagging about applying for a job. When they
discussed about their sexual problem as theirs is an unsatisfactory sex once a month,
Rodolfo would always say that sex is sacred and should not be enjoyed or abused. He did
not even want to have a child yet because he was not ready. The psychiatrist testified that
Rodolfo was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder whose response to ordinary
way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant
self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other people.
SC: The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and
prolonged dependence with a parent of the opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no
longer appropriate. This situation crippled his psychological functioning related to sex,
self-confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed prior to the
marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration due to marital stresses and
demands. It is considered as permanent and incurable in nature, because it started early in
his life and therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality structure. It is
severe and grave in degree, because it hampered and interfered with his normal
functioning related to heterosexual adjustment.
His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is referable to an unconscious guilt
feelings of defying the mother’s love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating
between the wife and the mother, so that his continuous relationship with his wife
produces considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and crippled him
psychologically.
The SC also cited Santos, Marcos, and Te decisions. It further stated that, “there
was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage
under Article 36.”
SO vs. VALERA 588 SCRA 319 (June 5, 2009)
Renato So was a 17-year old high school student while Lorna Valera was a 21-
year old college student when they fell in love. They cohabited for about 19 years before
they decided to get married. Five years later, Renato filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage for want of the essential and formal requisites. He also claimed that
Lorna is psychologically incapacitated as shown by her refusal and failure to cohabit and
make love with him, does not love or respect him. If he comes home late, Lorna would
refuse to let him in and in several instances he has to sleep in his car. She also refused to
practice her profession by selling her dental equipment that he bought and provided.
Instead she joined him in his electronics business and interfered in his decisions that
would sometimes make him lose face before his employees.
On nullity due to absence of the essential and formal requisites, Renato alleged
that Lorna merely asked him to sign a blank marriage application form and marriage
contract and that no marriage ceremony took place.
He presented Dr. Gates, a clinical psychologist, who testified that Lorna suffers
from Compulsive Behavior Patterns – evident in her marijuana habit, gambling and
habitual squandering of Renato’s money. That her Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive
Behavior Patterns already existed prior to her marriage to Renato. That it is continuing
and appears to be irreversible.

40
 SC: The allegation on nullity due to absence of the essential and formal requisites
of marriage was negated by the fact that during the trial Renato himself presented a
certified true copy of the marriage contract/certificate duly signed by the officiating
officer.
On psychological incapacity, the SC held that “Shorn of any reference to
psychology, We conclude that We have a case here of parties who have very human faults
and frailties; who have been together for some time; and who are now tired or each other.
to be tired and to give up on one’s situation and on one’s husband are not necessarily
signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled.
The statements made by Dr. Gates merely testify to Lorna’s impulsiveness, lack of
restraint, and lack of civility and decency in the conduct of her life. Dr. Gates failed to
prove that all these emanated from a behavioral disorder so grave and serious that she
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; that it was
rooted in the respondent’s medical or psychological history before the marriage; and that
a cure was beyond the respondent’s capacity to achieve.
RODOLFO ASPILLAGA vs. AURORA ASPILLAGA G.R. 170925 October 26, 2009
The marriage disintegrated when, after arrival from Japan, Aurora discovered that
Rodolfo cohabited with her cousin in their house and subsequently, left the family abode
in favor of the concubine. On the other hand, Rodolfo, in his petition, alleged that Aurora
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He
complained that Aurora is a spendthrift, domineering and frequently humiliated him.
Psychiatrist Maaba explained that the spouses harbor psychological handicaps that could
be traced from unhealthy maturational development. Rodolfo has an unhealthy familial
relationship during the early maturational development specifically in the form of a
domineering and protective maternal lineage.
Deep-seated sense of dejection, loneliness, and emptiness hamper Aurora’s
objectivity. She also projected signs of immaturity and has the desire to regress to a lower
level of development.
SC: Maaba failed to reveal that these personality traits or psychological
conditions were grave or serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. While he was able to establish the parties’ personality
disorder; however, Maaba failed to link the parties psychological disorders to his
conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as
husband and wife. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their
performance of their marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from
psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the FC. Mere difficulty is
not synonymous to incapacity. Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that each party’s
condition is so grave or is of such as to render said party incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. There is likewise no evidence that the claimed
incapacity is incurable and permanent.
EDWARD LIM vs. MA. CHERYL LIM G.R. No. 176464 February 4, 2010
Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric report stated that, “clinical evidence showed that Mr.
Edward Lim is suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder while Cheryl is suffering
from Histrionic Personality Disorder, associated with immaturity, that render both of
them psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage.”
The conclusion was based on what Villegas termed as “psychodynamics of the
case” where he alleged that Edward did not build close attachments to his parents. His
father was exceptionally temperamental and moody, while the mother was extremely
asocial, isolated, withdrawn and seclusive, that repelled him from both of them.
Cheryl, on the other hand, was initially congenial, which lasted only for a short
period of time. Later, her immaturity interfered with her behavioral pattern and
adjustment. Apparently, she could not recognized realities in their family set-up and will
insist on her fantasized wishes.
SC: It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of
Villegas with nary a link drawn between the “psychodynamics of the case” and the
factors characterizing the psychological incapacity.

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 Villegas’ global conclusion of both parties’ personality disorders were not
supported by psychological test properly administered by clinical psychologists
specifically trained in the tests’ use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders
of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully
established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure
specific aspects of people’s intelligence, thinking, or personality.
The SC also cited its rulings in the Santos (characteristics of psychological
incapacity and its definition) and Molina (guidelines) cases.
JORDAN CHAN PAZ vs. JEANICE PAVON PAZ G. R. No. 166579 February 18,
2010
Wife Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan.
She alleged that Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. That it was manifested by Jordan’s uncontrollable tendency to be
self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his pre-disposition to become violent and
abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied. According to psychiatrist
Gates, Jordan was afflicted with “Borderline Personality as manifested in his impulsive
behavior, delinquency and instability.”
SC: Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is
nevertheless a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent evidence
adduced by the person alleging said disorder.
Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-
depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis
of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
In this case, the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan’s psychological
incapacity were based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of
stenographic notes of Jeanice’s testimony before the trial court.Gates only diagnosed
Jordan from the statements of Jeanice, whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be
doubted. Gates did not actually hear, see and evaluate Jordan. Her report and testimony
were hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the facts she was
testifying on.
The SC also cited the following cases: 1. Santos vs. CA – on the 3 characteristics
of psychological incapacity;
3. Dimayuga-Laurena vs. CA;
4. Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris – on certain quirks and idiosyncrasies do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity;
5. Republic vs. Cabantug-Baguio
Other issues:
Requirement of filing motion for recon on denial before appeal (Rule of
Procedure on Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage).
SUAZO vs. SUAZO G. R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
Cases cited by the SC 1. Santos on characteristics;
2. RP vs. CA otherwise known as the Molina doctrine;
3. Marcos vs. Marcos – totality of evidence is sufficient to prove that respondent
is suffering from psychological incapacity;
4. Yu-Te vs. Te where the SC states that, “Santos’ doctrinal value was sustained in
Te, saying that its interpretation is consistent with the Canon Law. But the Te
doctrine did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements (Ting vs. Velez-Ting).
- The SC denied the petition because the methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required
to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from psychological disorder. The
psychologist meager information coming from a directly interested party
(petitioner).
LIGERALDE vs. PATALINGHUG G.R. No. 168796 April 15, 2010
Wife had an extra marital affair with whom she subsequently lived with after
telling the husband that she had no more love for him. Thus, the husband came to believe

42
that with the wife’s irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, she is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
SC: The psychologist failed to show the root cause of her psychological
incapacity. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as
psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the
totality of evidence presented during the trial.
The acts of the respondent do not even rise to the level of the “psychological
incapacity” that the law requires. Her act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically
be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was
shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage.
Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of
a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
TORING v. TORING GR# 165321 August 3, 2010
- Santos ruling re. Characteristics.
- Molina guidelines.
- The law does not require that the alleged incapacitated spouse must be
personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition
sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the FC.
- Such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such
as relatives, close friends, or even family doctors or lawyers.
REPUBLIC vs. GALANG 650 S 524 June 6, 2011
Nestor alleged that wife Juvy is a gambler, does not attend to her husband’s needs,
irresponsible, would steal money from Nestor and used it for gambling, would make
stories so that people would feel pity on her and give her money.
- SC cited: Santos on the 3 characteristics of psychological incapacity.
- The Molina guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36.
- Marcos where the SC stated that it is not absolutely necessary to
introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 if the totality of
evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
- The Rule on Declaration of absolute Nullity of Void Marriages provided
that “ the complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if
any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.”
- The 2009 Ngo Te v. Yu-Te ruling placed some cloud in the continued
applicability of the time-tested Molina guidelines as the guidelines
unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases involving
psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it which is contrary
to the intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can be
considered as completely on “all fours” with another but in Ting v. Velez-
Ting, the SC held that far from abandoning Molina it merely suggested
the relaxation of its stringent requirements. In Suazo, it states that Ngo
Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
In the case at bar, the acts attributed to Juvy, do not per se rise to
the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires. Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage- had to be
shown. Thus, her acts only showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of
responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in
the performance of marital obligations.
The psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her
conclusions exclusively from the information given her by Nestor. Evidence from

43
 independent sources who immediately knew Juvy before and after the
celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of difference and could have
added weight to the psychologist’s report. The psychologist failed to trace the
history of Juvy’s psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
MENDOZA v. REPUBLIC GR# 157649 November 12, 2012
SC: The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings she harbored towards
Dominic, which she admitted during her consultations with Dr. Samson, furnished a basis
to doubt the findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided, because
Dominic was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by the petitioner’s
expert. The findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were
solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him
rendered by the petitioner and her witnesses.
The SC applied the Marcos v. Marcos ruling on totality of the evidence.
REPUBLIC v. CA and DE QUINTOS GR# 159594 November 12, 2012
Facts: Neuro-psychiatric evaluation done by Dr. Reyes showed that respondent
wife exhibited Borderline Personality Disorder which is no longer treatable. Her sexual
infidelity, spending more time with friends rather than with her family, and her incessant
gambling constituted psychological incapacity.
SC: Psychological incapacity contemplates an incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true
inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love,
the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
SC cited Santos on the meaning of psychological incapacity, its characteristics.
The Molina guidelines, and Suazo where it held that there must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent from complying
with the basic marital obligations.
REPUBLIC v. ENCELAN GR# 170022 January 9, 2013
SC: Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do
not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity, these are simply grounds for legal
separation. It must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment were
manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse
from discharging essential marital obligations.
KALAW v. FERNANDEZ 745 S 512 (BERSAMIN)
On September 19, 2011 the Supreme Court denied the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36, Family Code stating that Ma. Elena Fernandez’s acts
of constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery,
neglect of children were not actually proven. The totality of evidence points to the
opposite direction.
The Supreme Court, in reversing its earlier denial, held that Dr. Gates’
(psychologist) expert opinion should not be considered in isolation but along with the
other evidence presented. The Court took into account the testimony of respondent’s own
witness, Dr. Dayan, who testified that respondent had “compulsive and dependent
tendencies” to the extent of being “relationship dependent”. It did not contradict Dr.
Gate’s findings that Fernandez is suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD)
and Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD). Likewise, a Canon law expert and an
Advocate before the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila, Fr. Healy, testified that respondent is narcissistic and is more concentrated on her
own beauty that it became an obsession, her family being merely secondary.
In its earlier decision, the Court said that while respondent admittedly played
mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she
neglected her duties as a mother and a wife.
The Court however, in the motion for reconsideration, said that the frequency of
the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited the Court’s determination of
the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be

44
her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the
time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and
responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender
ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices
that would erode their moral fiber.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions
did not only point to her neglect of parental duties but also manifested her tendency to
expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture
of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act
of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and
escapist desires. This was the observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr.
Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current psychological state of the respondent
had been rooted on her own childhood experience.
OBSERVATIONS: RE. DECISIONS OF THE SC INVOLVING CASES FALLING
UNDER ARTICLE 36
The SC almost always would state:
-What constitutes “psychological incapacity” and its 3 characteristics and
the meaning of each (Santos and Laurena cases);
-The intendment of the law as to the meaning of “psychological
incapacity”;
-The essential marital obligations of marriage;
-The Molina guidelines although the requirement on medical or clinical
examination of the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated may
be dispensed with if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity (Marcos vs. Marcos); and
-If there is no clinical or medical examination, the alleged psychological
incapacity of the spouse must be proven by independent evidence adduced
by the party alleging said disorder (Paz vs. Paz).

Art. 37 – Incestuous marriages – void from the very beginning.

Art. 38 – Marriages which are void by reason of public policy – (99)

Art. 39- Non-prescription of action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage (89)

Article 40 – Need for Judicial Declaration of a Void Marriage (91, 93)

1) Terre vs. Terre
211 SCRA 11
-For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio
is essential.
2) Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572
-Husband alleged that the marriage being void ab initio, there is no need for
declaring its nullity and hence, the petition is superfluous and unnecessary and Article 40
is only for purposes of remarriage. Is the husband correct?
-A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required as a
cause of action or a ground for defense.
-For purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.
-Where a party desires to enter into another marriage, he is required by law to
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
-A party may invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other
than remarriage such as an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property as well as custody and support of their common children.

45
 -The court before which the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is
likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the
couple’s properties.
3) Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr.
243 SCRA 32
-Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.
-Article 256 on retroactivity applies as Article 40 is a rule of procedure.
4) Beltran vs. People
334 SCRA 106
-Reiterated Domingo ruling.
-SC also held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it
be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
5) Carino vs. Carino
February 2, 2001
- For purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage, otherwise the second would also be void.
RULES ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES
(A.M. No. 02-11-02-SC): Effectivity – March 15, 2003
1. Prescription – action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
does not prescribe (Article 39, FC).
2. Only the husband or wife may file the petition before the Family Court.
3. A petition under Article 36 of the FC must specifically allege the complete facts
including physical manifestations, if any, showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any,
as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
RULES ON ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGES:
1. Persons given the right to file action – Article 45, FC.
2. Prescriptive period – Article 47, FC.
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, and TEOFILO CARLOS
II
GR No. 179922, December 16, 2008
-The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be
proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. Both rules
have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in
annulment of marriage. So is confession of judgment disallowed.
-Only the aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. It cannot be filed
by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and,
hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not
to seek its dissolution.
-The Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15,
2003 although the marriage is within the coverage of the Family Code. The new Rule
which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.
Article 41 – Subsequent Marriage contracted based on absence of spouse- (92)
-Need for declaration of presumptive death of absentee.
1.) Republic vs. Nolasco

46
 220 SCRA 20
-Four requisites that must be met for the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41. These are 1. the absentee spouse must have been absent for 4
consecutive years or 2 years if the disappearance is accompanied by any of the
circumstances mentioned in Article 391 of the Civil Code; 2.the spouse present
has a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is already dead; 3. there is a
judicial decree of presumptive death; and 4. for the purpose of remarriage.
-Spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of
them leaves the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the
policy of the laws on marriage.
2.) Calisterio vs.Calisterio
April 16, 2000
-Subsequent marriage was solemnized on May 8, 1958 the law in force at that
time was the Civil Code (Article 83).
-A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long
as the prescribed period of absence (7 consecutive years or if less, generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so) is met. In contrast, under the 1988
Family Code, in order that a subsequent marriage may exceptionally be
considered the following conditions must concur: (1) the prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for 4 consecutive years or 2 years where
there is danger of death under Article 391 of the NCC, (2) the spouse present has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead, (3) there is a judicial
declaration of presumptive death and (4) for the purpose of remarriage.
3.) EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE
November 29, 2005
Is the spouse who contracts a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
previous marriage still liable for bigamy despite the absentee spouse having been missing
for 21 years?
Facts: Eduardo married Rubylus in 1975. She went missing also in the same year
and was unheard of since then. In 1996, he married Tina. When he left Tina in 2001, the
latter became curious and made inquiries with the NSO in Manila and learned that
Eduardo had been previously married. Sued for bigamy, Eduardo avers that when he
married Tina in 1996, Rubylus had been “absent” for 21 years since 1975. He points out
that, under the 1st paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code she was presumed dead as a
matter of law because if one has been absent for 7 years, whether or not he/she is still
alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession. Thus, the
presumptive death of the absentee spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction
of 2 requirements: the specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable belief that the
absentee is dead. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there
must be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply.
Held: It was the burden of petitioner to prove his defense that when he married
Tina in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as
he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in
evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife
as required by Article 349 of the RPC (Bigamy- The penalty x x x x or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in a
proper proceedings.), in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial
declaration constitutes proof that petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate
criminal intent on his part when he married Tina and, as a consequence, he could not be
held guilty of bigamy. The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the
State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the “State shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.” Marriage is a social
institution of the highest importance.
REPUBLIC vs. CA and ALEGRO
December 9, 2005
Alan filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia
(Lea) when barely a month after the marriage, Lea left their conjugal abode. He then

47
looked for her in his in-laws house, in her friend’s house where the brother-in-law of
Lea’s friend told him that his wife left for Manila. He also inquired from his friends of
Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail. He also sought the help of Barangay Captain Magat
who promised to help him locate his wife. In 1995, he left for Manila and went to the
house of Lea’s friend but despite repeated talks with her, he failed to find her. He also
looked for Lea in the malls but to no avail. In 1997, he decided to return to Catbalogan
and again looked for his wife but failed. In 2001, he reported Lea’s disappearance to the
local police and also to NBI. Magat corroborated his statements during the trial.
SC: The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent
and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The belief of the present spouse must
be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is already dead, in
Republic vs. Nolasco, the Court warned against collusion between the parties when they
find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also a
maxim that “men readily believe what they wish to be true.”
In this case, Alegro failed to present a witness other than Magat. He failed to
present Janeth or Nelson or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries
about Lea to corroborate his testimony. What is worrisome is that, Alegro failed to make
inquiries from his parents-in-law considering that Lea’s father was the owner of DYMS.
He did report and seek the help of the local police and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was
only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS) and the SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
(SSC) vs. TERESITA JARQUE vda. DE BAILON
March 24, 2006
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead,
Bailon contracted a subsequent marriage with Teresita in Casiguran, Sorsogon. When
Bailon died Teresita claimed the death benefits from the SSS. It now appears that Alice is
very much alive and that it was Bailon who abandoned or deserted the spouse. Alice
alleged that she lived with her parents at Barcelona, Sorsogon because she found out that
Bailon was having an extra marital affair but Bailon used to visit her there after their
separation. That she only recently knew of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her
presumptively dead. The SSS denied Teresita’s claim contending that her subsequent
marriage with Bailon is void as it was contracted while Bailon’s marriage with Alice was
still subsisting and that there is no need to require Alice to execute an affidavit of
reappearance as there is no disappearance of Alice. In fact, the CFI order declaring Alice
presumptively dead did not become final, her (ALICE) “presence” being “contrary proof”
against the validity of the order. Teresita, however, maintains that her marriage with
Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it
remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon
designated her as his beneficiary. Went to the Social Security Commission but the SSC
upheld the denial of the SSS respecting Teresita’s claim for death benefits.
SC: The 2 marriages having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code specifically Art. 83
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. Under the said provision, a
subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void
ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of
the 3 exceptional circumstances (7 continuous years absence or if less than 7 years,
generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or
disappeared under any of the circumstances mentioned in Articles 390 or 391) falling
under said Article. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases
is deemed valid “until declared null and void by a competent court.” It follows that the
onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage.
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive
years when Bailon sought the declaration of presumptive death, which judicial
declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of remarriage. Under the Civil

48
Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is
necessary. Article 42 provides: “The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance
of the absent spouse, x x x x.” The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit
does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent
marriage.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent
marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere appearance, even if
made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.
Since the 2nd marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former
spouse is dead, such presumption continues in spite of the spouse’s physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee
until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of
reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar,
Tolentino submits: x x x. Generally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of
either spouse, the effects of dissolution of a valid marriage shall arise. The good faith or
bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised, because as in annullable or voidable
marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned in a direct action for annulment. Such
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of
either, in which case the offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
The marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
VALDEZ vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 180863 September 8, 2009
Sofio, married to Angelita, disappeared in 1972. He returned in 1975 and the
spouses agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. That was the last time
Angelita saw Sofio. After that she did not hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or
whether he was alive or not.
Believing that Sofio is already dead, Angelita contracted a subsequent marriage in
1985. Subsequently, however, Virgilio’s (Angelita’s 2 nd husband) application for
naturalization filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security was denied
because Angelita’s marriage to Sofio was subsisting. She then filed a petition seeking for
the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The RTC denied the petition contending that by petitioner’s own admission, she
did not try to find her husband anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live
separately.
SC: The marriages of Angelita to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June
20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
For purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has
been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the 2nd marriage, that the spouse present
does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court
declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken
place by the 7th year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
SANTOS v. SANTOS GR#187061 October 8, 2014
Sometime July 2007, Ricardo obtained a decree of presumptive death from the
court, 12 years after his wife Celerina allegedly disappeared from their residence in
Tarlac City. He alleged that Celerina insisted that she be allowed to work as domestic
helper in Hongkong after their buy and sell business floundered. She left Tarlac in April

49
1995 and was never heard from again. He claimed that he had exerted efforts to locate
Celerina, asking her whereabouts from her parents, relatives and friends, but no one gave
him any information.
Celerina learned of Ricardo’s petition a year later. She filed a petition for
annulment of judgment before the CA on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. She posits that she was deprived of her day in court when Ricardo despite
knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented that she was a Tarlac City resident when
actually she had been residing in Neptune Extension, Congressional Ave., Quezon City
since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. That she has never been a resident of Tarlac
nor has she worked as a domestic helper abroad and neither has she been absent for 12
years, in fact it was Ricardo who left the conjugal dwelling and cohabited with another
woman.
The CA dismissed Celerina’s petition for being a wrong mode of remedy. The CA
held that the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry
declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code. But
Celerina contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only
terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
SC: Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court’s
judgment, order or resolution has become final, and the “remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner. The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic
or actual. Extrinsic fraud as defined by the Court in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi (374
Phil. 879) is when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a party from
having a real contest, or from presenting all his case, such that there is no fair
submission of the controversy.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a
court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief
that the spouse is already dead. The first will be considered as having been validly
terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage
are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in
good faith is protected by law.
Celerina is correct in her contention that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy.
If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage
conceived before the termination shall be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment
declaring presumptive is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.
For the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also
nullifying the effects of the declaration pf presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage, mere filing of reappearance would not suffice.
REPUBLIC v. EDNA VILLANUEVA GR# 210929 JULY 29, 2015 (MENDOZA)
Edna who worked as a domestic helper in Singapore returned to the Philippines
after she allegedly heard the news from her children that their father Romeo and Edna’s
husband, who worked as a mechanic in Valencia City, Bukidnon, left their conjugal home
without reason or information as to his whereabouts. She inquired from her parents-in-
law and from their friends in Iligan City and even went to Romeo’s birthplace in
Escalante, Negros Oriental, and made several inquiries from his relatives but found no
leads as to his whereabouts or existence.
In 2009 or 15 years after Romeo’s disappearance, Edna instituted a petition to
declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code with petitioner
as sole witness.
SC: The stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” was not complied with. It
imposes a burden upon the spouse-present/petitioner to show proper and honest-to-
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but,
more importantly, whether the absent spouse si still alive or is already dead.
Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it
merely consisted of bare assertions without corroborative evidence or record.

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REPUBLIC v. SARENOGAN, JR. GR#199194, February 10, 2016 (DEL
CASTILLO)
FACTS: Jose and Netchie lived together as husband and wife for only about a
month as Jose has to work as a seaman. Netchie went to Hongkong to work as a domestic
helper. For 3 months, Jose did not receive any communication from her. He tried to
contact Netchie’s parents but was informed that they had already left Clarin, Misamis
Occidental.
When his contract expired, he went home and made inquiries from Netchie’s
friends and relatives but yielded negative results. Thus, he filed this petition to declare
Netchie presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage. He presented as witnesses his
brother and Netchie’s aunt.
SC: Given the Court’s imposition of “strict standard” in a petition for a
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family Code, it must follow that there
was basis at all for the RTC’s finding Jose’s petition complied with the requisites under
the said Article, in reference to the “well-founded belief” standard. If anything, Jose’s
pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required
degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. Aside from his bare claims that
he inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, he did not call
to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw and met in the
course of his search. Neither did he prove that he sought assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough,
determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least 2 years (and what those
years were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, that he visited by reason
of the search.

Art. 42 – Automatic termination of the subsequent marriage by the recording of the

affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse.
In the above mentioned case, the SC held that “a close reading of the entire Art.
42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to
several conditions:
(1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring
it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.
Art. 43 – effects of termination of subsequent marriage upon reappearance of absentee
spouse – (90)
Art. 44- Void- status of subsequent marriage falling under Article 41 if both parties acted
in bad faith- (90)
Art. 45 -Voidable marriages; Art.46-what constitutes fraud under Art. 45 (3), & Art. 47-
period within which to institute action for annulment-(90, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 02)
VILLANUEVA vs. CA
505 SCRA 565 (October 27, 2006)
Is non-cohabitation a ground for annulment of marriage?
SC: Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise,
the validity of the marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate
the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only
if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage,
such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x.
Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with Lilia on any of those
grounds, the validity of the marriage must be upheld.
MANUEL ALMELOR vs. RTC OF LAS PINAS CITY and LEONIDA ALMELOR
563 SCRA 447 (August 26, 2008)
Leonida filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Manuel
based on Article 36. The court instead, annulled the marriage based on Article 45 (3) in
relation to Article 46 (4) of the Family Code. She alleged that she noticed Manuel to be

51
peculiarly close to his male companions. That she caught him in an indiscreet telephone
conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller and that she found several
pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. Worse, she saw Manuel kissed
another man on the lips that she identified as Doctor Nogales.
SC: Even assuming that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot
appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear- a marriage
may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as
concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage
and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality,
and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such
concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent
to the marriage.
The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual preference
without the corroboration of witnesses. It took cognizance of Manuel’s peculiarities and
interpreted it against his sexuality.
The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances constituting
fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment. It is only a
ground for legal separation.
Article 48 – Court orders the prosecuting attorney to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Par. (2)- no judgment shall be based on stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment.
ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA
424 SCRA 725
Spouses Rodolfo and Marietta separated-in-fact but had their conjugal partnership
property dissolved judicially. One of the properties adjudicated in her favor was a resort
named Munting Paraiso that is now used as residence of Marietta and the children.
Rodolfo intending to remarry filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity of the wife docketed as Sp. Proc. NC-662. Although
Rodolfo knew that Marietta is residing at Munting Paraiso he had the summons served at
another address. For failure to file an Answer Rodolfo had the respondent wife declared
in default and was allowed to adduce evidence ex parte. After the grant of the petition,
Rodolfo contracted another marriage with Teresita on February 14, 1998. Marietta then
filed a petition for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite.
Held: The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he
interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith
rendered judgment against Marietta without a whimper of protest from the public
prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of
Article 48 of the Family Code which states that “In all cases of annulment or declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.” They also
ignored Rule 18, Section 6, 1985 Rules of Court now Rule 9, Section 3 (e) of the 1997
Rules of Court that “there is no default in actions for annulment of marriage or legal
separation.”
Art. 50, 51, 52 – delivery of presumptive legitimes of common children in cases of
termination of marriage & in Art. 52-necessity of recording in the appropriate civil
registry and in the registry of property the decree of annulment or nullity, dissolution,
liquidation and partition of either the conjugal partnership or absolute community
property and the delivery of the children’s legitimes- (89,91,92,93,99)
What do the children’s presumptive legitimes consist of?
In NOVERAS v. NOVERAS, the SC held that “under the 1st paragraph of Article 888,
Civil Code, “(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of ½ of the
hereditary share of the father and the mother.” The children are therefore entitled to half
of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the same.”

52
Art. 53- Effect re: non-compliance of the requirements under Art. 52-(89,90,93)e
Subsequent marriage is void. Art. 54- children born of 1.an annullable marriage
but prior to annulment, and 2. void marriages under Arts. 36 and 53 are legitimate.
Art. 55- Legal Separation (94,97,02,06)
-In cases of legal separation, where violence (physical or sexual or psychological)
is alleged by the petitioner the mandatory 6-month cooling-off period under Article 58
shall not apply [Section 19, RA 9262 or VAWC Law].
Art. 56 – grounds when petition for legal separation will be denied.
Art. 57- prescriptive period in instituting petition for legal separation (94)
1. 5 years from the occurrence of the cause.
Arts. 61 – 64 – effects of legal separation.
On forfeiture of the guilty spouse’s share of the net profits (Article 63 [2])
SIOCHI vs. GOZON 616 SCRA 87 March 18, 2010
Elvira obtained a decree of legal separation against her husband Alfredo. The
dispositive portion reads: “x x x x. Being the offending spouse, respondent (husband) is
deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred R.
Gozon whose custody is awarded to petitioner.”
ISSUE: Does the forfeiture refer to the one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the
property?
Article 63 shall have the following effects:
1. x x x x x;
2. The absolute community or conjugal partnership shall be
dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no
right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in
accordance with the provisions of Article 42 (2);
3. X x x x x .
Article 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
X x x x.
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, x x x x x x his or her share of
the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children or, x x x x x;
Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal
partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no
right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only
Alfredo’s share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article
102 (4) of the FC provides that “for purposes of computing the net profits subject
to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43 (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits
shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the
time of its dissolution.” Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not
Afredo’s share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of
the conjugal partnership property.
BRIGIDO QUIAO v. RITA C. QUIAO 675 S 642 (July 4, 2012)
Parties were legally separated on October 10, 2005 with Brigido’s share of the net
profits earned by the conjugal partnership forfeited in favor of the common children.
Brigido wanted to clarify the meaning of “net profit earned” for purposes of
effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the FC. The other issues raised
were: 1) Can Article 256 of the Family Code be given retroactive effect for purposes of
determining the net profits without impairing vested rights already acquired under the
Civil Code; and 2) what properties shall be included in the forfeiture of the share of the
guilty spouse?
SC: The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the
separate properties of the spouses and the products of their labor and industry.

53
 Article 102 (4) applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining “net
profit”. The provision applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal
partnership as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code relative to
the provisions on Legal Separation.
When a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under
Article 142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the
fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the
foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The
law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between
the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. Article 129 of the
Family Code applies in the liquidation of the couple’s properties. What remains of the
separate or exclusive properties of the husband and the wife shall be returned to each
of them.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the
spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them.
On the issue of retroactivity of the Family Code affecting vested rights already
acquired, the SC said “The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the
constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which
in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary court action. While
one may not be deprived of his “vested right”, he may lose the same if there is due
process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.”
Arts. 65 – 66 – reconciliation of spouses.
- if pending – terminated at whatever stage and if decreed – decree is set aside but
the separation of property and any forfeiture of the guilty spouse already effected shall
subsist unless there is revival of the former property regime.
Art. 67 – revival of the property regime.
Art. 68 – Rights and Obligations between husband and wife.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
332 SCRA 169
-May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her
in conjugal bliss?
- Facts: Erlinda and Potenciano were married for 30 years. In 1972, the spouse
separated from bed and board. When Potenciano arrived from the States in 1991
he stayed with Erlinda. The children alleged that Erlinda gave Potenciano an
overdose of antidepressant drug. On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate
meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City with Erlinda,
but instead stayed with a daughter at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. The wife
then filed a petition for habeas corpus. Proper?
-No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with
his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by sheriff or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond
judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
Article 73 – exercise by either spouse even without the consent of the other of any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity. Objection shall be based only on
valid, serious, and moral grounds otherwise the act of the husband in preventing the wife
from engaging in such activity shall constitute a violation of RA 9262 (VAWC Law).
-In case of disagreement the court shall decide whether objection is proper or not
and if proper, when did the benefit accrue – if prior to the objection, the resulting
obligation shall be enforced against the community or conjugal partnership property. If
benefit accrued after, the obligation shall be charged to the separate property of the
spouse who did not obtain consent.
Art. 74, 75, 76, & 77-property regime of future spouses, requisites (92,95,05)
-Property relations between husband and wife is governed in the following order:

54
 4. Marriage settlements which might either be the a. absolute community
property or b. conjugal partnership of gains or c. complete separation
of property;
5. By the provisions of this Code; and
6. By local customs.
-Absence of marriage settlement or if regime agreed upon is void – system of
absolute community of property.
-The marriage settlement as well as any modification thereof must be in writing,
signed by the parties, and executed before the celebration of the marriage.
Art. 82- Donations by reason of marriage
Requisites:
5. made before the celebration of the marriage;
6. in consideration of the same; and
7. in favor of one or both of the future spouses.
Art. 83 – Formalities to be observed involving donations propter nuptias are the
formalities on the ordinary rules of donation unlike that of the Civil Code where
donations propter nuptias are governed by the Statue of Frauds (Article 1403 (2), ©-an
agreement made in consideration of marriage other than a mutual promise to marry as
enunciated by the SC in Locquiao vs. Valencia).
Art. 84- Limitation in cases of donation of present property (91)
-if the spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community property,
they cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlement more than 1/5 of their
present property. The excess is void. The law on testamentary succession and the
formalities of wills will govern donations involving future property.
Art. 86- grounds for revocation of donations propter nuptias (96)
Art. 87 – Donation between husband and wife
ARCABA vs. TABANCURA, et al.
November 22, 2001
Facts: Francisco and his late wife were owners of a parcel of land. As he was
alone, he invited his niece, a cousin of the niece, and Arcaba to stay with him at his
house. Later on, the niece and the cousin of the niece left Francisco’s home leaving only
Francisco and Arcaba. Before his death Francisco donated a 150-sq. meter lot to Arcaba.
The heirs of Francisco are now questioning the legality of the donation. Arcaba
contended that the property donated is payment for her past services rendered to the
deceased. She further contends that sexual intercourse is no longer possible considering
that Francisco is already old.
SC: -Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of
the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least,
cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital
relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out
to the public as such.
-Their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver
and patient but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. Thus, the
donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Article 87 of the
Family Code.
Art.91 –What constitutes community property
Art. 92 – What are excluded from the community property (89)
Art. 96 –Ownership, x x x Disposition of the Community Property
NOBLEZA v. NUEGA 752 S 602 (VILLARAMA)
While still sweethearts, Shirley who worked as a domestic helper in Israel sent
Rogelio money (upon his request) so he can buy a lot in Marikina where they will
construct their family home. They got married in 1990, the following year Shirley went
back to Israel. She then received information that Rogelio brought to their home another
woman.
She returned to the Philippines and sued Rogelio for concubinage and another for
legal separation. In between these cases, she got wind of Rogelio’s intention to sell the
property as title thereto was registered in Rogelio’s name describing him as “single”.

55
Shirley informed the would-be buyers including Nobleza’s sister who is a neighbor of the
spouses Nuega about the existing cases she filed against Rogelio and cautioned them
against buying the property until the cases are closed and terminated. Nonetheless,
Rogelio sold the property to Nobleza without Shirley’s consent.
Meanwhile, the petition for legal separation was granted and ordered the
dissolution and liquidation of their absolute community property. Rogelio was prohibited
from encumbering or alienating or disposing any of the community property including
the house and lot before the required liquidation. And being the guilty spouse, he shall
forfeit the net profits of the community property in favor of Shirley.
Nobleza contended that she is a buyer in good faith as the property is titled under
the name of the seller Rogelio Nuega alone as evidenced by the Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) and tax declaration of the subject property. She also claimed that the sale
should not be nullified in its entirety but only the ½ portion representing Shirley’s share.
HELD: A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely
relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances
relevant to the sale. Nobleza’s sister, at the time of the sale, was residing near Rogelio
and Shirley’s house. had she been more prudent as a buyer, she could have easily checked
if Rogelio had the capacity to dispose the property. Shirley testified that she had warned
their neighbors including Nobleza’s sister not to engage in any deal with Rogelio relative
to the purchase of the subject property because of the cases she filed against Rogelio.
Issues surrounding the execution of the deed of absolute sale also pose question
on the claim of Nobleza that she is a buyer in good faith. The deed was executed on
December 29, 1992, the community tax certificates of the witnesses therein were dated
January 2 and 20, 1993. In the deed, the status of Rogelio as seller was not stated, while
petitioner as buyer was indicated as “single”. It puzzles the Court that while Nobleza has
repeatedly stated Rogelio is “single” under the TCT and the tax declaration, his civil
status as seller was not stated in the deed, further creating a cloud on her claim that she is
an innocent purchaser for value.
The deed of sale is void in its entirety. While the TCT shows that the owner of the
property is Rogelio alone, Shirley was able to prove that she contributed in the payment
of the purchase price. However, the nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised
on Shirley’s proof of financial contribution in the purchase of the subject property. Actual
contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is community
property for the law itself defines what constitutes community property (Article 91. X x
x, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the
time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.).
Based on Article 96 of the Family Code, Rogelio could not sell the subject
property without the written consent of respondent spouse or the authority of the court.
Without such consent or authority, the entire sale is void. But Shirley could not be held
accountable to Nobleza for the reimbursement of her payment for the purchase of the
property, there being no evidence on record that the amount received by Rogelio
redounded to the benefit of the family, Shirley cannot be made to reimburse any amount
to Nobleza.
Art. 116 – Conjugal partnership property
Article 121 (2) – Charges upon and obligation of the conjugal partnership (00,06)
1. Ayala Investments vs. CA 286 S 272
-The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a
by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
-Benefits such as prospects of longer employment and probably increase in the
value of stocks might have been already apparent or could be anticipated at the
time the accommodation agreement was entered into are not only incidental but
also speculative and too small to qualify the transaction as one “for the benefit” of
the surety’s family.
-While the husband derives salaries, dividend benefits from PBM (the debtor
corporation), only because said husband is an employee of said PBM. These
salaries and benefits are not the ‘benefits’ contemplated by Articles 121 and 122
of the Family Code. The ‘benefits’ contemplated by the exception in Art. 122

56
 (Family Code) are those benefits derived directly from the use of the loan. In the
case at bar, the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself,
not by petitioner-appellee-husband or his family.
2. CARLOS vs. ABELARDO 380 S 361
-May the husband notwithstanding his alleged lack of consent in obtaining a loan
be held solidarily liable for such together with the wife?
-While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and
signed by the wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because
it was used to purchase the house and lot that became the conjugal home of respondent
and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under
Article 121 of the Family Code, shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his
wife.
3. CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS 423 S 367
Facts: On September 28, 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc.
(PBMCI) obtained a 9-million peso loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). As
added security for the loan, Alfredo Ching together with 2 other persons executed a
continuing guaranty with ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the
payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of 38 million pesos.
PBMCI defaulted in the payment of its loans which, exclusive of interests, penalties and
other bank charges amounted to P12,612,972.88. After the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment the sheriff then levied the 100,000 common shares of CityCorp.
stocks registered solely in the name of Alfredo Ching. The wife of Mr. Ching then moved
to set aside the levy on attachment claiming that the 100,000 shares of stocks were
acquired by her and her husband during the marriage out of conjugal funds after the
CityCorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness
did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Is the argument of Mrs. Ching tenable?
Ruling: The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the
corporate books of CityCorp Investment solely in the name of Alfredo does not constitute
proof that the husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same. It was, thus, the
burden of ABC to prove that the source of the money utilized in the acquisition of the
shares of stocks was that of the husband alone. ABC failed to adduce evidence to prove
this assertion. In AIDC vs. CA, this Court ruled that the “signing as a surety is certainly
not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business. No matter
how often an executive acted on or was persuaded to act as surety for his own employer,
this should not be taken to mean that he thereby embarked in the business of guaranty or
suretyship.”
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. No
presumption can be inferred that when a husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited.
It could be argued that Alfredo was a member of the Board of Directors of
PBMCI and was one of the top 20 stockholders, and that his shares of stocks and his
family would appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained;
that Alfredo’s career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive because of the infusion
of fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the
Civil Code (Article 121 FC). The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan.
They cannot merely a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself (citing AIDC vs. CA).
Article 124 – Administration of the conjugal partnership property (00)
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO 453 S 283

57
 Spouses Dailo purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City and had
it titled in the name of the husband alone. In 1993, the husband obtained a
P300,000-peso loan from Homeowners secured by the house and lot. With the
loan unpaid, the bank foreclosed the security. For failure to redeem,
Homeowners consolidated ownership over the property. In 1995, the husband
died and the wife found out about the mortgage, foreclosure and consolidation.
Claiming absence of knowledge of the loan obligation, the wife filed an action
to annul the mortgage, certificate of sale, etc. Homeowners moved for the
dismissal of the petition on the ground that the property is the exclusive property
of the husband having been titled in the husband’s name alone. That assuming
that the property is conjugal, Article 124 of the FC should be construed in
relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership where the co-owner
may alienate, assign or mortgage and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment but the effect of the alienation or the mortgage shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-
ownership. Moreover, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family as the
proceeds thereof were used to fund the husband’s subdivision projects.
Held: In Guiang vs. CA, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property
requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the
Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders
the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. The same principle squarely
applies to the instant case. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of
conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between the
spouses. The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of
Marcelino and Miguela even in a suppletory manner. The conjugal partnership of
gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a
common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate
properties and those acquired by either or both spouses their efforts or by chance.
Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership
apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the
rules on partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined
in the chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the
knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage
on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By
express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of court
authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance
of the conjugal property is void. The aforequoted provision does not qualify with
respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance.
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership lies with the creditor claiming as such. Petitioner’s sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by Marcelino to finance the construction of
housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family is without
adequate proof. Other than petitioner’s bare allegation, there is nothing from the
records to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan redounded to the benefit of the
family.
GUIANG vs. CA 291 S 372
-Court applied Art. 124 of the Family Code.
-Any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family
Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the
consent of the wife is null and void. Such contract is void as one of the essential
elements of a contract is absent.
- Neither can the “amicable settlement” be considered a continuing offer that was
accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124.
The order of events is clear: after the sale, Guiang filed a complaint for

58
 trespassing against Corpuz, after which the barangay authorities secured an
“amicable settlement”. The settlement however, does not mention a continuing
offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was
to the effect that Corpuz would vacate the property. By no stretch of the
imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in
Article 124.
HEIRS of AYUSTE vs. CA and MALABONGA 313 S 493
-As the alienation was made prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the Court
applied Art. 173 of the Civil Code.
-Contract is voidable but spouse must bring the action for annulment within 10
years from execution of the contract and during the subsistence of the marriage.
MANALO vs. CAMAISA 374 S 361
-Whether or not the husband may validly dispose a conjugal property without the
wife’s written consent?
Facts: Manalo was interested to buy the Taytay and Makati properties of spouses
Camaisa. During the negotiations for the sale of the parcels of land both spouses were
present and that Manalo and Mr. Camaisa came to an agreement as to the price and the
terms of the payment, and a down payment was made but the wife of the vendor refused
to sign the contracts to sell. Having been aware of the transactions Manalo argues that
Norma Camaisa had consented to the transaction. And if she unjustly refused to affix her
signature to the contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the Family
Code is warranted.
Held: The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband
as administrator in appropriate cases require the written consent of the wife; otherwise,
the disposition is void. The properties, subject of the contracts were conjugal; hence, for
the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur.
Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties
but being merely aware of a transaction is not consent. While Manalo is correct insofar as
she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being
withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give the same if warranted by the
circumstances. However, it should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is
only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. In
this case Manalo failed to allege and prove that Norma was incapacitated to give her
consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wife’s incapacity, court
authorization cannot be sought.
HEIRS OF REYES vs. MIJARES 410 S 97
If the sale of the conjugal real property is annullable, should it be annulled in its
entirety or only with respect to the share of the spouse who did not give consent?
-The SC citing Paulino vs. Bucoy (131 Phil 790) held that the plain meaning
attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by
the husband without the wife’s consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress
intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall “prejudice” the wife, such
limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. To be underscored here is that upon
the provisions of Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is
liable for many obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that. The
conjugal partnership is even subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse
before the marriage, as those for the payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon
them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have been covered, if it turns out that the
spouse who is bound thereby, “should have no exclusive property or if it be insufficient.”
These are the considerations that go beyond the mere equitable share of the wife in the
property. These are reasons enough for the husband to be stopped from disposing of the
conjugal property without the consent of the wife. Even more fundamental is the fact that
the nullity is decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice but lack of consent of an
indispensable party to the contract under Article 166.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal or (community) property concluded after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same

59
Code that now treats such a disposition as void if done without the conjoint consent of the
spouses or, in case of a spouse’s inability, the authority of the court (footnote).
PELAYO vs. PEREZ 459 S 475
In January 1988, Pelayo, by a deed of absolute sale, conveyed to Perez 2
parcels of land situated in Panabo. Lorenza, Pelayo’s wife, signed only on the 3 rd page in
the space provided for witnesses on account of which Perez’ application for registration
of the deed with the office of the Register of Deeds in Tagum was denied. Perez
thereupon asked Lorenza to sign the 1st and 2nd pages of the deed but she refused, hence,
he instituted an action for specific performance.
SC: We agree with the CA ruling that Lorenza by affixing her signature to the
Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied
consent to the contract of sale.
Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either
be express or implied. A wife’s consent to the husband’s disposition of conjugal property
does not always have to be explicit or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is
given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza
signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said
document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal
property and consented to the sale.
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil
Code, which was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was
executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not
make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable. Hence, it has been held that the
contract is valid until the court annuls the same and only upon an action brought by the
wife whose consent was not obtained.
BUADO vs. CA and NICOL 586 SCRA 397 (April 24, 2009)
Erlinda Nicol was found guilty of slander and was also adjudged to pay the sum
of P35,000.00 representing moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost.
Erlinda’s property however, was insufficient to answer for the liability so the sheriff
levied the conjugal property of the Nicol spouses. The husband questioned the levy and
the subsequent sale claiming that he is a stranger to the suit and hence, levy upon the
conjugal property was improper.
SC: In Spouses Ching vs. CA, this Court that the husband of the judgment debtor
cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for
an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It must further
be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership or not.
Unlike in the system of absolute community property where liabilities incurred by
either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute
community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the
debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership
of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments
for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil
obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
RAVINA vs. VILLA ABRILLE 604 SCRA 120 (October 16, 2009).
In 1982, spouses Pedro and Mary Ann acquired a 555-square meter lot adjacent to
the land that was acquired by Pedro while still single. They then introduced
improvements on the property. In 1991, Pedro offered to sell the house and the 2 lots to
Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified Ravina of her objections but Pedro, nonetheless,
sold the house and the 2 lots without Mary Ann’s consent.
SC: The lot acquired during the marriage was conjugal in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the
subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.

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 A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the
Family Code is void if done a.) without the consent (written) of both the husband and the
wife, or b.) in case of one spouse’s inability – the authority of the court.
If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby
resulting in disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given
5 years from the date the contract implementing the decision to institute the case.
HEIRS OF HERNANDEZ,SR. vs. MINGOA, SR., et. al. 608 SCRA 394
Hernandez married to Sergia, was awarded a piece of real property by PHHC by
way of salary deduction. After full payment, TCT No. 107534 was issued to the spouses.
It bears a restriction of any unauthorized sale to 3 rd persons within a certain period. The
heirs learned, after Hernandez’ death in 1983 that TCT No. 107534 was cancelled in 1982
and in lieu thereof TCT No. 290121 was issued in favor of respondents. Apparently,
Hernandez was unable to fully pay the purchase price so to prevent forfeiture of his right
to purchase, Hernandez sold to Dolores Camisura his rights in 1963. To circumvent the
prohibition, the spouses Hernandez executed an irrevocable special power of attorney to
enable Dolores to sell the lot to Plaridel Mingoa without the need of requiring Hernandez
to sign a deed of conveyance. Plaridel then sold the property to his daughter Melanie,
then 20 years old. It was alleged that Sergia’s signature on the SPA was falsified. The
forgery is so blatant as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an ordinary
person. Petitioners now contend that the SPA and the deed of sale are fictitious, hence
null and void under Article 1409 of the NCC. The declaration of the non-existence of a
contract under Article 1410 does not prescribe.
SC: Articles 1409 and 1410 are not applicable. The subject matter involves
conjugal property. The events occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article
173 of the NCC governs these transactions and it states: “The wife, may during the
marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise
this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
the property fraudulently alienated by the husband.”
The failure of Sergia to file an action for annulment of the contract during the
marriage and within ten years from the transaction necessarily barred her form
questioning the sale of the subject property to 3rd persons.
FUENTES vs. ROCA 618 SCRA 702 April 21, 2010
Tarciano married but separated-in-fact sold a parcel of land to the Fuentes spouses
by way of an agreement to sell. The vendees were to give a down payment with the
balance to be paid as soon as Tarciano clears the lot of structures and occupants and
secure the consent of the estranged spouse Rosario to the sale. Allegedly, Atty. Plagata
worked on the requirements including Rosario’s consent to the sale. He alleged that
Rosario signed the affidavit of consent in Manila but he notarized it in Zamboanga City.
Tarciano then executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses.
When Tarciano and Rosario died in 1990, their children, in 1997, filed an action
for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land claiming that the sale was void since
Rosario did not give consent to the sale. Her signature on the affidavit was forged.
SC: Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958, it
would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and avoid the risk
that she would not give her consent to the sale or demand a stiff price for it.
The affidavit of consent has a defective notarization that strip the document of its
public character and reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together
with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario’s
consent to the sale of the land.
While Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, the property was sold on
January 11, 1989, a few months after the FC took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 124
of the FC provides that without the other spouse’s consent or a court order allowing the
sale, the same would be void.

61
 Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent
contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to
contracts that are declared void by positive provision of the law, as in the case of a sale of
conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent. A void contract is
equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated
either by ratification or prescription.
Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written
consent of their mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent.
The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not
obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband’s sale
of conjugal land. But Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the
right to have the sale declared void is lost forever?
No. The sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the
property of Tarciano and Rosario despite the sale. When the two died, they passed on the
ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As Lawful owners, the Rocas
had the right, under Article 429 of the NCC, to exclude any person from its enjoyment
and disposal.
EFREN PANA v. HEIRS OF JUANITE GR# 164201 December 10, 2012
Melecia together with other accused were found guilty of the crime of murder.
They were also adjudged jointly and severally to indemnify the heirs damages and civil
indemnity. To satisfy the award, the properties registered in the names of Efren and
Melecia were levied upon.
They moved for the quashal of the writ of execution, claiming that rhe levied
properties were conjugal assets, and not the paraphernal assets of Melecia. The heirs did
not dispute that it was the Civil Code, not the Family Code, which governed the marriage,
they insisted though, that it was the absolute community of property that applied to Efren
and Melecia because of Article 256 of the Family Code in relation to Article 105 of the
same Code as none of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no vested rights have been acquired
by each over the properties.
SC: While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets
are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and ,
therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is
evident that Article 256 of the FC does not intend to reach back and automatically
convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnership of gains
that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be
modified except prior to the marriage.
Post-modification of such settlements can take place only where (1) the absolute
community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon the decree of legal
separation; (2) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive
their former property regime; (3) judicial separation of property had been had on the
ground that the spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his
obligations to the family; (4) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135;
(5) the spouses jointly filed a petition for voluntary dissolution of their absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains. None of the circumstances exists in the case
at bar.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142
of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property
and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. This means they continue
under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their separate properties .
Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got
married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the FC
took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
REIMBURSEMENT RE: CONJUGAL FUNDS:
JOSEFA FERRER vs. SPS. MANUEL & VIRGINIA FERRER and SPS. ISMAEL
& FLORA FERRER 508 S 570

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 Before his marriage to Josefa, Alfredo acquired a parcel of land. Improvements
introduced by Alfredo on the property consisting of a residential house and a 2-door
apartment building were made during the marriage using their conjugal funds to pay off
the loan obtained by Alfredo for the construction of said improvements. Subsequently, a
warehouse was also constructed on the lot using the spouses’ conjugal funds. Sometime
in 1989, when Alfredo was already bedridden, spouses Ismael and Flora Ferrer made the
former sign a document purported to be his last will and testament. It turned out however,
that it was a sale covering Alfredo’s lot and the improvements thereon to the herein
respondents. Alfredo then instituted an action for the annulment of the sale but the trial
court held that the sale is valid and should be complied with by the parties in good faith.
The appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court. Alfredo died in 1999 and
relying on the decision rendered in the previous case where the court held that inasmuch
as the lot is of greater value than the improvements and since Article 120 of the Family
Code provides the rule that the ownership of accessory follows the ownership of the
principal, then the subject lot with all its improvements became an exclusive and capital
property of Alfredo with an obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership of the cost of
improvements at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, Josefa is now
demanding reimbursement for the cost of the improvements from respondents.
SC: What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite allegations contained
in the complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioner’s
spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to
reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to
reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the
case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect
petitioner’s right to be reimbursed.
JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
Article 134- In the absence of express declaration in the marriage settlements, no
separation of property shall take place during the marriage except upon judicial order.
The separation of property may either be for sufficient cause (Article 135) or voluntary
(Article 136).
Article 135 – For causes falling under numbers (1), (2), and (3) i.e.1. sentenced to
a penalty that carries with it civil interdiction, 2. judicially declared an absentee, and 3.
loss parental authority decreed by the court, the presentation of final judgment is enough
basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property.
Article 136 – Voluntary dissolution must be verified and jointly filed by the
spouses.
Articles 137, 138, and 139 – liquidation of either the absolute community or
conjugal partnership upon grant of petition, effect – the property relations of the spouses
is now governed by the regime of complete separation of property and the requirement of
registering the petition for separation of property and the final judgment granting the
same with the appropriate registries.
Article 141- revival of the former property regime that existed prior to its
separation upon proper motion. Thereafter no voluntary separation of property shall again
be granted by the court.
ELENA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER AUGUST 29, 2006
Elena and Helmut, a German national, were married in 1989 in Hamburg,
Germany. They initially lived in Hamburg but in 1992, the spouses decided to move and
permanently reside in the Philippines. Helmut sold the house he inherited from his
parents in Germany. With the money, he bought a P528,000.00 lot in Antipolo and
constructed a P2.3 million peso house thereon. The Antipolo property was registered in
Elena’s name. The marriage however, did not last due to Helmut’s alleged womanizing,
drinking and maltreatment and eventually the spouses separated. In 1994, Helmut filed a
petition for separation of properties. He claims that he is not praying for the transfer of
ownership of the Antipolo property as he is aware of the constitutional prohibition of
aliens acquiring lands of the public domain but merely reimbursement. That the property
is titled in the name of Elena because of said prohibition. That the funds paid by him for

63
the said property were in consideration of his marriage to Elena; that funds were given to
her in trust and equity demands that he should be reimbursed of his personal funds.
Issue: Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property?
SC: Aliens are disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of
the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.
Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional
prohibition. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit
that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. He
who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands.
Further, the distinctions between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of
funds is a futile exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect
permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property that he is not allowed to own. Thus, it
is, likewise proscribed by law.
The CA erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by
operation of law in view of Helmut’s marriage to Elena. Save for the exception provided
in cases of hereditary succession, Helmut’s disqualification from owning lands in the
Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the
purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express
provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of fraud. To hold
otherwise would be to allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
The Court decreed the separation of property between the spouses and ordering
partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines only.
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN 524 S 166
Virgilio and Dita’s marriage that was blessed with one son turned sour when the
former discovered that the latter was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which
resulted to the conviction of Dita and her paramour of the crime of adultery. Thereafter,
Virgilio filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, dissolution and liquidation
of the conjugal partnership of gains. During the pre-trial of said case, they entered into a
Compromise Agreement as partial settlement of their conjugal partnership property. This
was given judicial imprimatur by the judge hearing the case. In an omnibus motion
however, Virgilio prays for the repudiation of the compromise agreement on the ground
that it is against law and public policy; that the proceedings where it was approved is null
and void, there being no appearance and participation of the Solicitor General or the
Provincial Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated; and that respondent, having been
convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in the conjugal property.
SC: Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected
voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned
compromise agreement that was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of
property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the
declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
While the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or Public Prosecutor are
mandatory, the failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not per se nullify the
compromise agreement. There is no exigency for the presence of the Solicitor General
and/or the State Prosecutor because nothing in the subject compromise touched into the
very merit of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of any
possible collusion between the parties. The agreement pertains merely to an agreement
between petitioner and respondent Dita to separate their conjugal properties partially
without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case.
The conviction of adultery does not carry with it the penalty of civil interdiction
that deprives the person of the rights to manage to manage her property and to dispose of
such property inter vivos.
WILLEM BEUMER v. AVELINA AMORES GR# 195670 December 3, 2012
Willem, a Dutch national, and Avelina's marriage was declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code. Consequently, Willem prayed for the dissolution of their conjugal

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partnership. Of the 6 properties acquired during the marriage, 4 of these were through
purchase but were registered in the name of the wife alone. But Willem alleged that these
4 properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his
disability benefit since Avelina does not have sufficient income to pay for their
acquisition. He had the properties registered in the name of Avelina only because of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership but the money used to purchase the
properties came from his own capital funds. He now prays that for the reimbursement of
½ of the value of what he had paid, waiving the other half in favor of his ex-wife.
Otherwise, his ex-wife will be unjustly enriched at his expense.
SC: Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that “he is well-aware of the
constitutional prohibition” and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and
Avelina registered the subject properties in the latter's name. Clearly, Willem's actuations
showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such
admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and
accordingly, deny petitioner's claim for reimbursement.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject
properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. Corollary, thereto, under Article
1412 of the Civil Code, Willem cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow
him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid
either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.
One cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered
into.
Neither can there be a grant for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment.
The provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the
Constitution.
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign
citizenship. It is the Constitution itself that demarcates the rights of the citizens and non-
citizens in owning Philippine land. The constitutional ban against foreigners applies only
to ownership of Philippine land and not to improvements built thereon, such as the
houses standing on the 2 lots which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties
subject to partition. The purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony.
NOVERAS v. NOVERAS GR# 188289 August 20, 2014
Former Filipino citizens now Americans David and Leticia were married on
December 3, 1988 in Quezon City. They acquired properties in the Philippines and the
USA. Leticia subsequently obtained a decree of divorce from a California Court wherein
it awarded to Leticia all the properties in the USA. She later filed a petition for judicial
separation of conjugal properties with respect to their properties in the Philippines. The
trial court held that it is liquidation pursuant to Article 102 of the Family Code not
judicial separation because the spouses’ marriage had already been dissolved thru
divorce. But inasmuch as there is no proof as to their property regime then based on the
doctrine of processual presumption, the property relations between the spouses is that of
absolute community of property. It awarded all the properties located in the Philippines to
David while the properties in the USA went to Leticia with the directive that ½ of the
properties awarded to each spouse shall be given to their children as their presumptive
legitimes. The CA modified the RTC ruling. It held that the net assets of the community
property in the Philippines are divided equally between the spouses with half of Leticia’s
share to be given the children as their presumptive legitimes. Both were ordered to
deliver P520,000.00 to their 2 children as their presumptive legitimes.
David insists that the CA should have recognized the California judgment which
awarded the Philippine property to him as said judgment was part of the pleading
presented and offered in evidence. If Leticia is to share the Philippine property then she
would be unjustly enriched.
SC: The RTC erred in recognizing the divorce decree without having complied with Rule
132 Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39 Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court. It also
erred in proceeding directly to liquidation because absent a valid recognition of the

65
divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines in
consonance with the doctrine of processual presumption.
Leticia anchored her petition for judicial separation of property on pars. 4 and 6 of
Article 135, Family Code but the trial court correctly held that there was no abandonment
as it was proven that Leticia knew that David has returned to and stayed in his hometown
while the latter would also visit Leticia and the children in the US. However, records of
this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had separated for more than a
year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. Having established that the spouses had
actually separated for at least 1 year, the petition for judicial separation of their properties
should be granted. The grant automatically dissolves the absolute community regime as
stated in par. 4 of Article 99 of the Family Code. We agree with the appellate court that
the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David
and Leticia as Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as
personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
Art. 147 – Property of Unions without Marriage (92, 97)
Valdes vs. RTC B. 102, Q.C., Gomez-Valdes 260 S 221
-Marriage was declared void under Art. 36.
-Property acquired during the union is governed by Art. 147. It applies when a
man and a woman so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage.
-The term “capacitated” (1st par. of Art. 147) refers to the legal capacity of a party
to contract marriage, i.e. any “male or female of the age of 18 years or upwards
not under any of the impediment mentioned in Art. 37 and 38 of the Code”.
-If the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when
they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the
property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions.
-Art. 50 (Family Code) applying pars. (2), (3), (4) and 5 of Art. 43, relates only,
by its explicit terms to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages
under Art. 40 of the Code i.e. the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage
contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially
declared void.
BUENAVENTURA vs. CA MARCH 31, 2005
Noel and Isabel got married in 1979. The marriage later on was declared void by
reason of Noel’s psychological incapacity. The court, among others, ordered for the
liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership where the wife was given ½ of Noel’s
retirement benefits with 12% int. from date of decision, and ½ of his outstanding shares
of stocks with Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies. Noel
opposed the sharing claiming that the retirement benefits he received from Far East Bank
are gratuitous in nature and therefore, his exclusive property. He likewise acquired the
shares of stocks with the mentioned companies before his marriage and are, again his
exclusive properties.
SC: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous
marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42, and 43 of the Family
Code, providing dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rules applies, which is that in case a
marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated,
partitioned and distributed is that of co-ownership. The trial court did not commit a
reversible ruling that petitioner and respondent own the “family home” and all their
common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of
the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is

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annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common law spouses.
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple’s separate
property are not included in the co-ownership. Since the properties to be distributed by
the court a quo were found, both by the trial and appellate courts, to have been acquired
during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits
of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in
the distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned by the
parties herein ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis
of co-ownership and not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
JOHN ABING vs. JULIET WAEYAN JULY 31, 2006
In 1986, Juliet and John decided to live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. During the cohabitation, they purchased a 2-storey house where the
tax declaration was transferred in the name of Juliet. The house was renovated as annexed
to it is a new structure that housed a sari-sari store. In 1991, Juliet went to Korea and
while there she would send money to John who would deposit it in their joint bank
account. When she returned from Korea, they continued to live together, with John
working as an employee of Lepanto Mines and Juliet managing the store. In 1995, they
partitioned their properties and executed a Memorandum of Agreement that was unsigned
by the parties but signed by their witnesses where it was agreed that John shall leave the
house with Juliet paying him the amount of P428,870.00 representing John’s share in the
properties. Juliet made a down payment of P232,397.66 with the balance to be paid in 12
monthly installments. She failed however, to make good the balance so John demanded
that she vacate the annex. When she refused John filed an ejectment suit against Juliet
claiming that he alone spent for the construction of the annex using his own funds with
the tax declaration for the structure under his name and thru money he borrowed from his
relatives as proofs. The proof of indebtedness is a 1990 affidavit of one Macaraeg who
stated that John borrowed P30,000.00 from him.
Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive
ownership of John.
SC: Other than John’s bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and
money he borrowed form his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex, evidence
is wanting to support such naked claim. For sure, John failed to reveal how much he
spent therefore. Neither did he divulge the names of the alleged relatives from whom he
made his borrowings, let alone the amount of money he borrowed from them. All he
could offer by way of reinforcing his claim is the affidavit of Macaraeg but the affidavit
stated that it was in 1990 when John borrowed P30,000.00 from him. The annex structure
was constructed in 1992 or 2 years after he borrowed the P30,000 from Macaraeg. There
is a paucity of evidence, testimonial or documentary, to support John’s self-serving
allegation that the annex structure was put up thru his own funds and/or money borrowed
by him. Tax declarations do not prove ownership but at best an indicia of claims of
ownership.
In this connection Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. (Cite Article 147
in toto).
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property
acquired by common-law spouses during the period of cohabitation is presumed to have
been obtained thru their joint efforts, work or industry and is owned by them in equal
shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules in co-ownership. And under
this regime, they owned their properties in common “in equal shares.” Being herself a
co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly stated by the CA, may not be
ejected therefrom.
True, under Article 487 of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an action for
ejectment against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive
ownership of a common property. In this case, evidence is totally wanting to establish
John’s or Juliet’s exclusive ownership of the property in question. As borne by the record,
Juliet was in possession of the subject structure by virtue of being a co-owner thereof. As
such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John.

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 Juliet’s failure however, to pay the balance of John’s share in their common
properties could at best give rise to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for
rescission of the said agreement and not for ejectment.
METROBANK vs. PASCUAL 547 SCRA 246 (February 29, 2009)
The marriage was declared void under Article 36. In the said decision, the court
ordered the partition/dissolution of the conjugal partnership. No liquidation was,
however, made. Subsequently, ex-wife Florencia mortgaged the property to Metrobank to
secure a loan. Attached to the loan documents were the decision of the court nullifying
the marriage to Nicholson and a “waiver” purportedly signed by Nicholson where he
waived his share in the conjugal property. Florencia failed to pay the loan so Metro Bank
foreclosed the mortgage. When Nicholson learned of the foreclosure proceedings, he
instituted a complaint for declaration of nullity of the mortgage as it was made without
his consent.
SC: While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed
their marriage bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the property
acquired before such declaration continue to subsist as conjugal properties until after the
liquidation and partition. Pending its liquidation and citing DAEL vs. IAC (171SCRA
524), the conjugal property is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among
the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
Hence, Article 493 of the Civil Code shall apply. Florencia has the right to
mortgage her ½ undivided share /interest in the property but not the share of Nicholson.
ALAIN DINO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DINO G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
The court declared the marriage void by reason of wife’s psychological
incapacity. The trial also held that “A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE shall only be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code”. This is pursuant to Section 19
(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
SC: The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of nullity of marriage shall only
be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19 (1) of the
Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19 (1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family \code, which
should be declared without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the FC contemplates a situation where a second marriage or
bigamous marriage was contracted.
Article 45 of the FC, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages. In both
instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete
separation of property. If the property relations is governed by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and
distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. This is not the case
for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the FC because the marriage is governed
by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article
496 of the NCC, “partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
OCAMPO v. OCAMPO GR#198908 08/03/2015 (PERALTA)
ISSUE: May respondent spouse in a marriage declared void by the court under
Article 36 of the Family Code be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of
gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity?
FACTS: On January 22, 1993 Virginia and Deogracio’s marriage was declared
void due to the latter’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

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Included in the dispositive portion is the dissolution and liquidation of their conjugal
property and were ordered by the court to submit an inventory of their property before it
can act on the liquidation aspect. When the decision granting the decree of nullity became
final and executory, the parties were directed to submit a project of partition of their
inventoried properties but having failed to comply with the order, the court decreed that
the properties declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
HELD: The property relations between Virginia and Deogracio is the conjugal
partnership of gains having been married in 1978 but Article 108 of the Family Code
explicitly mandates that the Code shall apply to conjugal partnership of gains established
before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the
Civil Code or other laws.
The applicable law, however, in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liability is concerned, is Article 129 in relation to Article 147 of the
Family Code. Article 147 of the FC applies to union of parties who were legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is nonetheless, void, as in this case.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no legal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife
under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for
Article 147, FC to operate, the man and woman: 1.) must be capacitated to marry each
other; 2.) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3.) their union is
without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void as in the instant case. The term
“capacitated” in the 1st paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party
to contract marriage.
Both trial and appellate courts correctly held that the parties will share on equal
shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that the properties were acquired solely on
her effort. While it may be true that management of the business may have been actively
undertaken by Virginia, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner was able to do so without the
invaluable help of respondent-husband. Even a plain housewife who stays all the time in
the house and takes care of the household while the husband indulges in lucrative and
gainful activities is entitled to a share in the same proportion as the husband is, to the
property/ies acquired by the marriage. In the same breadth, respondent must be
considered to be entitled to the same extent. Petitioner’s claim that the seed money in the
business was provided by her mother and that, had it not been for that reason, the
properties now subject of the controversy could not have been acquired. That may be true
but the Court is not prone to believe so because of insufficient evidence to prove such
contention based on petitioner’s self-serving allegations. Attempts to establish Deogracio
as an irresponsible and an unfaithful husband, as well as a family man were made but the
testimonies adduced towards that end, failed to fully convince the Court that respondent
should be punished by depriving him of his share of the conjugal property because of his
indiscretion.
The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome
the presumption under Article 116 of the FC. All properties acquired by the spouses
during their marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered, are
presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere
fact that the certificate of title or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses
only. Article 116, FC expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the
property is “registered in the name of one or both of the spouses”. Accordingly, the
partition of the former spouses’ properties shall be based on co-ownership and not on the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
Art. 148- other kinds of cohabitation (91,92,98,00)
Agapay vs. Palang 276 S 341
-Petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the price of the riceland.
-The lawyer who prepared the deed of conveyance of the house and lot testified
that the money for the purchase price was provided for by Miguel and he also
directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.
-SC also cited Article 87 of the Family Code.

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 Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo 333 S 628
Both parties were already married when they cohabited together. During the
relationship they established a business enterprise and by reason thereof acquired several
properties. The properties however, were all registered in the name of Castillo. When
they decided to end the relationship, Mallilin demanded for his share in the properties
they acquired during the cohabitation. Castillo countered that Article 144 of the Civil
Code cannot be applied as the same covers only properties acquired by a man and a
woman living together as husband and wife but not married or under a void marriage. In
their case, their union suffered the legal impediment of a prior subsisting marriage.
SC: Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in
cases where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other.
- It applies as all but one property were acquired after the Family Code took effect
on August 3, 1988. With respect to the property acquired under the regime of the New
Civil Code, then it should be excluded. The legal relation of the parties is already
specifically covered by Article 148 of the Family Code under which all properties
acquired out of their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
constitute a co-ownership.
-Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the other.
-A trust relation already inheres in a co-ownership.
JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA JUNE 10, 2003
-Under the property regime governed by Art. 148 “x x x x only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions x x x x.” Proof of actual contribution is required.
- In the case at bar, nowhere in Gina’s testimony did she specify the extent of her
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase
of construction materials on 11/17/95 and 12/23/95 in the amount of P11,413.00.
With respect to the disputed personal properties both claimed that the money used
in the purchase thereof came partly from their joint account. There is however, no
sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares in the said account.
And pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent
of the parties’ respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.
Here, the disputed properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value
of which were not questioned by Jacinto, hence, their share therein is equivalent
to ½ , P55,687.50 each. And on the basis of the evidence established, the extent of
Gina’s co-ownership over the disputed house is only up to the amount of
P11,413.00 her proven contribution in the construction thereof.
-In Adriano vs. CA, the SC ruled that the fact that the controverted property was
titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof
of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property.
LUPO ATIENZA vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO 508 S 593
Lupo, married and the president and general manager of 2 corporations, hired the
services of Yolanda as accountant thereof. The 2 became intimate and eventually lived
together and had 2 children. The relationship turned sour and they parted ways. Lupo
then filed a petition for judicial partition involving a parcel of land with improvements
located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City. He alleged that the property was acquired
during their union and hence, the property is co-owned by them. He claimed that the
funds used in the acquisition of the said property were his exclusive funds and that the
title was transferred to Yolanda’s name alone was done without his knowledge and
consent. And since the property was acquired in 1987, therefore Article 144 of the Civil
Code should be applied. That he is not burdened to prove that he contributed to the
acquisition thereof because with or without contribution by either partner, he is deemed a
co-owner of the subject property. He added that Article 484 of the Civil Code states that
as long as the property was acquired by either or both of them during their extramarital
union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the
rules on co-ownership, which shall apply in default of contracts or special provisions.

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 SC: Here although the adulterous relationship commenced in 1983, Article 148 of
the Family Code applies because this provision is intended to fill up the hiatus/gap in
Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the FC was enacted, there was no
provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred
before the FC took effect, Article 148 of the FC governs.
Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase used as
consideration for the property, Lupo diverted the burden upon him to Yolanda as a shrewd
and scheming woman without capacity to purchase any property. Petitioner’s claim of
ownership is without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate his allege
contribution but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as
evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere
say so and voluminous bank records, which sadly finds no relevance in this case, the
petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof.
Respondent had sufficiently established that she derived funds used to purchase
the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman
engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented
clientele and promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients, her bank
account statements and bank transactions.
BORROMEO vs. DESCALLAR 580 SCRA 175 (February 24, 2009) 2012 Bar
Austrian Jambrich met and fell in love with Descallar, a married but separated
woman, who was working as waitress at a local hotel in Cebu City. She was earning
P1,000.00 per month and another P1,000.00 in the form of tips. Subsequently, they
bought 3 parcels of land with a house constructed thereon. The deed of sale originally
included Jambrich as buyer but because of the refusal of the Register of Deeds to register
the property in Jambrich’s name on the ground that a foreigner could not acquire
alienable lands of public domain they erased his name but not his signatures appearing in
all pages of the document. Jambrich and Descallar however, separated.
Subsequently, Jambrich incurred debts and to pay the obligation, he sold his
rights and interest in the property that is now registered in Descallar’s name in favor of
his creditor. Is the sale made by Jambrich valid?
SC: The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich
could have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the property
to Borromeo. Citing United Church of Christ vs. Sebastian, the Court reiterated the
consistent ruling that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction
is considered cured and the title of the transferee is considered valid.
LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA 730 S 314
When Eugenia and Juan separated in fact, they executed an Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement but without judicial approval. On January 26, 1976,
Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the CFI of Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic and on the same date contracted another marriage with
Soledad. In 1997, Luna died leaving, among others, a 25/100 pro indiviso share over a
condominium unit, law books, office furniture and equipment which became the subject
of a complaint filed by Soledad alleging that she is entitled to the properties as these were
acquired during their marriage. She further asserts that the lawbooks were fully paid for
solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Luna had even sent her a “thank-you”
note.
SC: From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until
the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code, even if or both spouses are residing abroad.
The mere execution of the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement did
not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the
Agreement by a competent court was still required under Articles 190 and 191 of the
Civil Code. The approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo, Dominican
Republic took place only as an incident of the action for divorce. With the divorce not

71
being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to public policy
and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable
under Philippine law.
Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; the properties
acquired during their cohabitation were governed by the rules on co-ownership. In such a
situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact.
It became imperative for petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
acquisition of the property. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,
did not serve the purpose.
Art. 150 – who are members of the same family for purposes of Art. 151
Art. 151 – Suit between members of the same family
(1) O’Laco vs. Co Cho Chit and CA 220 S 656
-It is well settled that the attempt to compromise as well as the inability to
succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the
same family. Hence, the defect in the complaint is assailable at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.
(2) Guerrero vs. RTC Br. XVI, Bello, Jr. and Hernando January 10, 1994
-Requirement is mandatory, so that “if it is shown that no such efforts were in fact
made, it must be dismissed.”
-Rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic
spectacle than litigation between members of the same family.
Exclusion to the requirement on earnest efforts:
1. Common law relationships;
2. Sisters-in-law (hence, also brothers-in-law);
3. Between collateral relatives who are not brothers and sisters (Mendez vs.
Eugenio);
4. Suit between a woman against her sister and the latter’s husband, the inclusion
of the husband is not within the “family relations” provided for by law
(Hontiveros vs. RTC);
5. If included in the suit is a stranger not of the same family as the interest of such
stranger may differ from the interest of the member of the same family ex. A co-
owner; and
6. Special proceedings- the term “suit” clearly implies only civil actions
(Manalo vs. CA)
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. vs. ACUNA and ALBERTO MORENO
500 SCRA 514 (August 31, 2006)
Moreno filed a case against Hiyas, his wife, spouses Owe and Register of Deeds
of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not obtain any loan
from Hiyas nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage, that his wife, spouses
Owe were the ones who benefited from the loan. He could not have executed and signed
the contract because he was then working abroad.
Hiyas moved to dismiss the complaint alleging non-compliance with Article 151
of the Family Code on “exerting earnest efforts toward a compromise” between members
of the same family which members include a husband and wife.
SC: Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same
family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made
towards a compromise before the action can prosper.
Article 151 is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among
members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked by a
party who is a member of that same family.
FAMILY HOME
Articles 152 & 153 – definition of a family home (89,94)
In Buenaventura vs. CA the SC held that the provisions of the Family Code on the
“family home”, i.e. the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code,
remain in force and in effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
Article 154- beneficiaries of a family home (89)

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Article 155 – exceptions to the general rule that a family home is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment.
Modequillo vs. Breva (94) 185 s 766
-Family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. No need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially.
-Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. It does
not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
-The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at
the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment
arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Manacop vs. CA and E & L Mercantile, Inc. 215 S 773
-The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of
law only under Art. 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family
home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
-The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the
owner thereof or by “any of its beneficiaries” must be actual. Actual occupancy,
however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, it may be
occupied by the ‘beneficiaries’ enumerated by Article 154 of the Family Code.
-The enumeration may include in-laws where the family home is constituted
jointly by the husband and wife. The law definitely excludes maids and
overseers.
Taneo, Jr. vs. CA 304 S 308
-Reiterated ruling in Modequillo and Manacop cases
-In the case at bar, Taneo constituted the house in question as the famly home on
March 7, 1964 but the instrument constituting the family home was registered
only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Taneo was rendered on
January 24, 1964. Thus at the time when the “debt” was incurred, the family
home was not yet constituted or even registered.
-The house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another as by the
very definition of the law that the “family home is the dwelling house where a
person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated.
-The constitution of a family home by Taneo was merely an afterthought in order
to escape execution of their property.
PERLA PATRICIO vs. MARCELINO DARIO III 507 S 438
Marcelino died intestate and survived by his wife Perla and 2 sons,
Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of
land with a residential house and a pre-school building constructed thereon
located at Oxford St., Cubao, Quezon City. After the heirs extra-judicially settled
the estate, Perla and Marcelino Marc advised Marcelino III that they intend to
partition the property and terminate the co-ownership but the latter refused on the
ground that a minor beneficiary who is Marcelino III’s 12-year old son and a
grandson of the decedent still resides in said home. He contended that as long as
the minor is living in the family home, the same continues as such until the
beneficiary comes of age. That despite the expiration of 10 years from the date of
death of Marcelino in 1987 i.e. even after July 1997, the subject property
continues to be considered as the family home considering that his minor son,
who is a beneficiary of said family home, still resides in the premises.
SC: The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either
by the owner thereof or by “any of its beneficiaries” must be actual. Actual
occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather,
the property may be occupied by the “beneficiaries” enumerated in Article 154 of
the Family Code, which include the in-laws where the family home is constituted

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 jointly by the husband and the wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and
overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, 3 requisites must concur: (1) they
must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2)
they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon
the head of the family.
Moreover, Art. 159 of the FC provides that the family home shall continue
despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for
a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This
rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family
home.
Thus, may Marcelino Lorenzo IV, minor son of respondent be considered
as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the FC? As to the 1 st requisite, the term
“descendants” contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who
constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include
the grandchildren and the great grandchildren of the spouses who constituted the
family home. Thus, Marcelino III’s minor son, who is a grandchild of Marcelino
satisfies the 1st requisite.
2nd requisite: minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family
home to avail of the benefits derived from Article 159. Marcelino Lorenzo IV has
been living in the family since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the
decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the 3rd requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo IV cannot demand
support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of
supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino
Lorenzo IV’s parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the
head of his immediate family. And only in default of his parents is the obligation
imposed on the grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo IV is dependent on legal support not from his
grandmother, but from his father. Thus despite, residing in the family home and
his being a descendant of Marcelino Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo IV cannot be
considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not
fulfill the 3rd requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support.
CABANG vs. BASAY 582 SCRA 172 (March 20, 2009)
Cabang mistakenly occupied the lot owned by Basay that was the subject matter
of a case that was earlier decided up to the Supreme Court. The writ of execution was
opposed on the ground that the houses of petitioners’ family home was still subsisting and
being such, it is not subject to execution.
SC: The family home must be established on a) the absolute community, or b)
the conjugal partnership, or c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the
consent of the other. It cannot be established on a property held in co-ownership
with third persons. However, it can be established partly on the community property, or
conjugal partnership and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with the
consent of the owner-spouse.
In the case at bar, the stark and immutable fact is that the property on which their
alleged family home stands is owned by respondents and the question of ownership had
been long laid to rest with the finality of the appellate court’s judgment. Thus, Cabang’s
continued stay on the subject land is only by mere tolerance of respondents.
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Articles 164 (06) - (1)-status of children conceived or born during the marriage
(2)- status of children conceived through artificial insemination
- requisites in order that a child conceived through artificial
insemination shall be considered legitimate.
166 (exclusive) grounds to impugn legitimacy (89)
170 – prescriptive period within which to institute an action impugning
legitimacy of child

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 171- Instances when heirs of the husband may impugn legitimacy
a. Badua vs. CA 229 S 468
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 are not applicable in the instant case. These
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child
of his wife but not where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or
biological child of a certain couple.
b. Babiera vs. Catotal 333 S 487
Alleged mother was already 54 years old at the time of her birth. The certificate of
live birth was not signed by the civil registrar or by the supposed mother.
-Article 171 is not applicable to the present case. It applies to instances in which
the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The
present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner.
The prayer is not to declare the petitioner an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but
to establish that the former is not the latter’s child at all.
-Ruling in Badua case applied.
3) DE JESUS vs. ESTATE of DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON
366 SCRA 499
In a notarized document Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as his own illegitimate children with Carolina Aves de Jesus who
were both born during the subsistence of the marriage between Carolina and
Danilo de Jesus. May the children be given due recognition as the illegitimate
children of Dizon?
SC: There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established
and founded on a sounder morality and convincing reason than the presumption
that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the 1st 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child (Articles 164 and 166, Family Code).
Succinctly put, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the
late Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being
children of Danilo and Carolina. This step cannot be done because the law itself
establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can
contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of the child born to his wife. Thus,
it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Indeed, a child born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentence as an adulteress (Article 167, Family Code).
4.) LIYAO, JR. vs. TANHOTI-LIYAO 378 S 563
Husband and wife were separated-in-fact. The wife then lived with William
Liyao and had a child with him. During the birth of the child it was William who attended
to the needs of Corazon, visited and stayed with the mother and child at the hospital. He
also shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Corazon and William, Jr. The children of
Corazon with her husband also acknowledged that William, Jr. is the illegitimate child of
William Liyao, Sr.
Whose child is William?
It bears emphasis that only the father may impugn the legitimacy of the child or in
proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth in Article 262 of the Civil Code.
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, the heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be
the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and
economic interest involved.

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 Article 168 – rule, in the absence of proof to the contrary, if wife contracted a
subsequent marriage within 300 days after termination of prior marriage and gives birth
thereafter. (99)
CABANIA v. CA GR#124814 October 21, 2004
-The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the
statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of
the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.
GERARDO CONCEPCION vs. CA and MA. THERESA ALMONTE 08/31/2005
Gerardo and Theresa were married on December 29, 1989 and after the marriage
lived with Theresa’s parents at Fairview, QC. Almost a year later or on December 8, 1990
Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. The marriage turned to be short-lived because on
December 19,1991 Gerardo filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Theresa
on the ground of bigamy. It was found out that Theresa married one Mario Gopiao on
December 10, 1980, which marriage was never annulled and that Mario is still alive and
is residing in Loyola Heights, QC. The annulment was granted and declared Jose Gerardo
as an illegitimate child. Custody was granted to Theresa but Gerardo was granted
visitation rights. Feeling betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage
annulled and held him responsible for the bastardization of the child, she moved for a
partial reconsideration of the trial court’s ruling contending that there is nothing in the
law granting “visitation rights in favor of a putative father of an illegitimate child.” She
further maintained that the surname of the child should be changed from Concepcion to
Almonte following the rule that the illegitimate shall use the surname of the mother. The
court denied Theresa’s motion applying the “best interest of the child” principle. Theresa
went to the CA that also denied her appeal. She then moved for reconsideration. The
appellate court in resolving the reconsideration ruled that when Jose Gerardo was born on
December 8, 1990, Theresa was legitimately married to Mario therefore Jose Gerardo –
under the law- is the legitimate child of Mario and Theresa. Shocked and stunned
Gerardo filed this appeal.
SC: The status and filiation of the child cannot be compromised, Article 164 of
the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his
parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides: “The child shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.” Gerardo cannot invoke Article 166 (1) as he has no
standing to dispute the status of the child. Only Mario, Theresa’s husband, or, in a proper
case, his heirs who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Theresa was void from
the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to
impugn the legitimacy of her child.
To rebut the presumption of legitimacy it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt
that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Here,
during the period that Gerardo and Theresa were living together in Fairview, Mario was
living in Loyola Heights which is also in QC. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a
scant 4 kilometers apart.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by
a more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the
truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties. Between the
certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo's illegitimacy and the
quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt)
of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also
more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of
the law.
A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.

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Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness.
ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG vs. MINOR JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ rep. by her
mother and guardian JINKY C. DIAZ 540 S 480
Jinky, who was already married to a Japanese national Hasegawa Katsuo, had an
affair with Rogelio Ong. They lived together for about 4 years (January 1994 to
September 1998) and had a child Joanne Rodjin. In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned
Jinky and Joanne and stopped supporting the minor alleging that he is not the father of
the child. Subsequently Jinky filed a complaint against Rogelio because of his continued
failure and refusal to give support to the child and to acknowledge the child as his. The
heirs, who substituted Rogelio when he died, insisted that the decision of the appellate
court remanding the case to the trial court for DNA testing analysis be set aside and to
declare Joanne as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa. It was established
however, that Hasegawa was living outside of the country and comes home only once a
year. No evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997
preceding the birth of Joanne Rodjin.
-The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative
father is the biological father of the child.
-A child born to a husband and a wife during a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate. This presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
-With the advancement in the field of genetics, and availability of new
technology, it can be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the
biological father of the minor, through DNA testing. DNA analysis is a procedure in
which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined.
The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from
whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for
identical twins.
-The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing
for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Biological samples
include blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
Article 172 – Proof of Filiation
1.) Fernandez vs. CA 230 S 130
-Photographs showing the presence of the alleged father in the baptism of the
child are far from proofs that he is the father of the child.
-Pictures showing putative father showering affection to the child fall short of the
evidence required to prove paternity.
-Baptismal certificate naming respondent as father of the child has scant
evidentiary value. No showing that he participated in its preparation.
-Certificate of live birth identifying the alleged father as father of the child is not
also competent evidence on the issue of paternity if records do not show that the
alleged father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.
2) FERNANDEZ vs. FERNANDEZ 363 S 811
-May filiation be collaterally attack in an action for declaration of nullity of sale
of real property?
HELD: While one’s legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine finds no application in the
instant case as respondents’ claim was that Rodolfo was not born to the deceased
spouses Fernandez, not a situation wherein the respondents’ deny that Rodolfo
was a child of their uncle’s wife.
-May an application for Recognition of Back Pay under RA 897 be considered as
proof of one’s filiation?
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay is a
public document nevertheless it was not executed to admit filiation of Jose with
Rodolfo. The public document contemplated under Art. 172 refers to a written
admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public

77
 document was executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay,
the contents being, only a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
-The claim that he enjoyed and possessed the status of a legitimate child, the
Court in Quismundo vs. WCC, held that “possession of the status of a child does
not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to
compel recognition by his assumed parent.”
3.)LABAGALA vs. SANTIAGO December 4, 2001
Is an income tax return that listed her as filer’s daughter sufficient to
prove filiation?
-The entries made in an income tax return only shows that income tax has
been paid and the amount thereof.
-Use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree.
4) LOCSIN vs. JUAN LOCSIN, JR. December 10, 2001
As between the original certificate of live birth issued in the place where
the alleged birth took place and a certified true copy issued by the civil registrar
general but has entries different from the one issued by the local civil registrar,
which copy must prevail?
HELD: Since the records of birth cover several decades and come from all
parts of the country, to merely access them in the civil registry general requires
expertise. To locate one single record from the mass, a regular employee, if not
more has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro
Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating
from the local civil registry of Iloilo City.
-Respondent’s photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan
C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a
very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims.
Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and
thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
5) BERNABE vs. ALEJO January 21, 2002
The child was born in 1981. The alleged father died in 1993. May the
child be allowed to prove his filiation despite the clear provision of Art. 175 of the
Family Code which requires that if the action to establish illegitimate filiation is
based on the 2nd paragraph of Art. 172 the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent?
HELD: The child should be allowed to prove his filiation as he was born
in 1981, and therefore, his rights are governed by Art. 285 of the Civil Code,
which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child
has attained the age of majority. The enactment of the Family Code did not take
away that right.
-Art. 285 is a substantive law, as it gives the child the right to file his
petition for recognition within 4 years after attaining the age of majority. The
Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition
because the right had already vested prior to its enactment. The rules on
compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.
Our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could
have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. The
State as parens patriae should protect a minor’s right.
DE LA ROSA, et. al. vs. HEIRS OF VDA. DE DAMIAN January 27, 2006
Facts: One of those claiming the estate of the late spouses Rustia is Guillerma
Rustia who claimed to be the illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia where she sought
recognition on 2 grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through
authentic writing. As proof of the latter, she presented the report card that identified
Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian. Also in Josefa Delgado’s obituary that was
prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named Guillerma as one of their children.
SC: There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate
child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this

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did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have
compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any (judicial) action for
compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory
recognition can no longer be filed. In this case, Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for
purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of
the parent. This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to
be his. Did Guillerma’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa
Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo qualify as authentic writings under the Civil
Code? Unfortunately not. The report card did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia.
The fact that his name appears there, as her parent/guardian holds no weight since he had
no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was
Guillermo himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa which was published in the
SUNDAY TIMES on September 2, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic
writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing
was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo himself and
signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the
original signed manuscript was fatal to Guillerma’s claim.
TEOFISTO VERCELES vs. POSADA 522 S 518
Posada, a young lass from a barrio in Catanduanes, was impregnated by Verceles,
the mayor of Pandan, Catanduanes. Verceles denied fathering the child. He argued that he
never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza Posada and that it was Clarissa Posada
who placed his name on the birth certificate as father without his consent. Clarissa, on the
other hand, presented as evidence the letters sent to her by Verceles starting from the very
time that she missed her menstruation and 3 other handwritten letters, 2 of which were in
his letterhead as mayor of Pandan. There were also pictures Verceles gave her of his
youth and as a public servant, all bearing his handwritten notations at the back. That she
was given P2,000 pocket money and another P2,000 for her delivery. Clarissa’s testimony
was corroborated by her mother.
SC: The letters of petitioner are declarations that lead nowhere but to the
conclusion that he sired Verna Aiza. Although petitioner used an alias (Ninoy) in these
letters, the similarity of the penmanship in these letters vis the annotation at the back of
petitioner’s fading photograph as a youth is unmistakable. Even an inexperienced eye will
come to the conclusion that they were all written by one and the same person, petitioner,
as found by the courts a quo.
In his memorandum, Verceles admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of
love letters between them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy.
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna
Aiza’s filiation under Article 172(2) of the FC. In addition, the array of evidence
presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are
convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate
child.
DELA CRUZ vs. GRACIA 594 SCRA 648 (July 31, 2009)
Jenie and Dominique lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage and stayed in Dominique’s parents’ house. During his lifetime, Dominique
wrote his autobiography that reads in part:
“As of now I have my wife named Jenie dela Cruz x x x. Then we fell in
love with each other. x x x x. And as of now she is pregnant and for that we live
together. X x x.”.
After Jenie gave birth, she applied for registration using the deceased’s surname
Aquino in support of which she attached the Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use
Surname of the Father (AUSF) signed by Jenie and Affidavit of Acknowledgment
executed by Dominique’s father. Attached to the AUSF is the autobiography. The LCR
denied the registration citing that the child cannot use the surname of the father because
the child was born out of wedlock and the father died prior to his birth and has no more

79
capacity to acknowledge his paternity. Moreover, the AUSF was unsigned by the father.
Jenie argued that Article 176 as amended by RA 9255 does not require the signature of
the putative father.
SC: Article 176 of the Family Code (FC) as amended by RA 9255, does not,
indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s
paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in
conjunction with related provisions of the FC which require that recognition by the father
must bear his signature, thus:
Article 175 in relation to Article 172 particularly paragraph 1 (2). “An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.”
The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act
of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial
approval is necessary.
That a father who acknowledges paternity through a written document must affix
his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the FC.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s
autobiography, though unsigned substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
1st. Dominique died about 2 months prior to the child’s birth.
2nd. The relevant matters in the autobiography, unquestionably
written by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial
evidence Jenie proffered.
3rd. Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father and testimony of his brother
whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the
questioned recognition of the child.
These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his
statements that “JENIE DELA CRUZ is “MY WIFE” as “WE FELL IN LOVE WITH
EACH OTHER” and “NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
TOGETHER.”
In the case at bar, the SC adopts the following rules respecting the requirement of
affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument
wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
3. Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance
with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and
4. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by
other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the
claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.
NEPOMUCENO vs. LOPEZ G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010
Araceli, for and in behalf of minor Arhbencel filed a complaint for recognition
and support against Nepomuceno.
She alleged that Arhbencel is the product of her extramarital affair with
Nepomuceno but that the latter refused to affix his signature on the child’s birth
certificate. But as proof of his acknowledgment that the child is his child, Araceli
presented as proof a handwritten note where he obligated himself to give financial
support in the amount of P1,500.00 on the 15 th and 30th of each month. She claimed that
the child’s filiation was established by the said note.
SC: Arhbencel’s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to
Nepomuceno as his illegitimate daughter falls under Article 195 (4). As such, her
entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation.
To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself
and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to
support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered

80
acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and
pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the
certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to father’s operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave
consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of
baptism or family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
In the present case, Arhbencel relies on the handwritten note executed by
petitioner:
“I, Ben Hur Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial
support in the amount of x x x x x , to Arhbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the
custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the necessity of demand, subject to
adjustment later depending on the needs of the child and my income.”
The above-quoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about
Arhbencel’s filiation to Nepomuceno. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172
(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the FC, which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate
filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to
support the child. For it is not even notarized. And the notarial agreement must be
accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence
of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through
contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her
Certificate of Live Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the
latter not having signed the same.
CHARLES GOTARDO v. DIVINA BULING 678 S 436
Gotardo denied fathering the child of Buling claiming that he first had sexual
intercourse with respondent on the 1st week of August 1994 and she could not have been
pregnant for 12 weeks or 3 months when he was informed of the pregnancy on
September 15, 1994.
 SC: A prima facie case exists if a woman declares – supported by
corroborative proof – that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point,
the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father. The defenses available to the putative
father are: (1) inability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence
or impotence, or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of
conception.
 The respondent established a prima facie case that petitioner is the
putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only
with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo, the owner of the
boarding house where petitioner is staying, corroborated her testimony that the parties
had intimate relationship.
 On the other hand, petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters
with respondent, only that it occurred in a much later date than the respondent asserted,
such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been 3 months pregnant
already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. However, petitioner
failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. His
denial cannot overcome the respondent's clear and categorical assertions.
 Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of
obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

ANTONIO PERLA v. MIRASOL BARING GR#172471 11/12/2012 685 S 101

May the fact that the alleged father hugged and promise to support the child and
the child hugging and calling the putative father “papa” as well as the sister of the alleged
father treating him as a relative during his one-week stay at her place sufficient to
establish filiation?

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 -To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a
nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apaprent desire to
have and to treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally
but continuously. Here, the single instance that Antonio hugged Randy and promised to
support cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of the child.
GERONIMO v. SANTOS GR#197099 09/28/2015 (VILLARAMA)
FACTS: This involved a document titled “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman”
where the RTC and the CA declared the same as void and directed Geronimo to surrender
the ½ portion of the property, subject matter of the document, to Karen Santos. Santos
alleged that she is the legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo and
that petitioners Eugenio and Emiliano are the half-brothers of his late father. That Rufino
died in 1980 when she was only 8 years old, and 18 years later, she and Caridad executed
an extrajudicial settlement of Rufino’s estate whereby Caridad waived all her rights ot
Rufino’s share in her favor. In fact before the settlement, Caridad had filed before the
court and was appointed guardian over her person and property. Further, she was in open,
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child as established and evidenced by
her certificate of live birth.
Eugenio, on the other hand, claimed that Karen has never been the child of the
spouses Rufino and Caridad but rather she is the child of Caridad’s sister. She joined the
the Geronimo household 13 years after the marriage of the spouses. Karen’s birth
certificate shows irregularities in 2 entries: 1.) the date of birth was erased and the word
and figure April 6, 1972 was written; and 2.) the name Emma Dano was superimposed on
the entry in the box intended for the informant’s signature. He also presented DEC’s legal
consultant in Bulacan who presented Caridad’s service record as an elementary teacher in
Paombong, Bulacan to show that she did not have any maternity leave during the period
of her service from March 11, 1963 to October 24, 1984, and a certification from the
Schools Division Superintendent that Caridad did not file any maternity leave during her
service.
Both the trial court and the CA, however, held that Karen is the legitimate child of
the spouses and thus, has right over Rufino’s share in the property. The RTC shifted the
burden on proving that the alterations in the birth certificate were due to the fault of
Santos. While the CA resolved that the birth certificate does not qualify as the valid
registration of birth in the civil register as envisioned by law; otherwise, with an
informant as shadowy as Emma Dano who was not identified as Karen’s parent or the
physician or midwife who attended her birth, the floodgates to filiation will be opened
but both courts declared that Karen was able to prove her filiation via open and
continuous of the status of a legitimate child. Karen was 1.) allowed to bear their family
name GERONIMO; 2.) they supported her and sent her to school paying for her tuition
fees and other expenses; 3.) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad
before the GSIS; 4.) after Rufino’s death, caridad, applied for and was appointed guardian
of the person and property of respondent; and 5.) Karen and Caridad executed an
extrajudicial settlement of Rufino’s estate on the basis that they are Rufino’s heirs.
Before the SC, petitioner argues that secondary evidence may be admitted only in
a direct action under Article 172 (Family Code) because the said provision of law is
meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be raised as a
collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for annulment of document and
recovery of possession.
SC: Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, FC or
illegitimacy under Article 175, FC, should only be raised in a direct and separate action
instituted to prove the filiation of a child.
What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that the procedural rule is
applicable only to actions where the legitimacy – or illegitimacy – of a child is at issue.
This situation does not obtain in the case at bar.

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 In the instant case, the filiation of a child –herein respondent- is not at issue.
Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased
brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What he alleges is that Karen is not the child of the
deceased spouses at all.
Based on the evidence on record, all proof points to the conclusion that Karen is
not the child of the deceased spouses. A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate
would show that it was tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth
of Karen and the informant. Reyes, a representative of the NSO, confirmed that the
entries on the date of birth and the signature of the informant are alterations of the birth
certificate which rendered the document questionable. Even the respondent herself did
not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities on her birth certificate.
The concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts a quo does
not sufficiently establish the crucial fact that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased
spouses. The mere registration of the child in his/her birth certificate as the child of
the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the
status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to
simulation of the child’s birth or falsification of his/her birth certificate, which is a public
document (Benitez-Badua v. CA, 229 S 468). It is well-settled that a record of birth is
merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence
of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties.
Art. 173 – Action to claim legitimacy
Art. 174 – rights of a legitimate child – (90)
Art. 175 – filiation of an illegitimate child (95)
May be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
ARADO HEIRS v. ALCORAN G.R.#163362 07/08/15 (BERSAMIN)
FACTS: Nicolas, son of the spouses Raymundo and Joaquina, is married to
Florencia but the union produced no offspring. During their marriage, however, Nicolas
had an extramarital affair with Francisca who gave birth to respondent Anacleto on July
13, 1951.
Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died in 1954. Likewise, Florencia died in
1960 and Joaquina died in1981.
After Joaquina’s death, her heirs questioned Anacleto’s possession of the
properties left behind by Joaquina and filed a complaint for recovery of property with
damages against Anacleto. It was alleged that Anacleto not having been recognized by his
father Nicolas as the latter’s spurious child during his lifetime is not entitled to inherit
from Nicolas. That there was no law for the acknowledgment of a spurious child and
even if Anacleto would be given the benefit of the doubt and be considered a natural
child, Article 278 of the Civil Code states that “recognition shall be made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing;” but the
appearance of the father’s name in the birth certificate alone, without his actual
intervention, was insufficient to prove paternity. That the mere certificate by the civil
registrar that the father himself registered the child, without the father’s signature, was
not proof of the father’s acknowledgment. The baptismal certificate was insufficient
proof of paternity. If there was a ground for Anacleto’s recognition, the period to claim
recognition had already prescribed.
Respondents countered that Nicolas recognized Anacleto as his illegitimate child
because Nicolas had himself caused the registration of Anacleto’s birth and the
petitioner’s allegation of prescription lacked basis inasmuch as Anacleto was not seeking
compulsory recognition; he had already voluntarily recognized by Nicolas as his
illegitimate son.
Both the trial and appellate courts applied Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family
Code, the law applicable at the time of the filing of the case. Both courts decided that
Anacleto’s filiation was established by the record of his birth appearing in the civil
register; and that Anacleto possessed rights in the subject properties.

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SC: The Court affirms the holding by the RTC and the CA that the provisions of the
Family Code should apply because the complaint was filed, litigated and decided by the
RTC during the effectivity of the Family Code. Under the Code, the classification of
children is limited to either legitimate or illegitimate. Illegitimate filiation is proved in
accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code in relation to Article 172 of the same
Code.
Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously concluded that Nicolas had
duly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son. Anacleto’s birth certificate appearing
in the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental showed that
Nicolas himself caused the registration of the birth of Anacleto. The showing was by
means of the name of Nicolas appearing in the column “Remarks” in the book of the
Register of Births which, based on the certification issued by the local civil registrar of
Bacong, the column entitled “Remarks” was the space provided for the name of the
informant of the live birth to be registered. Nicolas had a direct hand in the preparation of
the birth certificate and reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his
paternity was fully warranted.
Anacleto’s baptismal certificate was of no consequence in determining his
filiation. As held in Cabania v. CA, that “while baptismal certificate may be considered a
public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on
the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity;”
and thus, “cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove filiation.”
The picture depicting the young Anacleto in the arms of Joaquina as she stood
beside the coffin of Nicolas merely manifested that it was Joaquina who acknowledged
her filiation with Anacleto. His school records which evinced that Joaquina was the
guardian of Anacleto in his grade school years and the marriage contract between
Anacleto and Elenette which indicated that she had given consent to Anacleto’s marriage,
did not have evidentiary value and mattered little, for, as stressed in Cenido v.
Apacionado, the recognition must be made personally by the parent himself or herself,
not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a
voluntary declaration by the parent, or if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to
establish the paternity or maternity of children born outside wedlock.”
Art. 176 as amended by RA 9255– rights of an illegitimate child (90)
Art. 177 – Legitimated children
De Santos vs. Angeles
251 SCRA 206
-Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimated because of the
impediment present at the time of conception of the child.
RA 9858 – AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN
BORN TO PARENTS BELOW MARRYING AGE
- Amended Article 177 of the Family Code that now reads “Art. 177. Children
conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents, who at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so
disqualified only because either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of
age, may be legitimated. (Underscoring supplied)”
Articles 183 to 193- ADOPTION (83,94,95,96,00,01,03,05,06,12)
The Family Code provisions on adoption had been repealed by Republic Act 8552
or the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 but determining factor whether the new law is
applicable or not is when was the petition for adoption filed because the right has become
vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law
then in force and cannot be impaired by the enactment of a new law on adoption
(Republic vs. Miller, April 21, 1999).
Effect of Adoption under RA 8552:
Section 13-“x x x x, and that the adoption would redound to the best interest of
the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be entered which shall be effective as of the date
the original petition was filed. This provision shall also apply in case the petitioner dies
before the issuance of the decree of adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee.

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 In Tamargo vs. CA, 209 SCRA 518, the SC said that “we do not consider that
retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose liability upon
the adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some
benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Put a little differently, no presumption
of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents could have arisen since the
adopted child was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.”
In Lahom vs. Sibulo (July 14, 2003) the SC held that RA 8552 had abrogated
and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind
a decree of adoption. The adopter while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption,
can always for valid reasons caused the forfeiture of certain benefits. For instance, upon
the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and,
by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable
portion of his estate.
Section 18 of RA 8552 does not give the adopter the right of representation
because this does not involve a “reciprocal” right between a parent and child.
LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC June 27, 2006
Minors Elaine, Elma, and Eugene were the children of Amelia and the late
Manuel Ramos. After Manuel’s death, the children were left under the custody of their
paternal grandmother because Amelia left for Italy. When the paternal grandmother died,
the children were taken cared of by a paternal uncle. Landingin, the 57-year old aunt and
sister of the late Manuel and an American citizen residing in Guam, now desires to adopt
the 3 children. In her petition, she alleged that the mother of the children had abandoned
them and had not communicated with her children neither with her in-laws. In fact
Amelia has already remarried and has 2 children with her 2 nd husband. That petitioner and
her other siblings were the ones financially supporting the children. That she is already a
widow and living alone because all her children are already married and are gainfully
employed. They have given their consent in writing to the adoption, and also promised to
help her in supporting the children financially. Likewise, the paternal uncle where the
children are currently staying also signified his willingness and commitment to support
the minors while in petitioner’s custody.
The Child Study Report submitted by Social Welfare Officer Pagbilao stated that
the surviving parent consented to the adoption as evidenced by the Affidavit of Consent
executed by the children’s mother Amelia as the mother came home on May 2, 2002 and
stayed for 3 weeks. The minors likewise, consented to the proposed adoption. Pagbilao
then recommended that the children be adopted by petitioner. During the trial however,
Landingin failed to present Pagbilao as witness and also failed to adduce documentary
evidence that, indeed, Amelia assented to the adoption.
Issues: 1. Whether petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written
consent of the biological mother?
2.Whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by petitioner’s
children sufficiently complies with the law? And;
3.Whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees?
SC: Section 9 of RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) provides: Whose
consent is necessary to the adoption:
X x x x.
(b) The biological parents of the child, if known x x x .
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and
to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interest of the child.
Clearly, the written consent of the natural parents is indispensable for the validity
of a decree of adoption. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
Amelia to the adoption.
Petitioner’s argument that her consent is no longer necessary because she left for
Italy and never came back, hence, Amelia had abandoned the children and it was just by
twist of fate that after 12 years Amelia was on vacation and was able to meet Pagbilao,

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must be rejected. If, as claimed, that the biological mother had abandoned them, she
should have adduced the written consent of the children’s legal guardian. Merely
permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others does not
constitute abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment
must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
Here, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine, the eldest of the
3, to prove that Amelia abandoned them.
The Home Study Report tends to show otherwise. Elaine during the interview said
that “in serious problems she already consult her mother and petitioner-aunt.” And
while petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously providing for most of their
needs and education, Amelia would also send financial support ranging from
P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 a month through her parents and share P3,000.00 to
P5,000.00 thereof with the children.
Thus, Amelia left for Italy without intention of abandoning her children, or to
permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the
country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or
relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing her children to her now deceased
mother-in-law.
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s report and the joint affidavit of
consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise,
failed to prove. As to her financial capacity, the Report stated that petitioner is 57 years
old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around
$1,000.00 per month. That she owns her house at Quitugua Subd., Yigo, Guam but the
same is still being amortized. Given these limited facts, it is doubtful whether petitioner
will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the 3 children in the US.
While she claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children, the OSG
is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as
adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, no
proof was adduced to prove her allegation that her children and siblings are willing to
support the minors herein.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELE P. LIM and MICHAEL JUDE
LIM 588 SCRA 98 (May 21, 2009) 2012 Bar
Michelle was given to the spouses Lim in 1977 while Michael was delivered in
1983. They were only about 11 days old when they were given to the spouses Lim who
had them registered as if they were their own children. They were reared and cared for
and were sent to exclusive schools and used the surname “Lim” in all their school records
and documents. In 1988, the husband died and the surviving spouse entered into another
marriage with an American citizen, Olario. Monina (the surviving spouse) then filed two
separate petitions to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552
or the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 to those individuals who simulated the birth of the
child. Both children, who are already of legal age, gave their consent including
Michelle’s husband to the adoption. Olario likewise executed an affidavit of consent for
the adoption of Michelle and Michael. The lower court denied the petition because
inasmuch as Monina has remarried, her petition should have been jointly filed with her
new husband.
ISSUE: Whether Monina, who has remarried, can singly adopt?
SC: It is undisputed that at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petition by herself, without being joined by
her husband Olario. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads “Husband
and wife shall jointly adopt subject to the exceptions. The word “shall” means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This in consonance with the concept
of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule is to insure harmony between the spouses.
Neither would the exceptions apply. 1st the children are not the legitimate children
of the petitioner or of her husband; 2nd the children are not the illegitimate children of the
pettioner ; and 3rd, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

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 There are also certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American
citizen. None of the qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. Neither are the
requirements on residency and certification waivable as the children are not relatives
within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or Olario.
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation- that is, when he
attains the age of majority or 18 years of age-emancipation terminates parental authority
over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for
all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption.
Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered
the legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child as provided for
under Article 174 of the Family Code. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with
respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled
such as support and successional rights.
While petitioner insists that joint adoption is no longer possible because Olario
has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner before the Los Angeles
Superior Court, the filing of said case is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of
dissolution of marriage. until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of
the marriage between Monina and Olario, the marriage still subsists.
CASTRO v. GREGORIO 738 S 415 (LEONEN)
FACTS: Siblings Jose Maria Jed and Ana Maria Regina both surnamed Gregorio
were adopted in October 2000 by Atty. Jose Castro. It was alleged that they were Castro’s
illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio, Jose’s alleged lover. Jose was, at the time of
the adoption, separated in fact from his spouse Rosario who was living in Manila together
with their child Joaane.
Rosario learned of the adoption in 2006 or 6 years later. On October 18, 2007
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the
October 16, 2000 decision approving Jed and Regine’s adoption on the following
grounds: 1.) Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent as she never gave her consent
to the adoption; 2.) Jed and Regina’s birth certificates showed sets of information. In one
set it showed Jose as father. In another, it indicated Larry Rentegrado (Jose’s alleged
lover as Jose is said to be a homosexual) as father and Jed and Regina are Larry and
Lilibeth’s legitimate children; 3.) no notice was given to Rosario; and 4.) Joanne’s
consent was not obtained/secured as she was more than 10 years old at the time of the
adoption. The petition for annulment was filed a year after Jose’s death.
Jed and Regina argued that petitioners were not deprived of their day in court
because 1.) their interest was amply protected by the appearance of the Solicitor General
thru its deputized prosecutor; 2.) there was constructive notice thru publication once a
week for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation which serves as
notice not only to them but to the whole world; and 3.) they are not indispensable parties.
SC: RA 8552 applies to the proceedings. It requires that the adoption by the father
of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent
of his legitimate children. As a general rule, husband and wife must jointly file a petition
for adoption. The law provides several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation
where a spouse seeks to adopt his/her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance,
joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the
consent of his/her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de facto separation. His submission of a fraudulent
affidavit of consent in Rosario’s name cannot be considered compliance of the requisites
of the law.
Likewise, Joanne’s written consent who was over 10 years old at the time of the
adoption proceedings, was necessary for the adoption to be valid. it ensures harmony
among the prospective siblings.
The badges of extrinsic fraud are present in this case 1.) the place where the
petition for adoption was filed has no relation to the parties. Jose is from Laoag, Lilibeth
and Larry are from Brgy. 6, Laoag, Jed and Regina were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos

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Norte while Rosario and Joanne are residents of Paranaque, Metro Manila; 2.) using the
process of delayed registration, Jose was able to secure birth certificates of Jed and
Regine showing him as father and Larry as the informant. Worse is that 2 different sets of
fraudulent certificates were procured: a.) one showing Jose and Lilibeth were married on
December 4, 1986 in Manila, and b.) another wherein the portion for the mother’s name
was not filled in at all. The birth certificates of Jed and Regina from the NSO, however,
show that their father is Larry Rentegrado. These certificates are clear contradiction to the
birth certificates submitted by Jose to the adoption court; and 3.) Jose blatantly lied to the
court when he declared that he and his wife Rosario were childless, to the prejudice of
their child Joanne.
All these were made not only to induce the court in approving his petition, but
also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from participating in the proceedings or opposing the
petition.
BARTOLOME v. SSS 740 S 78 (VELASCO)
ISSUES: 1, If the adoptive parent dies during the minority of the adopted child, is
parental authority automatically reverted back to the biological parent or parent by
nature?
2. May the biological parent still inherit from the adopted child?
FACTS: John, then about 2 years old, and his sister were adopted by their great
grandfather Cornelio Colcol, Bernardina Bartolome’s grandfather. While under the
employ of Scanmar Maritime on board the vessel Maersk Dansville, John met an accident
that led to his untimely death. Childless and unmarried, Bernardina, John’s biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary filed a claim for death benefits under
PD 626 with the SSS but was denied by the latter stating that “x x x you are no longer
considered as the parent of John Colcol as he was allegedly adopted by Cornelio Colcol x
x x.”
Cornelio Colcol died on October 26, 1987, or less than 3 years since the decree of
adoption on February 4, 1985 attained finality.
SC: 1. Yes, under such circumstances, parental authority should be deemed
reverted back in favor of the biological parents. To be sure reversion of parental authority
in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of RA 8552 on effects
of rescission of adoption is applicable by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned. While there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern
contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition; nevertheless, WE
are guided by the state policies behind RA 8552 wherein the paramount consideration is
the best interest of the child, which WE invoke to justify this disposition. It is after all, for
the best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and
upbringing should his/her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties
as a parent at a time the adoptee is still in his formative years, and, in the absence, or in
this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the
role of parent other than the adoptee’s biological one. Thus, Cornelio’s death at the time
of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the
adopted child.
2. Even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties
between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. The biological
parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned form
Article 190 (2), Family Code: “when the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or legitimate
ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate xx.”
While SSS benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not
form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate
succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
SUPPORT
DE ASIS vs. CA 303 S 176
The mother filed an action for recognition and support. The putative father denied
paternity and instead filed a counterclaim. The parties agreed to dismiss the case provided
the alleged father would no longer pursue his counterclaim. Subsequently, the mother

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filed another case against the alleged father again, for support and recognition. The
putative father moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of res judicata.
SC: Such manifestation does not bar the mother from filing a subsequent
case for support on behalf of the same child against the same defendant because
such manifestation and the agreement to dismiss the case on condition that the
defendant will not pursue the counterclaim constitute a form of renunciation as
they severed the vinculum that gives the child the right to claim support from the
putative parent.
-The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third
person.
-To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a
person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the
recipient to a public burden.
-An agreement for the dismissal of a complaint for maintenance and support
conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a
compromise that cannot be countenanced.
-If paternity is at issue in a case, its existence or absence must be judicially
established and cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
GAN vs. REYES May 28, 2002
Apprehensive that she would be unable to send her 3-year old daughter to
school, she wrote Gan demanding support for their “love child”. Gan denied
paternity of the child. He argued that since the child’s birth certificate indicated
her father as “UNKNOWN”, then there is no legal basis for the claim for support.
Gan was declared in default and was ordered to recognize the child Francheska
Joy as his illegitimate child and to support her. A writ of execution was issued
citing as reason the child’s immediate need for schooling. Meanwhile, Gan
appealed the judgment of the CA. He then filed a petition for certiorari insisting
that the judgment sought to be enforced did not yet attain finality. He also seeks
the setting aside of the default order and the judgment rendered thereafter for the
reason that he should be allowed to prove his defense of adultery.
SC: There is no evidence to justify the setting aside of the writ on the
ground that it was issued beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial discretion. The
Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in
actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal.
This is an exception to the general rule, which provides that the taking of an
appeal stays the execution of the judgment. The aforesaid provision peremptorily
calls for immediate execution of all judgments for and makes no distinction
between those that are the subject of an appeal and those that are not. To consider
then petitioner’s argument that there should be good reasons for the advance
execution of judgment would be to violate the clear and explicit language of the
rule mandating immediate execution.
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the
paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the
child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of
the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. Parenthetically,
how could he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery when it was not even
hinted that he was married to the mother of the child.
MANGONON vs. CA 494 S 1
Ma. Belen Mangonon and Federico Delgado were civilly married. The
marriage however, was subsequently annulled due to absence of the required
parental consent under Article 85 of the Civil Code. 7 months after the annulment,
Mangonon gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. Federico totally abandoned them
and Mangonon had to rely upon her 2nd husband for assistance. Demands made
upon Federico and the latter’s father, Francisco, the latter being generally well
known to be financially well-off, were unheeded. Petitioner then filed, for and in
behalf of the twins a petition for declaration of legitimacy and support with
application for support pendente lite before the RTC of Makati. As legitimate

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children and grandchildren, the twins are entitled to general and educational
support under Articles 174 and 195 (b) in relation to Articles 194 (1) and (2) and
199 (c) of the Family Code. Mangonon argued that in case of default on the
parents’ part, the obligation to provide support falls upon the grandparents of the
children; thus, Federico, or in his default, Francisco should be ordered to provide
general and educational support in the amount of US$50,000.00, more or less, per
year. Francisco stated in his answer that as the birth certificates of Rica and Rina
do not bear the signature of Federico, it is essential to 1 st establish their legitimacy
as “there is no basis to claim support until a final and executory judicial
declaration has been made as to the civil status of the children.” Whatever good
deeds he may have done to the twins were founded on pure acts of Christian
charity. And assuming that he could be held liable for support, he has the option to
fulfill the obligation either by paying the support or receiving and maintaining in
the dwelling here in the Philippines the person claiming support. He further posits
that because petitioner and the twins are now US citizens, they cannot invoke the
Family Code provisions on support because “laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (Article 15, NCC).”
Federico, on the other hand, alleged that he left for abroad and stayed there for a
long time “within the 1st 120 days of the 300 days immediately preceding March
25, 1976 (birth of the twins)” and that he only came to know about the birth of the
twins when the latter introduced themselves to him 17 years later. He did not tell
them that he could not be their father in order not to antagonize them.
The trial court said that, “the status of the twins as children of Federico
cannot be denied. They had maintained constant communication with their
grandfather Francisco. Francisco admitted having written several letters to Rica
and Rina. In said letters, particularly at the bottom thereof, Francisco wrote the
names of Rica and Rina Delgado. He therefore was very well aware that the twins
bear the surname Delgado. Likewise, he referred to himself in his letters as “Lolo
Paco” or “Daddy Paco”. In his October 13, 1989 letter he said, “as the
grandfather, am extending a financial help of US$1,000.00.”
SC: The pertinent provision is Article 199 of the FC; “Whenever 2 or
more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:
i. The spouse;
ii. The descendants in the nearest degree;
iii. The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
iv. The brothers and sisters.
Tolentino explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on
those more closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives
may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those
who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so.
There being prima facie showing that Mangonon and Federico are the
parents of Rica and Rina, they are primarily charged to support their children’s
college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish
said support shall be borne by Francisco. Under Article 199 of the FC, as the next
immediate relative of the twins, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in
default of their parents. It having been established that he has the financial means
to support the twins’ education, he, in lieu of Federico should be liable for support
pendente lite.
While respondents have the option under Article 204 “to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining
in the family dwelling the person who has the right to receive support. The latter
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.”
In this case, Francisco cannot avail himself of the 2nd option. Prior to the
commencement of this action, the relationship between Francisco and the
petitioner and daughters was quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged

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 among them expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for
another’s well being. The photographs presented a seemingly typical family
celebrating kinship. All these, however, are things of the past. With the filing of
this case, and the allegations hurled at one another, the relationships had been
affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who
they considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship
with them. Given all these, we could not see the twins moving back here in the
Philippines in the company of those who disowned them.
LIM vs. LIM 604 SCRA 691 (October 30, 2009)
Spouses Cheryl and Edward and their 3 children live with Edward’s parents, and
his grandmother. Edward is receiving P6,000.00 from their family business. Cheryl, on
the other hand, had no steady source of income.
In 1990, Cheryl together with her 3 children left her in-laws house after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with in-house midwife of his grandmother
in what the court described as “a very compromising” situation. She then sued Edward
together with his parents and grandparents for support.
The court ordered Edward, his parents and grandparents to provide support in the
amount of P40,000.00. P6,000.00 from Edward while the balance of P34,000.00 shall be
borne by his parents subject to the subsidiary liability of the grandparent. The court held
that Edward’s parents (petitioners in this case) and his grandmother Chua Giak were
jointly liable with Edward because of the latter’s “inability to x x x to give sufficient
support x x x.”
The petitioners further argued before the CA that while Edward’s income is
insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that that legal support should
be “in keeping with the financial capacity of the family” under Article 194 of the Civil
Code as amended by the FC. Further, their liability is activated only upon default of
parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the
children’s minority. At the time Cheryl sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children hence, the obligation to support ends with them.
SC: While parental authority under Title IX pertains to parents, passing to
ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal
support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the
latter’s inability to provide sufficient support.
There is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide
sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that
the amount of support Edward is able to give is insufficient to meet respondents’ basic
needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts
a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal
and maternal line (Cheryl’s family had already been giving support to respondents)
following the order established in Article 199 of the FC. To hold otherwise, and thus
subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating
extreme material deprivation of children because of paternal inability to give adequate
support even if the ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.
However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their
descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives by blood of lower
degree. Hence, only the children of Cheryl and Edward are entitled to receive support
from their grandparents. Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends
only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
Petitioners’ wish to exercise the option under Article 204 is unavailable. It will
force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her husband’s infidelity.
While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryl’s charge against
Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence
on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of
the exception clause of Article 204.
CHERRYL DOLINA v. GLENN VALLECERA G.R. No. 182367 December 15, 2010
In the complaint for violation of RA 9262, Dolina added a prayer for financial
support from Vallecera for their supposed child. Vallecera opposed the petition as

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Dolina’s action was essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against
woman and child abuses.
SC: To be entitled to legal support one first establish the filiation of the child, if
the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son
is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to
such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation
to him. The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action for compulsory
recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In
short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their
filiation must be duly proved.
While the Court is mindful of the best interest of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits
cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.
SUSAN LIM-LUA v. DANILO LUA GR# 175279-80 June 5, 2013
ISSUE: May certain expenses already incurred by the respondent be deducted
from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children?
FACTS: During the pendency of the complaint for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Danilo, Susan prays that she and her children be given support pendente
lite. The trial court granted the prayer and ordered Danilo to pay Susan P1.750 million
including support in arrears and thereafter, P250,000.00 as monthly support effective
April 2004. On appeal and as prayed for by Danilo, the CA reduced the P250k monthly
support to P115k and to deduct the advances given by him to his children and petitioner.
The advances include groceries and dry goods, vehicles consisting of Volkswagen Beetle
and BMW 316i and its maintenance, among others.
SC: As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage
and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient (Article 201, FC).
Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family.
The CA should nat have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be
credited against the accrued support pendente lite. The deductions ahould be limited to
those basic needs and expenses like medical expenses for Susan Lim-Lua, dental
expenses for Daniel Ryan, credit card purchases (dry goods and groceries) of Angelli and
credit card purchases by Daniel Ryan.
BBB v. AAA 750 S 188
ISSUE: May a husband exempt himself from giving support to a child who
actually was not his child with the mother of the child but was included in the
legitimation upon their subsequent valid marriage?
FACTS: Before AAA’s cohabitation with BBB, she already had an illegitimate
child CCC fathered by another man. AAA and BBB decided to get married when DDD
and EEE were born. Thereafter, the birth certificates of the children including CCC’s
were amended to change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage.
The marriage, however, did not last long when AAA alleges that BBB is having
an extramarital affair with FFF which caused the parties’ separation in fact. When
directed to give support to the children, BBB claimed that CCC is not his biological son
and thus, not entitled to receive support from him.
SC: In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC’s
biological father. Such being the case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the
celebration of BBB and AAA’s marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation
was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431
of the Civil Code provides; “Through estoppel am admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved
against the person relying thereon.
At least, for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of estoppel
finds application and it now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his previous
representations. He should not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own

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misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains
to be BBB’s son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is entitled to
the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his father’s support.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY
- Espiritu vs. CA 242 S 362
-The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a
ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a
minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount
criterion must always be the child’s interests.
-In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by
the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is
under 7 years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The
presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by “compelling
reasons.”
-Either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if
deprived of custody but it is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of
either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.
Santos, Sr. vs. CA 242 S 407
-The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons
of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent
present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of parents’
death, absence, or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by
the surviving grandparent.
-The legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents despite the latter’s
demonstrated love and affection. Wealth, too, is not a deciding factor.
-The father’s previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest
criticism. It cannot, however, be construed as abandonment.
Eslao vs. CA 266 S 317
-When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it
does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
LAXAMANA vs. LAXAMANA September 3, 2002
The results of the psychiatric evaluation submitted to the trial court states that “
Reymond Laxamana is not yet considered completely cured (of his drug dependency)
even though his drug urine test for “shabu” was negative.” Likewise the children aged 14
and 15 when asked whether they like to be with their father but they said that they
entertain fears in their hearts and want to be sure that their father is no longer a drug
dependent. The trial court then awarded custody of the children to their mother. Is the
court correct?
While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are
inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. The psychiatric evaluation
that he is not yet “completely cured” may render him unfit to take custody of the children
but there is no evidence to show that he is unfit to provide the children with adequate
support, education, as well as moral and intellectual training and development. While the
children were asked as to whether they like to be with their father but there was no
showing that the court ascertained the categorical choice of the children.
In controversies involving the care, custody, and control of their minor children,
the contending parties stand on equal footing before the court who shall make a selection
according to the best interest of the child. The child if over 7 years of age may be
permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the court is not bound by
such choice if the parent chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration
is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned taking into
account the respective resources as well as the social and moral situations of the opposing
parents.

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JOYCELYN GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V
461 SCRA 451 (June 28, 2005) [2006 Bar]
Is a mother allegedly a lesbian unfit to have custody over a child below seven
years of age?
SC: The convention on the Rights of the Child provides that “in all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child
shall be a primary consideration. The principle of “best interest of the child” pervades
Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in
conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that in
choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always
be the paramount consideration. Courts are mandated to take into account all relevant
circumstances that would have a bearing on the children’s well-being and development.
Aside from the material resources and the moral and social situations of each parent,
other factors may be considered to ascertain which one has the capability to attend to the
physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children.
As a general rule a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children
under the age of 7. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored,
except when the court finds cause to order otherwise. The so-called “tender-age
presumption” under Article 213 may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the
mother’s unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the
child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relationship as the
compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under
certain circumstances, the mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason
to deprive her of custody.
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or
incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her
husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of
custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse
effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising
parental care.
SALIENTES vs. ABANILLA August 29, 2006
Loran and Marie Antonette are the parents of Lorenzo Emmanuel. They lived with
Marie’s parents. Due to in-law problems, Loran suggested that they transfer to their own
house but Marie refused so he, alone, left the house and was, later on, prevented from
seeing his son.
He then instituted a petition for habeas corpus and custody. Ordered to show
cause why Lorenzo Emmanuel should not be discharged from restraint Marie moved for
the reconsideration of the order which the court denied. She went to the CA which the
affirmed the denial of the lower court. On certiorari, she contended that there was no
evidence at all that the 3-year Lorenzo was under restraint and no evidence of maternal
unfitness to deprive the mother Marie of her son of tender years. That the writ is
unwarranted considering that there is no unlawful restraint by the mother and considering
further that the law presumes the fitness of the mother, thereby negating any notion of
such mother illegally restraining her own son. She maintains that Loran had the burden of
showing a compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.
Accordingly, the proper remedy is an action for custody and not habeas corpus as the
latter is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the
minor. Loran, on the other hand, argued that under the law, he and Marie have shared
custody and parental authority over their son. That at times that Marie is out of the
country as required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should
have custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.
SC: Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld
from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the FC, Loran and Marie Antonette

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have joint parental authority over their minor son and consequently, joint custody.
Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be
adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both
parents are entitled to the custody of their child. In this case, Loran’s cause of action is
the deprivation of his right to see his son, hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available
to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration.
The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding
the care and custody of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 213 of the FC deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as
a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a
counterargument for Loran’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the
father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing
or visiting his child under 7 years of age.
GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. CA 527 SCRA 380 (July 11, 2007)
Spouses Franklin and Agnes have a 4-year old daughter named Simone. Their
problem started when Agnes wanted to stay in Makati while Franklin would like to stay
in their conjugal home in Diniwid, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. One day, Agnes went to
Boracay, asked for money and for Franklin’s permission for her to bring their daughter to
Makati City for a brief vacation. He later however, discovered that neither Agnes nor
their daughter would be coming back to Boracay. He then filed a petition for habeas
corpus for Agnes to produce Simone. The CA granted joint custody of the minor child to
both parents.
SC: The CA committed grave abuse of jurisdiction when it granted joint custody
of the minor child to both parents.
The Convention of the Rights of the Child provides that “in all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interest of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
The so-called “tender age presumption” under Article 213 of the FC may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is declared
unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable diseases. Here, the
mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child.
All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s
custody.
HERALD DACASIN vs. SHARON DACASIN G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
Sharon, Filipino, married to an American, Herald, obtained a decree of divorce
from an Illinois court. The court awarded to Sharon sole custody of their daughter
Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes. Subsequently,
the parties executed in Manila an agreement for the joint custody of their daughter and
chose the Philippine courts as the exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the
agreement. Sharon, in fact undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
“relinquishing” jurisdiction to Philippine courts. In 2004, Herald sued Sharon for alleged
violation of the agreement as the latter exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
SC: At the time the parties executed the agreement on January 28, 2003, 2 facts
are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under 7 years old (having been born on September 21,
1995); and (2) Sharon and Herald were no longer married under the laws of the US
because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses
separated in fact or in law is also undisputed: “no child under 7 years of age shall be
separated from the mother x x x. (Article 213 (2) FC)”. This award of sole parental
custody to the mother is mandatory, grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only
to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here. The agreement’s object to establish a
post-divorce joint custody regime between them over their minor child under 7 years old
contravenes Philippine law.

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 The agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated
because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together.
However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if
the child is below 7 years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. The separated
parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of
children below 7 years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is
unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a
communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under 7 as these are reasons
deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime
under the 2nd paragraph of Article 213.
The rule’s seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary
agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the visitation and
other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with regime of sole maternal
custody under the 2nd paragraph of A. 213 which merely grants to the mother final
authority on the care and custody of the minor under 7 years of age, in case of
disagreements.
2. Default custodial regime or mandatory maternal custody regime – 2 nd
paragraph of A. 213 of the FC vesting on the mother sole custody of a
child under 7 years of age.
3. Default standard on child custody proceedings - the best interest of the
child.
Articles 218 and 219- (03)
ST.MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS 376 S 474
-Under Art. 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: 1) the
school, its administrators and teachers; or 2) the individual, entity or institution engaged
in child care. Such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other
affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the
school or its teachers. Under Art. 219 those exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
-For a school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.
SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY vs. TAGUIAM 558 SCRA
223 July 14, 2008
Taguiam was an adviser of a Grade V class of the above said school. The grade
school principal granted the written request of the class president authorizing the class to
hold a year-end celebration at the school grounds and to use the swimming pool. Taguiam
distributed the parents/ guardian permit forms to the pupils. One of the pupils’, Chiara
Mae Federico, form was unsigned but Taguiam presumed that she was allowed to join the
activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and
swimsuit. Taguiam warned the children not to go the deeper portion of the pool.
Subsequently, 2 of the children sneaked out and went after them. While she was away
Chiara Mae drowned.
SC: As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, Taguiam should have
made sure that the children were protected from all harm while in her company. She
should have known that leaving the pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves
may result in an accident. A simple reminder “not to go the deepest part of the pool” was
insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the situation presented to the
children, especially Taguiam knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim. Dismally, respondent
created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real
danger. This a clear violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed on her by the
parents of the pupils but of the school itself.
Article 231 – grounds for suspension of parental authority – (94)
RA 7610 – CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION

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 4. CHILD ABUSE –refers to maltreatment of a person below 18 years of
age or over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition. It includes:
5. A. Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
6. B. Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
7. C. Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as
food and shelter;
8. D. Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child
resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his
permanent incapacity or death.
Articles 234 and 236 as amended by RA 6809 – emancipation and effects of termination
of parental authority and its exception – (93)

TITLE XI
The SC in Republic vs. CA (May 6, 2005) said that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding under the Family Code and not a
special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court.
In Republic vs. Lorino (January 19, 2005) the SC held that “in Summary Judicial
Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to
perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision
of Article 247 thereof, are “immediately final and executory”.” An appellate court
acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment, which by express provision of law, is
immediately final and executory. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor is part of
due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege (Veloria vs. COMELEC).
In REPUBLIC vs. TANGO G.R. No. 161062 July 31, 2009 the SC held “Article
238 of the FC, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the
Family Code.”
In turn, Article 253 of the FC specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters
two and three of the same title. It states: “The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof
shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51. 69, 73, 96, 124
and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads: “The judgment of
the court shall be immediately final and executory.”
It follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41
of the FC. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition
should be filed in the CA in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
Others – Constitutional provisions strengthening marriage as an institution (91).
SURNAMES
Art. 364 of the New Civil Code– Legitimate and Legitimated Children shall use the
surname of the father
Republic vs. CA and Vicencio 300 S 138
-A legitimate child generally bears the surname of the father. It must be stressed
that a change of name is a privilege not a matter of right, addressed to the sound
discretion of the court.
-More confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if a legitimate child is
allowed to use the surname of the stepfather, who did not legally adopt her.
-While previous decisions have allowed children to bear the surname of their
respective stepfather even without the benefit of adoption such as in the cases of
Calderon and Llaneta, wherein the Court allowed the concerned child to adopt the
surname of the stepfather, in those cases the children were not of legitimate
parentage.

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Art. 368 – Surname of illegitimate children
-Illegitimate children shall generally, use the surname of their mother if not
recognized by the putative father.
RA 9255 – An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father
In Re: Petition of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang 454 S 215
ISSUE: May a person be allowed to drop his middle name?
Facts: Julian is the legitimated son of spouses Anna Maria Carulasan and Song-
Pei Wang. Since the couple decided to settle in Singapore where Julian will study
together with his sister, Anna Maria filed a petition seeking to drop his middle name and
have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
to Julian Lin Wang as he might be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore
because of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden name
surname of the mother is not carried in a person’s name.
Held: Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or affiliation of a
person and further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and
surname as he has. When an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of
his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public instrument or a private handwritten
instrument, he then bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged
natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate
child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.
Before the registered name of a person may be changed he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason that may justify such change. Among the
grounds are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence as in legitimation; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name and is unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alien parentage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name is for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by Julian for dropping his middle
name is convenience. How such change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued
use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper
and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
GARCIA MARCH 31, 2005
May an illegitimate child be allowed to use her natural mother’s surname as
his/her middle name when the child has been subsequently adopted by his/her natural
father?
Facts: Catindig decided to adopt his illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia with Gemma Astorga Garcia. The petition for adoption was granted and ordered
that Stephanie’s surname be changed from “Garcia” to “Catindig” but nothing was
mentioned with respect to Stephanie’s middle name. In his motion for
clarification/reconsideration petitioner Catindig prayed that Stephanie should be allowed
to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. He contends
that 1. there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case
there is only one adopting parent; 2. it is customary for a every Filipino to have as middle
name the surname of the mother; 3. the middle name or initial is part of the name of a
person; 4. adoption is for the benefit of the and best interest of the adopted child, hence,
her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; 5. permitting Stephanie to use the
middle name “Garcia” (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and;
6. her continued use of “Garcia” as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig
or Garcia families.
SC: As correctly submitted by the parties, there is no law regulating the use of a
middle name. Even Article 176 of the family Code, as amended by RA 9255, is silent as

98
to what middle name a child may use. The middle name or the mother’s surname is only
considered in Article 375 (1) of the Civil Code, in case there is identity of names and
surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
mother’s name shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the
adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. Being a legitimate
child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her mother and father.
Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle name will
maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189 (3) of the Family Code
and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of
his/her biological parent.
To allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only
sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the
stigma of her illegitimacy.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and
welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill the noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.
REPUBLIC vs. CAPOTE 514 S 76
[more on procedure – Rule 103 of the Rules of Court]
Capote is the guardian of minor Giovanni Gallamaso who is the illegitimate
natural child of Corazon Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. Giovanni was born in 1982
and his mother used the surname of the father when she registered the child despite
absence of marriage between them. The alleged father failed to take up his
responsibilities on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. The
child’s pleas for attention along that line fell of deaf ears. As his mother is in the US and
might eventually petition the child to join her in the US, the continued use of the surname
Gallamaso, the surname of the natural father, may complicate Giovanni’s status as natural
child. The Republic contends that the purported parents and all other persons who may be
adversely affected by the child’s change of name should have been made respondents to
make the proceeding adversarial.
SC: “The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which
serves to distinguish him from all others; this symbol is his name.”
When Giovanni was born in 1982, the provision that will apply is Article 366 of
the Civil Code: “A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the
surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall
employ the surname of the recognizing parent.”
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mother’s surname from
birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovanni’s putative
father to actually recognize him. Meanwhile Art. 176 of the Family Code which repealed,
among others, Art. 366 of the Civil Code provides: “Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code. X x x x x.”
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by
the father bears only a given name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a
middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies
him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and
his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated or an
acknowledged child.
GRACE GRANDE v. PATRICIO ANTONIO 716 S 698 (February 18, 2014)

99
 Grace and Antonio lived together as husband and wife, although the latter was
already married to someone else at the time. They had 2 children but unrecognized by
Antonio. When they separated, Grande left for the US bringing with her the 2 kids.
Antonio then filed a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with prayer to take
Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors
and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction appended thereto is a notarized
Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of children which petition was decided in
favor of Antonio citing the best interest of the children. The CA modified the RTC ruling
where it granted custody over the children to their mother with Antonio given visitorial
rights. The Civil Registrar General and the Civil Registrar of Makati City were ordered to
enter the surname Antonio as the surname of the children. Grande, on the one hand, posits
that Article 176 of the Family Code - as amended by RA 9255, couched as it is in
permissive language – may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his
illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.
SC: Central to the core issue is the application of Article 176, Family Code which was
later amended by RA 9255 which reads: Illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental of their mother, x x x x x. However, illegitimate children
may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized
by their father x x x x x x.
It is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of
the mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through a record of birth appearing in the civil register or when
an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. In such a situation, the illegitimate may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition
of filiation with prayer for the correction or change of surname of the minors from
Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his
children.
There is no legal basis for the Court to order the change of surname to that of
respondent otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal
provision of Article 176 of the Family Code as amended by RA 9255. Article 176 gives
the illegitimate the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It
is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of
their illegitimate children. Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to
use his surname has no legal basis.
The use of the word “may” in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father. The word “may” is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the
illegitimate children.
On the matter of children’s surname, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the
idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child.
An argument may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the father’s
surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255 which states: the illegitimate child shall use the
surname of the father in Rules 7.1.1; 7.1.2; 7.2.1; 7.2.2; and 8.1.1. Nonetheless, the
hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act.
Thus, we can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no
ambiguity in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous. This Court has the
constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as void the rules of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies when found contrary to statutes and/or
Constitution. We exercise this power (Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the Constitution) in
voiding the provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by
illegitimate children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s recognition of his
paternity. Illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they
will be known.

10
RA 9048- AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST
NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A
JUDICIAL ORDER AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412
OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Approved: March 22, 2001
- No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order
except: 1. clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which is
defined as a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the naked eye or obvious to the
understanding, and can be changed only by reference to other existing record/s; and in
Section 4 thereof - 2. the first name or nickname is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 3. the new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously use and he has been known by that first name or nickname in
the community; or 4. the change will avoid confusion.
- First name refers to a name or a nickname given to a person which may
consist of one or more names in addition to the middle and last names.
- No correction must involve the change of a. nationality; b. age; c. status;
or; d. sex.
- The remedy may only be availed of once (2006 Bar)..
- Petition must be verified.
- If the petitioner has migrated to another place in the country and it would
be very expensive and impractical to appear before the local civil registrar
keeping the documents to be corrected or changed then it can be filed, in
person, with the local civil registrar of the place where he is residing or
domiciled.
- Filipinos presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries – with the
nearest Philippine Consulates.
- The civil registrar general shall exercise his power within 10 working days
from receipt of the decision granting a petition, to impugn such a decision
on any of the following grounds: 1. the correction is substantial or
controversial as it affects the civil status of a person; 2. the correction is not
clerical or typographical; or; 3. the basis in changing the first name or
nickname of a person does not fall under Section 4 of RA 9048.
RA 10172 – An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul
General to Correct Clerical or Typographical Errors in the in the Day and Month in
the Date of Birth or Sex of a Person Appearing in the Civil Register Without Need of
a Judicial Order Amending for this Purpose RA 9048
9. Section 1 of RA 9048 as amended by RA 10172 now includes correction
of the date and month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is
patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake
in the entry.
10. Clerical or typographical error refers to misspelled name or misspelled
place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the date of birth
or the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records.
11. No correction must involve the change of nationality, age, or status of
the petitioner.
12. Section 5 of RA 9048 is amended: The petition for correction of a
clerical or typographical error, or for change of first name or nickname,
as the case may be shall be in the form of an affidavit subscribed and
sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
13. The petition shall be supported with the following documents:

10
 1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the
registry book containing the entry or entries sought to be corrected
or changed;
2) At least two public documents or private instruments showing the
correct entry or entries upon which the correction or changed shall
be based;
3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal
registrar or the consul general may consider relevant and necessary
for the approval of the petition.
14. No petition for the correction of erroneous entry concerning the date of
birth or the sex of a person shall be entertained except if the petition is
accompanied by earliest school record or earliest school document such
as but not limited to, medical records, baptismal certificate and other
documents issued by religious authorities.
15. No entry involving change of gender shall be allowed except if the
petition is accompanied by a certification issued by an accredited
government physician attesting to the fact that the petitioner has not
undergone sex change or sex transplant.
16. Publication of petition once a week for 2 consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation.
17. Submission of certification from appropriate law enforcement agencies
that he has no pending case or criminal record.
18. Published August 24, 2012.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC 537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change
of name and sex.
SC: The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for
change of name are controlled by statutes.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority
to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative
officers. The intent of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of
Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating the
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter
one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on
the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s
first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
Assuming it could be legally done, it was an improper remedy because the proper
remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where
his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all.
RA 9255 – AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE
SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER
-Approved on February 24, 2004.
-There must be an express recognition by the father either a. record of birth
appearing in the civil register; or b. admission in a public or private handwritten
instrument (Article 172 in relation to Article 175 of the Family Code.)

10
 -Applies to 1. unregistered births; or 2. registered births where the illegitimate
children use the surname of the mother.
-Who may file: 1. father; 2. mother; 3. child, if of age; or 3. guardian where an
Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) is executed.
-What to file – 1. Certificate of live birth with accomplished Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity at the back; 2. Public Document-
affidavits of Recognition executed by the father such as the Affidavit of
Admission of Paternity or the Affidavit of Acknowledgment; and 3. AUSF
including all supporting documents.
-When to register – the public document not made on the record of birth, or the
AUSF shall be registered within 20 days from the date of the execution at the
place where the birth was registered.
Article 412 – Civil Register (87,06) cf. RA No. 9048 – An Act Authorizing the City or
Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical
Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register without
need of a Judicial Order. Amending Articles 376 and 412 of the NCC.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC 537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
-No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground
of sex reassignment.
-The change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
-The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided for in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code.
-The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of
the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment.
-To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from” while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind
or with something that serves as a substitute.” The birth certificate of the petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein including those corresponding to his first name and
sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
-Sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
-“The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations,
more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as
his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. X x x.” (Salonga, Private
International Law, 1995 Edition).
-A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part
of a person’s legal capacity and civil status.
-The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing
sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error, is immutable.
-While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to
sex in the civil registry for that reason.
REPUBLIC vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN 565 S 72
Jennifer was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed 2ndary male characteristics
and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition
where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She was
diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy in her early years and at age 6, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age 13, tests revealed
that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast
or menstrual development and that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind

10
and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
In support of her petition, Dr. Sionzon testified that genetically Cagandahan is
female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally and she has 2 sex organs – female and male. This condition is very rare, and
that Cagandahan’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and
that she has no monthly period. That this condition is permanent and recommended the
change of gender because Cagandahan has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role
as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
Does her medical condition i.e. congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) make
Jennifer a “male”?
SC: Article 412 together with Article 376 of the Civil Code had been amended by
RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without
the need for a judicial order.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Cagandahan undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
“inappropriate” appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this
condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. CAH is one of many conditions
that involve intersex anatomy.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be the subject of outright
denial.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent
has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia
and the phenotypic features of a male.
We are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of her/his sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high
levels of androgen there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is
fixed. The Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal
judgment of being a male.
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a
change is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. Considering the consequence that
respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in
respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry of
his birth certificate from female to male.
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS G.R. No. 169902 March 5, 2010
Remo requested the DFA, upon application for the renewal of her passport, to
revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. The DFA denied her
request.
SC: The word “may” in Article 370 indicates that the use of the husband’s
surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory.
A married woman has an option, not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in
any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the NCC. She is therefore allowed to use not
only any of the 3 names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon
marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden once she is married

10
because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status.
This interpretation is consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.
The conflict between A. 370 of the NCC and Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (Philippine
Passport Act of 1996), is more imagined than real. RA 8239 including its implementing
rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in
her passport.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her
passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name except (1) death of the
husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to
her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.
A married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the
severance of marriage.
If we allow petitioner’s present request definitely nothing prevents her in the
future from requesting to the use of her husband’s surname. Undue confusion and
inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise.
CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS GR#186571 August 11, 2010
ISSUE: Effect of registration of foreign decree without the requisite judicial
recognition. And if it is judicially recognized, does cancellation of the entries in the civil
registry automatically follow?
SC: We consider the recording to be legally improper.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that “acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.” The law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences
touching upon a person's legal capacity and status, ie., those affecting “all his personal
qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his
own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.”
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a
person's legal capacity and status that must be recorded. But while the law requires the
entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree
by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree's registration. The law should be
read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect.
The recognition that the RTC may extend to to the Canadian divorce decree does
not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
the recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under
the Rules of Court, for cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the NCC declares that “no entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected without judicial order.” Rule 108 of the Rules of Court supplements Article
412 of the NCC by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.
YASUO IWASAWA v. FELISA GANGAN, et.al GR#204169 09/11/13 705 S 669
ISSUE: Is the testimony of the National Statistics Office (NSO) records custodian
certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public documents issued by the said
office necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight?
FACTS: Iwasawa filed a petition for the declaration of his marriage with Gangan
as null and void on the ground that their marriage is bigamous, based on Article 35 (4) of
the FC. As proofs he presented, aside from his testimony, the following documentary
evidence issued by the NSO: (1) Certificate of marriage between petitioner and Gangan
to prove that he and Gangan were married on November 28 2002; (2) Certificate of
marriage between Gangan and Raymond Arambulo on June 20, 1994; (3) Certificate of
death of Arambulo who died on July 14, 2009; and (4) Certification from the NSO to the
effect that there are 2 entries of marriage recorded by the office to prove that Gangan
contracted 2 marriages, the first one with Arambulo and the second one with petitioner.
The RTC denied the petition ruling that there was insufficient evidence to prove
Gangan's prior existing marriage to another man. That while petitioner offered the
certificate of marriage of respondent with Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified
about said marriage. His testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of

10
Gangan's prior marriage nor the death of Arambulo and the latter's death certificate.
Petitioner is a stranger to the preparation of the document.
SC: Citing Article 410 of the New Civil Code held that “As public documents,
they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness . Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole
ground that petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them
to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due
execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible,
they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain
unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented
evidence to the contrary.
REPUBLIC v. MERLINDA OLAYBAR GR#189538 February 10, 2014
Merlinda requested from the National Statistics Office a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend.
Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to one Ye Son Sune, a
Korean national on June 4, 2002. Having denied contracting the said marriage, she filed a
petition for cancellation of entries in the marriage contract, especially the entries in the
wife portion thereof.
Thereafter, the RTC ordered the Local Civil Registar of Cebu City to cancel all
the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and
respondent Ye Son Sune. It was established by petitioner through the testimony of one
Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of
Ye Son Sune was celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who
appeared was definitely not Merlinda. A document examiner testified that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was forged.
Republic moved for the reconsideration of the assailed decision based on 2
grounds (1) there was no clerical error in the spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
SC: In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage
are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. She, however, claims that her
signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted the marriage with the
purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or
if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract.
With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the
signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent's
signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. The court
made a categorical conclusion that respondent's signature in the marriage certificate was
not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that no such marriage was
celebrated.
A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving
limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and,
children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the
investigation by the public prosecutor to determine collusion. In other words, a Filipino
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
Respondent sought not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth
by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way,
declare the marriage as void as there was no marriage to speak of.

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