Diagraph of Metaphysic or Ontology

Jacob Lorhard, trans. by Sara L. Uckelman∗

∗ Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation, suckelma@illc.uva.nl

1 Introduction ceptual foundations of diagrammatical ontology”, in S. Polovina, R. Hill,
& U. Priss, Conceptual structures: knowledge architectures for smart ap-
This is translation of Book 8 of Jacob Lorhard’s Ogdoas scholastica, published plications LNAI 4604, pp. 374–386.
in Sangalli in 1606. The Ogdoas is a grammar school textbook, written in Latin,
whose interest stems from Lorhard’s use of diagrammatic trees throughout the • Øhrstrøm, P., Schärfe, H., & S.L. Uckelman. in preparation. “Jacob
entire book. Lorhard’s ontology: a 17th century hypertext on the reality and tempo-
Lorhard used Greek text primarily in two different ways. In one way, the rality of the world of intelligibles”.
Greek text is given as a gloss of the Latin text; here, the Greek says nearly
exactly what the Latin says. In the other way, Greek words are used as if they
were Latin (with all of the required inflection for case, number, and gender).
This usage is a bit puzzling: Sometimes he does so when there is a Greek word
for which there is no natural Latin synonym, but sometimes he uses a somewhat
arcane Greek word instead of the expected, usual Latin term.
Because of the first way, as a gloss upon the Latin, one cannot just trans-
late the Greek and Latin directly without giving any information about which
language the English translation is being created from, because it would give
nonsensical sentences. I have adopted the convention of putting translations
from Greek in bold, with one exception. The exception is the word lógoc
‘word’, which Lorhard uses in the general sense of ‘note’. To keep the broader
meaning of the Greek word, I have opted to simply transliterate it.
A final version will have the 1606 Latin text with the translation on facing
pages.
A number of acknowledgments need to be made: Brian M. Scott, Amy
Selman, and Ursula Whitcher for discussions on some of the tricky Latin, Stefan
Bold for his help with the German, Ulrik Petersen for his help with the Greek,
and Tikitu de Jager and Joel Uckelman for creating the LATEXpackage with
which this text is produced.
Further information on Lorhard’s conception of ontology and how this is
represented in his diagrammatic trees can be found in the following sources:

• Øhrstrøm, P., Andersen, J., & H. Schärfe. 2005. “What has happened
to ontology” in F. Dau, M.-L. Mugnier, & G. Stumme, eds., Conceptual
structures: common semantics for sharing knowledge LNAI 3596, pp. 425–
438.

• Øhrstrøm, P., Uckelman, S.L., & H. Schärfe. 2007. “Historical and con-
 

lógos: An Intelligible is said to be anything, which is



perceived and comprehended by the intellect.









The parts of meta- By most general

Nothing: This is simply not something.

 
physic (which is distributions. How- 

 
 

  

knowledge of an ever it should

 
 


 
 
 
intelligible by  be noted of an 
 
Essence. See A.

Distribution: An
  
 
which it is intel- Universal, which Intelligible.

  Positive, because

Intelligible is either

 Being. See B.

ligiblea , because 
consists of intelligi- 

 



 it fixes or affirms
 

bles and beings.
it is intelligible 

 
 
 something. It is
Something: What-
 
 
 

by man through

 
 
 
 either
ever is simply not 

 
 

By most common attributes. See C.  
the natural light  nothing. It is either Negative. See RRR.a


of reason without 
 

 
 a This cross-reference is a printer’s error; the final section is
any conception of 

 

NNN, not RRR. The errata for the chapter say that NNN on
 

matter.) are two; Particular. See EE.
 

p. 58 should be changed to RRR, but it is rather the other way

Either

around, since the immediately preceding section is MMM, not


a Lorhard’s
QQQ.
original
text misspells the first
word as epishmh.

1
 lógos: Essence is something productive, by which a Being is what it is. This foreign [word] is called by the Scholastics


by the word Entity or quidditas.










  

  Real ; which
A. Of this 

  


 is an actu- 


 Simple, which belongs to a simple being.
it should be 
 ality of a

 1
Composite, which belongs to a composite being.

  

observed

   







 real being, 












 because it





Absolute, which is of an absolute being.
Distribution. 2
   





 is of such a 
 

 Respective, which is of a respective being.
For example kind.

 
 
 

  
essence is either Both are 

 Imaginary;   
  Generic, in so far as a being, by




 which is an









 its own genus, has [things] com-

Universal, which is of a universal mon with other species.
  
actuality of



 



   
an rational 
being. It is either
 
 
  

Specific, through which a being

  
  

being,

be-
  
3
  


cause it is of



  is placed in a certain species.
Singular, which belongs to any
  
  
such a kind.
  

singular and individual being.

2
 

lógos: Being is something productive, essence [something] endowed.


 
lógos: A Real Being is a being, which [is] in fact



 
through its own essence, and further is suited to exist

 


 
apart from cogitation of the mind.

 


 

 


 
 






 Uncomplex, which is able to be
 









comprehend through itself by
 


 

  one simple conception.

1. Being is

 


 
 
Complex, which is not able to be







 either







comprehended through itself by

  
 

 
 
 
B. Being Of 
  
one simple conception.
  


Real of this
 
this it should

Absolute, which has no respect to
 


it should be
   
be noted
   

 
  
 something.

2. Being is
    
observed

First, or be-

  
 

 
    
either
     
cause the same Respective, which exists in re-

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
is uncreated.

spect to something.

  
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 
On the one
  
 
  
 
Universal, which is suited to ex-

 
 
 
 
 

 
hand, a first
  
 
 
 
 

ist in many things through essen-

 
 
 
 
 
 

 
Being exists,
  
 
 
 
 
tial communion.

 
 
    

Of these two
    
because it exists
      
Distribution 3. Being is

  
 
 
 
 
varied are
    
from itself. Singular, which has an individual
     
in being is either

  
 
 
 

  
the species,
   
essence, in other words accord-
   
either
   


 
 Second, or which in five  
ing to nature not in fellowship
   

Distribution
  
sprung from the
     
classes are 
   
with anything.
 
 
  
in Being

first [being], or
  
distributed
   
 
  
 Without matter Immaterial,
created. On the

 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
which is free from all compact-
other hand, a

 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
ing of matter either sensibile or
second being
 
 
 
 
4. Being is intelligible

 
 
 
 

exists because
 
 
 

either

 
 
 

 
it exists from
    





 



 

In matter Material, which is
another.
    









composed of some compacting of
 






 matter.
 






 Permanent, which possesses its
 


 Rational or of reason. It is a Being of reason, which is






whole essence simultaneously,
 
touched by the cogitation of a single mind according to the is without change and addition of
  
5. Being

 
 




 mode of a real Being, and apart from this it is nothing. It


either essential parts.

is called a Being fictitious, & Imaginary. 


Successive, whose essence con-
3 



sists in continual change and ad-

dition of essential parts.
 

lógos. For example Existence is an actuality, whereby a Being exists, pending
from its own essence.




 
Real

 
1. One is
 
Existence. Of this Imaginary


 

it should be noted Uncreated

 
 

There are as many species as  2. Another Created

 
 

 
 
there are the species of general 
  
  
Simple [attributes], Absolute

 
Beings and Essences. 3. Another Respective

 
which combine

 


 
 
 
C. Most common  absolutes of every  Universal
  

4. Another Singular

 
 

attributes of intel- Being without Duration. See D.
  


 
ligibles and Beings disjunction of op- Substantial


5. Another
 
are either posites, are either Accidental








Conjunctive. See E.


4
 

lógos: For example duration is the abiding of a being in actual existence.



























 

  Hyperphysical,
 Absolute, which is duration infinite simpliciter and of an immutable, 
D. Duration. 
 
 
  which is
uncreated Being.
  


Of this it
 


 

 properly of
should be 
 
Eternity, which is a dura- Limited, which is duration infinite secundum quid of a created being, 


 a substance
tion by which a being is
 
noted
 
spiritual and
  
which has for instance an origin and a succession, but without depriva-
 
  

  
named eternal. It is either tion, either in themselves, or in our regard.
  
incorporeal.
 
 
Substantial,

 

 
 
 
which is in 

   
Physical,

 
 
 

 
substantial

   

which is

 
 
 


 
 
creatures. 

properly of
   
Intrinsic, which And either 

 
 
Distribution, 
   
a corporeal
  
is duration, by

 
 
 
 

It is for
    
substance.
   
which a created 

 
 
 

example

Accidental, which is in ac-

 
  
Being in truth 

  
 

either 


endures in its cidents.

 

own existence.

 


 

   It is either

Momentary, which


Real, which

  
Time which is
 
separates a succes-

   
in fact is 

 
 
 
 
duration finite
  
sion of parts ac-
  
Extrinsic, which is duration certain  Hour.
    
found out-

 
 
 
 
simpliciter and of
  
cording to prior and
 
and determinate, fixed by will and Day.
     
side of the 

 
 
 
  

a mutable, created
  
posterior.
  
council, partly of God, partly of Month.
     
intellect. It 

 
 
 
 
 
being, by which it
    
wise men, for measuring and making Year.
     
is either
 
 
 
  
Successive, which
 
is named temporal.
     
known intrinsic time. The species of 5 Years.

 
 
 
 
 

admits a succession
 
It is either Both are
 
this are Age.

of parts accord- either

likewise:

 
 
 

  
ing to prior and
  

Spring.

 
 
 

  
posterior. Of this
   


 



 Summer.

the differences and
   









 Autumn.

virtual parts are
   

Fall. &c.

 
 
Imaginary, which is formed by the cogitation 
  

present, past, and 
 



future.

 of a single mind, and without it it is nothing.

5
 
 Perfection. See F.
1. Classes are
Imperfection. See f.




Simplicity. See G.


2. Classes are


Composition. See g.




Unity. See H.


3. Classes are


Multiplicity. See h.




Infinity. See I.


4. Classes are


Finity. See i.




Illocality. See K.
 
Absolute, which in itself is able to be 5. Classes are
Locality. See k.


considered to be without respect to 

 
Necessity. See L.

E. Conjunctive [at- 
 
anything. The species of this can be 6. Classes are
 
Contingency. See l.

tributes] are what, of  
distributed in classes. I coin these:

 

Possibility. See M.

all Beings, are not ex-  
7. Classes are
 

Impossibility. See m.

isting simply but which 


Truth. See N.
 
combine opposites with  
8. Classes are

 

Falsity. See n.
 
disjunction. Of these 




Goodness. See O.
 
some are: 




9. Classes are
Badness. See o.


Respective. See V.


6
 Uncreated which is in the sole first Being, excluding every imperfection and limitation. Whence it is also called, independent


perfection, whole and unlimited.








Created, which is 

Simple;

F.Perfection 
  
in a Being sprung 
 
through

 
Generic, which a being has in common

is an ac- 

  
from the first being,
 
which some
   

with another being of the same genus.
 
tuality of always

   

including 
 
created Be- 
 
Substantiality, which is dis-
perfection,  
some imperfection 
  
ing in its  
cerned clearly or which is consti- 
Specific, which whatever of a Being’s
because it is  and limitation.

 
 
 
own genus
 
species is properly.
  
tuted by an essential Being, or is
   
perfect. It is 

   
Whence it is also 
  
 or species is 
 
attended necessarily and insepa-
either

   
called, dependent 
  
perfect.
  
rably by a constituted essence of

  
 


perfection par-
 
 
 

a being. It is

 
 
 

 Comparative;
ticipated in and 
     
Innate,

  

through
 
limited. It is either In each this 

 which is in a


which a cre-
 
is either
    
Being from a

 
 
 
 
  
ated Being,
   
 

first origina-

 
 
 
  Accidentality,  
either by
   
 

tion of itself.

 
 
  
which is in a being 
  
Extensive, through which
  
itself or with
    

It is called

 
 
  
contingently and 
  

some other

 
  
 a Being according to

by others

 
 
   
separably. It is 
  

connection,

 
  
 quantity is perfect.

Natural

 
 


is called

 either Each is either
perfection. 
 
Intensive, through which a

 
  
greater or

  
 
 
  
Being according to quality

 
   
smaller

 
 
Acquired, 
 
  
is perfect.

 
  
perfection.

which 

 be-


gins to be 


 
in a Being
 

 


after 

 its


 
origination.

f. Imperfection is [that] by which a Privative, which is a defect of perfection, of some being by nature possible to be in or withheld.
Being is denominated imperfect. It
Negative, which is a defect of perfection, of some being not adequate by Nature.

is either

7
 
Absolute, which is the immunity of a Being uncre-



ated by any thoroughly real [thing] from diversities
G. Simplicity is an actuality of simplicity, be- in composition.

cause it is simple. It is either 



Comparative, which is the immunity of a Being cre-

ated by a certain composition of a real species.


 Being

1. One out of &
Essence

 

 




 Genus univocal
2. Another out of &




Difference specified
  
General, 
Subject


which comes

 

 


 together in 

3. The third is out of &
Adjunct inhering

 
 
every cre- 

 
  
Actuality
 
ated being in 

  
 
4. The fourth is out of &
 

 reality. The
Potentiality common to many

Real, which species


 of
is in fact in 




 this are

some being, 

 

g. Composite is 

 Special, which coincides in not every

apart from  
an actuality of 

 created being, but only in that, which 

the cogita- 
  1. One out of subjective parts, of what this kind are the
composition be- tion of a  sustains the whole of reason. The 


species of a genus of a subject.
 
cause it is com-  mind. It is species of this are foremost

 2. Another is out of essential parts, as are Matter and Form.
posite. It is ei- 

 
either

 3. The Third is out of integral parts.
ther







Rational, which is assigned to some being according to our mode of comprehension, as and since it may



not be in reality.

8
 
First, through which a Being uncreated by a mode



most simple and most perfect is one. This unity prin-



ciple is not only of every inferior unity; but indeed of

 every multitude, which is discerned in created things.

Essentiality,
 Sprung from the first or second,


through which 

 through which every being created in 


a Being in itself is 

 by a Universal.
 itself is one. This is attributed of Be- 


one, without re-  
 
spect to anything. ings either


by a Singular, and called numer-


 


It is either ically one or individual.




 

Real, through Accidentality,  Generic, through which a being with some genus or univo-

which a Being cal or analogy, either proximate or remote, is one.

through which a 

 
 

 
1 is Unity

really is one. It is

being with a certain 

 
 

Specific, through which a Being with some species is one:
   
either

manner and respect 

 
  

  
as in a single man with a man is a species.
 
 


 is one. Many are 
 
 
Causal, through which a Being with some cause or other
 
 
the species of this, 
  
H. Unity is actual- 
   

is one, whether this is efficient, or material, or formal, or
 
  
which are reduced 
   
ity of a single thing,
   

2 is Unity limiting.


because it is one. It  to three orders.
  
is either

 
 
Effectival, through which a Being with some effect or an-

 
 

  





 other is one.
  





  Subjective, through which a Being with some subject is one,
  





 whether that may be receiving or occupying.

3 is Unity

 


 
 Adjunctive, through which a Being with some adjunct is
Rational, through which a being by reason is one.
 

one, whether that may be being received, or being occupied.



 in Essence.
in Cause.




in Effect.


 

Real, through which a real Being is manifold, in Subject.
whether in Adjunct.

 

h. Multiplicity is an actuality of a multiplex, because


in Parts.


it is multiplex. It is either


in some other manner.

 


Rational, through which a rational Being is manifold.


9
 
Absolute, through which a Being simply is infinite. 1 It separates from a being, cui inest, as much



by passive potentiality as by every actuality of limitation, termination, and dimension. 2 And it



does not consist in some unbounded extension of a Being according to quantity, or in negation of
I. Infinity is an actuality of infiniteness a consumation of perfection: but capable in excellence of highest perfection.

because it is infinite. It is either 



Restricted, through which a Being secundum quid is infinite. It is a single actuality of limitation,



termination, and dimension, ab Ente, cui inest excludit, not in fact in itself, but in respect of our

observation, or perception, or other circumstances.

i. Finity is an actuality of finiteness, because it is finite. It limits simply as much by passive potentiality as by an actuality of limitation, termination, and
dimension.

K. Illocality, is the immunity of the Being first and uncreated by anything of a place absolutely really and properly called, in which it must exist, by need and
necessity. It is also called by the name Ubiquity & Omnipresence, because through this the first Being is ubiquitous and omnipresent.

10
 
Spiritual in which a finite incor-

poreal substance exists.

Substantial, which is a receptacle


k. Locality is through which a  of a substance. It is either

 Corporeal in which a corporal



created Being is not only suited  Real which apart from cogitation substance exists.
to be placed: but further in  of the mind is discerned in fact in 
 


actuality always and necessarily Nature. It is either Accidental, which is a receptacle of an accident.
exists in one spot somewhere. 



However the spot is located in a Imaginary, which is touched by our mind, and is attributed to some being.

receptacle of a genus. It is either

11
 1 the essence itself of a Being. 


Matter.


2 some intrinsic cause of a being


 Form.
Absolute, through which a Being
3 some essential property


simpliciter according to its na- 

 

4 some certain common and in-

 
ture is immutable, that is, follow-

 

 separable accident



ing every differentiation of time
it is not able to be constituted in

L. Necessity is an actuality of  
another fashion; excluding every

necessariness, because it is nec- 

contingency. This depends on ei-

essary: or, as I may say more  
clearly, it is a quality, through ther
which a Being is not able to be 

Hypothetical or conditional,


constituted in another fashion.  
through which a Being on the
It is either

supposition of a certain condi-


 
Efficient

tion is not able to be consituted


1 some extrinsic cause
 
Bounded

in another fashion, always in- 

 


 
cluding something contingent. 

 




This depends on either 2 a manifest absurdity and im-


plication of contradiction, which
follows from a contrary affirma-



tion or negation.

12
 1. the essence itself of a Being. 


l. Contingency is an actuality of contingentness, be-  Matter


2. some intrinsic cause of a Being

cause it is contingent, or as I may say more clearly, Form



it is a quality through which a Being is able to be 3. some essential property.
constituted in another fashion. This depends on ei- 



ther 4. an indifference and indetermination of an extrinsic



principle according to being a cause.

M. Possibility is an actuality of possibleness, because it is possible: or it is that through which something is possible, that is, such a thing as is able to be in an
act, without contradiction and implication in a contradictory fashion.


Absolute, through which something is simply impos-
m. Impossibility is an actuality of impossibleness, be- 


sible, that is, such a thing as may be able to be pos-
cause it is impossible, or it is that through which 

sible in no mode and respect.
something is impossible; that is, such a thing as is
Limited, through which something, which is posssible
not able to be an act, without contradiction and im-  

per se, nevertheless is said to be impossible secundum
plication in a contradictory fashion. It is either  

quid.

13
   


 
 First which exists 









 from eternity in the 










 Creator. 



 
Incomplex, through
 
Sprung from the

 

 
which an incomplex 
 
Of a thing, which is first, which ex- Each is either nec-

 
Being is called true. It
 
congruence of that ists in creatures  essary or contin-

 
 
 

 
is either
   
with its Nature. It themselves. gent.

 
  


 
 

is either

 
 

 
 

Complex through which a Complex Being is

 
 

 
 

N. Truth is the conformity of a being called true.

with its Archetype. It is either 




Of a Sign, which is
Congruence of that Of conception, which is conformity of that with a thing, in

 


with a thing signi- 

so far as it represents.

 


fied. The species of

 


  
this are truth either  Of a sermon, through
Of speech, which is congru- 
 
which a sermon is called

 
ence of that with a thing in so 

 
true.


far as it signfies: it is either



 Of scripture, through
which scripture is called



true.



 Of a thing

1
Of a sign

 


 Incomplex


n. Falsity is incongruity of a Being
2
with its Archetype. It is either
Complex

 


Necessary




3

Contingent


14
 

Apparent, which is an imaginary quality, through which a Being is seen to be good, but in truth is not good.










Infinite, or primary which is in the sole uncreated Being. It is the source  of every finite good.
 

Universal, which is in a created
 
O. Goodness 

 

 

Being in [its] genus, because it is
 
Finite or

is an actual- 

 
 
 

a Being.
 
secondary,

ity of good, 

 
 

Essential, which is in a Being cre-
  
because it is  which is in a

 
 
 Particular, which is in a created
ated necessarily and immutably. 
  

good; or it  created Be-

 
 
 

Being in [its] species because it is

It is either
   
ing, [which

is a quality,
 
Natural, which is

 

some such Being.

 
through is good] as 

the agreement in a 

 

 
 
 

which a much as 
 
being with the rule 

True, which Absolute,
 
Accidental, which is in a created being contingently and accidentally.

 

Being is  the same

is a real qual- 
 of creation, or of a
through

 
 

things are 

denominated 
 
generating Nature.

ity, through 

 
which a Be- 

 

impressed

good. It is 

It is either

which a Be-

  
ing in truth 
    
Habitual, or perma-
  
either in the im- 
 
ing is good in
 
  
is good in it- 
    
nent, which is in the
   
age of the
 
reality, when 
 
   

self without 
   
perceiving creature
  
first good
 
it is seen [to 
  
General, which
 
   
respect to 
  
itself, and which ex-
   
through par-
 
be good]. It anything. It 
  
indeed is found

 
 
 
   

ecutes and disposes
   
ticipation. It
 
is either Moral which 
  

is either

 
 in pagans, & is
  
In nature
 
itself according to
  
is either
is an agree- 
  
called probity

     
   
    what must be done

ment of a By arbi- It is either

 
    

 
Special, which is Each well.
Being with 

 
trary ar-

is
    
  

found in Chris-
 
moral law: greement
      
Actual, or tran-
      
  
 either 
 
tians, & and is

either
   
sient, which is in

 
 
 
 

  
called piety &

 
  
the moral actions of

 
 
 
 

  
sanctity.

 
 
a perceiving crea-

  

Respective. See P.

 


ture, and renders

 


 

them laudible.

 



 15 


Artificial which is an agreement of a Be- Habitual, which is in a perceiving creature.
Actual, which is in the actions or works of a

ing with the rule of art. It is either
perceiving creature.
 

Honor, through which some Being is honorable.



P. Respective goodness is that through which some Being or other is truly good. It is either Utility through which some Being is useful and suitable.




Jocundity through which some being is jocund & delightful.



Apparent, through which a Being



is seen to be bad, but in truth is

not bad.
o. Malice is a defect of goodness   
Natural. See Q.
through which a Being is called bad. It 



is either

True through which a Being 

  
 Absolute, through which a Being Moral. See R.

truly is bad in itself and without 
truly is bad in itself without re- 

  
respect to anything. It is either


spect to anything. It is either Artificial. See S.



Respective. See T.


Q. Natural, which is a discrepancy of a Being from the rules of Creation, or of natural generation.

by Nature 
 
 

R. Moral, which is 

 
 General : that 
Habitual : that is, a fault of Morality.
  
  is, improbity 

a discrepancy of a by ar-
 
It is either Each is either
Being from the law bitary

agree-

 
Not general :  
Actual : that is, that which consists in action.
of Morality either 

 
 


 
 that is, impiety
ment

16
S. Artificial, which is a discrepancy of a Being from the rules of art.



Turpitude, through which some Being is base, or indecorous.
T. Respective, through 


which some Being is truly Inutility, through which some Being is useless, or injurious.
Bad. It is either




Unpleasantness, through which some Being is unpleasant, or grievous.



 Principle. See VV.

1. Every being is either
Principiate. See vv.

 


Cause. See X.




2. Every being is either




Of causes. See x.

 


Subject. See Y.




3. Every Being is either




Adjunct. See y.

 


Signifier. See Z.




V. Conjunctive attributes are respective,  4. Every Being is either



which consist in relation it has & in habit con- Signified. See z.
 
cerning something. The classes of this genus   Whole. See AA.
of species are: 5. Every Being is either




Part. See aa.

 


The same. See BB.




6. Every Being is either




Diverse. See bb.

 


Ordered. See CC.




7. Every Being is either




Disordered. See cc.

 


Prior. See DD.




8. Every Being is either

Posterior. See dd.


17
   

 First simpliciter, 









which has in itself  


Imaginary, which doesn’t belong to something except according









no other prior 




Intrinsic.
to our conception.






 principle.
 



1
First whence

 
 
 

Extrinsic.

 
 
 
 

  
something arises

First secundum  
Of being; from Each

 

VV. Principle is 
  from the first. 
quid, which has in  
Transient.

which a principiate  is

  
  

itself another prior

that, from which It is either
  
 
 
 

2

has an origin. It is either
 
 
 
 
Real, which belongs principle.

a principiate de-   
 

Permanent.
 
either 
 
 
to something in re-

pends. It is either 
  
 Through itself, which 
 

Depending from a first, is that which
  
ality, apart from 
   
by its own characteris- 

   
 
 
subordinated by the first.
  
the conception of
  
tic virtue & nature is

 
 

  
our mind. It is ei- 
  

 assigned to a principi-  

A principle of examining. See ξξ.

ther ate. It is either











Through an accident, which is assigned to a principiate through a certain extrinsic and accidental respect.


18
 Incomplex, evidently a simple term not discharging a whole sentence.





  
ξξ. Principle of examin-  Immediate, which does not have something in


 
ing, is that from which a Complex, without a doubt 
 
the middle or first, through which à priori it is


 

a sound proposition, from
  
principiate is learned. It 



able to be demonstrated perspicuously. Of 

 Common, of which great
which a conclusion is de-
  
is either such a kind is this single thing: It is impossible












use the sciences claim for
duced and proved. It is ei-
  
that something both be and not be simultane-





 
 
themselves.
ther ously, by all preserved principles contradic- Each is either


torially.





Proper, the use of which
pertains to one thing,

 
 


 
 

namely art.
  


Mediate, which has something in the middle 


 


or first, through which à priori it is able to be 


 
demonstrated perspicuously.


 Imaginary.
1 

Real.



vv. A principiate is that which depends on a principle. It is either 
Uncomplex.




2

Complex.


19
 
Per se, which is caused by its own power.
 
 1

Per accidens, which is caused by an extraneous power.

 




 
 Ordinary, which is caused according to the common and usual order of nature.

 And it is called natural.



2






 Extraordinary, which is caused contrary to or byoned the common and usual


order of nature. And it is called preternatural or supernatural.

 


Necessary, which is caused necessarily or simpliciter.




 3


1. By mode of cau- 
Contingent, which is caused contingently.
sation. And in this 

 
 
Natural, which is caused out of the power of nature alone and by instanct.

 
way some are

  


 
 
4

 
 
Proairetic, which is caused with planning, or out of free and vol- Moral

 


 
 
untary constition and arrangement. It is either

 
 

 

Artificial

 
 
 
General distinc-
 
Common, which is responsible for the influence of general causation. It is called
 

  
tions. These are 
   
general or universal.

  
 

  
obtained out of 
  


 
 5
either

 

 Proper, which is responsible for the influence of special causation. It is called

  

X. A cause is a principle  special or particular.

 

 
pp.

from which an effect de-
 
2. By the order of causation.


of its causes. See rr.

pends. Of this it should 

3. By the nature & condition
 
be considered














Species. See ww.




20
 
Simpliciter, which entirely has no other cause prior



and superior to itself: or, which is completely inde-

pendent in having to be caused by something.

First, which obtains in the first causa-

 Secundum quid, which is really independent of cause
tion and highest place. The first is ei- 



 

 
ther

from genus and order merely in consideration or in
1. either 




 
 fact.

 


 




 Second, which depends from a first in causation.


 
Immediate or proximate



 

 
2. or

 
Remote, which causes by intervention of many things.



 

Mediate the same either

 


Near, which causes without many things, or of one cause alone.

 
pp. Of the order of 




causing. And thus a

 Solitary, which is caused without some cause of the same genus or order.
cause is

 


 

  
Through itself

 
3. or

 



 
   
1


  Sharing, which is caused with some cause of Coordinated 

  Through accidence


 
the same genus or order. It is either either

 

 




Subordinated
  Necessarily


 
2

 


Contingently

 

 
Total, which is sufficient for causing without the help of another.



 
4. or

Partial, which is insufficient for causing without the help of another.


21
 
 Principal, which holds in the first cause.
1. either
rr. By nature  
Not principal, which holds in a second cause.

 
& condition 


Univocal, which is of the same species as the cause.

of the cause 2. either

itself. In this 
Equivocal, which is not of the same species as the cause.
 
way a cause 


Substantial, which according to its absolute essence is a substance.

is


3. either
 
 Simpliciter, which has no other limit to which it is
Accidental, which is an accident.
 


 referred.
 Ultimate, to which the rest
 Secundum quid, which is such only in a certain re-


 of the limits are referred. 
spect.


A limit is an extrin- It is ultimate either
sic cause, of which, 

 


 


for example, some- Subordinated by an ultimate, whereby an intermediate is referred to an ultimate.




thing is finite. It is



either






Extrinsic, which


exists beyond the 

 

 
essence of its own 
  
Principal

 
An efficient cause
  
causing. It is either

 
 
  
is an extrinsic 

 
 

 
 
 
cause, from which External, fully sufficient in advance
  
ww. Species. In- 

 
 
 
   
an effect is. It is which exists apart from the principal ef-
 
 
 

  
deed it is some

either Impulsive, which over- fect.
 
cause

  

comes an efficient prin- 
   
Internal, inducing which exists within

 
 
 
   
ciple [and] results in an
   
a principal effect.

 
 
 
  

  effect. It is either

Not principal, it 
 


  

being either
 


 Intrinsic, which constitute a causal Instrumental, which is
essence. See dd.
 
attached to principal Active, which moves by itself in causa-
 
 


causes, [and] is taken 

 tion, and it is called in assistance work-

 
up from the same to
 


 ing together.

the effect. It is either



Passive, which in causation it is moved



or considered by itself only: a cause ex-

emplar pertains to this.
22
 
Transient, which does not re-



main in a material embodiment

 except by force.

Sensitive & corpo-
 Permanent, which actually


real is composed  

abides in a material embodi-

from a corporeal 

 

 
ment.
Matter, which is an intrinsic material embodi-

 ment. It is either
cause from which a material em- 



 

bodiment exists. It is either

 
Intelligible & incorporeal is composed from an incorpo-
 


 

dd.

real material embodiment.
 
Moreover it is

either 




Form is an intrinsic cause, Generic, which a formation has from its own genus.

 


through which a formation is. It 

 


is either. Specific, through which a formation is established in a
certain species, & is distinguished essentially from an-



 other.




 

  Through itself.

 1
Through an accident.
  
Of efficiency, Effect. 

 


  
Ordinary.

 
 
 

2

 
 
 

Extraordinary.
  
Of matter, Material
   
x. Effect is a 

 
 
 

 
Necessary.
 
principiate deriving And it is called by embodiment. It is either 3
from a cause.

reason

 
  Contingent.

Of form, Formation. 

 Natural.

 
  

4

 
 
 
 By choice.

 
 
 

 
 
 
Of finality, finite.

 Moral.

 


 5



 Artificial.



23
   
 Universal, which is equal  Absolute, by which an
  
adjunct belongs with-
to its adjunct and recipro-

 
 

  

out any limitation.
cates with the same.

 
 

 
 


Of inherence, which re- Particular which is con- Each is either Limited, by which an

ceives an adjunct in it- 
   
fined to its adjunct or is
 
adjunct belongs not

 
  


self, or in what an adjunct
   
beyond what the adjunct
  
simply but secundum

 
 
 


proves to be. It is either   
extends.
  

Receiving, which re- quid.
Y. Subject is what 

ceives an adjunct. 
 

Of adherence, which re- 

is attached to some- 

It is either
 

ceives an adjunct to itself Of a connection, which receives an extrinsic adjunct to itself.

thing other than an
 



essence: or what is  or near itself. It is either
Of a circumstance, which receives an adjunct near itself.
 
subjected to an ad- 



junct. It is either 

Occupying. See yy.



24
 
First, which is primarily

  opposed to its adjunct.

Common, which 

  1. either


dwells simultane-




 
 Second, which is secondar-

ously near many  
 

ily opposed to its adjunct.

 
 


adjuncts. 
 

   
Per se, which Each is 
Immediate, which is op-



dwells near the

 Proper, which
 
 

yy. Occupying, which is  posed to its adjunct with-

 
 
 
 
dwells near no

adjunct through 

   
 

 
 
 
 out a medium.

occupied near an adjunct. itself. It is either 
  more than one  
2. or
  
 
It is called object. It is ei- 
 adjunct. 
 Mediate, which is opposed

ther

to its adjunct by means of

 


 

something.

 

Through an accident, which dwells near an adjunt through an accident.


25
   
  Simpliciter, which essentially & unend-
Inherent, which is
  
ingly in obligation connects with its sub-

 
 
  
received by a sub-
  


 ject. It is called adjunct substantial or
 

ject in itself, or Necessary, which is indivisible.

 


 

what exists in a  in a subject by ne- 

 
 


Secundum quid, which is in its subject im-

subject. It is either cessity. And either  See ΦΦ.


 
mutably in a certain respect.

necessary

 
 


 
 


 
 

  
Contingent, which is in its own subject contingently or mutably,

 
 


 
 

or which is able to be in and to not be in. It is called separable

 
 


 
 

accident, divisible.
   

Being received,
which is received 
 
Adherent which is

 
 
y. An adjunct is something  by a subject. and 


 
received by a sub-
either

subjected to something, or 

ject or near it or 




what is adjoined to a sub- 

around it. It is ei- A connection, which is conjoined externally with the receiving.

ject beyond the essence. It 

ther
 

is either

Circumstance, which externally surrounds the receiving subject.

 





Being occupied, which is occupied or dwells all around an object.


26
 
Simpliciter, which through nature is thus in one thing, that is able to be com-

mon in many subjects in no mode or respect.

Proper, which is in only one sub-

 Secundum quid, which in truth it belongs, in a respect, to only one subject and
ject & beyond that is not suffi- 



 

cient for any other. It is called not to many.




1. either an idiom or property. A prop-
erty is either

 


 


 


 

Common, which by nature is able to be in many subjects.
FF. Each is 






 
Native, which is in the subject itself from the first origination.




2. either

Adventive, which begins to be in the subject itself only after origination.


27
 

A phantasm, which is a likeness of a perceptible thing,
through itself an object of fantasy.







 


 
First, which is outside of
Internal, which designates some- the soul [and] represents a
 

N óhma
 
thing internal through acquain- thing to the understand-

  
is a likeness of an intelli- 
 
 
 
tance, & is called a concept. It is ing immediately and fore-

  
gible thing, through itself an ob- 
 
 
 
either most.

  
ject for the intellect. It is called 
 
 
  


Natural, which by reason of the 
in Latin knowledge. It is either Second, which is outside
order of nature has the ability of
 
 
the soul [and] represents a

 
 

 
signifying something. This signi- 
 
Z. A sign is a sensitive  thing to the understand-

 


fies the same thing in the pres-   
being, signifying a sign
 External, which signifies something external to the awareness. See
ing secondarily & of a
bb
 

ence of all people. It is either

.

through acquaintaince. It  mediating first intelli-


 
is either. gible.

 





Arbitrary. See gg.




28
 
Present.
 
Necessary which signifies something 


 


certain: as in, smoke fire, a sole foot,
 


1. It signifies a thing either Past.
 


an image in a mirror a face, it is called

 
 
  


positive proof in Greek. 








Future.

 
 
 
bb
  
It is either Each is 


Contingent, which signifies something 



  It precedes, & it is called an antecedent.
   


uncertain: as in milk in breasts birth:







  


redness of the evening heavens, the fair



2. It signifies a thing as either It is followed, & it is called a consequent.
 


weather following day: laughter happi- 




  
ness. 
It is united with it, & it is called a conjunction.

29
 Typilegales.1
(

Sacred or mystical, which signi-

 Old.
The sacred testaments

fies something from divine insti-

New.



tution, which types are


 

1. By reason  Artificial, which is devised from art or is known well
 
to be signifying something: as in stature, a picture,
of effect, and ei- 
  
Profane or political, which sig- 
  

 stylus insciaterio a , &c.
ther
  
nifies something from human or 

 
 

 
a I also cannot identify insciaterio.

diabolic institution. It is either

 







 Inartificial, which has the power of signifying with-

Real, which
 out art and from only habit and common usage: such
gg. Arbitrary, is what, 



 as, ivy in a respect [signifies] marketable wine, fasces
is found in 

 
 

 
by reason of volun-   in some respect [signifies] command etc.
things. And 
 


tary institution, has   
it is diverse, 



 1. Making known, which leads us in notice of a thing, things made known, Judgment,
the ability to signify   
sennzeichen, merckzeichen, merckinal.
either  
2. By reason of 2. Remembering, which renews in us the memory of some thing: it is called something

 

something. And for 
goal, it is either
this reason it does not  remembered, memorial, advice, denckzeichen, denckmal.

 
 3. Sealing which certifies and confirms to us concerning something. seal or seals, seal,

signfiy the same thing 
 
 
Waarzeichen.
 
in the presence of all 



people. It is either

Verbal. See ll.



30
 
 Of the first intention.

A categoreme, which is a vocal-
ization of some thing correctly Of the second intention.

 


without signifying another thing.
  

Spoken, which sig- 

It is either
  
Adverbs.
  


nifies a thing by an- 
 
1. a thing signified, & it is either


A syncategoreme, which is a vo- Prepositions.
  


nouncing a concept 




 
Conjunctions.
   


in the intellect. It




 

calization of some thing cor- 
Interjections.
    



is called produced 









rectly while signifying some-




word : by Aristotle 








thing: which are



a symbol of an 










affectation of the 







soul.
  
ll.
 
Verbal is what The distribu-
is founded in words.
Written, which 
tions of either
 
Abstract, signifying a single thing separately as in,

 
 

signifies a thing
   
It is either are selected
   
candor, whiteness, humanity.

 
 
 

through writing
   
 either out of
 

 
 
 1. either
a concept in the
  
Concrete, signifying a thing with some conjunction:
  
 
 

    
intellect. It called
    
as in candid, human.
  
 

   
written word : by
   
Proper, signifying a thing without a trope.
  
 

   
Aristotle a symbol
   
2. either
  


of an affectation
 
 2. In mode of signification & are
Improper, signifying a thing with a trope.
   
  
in speech.
  
 



 Certain, signifying a single thing fixedly and dis-







tinctly.
 
3. either Ambiguous, signifying many and diverse things in-



distinctly and confusedly. It is called equivocal. See
mm.




31
 
By chance, whereby a thing by Nature in all things signifies diverse things by chance & without a certain



rationale, of which kind is the speech of the French, the law, the evil people, &c.
mm. Ambiguity is either of

Counsel, which a thing signifies diverse things by Na- 



ture because of a certain reason, without doubt be- Indigence of designations for earlier things.

cause of either
Things lent mutually between analogy, association or affection.



 Incomplex

1
Complex

 


Corporeal







2
Incorporeal

 


Natural







3
 Supernatural
z. Signified, is that which is signified in understanding by a signifier. It is either 

 Terrestrial



4
Celestial

 


Substance







5
Accident

 

 
Present




6 Past

Future


32
 Chief, has has nothing superior to it.


Subaltern, which is



able to be a species

Perfect, which by
of superiority and a 



reason of its like  Remote, by which species are
genus of inferiority. subjects mediately.

 

species is common,

 

 It is either Proximal, by which species


& it is called genus 

are subjects immediately.

Genus, is a uni- synonymous, uni-

vocal, according


versal whole, which 

 

to one. It is either

 
sustains species un-
 


 Imperfect,

 which unequally, that is according to prior and posterior, imparts
der it. It is either
 
itself to its species. It is called a genus in relation to one or of one, or

 


 

analogous.
  

Universal, which
has parts adjacent
  





 Subaltern, which is therefore a species, in order that
Species, is a univer-
to themselves, in
 







a genus is a able to be in some respect, or which
sal whole, contain- 
all of which its Perfect, which re-






  shares itself with individuals immediately.
ing beneath it indi-  Infime, which has an individual beneath it immedi-
essence is shared. ceives itself out of

  
 


 
 



universally a viduals. It is either its like individuals. ately.
 

Through whole. It is either. It is either


 Imperfect, which imparts itself to its individuals unequally.
itself,

 


 

which has 

 

 

parts prop- 

 

 
Essential, which is constituted out of essential parts.

erly called. 

 

 
 
AA. A whole 


It is either 


Integral, which is constituted out of integral parts. It is  Homogeneous & similar, which is constituted out of homo-
 
is what has 

 

either geneous parts.
Heterogeneous & dissimilar, which is constituted out of het-
parts. A 

erogeneous parts.
whole is ei- 



ther













 



 
 1. Effects, by reason of causes.
2. Causes, by reason of effects.

 
Through an accident, which is constituted out of parts improperly called. They are of such kinds

 3. Subjects, by reason of adjuncts.
4. Adjuncts, by reason of subjects.


33
 
 Species, which part subjected by genus.

Of a subject, which is subordinated by a Universal whole. It is either
Individual, which is a part subjected by species.

 

 



   Matter



 
 1
Form

 
 

 



Essential, which constitutes an essential whole. It is either  
Genus.


Through itself,
  

2 because they are affects concerning the whole.
 
which is ascribed 

 
 
Difference
     
to a whole through  Homogeneous &

 

 
 
 
itself. It is either similar to it with a

 
 
 

 
 
 


 
 Whole of name &
  

 
 
 
 Principal which for the saving of a whole is

 
 ousia.
 
 

aa. A part is what 

 



 
 
 simply necessary.
Integral, which con- Heterogeneus It is either
 
is limited under a & Less principal, which is able to be removed
stitutes an integral 

dissimilar, of di-
 
whole. It is either 

 
 
 


whole. It is either
  from a whole without regard to its destruction.
verse name and
 
 


 
 


ousia from a
 
 


  

Whole.
  



 
1. Of a cause by reason of being caused.


Through an accident, which is ascribed to a

 
2. Caused by reason of causes.

 
whole through an accident, of which kind are

 3. Adjunct by reason of subjects.
4. Subject by reason of adjuncts.


34
 
Rational, through which One Being with another is by reason, that is according to a conception of our mind, the same.

 
Numeric, which exists between them which, by num-



 

BB. Identity is agreement of  ber, that is, share One & the same singular essence.
 

 
Specific, which is between them which share between

one being with another, aris- 
 
1. Identity is either themselves the lowest species.
 
ing from unity of some third, Real, through which one Being 
Generic, which is between them which share

 

which brings together each. 
  
with another by reason of some
 
between themselves a genus.

 
 
It is either

  
third [thing] is in reality the 

Of effect.

 
  

same. Three are the classes of 

Of matter.

  
Causal, which is the agreement of Beings by
 
species of this.  Of form.
reason of some cause, either
 
 

Of limit.

  



2. Identity is either
 
Effective, which is agreement of Beings by rea-

 


 
son of some effect.


3. Identity by subject & by adjunct. See pt.




35
 
Extensive.
 
By subject, which is agree-
Equality, which is identity of Beings, arising from unity of quantity, or that
  


ment of Beings by reason 
 
[which] may be Intensive.
  
of a subject or that [which]
  

 
 

  


may be receiving or occu- 




Similitude which is
pt. Identity
 
pying. This concerns
 
identity of Beings, Primary, which is
  
agreement of Beings Simple, established be-

 
 
 

By adjunct, which is 
 
by which they are





 

according to a quality. tween two only two terms.

 
 
   


agreement of Beings with 




called similar. It is









  
respect to an adjunct, or either Secondary, which iseach is either
 
Composite, dwelling be-
 
 
being occupied. 
  



agreement of Beings 



tween four terms: called
  


according to motion & 

 analogy, or proportion.
 
relation.

36
 
Rational, which comes about according to our mode of conception.



   



 
 
 Numerical, between them which differ mutu- 

 
 ally in number, that is by a unique essence. 
 
   
bb. Diversity is  Distinction; which



1. Distinction is either Specific, between them which differ in the 



disagreement of 

is diversity without








 lowest species. 


Generic, between them which differ in genus.
  
  

one Being from  conflict. It is either

 
 
 

 
 
 

another, arising 

 
 
 

 
from three, in

Real, which in reality are  Causal, of them which differ in cause. See '.
which [they] are 

 distinguish without regard


 2. Distinction is either 


Effective, of them which differ in effect.
   
to cogitation of the mind 
 
compared by 
  


  
by belonging to what has
 
pluralities. It is 

 
 


Subjective, of them which differ in subject.
  
Opposition. See ''. location. The classes of
 
either
 
  

3. Distinction is either
 
these species are three.

 

 
Adjunctive, of them which differ in adjunct.
  



Inequality, which is a diversity of Be-
ings, according to quantity.


Primary, evidently of Beings according to quality.
 

'. Here these pertain to 
Dissimiltude, which is a diversity of Be-
Secundary, evidently a diversity of Beings according


ings from which it is called dissimilar. to movement and relation.

 

It is either

37
 

1. It is required : to be able to agree assuredly of oppositions neither one to the other nor the other to one, and the same to a third



following the same, by the same, and in the same time.










''. Opposition is 




difference, includ- 

ing a dispute. Of 
this it must be 

 
Division, namely between them, of which one is equally opposed to many.

 
noted  


 


 


 

 
Adversative of them, of which one thing does
 

2. Distribution. In-

 
 
 
not depend on another, but which will perpet-
 
 
deed opposition is 

 
 

 
 ually be separated.

either
 
 
Positive of them which are affir-
 Respective of them, of which one thing de-
matively opposed to themselves 

 

 
 

pends on another on a account of mutual re-

in turns. It is either
  
Contrariety between

 
 

 
spect between them.

 
them, of which one is 

 

 

opposed to only one. It is 

 

 
either





 Contradiction of them, of which one thing sim-



 ply and immediately negates and excludes the


 
 other: such are Being & non-Being.

Negative of them which are neg-

 

 

atively opposed one to another.

 


 Privation of them, of which one thing negates
It is either.

and excludes another only secundum quid, in-



deed in the same subject, which brought forth



for the reception of either, with a determina-



tion of a certain time. Of this type are: habit

& privation.

38
 
 Of origin, of them, of which one is prior in

origin to the other. It is called order of nature,

Primary is either or order of being.








 Of time, of them, of which one is prior to the




 other in time.
 

Real, which without regard to an opera- 
 Of position, which is of them of which one



tion of the mind exists between diverse






 through itself maintains superior position over

the over.
 
beings. It is either

 
 
Of dignity, which is of them of which one

 
 


 

CC. Order Order is the 


 Secondary is either through itself is more deserving and more ex-
cellent than the other.
 
disposition of diverse be-
 

 Of natural enumeration, which is of them of
ings accoring to prior and 

which one through itself is in enumeration


 
posterior. It is either
 
prior to the other.

 




Rational, which depends on the correct Artificial, which art in our cognizing and acting directs. See X.

 


judgment and institution of the mind. 

 


It is either Arbitrary, which something without regard to the prescription of
art establishes out of consideration of reason and circumstances.



Indeed it is called order of prudence.

39
 
Of invention, which directs our mind in studying and investigating unknown



things, by leading us from secundum quid basics to simpliciter basics.



Theoretical, which has for a boundary Of instruction, which directs our mind in learning and receiving the same


things, which are made known to us, to be perceived easier and better by

only cognition of things. It is either

 

 
the same thing than by another, by leading us from basic simpliciter to basics

 


 
secundum quid.


X. It is either
  
Of intention, which is observed in con-



 
Concerning both is Axiom; What is
 
sultation.
  
Practical, which has for a boundary ac-

 
 

first in intention is last in execution, &
 
tion, or achievement. It is either

Of execution, which is observed in la-on the contrary; what is last in inten-
boring and executing after consulta-
 
tion is first in execution.
 
 
tion.


cc. Disorder disorder, is lack of order between diverse beings.

40
 

1. according to nature, according to nature or origin.
2. according to time, according to time.




3. according to location, according to location.

DD. dd. The modes of prior & posterior are

4. according to worth, according to dignity.
5. according to arithmetic, according to number.




6. according to knowledge, according to knowledge.



 Uncreated. See FF.
One is concerning substance. Moreover, a substance 

EE. A Particular part of metaphysics, governs 
is an incomplex Being subsisting through itself. It is Created. See GG.
concerning a Being incomplex in species. The either
parts of this are two.




The other is concerning accident. See AAA.

41
 
 It is to be not universal, either by genus or one species,
FF. Uncreated, which exists from  
Essence, which is a pure act,
through which God is that which But singular, that is by one number.
itself and through itself: as in the 

he is, and is distinguished from

sole God, who is a Being first,  
most simple and most perfect, every other Being. The condition


the foundation of all good in Na-  of this is
Supreme simplicity. See ggg.
 
ture. Of him we come examining 

 
Properties of God which are

according to our mode of concep- 

Supreme perfection. See ddd.
 

  
tion either

Divine attributes, which are either



Actions of God. See ZZZ.


42
ggg. Supreme simplicity is a property of God, according to which he is most simple, having no part in any real composition.

Infinity, which is a perfection of God, according to which he is absolutely infinite, having no part in any



determination, limitation, and random measurement.
 
1. Supreme


 Ubiquity, which is a perfection of God, according to

which he is omnipresent, having no part in any loca- Absolute necessity, according to which God simpliciter

 


 

tion of existence.

 



 in his essence is not able to have it in another way.

Immutability, which is a perfection of God, according

 
 
 Absolute immortality, is according to which God at no
to which he absolutely is immutable, having no part in 

 

 
 

any passive potential for receiving change in himself. times is dead, and also is not subject to death.

 


2. Supreme
The species as it were of this are

 

 


 

 
Eternity, which is a perfection
 of God, according to which he is free from beginning, succession, and ending.



Absolute, according to which God in himself is good, without respect to creatures.


ddd. Supreme per- 

 

This is called natural good.
 


 

fection, is a prop- 
 
 

   General, which God administers to all his
Goodness, which is a per- Respective, according to which

erty of God accord- 
 

 
 God is good towards his crea- 

 creatures; which kinds are: love and general
ing to which he is  fection of God, according 
  
benignity.
 
 
 

 tures. This is called moral good. 
most perfect having to which he is best having 

  
 
It is either
no part in any de-  no part in anything bad.
 

Special which God administers 

 

fect. The classes of  Supreme This is either Veracity.
 
3. to creatures endowed with 

 

species of this are   
 Fidelity.

reason, particularly to the hu-

 
 
 

Mercy.

five.

 
  
man genus. Which kinds are:

 
 
Justice.

 

  
Blessedness, which is a perfection of God, through which he
  
Mercy.

 
 

  
himself is bound together in himself, needing no other good.
 
& c.

 







 


 Wisdom or omniscience, which is a perfection of God, according to which he is perfectly wise, subject to no
 


 error of ignorance.

4. Supreme









Power or omnipotence, which is a perfection of God, according to which he is able to will and do all things,
 
 which are not opposed to his nature & do not involve a contradiction.
pl.



5. See

43
 Dominion, which is an absolute property of God, which he has in creatures in his own universe.


pl. 5. Supreme Liberty, is an absolute want of distinction of God with respect to doing & not doing such as this rather than that, divided from every



necessity of external violence.

Internal or immanent, which are limited by God, & not produced in some object other than God; of such a kind are these, in which


God himself cognizes, wills, loves.





 
Preordination, which is an external action, by which he from eternity has deter-

 


mined, for his liberty and good will, what, in his time, might be future, and

 


 
indeed he has ordained a fixed means because of it.
 



 
 Eternal, & either
  
Precognition, is an external act of God, by which he foreknows from eternity all

 
 


 
 

future things which may exist.

 
 

 

 

ZZZ. Actions of
 


 
God are either  Creation, which is an external act of God, by which in the beginning of time he had

 General, 
produced the world and all species of things sustained in him by a hyperphysical

External or 
  

 these
 




mode, & to this point in his time he does not produce an indivisible out of no

transeunt
   

 either







things.

which are 

 
 
 


  
 
produced in 

 
 
 


Management of things, is an

  
 
some object
  
Temporal ; as in
  
external action of God by

 

outside of 

  

which the world is made in it- Ordinary, by which God according to usual and

 
  
God. These

 
 


self, [and by which] he admin- 
  
common arrangement and course of nature by
 
are either

 


isters and conserves wisely

his own sanctification, administers and conserves
 
 

 
 
and competently all things 
 






 worldly things.
which are in it. It is either




 Extraordinary, is that by which God contrary to
Special, which belongs

 

 


to understanding 


the common and usual order of nature and by


Redemption 
 his own sanctification administers and conserves
creatures, particularly 

 

 




the genus ‘man’: The Regeneration




 certain things in the world.

modes of these are Justification of which kind the doctrine of sacred theology is.

Salvation & 
 

  44

others,
 
 
 In reason.

Essence, which is the first act of a created substance, through which it
is what it is. It is distinct from a created substance In reality.

 





 



  Composition, which is a property according to which a created


1.


 substance is composite.

  
Properties idioms, which are Created perfection, wich is a property, according to which a cre-
 


 


 
 
 
GG. Created substance,  ated substance is in its own genus and order perfect. The species

 
 
 

  
Accidents of a created
   
is that which has its  of this are see ♂.

 
 


 substance are either

origin from God in 
time. In it generally  


 Motions, which are actions, according to which a  

are selected considera- 

 
 created substance is said to move or experience. Actions 
 
 Indeed every created substance ei-
tions

 These are either

2. Distribution. In- ther moves something or is moved.
Passions

   



deed every created  Spirit. See HH.
substance is either
Body. See LL.


 
Finitude 
1. Indeed every created substance is finite and local.


Locality

  

  
Mutability 




♂ The species of cre- 2. Indeed every created substance is mutable & in time.

ated perfection are 

Time

 
Natural 



 
 
 goodness 

  

3. Indeed every created substance is good naturally and suited for moving.


Power of 

 
movement

45
 1. lógos. Indeed a spirit is a created substance, having no part in corporeal form.




 


 
1. To be produced immediately out of nothing.

2. To be without matter and form, having no part in matter or form.

 

2. Affections, 3. To be without magnitude and parts, having no part in magnitude or pieces.

 


which are


4. To be imperceptible through itself.

 

  
Of perceiving.

5. To be in a place without occupying or filling up a spatial location.

 
 



 
Innate, which is a faculty Of willing.
Of moving location.

 
 
  
Natural, de-

 


 
 

pending on a

 
 


 
 

natural rele-

 
 


 
 

vation.

   


 1. Quality: which is ei- 

HH. Spirits may
 
 

ther

Intellectual, which is Supernatural,

 
 
be considered 

 
 
    depending
the knowledge of an 
 
 
 


    
on a su-
   
Angel which it has con-

 
  
 


  
  
pernatural
   






 

 cerning things. It is ei- 
 

 
Adventitious, it [is] either relevation of

ther

 
 

  
God.
 
 
 

 
 


 
 


  
Moral, which is a habit, through which
 
An Angel, which is

 


  
an Angel is disposed to moral actions.
 
a perceiving spirit,

  
  
 
Internal. Natural.
 
 

immortal, through

  
 
 
Action, Each is either Moral.
 
 

itself free from 

  
 


3. Species. In- 2. Movement, which is either External. Artificial.
 
     
union with any 

  


deed a Spirit is either
 
 
body, established 

  
 


either Passion.
 
in service of God 


 

and man. Con- 

 
  
siderations of this 3. An Ethical Distinc- Good angels, concerning which [see] the holy Theology.

 


 Bad


[are] tion in





 46
Substantial Form, see KK.
 
Nature, which is an incorporeal substance determined by the fashion of an inanimate body.
KK. Substantial form,  
 Vegetative, which is determined by the

which is spirit created by 
 

 

information of a living body, because it
God in this land, that a
 
Spirit, which is an incorporeal Irrational which is a blessed is living.

natural body united with  Sentient, which is determined by the in-
substance determined by the 
 spirit, which without an organic 
matter is formed. It is  formation of an animal, because it is
 
 

information of a natural ani- 
 
body cannot subsist separately.


either animal.

 
mate body. It is either The foresmost species of this are




Rational, which is an understanding spirit able to subsist without a human



body, [but which] naturally survives with one.

47
 
 Length

 1. To be of some size through itself, & extended in Width
Depth

 





 2. to be mensurable.
3. to be terminated in surface.




4. To have a figure through itself.


 

1. Affections which are 5. To have position, order & remote parts.
6. to occupy & fill a certain spatial location.

 


 

7. to be divisible through itself into corporeal parts.

 


 

8. to support a reason of bounding of place, from beginning, to end.

 


 

9. to be perceptible through itself.

 


 

10. [sic] to be continuous or continguous with another body.

 

LL Body, is a cre- 

Most ample.

 
ated substance, fit- 

 
Most capacious.
 


ted through itself
 
Most brilliant
 
by dimension. Of  The Supreme heavens, which is the body
 
 In the highest location of the world
created by God immediately out of noth- 

this it should be ob- 
  
above the remaining visible heavens as-
 
 
 
served
 ing, that it may be the home of spirits, 

sembled & established

 
 





Immaterial, which men, and created things. The proper ad-
  junct of this is to be
is produced out of 

 


 
 

no matter. The

 
 


2. Distribution, In-

 
First matter which is the body created by God immediately out of nothing, that it
species of this are

 
 




deed every body is


 may be the primary material principle of natural bodies.
either






 Material, which is



 produced out of 
something


 mate- Natural, is treated in natural philosophy.
rial. It is either
Artificial, which is treated in the arts present in mechanics.


48
 
 1. To inhere in something or to be in a subject of inherence.



 2. To be a more imperfect body.



 3. To be a nature following from its subject.
4. And consequently not to constitute an absolute essence of its subject, but to comprehend



1. Affections, which are it constituted either necessarily or contingently.


5. To be predicated of its subject derivatively, that is, not in abstract, but in concrete.

 


 
AAA. An accident is an 


 

 6. To characterise its subject.

uncomplex being, existing  7. To not be able to be transformed from one subject into another.
 

 

in some subject of inher- 8. To produce either through motion or without motion through simple emanation or reverberation.
ence. Of this these should 
 

 Quantity. See BBB.
be observed

 



 
Absolute, which has an absolute essence. The species of this are Quality. See EEE.
Movement. See GGG.

  
2. Distribution. It is either


Respective. See MMM.


49
 
Longitude, which is a simple magnitude

according to which something is long.



Latitude which is a simple magnitude



Simple, which con- according to which something is wide.
 Profundity, which is a simple magni-


sists in one dimen- 

tude according to which something is
 
sion and is either

 

 
deep.

 



Extensive, accord-

ing to which some- 

Composite, which Surface, which is a magnitude com-

  

 
thing is extended 

consists in many di- 

posed out of longitude and latitude.

 
  


and measurable. It 
 Corpus of Mathematics, which is mag-


 
 mensions. It is ei-  
nitude composed out of longitude, lati-

Magnitude, which is is called quantity of ther
 
tude, and profundity. It is called Mass



an absolute quan- 
Mass. It is either 



or triple dimension, Greek three di-

 
 
tity, by which some- 

  


mensions.

 

thing is called large 

 

 Intensive, according to which something accepts in itself grades of perfection. It is

in itself. It is either 
 



 called of amount of perfection, of virtue, of degree.
 

Absolute,
by which  Number is an ab-

 

 

something solute quantity, ac-

 

 
First which is of its origin, as a unity [is] while [it

 
is called of cording to which

 
 
 
is] numbered by itself.

  
such a size  something is called
 
  

Abstract,
 Active, by which something [is]
numerable. It is ei- 
in itself, 

 

numbered. It is either Proceeding from the first, which derives its origin
  

such as 

without ther

  
from a first [thing].
 

size, is an 
 
comparison

 

 
 Passive, [which] is the numeration of a multitude of diverse things.
BBB. Of  accident,
 
to anything.
 

 
these ac- from which 

It is either
 
cidents it something is Comparative. See CCC.
should be designated of



considered  such a size.



It is either








Concrete, as in size. See DDD.

50
 
 Magnitude.

1
Smallness.
 



Length.




2




 Shortness.

 
CCC. Comparative, from which some- 
 Width.


thing is said to be great not simpliciter,
3
but in comparison to something. The 
Narrownes.
 
species of these are

 



 Height.
4




Lowness.
 



Gravity.




5

Levity.



 Through itself, by which a quantity inheres per se.

1
Through an accident, which, because of something by which it is adjoined, it is called so great.
 






DDD. Concrete or of such 

Extensive, which is mensurable and a real thing divisible in parts of which it consists.

 
a size, which is a disposi-
 


tion in quantity. It is ei-  Absolutely such a size, be-
Intensive, which is large in position, & is able to be divided in the cogitation of the
 

ther

 
cause the disposition is 

 
 mind.







absolute quantity, & ei-


 ther

2

Comparatively such a size,


because the disposition Equality or parity, through which the compared things have between themselves one

 

is comparative quantity. 
 


 and the same quantity.
The property of this is



Inequality, imparity, through which the compared things do not have between them-

selves one and the same quantity.

51
 
 
Visible. 
Audible. 



   
Of a single sense Smellable.

 

 
 

proper, which is Tastable.

 
 
 


 
 
 

possible to be Feelable.

 
  


 
 

present before only

 
 


 
 

one sense. It [is]
 
Perceptible through

 

 
either
 
itself, which is 
 
Abstract, which is 
 Each is. See FFF
able to be appre-
 
a Quality, which
 
Of many features, which
  
 

   
hended through 
  
is an absolute ac-
 
is able to be presented by
   

 
observation. It is
   
cident, from which
 
many senses.
   

  
either
  
a Being is denom-

 
 

  
EEE. Of this acci- 
 
inated of a certain 
 

Imperceptible through itself, which is not able to be
 
dent it should be sort. It is either

 

 
apprehended through the sense itself.
 
considered.










Concrete, which is a quale. This is

called it, which is an affect in quality. 
Similar. Moreover, these are properly similar which are affected by one and the same quality.





Since by this it is compared with some-  
thing, it turns out to be
Dissimilar. Moreover, these are properly dissimilar which are not affected by one and the same

quality.

52
 
Absolute, through which a Being is disposed to agency simply, without deter-

Active, through which mination.



a Being is suited for Determined, through which a Being is disposed to either good or bad agency.

 



Innate, which is in a natural agency. It is ei-

 ther
Being from the first 



 

beginning of its or- Passive, through which a Being is suited for patiency.

 


der. It is either



FFF. Each is either

Foreign, which 


Infused, which from God is communicated immediately to some being out of a singular grace.


comes to a being 



 

from outside. It is 

 


 Acquired, which is ac-
either

quired by virute of the Natural, which is established in virtue of a single nature.



creation of a being. It 

 
 
is either Habitual, which is acquired by 
Intellectual, which regulates and informs
the zeal and industry of intelli- the intellect.



gent creatures. It is either


Moral, which regulates and informs the will.

53
 
 Immanent, which some agent provides for and brings about an object, not
 Action, which is an act of an something outside the agent.
 agent because it is efficient. It Transient, which is brought from some object, outside the agent.
1
is either

 
Passion, is an act of a patient because it is suffering.








 
Absolute, which is indifferent in its nature, for diverse or opposed objects.



 

 


 

 
Natural, which in virtue of nature is determined for natural

1. From a mode

Determinate, which is a

  
 
limitation for one certain goodness or badness.

of moment one

 
 
 

 
Voluntary, which
 
 

thing is
  
object. It is either

  
consists in a certain 

 


Moral, which is a determination for

  

Simple 2. or 2. From a mode 

Momentaneus, which

 purpose. It is 

moral goodness or badness.


happens in a moment. either

  
which is not  Artificial, which is a determination for
  


 
 

 of duration another 

composed artificial goodness or badness.
  
 
 thing is
 

Successive which may be in succession.

  
out of other

 
 


3. From a limit to which. See HHH.
 
motions. It 
 
GGG. Motion is an  




is either
 
accident according 

Necessary, which happens necessarily.


3 or


to which a Being is
Contingent, which happens contingently.




said to act or en- 

Spontaneous which is of its own free will.
 

4 or
 

dure. it is either

Violent, which happens by virtue of a certain something.

 


 

Physical, which happens in a natural mode.

 

5 or

 



 Hypherphysical, which happens in a supernatural mode.



Composite. See LLL.


54
 
Immediate, which is the hyperphysical



production of a substance of out noth-

Creation which is the hyperphysical production of a ing.

 Mediate which is the hyperphysical pro-
substance by virtue of an infinite act of God alone, 


duction of a substance out of some-

 

without coorpe a by reason of a second cause. It is thing.




either


Productive, by

 a This appears to be a typographical error in the original.
which a substance 
 
I cannot determine what this word was supposed to be.

 
 
of something new  Generation is the production of a sub-
 

 

stance by virtue of an act of a second 
begins to be. It is 

Substantial,
 
 Natural, which produces a natural body.
 iether cause. It is either
which is ter- 

Artificial, by which an artificial body is produced.
 


 
minated by a 

 
HHH. From a 

 

substance. It is Destruction. See III.

limit to which
either
another










Accidental. See KKK.


 Immediate, which is the hyperphysical destruction of a substance

Annihilation, which is the hyperphysi- into nothingness.


 Mediate, which is the hyperphysical destruction of a substance
cal destruction of a substance by virtue into something.

 


of an infinite act of God alone. It is

III Destruction is a mode in which a
substance ceases to be. It is either either


Corruption, which is the destruction of
a substance by virtue of an act of a sec- 


Natural, where a natural body is corrupted.


ond cause. It is either

Artificial, where an artificial body is corrupted.

55
 

Augmentation, where a larger quantity is acquired.
KKK. Accidental motion is what Diminution, where a smaller quantity is acquired. 



is bounded by an accident. The Alteration, where some quantity is acquired either Simpliciter.
species of this are


 Secundum
 quid.
Simpliciter.


Local motion, where some location is acquired either

Secundum quid.



1. In order that both the starting point as well as the lim-
iting point may be a substance.



2. In order for the starting point to cease to be, nevertheless



still in its remaining material.

1. Conditions
3. In order for the limiting point of something new to begin



 

to be.

 

4. In order to be near the efficient, and indeed substantial,

 


 

principle, from which the conversion is created.

 
 
Substantial which is the con- 
Annihilation.


version of one substance into

 

 
LLL. Composite motion  Hyperphysics, which exists by virtue of
 
another. It is called in for- 

  
 
is what is composed out  God alone, & is composed out of medi- Creation.
  
eign speech Transsubstantia-

 
 


of simple movements. tion, change of substance. 2. Distribution in ate

 
It is called composite Of this it should be noted 
 
change, mutation or 




 Physics, which happens in virtue of na- Corruption.

transmutation.

It is 

 ture and is composed out of natural
Generation.
 
either





Accidental, which is the conversion of one ac-

cident into another.

56
 

1. Subject of a relation, which is an absolute Being, [which] formally adheres to the denominate by the
relation to itself, whether it may be substance or accident.



 
Quantity.




2. Foundation of a relation, which is an absolute Being, the relation of which [is] by right Quality.




Movement.

 



 
3. Terminus of a relation, which is an absolute Nature

1. Conditions sub-
   
 Being, by which the subject (of the relation) Of God  Substance.
stantialities which 

 
is regulated whether by Will whether it be
  
 
according to the 

 
Of man Accident.
    

nature and con- 

 
 
  4. The thing related, which has 
struction of the  1 To be moved back and forth between them.

 
 

  a consideration according to the  

2 To exist by nature simultaneously, and
relation are neces-

 
 
 
 thing correlated.

 
 
 

sary. Which by  The properties of these are therefore to put down and to raise up in their




number are five mutual selves.


 5. The thing correlated, which  

3 One to be specified and recognized by the
MMM. Respective, 

 

 has a consideration according to 
 

other.
which is a Relation, 
 


 the thing related.
which is an acci- 


 
dent, according to

Of reason, which whole consists only in conception of the mind and in fiction, & apart from that is nothing.

which one being is 



2. Species. In an-    
related to another.  Perfect or per se,
 
 
  
Natural, which is in an absolute
Of this considera-  other relation is ei-  which has nothing
 
 
 
 
 

Being through nature.
tions come ther of absolute essence

 
 
 
 

 
   



 
 
 mixed with it. 
 

Each is either Voluntary, which is in

Real which is really in an abso-



Imperfect, which



 lute Being without regard to cog-


 



 an absolute Being from 
has something of
   


3. Concrete, such as itation of the mind. It is either








 agreement or voluntary in- Of God.
absolute essence
   


the thing Related, 

 
 stitution either
mixed with it.
  
which is considered Of man.

 





from the nature of
the relation.

57
  
 Perfect, which ex-
 


 cludes simpliciter a 

  


 habit from that be- 
  Substantial, which is negation of a substantial habit in a Being,
  


 ing in which it is. 



 which through nature is able or bound to be.
  


 It is called total, or







 absolute privation. 




 Accidental, which is

 
 
negation of an ac-
 
True, which in Imperfect, which Each is either cidental habit in a  Quantity.
NNN. Something 

 
truth is a habit in Being which is able Of inherence, through Quality.

 
 
 
excludes a habit
    
negative is nothing 
  
a capable being. Movement of
 
 
 

merely secundum or bound to be. Of 
 
which an inhering ad- 
  
other than a pri- 
    relation.
It is called real 
 
 
 
quid. It is called an adjunct it is ei- junct is removed from
    

vation which is a 
  
privation. It is 

 
 

negative habit in either

 particular priva-
 ther a Being. It is either
 
tion, or secundum
  

a being, of which 

 
 
 

Of adherence, through which an adherent
 
quid.
 

then it is either 
 
 
 adjunct is removed from a Being.
able or required to 


Fictional, which in truth is not in any Being, but is attributed solely through a fashioning on the mind. It is called rational or
be in. It is either 


imaginary.

END OF THE ONTOLOGY. With God.

58