BAKSH v.

CA
G.R. No. 97336

Date of Promulgation: February 19, 1993

Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
Petitioner: Gashem Shookat Baksh
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Marilou Gonzales

Facts:
Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian student studying at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges
in Dagupan, courted private respondent Marilou Gonzales until she accepted his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987. Baksh and Gonzales visited the latter’s parents in Bugallon,
Pangasinan where he told them of his intent to marry her in October. Gonzales’s parents thought
that Baksh was good for their daughter and allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with her
while the two were in Bugallon. Gonzales’s father also began wedding preparations by looking
for sponsors and securing pigs and chickens.

Baksh and Gonzales returned to Dagupan and continued to live together in his apartment. The
relationship became abusive, with Baksh tying Gonzales’s hands and feet and drugging her.
When she kept reminding him of his promise to marry, he told her he was already married to a
girl in Bacolod, although in truth Baksh was still single. He later repudiated his promise during a
confrontation with Gonzales and a barangay tanod.

Applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, the Pangasinan RTC ruled in Gonzales’s favor. The CA
affirmed the same.

Issue/Held:
WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of
the Civil Code – YES

Doctrines:
1. Article 2176, CC. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

2. Article 21, CC. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

Ratio:
The Court’s ruling in De Jesus v. Syquia establishes the rule that a breach of promise to marry
per se is not an actionable wrong. However, Article 21 of the CC expands the concept of torts or
quasi-delicts by granting a legal remedy for moral wrongs which are impossible to specifically
enumerate and punish in statutes. Article 21 is significant because the concept of torts, which is
broader than culpa aquilana, also embraces intentional criminal acts. As such, in the Philippine
legal system intentional and malicious acts are generally governed by the RPC while negligent
acts or omissions are covered by the CC. Article 21, then, fills the vacuum between these two
opposite spectrums. (see note below)

Therefore, where a man’s promise to marry a woman is the proximate cause of her acceptance of
his love, when in fact he only intended to obtain her consent to the sexual act, an award of
damages under Article 21 is justified. However, such injury should be contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy.

Gonzales surrendered her virginity to Baksh not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. To
constitute seduction, there most be a sufficient promise or inducement, and the woman must
yield because of said promise or inducement. Prior decisions of the Court have suggested that
Article 21 may apply in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction. On this matter, Baksh stated that Gonzales’s situation was her own doing, motivated
by a need for security. Thus, Baksh’s profession of love was a fraudulent promise intended to
fool Gonzales into satisfying his lust.

Decision:
Decision is affirmed.

Note:
Given the seemingly contradicting rulings of the Court in various cases, it seems that the
following is the “scope” of “intentional” acts contemplated of under Philippine tort law:

1. Voluntary acts with intent to harm and punishable by law – Revised Penal Code
2. Voluntary acts without intent to harm – Art. 2176 of Civil Code
3. Voluntary acts with intent to harm and not punishable by law – Art. 21 of Civil Code

Note, however, that L.G. Foods v. Philadelfa later notes that, with regard to items 1 and 2, an act
can lead to an action for either civil liability arising from culpa criminal, or one for culpa
aquiliana.

(Sources: Cangco v. Manila Railroad, Elcano v. Hill, Baksh v. CA, L.G. Foods v. Philadelfa)