East Asians' Social Heterogeneity: Differences in Norms among Chinese,

Japanese, and Korean Negotiators

Sujin Lee (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology)

Jeanne Brett (Northwestern University)
Ji Hyearn Park (Harvard University)

Paper Presented at the

23rd Annual International Association of Conflict Management Conference
Boston, Massachusetts
June 24 – 27, 2010

Abstract:
This paper shows that the assumption, widely accepted in the culture and negotiation literature,
that East Asian cultures are homogeneous in their value for preserving social relationships is an
oversimplification. We propose that there will be differences in negotiation norms among
managers from China, Japan, and Korea because the focus of social relations – individual versus
group – and the emotional versus instrumental nature of those relations varies systematically
among these three cultures. Web survey data from managers from the three countries showed, as
predicted, that Japanese managers were most likely to endorse distributive tactic norms; Chinese
managers were least likely to endorse integrative tactic norms; and Korean managers were most
likely to endorse norms for self-interest.
 East Asian Negotiators 1

East Asians’ Social Heterogeneity:

Differences in Norms among Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Negotiators

Abstract

This paper shows that the assumption, widely accepted in the culture and negotiation

literature, that East Asian cultures are homogeneous in their value for preserving social

relationships is an oversimplification. We propose that there will be differences in

negotiation norms among managers from China, Japan, and Korea because the focus of

social relations – individual versus group – and the emotional versus instrumental

nature of those relations varies systematically among these three cultures. Web survey

data from managers from the three countries showed, as predicted, that Japanese

managers were most likely to endorse distributive tactic norms; Chinese managers were

least likely to endorse integrative tactic norms; and Korean managers were most likely

to endorse norms for self-interest.

Keywords: negotiation, culture, East Asian, norms, social relationships

 East Asian Negotiators 2

The economies of East Asian countries – China, Japan, and South Korea, are

related to that of the United States and to each other. For example, in 2008 before the

current economic readjustment, Japan sent 17.6% of its exports to the United States,

16% to China and 7.6% to South Korea. In the same year, South Korea sent 6.7% of its

exports to Japan, 21.7% to China, and 11% to the United States. Finally, in 2007, China

sent 4.6 % of its exports to South Korea, 8.4% of its exports to Japan, and 19.1% of its

exports to the United States. As the world recovers from the 2008-2009 economic

readjustment, there is every reason to believe that economic collaboration and

negotiation among East Asian businesses and governments will continue and grow.

Yet, no one suggests these East-East and East-West economic collaborations are

easy to negotiate. The business press is rife with stories of failed negotiations and of

frustrating and financially unrewarding collaborations. Consider for example the now

defunct joint venture between the French company, Danone, and the Chinese company

Wahaha. If negotiators are to create economic value for parties planning or executing

East-East or East-West collaborations, they will need to overcome a myriad of cultural

differences (Adler & Graham, 1989; Brett, 2007).

Obfuscating insight into cultural differences that affect negotiators in these

contexts is the tendency for cultural psychologists and negotiation scholars to treat East

Asia as a homogeneous region (Adair & Brett, 2005; Nisbett, 2003). On the one hand,

treating East Asia as a region is understandable because the Chinese, Japanese, and

Korean cultures have all been influenced by Confucian philosophy which emphasizes

hierarchical social structure and the preeminence of the family. All three cultures share

values of social order, hierarchical respect, collectivism, and thrift centeredness (Bond,
 East Asian Negotiators 3

1991). However, the intensity of the Confucianism influence varies by culture, as does

the manner in which values grounded in Confucianism interact with these nations’

political, economic, and social ideologies. For example, although the three cultures are

similar in terms of concern for others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), there are significant

differences in their egoistic motives in negotiation (Chen, Mannix, & Okumura, 2003).

Despite Chinese and Japanese managers sharing similar cultural values with respect to

hierarchy and tradition, they do not always behave similarly (Brett, Tinsley, Shapiro, &

Okumura, 2007; Kim, Wang, Kondo, & Kim, 2007), and the Japanese consider others

more and the self less in conflict situations than the Chinese (Ting-Toomey, Gao,

Trubisjy, & Yang, 1991). Just as people from these cultures speak related but

completely different languages, we propose that within the East Asian region,

negotiators espouse significantly different norms for negotiation.

Norms are standards of appropriate behavior; norms are situational and apply to

groups (Katz & Kahn, 1966). In this study, we develop hypotheses concerning Chinese,

Japanese and Korean managers’ norms for negotiation based on rich descriptions of

each country’s unique social system. We test these hypotheses with survey data from

148 Chinese, 95 Japanese, and 145 Korean managers. Our perspective is that although

all the East Asian cultures value social relationships, the focus of social relations –

individual versus group – and the emotional versus instrumental nature of those

relations varies systematically among these three cultures. For example, in China,

instrumental relationships dominate social interactions among business partners. In

Japan, business partnerships are subservient to loyalty to groups or organizations. In

Korea, business relationships are likely to be emotion-based (Leung & Tjosvold, 1998).

We propose that these differences in the focus and the emotional versus the instrumental
 East Asian Negotiators 4

nature of business relationships are manifested in the negotiation norms endorsed by

Chinese, Japanese, and Korean managers.

We begin by explaining the origins of differences in the focus and emotional

versus instrumental nature of social relationships in China, Japan and Korea. We then

develop hypotheses linking culture to three negotiation norms: distributive bargaining

tactics, self-interest and integrative bargaining tactics. We test our hypotheses with web

survey data from managers who are actively engaged in the economic sectors of each of

these countries.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

Social Systems of China, Japan, and Korea

China

The most characteristic of the social principles deeply rooted in the Chinese

culture is the indigenous concept of guanxi (Chen et al., 2003; Yeung & Tung, 1996).

The term guanxi in Chinese means a mutually beneficial relationship that people have

with each other, with implication of unlimited exchange of favors in spite of official

commands to act neutrally or fairly (Pye, 1982). The Chinese place much emphasis on

forming long-lasting, reciprocal relationships. Trust and respect shaped through such

bonds are highly valued in social settings including business negotiations (Chan, 1998).

The guanxi relationship can be as, or more, utilitarian than emotional. The

closely tied bond in guanxi is formed by giving face (Ting-Toomey et al., 1991). That is,

the moral dimension behind the concept of guanxi is that a person should willingly

return favor for favor and those who refuse to employ this social practice lose face and

become defined as untrustworthy (Alston, 1989). Chinese people consider face as a very

important factor in social relationships and are careful not to cause others to lose face.
 East Asian Negotiators 5

This traditional social system can be observed in one of the four major Chinese

historical novels, Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo Yanyi 三国演义) by Luo

Guanzhong. The skillful administration of guanxi serves a crucial role in the main

protagonist Liu Bei’s rise to the position of emperor in the end.

Japan

The Japanese display a unique emphasis on social harmony which derives from

loyalty and commitment to groups or organizations. Japanese identify with the

collectives to which they belong and are attracted by the social rewards conferred on

them by their groups (Bowman, 1984; Iwata, 1990). The emphasis Japanese place on

group consensus and loyalty and dedication to one’s group or organization is captured in

the concept of wa. Wa means seeking mutual cooperation for a unified group goal, and it

implies sacrificing one’s personal goals to do so. Because the Japanese’ group

membership is fundamental to their self perception, it is only natural for them to value

benefits for their group over individual gains (Alston, 1989).

The importance of loyalty to one’s group can be traced back to the Tokugawa

period. At this time a strict hierarchy of classes was established under a military

government, and the social system was characterized by absolute loyalty to the Shogun,

the political leader. This tradition has also been translated into the structure of Japanese

companies that emphasize loyalty. Whereas lifetime employment in return for this

loyalty is becoming less frequent than in the past (Ohbuchi, 1998), what has not seemed

to change is the dedication shown by Japanese managers and employees toward

attaining as many benefits as possible for the company (e.g., Moran, Allen, Wichmann,

Ando, & Sasano, 1994).

Korea
 East Asian Negotiators 6

South Korea is culturally unique in that while being one of the most collectivist

countries in the world (Hofstede, 1991), the national culture also displays individualistic

tendencies. The coexistence of Eastern collectivism and Western individualism may be

explained by the fact that South Korea has undergone rapid and vast economic, social,

and political changes (Cho & Park, 1998). The key social concept in the Korean

business setting is inhwa with its roots in Confucianism. While the meaning of inhwa is

similar to the Japanese wa in that inhwa also stresses the value of harmony, there is no

concomitant strong emphasis on loyal group behavior. Instead, the harmony is

embedded in interpersonal, not group relationships, such as in the relationship between

subordinates and superiors (De Mente, 1988).

Although inhwa encourages an enduring relationship between people, it is

clearly distinguishable from the Chinese concept guanxi. While guanxi is characterized

by the symbiotic nature of a mutual, favor-exchanging relationship, inhwa focuses on

the emotional aspect of the relationship. If a successful guanxi relationship in the

Chinese culture is maintained by saving the other person’s face, a successful inhwa

relationship in the Korean culture is achieved through having respect for the other

person’s kibun or emotional state. This value of respect for another’ emotional state

seems to allow Koreans to display more individualistic tendencies than citizens of other

collectivist cultures (Cho & Park, 1998). For example, because Koreans are oriented

towards emotion-based interpersonal attachment, as in employees focusing more on

their relationship with a superior than their role within the organization, they are less

likely to react negatively to unfair treatment from the organization which is not directed

to them by their superior (Kim & Leung, 2007).

Summary
 East Asian Negotiators 7

Although China, Japan, and Korea share similar cultural roots in Confucianism

and similar cultural values like collectivism and social harmony, the type of connections

and to whom harmony is directed vary rather dramatically (Leung & Tjosvold, 1998).

Given these differences in social systems associated with social interaction, we propose

that there will be divergent norms (standards of appropriate behavior) for the Chinese,

Japanese, and Koreans in negotiation settings. In the current research, we predict that

the differing social systems of China, Japan, and Korea will be reflected in the

negotiation norms endorsed by managers from each culture.

Negotiation Strategy, Tactics and Norms in China, Japan, and Korea

Negotiation strategy is distinguished by two sets of tactics or strategic

behaviors (Walton & McKersie, 1965). Distributive strategy consists of tactics that

negotiators believe will, and use to, help them claim value or realize individual gains.

Distributive tactics include offers – typically single issue and substantiation (Weingart,

Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990). Offers are actions intended to close the gap

between negotiators (Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007). Substantiation includes

all kinds of information shared for the purpose of trying to influence the other

negotiator to make concessions, including, but not limited to, justifications of offers,

threats, and appeals to sympathy. Integrative strategy consists of tactics that negotiators

believe will, and use to, help them create value or realize mutual gains (Weingart et al.,

1990, 2007). Integrative tactics rely heavily on reciprocal behavior patterns of asking

questions and receiving answers (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Weingart et al, 1990). Once

information is collected, negotiators bundle that information into multiple issue offers

(Adair & Brett, 2005). Norms for self-interest in the negotiation outcome has several

important effects. It influences the goals or targets that negotiators set (Neale &
 East Asian Negotiators 8

Bazerman, 1991; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). These goals or targets in turn influence first

offers which in turn anchors counteroffers (Northcraft & Neale, 1987) and individual

gains (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). In addition, self-interest translated into goals and

targets seems to motivate negotiators in the context of multiple issue negotiations with

joint gain potential to keep searching for a better, hence higher joint gains agreement

(Pruitt, 1981).

Culture has broad effects on the strategies negotiators use. For example, Adair

and Brett (2005) found that negotiators from low-context cultures, which in their study

were U.S., Germany, Sweden, and Israel, reciprocated questions and answers

throughout their negotiations significantly more frequently than negotiators from high-

context cultures, which in their study were Japan, Thailand, Russia, Hong Kong. In

contrast, negotiators from high-context cultures opened their negotiations reciprocating

offers significantly more frequently than negotiators from low-context cultures. The

latter only caught up to the high-context culture negotiators’ use of offers in the fourth

quarter of the negotiation.

In the current study we take a closer look at culture and negotiation strategy

proposing and testing hypotheses about differences in culture and norms for negotiation

strategy within a group of cultures that have traditionally been characterized as high-

context: China, Japan, and Korea (Hall, 1976). We propose hypotheses for norms

concerning distributive tactics, integrative tactics, and self-interest.

Distributive Tactic Norm

Norm for distributive tactics refers to the appropriateness of a distributive

approach to negotiation. Distributive tactics are the ones negotiators use to claim value

or “win” the negotiation and cause the other negotiator to “lose”. Chinese and Korean
 East Asian Negotiators 9

negotiators are less likely to use distributive tactics because both cultures stress

interpersonal relationships. Specifically, the concept of guanxi in Chinese culture

promotes mutual benefits in long-term, interpersonal relationships through favor-

exchange behavior. To maintain guanxi the Chinese in social interactions need to save

each other’s face. The use of distributive tactics may interfere with saving face.

Similarly, because the Korean concept of inhwa is to value interpersonal relationships in

the business setting based on one’s emotion, Koreans are also less likely to employ

distributive tactics, which could possibly hurt the other’s feeling.

Unlike China and Korea where norms for social interaction are based on

person-to-person relationships, Japanese culture emphasizes relationships between

individuals and their groups or organizations rather more than interpersonal

relationships. Therefore, compared with the Chinese or the Koreans, the Japanese

should be more comfortable with distributive tactics. Indeed, Japanese managers were

found to use status or power-based tactics in negotiation (Adair et al., 2004; Adair,

Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Brett & Okumura, 1998) and conflict resolution (Tinsley,

1998) more than U.S. and other Western culture managers. Distributive tactics are

normative in negotiation in Japan relative to the United States (Brett et al., 1998).

Hypothesis 1: Japanese negotiators are more likely to endorse the distributive

tactic norm than Chinese and Korean negotiators.

Self-Interest Norm

The self-interest norm denotes the degree to which the negotiator thinks that it

is appropriate to try to satisfy one’s own needs in the negotiation. The concept of inhwa

in Korean culture promotes interpersonal relationships which are highly dependent on

the emotion of the self. This means that a business relationship – even one between a
 East Asian Negotiators 10

superior and a subordinate – does not have to be strictly based on social hierarchy

(Alston, 1989); it may also be based on self-interest. To the extent that Koreans consider

kibun or one’s state of emotion very important in social interactions, they are more

likely to be self-interested in social behaviors fitting or promoting one’s kibun. In

contrast, because the Chinese social relationship has its basis in mutually beneficial

relationships between trusted favor-exchange partners (vs. emotion) and the Japanese

social relationship in dedication to a group or organizational (vs. self) goal, both

Chinese and Japanese are less likely than Koreans to consider the self-interest norm as

appropriate in negotiation.

Hypothesis 2: Korean negotiators are more likely to endorse the self-interest

norm than Chinese and Japanese negotiators.

Integrative Tactic Norm

Norm for integrative tactics refers to the appropriateness of an integrative

approach to negotiation. Integrative tactics are those negotiators use to create mutual

gains in negotiations via questions and answers (Walton & McKersie, 1965; Weingart et

al., 1990). Interestingly, in Western culture, negotiators who are self-interested, tend to

discuss their interests using questions and answers (Brett et al., 1998; Tinsley & Brett,

2001). They then synthesize multiple interests using multiple issue offers (Adair & Brett,

2005), and thus reach more integrative outcomes (Brett, 2007). If, as we proposed in

Hypothesis 2, Korean negotiators are more likely to view self-interest goals as

normative, and if the strategic link between self-interest and use of integrative strategy

identified in the West holds for Koreans, then Korean negotiators should be likely to

endorse integrative tactics as normative.

Although the Japanese value and use power-based strategies in negotiation

 East Asian Negotiators 11

(Adair et al., 2001, 2004) and conflict resolution (Tinsley, 1998), they also generate

integrative agreements (Adair, Weingart, & Brett, 2007; Brett & Okumura, 1998). There

are two explanations. One explanation is that the Japanese do not close deals

prematurely because they are trying to determine which party is powerful in the

relationship and in doing so they push toward integrative agreement (Brett et al., 1998)

or stumble into it (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Another explanation is that Japanese

negotiators are supreme practitioners of the high-context art of reading the subtext of

offer patterns (Adair et al., 2007; Brett, 2007). That is, they reach integrative

agreements, but not by the Western low-context approach of engaging in questions and

answers, but by inferences drawn from the Eastern high-context approach of engaging

in offers and counteroffers. Thus, Japanese negotiators are expected to endorse the

integrative tactic norm although the reason behind their endorsement of the norm may

differ from that of Korean negotiators’.

Finally, the Chinese may be less likely to endorse integrative tactics because of

their concern for saving own and the other party’s face in social interactions. The

Chinese’ guanxi values the mutual, reciprocal interests of business partners rather than

their self-interest (Yeung & Tung, 1996). Integrative tactics, with their strong emphasis

on directly sharing and asking information about one’s own and the other party’s

interests, place a burden on disclosing the underlying true motive of the self – which

may or may not be compatible with the other party’s interests, and thus potentially

losing face. Moreover, negotiators do play fast and loose with the truth and expect

counterparties to do so as well (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998). Catching the counterparty

in a lie causes that party to lose face. Chinese negotiators can avoid this likely outcome

by avoiding engaging in the integrative tactics of direct questions and answers. To be

 East Asian Negotiators 12

sure, negotiators systematically exaggerate offers, but they seldom lie, making an offer

that they will not accept (Brett, 2007). Indeed, integrative and information-exchange

oriented behaviors negatively influenced Chinese negotiators’ profits (Graham, Kim,

Lin, & Robinson, 1988). Rather, face saving is achieved by indirect modes of

communication; circumspect speaking (vs. explicit questions and answers) is a more

skillful way to give or save face (Ting-Toomey, 1999). Because of the Chinese

negotiators’ concerns with saving own and other’s face, we expect integrative tactics to

be less normative in China than Korea or Japan.

Hypothesis 3: Chinese negotiators are less likely to endorse the integrative

tactic norm than Korean and Japanese negotiators.

METHOD

Procedures and Participants

Managers from the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and South Korea

completed a web survey prior to attending an executive education course in negotiations.

This sample, therefore, in no way reflects the norms of a random sample of cultural

members, but a self-selected sample of managers from the national culture who were

sufficiently interested in negotiations to sign up for a course. All cultures are

represented by managers whose national citizenship and cultural identity coincided. The

Chinese sample was 148 managers (25.7% females) with mean age of 36.29 years (SD

= 5.8 years) and mean work experience of 21.88 years (SD = 6.39 years). The Japanese

group was 95 managers (0% female) with mean age of 32.81 years (SD = 7.63 years)

and mean work experience of 22.54 years (SD = 7.49 years). The Korean sample was

145 managers (24.1% females) whose mean age was 37.45 years (SD = 8.35 years) and

mean work experience was 12.22 years (SD = 8.74 years). There were no differences in
 East Asian Negotiators 13

the gender composition of the Chinese and Korean samples (p > 0.40). There were

significant differences in age (F2,383 = 12.00; p < 0.001) and work years of participants

in the three samples (F2,342 = 68.90; p < 0.001). Thus, we controlled for age and work

years in analyses. Note too, there were some missing data on demographic

characteristics which accounts for different degrees of freedom.

Measures

The survey was originally written in English. The Chinese, Japanese, and

Korean surveys were translated and back-translated by bilingual research assistants of

each national culture. All questions were asked in response to the cue, “In negotiation it

is appropriate…” and measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly

disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).

Questions for the distributive tactic norm included: give in, make concessions,

bluff, ask for sympathy, display your frustration, argue to support your positions, make a

counteroffer when the other party makes an offer, offer less than willing to pay. A high

score indicates that these tactics were viewed as appropriate in negotiations. Coefficient

alpha was .65.

We asked one question about the appropriateness of satisfying your own needs

with a high score indicating high self-interest.

Questions for the integrative tactic norm included: collaborate with the other

party, share information with the other party, be positive about the other party’s ideas,

share information when the other party shares information, try to build a relationship,

engage in a give and take exchange. A high score indicates these tactics were viewed as

appropriate in negotiations. Coefficient alpha was .71.

Analysis
 East Asian Negotiators 14

We standardized participants’ responses for the norms of distributive/integrative

tactics and self-interest, and used z-scores to examine cross-cultural differences between

the three East Asian samples (Leung & Bond, 1989). We ran ANCOVAs to test our

hypotheses while controlling for age and the number of work years.

RESULTS

The results generally supported our hypotheses, indicating predictable cultural

differences in negotiation norms between Chinese, Japanese, and Korean negotiators.

Table 1 presents the correlations among the variables (see Table 1).

Hypothesis 1 predicted that Japanese managers would endorse the norms for

distributive tactics in negotiations more than the Chinese and Korean managers. An

ANCOVA showed significant differences among the three countries (F2,339 = 10.09; p <

0.001) with age (F1,339 = 2.77; p < 0.10) and work years controlled for (F1,339 = 2.82; p <

0.10). Post hoc Bonferronni tests supported the hypothesis: Japanese indeed had the

highest mean score for distributive tactic norms (M = .45, SD = .85). The difference

between Japanese and Chinese (M = -.23, SD = 1.03) was statistically significant (p <

0.001). So was the difference between Japanese and Koreans (M = -.05, SD = .97) (p <

0.001). The difference between Chinese and Koreans was not significant (p > 0.30) (see

Figure 1).

Hypothesis 2 predicted that Korean managers would endorse norms for self-

interest in negotiation more strongly than Chinese and Japanese managers. An

ANCOVA showed that the three countries were significantly different from one another

(F2,338 = 11.01; p < 0.001). The covariates – age and work years – were not significant

(p > 0.60). Korean managers scored the highest (M = .44, SD = .66), supporting this

hypothesis. Post hoc Bonferronni tests showed that the differences between Koreans and
 East Asian Negotiators 15

Chinese (M = -.21, SD = 1.10), and Koreans and Japanese (M = -.35, SD = 1.03) were

also significant (p’s < 0.001). Thus, Korean managers were indeed more self-interested

in negotiation settings than Chinese and Japanese managers. The difference between

Chinese and Japanese was not significant (p > 0.80), although Japanese did have the

lowest mean score for self-interest (see Figure 2).

Hypothesis 3 predicted that Chinese managers would be less likely to endorse

the norm for integrative tactics in negotiations than Korean and Japanese managers.

This hypothesis was supported (F2,339 = 18.99; p < 0.001), with China having the lowest

mean score (M = -.34, SD = .92) and Korea having the highest (M = .28, SD = .94). Post

hoc Bonferronni tests showed that the difference between Chinese and Japanese (M

= .11, SD = 1.07) was significant (p < 0.01). The difference between Chinese and

Koreans was also significant (p < 0.001). The covariates – age and work years – were

not significant (p’s > 0.60) (see Figure 3).

DISCUSSION

There is heterogeneity underlying the homogeneity assumption that East Asian

cultures value relationships. In this study we drew upon prior rich descriptions of social

interaction in China, Japan, and Korea to generate hypotheses about negotiation norms.

We based those hypotheses on these cultures’ focus on individuals versus groups and

their emphasis on instrumental versus emotional ties in social relationships. We

predicted and found using web survey data from managers active in the economies of

each of these cultures that Japanese managers were most likely to endorse distributive

strategy, Korean managers were most likely to endorse self-interest, and that Chinese

managers were least likely to endorse integrative strategy. Our results contribute to

theory of negotiation and culture and have important implications for those negotiating
 East Asian Negotiators 16

with managers in these cultures.

Theoretical Implications

This research makes three important contributions to theory. First, it shows that

there is heterogeneity underlying the general assumption of East Asian homogeneity

regarding the importance of the value for social relationships. Furthermore, the research

shows that this social heterogeneity is defined by national boundaries. Second, the

research illustrates the value of parsing a general value for the importance of social

relationship into focus on the individual versus the group and emphasis on instrumental

versus emotional ties. Third, the research shows that negotiation norms reflect

differences in the focus and emphasis of social interaction in three different East Asian

cultures.

Culture is inherently a social construct. It reflects the ways that people in a

social group respond to opportunities for social interaction (Trompenaars, 1996). What

complicates this definition of culture is the fact that the boundaries of social groupings

are dynamic. Large social groups can be formed from many smaller social groups and

small social groups can be combined into larger ones. Put simply, cultures can be

constructed and deconstructed. Our study demonstrates the value of deconstructing

regional culture and using national cultural boundaries to do so. While it is not

surprising that culture varies with national boundaries which delineate geography,

history, and politics (Brett, 2007), in our study national boundaries provided a

distinction that allowed us to differentiate patterns of social interaction. In doing so we

relied not on geographical distinctions but on social distinctions. Thus, our research

provides important evidence justifying the use of national boundaries to distinguish

cultures in psychological research.

 East Asian Negotiators 17

Our study not only deconstructs regional homogeneity into national differences,

it also deconstructs the cultural value for social relationships into the focus of the

relationships (the individual or the group) and the emphasis on social ties in those

relationships (instrumental or emotional). There is ongoing discussion in cultural

psychology about cultural differences in independent, relational, and collective self-

construals (Brewer & Chen, 2007). The distinction between relational versus collective

self-construal parallels the distinctions we have drawn between focus on the individual

(relational) versus focus on the group (collective) in social relationships. However, our

study makes several independent theoretical contributions to this literature on culture

and the nature of self-construal. First, our constructs combine in a new and interesting

fashion. For example, it is both the relational and the emotional aspect of social

relations in Korean culture that leads to our predictions. And it is both the relational and

instrumental aspect of social relations in Chinese culture that leads to our predictions. A

second contribution to theory is that self-construal is very much an inward looking

internalized value. Our theorizing, however, is based on what is widely endorsed in a

culture, not what is individually valued. Thus, the nature of our explanatory constructs

is more similar to the constructs of perceived cultural consensus (Zou, Tam, Morris, Lee,

Lau, & Chiu, 2009) or descriptive norms (Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim, 2009) than to

the self-construal construct. Not surprisingly, our constructs effectively explain cultural

differences in negotiation norms, where self-construals have a checkered history of

being able to predict cultural differences (Levine et al., 2003).

Norms are important factors predicting the success or failure of negotiation.

Previous negotiation research has demonstrated that culturally normative behaviors

explain enhanced negotiation outcomes (financial joint gains) in that culture – because
 East Asian Negotiators 18

when negotiators use culturally normative behaviors, they can communicate more

effectively which enhances information exchange and the potential for finding mutually

beneficial joint gains (Adair et al., 2001, 2007). Our study contributes to theory of

culture and negotiation by documenting cultural differences in norms for negotiation

that are defined not by region but by national boundaries. All three of the East Asian

cultures we studied are “tight” societies which impose strong social norms and sanction

deviation from those norms (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006). Thus, in these cultures,

negotiators are particularly likely to use the norms that are culturally dominant to

construct negotiation strategy.

By relying on what is widely endorsed in a culture, not what is individually

valued, we generated some surprising predictions compared to prior research. For

example, it may seem surprising to predict that Koreans endorse self-interest norms,

because previous research has found that East Asians are less egocentric than

Westerners (Gelfand et al., 2002; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). Because

we did not compare Koreans with Westerners, our research does not negate the previous

findings (and this question merits a future study). However, much previous cross-

cultural research has used Japanese as a representative sample and proxy of East Asian

culture (e.g., Adair et al., 2001, 2007; Brett & Okumura, 1998). Our research shows

clearly that managers in China, Japan, and Korea differentially endorse negotiation

norms. This suggests that researchers should be careful in interpreting existing cross-

cultural findings and pay particular attention to the national cultures of those sampled.

Furthermore, future research will only be able to clarify the boundaries of theory and

practice by studying negotiators from multiple national cultures within the same study.

Practical Implications
 East Asian Negotiators 19

This research allows managers from around the world to benchmark their own

views of what is normative in negotiation against the views of managers from China,

Japan, and Korea. Understanding that Koreans endorse self-interest and so set high

goals, Japanese endorse distributive bargaining and so rely on offers and counteroffers,

and Chinese eschew integrative negotiations and that strategy’s requirement to share

information should help managers prepare for negotiations with Chinese, Japanese, or

Korean business partners. The ability to anticipate the other party’s culturally normative

behaviors is key for inter-cultural negotiation success. This is because accurate

knowledge of the other party’s culturally normative negotiation provides an acceptable

explanation for negotiation behavior that might otherwise be attributed to personal

values such as greed (self-interested Korean negotiators), lack of trust (Chinese

negotiators who avoid sharing information), or competitiveness (Japanese negotiators

relying on offers and counteroffers). Negotiators who lack accurate knowledge of the

other party’s culturally normative behavior may form inaccurate interpretations of the

other party’s behavior leading to the strategic mismatches that arise in inter-cultural

negotiations (Adair, Taylor, & Tinsley, 2009). Global negotiators will benefit from

knowledge that delves into regional differences, that does not assume that a new Korean

partner in an upcoming negotiation will behave similarly to a Japanese partner in a

previous negotiation just because both are East Asians. Our study suggests that global

negotiators need to guard against over-generalizing prior experience in one East Asian

culture to future experience in other East Asian cultures.

Future Research

The strengths of this study are its samples of managers actively engaged in the

economic activity of three East Asian cultures and its findings that these managers
 East Asian Negotiators 20

espouse significantly different norms for negotiation. The normative differences

identified in the study provide a guide for future research that focuses on actual

negotiation strategy in use. Norms are but one factor affecting strategy in use.

Individual differences and contextual factors may also influence strategy in use.

However, the fact that the East Asian cultures we studied are culturally “tight” societies

which impose strong social norms and sanction deviation from those norms (Gelfand et

al., 2006) suggests that norms will have a strong influence on strategy in use in these

cultures.

Future research might also investigate links between norms, strategies in use,

and negotiation outcomes. The results of this study suggest some interesting hypotheses.

For example, Koreans’ self-interest is very likely to translate into stretch goals or targets.

Research indicates that such goals can lead to value claiming when the other party’s

goals are less extreme, highly contested distributive negotiations and even impasses

(Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001) or creative integrative negotiations motivated by

determining how each party can realize its goals (Pruitt, 1981). In contrast, Japanese

negotiators’ norms for distributive strategy and reliance on offers and counteroffers

would seem to lead to distributive outcomes. Except substantial research shows that

Japanese negotiators are actually adept at negotiating integrative or high joint gain

outcomes, and they do so by using lots of offers and counteroffers (Adair et al., 2001,

2007).

CONCLUSION

While there is widespread acceptance in cultural psychology that East Asian

cultures are homogeneous in their value for preserving social relationships, our study

shows that this is an oversimplification. By deconstructing regional homogeneity into

 East Asian Negotiators 21

national differences with respect to the focus of social relationships (the individual or

the group) and the emphasis of social ties (instrumental or emotional), we generated

hypotheses predicting the differential endorsement of negotiation norms among

managers from China, Japan, and Korea. Our results indicating the hypothesized pattern

of endorsement of negotiation norms contribute to theory and provide insights to

managers extending their negotiating reach from one East Asian culture to another.
 East Asian Negotiators 22

REFERENCES

Adair, W. L., & Brett, J. M. 2005. The negotiation dance: Time, culture, and behavioral

sequences in negotiation. Organization Science, 16(1): 33-51.

Adair, W., Brett, J., Lempereur, A., Okumura, T., Shikhirev, P., Tinsley, C., & Lytle, A.

2004. Culture and negotiation strategy. Negotiation Journal, 20(1): 87-111.

Adair, W. L., Okumura, T., & Brett, J. M. 2001. Negotiation behavior when cultures

collide: The U.S. and Japan. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(3): 371-385.

Adair, W. L., Taylor, M. S., & Tinsley, C. H. 2009. Starting out on the right foot:

Negotiation schemas when cultures collide. Negotiation and Conflict

Management Research, 2(2): 138-163.

Adair, W. L., Weingart, L. R., & Brett, J. M. 2007. The timing of offers and information

exchange in U.S. and Japanese negotiations. Journal of Applied Psychology,

92(4):1056-1068.

Adler, N. J., & Graham, J. L. 1989. Cross-cultural interactions: The international

comparison fallacy. Journal of International Business Studies, 20(3): 515-537.

Alston, J. P. 1989. Wa, Guanxi, and Inhwa: Managerial principles in Japan, China, and

Korea. Business Horizons, 32(2): 26-31.

Bond, M. 1991. Beyond the Chinese face. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

Bowman, J. S. 1984. Japanese management: Personnel policies in the public sector.

Public Personnel Management Journal, 13(3): 197-247.

Brett, J. M. 2007. Negotiating globally: How to negotiate deals, resolve disputes, and

make decision across cultural boundaries. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

 East Asian Negotiators 23

Brett, J., Tinsley, C. H., Shapiro, D. L., & Okumura, T. 2007. Intervening in employee

disputes: How and when will managers from China, Japan, and the U.S. act

differently? Management and Organization Review, 3(2): 183-204.

Brett, J., Adair, W., Lempereur, A., Okumura, T., Shikhirev, P., Tinsley, C., & Lytle,

A. 1998. Culture and joint gains in negotiation. Negotiation Journal, 14(1): 61-

86.

Brett, J., & Okumura, T. 1998. Inter- and intracultural negotiation: U.S. and Japanese

negotiators. Academy of Management Journal, 41(5): 495-510.

Brewer, M. B., & Chen, Y. 2007. Where (who) are collectives in collectivism? Toward

conceptual clarification of individualism and collectivism. Psychological Review,

114(1): 133-151.

Chan, A. C. 1998. Business negotiation with the Chinese: Evidences from China,

Taiwan and Hong Kong. In K. Leung & D. Tjosvold (Eds.), Conflict

management in the Asia Pacific: Assumptions and approaches in diverse

cultures: 73-121. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons.

Chen, Y., Mannix, E. A., & Okumura, T. 2003. The importance of who you meet:

Effects of self-versus other-concerns among negotiators in the United States,

the People’s Republic of China, and Japan. Journal of Experimental Social

Psychology, 39(1): 1-15.

Cho, Y., & Park, H. 1998. Conflict management in Korea: The wisdom of dynamic

collectivism. In K. Leung & D. Tjosvold (Eds.), Conflict management in the

Asia Pacific: Assumptions and approaches in diverse cultures: 15-48.

Singapore: John Wiley & Sons.

De Mente, B. 1988. Korean etiquette and ethics in business. Lincolnwood: NTC

 East Asian Negotiators 24

Business Books.

Galinsky, A. & Mussweiler, T. 2001. First offers as anchors: The role of perspective

taking and negotiator focus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,

81(4): 657-669.

Gelfand, M. J., Higgins, M., Nishii, L. H., Raver, J. L., Dominguez, A., Murakami, F.,

Yamaguchi, S., & Toyama, M. 2002. Culture and egocentric perceptions of

fairness in conflict and negotiation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(5):

833-845.

Gelfand, M. J., Nishii, L. H., & Raver, J. L. 2006. On the nature and importance of

cultural tightness-looseness. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(6): 1225-1244.

Graham, J. L., Kim, D. K., Lin, C., & Robinson, M. 1988. Buyer-seller negotiations

around the Pacific Rim: Differences in fundamental exchange processes.

Journal of Consumer Research, 15(1): 48-54.

Hall, E. T. 1976. Beyond culture. New York: Doubleday.

Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. 1999. Is there a universal

need for positive self-regard? Psychological Review, 106(4): 766-794.

Hofstede, G. 1991. Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. London,

England: McGraw-Hill.

Iwata, R. 1990. Jyugyoin no ketugotai tositeno nihon kigyo: sono roots to hatten katei

(Japanese companies as employees’ organization: Their origins and

developmental processes). In K. B. Kaikan (Ed.), Gendai Nippon no seiji jeizai,

Vol. 3: Nippon no bunka to shakai keizai system (Modern Japanese politics

and economy, Vol. 3: Culture and socio-economic systems in Japan): 253-288.

Tokyo: Sogo Kenkyu Kaiharsu Kiko.

 East Asian Negotiators 25

Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. 1966. The social psychology of organizations. New York:

Wiley.

Kim, T. Y., & Leung, K. 2007. Forming and reacting to overall fairness: A cross-

cultural comparison. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,

104(1): 83-95.

Kim, T. Y., Wang, C., Kondo, M., & Kim, T. H. 2007. Conflict management styles:

East Asia differences. International Journal of Conflict Management, 18(1):

23-41.

Leung, K., & Bond, M. 1989. On the empirical identification of dimensions for cross-

cultural comparison. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 20(2): 133-151.

Leung, K., & Tjosvold, D. (Eds.) 1998. Conflict management in the Asia Pacific:

Assumptions and approaches in diverse cultures. Singapore: John Wiley &

Sons.

Levine, T. R., Bresnahan, M. J., Park, H. S., Lapinski, M. K., Wittenbaum, G. M.,

Shearma, S. M., Lee, S., Chung. D., & Ohashi, R. 2003. Self-construal scales

lack validity. Human Communication Research, 29(2): 210-252.

Lewicki, R. J., & Robinson, R. J. 1998. Ethical and unethical bargaining tactics: An

empirical study. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(6): 665-682.

Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. 1991. Culture and the self: Implications for cognition,

emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98(2): 224-253.

Moran, R. T., Allen, J., Wichmann, R., Ando, T., & Sasano, M. 1994. Japan. In M. A.

Rahim & A. A. Blum (Eds.), Global perspectives on organizational conflict:

33-51. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

 East Asian Negotiators 26

Neale, M. & Bazerman, M. 1991. Cognition and rationality in negotiation. New York:

Free Press.

Nisbett, R. E. 2003. The geography of thought: How Asians and Westerners think

differently . . . and why. New York: Free Press.

Northcraft, G., B., & Neale, M. A. 1987. Experts, amateurs, and real estate: An

anchoring-and-adjustment perspective on property pricing decisions.

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39(1):84-97.

Ohbuchi, K. 1998. Conflict management in Japan: Cultural values and efficacy. In K.

Leung & D. Tjosvold (Eds.), Conflict management in the Asia Pacific:

Assumptions and approaches in diverse cultures: 49-72. Singapore: John

Wiley & Sons.

Pruitt, D. G. 1981. Negotiation behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pruitt, D. G. & Lewis, S. A. 1975. Development of integrative solutions in bilateral

negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31(4): 621-633.

Pye, L. 1982. Chinese commercial negotiating style. Cambridge: Oelgeschlager,

Gunnand Hain Inc.

Shteynberg, G., Gelfand, M., & Kim, K. 2009. Peering in to the “magnum mysterium”

of culture: The explanatory power of descriptive norms. Journal of Cross-

Cultural Psychology, 40(1): 46-69.

Ting-Toomey, S. 1999. Communicating across cultures. New York: The Guilford

Press.

Ting-Toomey, S., Gao, G., Trubisjy, P., & Yang, Z. 1991. Culture, face maintenance,

and styles of handling interpersonal conflicts: A study in five cultures.

International Journal of Conflict Management, 2(4): 275-296.

 East Asian Negotiators 27

Tinsley, C. 1998. Models of conflict resolution in Japanese, German, and American

cultures. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83(2): 316-323.

Tinsley, C. H., & Brett, J. M. 2001. Managing workplace conflict in the United States

and Hong Kong. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,

85(2): 360-381.

Trompenaars, F. 1996. Resolving international conflict: Culture and business strategy.

Business Strategy Review, 7(3): 51-68.

Walton, R., & McKersie, R. 1965. A behavioral theory of negotiation. New York:

McGraw-Hill.

Weingart, L. R., Brett, J. M., Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. L. 2007. Conflicting social

motives in negotiating groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,

93(6): 994-1010.

Weingart, L. R. Thompson, L. L. Bazerman, M. H., & Carroll, J. S. 1990. Tactical

behavior and negotiation outcomes. International Journal of Conflict

Management, 1(1): 7-31.

Yeung, I. Y. M., & Tung, R. L. 1996. Achieving business success in Confucian

societies: The importance of guanxi (connections). Organizational Dynamics,

25(2): 54-65.

Zou, X., Tam, K-P., Morris, M. W., Lee, S-I., Lau, I., & Chiu, C. 2009. Culture as

common sense: Perceived consensus versus personal beliefs as mechanisms of

cultural influence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(4): 579-

597.
 East Asian Negotiators 28

TABLE 1

Correlations of All Variables

Variable 1 2 3 4 5

1. Age ---

2. Work years .57** ---

3. Culture .17** -.54** ---

4. Distributive tactic norm -.07 .04 -.05 ---

5. Self-interest norm .05 -.18** .34** .12* ---

6. Integrative tactic norm .05 -.06 .21** .09+ .14**

_____________________________________________________________________

Culture (1 = Japan, 2 = China, 3 = Korea)

All variables were standardized.

+
p ≤ 0.10

* p ≤ 0.05

** p ≤ 0.01
 East Asian Negotiators 29

FIGURE 1

Distributive Tactic Norm Endorsed by Chinese, Japanese and Korean negotiators

 East Asian Negotiators 30

FIGURE 2

Self-Interest Norm Endorsed by Chinese, Japanese and Korean negotiators

 East Asian Negotiators 31

FIGURE 3

Integrative Tactic Norm Endorsed by Chinese, Japanese and Korean negotiators