April 19, 1991 Memorandum for the President Subject: Soviet American-Relations The Soviet ‘economy is collapsing Sceatibnel geet heeby performance which produces a solution to what appeared to be currently totally insoluble economic problems. Ironically, Gorbachev’s democratic reforms have in large part caused this problem. Glasnost open the eyes of the Soviet people to their horrifying past and destroyed their faith in the communist idea which had sustained them for so many years. The communication revolution allowed them for the first time to see on T.V. the contrast as to how much better life was in the much-maligned capitalis' . the communist Soviet Union. Gorbachev's fo1 trips, which gave fs 5 1Be him enormous interna’ : ja reverse 3 pect because it between the hich GorbachevGobet Bub 12 unable to cover up the terrible Nsappointuent he is experiencing because or the relive of big pollelegs ther osteclen ttn. the nea tice he went into a long wonclogue about the noon te oeitct the Russian minorities in these counteles Me completely glossed over the fact that a najousty of those of Russian background in Lithuania, Sevela’’ and Latvie had voted for independence. “He defenicn his rejection of proposals for moving more aggrescively to a Private enterprise economy by pointing cet the Problems the countries of Eastern Burope weve having in Roving too fast from command to free eeonoaies He spoke with great bitterness about the fact that Feet Germany's GNP had dropped 20% in 1990 and would caoe another 20% in 1991, He then made the point that this was a greater drop than that which led to the gecat depression in the United States in the '30s ant nich brought Hitler into power in Germany, I could give other examples, but there is no question but that the Gorbachev we knew and admired as the great reformer has become Gorbachev the reactionary. We liked the old Gorbachev, but we have to face up to the fact that we are now dealing with a new Gorbachev. He and his loyal subordinates insist almost on cue that he has not changed. They say that this is simply a change in tactics. I put the question bluntly to him, "Is this a detour which leads to a dead end?" He came right back and said, "No, we're on a detour, but it’s going to lead back to the main road.” I hope he is right. But Shevardnaze, in a moment of candor, got it right when he observed that Gorbachev "could", if he were willing, put reforms back on track, but the question now is whether he was willing. He then went on to say "If he doesn’t take this step and take it soon, he will totally lose the support of the democracy movement and that’s death." Shevardnaze believes that unless Gorbachev acts on the economic crises in "one to three months", there would be a great potential for violent protests. He let his hair down a bit when I asked him a question as to whether this move to the reactionaries by Gorbachev came from the head or the heart. He thought for a long time and said that he was convinced that Gorbachev was still for reforms, but that it was essential for him to be “more decisive" in dealing with opponents of reform though it will be "very risky and very difficult" for him to do so. Shevardnaze was particularly concerned as were all of Gorbachev's opponents as well as some of his more candid supporters with his recent reactionary moves toward T.V. censorship. He said he still believes that there is a great risk that a dictator will come to power. ple dis doesn’t bsaid that he didn't think Gorbachev was a "willing" captive of the reactionaries. He feels that he simply had no choice but to go with them at this time because of the failure of his economic policies. Gorbachev is a tragic figure, I still believe he is one of the greatest leaders of the post World War IT and that he is without question the man most period, But qualified to be the leader of the Soviet Union. that will continue to be true only if he becomes again the old Gorbachev who just a year ago was Time Magazine’s Man of the Decade, and who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, rather than the new Gorbachev who is now without question, whether by choice or necessity, under the domination of the reactionaries. One of his major problems is the weakness of his supporting staff. Except for the Foreign Minister who is a first-class professional, he is surrounded by yes- men, second raters, or very tough doctrinaire communist hardliners, like the head of the KGB -- undoubtedly the strongest man on this team. Unfortunately, his best people have either deserted him or been deserted by him. It isn’t that they are that attracted to Yeltsin, but that they have given up on Gorbachev. What particularly must disturb Gorbachev is that not just his opponents, but even some of his supporters speak so disrespectfully of him. They call him “indecisive, weak, a talker not a doer”. One of his hardline supporters called him a "brutal wimp". Another referred to him as a "shit". He is catching it from both sides -- the reformers who consider him weak because he won’t bite the bullet and go forward on economic reforms that are desperately needed and who were shocked by the massacre in Lithuania, and the reactionaries who call him weak because he’s not ruthless enough. All this indicates why Gorbachev's approval in the Soviet Union today in the latest poll is only 16 percent. Yeltsin in a trial heat, leads him 70 to 14 percent. Perhaps even more significant, only 6 percent of those polled nationwide approved of the communist party. Gorbachev, we must remember, still insists that he is a loyal communist. A brief word about the head of the KGB. He is without question the most impressive of all the people around Gorbachev. He makes no bones about the fact thet the reforms have gone much too far and that it will be years before the Soviet people are ready for reforms. He summed up his attitude by stating bluntly, "I have had as much democratization as I can stomach.” The most intriguing question is whether Gorbachev can recover. Looking at him as a politician, it is ilto recognize that in addition to being the , he is also a fighter. Even more important, he has demonstrated that he is able to make ee tirece when he sees that he is on the Serre eee serietucs After insisting that he would teat agree co a milticparty political system, he went Bidag with the repeal of Article VI of the Soviet Constitution, After insisting that he would never Sens ES Ailow Bast Germany to become a part of West Géraany and NATO, he weat along when he realized that he needed West Germany’s economic assistance far more than he needed to keep East Germany under Soviet domination in order not to jeopardize the support of fis hardliners As I finished our hour and a half hosting with him, the thought crossed my mind that like importan best qualified leader so many great reformers of the past -- Sir Robert Peel and the repeal of the corn laws in 19th century Britain comes to mind -- those who plant the seeds of reforms often do not reap the harvest. Yeltsin Yeltsin was really the only significant surprise I had on this trip. Virtually everything I had read by Soviet experts in the media wrote him off as a lightweight and a demagogue. I knew, too, that he had made an ass of himself in his visit to the United States, and particularly in the meeting he had with Brent Scowcroft where you met him briefly. Matlock categorically told me that Yeltsin "believed in nothing but desire for power. I got a chance to evaluate Yeltsin in a one-on-one meeting in which only his translator was present. He is certainly not in Gorbachev's class as an intellectual, but he is a political heavyweight without question, I was impressed by the fact that in our hour’s conversation which covered a wide variety of issues, he was articulate, concise, and totally candid. Let me make a politician’s assessment of the two men. Both have enormous charisma, but they appeal to different constituencies. As I have indicated, Gorbachev is Wall Street; Yeltsin is Main Street. Gorbachev is Georgetown drawing room; Yeltsin is Newark factory gate. Gorbachev appeals to the head; Yeltsin appeals to the heart. Gorbachev can dazzle an audience; Yeltsin can move an audience. If Yeltsin wanted to lead a violent revolution, he would be a very dangerous man. Fortunately, he has no desire to do so. He may not be sincere about anything, but I a1 convinced that he wants to get power through the democratic process and not by a coup or by violence.the problem our caret P. a described er diplomats and self-d OE Eee a wta hava tay tree a navman rte mminy ee tere e' rts h t they 7 3 than by substance. Se et ag nore impressed by style th ances of being nore seve important is what the aan stand for. Yeltsin has totally repudiated the communist party; Gorbachev has not. Yeltsin totally supports private ownership across the board; Gorbachev does not. Yeltsin is for immediate independence for the Baltics and for Georgia; Gorbachev is not. Yeltsin is for immediately cutting off all economic and military aide to Cuba, Afghanistan, Angola; Gorbachev is not. and Yeltsin is totally committed to gaining power by winning a free election; Gorbachev will not take this chance. All of this can be a con by Yeltsin, but if it is. he is even a better actor than Gorbachev. At least at the moment he seems to believe what he says on these issues. The most interesting interchange occurred towards the end of our conversation. I asked him whether he wanted Gorbachev’s job, and he answered flatly, no. I think this is simply good political judgment on his part. He knows very well that those who put Gorbachev in power and keep him there -- the KGB, the military industrial complex, and the Communist party would never support him. He believes the best way to power is to be elected President of the Russian republic and then to develop a loose federation with four or five other republics, including, interestingly enough, the Ukraine and then for these major republics to delegate to the central government control of foreign policy and defense. No one knows how this is going to work out except that when the election is held in June, assuming that in the meantime he is not knocked off by some jealous husband whose wife he is chasing, he will be elected overwhelmingly as the President of the Russian republic. One of his great advantages is the very disadvantage that I refer to earlier with regard to Gorbachev: the brightest and the best are now with Yeltsin, Some deserted Yeltsin for a while, but now they are back on his team. I have met several of them, and they were outstanding. Intellectually, they would be far more comfortable with Gor!mitted to democracy and have been so massacre in Lithuania, and by t what they consider to be rms, that they have so strongly com disillusioned by the Gorbachev's failure to adop' t ‘absolutely essential economic reforms deserted Gorbachev and support Yeltsi How Will It Sort Out For the next few months Gorbachev wil But if he sticks with the reactionaries he may hol\ r for a time, but he will lose his place in history. There is really no realistic alternative leader for him among the reactionaries. The head of the KGB has a candidate -- the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, but I don’t see him making it. And I give no credence to the possibility of a military coup. Yasov fs a very strong, powerful personality, but I think he is a professional military man and not a potential professional politician. Gromov, the little Napoleon, would be an ideal candidate, but I think they have him safely tucked away as deputy to Pugo, the Interior Minister who I found, incidentally, a boring, insecure, party hack. 1 survive. d his powe Many predict violence, but I tend to discount that and I only hope I am right. Pushkin in the 19th century observed that “rebellions in Russia tend to be senseless and horrifying." However, in this case, the positive factor is that Gorbachev who at present is under the domination of reactionaries who are potential killers, is not at heart a killer himself. And on the other side, Yeltsin wants power but through the ballot box and not from the barrel of a gun as Mao used to put it. The fact that each time they have these huge demonstrations in Moscow there is no violence is a tribute to both of them. Of course, Gorbachev is inhibited by the fact that he knows that if there is another incident of violence, he will lose any chance whatever to get the desperately needed economic assistance he needs from Europe, the United States, and Japan. And curiously enough, I believe that Yeltsin, despite his animal magnetisi is not an animal at heart. They will both go to the brink as they did while I was in the Soviet Union, but they will both beck down when their confrontation threatens to become violent. Those who predict that there will be a violent revolution in the Soviet Union overlook the fact that as compared to the so-called "time of troubles" in aS 17th century, and the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, there are |As James Billington has pointed out, it is important to recognize that what is going on in the Soviet Union is not a revolution. Revolutions in modern times have been anti-religious, anti-property, often fired with a wild enthusiasm of youth and Violence. What is happening in the Soviet Union is surprising and unprecedented, but it is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The democracy movement and | the nationalist independence movements have the churches with them. These movements are pro-property and are led by educated people: lawyers, economists, poets, writers, powerful political bosses inlcuding even communists, and the best and the brightest among the middle level professional military leadership. All the movents, economic reform, democracy, independent, are basically non-violent. The main episodes of violence or intimidation have been acts of the state like the massacre in Georgia in 1989 and in Lithuania in 1991 and these have signaled political defeats for Gorbachev and he knows it. What Should Our Policy Be? There is a disturbing impression among all of the opposition leaders I met in Moscow as well as the government and opposition leaders in Lithuania, Georgia, and even to an extent the Ukraine, that the United States is totally committed to Gorbachev, is trying to limit contact where possible with the republics, and even will look the other way unless congressional sentiment forces them to do otherwise when Gorbachev finds it necessary to use repressive methods against his opponents in the republics. They believe that because of the Administration's obsession with negotiating arms control and other agreements with Gorbachev in the foreign policy area, Gorbachev will feel that he has the green light to deal with his internal problems in any way he feels is necessary in order to maintain stability. I believe it is absolutely essential to change this perception. We should not join the British and the Germans in declaring that Gorbachev is our only and best hope for reform in the Soviet Union at home, and for a non-aggressive, benign foreign policy abroad. support the old reforming Gorbachev is in our intent. To support the new Gorbachev who is controlled by the reactionaries is not. This does not mean we should against Gorbachev, but it doe: recognize that economic and p Pepubli gees euinne n Tojon, and ironically enough, in eople of the Soviet Un : Corbi It is in cur interest Gorbachev’s interest as well. because to have the Soviet economy to continue to deteriorate would lead to disaster. Ten years ago Reagan was criticized for calling the Soviet Union an evil empire. Today, the danger is that the Soviet Union will become an irrelevant empire. In one sense, this serves our interests because it means that their problems at home will make it difficult for them to support an aggressive foreign policy abroad. On the other hand, we must face the fact that the Soviet Union is still the only other nuclear superpower. To have that superpower plagued with a hopelessly deteriorating economy and a bitter discouraged people, would only add to the instability which could encourage the reactionaries to resort to a more belligerent foreign policy. Gorbachev and I both referred to the statement I made to him in 1986: that the security of one nuclear superpower cannot be based on the insecurity of another. We agreed that is as true today as it was then. An insecure, economically weak Soviet Union with awesome nuclear superpower capabilities would be a far greater threat to peace and to our own security than a Soviet Union with a healthy economy and a relatively happy people. I raised the question directly with Gorbachev as to how he would react to our increasing political, economic and other contacts with the various republics. He obviously took a very dim view of that suggestion and indicated that he thought it was premature to do so until he was able to establish the new relationship with the republics which he insists (in my view inaccurately) the recent referendum endorsed. The argument on the other side, however, is that Gorbachev, who is a consummate politician, is going to stick with the reactionaries unless there are pressures from the reformers which move him back in their direction. The trick is to develop contacts across the board with the various leaders of the republics while at the same time recognizing Gorbachev's status as the leader we deal with on foreign policy and defense issues. Consequently, I would strongly recommend that when Yeltsin visits the United States he should be received in the Oval Office. He should not address a joint session, however. The best alternative there is one that Johnson and I worked out when I was Vice resident. Where distinguished fo an sitors who did not rate a joint session came tor would have an informalsuch visitors could be informed that under our protocol the President gives dinners and luncheons only for heads of government and heads of state. On the other hand, the Vice President hosts such affairs where distinguished foreign leaders who are not heads of state visit the United States. Eisenhower often did that with me when he would have me give lunches or dinners for high-ranking opposition leaders or high- ranking government officials who did not rate a White House state dinner or luncheon. Most important, I believe that strengthening the reformers gives Gorbachev a weapon he can use against his more reactionary present supporters who are urging him to abandom some of the reforms he has already initiated, and eventually, he might be able to get some of the more able people who have deserted him to join his government again on an official basis. The ideal solution would be for Gorbachev and Yeltsin to join forces. I think Yeltsin might be willing to do so but based on what others have told me and my own observations, I believe Gorbachev’s hatred of Yeltsin is now pathological. He wouldn’t even mention his name in cur discussion and lumps all of his opponents together as "irresponsible troublemakers. The best policy for the United States is to have good relations with Gorbachev as President of the Soviet Union and also with the reformist administrations in the republics. This also provides an opportunity to try out economic reform in the various republics. If they work there then Gorbachev might bite the bullet and try them nationwide. The Baltics and Georgia are exceptions. My line with Gorbachev and all of the other members of his government was that it was far better for a nation to have as a neighbor friendly people living in an independent country than unfriendly people living in a province. I was unable to make the sale, but I still think it the only proper position for us, and in the long run, it’s the best position for Gorbachev because independence for ai Baltics is inevitable. Georgia is Tpranacriee te ates pm tetirecee gta indevendence is not fete et it will indeed be a bloody business because the Georgian President, unlike Yeltsin, is not inhibited by any qualm: about the use of violence. Gorbachev must be taken to the mountaintop and be reassured that our SSE ear feeder, in a market oriented eco representaExpanded commercial, cultural, and political contacts Atall levels in every area of the Soviet Union should be our policy. If the central government resists these initiatives, such resistance should be made an issue in the context of our interest in collaboration with the Kremlin in building a New World Order. Under no circumstances should we buy i proposition that there is no alternative to Gorbac! ‘therefore, we should support him where ever his strong resistance to a to be the nto the hev and that, he decides to go including looser voluntary union. This may appear safest and most comfortable course and it certainly is Consistent with the U.S. government’s policy of recent years. But we are not dealing with the “old” Gorbachev and this option puts us too much in the "new" t risks betrayal of Gorbachev’s hands. In doing so i our own interests, both moral and practical, -~ and Gorbachev's longterm interests as well. Incidentally, Bob Ellsworth had discussions with several middle level Soviet military officials. He says that to a man they ‘all take the reformers’ line rather than that of the reactionaries on the Baltics and other issues, and that we should increase our contacts wherever possible with them. ‘As you might expect, I emphasized at every opportunity the points that you have been making with regard to areas where we should be cooperating with the Soviet Union. I particularly came down hard on the need to cooperate in opposing proliferation of not only nuclear weapons but of missiles which could carry other types of weapons as well. I sense, incidentally, that not just the Soviet military but the political leaders were shocked by our brilliant and quick victory in the Gulf. Whether the President of Georgia can be believed or not, he insisted to me that Gorbachev shortly after the beginning of the Gulf War was elated because he felt that he U.S. would be tied down for a long period of time as the Soviet Union had been tied down in Afghanistan and as we had been tied down in Vietnam. He said that at that time Gorbachev was quite "arrogant" towards him because he was so confident that the Soviet Union would end up gaining from the war. He said after the war ended so suddenly, he didn’t hear from Gorbachev on the phone for over a month! One approach, incidentally, I found very useful in meeting with some of the economic experts both in and out of government, was to point out that the risk of radical reforms was worth taking. I summed it up by saying that stability at the cost of freedom was too high a price to pay because it leads to no progress.