Elcano V Hill 77 SCRA 100 – May 26, 1977

Jose Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co.

30 Phil 768 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Distinction of Liability of Employers
FACTS: Under Article 2180 and Their Liability for Breach of Contract

On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He
Reginal Hill was married and a minor who was then still living in care of his father, was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the
Atty. Marvin Hill. Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally for killing Agapito train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from
Elcano. Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his acts were not criminal his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight
because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistakes. The father of Agapito from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack
Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his father (Marvin Hill) for of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This
damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by
barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters
as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an more as the train slowed down.
emancipated minor by reason of his marriage
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of
watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as
he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to
ISSUES:
stop.
1. W/N the civil action should be barred by the acquittal of criminal action -
NO ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
2. W/N the Civil Code can be applied to Atty. Marvin Hill even though
Reginald is already married -YES HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common
HELD: order appealed from is reversed practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury.
Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so
risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have
1. NO. been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of
 separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil
watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place
was dimly lit. The Supreme Court’s conclusion was that the conduct of the
Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent
plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been
negligence.
sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
 If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers
fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of under Article 2180 and their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would
have very little scope and application in actual life
 to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. . Otherwise.
there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium."
 ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
 in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law
 It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case
has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not
a bar to the instant action against him.
2. YES
 While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of
the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation
takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear
that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not
really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It
shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age,
but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property
without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and
NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the
be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter,
whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by
 Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for the person injured.
whom one is responsible
 the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary
see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which inattention, has caused damage to another.
cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact
 Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-
become milling, subsidiary to that of his son. contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed
between the parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an extra-
contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means “an obligation of law”, or the right of the obligee to
enforce a civil matter in a court of law.
ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 179799
FACTS: The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint for violation of
B.P. 22 by Emma J. Datuin (Datuin), as Officer-in-Charge of the Accounts
Receivables Department, and upon authority of Sansio Philippines, Inc. (Sansio),
against Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio) and one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of
Alvi Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as
payment for the numerous appliances bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio. As
the address stated in the complaint was incorrect, Gregorio was unable to
controvert the charges against her. Consequently, she was indicted for three (3)
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest, and it was served upon her by the
armed operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) on October 17, 1997,
Friday, at around 9:30 a.m. in Quezon City while she was visiting her husband and
their two (2) daughters at their city residence. Gregorio was brought to the
PARAC-DILG Office where she was subjected to fingerprinting and mug shots, and
was detained. She was released in the afternoon of the same day when her
husband posted a bond for her temporary liberty.
On December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion for Deferment of
Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging that she could not have issued the
bounced checks, since she did not even have a checking account with the bank on
which the checks were drawn, as certified by the branch manager of the
Philippine National Bank, Sorsogon Branch. She also alleged that her signature
was patently and radically different from the signatures appearing on the
bounced checks.
The MeTC granted the Motion and a reinvestigation was conducted. In the course
of the reinvestigation, Datuin submitted an Affidavit of Desistance stating, among
others, that Gregorio was not one of the signatories of the bounced checks
subject of prosecution.
On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and
Datuin before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao, Albay. Sansio and
Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint, being one for
damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as
the ultimate facts constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the
complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based on quasi-
delict or malicious prosecution.
HELD: A perusal of the allegations of Gregorio’s complaint for damages readily
shows that she filed a civil suit against Sansio and Datuin for filing against her
criminal charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22; that respondents did not exercise
diligent efforts to ascertain the true identity of the person who delivered to them
insufficiently funded checks as payment for the various appliances purchased; and
that respondents never gave her the opportunity to controvert the charges
against her, because they stated an incorrect address in the criminal complaint.
Gregorio claimed damages for the embarrassment and humiliation she suffered
when she was suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon City while visiting
her family. She was, at the time of her arrest, a respected Kagawad in Oas, Albay.
Gregorio anchored her civil complaint on Articles 26, 2176, and 2180 of the Civil
Code. Noticeably, despite alleging either fault or negligence on the part of Sansio
and Datuin, Gregorio never imputed to them any bad faith in her complaint.
Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by the
material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
Undeniably, Gregorio’s civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint based on
quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather
than on malicious prosecution.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to
prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the
fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose act he must
respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
and the damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no preexisting contractual
relation between the parties.
On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for
damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily
constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal
dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to
social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.
A scrutiny of Gregorio’s civil complaint reveals that the averments thereof, taken
together, fulfill the elements of Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil
Code. It appears that Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal security,
privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed
to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they
should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was
compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus
depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not
given proper notice. Because she was not able to refute the charges against her,
petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Although she was never found at No. 76 Peñaranda St., Legaspi City, the office
address of Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was
conveniently arrested by armed operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her city
residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family. She
suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention
and she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and
reputation, considering that she had held several honorable positions in different
organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in
Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation between
Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability, as employer, arising from
the act or omission of its employee Datuin.
These allegations, assuming them to be true, sufficiently constituted a cause of
action against Sansio and Datuin. Thus, the RTC was correct when it denied
respondents’ motion to dismiss.
American Express International, Inc.
VS
Noel Cordero
G.R. No. 138550 [October 14, 2005]
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Factsof the Case:
American Express International was a foreign corporation that issued charge
cards used to purchase goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide to
its customers. Nilda Cordero, wife of respondent Noel Cordero, was issued an
American Express charge card. An extension charge card, was likewise issued
to respondent Noel Cordero which he also signed. Respondent, together with his
family went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. The group went to the
Watson’s Chemist Shop. While there, Noel picked up chocolate candies and
handed his American Express extension charge card to the sales clerk to pay
for his purchases. Susan Chong, the store manager, informed respondent that she
had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondent’s American Express
card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him
embarrassment and humiliation. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using
her own American Express charge card.
The card was placed in the Inspect Airwarn Support System, asystem utilized by
petitioner as a protection both for the company and the cardholders against the
fraudulent use of their charge cards. Once a card suspected of unauthorized use
is placed in the system, the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the
identity of the holder. If the true identity of the card owner is established, the
card is honored and the charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or
confiscated.
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against
petitioner. He prayed for the award of moral damages and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney’s fees as a result of the humiliation he suffered. According to
the trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent that on November 1,
1991, a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card bearing similar
number to that of respondent’s card and that petitioner’s inexcusable failure to
do so is the proximate cause of the “confiscation and cutting of respondent’s
extension card which exposed the latter to public humiliation for which the
petitioner should be held liable. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether the lower courts gravely erred in awarding moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees to Cordero.
Ruling of the Court:
YES. The Court ruled that petitioner can revoke respondent’s card without notice,
as was done. The subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had
respondent talked to petitioner’s representative and identified himself as the
genuine cardholder. As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his
card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the
authorized cardholder. That could have been accomplished had respondent
talked to petitioner’s representative, enabling the latter to determine that
respondent was indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly, no negligence which
breached the contract could have been attributed to petitioner. If at all, the cause
of respondent’s humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to
petitioner’s representative. It was thus safe to conclude that there was no
negligence on the part of petitioner and that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to
respondent for damages.
The petition was granted.
Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso
Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Negligence – Malfeasance – Quasi-Delict
Remedial Law – Evidence – Hearsay Rule – Res Gestae – Startling Event
In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en
route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by
Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager
of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a “better right”
than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of
other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the
plane’s tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air
France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court,
Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the
tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a plane
purser who told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the
issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be
seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true
intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding
the note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was
not presented in court is admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual and
on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was
a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract
was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s employee
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was
already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance
of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first
class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and
nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The
stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case
ofquasi-delict. Damages are proper.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France
and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers
do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They
are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action
for damages against the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one
attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of
quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae.
The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the
entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the
purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and
continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then,
in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the
purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It
thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V. C.A. & LUISA. LUNA
G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995
FACTS:
Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a Fareast card
issued by petitioner FEBTC.
Clarita informed FEBTC that she lost her credit card. In order to replace the lost
card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's
internal security procedures and policy would be torecord the lost card, along
with the principal card, as a "HotCard" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.
Luis then tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend. When he presented his
fareast card to pay for the lunch, the card was not honored, forcing him to pay in
cash the bill. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.
Private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the
payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a vice-president of the bank, expressed
the bank's apologies, admitting that they have failed to inform Luis about its
security policy.
Private respondents then filed a complaint for damages in the RTC, which
rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled of moral damages.
HELD:
NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant
is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.
Concededly, the bank was negligent for failing to inform Luis of his own card's
cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court can
sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to
private respondents. The failure to inform Luis is not considered to be so gross
that it would amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a
conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliguity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice
or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or ill-will.
Article 21 of the Code contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. In relation to
a breach of contract, its application can be warranted only when the defendant's
disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree
of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly,
Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that
clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the
Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely
when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.
The decision is modified by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages
to private respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay nominal damages
sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code
Equitable Leasing Corporation vs Suyom
388 SCRA 445 (2002)
Facts:
On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the
house cum store of Myrna Tamayo in Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was
destroyed which caused death and injury. Tutor was charged with and later
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple
physical injuries.
Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, it was known that the
registered owner of the tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to
Edwin Lim. On April 15, 1995, respondents filed against Raul Tutor, Ecatine
Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a
Complaint for damages.
The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that
the former was no longer in possession and control thereof at the time of the
incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee, not of Equitable, but of
Ecatine.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was liable for damages based on quasi delict for
the negligent acts.
Held:
The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the
intention of the parties to enter into a finance lease agreement. Ownership of the
subject tractor was to be registered in the name of petitioner, until the value of
the vehicle has been fully paid by Edwin Lim.
Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor. Thus, a Deed of
Sale over the tractor was executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented
by Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not registered with the LTO.
Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was
the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has
consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered
owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are
concerned.
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape
primary liability for the deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the
driver.
PICART V SMITH
STREET; March 15, 1918
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union
FACTS
 On December 12, 1912, plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan
Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union.
 Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the
opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or
twelve miles per hour.
 As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff and blew his horn
to give warning of his approach.
 He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge, he gave two
more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback
before him was not observing the rule of the road.
 The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
 However, given the novelty of the apparition and the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side
of the bridge instead of going to the left.
 He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over
to the other side.
 As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left,
that being the proper side of the road for the machine.
 In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side.
 The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for
the automobile to stop.
 Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of
veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down,
continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of
speed.
 When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse
getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing
where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such
close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body
across the bridge with its head toward the railing.
 In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the
car and the limb was broken.
 The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
 As a result of its injuries the horse died.
 The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness
and required medical attention for several days.
 CFI absolved defendant from liability
 Hence, the appeal
ISSUE
WON the defendant, in maneuvering his car in the manner above described, was
guilty of negligence that would give rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage
done
Ratio: The person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other part.
HELD
Yes.
 As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that
the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he
moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes
that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that
it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving
vehicle.
 In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the
automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was no
longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going
to a place of greater safety.
 The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and
it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that
there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
 The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was,
the court thinks, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not
yet exhibited fright.
 But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk
that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he
might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted
him.
 When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger, he was, in
our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
 The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
 The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
 The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference
to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
 The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in
a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a
result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to
take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
 Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of
negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
conduct or guarding against its consequences.
 Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case,
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of
the defendant, would have recognized that the course which he was
 pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to
the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard
against the threatened harm.
 The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent MARCH 26, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. It will be
noted however, that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the G.R. No. L-21291
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
Dispositive: Appealed decision is reversed.
March 28, 1969

FACTS: Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base. The jeep he

The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was
his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no was driving while accompanied with a P.C. soldier, collided with a locomotive of
other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away
from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the Manila Railroad Company (MRC) close to midnight at the railroad crossing in
defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. died
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. of serious burns at the hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was
guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. physical injuries and burns.
But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case
the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly
responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the evidence,
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances concluded that the deceased “in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the oncoming
the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to
locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but
the prior negligence of the other party.

unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation.

Barredo vs Garcia and Almario

July 17, 2011

The negligence imputed to MRC was thus ruled out by the lower court,

satisfactory proof to that effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this appeal

direct to us, the amount sought in the concept of damages reaching the sum of
73 Phil 607
P282,065.40.
Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a “kalesa” thereby
ISSUE: WON the lower court’s decision is erroneous
killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit
against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla
was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against HELD: The decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint, is affirmed.
Barredo – the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on
Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their NO
employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary
and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily
and not him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable. The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It is
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action
against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He entitled to great respect. In the absence of compelling reasons, [the factual]
reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious
because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence determination is best left to the trial judge why had the advantage of hearing the
and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his
employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic
infractions already before he hired him – something he failed to overcome during parties testify and observing their demeanor on the witness stand.”
hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo
would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for But more importantly, this action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code
damages arising from a criminal act (his driver’s negligence) but rather for his own
negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).
making clear that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done. Unless it could
be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that MRC was guilty of negligence then it could
not be held liable. The crucial question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.
Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo and
United States v. Barias. Cooley’ formulation was quoted with approval in both the
Juanillo and Barias decisions. Thus: “Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.),
Sec. 1324, defines negligence to be:
“The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand
whereby such other person suffers injury.”
There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. Thus: ”
“Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or
comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation
of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary,
and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.”
To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to MRC and the action
of Corliss must necessarily fail. The facts being what they are, compel the
conclusion that the liability sought to be fastened on MRC had not arisen.
Finally, each and every case on questions of negligence is to be decided in
accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can
be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands.
A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular
road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it
as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the apperance of a train,
is guilty of crominal negligence, providing a collission occurs and injury results.¨
The accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s husband and she was not
allowed to recover.
MCKEE v IAC, TAYAG
211 SCRA 517
DAVIDE; July 16, 1992
NATURE: Appeal from decision of the IAC
FACTS:
- A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by private
respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose
Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida
Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and
Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
- When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern
approach of the bridge, two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road
and into the lane of the car. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left
and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car,
applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he
could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of
the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
- Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977.
- On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of
"Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court.
- Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal charge and ordered him to
pay damages. Galang appealed to IAC. IAC affirmed decision.
- Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awarded private respondents
moral damages and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fee. Petitioners appealed
to IAC. In its consolidated decision of the civil cases, it reversed the ruling of the
trial court and ordered the defendants to pay damages. The decision is anchored
principally on the findings that it was Galang's inattentiveness or reckless
imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the
law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants, as employers of Galang,
in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these
defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said
employee.
- In an MFR, the decision for the consolidated civil cases was reversed. Hence this
petition.
ISSUES
WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported by
evidence or are based on mere speculations, conjectures and presumptions.
HELD
YES
- Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside
when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial court
failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion
different from what was stated in its judgment.
- The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane
of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the
presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of
this presumed negligence, IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's
negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an
unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows
that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern
end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into
the lane of the car.
- Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do
- The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
- Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by
swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering
the opposite lane.
- Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear
to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.
- Assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been
defined as: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred; the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.
- Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial
act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual
injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the
negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The
entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision
had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down
and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing
down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper
precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued
at full speed towards the car.
- The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his
truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph. Under Article 2185 of
the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
- Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds
application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states
that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for
damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the
injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.
- Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the
defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence.
The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts
may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured
person is entitled to recovery. a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law
solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. The practical import of
the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or
even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he,
aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should have been
aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later
than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident.
- As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The
presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee.
That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only
possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage. The answers of the private respondents in the civil
cases did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
On the separate civil and criminal actions
- The civil cases, which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a quasi-
delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed
ahead of criminal case. They were eventually consolidated for joint trial. The
records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties, and it may
therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made, to consolidate criminal
case with the civil cases, or vice-versa.
- Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of
suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested
dockets to simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice with the
least expense to the parties litigants, would have easily sustained a consolidation,
thereby preventing the unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of two judges
appreciating, according to their respective orientation, perception and perhaps
even prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafter rendering conflicting
decisions. Such was what happened in this case.
- The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. In the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code, the
result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely
irrelevant to the civil action. What remains to be the most important
consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should not be considered
in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein.
Dispositive Petition granted. Assailed decision set aside while its original is
REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased
from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh
McKee