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6 Rome, Italy
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7 University of Rome Tor Vergata, Rome, Italy To define the fundamentals of military gover- 27
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8 Pictet Asset Management, International Trade nance and its actual trends today, it is necessary 28
AU1 9 and Development, Paris, France to frame the military dimension of governance. 29
12 ness of military organizations; Leadership inter- violence has varied greatly through the millennia 35
13 action; Military governance; Social norm and and within different contexts and historical 36
54 scopes involving very high stakes, both a aspects are “Decision-Making” and “Leadership 101
55 decision-making function and an effective inter- Interaction: Fear or/and Trust.” Of course, also 102
56 action among combatants, also through social quality and effectiveness of the “social norm and 103
58 Very specific of the military function is the process and the collective action are relevant, but 105
59 criticality of the mentioned stakes. In fact, the as a second order of these primary factors. It must 106
60 military is normally a last resort choice to promote be clear that the abovementioned oversimplified 107
61 or protect very critical interests, and once a con- classification is meant only to make a general 108
62 flict has started, the ultimate ones, like life or point about military governance, considering 109
63 death or great sufferance of the people and the some examples, and it is by no means scientifi- 110
89 history a range of solutions that go from a Many archives have showed that the kings led 130
90 combination of the most autocratic and vertical their armies in war. Both Sargon II and Tiglath- 131
91 decision-making with regular exertion of violence pileser III are remembered today as having been 132
92 to maintain discipline and a compliance based on very active and close to their men during war 133
93 fear to very contributive decision-making and a campaigns. It is even believed that the King 134
94 cohesion based on strong consensus. Just to give a Sargon III has lost his life while fighting alongside 135
95 very general idea of how these issues have been his army. Kings were thus very respected by the 136
96 dealt with through time, it can be helpful to give a armed forces which showed clear willingness to 137
97 cursory look at some hints thereof taken from dedicate their energy and life in serving them. 138
98 military history, to enable focusing on nowadays Nonetheless, according to the culture of the 139
99 trends, evolving to face the continuously emerg- times, punishments were harsh and fear was also 140
100 ing new challenges. The two key highlighted a relevant factor in maintaining discipline. 141
Military Governance and Trends 3
142 Ancient China hierarchy and expected to take key decisions in 185
143 The Chinese general and philosopher Sun Tzu, concert with trusted generals of noble rank. 186
147 Decision-Making sion while requiring trust in a leader who could 190
148 Military leaders make decisions which regularly rarely be present in the main battle line. This 191
149 involve high risks and uncertainty, balancing patriotic and cohesive core is celebrated by the 192
150 wisdom and strategic planning to de-risk a battle. willingness of Leonidas’ men to stand with him at 193
151 Reference to officers does not highlight collabo- Thermopylae. For Sparta as much as Athens, this 194
152 rative decision-making. was to a degree the result of the soldiers being 195
172 Ancient Greece question, this could be a relatively open and hor- 216
174 As with many ancient societies, the early ancient discussion among the commander-in-chief and 219
175 Greek military structure was very similar to that of the subordinate commanders to enhance 220
176 the society and wider political power. Significant decision-making. One of the key roles that was 221
177 to this respect is the election of (aristocratic) devolved to staffs was a complex and efficient 222
178 Athenian generals by the soldiers at Marathon; logistical systems that enabled Roman com- 223
179 in this ancient epoch, the core of the army was manders to campaign longer and more effectively 224
180 composed of middle-class, property-owning than their opponents. This effective management 225
181 hoplites that reflected this less autocratic arrange- of supply and reinforcement required effective 226
182 ment through their selection of commanders in use of subordinates with independent authority. 227
183 whom they placed most trust. Later also, aristo- Despite claims by Caesar and accounts of 228
184 crats were assigned to highest rank of the military the young Pompey, commanders were rarely 229
4 Military Governance and Trends
230 expected to take directly part in battles but rather and effective bond between soldiers, their imme- 277
231 to command their subordinates and the timing of diate officers, and their general, but as it grew 278
232 reinforcement. At the lower level, the centurions stronger, it was to cause continued damage 279
233 were supposed to take the commander’s orders through ongoing civil wars and ultimately played 280
234 and adapt them where necessary and within limits, a strong part in the disintegration of the Republic 281
235 to address the difficulties of command and control and subsequently the empire. Military governance 282
236 in battles of 50,000 troops on each side. However, had then direct impact on major geopolitical 283
240 circumstances.
241 Under the empire, command at an opera- Decision-Making 286
242 tional level remained roughly the same, but army Authority to command was founded on the idea of 287
243 commanders surrendered strategic freedom to the the king as the rightful ruler of society: in this 288
244 ruling princeps to whom they and their men swore sense it was extremely hierarchical but, in reality, 289
245 direct loyalty. This semi-medieval arrangement may have been more flexible as capable lower- 290
246 became stronger in the later empire, with the ranking commanders exercised authority under 291
247 emperor himself often taking the field in order to actual battlefield conditions. However, as feudally 292
248 ensure loyalty of the army and its generals. raised armies often had greater loyalty to an 293
249 Leadership Interaction: Fear or/and Trust senior noble or king, the debate and planning 295
250 The Roman army was famous for its strict process had to offer a degree of inclusivity to 296
251 discipline, but that was accepted by the soldiers powerful nobles in order to retain their loyalty, 297
252 as necessary to a degree. It is an early and both at an operational and tactical level. By con- 298
253 well-documented case of widespread small unit trast the lower-ranking lords, their professional 299
254 motivation, with squads (contubernio) bunking knights, and cavalry/archer and their levies had 300
255 and fighting together and the 80-man century little input but were expected simply to fight as 301
256 organized under their own standards. Personal they were told. 302
259 promotions, were a key driving force behind its Medieval command was based strongly on 304
260 success, along with continuous training. The high the personal charisma and strength of the com- 305
261 casualty rates of centurions – who lead from the mander, either king or nobleman, as well as his 306
262 front – speak to this emphasis on bravery and ability to generate military power, very much 307
263 leadership. A key element of this, whoever – and together with his ability to pay and support his 308
264 to some degree reflective of the Athenian soldiers. Command traditionally rested on the 309
265 phalanx – was the concept of state citizenship; personal authority and seniority – essentially his 310
266 the soldiers were active members of the state, reputation – as well as strength of the forces that 311
267 and though their democratic ideal declined, they he brought to the table. 312
268 thought of themselves as representative of the Most medieval campaigns were relatively lim- 313
269 Roman state at war, their future tied to its success ited in scope (the Crusades being a notable excep- 314
270 and failure. This was though balanced by personal tion in strategic movement, if not in the style of 315
271 loyalty to legion and army commanders who – command). Armies fought in general under their 316
272 through the spoils of their campaigns and their local commanders, though the further up the 317
273 ability to guarantee generous retirement packages social scale, the more professional the combatant 318
274 for their soldiers – melded their forces into what and hence likely greater willingness to serve. Pay 319
275 became effectively personal war-bands. This pri- through spoils of war was an important motivating 320
276 macy of loyalty to the commander proved a strong factor, but loyalty to a lord or house, defense of 321
Military Governance and Trends 5
322 one’s land, and some belief in the righteousness of strategy and operations together with responsibil- 367
323 a cause were all contributory factors. Even though ity of junior commanders to develop or exceed 368
324 it is not easy to determine to which extent the orders (the modern example of mission-oriented 369
325 soldiers felt themselves part of their kingdom, it command) was both a key component of effective 370
326 is reasonable a degree of identification, even if not leadership. Establishment of a staff, a war acad- 371
327 quite the same as Republican or city-state soldier emy, manuals for officer, and consideration of 372
329 As with the Roman legions, although lacking were part of a wider open-minded appreciation 374
330 their sophistication, leadership and bravery were of how to maximize Prussian military advantages. 375
331 key and nobles were expected to fight in the front Producing and sharing knowledge through a staff 376
332 lines. Furthermore, the strength of loyalty – both for the sake of better decision-making was even- 377
333 for mercenary and political reasons – should not tually a Prussian invention. 378
412 Napoleon’s Revolution in Military Affairs unimportant, was not perceived as a barrier to 459
413 Decision-Making nized in front of one comrades was a key element 461
414 The experience of the French and their opponents of the armies’ aggressive appetite and resilience. 462
415 from 1789 to 1815 represents an important mili- A well-established structure of command allowed 463
416 tary evolution on many levels. Command was flexible organization at lower levels as well as 464
417 essentially hierarchical, relying on competence depth of control should individuals be injured. 465
418 and charisma to motivate and guide forces but As with the Caesarian legions, discipline was 466
419 with a degree of debate and collective decision- also relatively fierce, providing the stick alongside 467
420 making. Though much was later made of the the carrot of rewards. 468
421 levée en masse and new commanders with revo- Over time and despite the nominal flexibility 469
422 lutionary zeal, the management of the early and opportunity offered, the Imperial Armies 470
423 French Revolutionary armies depended signifi- became increasingly hierarchical, though they 471
424 cantly on the existing infrastructure and training managed to retain their offensive spirit and confi- 472
425 of the royal army of Louis XVI. As the old com- dence owing to the personal loyalty shown by 473
426 manders and structures died through attrition, the middle- and lower-level commanders to their 474
427 Republican and Napoleonic armies became more corps or army chiefs and ultimately to Napoleon 475
428 meritocratic (often by necessity) as junior, capable himself. As long as the regime met with success, 476
429 commanders – including Bonaparte himself – this was sustainable, but as defeats mounted, the 477
430 imposed their more agile vision of military affairs. reliability of army commanders – his marshals – 478
431 Napoleon’s famous victories in his early and their subordinate armies began to decline. 479
432 years were a balance of his personal authority Nevertheless, the freedom of corps commanders 480
433 and capability combined with that of subordi- and the collective input under Napoleon’s unas- 481
434 nates. A degree of council on decisions and the sailable position continued to be the main feature 482
435 articulation of objectives combined with freedom of control, even if Ney and Grouchy’s actions at 483
436 to – and expectation of – exercise judgment at Waterloo showed the limits of allowing subordi- 484
437 lower levels to take advantage of developing sit- nates to operate with minimal oversight. 485
442 Leadership Interaction: Fear or/and Trust Even a very simple scheme as ours would require 488
443 The French Republic was perhaps the first entity a large book by its own to map the last century of 489
444 since antiquity that managed to generate a com- military governance. We try to capture some gen- 490
445 mon principle of citizenship and shared responsi- eral ideas from the governance and leadership 491
446 bility. This tilted heavily the trust/fear relationship dynamics of the period, to confront with our pre- 492
447 toward the first term. Furthermore, Napoleon’s vious discussion. The Industrial Revolution pro- 493
448 policies offered prospects and promotion lacking duced armies by far larger than any other time, 494
449 in other armies to those prepared to take risks and through the related demographic explosion, and 495
450 forge relationships with their units, motivating equipped with the deadliest killing technology 496
451 their forces to succeed. The Legion of Honor ever seen on the planet. In the age of industrial 497
452 and rapid promotions exemplified the potential wars, the twentieth century, a Tayloristic approach 498
453 rewards of success, as did – initially at least – to the enormous production of violence and of its 499
454 the ostensible sharing of campaign hardships instruments aimed at enemy systems could maxi- 500
455 among officers and men. A focus on battlefield mize coercion of enemy’s will. A rather vertical 501
456 capability and the opportunity to be recognized decision-making for large masses of soldiers 502
457 and gain the rewards of service were key facets of together with production of huge amounts of 503
458 Napoleonic service. Social position, though not armaments to feed the fight have been decisive. 504
Military Governance and Trends 7
505 Centralized command and control, more or less combination thereof. These ranged from a very 551
506 open to contribution, could often leave men on the vertical, authoritarian stance, though coupled to 552
507 ground with no clue of the reason for their orders. strong charismatic leadership, deaf to contribu- 553
508 Discipline was harsh and court martial proceed- tions and conductive to disaster, like Hitler’s stra- 554
509 ings severe. Decision-making was supported by tegic conduct of World War II, to the Israel 555
510 varying degrees of commanders’ discussion in the Defense Force model of horizontal relations and 556
511 western democracies while being mainly vertical diffused leadership, formally loose but dense of 557
512 and authoritarian in Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s interactive exchanges within clear strategic direc- 558
513 Russia. The cohesion was tied to a nation-state tives. Identification with the institution (Rome, 559
514 ideal, until that survived the harshness of the the Republic of Venice, the country, etc.) or with 560
515 battlefield, and to peer-to-peer bond among sol- the leader has often been a pillar of motivation to 561
516 diers. War was generally seen through the lens of fight, as loyalty to one’s own fellow soldiers. Trust 562
517 the positivistic culture, as an organized, linear could be established between the leader and the 563
518 process where power factors were engineered to soldiers, within the units, and in both cases in the 564
519 coerce the enemy’s will. Actually, economic best circumstances. Fear of punishment has 565
520 power and industrial production were key in win- always been in varying degrees a contributor, 566
521 ning the war for the Allied Powers. But in sum, sometimes the main one, to collaboration versus 567
522 notwithstanding the enormous scale of the conflict defection. Social norms and institutions generally 568
523 and its incredible technological leaps, not much in followed the lines of the different governance 569
524 terms of decision-making process and leadership modes. Of course, we shall recall that their effec- 570
525 interaction had changed, at least for the main- tiveness depended largely on the context in which 571
526 stream war. They were linked to trust to identities they had to operate. 572
527 as the state, the nation, and some leaders, based on Nowadays, apart from the dormant nuclear 573
528 fear for harsh punishment in case of desertion, confrontation, conflicts seem to be much smaller 574
529 with a largerly vertical decision-making process. than the global deflagrations of last century but 575
530 Varying degrees of shared analysis at the top and much harder to understand and manage. The end 576
531 some tactical freedom from subordinate com- of the Cold War has opened a Pandora’s box of 577
532 manders were often allowed but also often not. tensions and conflicts, in which the industrial age 578
533 The MAD (mutual assured destruction) paradigm paradigms show very little effectiveness. What 579
534 of the Cold War added an absolute new and fright- has been called a VUCAR (volatile, uncertain, 580
535 ening paradigm change to confrontation, de facto complex, ambiguous, and rapidly changing) 581
536 quelling the potential for major conflicts. But even world has deeply changed the challenges that 582
537 there, no corresponding change arose in gover- militaries face and thus their governance needs. 583
538 nance concepts. Remarkable in a sense was the The new emerging trend for the nowadays effec- 584
539 extreme centralization and verticalization of the tive military governance is still inevitably based 585
540 Soviet military system, fully discovered after on satisfaction of the deep needs of humankind: 586
541 the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its operational social interaction, leadership, and values as 587
542 and tactical fragility is an icon of the inadequacy glue of the collective action. The appreciation of 588
543 of linear, disempowering governance systems those is today key for a mature adhesion to the 589
544 posed to confront the “fog and friction” of war. mission accomplishment. But also on an agile, 590
545 Drawing Conclusions: Trends in Military because of the key importance of the distributed 593
546 Governance Today ability to contribute with information and ideas to 594
547 Our very shallow look at some fundamental of individuals and teams to take the initiative 596
548 modes of military governance through history when their situation awareness so dictates or 597
549 has shown a wide variety of decision-making when centralized control fails. Those are trust- 598
550 and leadership interaction approaches and of based actions, apt to contribute enormously to 599
8 Military Governance and Trends
600 effectiveness in complex environments and resil- opportunities but also new challenges, since sys- 630
601 ience in any contested endeavor. The age-old tem thinking is still unusual among humans, 631
602 conundrum between trust and fear is thus defi- let alone among humans and machines. Opportu- 632
603 nitely gone to trust, just like the many different nity and challenge will be multiplied manyfolds in 633
604 combinations of authoritarian versus collabora- the next future, most likely well before we gener- 634
605 tive decision-making go definitely toward a coop- ally think, as artificial intelligence will explode as 635
606 erative mode. Collaborative doesn’t correspond to a diffused new tool, with mind-numbing implica- 636
607 the definition of democratic political process: mil- tions, among which its potential to utilize humans 637
608 itary officers are appointed and not elected and as tools for mission accomplishment. Thence will 638
609 bear personal responsibility for the decision taken military governance, as actually any governance 639
610 as a synthesis of the decision-making process. But at all, need to be thoroughly redefined once again. 640
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