LEGAL PROFESSION

CASE DIGEST

1.

Cayetano V. Monsod
GR No. 100113, September 3, 1972
Ponente: Paras, J.

Facts:

Christian Monsod, the respondent, was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Renato Cayetano, the Petitioner, opposed the nomination
because, allegedly, Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. The notion refers to the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
Sec. 1, Article IX-C mentioning “…However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.”

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod.

On June 18, 1991, he took his oath and assumed his office. The petitioner filed the instant Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that the said confirmation and appointment be declared null
and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent has been engaged in the practice of profession for at least
ten years.

Ruling:

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of
the “practice of law” and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the constitution, Atty. Christian Monsod’s past experiences, as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur on industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts and a lawyer-
legislator of both rich and poor, verily more than satisfy the requirements of the constitution and
had proven that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

2.
Phillippine Lawyer’s Association V. Celedoni Agrava
GR No. L-12426, February 16, 1959
Ponente: Montemayor, J.

Facts:
The petition was filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27,
1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an examination for
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. The petitioner
contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s holding an examination for the purpose
is more than his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent maintains that the
prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual
practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers
and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed
examinations as given by the Patent Office…”. Furthermore, the respondent would appear to have
been holding tests or examinations and this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents
has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue.

Issue:

Whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

Ruling:
 The court held that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar
authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession
before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws
applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the
functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders
and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent
Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an
examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the
Patent Office.

3.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. L-19450, May 27, 1965
Ponente: PAREDES, J.

Facts:
On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva
with crime of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de officio, but later replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private-prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice.

The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the
accused. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance
of City Attorney Fule. On January 4, 1961 Counsel for the accused presented a “Motion in inhibit
Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private prosecutor in this case, “this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127,
now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary
of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the
trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive
any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was
questioned by the counsel for the accused. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order
sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule
from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec.
35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims
that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the
right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law
practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio,
which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961. The CFI of Laguna holds that Asst. City Attorney
Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private
prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and
which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused
interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides
that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was
engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than
an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding
payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as
counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice
of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who
is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..