Republic of the Philippines Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil
referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of Appeals
modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity
of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the
complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of
alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due
course, later on, said court rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural
daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said
child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every
month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as
attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and
compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga
Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go
around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In
1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy
developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had
sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In
February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her.
Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was
commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage. No
court shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the
concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if the
banns have been published, the one who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to
reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason of the promised
marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be brought within
one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil.,
866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the
drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote
from the report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not
enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the
aspect treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative
solutions to some questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are:
That authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that
creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be broken.1awphîl.nèt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book
I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or guardian, be
entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a female between the ages of
sixteen and eighteen years. Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry
cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not civilly
actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a male
for seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party even though
a minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the
parent or guardian may institute the action.
 Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and pecuniary losses
but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the affianced
parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material and
moral, to the engaged person who is rejected.
petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher
and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice
pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even
before they had the benefit of clergy."

Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be obliged to
return what he or she has received from the other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report of the
corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm
suit in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the
support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her
pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral
damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of
P1,114.25 — consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the
parturiation, and the balance representing expenses incurred to support the child — and increased the moral
damages to P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore,
in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and
Dizon, JJ., concur.

Florida 1945 — pp. 1342 — 1344

Maryland 1945 — pp. 1759 — 1762
Nevada 1943 — p. 75
Maine 1941 — pp. 140 — 141
New Hampshire 1941 — p. 223
California 1939 — p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 — p. 326
Indiana 1936 — p. 1009
Michigan 1935 — p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450

The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in legislation when it
provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such causes of action
at a time when so many States, in consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may
well prove to be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May
19, 1949, p. 2352.)

The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest intent
of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made
by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:

Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee,

overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-
control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and,
therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph
3, of the new Civil Code.

Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those
following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that
the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that
 THIRD DIVISION From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the
Central Luzon Doctors Hospital, Tarlac City.

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, G.R. No. 171713 Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the
Petitioner, hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joannes needs recognizing the child as his.
Present:
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., alleging that he is not the father of the child.
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give support for the
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by CHICO-NAZARIO, child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted complaint.
Her Mother and Guardian, JINKY C. DIAZ, NACHURA, and
Respondent. REYES, JJ. After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any responsive pleading despite
repeated motions for extension, prompting the trial court to declare him in default in its Order dated 7 April
1999. Rogelios Answer with Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative Defenses was received by the trial court
Promulgated: only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence ex parte on the basis of which the trial court
on 23 April 1999 rendered a decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
December 17, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x In its Decision[6] dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

DECISION
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child;

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly support of P10,000.00 and further

This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing (1) the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2) the Resolution[2] of the same
court dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.
A Complaint[3] for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against
Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her Complaint, Jinky prayed
that judgment be rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and the
cost of the suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for reconsideration seeking the
courts understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to find a solution to a very difficult problem of
his life.[7]
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the decision of the trial court dated 23
April 1999 be vacated and the case be considered for trial de novo pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 37
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[8]

(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00 pendente lite and On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelios Motion for New Trial:
thereafter to fix monthly support.
WHEREFORE, finding defendants motion for new trial to be impressed with merit, the
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the sum of P100,000.00. same is hereby granted.

(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe just and equitable in the The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the decision is this court
premises.[4] dated April 23, 1999 are hereby set aside but the evidence adduced shall remain in record,
subject to cross-examination by defendant at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.

As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This
developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese
national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge
Panfilo V. Valdez.[5]
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at Fairlane Subdivision,
and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
In the meantime defendants answer is hereby admitted, subject to the right of plaintiff to
file a reply and/or answer to defendants counterclaim within the period fixed by the Rules
of Court.
Acting on plaintiffs application for support pendente lite which this court finds to be
warranted, defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum
of P2,000.00 a month from January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support pendente lite in
arrears and the amount of P4,000.00 every month thereafter as regular support pendente lite
during the pendency of this case.[9]

The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant is the father of the plaintiff
Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother Jinky Diaz was married at the time of
the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the
spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child is still
presumed legitimate even if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy (Article
167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds provided for in
Article 166 of the same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there must be
physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife within the
first 120 days of the 300 days following the birth of the child because of
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national and that he was
living outside of the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home only once a
year. Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was outside the country and no
evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth
of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship with another man before
she met the defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations with other
men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see
Exh. A), so her first child, a certain Nicole (according to defendant) must have a different
father or may be the son of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered the hospital bills representing
the expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of admission that he
is the real father of plaintiff.Defendant also admitted that even when he stopped going out
with Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels even after 1996. Defendant also admitted that
on some instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was
even the one who fetched Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and
defendant Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the latter should support plaintiff. [10]
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the
illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this
Court awarding support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed and that the
support should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority age. [11]
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in an Order of the trial court
dated 19 January 2001.[12] From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio appealed to the Court of
Appeals. After all the responsive pleadings had been filed, the case was submitted for decision and ordered re-
raffled to another Justice for study and report as early as 12 July 2002.[13]
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelios counsel filed a manifestation informing the
Court that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed by said counsel praying
that Rogelio be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong,[14] which motion was accordingly granted by
the Court of Appeals.[15]
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
appealed Decision dated December 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac,
Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED
to the court a quo for the issuance of an order directing the parties to make arrangements
for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne
Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with laboratories and experts on the
field of DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.[16]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 1
March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendant-appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early
stage of the proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and plaintiffs mother submit
themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the issue of paternity, as a sign of good
faith. However, the trial court did not consider resorting to this modern scientific procedure
notwithstanding the repeated denials of defendant that he is the biological father of the
plaintiff even as he admitted having actual sexual relations with plaintiffs mother. We
believe that DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most
reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute. Considering,
however, the untimely demise of defendant-appellant during the pendency of this appeal,
the trial court, in consultation with out laboratories and experts on the field of DNA
analysis, can possibly avail of such procedure with whatever remaining DNA samples from
the deceased defendant alleged to be the putative father of plaintiff minor whose
illegitimate filiations is the subject of this action for support.[17]
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT
DISMISS RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE
THAT ROGELIO G. ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II
 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT
DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND
HER JAPANESE HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO
REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED THE
CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT
IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG. [18]
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 23, 2005 be modified, by setting aside the judgment remanding the case to the trial court for DNA
testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for compulsory recognition, and by declaring the
minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo.[19]
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds it prudent to concentrate its attention on the
third one, the propriety of the appellate courts decision remanding the case to the trial court for the conduct of
DNA testing. Considering that a definitive result of the DNA testing will decisively lay to rest the issue of the
filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to resolve the first two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be
rendered moot by the result of the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in
favor of the said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated
with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity
is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child. [20]
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. [21] As a guaranty in favor of
the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of
this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals[22]:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but
is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring
from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by
evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code[23] provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of
the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of
the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was
not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.[24]
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties to the
present petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can
now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA
testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all
human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique.Hence, a persons DNA
profile can determine his identity.[25]
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is
examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the
sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is
exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a
single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every
cell in the human body, the DNA of an individuals blood is the very DNA in his or her skin
cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (Adenine), G
(guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an
individuals DNA determines his or her physical make up. And since DNA is a double
stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-
G. These are called genes.
 Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular
sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework,
nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as polymorphic loci, which are the
areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing
simply means determining the polymorphic loci.
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular
biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to
conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP(restriction fragment length
polymorphism); reverse dot blot or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that
were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; DNA process;
VNTR (variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR-
([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996,
was availed of by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating
or copying DNA in an evidence sample a million times through repeated cycling of a
reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes
measurements in 13 separate places and can match two (2) samples with a reported
theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, matches are determined. To illustrate, when
DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence
collected from the crime scene is compared with the known print. If a substantial amount of
the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But
then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to
have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each
of these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called allele, one inherited from each
parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions
in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother
and child, it is possible to determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the
mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged
fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile,
which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the
child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as
the father.[26]
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be defined
as follows:
xxxx
(c) DNA evidence constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic
information directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) DNA profile means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological
sample obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable
as originating from that person;
(e) DNA testing means verified and credible scientific methods which include the
extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and
the comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological
samples for the purpose of determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or
not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates
from the same person (direct identification) or if the biological samples originate
from related persons (kinship analysis); and
(f) Probability of Parentage means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of
a putative parent compared with the probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals in a given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution thereof may provide the definitive
key to the resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne. Our articulation in Agustin v. Court of Appeals[27] is
particularly relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe
Lim v. Court of Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in 1997, we cautioned
against the use of DNA because DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been
accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by
such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts,verbal and written, by the
putative father.
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as
enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in
using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-
NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis
is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2)
copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The
DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the
use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as
the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said results is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in
Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with out en banc decision in People v. Vallejo [G.R.
No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and murder victims DNA
samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We
reasoned that the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association
exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected
(were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA
584], we acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because doubts
persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had)
been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other
scientific evidence to still our doubts.
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and
161824, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277], where the Court en banc was faced with the issue
of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:
 In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged
the strong weight of DNA testing...
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v.
Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 504], we affirmed
the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the principal
evidence for which included DNA test results. x x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the appropriateness of the
order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner
has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible
due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for
purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New
Rules on DNA Evidence[28] allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon
a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424
SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our jurisdiction in this
wise: [i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from
body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to.
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of AAAs
child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and correct
adjudication of the instant appeal.Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized,
after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while this
Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act on the
matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the course
of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate that the case be
remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to
the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals[32]:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers
who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology
finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We
have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in
the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this
opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant
to the proper resolution of the case; and

(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.

From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of
DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.

As defined above, the term biological sample means any organic material originating from a persons
body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other
body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.[29]

Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an
appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.

And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v. Umanito,[30] citing Tecson v.
Commission on Elections,[31] this Court held:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.; MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S.
INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR.,
Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, Bayan Muna Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN,
PH.D., Junk VF A Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO,
Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham,
ELMER C. LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A.
AFRICA, THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A.
EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, MARK A. RICE in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO,
Secretary, pepartment of Foreign Affair.s, HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of
the President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of National Defense, HON.
RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE
ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO RENA, Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard,
COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN.
VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and LT. GEN.
TERRY G. ROBLING, US Marine Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-
Director, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in
relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines) language which means
"long reef exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll and the south
atoll - and the Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of
Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan. 1
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of
Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing
excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park
is also an important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited
Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an important and significant natural habitat for in situ conservation of
biological diversity; an example representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes; and an area
of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance.2
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs
Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally significant
economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for
the enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is
strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering,
destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area
Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US
Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial
waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty."4 On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on
January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.1âwphi1
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On
January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and
there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a
press statement.5 Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and
assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate
compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship."6 By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had
finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective
sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott
H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer
of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013
Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary
Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin (Department of National Defense), Secretary Jesus P. Paje
(Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag
Officer in Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore
Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP
Commandant), collectively the "Philippine respondents."
The Petition
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and
continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan,
Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi,
which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive
from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067:
unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement
officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]).
Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this
Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to wit: WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1. Immediately issue upon the filing
of this petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in
particular,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations over the
Guardian grounding incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an additional buffer zone;
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' because of the absence of
clear guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and require Respondents to
assume responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in general, and environmental
damage under the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, recreation, and limited
commercial activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or around the TRNP but away
from the damaged site and an additional buffer zone;
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further orders of the Court;
3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without limitation:
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive portion of Nicolas v.
Romulo, "to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement
on [environmental guidelines and environmental accountability] under Philippine authorities as
provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... "
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative, civil, and criminal
proceedings against erring officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such
proceedings public;
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal jurisdiction over
erring U.S. personnel under the circumstances of this case;
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the settlement of all meritorious
claims for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less severe than those
applicable to other States, and damages for personal injury or death, if such had been the case;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection
and production of evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects connected with the offenses
related to the grounding of the Guardian;
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each other of the disposition
of all cases, wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair, salvage or post
salvage plan or plans, including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef
absent a just settlement approved by the Honorable Court;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in accordance with the Local
Government Code and R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to the TRNP Trust Fund
defined under Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full reparations;
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected by the grounding of the
Guardian in light of Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009, among other
similar grounding incidents;
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name of transparency and
accountability such environmental damage assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all stages
of negotiation;
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and technical support to the
TPAMB;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense
Treaty to consider whether their provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology and for damages which follow from any violation of those rights;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes of protecting the
damaged areas of TRNP;
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the
Visiting Forces Agreement unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for violating the
preemptory norm of nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section 2,
Article II, of the Philippine Constitution;
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other respects; and
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs as are just
and equitable under the premises.7 (Underscoring supplied.)
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment 8 to the petition, petitioners also filed a motion for early
resolution and motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents.9
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection and production
orders, respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have
become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were already completed; (2) the petition is
defective in form and substance; (3) the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic
of the Philippines and the United States of America; and ( 4) the determination of the extent of responsibility of
the US Government as regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the executive branch.
The Court's Ruling
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition.
10
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." Specifically, it is "a party's
personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act
being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance."11 However, the rule on standing is a
procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. 12
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. 14
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do
ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future generations. Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations,
file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept
of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in
its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present a:: well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.15 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn,
is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on
citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that
humans are stewards of nature."16
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of whether this Court has
jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the
State,17is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of state immunity from suit, as follows:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the
law of our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law
under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are
deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the
society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these
principles in its relations with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes
that ''there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends."
[Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In
the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in
the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over
one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations."
[De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the same,. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the
suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of
Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has
been filed without its consent.19 (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment which reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,20 we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states from the
jurisdiction of local courts, as follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary
international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the
emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but
also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official
capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent.
Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded
for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet
imperium -that all states are soverr~ign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in
broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act
to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the
suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. 21 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from
the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from
the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,23 one of the consolidated cases therein involved a Filipino employed
at Clark Air Base who was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers of the US Air
Force, and was eventually dismissed from his employment when he was charged in court for violation of R.A. No.
6425. In a complaint for damages filed by the said employee against the military officers, the latter moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the suit was against the US Government which had not given its consent. The
RTC denied the motion but on a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed before this Court, we reversed the
RTC and dismissed the complaint. We held that petitioners US military officers were acting in the exercise of
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter
testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they
cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and
governmental acts (Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the
restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of
State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign,
its commercial activities or economic affairs.24
25
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals, we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle, thus:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law
and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its
officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his
rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has
been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit
against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The
rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice.
xxxx
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply
and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they
are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority
or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in
his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad
faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. 26 (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the US respondents
were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they we:re performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US
in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the
TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to
comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters
and the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing
policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses of the oceans" as
codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and
the US judiciary in the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd.27
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid customary norms governing the
uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a
branch of public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans." 28 The
UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay,
Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the
submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and
the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). 29 The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of
the oldest customary principles of international law.30 The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in
varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous
zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over
foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located.31
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to
the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea
as well as to its bed and subsoil.32
In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to
the following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the
territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may
require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the
non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this
Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention
affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. (Emphasis
supplied.) A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine
resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship is a non-
party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite this the US,
the world's leading maritime power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, the U.S. delegation
ultimately voted against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed mining technology
transfer provisions contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce U.S. membership, the bulk
of UNCLOS member states cooperated over the succeeding decade to revise the objection.able provisions. The
revisions satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the revised Part XI implementing agreement in 1994.
In the fall of 1994, President Clinton transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate
requesting its advice and consent. Despite consistent support from President Clinton, each of his successors, and
an ideologically diverse array of stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent required for the President
to internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during the 108th and 110th Congresses,
its progress continues to be hamstrung by significant pockets of political ambivalence over U.S. participation in
international institutions. Most recently, 111 th Congress SFRC Chairman Senator John Kerry included "voting
out" UNCLOS for full Senate consideration among his highest priorities. This did not occur, and no Senate action
has been taken on UNCLOS by the 112th Congress.34
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on March 10, 1983 that the
US will "recognize the rights of the other , states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the convention
[UNCLOS], so long as the rights and freedom of the United States and others under international law are
recognized by such coastal states", and President Clinton's reiteration of the US policy "to act in a manner
consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to traditional uses of the oceans and to encourage other
countries to do likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the "traditional uses of the oceans," and "if under its policy,
the US 'recognize[s] the rights of the other states in the waters off their coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that
"there is more reason to expect it to recognize the rights of other states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu
Sea in this case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US' refusal to join the UN CLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans
and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind," pointing out that such "has nothing to do with its [the US']
acceptance of customary international rules on navigation."
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps publicly endorses the ratification of
the UNCLOS, as shown by the following statement posted on its official website:
The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes stable maritime zones,
including a maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic
sea lanes passage rights; works against "jurisdictiomtl creep" by preventing coastal nations from expanding their
own maritime zones; and reaffirms sovereign immunity of warships, auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
xxxx
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by enhancing the ability of the
US to assert its sovereign rights over the resources of one of the largest continental shelves in the world. Further,
it is the Law of the Sea Convention that first established the concept of a maritime Exclusive Economic Zone out
to 200 nautical miles, and recognized the rights of coastal states to conserve and manage the natural resources in
this Zone.35
We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will
disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect
the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which
adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading
partner, which has been actively supporting the country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would
shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters.
Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply
with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine
environment as provided in Article 197, viz:
Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent
international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended
practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said
treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the.latter's
territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial '::;ea immediately if they flout the laws and
regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other
government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, they invoke federal
statutes in the US under which agencies of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to any action. Even
under the common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents are liable for negligence,
trespass and nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines to promote "common security interests" between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides
for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States
and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation
and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.36 The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common
law is thus improper considering that it is the VF A which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew
navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil
actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17,
Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be
filed separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not
preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian,
would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at
this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot
grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of
damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that
deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.37
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to
wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall
render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the
performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or
damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person or entity to protect,
preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor
strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make
periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to
the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of
damages to individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the sense that
the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought
recourse from this Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the
coral reef stn icture and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are
entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef.
However, we are mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to
negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy
has also declared it is closely coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage
and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As can be gleaned from
the following provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration of the parties, and which
dispute resolution methods are encouraged by the court, to wit:
RULE3
xxxx
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire from the parties if
they have settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties or their counsel, if authorized
by their clients, to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for purposes of mediation. If not available, the
court shall refer the case to the clerk of court or legal researcher for mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of referral
to mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-day period.
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial. Before
the scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary
conference for the following purposes:
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties and their counsels under oath, and
they shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The judge may
issue a consent decree approving the agreement between the parties in accordance with law, morals, public order
and public policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to compromise or settle in
accordance with law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-missile cruiser, the USS Port Royal,
ran aground about half a mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four days. After
spending $6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the US government was reported to have paid the State of Hawaii
$8.5 million in settlement over coral reef damage caused by the grounding. 38
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the
USS Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the formation of a US
interdisciplinary scientific team which will "initiate discussions with the Government of the Philippines to review
coral reef rehabilitation options in Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists." The
US team intends to "help assess damage and remediation options, in coordination with the Tubbataha
Management Office, appropriate Philippine government entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific
experts from Philippine universities."39

A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major relief that may
be obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:

RULES

SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall
include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs
of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or
restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust
fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court.1âwphi1

In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and
rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with
another State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the
foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the
political" --departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."40

On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the VFA
and to nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.

As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora,41 the VFA was duly concurred in by
the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly
authorized representative of the United States government. The VF A being a valid and binding agreement, the
parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. 42 The present petition
under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the
petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Aldrin Jeff Cudia vs The Superintendent of the Philippine Military
Academy
G.R. No. 211362 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Academic Freedom
Remedial Law – Mandamus – Ministrant vs Discretionary Function
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On
November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR) subject the
schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked
Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class (English). Later, the English
teacher reported Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit late. The tactical
officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their OR class was
dismissed late because the OR teacher said she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with
demerits and touring hours because of said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content with the explanation of the TO,
Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked
Cudia to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm
while his English class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on record, and based on the interview with
the teachers concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started
at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted his examination paper, he is
dismissed from said class and may be excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well
before 3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late because again, on that day in the
OR class, each student was dismissed as they submit their examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if
Cudia was ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated by the teacher, rather,
it was initiated by Cudia (because of his query to the teacher), although there were at least two students with
Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be considered a “class”; Cudia could just have
stated all that instead of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The STO sustained the
decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the Honor Code.
Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late
for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of their cadets. Any violation
thereof may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine (9) cadets, conducted
an investigation. After two hearings and after the parties involved were heard and with their witnesses presented,
the HC reconvened and the members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1
acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor System), a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However,
they also have a practice of chambering where the members, particularly the dissenter, are made to explain their
vote. This is to avoid the “tyranny of the minority”. After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his
initial “not guilty vote” was improper, hence he changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia
was immediately placed inside PMA’s holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of the PMA
ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military officers requesting for a re-
investigation. It was their claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by the HC. As a result of
such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where it was alleged
that PMA’s “sham” investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and privacy of
communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on the other
hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that the same is not proper
as a matter of policy and that the court should avoid interfering with military matters.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper.
2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.
HELD:
I.
Mandamus is not proper
Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudia’s prayer that PMA should be compelled to reinstate him as well as
to give him his supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts, even the Supreme Court, cannot compel
PMA to do so because the act of restoring Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a
discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be availed against an official or government agency, in this case PMA, whose
duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. Further, such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to
perform is within PMA’s academic freedom as an educational institution – and such performance is beyond the
jurisdiction of courts.
Certiorari is allowed
The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA and its responsible officers
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts
to decide actual controversies and to determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality acted with
grave abuse of discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a
matter of policy. Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule.
On the civil liberties of PMA cadets
One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA, have surrendered parts of
their civil and political liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined and punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot
question the same, much less, question it in the courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.
On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by enrolling at PMA, must be
prepared to subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to,
one that is with a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet facing dismissal from
PMA, whose private interests are at stake (life, liberty, property) which includes his honor, good name, and
integrity, is entitled to due process. No one can be deprived of such without due process of law and the PMA,
even as a military academy, is not exempt from such strictures. Thus, when Cudia questioned in court the manner
upon which he was dismissed from the PMA, such controversy may be inquired upon by the courts.
(Author’s note: PMA, in essence, raised that due process, as contemplated by the Constitution, is not needed in
dismissing a cadet yet, as can be seen in the below discussion, PMA presented evidence that due process was, in
fact, complied with.)
II. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still worthy to be part of
the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was
accorded due process. In this case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed
procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was
then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire
process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and
submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written report together
with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations.
When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the hearing.
During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and given the right to enter
his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his
behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code.
Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level – from the OIC of the HC, to the
SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate
investigation was also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-
GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a
Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was
constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the
President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the
findings of facts by these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to
dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor Code violation is not among those
listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner
which PMA conducts investigation of Honor Code violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically
terminated or dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the
President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may
exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic freedom. Academic freedom or, to
be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the
Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If it determines that a cadet
violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case, based on its findings, Cudia lied – which is a
violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes any form of lying. It
does not have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the PMA as to what penalty may be imposed.
When Cudia enrolled at PMA, he agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus, while the
punishment may be severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due
process -also considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.