Liza B.

Siccion
Intro to Law Digests

Case No. 1

ASKAY S. FERNANDO A. COSALAN

GR NO. 21943
SEPTEMBER 15, 1924

Facts of the case:

The plaintiff in this case is ASKAY, an illiterate Igorrote between 70 and 80 years of
age, residing in the municipal district of Tublay, Province of Benguet, who at various
time has been the owner of mining property. The defendant is FERNANDO A.
COSALAN, the nephew by marriage of ASKAY, and municipal president of Tublay, who
likewise has been interested along with his uncle in mining enterprises.

About 1907, ASKAY obtained title to the Pet Kel Mineral Claim located in Tublay,
Benguet. On November 23, 1914, if ASKAY sold this claim to COSALAN, nine years, in
1923, ASKAY instituted action in the court of first instance of Benguet to have the sale
of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim adhered null, to secure possession of the mineral claim,
and to obtain damages from defendant following trial before Judge of first instance
Harvey, Judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint and absolving the defendant
from the same, with costs against the plaintiff. On being informed of the trial court,
plaintiff attacked it on Jurisdiction.

Issue: WON Judge GEORGE R. HARVEY had jurisdiction to try the case.

Ruling:

Act No 3107, amendatory of section 155 of the Administrative Code, which authorizes a
Judge of First Instance to be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to Temporary duty, for
a period which shall in no case exceed sex months, in a district or province other than
his own, for the purpose of trying all kinds of cases, excepting criminal and election
cases, was not in force until fifteen days after the completion of the publication of the
statute in the official gazette, or not until August 3, 1923. Plaintiff relies on section 11 “ A
statute passed by the Philippine Legislature shall, in the absence of special provision,
take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of
the statute in the Official Gazette, the date of issue being excluded.

Act No. 3107, its final section provides that “This Act shall take effect on its approval.”
The act was approved on March 17, 1923. Therefore, there being a special provision in
Act No 3017, it applies to the exclusion of the general provision contained in the
Administrative Code.

Therefore, that the Act No. 3107 went into effect on March 17, 1923, and that it was
subsequent thereto, on April 16, 1923, that Judge Harvey was authorized to hold court
at Baguio, beginning with May 2, 1923, appellants argument along this line is found to
be without persuasive merit.
Case # 2

TANADA VS. TUVERA ET AL

GR NO. L-63915
APRIL 24, 1985

Facts of the case:

Petitioners asked for the issuance of the Writ of the Mandamus to compel the
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette the unpublished Executives Issuances
such as: Presidential Decrees, Proclamations, Executives Orders, General Orders,
Letters of Implementation, and Administrative Orders. In defense respondents stated
that the petitioners stated that the petitioners have no legal petitioners have no legal
personality in the case citing sec. 3 of the rules of court which lays-out the requirement
for filing for a writ of mandamus. Petitioners contended that the issue touches the public
and thereby does not require any special circumstance to institute an action. On the
other hand, sine qua non requirement stated that publication of the mentioned
issuances is not a sine qua non requirement as the law provides its own affectivity date
as stated in Art. 2 of the Civil Code.

Issue: WON publication affects the validity of the Executives Issuances.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court in its decision, ordered the respondents to publish the Executive
Issuances of general application, and further stated that failure for publication would
render the issuances no binding force and effect. It was explained that such publication
is essential as it gives basis to legal maxim known as ignorantia legis non excusat.
Thus, failure to publish would make create injustice as would it would punish the citizen
for transgression of the law which he had no notice.

The court declared that presidential issuances with general application without
publication would be inoperative and null and void. However, some justices in their
concurring opinions made a qualification stating that publication is not an absolute
requirement for the publication. As Justice Fernando stated that, publication is needed
but it must only confined in the Official Gazette because it would make those other laws
not published in the Official Gazette bereft of any binding force or effect.
Case # 3

TANADA VS. TUVERA

GR NO. L-63915
DECEMBER 29, 1986

Facts of the case:

Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they

claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive
portion as follows: the court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all published presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect. The petitioners suggest that
there should be no distinctions between laws of general applicability and those which
are not, that publication means complete publication and that the publication must be
made forthwith in the official gazette.

Issue: WON all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

Ruling:

The court held that all statutes including those of local application shall be published as
condition for their affectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different affectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the laws. The clause” unless otherwise provided” in article 2 of
the new civil code meant that publication required therein was not always imperative,
that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.
Case No 4

GIL BALBUNA
VS.
SEC. OF EDUCATION ET AL
GR NO. L-14283

Facts of the case:

The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955,
issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the
conduct of compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republic Act 1265.
Petitioners assail the validity of the above department order for it allegedly denies them
freedom of worship and of speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights; denies them due
process of law and the equal protection of the law; and that it unduly restricts their rights
in the upbringing of their children. Since the brief for the petitioners assails Republic Act
# 1265 only as construed and applied, the issue ultimately boils down the validity of
Department Order no. 8 s 1955, which promulgated the rules and regulations for the
implementation of the law.

Issue: WON Department Order No 8 has no binding force and effect, not having been
published in the official gazette as allegedly required by Commonwealth Act 638, Art. 2
of the new civil code.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the assailed department order, being addressed only to
the Director of Public and Private Schools and Educational institutions under their
supervision, cannot be said to be of general application. The laws in question do not
require the publication of the circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned in order
to become binding and effective but said law do not say that unless so published they
will be of no force and effect. In other words, said act merely enumerate and make a list
of what should be published in the officials gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the
different branches of the government issuing the same, and of the Bureau of printing.

In the case at bar, Department Order No 8, does not provide any penalty against those
pupils or students refusing to participate in the flag ceremony or otherwise violating the
provisions of said. Their expulsion was merely the consequence of their to observe
school discipline which the schools authorities are bound to maintain. As observed in
Gerona vs. Secretary of Education.
Case NO 5

ZULUETA V ZULUETA
GR No. 428 APRIL 30, 1992

Facts of the case:

Heirs of the late Don Clemente Zulueta nominated each auditors and a separate one as
auditor umpire. The two auditors nominated by the heirs failed to agree and filed
separate reports. The auditor umpire had his side with the auditor of the plaintiff. The
opposition was filed by the defendant. The court directed actions to be followed and
forwarded to Doña Francisca for her to create her demands due to disagreements of
both parties. On May 7, on plaintiff’s demand, to change the 15 days to a 7 days within
which she must express her demands. The defendant filed another petition to suspend
the proceedings until the new Code of Procedure takes effect on June 5, citing it is more
advantageous on her rights. The court denied the petition as the term for filing has
expired. Reason cited by defendant is her mistake as to the term prescribed which
prevented her from filing an opposition for auto of June 22.

ISSUE:

WON Doña Francisca is entitled to relief against the consequences of her failure to
interpose her appeal against the auto of June 22 within the period fixed by the law.

Ruling:

No. The mistake in this instance was her own, but it was a mistake of law, and while we
should be unwilling to say that special cases might not occur in which relief would be
afforded in such a proceeding as this against a mistake of law made by a party. Nothing
is shown here except the bare fact that the party acted under ignorance or
misconception of the provisions of the law in regard to the time within which the appeal
could be taken, and there is no reason why the general principle, a principle "founded
not only on expediency and policy but on necessity," that "ignorance of the law does not
excuse from compliance therewith" (Civil Code, art. 2), should be relaxed.

Act No. 75 was framed for the purpose of preventing injustice, and although the legal
construction to be placed upon its provisions cannot of course be affected by any
considerations as to the hardships of the particular case in which it is invoked, it is
proper to say that if the question determined in the auto of June 15, which is that
against the consequences of which the petitioner seeks ultimately to be relieved, were
to be decided upon its merits, that auto would necessarily be sustained, so that the
petitioner has in fact suffered no hardship or injustice by reason of the auto having been
left in effect as a result of the mistakes which she claims to have vitiated the subsequent
proceedings.
Case No 6.

CERRANO VS. TAN (1918)

G.R. No. L-12907 August 1, 1918

FACTS of the case:

January, 1916: Tan Chuco owner of casco No. 1033 rented it to Vivencio Cerrano for
P70/month payable at the end of each month. No duration was stipulated.May, 1916:
Tan notified Cerrano that it was necessary to repair it at Malabon. Cerrano was
interested to rent it after the repair but Tan told him that it was already for P80/month. A
week before the end of the repair, Tan sold it to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Siy Cong Bieng
& Co. induced Santos to refuse to take orders from the new owners Siy Cong Bieng &
Co. were obliged to bring an action of replevin against Santos for the recovery of the
possession of their casco. The sheriff took possession of the casco under a writ of
replevin, but redelivered it to Santos upon a delivery bond and his wife as sureties.
After the casco had been in possession of Santos for some three months, the replevin
suit held that casco was the property of Siy Cong Bieng & Co. at the time of the suit
was commenced, and that the "illegal detention" of the casco by Santos had caused
damages of P457.98 to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Cerrano paid the judgment in favor of
Siy Cong Bieng & Co. and the attorney's fees of Santos which shows that Santos was
only a nominal defendant in the replevin suit,which was entirely controlled by Cerrano.
CFI: casco was rented 10 months at the rate of P60, P457.98 for damages and P500 for
attorney's fees

ISSUE: WON the contract of rent is broken by Tan Chuco's act as proximate cause
making him liable to Cerrano for damages

Ruling :

RTC reversed P50 damage and his costs in the CFI article 1581 of the Civil Code
provides that when no definite agreement has been made regarding its duration, the
lease of a house is deemed to have been made from day to day, from month to month,
or from year to year, according to whether a daily, monthly, or yearly rent is to be paid.
reasonable presumption that one who agrees to pay a monthly rent intends that his
tenancy is to endure for a like period, subject to indefinite tacit renewals at the end of
each month as long as the arrangement is agreeable to both parties. Article 1106 of the
Civil Code establishes the rule that prospective profits may be recovered as damages.
Article 1107 of the same Code provides that the damages recoverable for the breach of
obligations not originating in fraud (dolo) are those which were or might have been
foreseen at the time the contract was entered into. it is unquestionable that defendant
must be deemed to have foreseen at the time he made contract that in the event of his
failure perform it, the plaintiff would be damaged by the loss of the profit he might
reasonably have expected to derive from its use GR: plaintiff may recover
compensation for any gain which he can make it appear with reasonable certainty the
defendant's wrongful act prevented him from acquiring plaintiff would have earned a net
profit of P50 from the use of the casco in the month during which he was entitled to its
possession damages resulting from avoidable consequences of the breach of a contract
or other legal duty are not recoverable. It is the duty of one injured by the unlawful act of
another to take such measures as prudent men usually take under such circumstances
to reduce the damages as much as possible. Burden of proof rests upon the defendant
to show that the plaintiff might have reduced the damages - none in this case. The
contract of lease or hiring does not create a right in rem in favor of the lessee, except in
the case of a recorded lease of real estate . Santos' attempt to retain possession of it
against the lawful owners by whom he had been placed in charge of it, was unlawful if
Cerrano is unable to recover from Santos the money paid by him will not justify us in
imposing the burden of repaying this money to him damages suffered by reason of his
voluntary assumption of the liability incurred by Santos by reason of his unlawful
attempt to withhold possession of the casco from its owners, by whom he was put in
charge of it, are not attributable to Cerrano and he is not responsible for them -NOT
proximate cause (proximate cause is Cerrano's own imprudence)
Case No. 7
CALANG VS. WILLIAMS
70 PHIL 726 1940
December 2, 1940

Facts of the case:

Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works
promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal
Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic. Among others, the petitioner Calalang, concerned citizen,
aver that the rules and regulations complained of: infringe upon constitutional precept
on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all
people; and that it constitutes unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade
and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.

Ruling:

YES, it still promotes social justice. In enacting the said law, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare.

The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy

towards any given group (e.g. the poor - because social justice is bringing the greatest
good to the greatest number, not necessarily just the poor like the drivers of the animal-
drawn vehicles).

Social justice: : "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. The promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex. must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force
in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

RATIO:

(1) Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy.

(2)The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness of all.
Case No. 8

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMELEC

618 scra 32

Facts of the case:

Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of

men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-
gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of
the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation
in their application.

Issue: WON Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Ruling:

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted. Comelec’s
citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a violation of
the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The
proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that
is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"),
rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their
allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested
rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply
with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on
the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination
based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any
international laws to which we adhere.
CASE No 9

TAMAYO vs GSELL
G.R. No. 10765 December 22, 1916

Facts of the case:

An action for damages against Carlos Gsell for personal injuries suffered by Braulio
Tamayo, minor son of plaintiff asking for P400, without costs except P25 for the attorney
of the Bureau of Labor. Braulio is a minor, about 11 or 12 years old who is employed as
a workman in the match factory located in Sta. Ana, Manila. He met an accident which
consisted of an injury caused by the knife of one of the machines of the factory which
cut the little and ring fingers on the right hand, the latter of which was severed. Incident
occurred because he was assigned by Eugenio Murcia, a foreman, in a work whish was
not familiar with Braulio. He was not given any instruction and was put in the new task
only on the day of the accident. He was brought to the General Hospital.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in rejecting the defenses of assumption of risk and
contributory interpose by the defendant.

HELD:

Applying the foregoing principles (cited in the decision are many American cases in
relation to the case and Act No. 1874, Employer’s Liability Act), which are founded upon
reason and justice, it is concluded that the trial court did not err in rejecting the defense’
claim. Tamayo is also awarded damages for the injury cost on him on the negligence of
the part of the foremen to warn Tamayo or to give instructions and consideration to his
age, skills and capabilities & for pecuniary loss occasioned by the injury as well as his
diminished capacity resulting from the injury.
Case No 10
CAYETANO VS.MONSOD
201 SCRA 210September 1991

Facts of the case

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the

position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article
IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: WON the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Ruling:

In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the
foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any
activity, in or out court ,which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses
the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing,
the petition is DISMISSED.*** The Supreme Court held that the appointment of Monsod
is in accordance with the requirement of law as having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer negotiator of contracts and
a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. Again, in the case of Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs. Agrava, the practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases and litigation in court; item braces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings
and other similar work which involves the determination by a legal mind the legal effects
of facts and conditions.
Case No 11

ULEP VS LEGAL CLINIC INC.

223 scra 378

Facts of the case:

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to
Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the
services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal
Clinic because of the latter’s advertisements which contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. Guam divorce. Annulment of
Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s
Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.

Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal
Problems” in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal
Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how
complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in
various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists
are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.

As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence
in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that
besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The
Legal Clinic offers.

ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such
is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.

HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is
not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered
include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the
services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who
is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his
talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the
advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous
marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is
highly reprehensible.

The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.
Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of
advertisement:

Advertisement in a reputable law list

Use of ordinary simple professional card

Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialize

Case No 12

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP

VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY,
Petitioners,
VS
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY,
ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

Facts of the case:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six
feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law”
referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check
mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team
Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for
the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but
were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

WON the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question,
hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.

WON COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

WON the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
Ruling:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution.

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even
assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right
to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the
branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally

imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the
existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the
body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall
squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On
the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more
than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of
the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

THIRD ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise
protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property

or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers
should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
Case No 13

ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMM.

63 PHIL 139

Facts of the case:

Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas
province.

On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-

elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his
oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which
declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared
elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in
Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before
the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was
filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.

Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the
Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as
regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:

WON the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the controversy;

WON The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created
by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.
Case no. 14

ABUEVA VS. WOOD

45 PHIL 612

Facts of the case:

Petitioners are members of the Independence Commission. The creation of the

commission was ratified and adopted by the Philippine Legislature on the 8th day of
March, 1919. Twenty six of the petitioners are members of the House of
Representatives and four are members of the Senate of the Philippine Islands and they
all belong to the democratic party;

Respondents are Leonard Wood, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands,

Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, Presidents of the Independence Commission.
Sued as well are the Acting Auditor, the Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the
Independence Commission.

This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court by the petitioners for the
writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to exhibit to the petitioners and to permit
them to examine all the vouchers and other documentary proofs in their possession,
showing the disbursements and expenditures made out of the funds of the
Independence Commission.

By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands provided for a standing
appropriation of one million pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable out of any funds in
the Insular Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, to defray the expenses of the
Independence Commission, including publicity and all other expenses in connection
with the performance of its duties; that said appropriation shall be considered as
included in the annual appropriation for the Senate and the House of Representatives,
at the rate of P500,000 for each house, although the appropriation act hereafter
approved may not make any specific appropriation for said purpose; with the proviso
that no part of said sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular Auditor until it shall
be necessary to make the payment or payments authorized by said act

Petitioners averred that as members of the Independence Commission they are legally
obliged to prevent the funds from being squandered, and to prevent any investments
and illicit expenses in open contravention of the purposes of the law. Petitioners have
verbally and by writing requested the respondents to permit them to examine the
vouchers and other documentary proofs relating to the expenditures and payments
made out of the funds appropriated for the use of the Independence Commission.
Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the petitioners from
examining said vouchers and documentary proofs.

ISSUE: WON can the Court compel the respondents to address the claims of the
petitioners

Ruling:

Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and head of the

executive department of the Philippine Government, is not subject to the control or
supervision of the courts.

Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman of the Independence Commission,

are mere agents of the Philippine Legislature and cannot be controlled or interfered with
by the courts.

As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action because
section 24 of the Jones Law provides that: “The administrative jurisdiction of the Auditor
over accounts, whether of funds or property, and all vouchers and records pertaining
thereto, shall be exclusive”

The determination of whether the accounts of the expenses of the Commission of

Independence should be shown to the plaintiffs or not is a question of policy and
administrative discretion, and is therefore not justiciable.
Case No 15

FABIAN VS. DESIERTO

295 SCRA 470

Facts of the case:

Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business
with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First
Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).

Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin.

Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her
attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and
threats. She eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led
an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself.
But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.

The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory.
Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that:

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision
or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

Issue: WON the Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

Ruling:

No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That
constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a measure of control over cases
placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the appellate
jurisdiction of the SC contemplated therein is to be exercised over “final judgments and
orders of lower courts,” that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It
does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.

Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to
be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-
judicial agencies