RELIGION, POWER &

&V IOLENCE
VIOLENCE
 RELIGION, POWER &
&V IOLENCE
VIOLENCE

EXPRESSION OF POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY TIMES

Editor
Ram Puniyani

SAGE Publications
New Delhi / Thousand Oaks / London
Copyright © Ram Puniyani, 2005

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Religion, power and violence: expression of politics in contemporary times/editor,

Ram Puniyani.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. India—Politics and government—1977– 2. Religion and politics—India.
3. Communalism—India. 4. World politics—1989– 5. Religion and politics.
6. Political violence. I. Puniyani, Ram.

DS480.853.R45 320.954'09'0511—dc22 2005 2005005282

ISBN: 0–7619–3338–7 (Pb) 81–7829–474–5 (India – Pb)

Sage Production Team: Proteeti Banerjee, Rajib Chatterjee and Santosh Rawat
 CONTENTS

List of Tables 7
Preface 8

Introduction: Religion, Power and Violence 12

Ram Puniyani

1. Religion: Opium of the Masses or . . . 27

Ram Puniyani
2. Globalization and Communalism:
Locating Contemporary Political Discourse
in the Context of Liberalization 44
V. Krishna Ananth
3. Terrorism and Imperialism: Two Sides
of the Same Coin 67
Thomas Sebastian

4. Islam, Terrorism and the New World Order 91

Jawaid Quddus
5. Syncretism and Communal Harmony in Bengal 108
J.J. Roy Burman
6. RSS and the Raj 124
Shamsul Islam

7. Hindutva and Indian Diaspora 144

Jawaid Quddus
6 Religion, Power & Violence

08. Hindutva and Weaker Sections:

Conflict between Dominance and Resistance 157
Prakash Louis

09. Mobilization for Hindutva 176

Manjari Katju
10. Fundamentalism, Communalism and Gender Justice 191
Vibhuti Patel
11. Hindutva Agenda and Dalits 208
Anand Teltumbde

12. The Supreme Court, Media and UCC Debate 225

Flavia Agnes
13. Educational Backwardness among the Muslims
in India: A Case of Misrepresentation? 248
Ranu Jain
14. Violence against the Cross 277
Sarto Esteves

15. Gujarat—Hindu Rashtra Laboratory 290

Uday Mehta
16. ‘After Gujarat . . .’: Making Sense of Reports on the
Post-Godhra Violence and its Aftermath 306
Rowena Robinson and D. Parthasarathy

About the Editor and Contributors 319

Index 322
 LIST O F TABLES

3.1 Historical Background: ‘Links’ of US Officials to

Al Qaeda and other Terrorist Organizations (partial list) 76
3.2 Bush Administration Officials: Links to
Al Qaeda and the 9/11 Terrorists (partial list) 77
8.1 Sex-wise Literacy Trend among SCs, STs and
Total Population—India 160
8.2 Estimate of the Total Number of Persons and Tribals
Displaced and Resettled by Various Development
Projects in India: 1951–90 (number in lakhs) 162
13.1 Percentage Distribution by General Education,
Household Religion and Area 263
13.2 Social Group-wise Literacy Rate of Indian States 264
13.3 Hindu–Muslim Literacy Gap in States/UT having
more than 10 per cent of Muslim Population 265
13.4 Percentage of Muslims (aged 15 and above)
in Kerala and West Bengal 266
13.5 Social Group-wise Participation in Literacy
Programmes and Achievement of Non-Enrolled
Children in the Age Group 6–14 267
13.6 Proportion of Population Completing Middle and
Matriculation Level Education by Population Groups 267
13.7 Percentage Distribution of Students in the
Age Group of 6–14 Years by States 268
13.8 Household Expenditure on Education by
Social Groups and States in India 269
13.9 Age-Specific ever Enrolment, Discontinuation and
Non-Attendance Rates (%) in Age Group 6–14 270
 PREFACE

R
eligion and politics have coexisted in the whole world since
ancient times. However, the recent manifestations of religions
being exploited to further political interests have become much
more overt. An intensification of communal violence over the last two
decades has made this clear to us in India. In a similar vein the latent
language manifested through theories like ‘Clash of Civilizations’, which
states that the major conflict in the world is the clash between the
backward Islamic civilization and the advanced Western one. Also the
obvious manifestation of politics in the language of religion has surfaced
with the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC)
after which some people were targeted politically for having been born
in the ‘wrong’ religion, some countries were attacked as they were sup-
posed to have harboured Islamic terrorists, some others are being targeted
because the United States (US) has discovered a link between the
terrorists and the administration of that country.
The demonization of Muslims and the denigration of Islam has been
the most overt observation in large parts of the world. In India we also
have the anti-Christian tirade, an addition to the regular anti-Muslim
attacks. Thousands have lost their lives in the name of this politics, which
is being brought in apparently in defence of one or the other ‘religion’.
This has converted the last part of the twentieth century as one amongst
the most violent; it has also created fear in the psyche of the world’s
second largest religious community, the Muslims.
One nostalgically recalls the decades from the 1940s to the 1970s, the
era of national liberation from the yoke of colonialism. The eras of Gandhi
and Mao, of Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh also comes to one’s mind.
One recalls the likes of Cohn Bendits, Rohan Vijevira, Charu Majumdar,
Preface 9

Tariq Ali and the movements they were associated with. One recalls
Mossadeq of Iran who nationalized his country’s oil wells, Pandit Nehru
who laid the foundations of the public sector, flagging off the process of
industrialization in this vast country. Now all those are things of the past.
Currently it is the communal interpretation of the past, the elite of
religious communities in countries like India, and the supreme power of
the world, US, which rule the roost. The earlier discourses were around
the issues of industrialization, education, social welfare, land rights, eco-
nomic justice and a host of social and gender issues. Currently either it
is jehadi terrorists initially trained by the US itself, or the crusade launched
by the US to install its puppets in one country after the other, or Hindutva
of Modi-Vajpayee variety which takes centre stage.
Is it all religion? Or is it politics of the elite in societies and of
imperialism the world over which is adorning the language of religion?
As long as the alternative super power, the socialist block, existed parallel
streams of thought prevailed and competed. With the demise of the
socialist block, the US and its cohorts changed the track. The offence
against ‘communist authoritarianism’ got transformed into the offence
against the threat of the ‘backward religion’, Islam, and the task of
hegemonizing the rest of the world was easy enough. Imperialist powers
attacking any country at will became a matter of strategy. Iraq, Afghani-
stan, then Iraq again and now the possibility of Iran being on the chopping
block is a matter of concern. But at the same time, identifying terrorism—
Islamic—as the problem of the world has percolated as a part of social
common sense the world over.
The timing in the early 1980s of ‘Islam’ replacing ‘communism’ as the
enemy of the world is very revealing. The deeper politics continues its
journey. As demonization of communism, which was a way to usher in
industrialization in the ex-colonies, was propagated through the massive
media management of the US and its allies, the process of manufacturing
consent for actions like its attack on Vietnam was there for all to see and
for many to believe in. The manufacture of myths to demonize not only
a community but also a religion became the central concern. What is most
amazing is that we took so long to recognize the change in the language
of political discourse, its real goal, and its agenda. Is it a mere coincidence
that at the same time that the political scene in India is being dominated
by the language of religion-based politics, global politics has also assumed
the language of religion? It is also the period in which the weaker sections
have been further marginalized and the social transformation of caste
(class) and gender has taken a beating.
10 Religion, Power & Violence

I started realizing the deeper meaning of the ongoing process mainly

after the Babri Masjid’s demolition and the consequent Mumbai riots. It
was the period just prior to the first attack on Iraq by the US. I was totally
baffled by both these events and the intensity of violence in the name
of religion. Since then more and more events took place in succession,
forcing one’s attention on this issue. Accompanying this was the
demonization of Muslim minorities in India and the identification of Islam
as a religion of terror all over the world. It was agonizing to hear all around
conversations about the nature of Islam and Muslims. It was beyond
comprehension as to how ‘constructed social common sense’ accepted
that religion could be the sole marker of human nature. It was also painful
to see how one religion was targeted and how successfully and easily those
with vested interests could do so.
Social common sense did not blame imperialists for their cunning, for
their plunder, for their cruelties in colonies but focused totally in blaming
the poor minorities in this part of the world for all the problems here.
The analogy with Hitler’s Germany is too obvious; one after the other
minorities were picked up and targeted before Germany herself was
destroyed by this divisive narrow vision of nation and communities. The
gruesome burning of Pastor Graham Staines shook the conscience of
India. While the international bodies kept protesting all these violations
of human rights, their voices were of no effect in controlling the train of
events, though these did come as grim reminders to the policy makers of
the countries.
The theorem that the world can be divided on religious lines was
proved otherwise when ‘Muslim’ Iraq was attacked by the US and another
Muslim country, Pakistan, provided the base for US planes refuelling, and
other Muslim countries either kept quiet or approved the US actions. The
biggest counter came not from the Muslims as such but from the global
supporters of peace. Millions in US, Europe and other countries marched
to condemn the dastardly attack on Iraq. And this holds a lot of promise.
In India also, the anti-Muslim atrocities and anti-Christian violence were
opposed by the secular movement, the progressive parties and groups who
have stood for the democratic principles and are upholding the values of
secularism. This progressive movement has over a period of time become
more articulate in opposing every attack on secular values and the rights
of minorities. Victims of communal violence have begun associating with
this movement in large numbers.
Two heartening phenomena in this grim scenario have come as a big
relief. At the national level the horrific Gujarat violence aroused the
Preface 11

conscience of the social movements greatly. Most of the groups working

on crucial social issues have realized that whatever be their individual area
of concern, the issue of entrenched communalism has to be confronted
by all of us. Since the last few years, these groups have made the fight
against communalism an integral part of their agenda. In addition, groups
devoted to communal harmony and national integration are springing up
at various places with the goal to keep communal forces at bay.
Worldwide, with the emasculation of the United Nations (UN), there
is no effective counter to the might of US. The body bags from Iraq will
force the hawks in US politics to the backseat, but it will not end the
imperialist lust to control raw materials and the global economy. The rise
of the global peace movement, global initiatives against war, against
nuclear power, for protection of ecology and enhancement of human
rights hold the promise for a better world in coming times.
This is what led me to request friends working on related themes to
put their ideas in the form of short essays which, together, can give the
total picture of the global and local political scenario. The book has tried
to analyse most aspects of contemporary politics, though some more
dimensions could have been added. It tries to grapple with the changing
paradigm of the political scenario of India and the world. Friends who
have contributed are mostly associated with the understanding of social
movements. I gratefully acknowledge the debt of contributors. One hopes
this will contribute to a deepening understanding of contemporary pol-
itics. I also wish to thank my friends Asghar Ali Engineer, Shabnam
Hashmi, Suma, and Daniel Mazgaonkar amongst others who have been
a source of inspiration for me.

Ram Puniyani
April 2005 Mumbai
 INTRODUCTION: RELIGION,
POWER AND VIOLENCE

RAM PUNIYANI

CONTEMPORARY WORLD SCENARIO AND

THE LANGUAGE OF RELIGION

T
he beginning of the twenty-first century has been marked by two
most dastardly crimes. The world witnessed with helplessness two
airplanes ramming into the WTC and killing over two thousand
innocent lives. In the immediate aftermath Osama bin Laden thanked
the Allah for this event. At the same time US President George W. Bush
announced that this was an act of Islamic terrorism and that the US would
initiate a war on terror, a crusade against Islamic terrorism. This resulted
in an attack on Afghanistan where bin Laden was thought to be living
then, in the process killing thousands of innocents.
In a nondescript town called Godhra in Gujarat, a coach of the
Sabarmati Express was torched killing 58 innocent people. This was
deemed an act of Islamic terrorism and it triggered off communal riots
in which thousands lost their lives. The carnage which took place was
well planned and thought to be abetted by the state government. People
were led to believe that the carnage was in reaction to the Godhra
incident.
What connects these two tragedies mentioned above which occured
in different parts of the world? The language used in violence takes off
from the religion and ends in killing the people belonging to a particular
religion, in this case Muslims. However, these are no exceptions. Politics
Introduction 13

over the last three decades has been conducted in the name of religion.
It began with the overthrow of Raza Shah Pehlavi in Iran and the rise
of Ayatollah Khoemini and his Islamic rule. This was celebrated as a
revolution, and led to the creation of an Islamic state in Iran. In Bosnia
and Rwanda too people suffered in the name of religion.
Other changes which have made an impact on the world have been
related to the collapse of socialist states and the emergence of US as the
sole superpower of the world. It has also seen the World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO), World Bank and other economic institutions are presid-
ing over the reorganization of the global economy. Islamic fundamentalism
rose in alarming proportions—violence was witnessed in the form of Iraq-
Iran war (1980); it is alleged that Libya bombed the Pan Am flight killing
270 people (1980); the forces led by local war lords, bin Laden, US and
Pakistan forced the retreat of Russian armies from Afghanistan; in 1990
Iraq invaded Kuwait and to ‘rescue’ the Sheikh of Kuwait, the US
attacked Iraq and later imposed economic sanctions which resulted in
great hardship in Iraq. In 1993 Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman set off a bomb
in the WTC basement killing six and injuring over 100 people; in the
same year Timothy McVeigh dropped a bomb in Oklahoma, killing over
300 people; in 1996 a fuel truck detonated outside Khobar Towers, a US
military housing complex in Dhahran, killing 19 Americans; in 2000 two
suicide bombers aboard a small boat in Aden staged a midday attack on
USS Cole killing 17 sailors. All this is labelled as Islamic terrorism and
Samuel Huntington comes up with the theory of clash of civilizations
according to which the less-developed Islamic civilization is attacking the
advanced western civilization.
In India one witnessed Rath Yatras (chariot processions) and the insti-
gation of revenge against the atrocities committed by earlier Muslim
rulers. The imagery of the Rath Yatra is associated with Lord Ram and
other figures in Hindu mythology, where the Lords would embark on a
chariot procession to destroy evil, demons, etc. In today’s parlance, it
means that the charioteer of the Rath—the leader of the BJP—is under-
taking this exercise to protect Hindus from contemporary demons—the
Muslims. To begin with, the chosen target was a mosque in Ayodhya which
was claimed to symbolize an insult to Hindu honour—the Islamic invader
Babur had destroyed the temple of the Hindu deity Ram, who was also
looked upon as the symbol of Hindu (Indian!) nationalism. This was
followed by massive anti-Muslim riots all over the country for nearly six
months, followed by a series of bomb blasts, allegedly by Islamic terrorists.
During the trajectory of the rise of this politics, Hindutva, an additional
14 Ram Puniyani

agenda was added—to deal with the threat from the activities of Christian
missionaries converting ‘gullible’ tribals into Christianity. To ‘solve’ the
problem, to get rid of this menace, a Christian Pastor, Graham Staines and
his two sons were burnt alive by a practitioner of Hindutva politics. While
Christians remain a minor target of this politics, its preferred enemy is
Islam and Muslims. This is why the Gujarat genocide, allegedly sponsored
by the state government ruled by a Hindutva leader, took place.
All the while the restructuring of the global economy to the advantage
of the US and its allies continues unabated. Even during this anti-Muslim
march of the US-led countries, their grip over the Middle East’s oil fields
becomes tighter by the day. The global domination of the unipolar force,
US, is almost unchallenged. In India the rise of Hindutva has intimidated
and ghettoized the minorities. Christians are feeling the heat of the
ascendance of Hindutva as nuns and priests are regular victims of the
bearers of tridents and their political protectors, the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP).
Some questions come to the fore. Is it for the sake of religion that the
ilk of bin Laden is striking the US and its allies in a cowardly manner—
terrorism, the killing of innocent beings? Are the terrorists the represen-
tatives of Islam? Have they been representing the Muslim community
locally or globally? Is the US undertaking a holy crusade when it is
attacking Afghanistan or Iraq? In a similar vein, are the practitioners of
Hindutva the representatives of Hinduism? Have they been chosen by
Hindus to undertake the process of revenge as claimed by them? Another
point to ponder is, are the bomb blasts and other acts of terror the
outcome of Islamic teachings or are they a frustrated response of people
whose back is to the wall? What is the link between bin Laden and his
ilk and the terrorist attacks in Mumbai or the burning of the train in
Godhra? Does religion hold the key to understand the policies of the
world’s biggest power? Does Hinduism hold the key to understand the acts
of Hindutva politics? Is it religion or deeper economic interests of the US
and elite sections of Indian society who are masquerading their imperial
and hegemonic ambitions under the cover of religion?

IMPERIALISM AND ISLAM

The political discourse of the earlier decades of the twentieth century

was marked by an intense debate between free world versus communism
Introduction 15

and free enterprise versus state controlled economy. It was the period
when most of the colonial states surged towards national liberation. The
colonial era in these countries had its own logic and at places the colonial
powers sowed the seeds of divide and rule very deep in the body politic
of those nations. Many colonies won their freedom by peaceful struggles
and many resorted to revolutions, mostly under the socialist flags. The
building of these nation states required the assistance of the state
machinery as private capital was weak and in capable of building
infrastructure for the industrial development of the country. The erst-
while Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the torchbearer of
socialism, supported various such state sponsored industrial endeavours,
while the US preferred client states who could act compradors for their
industries. Radicalism, the longing to change cultural and social values,
marched with ideals labelled as socialism. Religion in the social and
political space was conspicuous by its absence. It remained a private
matter of individuals.
The influential allies of the US had anti-socialism as their main
political slogan. The national liberation movements and activities started
weakening by the early 1970s and the state controlled economy started
disintegrating by the late 1970s and collapsed in most socialist countries
in due course. While the US led camp celebrated the victory of freedom,
the ex-socialist states had by then developed industrial infrastructure
despite the opposition from the so-called free world. With the demise of
socialist economy and the coming of Iranian political change, religion, nay
Islam, replaced socialism as the much-needed enemy for the dominant
countries. The presence of a real and ideological enemy is a prerequisite
for the agenda of ex-colonialists, now joined by a new power, US, which
later emerged as the strongest amongst them. The presence of oil wells
in the region inhabited by the followers of Islam gave the US and its allies
all the more reason to target them as a political enemy.
The attacks on Islam at the ideological level and the presentation of
the ghettoized Muslim communities as the symbols of Islam were used by
the US foreign policy to attack Muslim countries. Democracy became a
rarity in the countries where Muslims were predominant. The US had
a major role in ensuring that dictatorial regimes prevailed in the region
at the cost of democracy. Political interests hid behind religion and in due
course the mental ghettoization of Muslims all over the world started
taking place. By now a global stereotyping of Muslims, Islam, and Islamic
countries is close to complete along with the identification of Islam as a
violent religion giving rise to terrorism. This matched perfectly with the
16 Ram Puniyani

changes in India; with the rising tide of Hindutva, the unresolved Indo-
Pak ties manifested through the tension in Kashmir, the global demonization
of Islam came in handy. So now even in India, any minor skirmish is
alleged to be masterminded by Osama bin Laden. Just as the US needed
an enemy to build its global agenda, Hindutva also needed an external
enemy to consolidate its divisive politics. How the global agenda of the
US matches with the domestic agenda of Hindutva is a matter that
requires deeper analysis. The fact that the propagators of Hindutva
politics were never against colonial rule comes as a point requiring further
analysis.
The victims of US policies underwent turmoil and restlessness. A
section of Muslims adopted violence due to frustration, helplessness, and
the feeling that justice was out of their reach. The Palestinian refugees
took to the path of terrorism. The Jehadi terrorists were also trained by
the US to fight against the communist forces occupying Afghanistan.
Ayatollah Khoemini taking over Iran had a lot to do with the overthrow
of Mossadeq’s regime and promotion of Raza Shah Pehlavi as a puppet
of the US. The response came in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. The
Al Queda also took its legitimacy from Islam and many an act of terror
came to be identified with Muslims. What was common between the
Jehadis trained to overthrow the communist regime in Afghanistan and
the Palestinian refugees, between scattered attacks against US war ma-
chinery and those planting bombs in the streets and buses in Mumbai after
the anti-Muslim pogrom there?
The causes were different, the genesis of each reaction was different
but since the only unifying factor was that those involved were Muslims,
Islam came to be identified as the religion of terror. The conservatism and
orthodoxy which got duly promoted came to be known as Islamic fun-
damentalism. In a way, this has been the insane reaction of people
cornered by different isolationist policies, which were pursued in the quest
for control over oil resources worldwide, and in pushing back the values
promoting caste and gender equality in the Indian scenario. But there is
a historical convergence here—that of the agenda of the US and its oil
thirsty allies and the elite upper castes in India. The latter agenda pursues
itself in the name of Hindutva. Politics in the name of religion emerges
from three major sources. The first and major one is the oppressed
communities, victims of US policies, starting from the formation of Israel
to the Jehadis being trained to fight the communist forces in Afghanistan.
The second is the one where regimes in the Muslim majority countries
resort to it for their vested interests. This was witnessed in Iraq in full
Introduction 17

form, in Pakistan to a large extent, and in many other Muslim majority

countries. One can put Hindu fundamentalism in the same category; its
goals are similar to those of Khoemini or Zia-ul-Haq, the preservation of
interests of the elite section of society. The third category comes in the
form of mindless acts of terror like the ones of Kashmiri militants, or the
one called the Gujarat Muslim ‘Revenge Group’. This is the group that
took responsibility for the Mumbai blasts in the aftermath of the Gujarat
violence. These are more expressions of local ignominies hurled upon
sections of community.

HINDUTVA

Hindutva, the politics in the name of Hinduism, came up from the mid-
1920s. Its earlier roots in the declining sections of Hindu landlord and
priestly classes can be traced to the introduction of modern education and
rise of Indian National Congress. It ran parallel to Muslim communal
politics amongst the declining sections of Muslim landlords. It was articu-
lated theoretically by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar and further defined by
Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar. Its deeper social goal was to oppose the
quest for social and gender equality, which was being articulated by the
non-Brahmin movement and the introduction of education amongst
women. Its manifest aim was to oppose the politics of Muslim commu-
nalism and in the process its practitioners participated in mutual mud
slinging. The partition and the consequent changes altered the paradigm
of politics in south Asia. India took the path of secular democracy and
Hindutva remained dormant till quite recently.
In the early 1980s it started asserting itself and taking advantage of
every possible event. Starting from the Meenakshipuram conversion of
dalits to Islam, it went on to build itself aggressively in the wake of the
Shah Bano case, which came in as an ideal pretext for Hindutva politics.
It could consolidate itself with the Ram temple movement. This totally
transformed the language of Indian politics and its priorities. The major
social issues and problems got sidetracked, the liberal democratic atmos-
phere started getting stifled and in its place identity driven politics
took centre stage. The hate propaganda, which this politics had been
planting over several decades, became central to prevalent notions and
started defining the stereotypes. The merger of these stereotypes with the
image of terrorism completed the picture. The result was that communal
18 Ram Puniyani

violence started becoming more and more horrendous. Every act of

violence showed the nadir of barbarity, to be surpassed by a new one.
It was against such a background that the riots in Gujarat took place.
Narendra Modi, an active member of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS), conducted the pogrom with the deft efficiency of an evil genius,
polarized Gujarat along religious lines, and is currently busy protecting
the perpetrators of the violence. With the cover of RSS ideology pro-
tecting him, the remarks of either the Supreme Court or human rights
organizations do not affect him in the least bit. He constructs his own
ideological defence by using all his training in RSS shakhas. The polar-
ization brought in by this politics gave him another poll victory. It has
also given him the chance to consolidate ‘fascism in a single state’ in the
Indian context. It is not true that other Indian states are insulated from
this threat. In many states where the BJP has been ruling, the roots of
democracy are being loosened to make way for Hindutva politics. Uma
Bharati, amongst the few top BJP leaders who has not seen the RSS
shakha as women are not permitted to be the part of RSS, has taken the
Hindutva agenda in a different direction also. During her tenure as Chief
Minister of Madhya Pradesh, she turned the cow into the reigning deity
of the society there, and a cow-based economy was projected as the
foundation of the Hindu state.
The rule of the BJP at the centre had been lacklustre as far as social
progress was concerned. India dropped in the scale of social development
and is, as per the UN Human Development Index, now amongst the
bottom few on this scale. Unmindful of that, the BJP wasted crores of
Indian taxpayers’ money to create the image of India ‘Shining’, a cam-
paign that was difficult match in scale and extravagance. However, in
erstwhile Prime Minister Vajpayee’s constituency itself, 21 women and
one infant lost their lives in an attempt to get a sari, an election bribe
masquerading as a birthday gift. The cost of the sari was a measly Rs 40.
Hindutva also got a smooth entry into many prestigious institutions
of learning and in school textbooks, especially history. Most of these
books seem to be coming straight out from the RSS stable and thus its
ideological poison can be spewed through the network of schools. India
stands at the crossroads—Hindu rashtra or a secular democracy? The
threat posed by Hindutva goes far beyond the electoral process. The
poison has penetrated all levels of civic society through different channels
of religiosity, the media, and cultural bodies. Hindutva politics has the
proud privilege of operating through scores of organizations: BJP being
the one on the electoral chessboard, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) being
Introduction 19

a conglomeration of sadhus and traders, Bajrang Dal being the storm

troopers, and Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram carrying the Hindutva agenda to
tribals in remote places, in places where they can later burn the likes of
Pastor Graham Stewart Staines. The deeper connections of Hindutva
politics and the US and its allies need to be brought out in some detail.
Is it a coincidence that the RSS was pursuing an anti-communist tirade
precisely during the McCarthy era? Is it a mere coincidence that it
supported US policies on Vietnam earlier and in Iraq and Afghanistan
recently? At some point this politics can go on to take the form of
violence, a violence which essentially is one of cowards, directed against
the weak. RSS followers were known to have bowed before the British
in the past, and are now doing so in front of Uncle Sam in a shameful
manner.

THE PRESENT STUDY

The chapters in this anthology aim to grapple with different aspects of

the problem at the global and national levels. Since the dynamics of
contemporary politics is laced in the language of religion, it is imperative
that we have a bird’s eye view of religion itself.
Ram Puniyani in his chapter points out that when we use the word
‘religion’, it cannot indicate a single specific phenomenon. Since religion
has multiple facets—prophets, holy books, places of pilgrimage, commu-
nity functions, ethical values, and clergy—one should be specific as to
which facet of religion is being talked about. Since in the current discourse
it is generally not specified, it comes to mean followers of that religion and
the clergy. The holy people associated with religion can broadly be put
in two categories, those in alliance with the socially powerful like the
clerics, an alliance most visible during feudal times, and the saints who
are close to the ordinary people. In today’s parlance, the word religion is
totally bereft of its ethical and moral content and its followers’ ways are
used to characterize that religion. The clergy also presents itself as the
sole representative of that religion. In the global context today, it has
often become the rallying point of those being persecuted for political
reasons. The clergy plays a double role; it puts up a front to the invading
power, and it upholds the status quo in social relationships. At yet another
level, the clergy has also identified itself with the politics in the name of
religion. All said and done the major point which emerges is that, in most
20 Ram Puniyani

cases the use of the language of religion creates an emotional, blinding

effect, a mass hysteria in which the powers that be are able to execute their
social agenda fully.
The socio-economic roots of politics are very crucial to understanding
the political phenomenon. Krishna Ananth traces the economic devel-
opments in India and the economic compulsions which led to the need
to promote the public sector and the consequent rise of the middle classes.
Undoubtedly, the poor have been the victims of the economic policies
pursued so far. A fall in the growth of employment generation and rise
of the middle class has resulted in policies which undermine the public
welfare as the affluent middle class does not depend on social welfare
anyway. Liberalization, globalization, and privatization have adversely
affected the poor. At a deeper level, this phenomenon has gone hand-
in-hand with the rise of religion based politics. While parties which relied
on communal feelings existed earlier also, it’s with the advent of the ill
effects of globalization that communalism started gaining a stranger foot-
hold, first through the Congress and later though the BJP and its multiple
affiliates. One recalls here that communalism is again rooted more in the
middle classes who have been the biggest beneficiaries of the economic
development, and who may fear that they stand to lose what they have
if the lower classes start fighting for their economic and social rights.
The global scenario has been marked by another accompanying
phenomenon—terrorism. While the concept of terrorism is difficult to
define, it is easy to put into practice. This term came to the fore with a
different vehemence and aggression after the 11 September attack on the
WTC. As such terrorism associated with Muslims has been around since
the middle of the twentieth century, in particular after the formation of
Israel and the displacement of close to a million Palestinians. Later the same
phenomenon was consciously promoted through the Al Qaeda which was
formed to evict the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Thomas Sebastian
argues that while we are made to believe that only the likes of Osama bin
Laden are terrorists, it is the US itself which is the root cause of the genesis
of terrorism. Its aim is to have a control over global political and economic
order and prevent the emergence of any other competitive power. Interest-
ingly, the so-called war against terror is generally aimed against those very
forces which were products of US machinations; be it Osama bin Laden or
Saddam Husein, they have all been beneficiaries or products of US policies.
Looking at the same topic from another angle, Jawaid Quddus points
out that the present tendency to equate terrorism with Islam has been
constructed for political reasons. It so happens that Islam is followed in
Introduction 21

areas which are rich in oil. Quoting from the Quran, Quddus points out
that it does not support violence against innocents, which is what ter-
rorism is. Islam came as a message of peace in the war ravaged Arabian
society. It outlined the norms of peace between different individuals and
also focused on the rights of women. In India also, contrary to popular
perceptions it spread through peaceful means, through the teachings of
Sufi saints and also through the interaction with Arab traders. The
Muslim kings did use it occasionally to humiliate their opponents, but that
again was primarily a political move and had nothing to do with Islam
itself. The present projection of Islam as a terrorist religion is a political
ploy of the imperialist powers with an aim to control the oil resources by
politically controlling the countries producing it. He also cites examples
from different countries where those belonging to practically all the
religions of the world have resorted to terrorism. Socio-economic circum-
stances lead to this phenomenon and not religion per se.
While hostility between religions is prevalent, people-to-people inter-
action binds them socially. J.J. Roy Burman, who has systematically
studied such social interactions in different parts of India, outlines the
basics and dynamics of such a process in Bengal. Bengal was where the
Islamic tradition, Sufism, and Hinduism were widely prevalent. It was
during the medieval period that both the Sufi and Bhakti traditions
flourished and influenced each other to a great extent. The likes of Satya
Pir, Ramdeo Baba Pir symbolize this culture. Like other Indian states,
Bengal is full of shrines dedicated to pirs. Popular songs of folk groups,
which permeates the average people of Bengal, similarly intermixes trad-
itions. Burman argues that religious divides do not bother common people
whose search for spirituality is not bound by any religious rigidities. These
traditions shared another peculiar characteristic, sidetracking the clergy
and rituals associated with the elite traditions of religion.
While common people were unmindful of religious boundaries, the
elite of society who felt threatened due to the rise of lower sections in
the wake of industrialization, education, the possibility of land reforms,
and elimination of nobility were the ones to use religion in the political
space. The Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha-RSS were such forma-
tions and they, though appearing to be opposed to each other, shared a
lot in common. One of the major factors shared was their aloofness
from the freedom struggle. They were critical of the national movement
and the values it represented. Shamsul Islam in his detailed and well-
referenced study points out that those who claim to be the major cham-
pions of nationalism today had nothing whatsoever do with the struggle
22 Ram Puniyani

for India’s independence. The role of three major icons of the RSS is
brought out very well in his chapter. Hedgewar did go to jail but with
different goals, M.S. Golwalkar called the freedom struggle reactionary
and advised his followers not to have anything to do with it, while
Vajpayee, who was arrested as a case of mistaken identity during the 1942
Quit India movement, was quick to give a letter to the British seeking
his release. He also gave the names of the leaders of the movement in
his village Bateshwar. They were subsequently jailed for their participation
in the freedom struggle.
Currently, the Hindutva camp has been on the rampage as it is flush
with funds. Their so-called social work hides their spreading of hatred
against the minorities and the subsequent violence. It has come to be
known that large amounts of money for this divisive politics is coming
from the non-resident Indians (NRIs). What makes Hindus settled in the
US or UK fund these organizations has been investigated by a group of
Indians committed to secular values. They also came out with a campaign,
Stop Funding Hate, which was aimed at apprising the US corporations
about the real intent and purpose of this charity, which is being routed
through official channels. The psychosocial aspects of this issue are
brought out by Jawaid Quddus in his second chapter in this volume. He
traces the historical roots of the phenomenon, why a diaspora is formed,
what memories it lives with and what compels it to keep these fresh, to
contribute for the welfare of its homeland and yet support identity-based
organizations for whom social welfare is a mere facade.
The core agenda of religion-based politics is to promote the interests
of the elite and middle classes of society; the poor and exploited are not
the focus. How does its agenda reflect the needs of the poor and exploited
sections of society? How does its work reflect its faith in the caste and
gender hierarchy? Prakash Louis reflects on these questions by showcasing
the elitist nature of its programmes and agenda and the plight of Adivasis,
Dalits, workers, women, and minorities under the spell of Hindutva
politics. Manjari Katju takes off from there to outline how this formation
can mobilize the same sections of population it wants to oppress. The
mechanism by which it is able to project a monolithic image of Hindus
and the use of identity and other emotional issues to mobilize and co-
opt these sections into the politics of the Hindu right are well brought
out in her chapter. Katju traces the machinations of the Sangh Parivar
in making its forays in different sections of society, its creation of an
‘external’ image in Muslims, and to ensure that its mobilization is trans-
lated into electoral gains for the BJP. Needless to say, the biggest example
Introduction 23

of this mobilization is the Adivasis among whom the BJP is has gained
a lot of electoral ground.
Anand Teltumbde, in his chapter, outlines the relationship between
the Dalits and Hindutva. According to him, the upper caste origins of the
RSS are not a coincidence. Their ideological connections with the Italian
Fascists and their fascination for the genocide conducted by Hitler tell a
deeper tale. As Dalit aspirations were articulated, a section of brahmins,
felt threatened and went on to construct the whole ideology of Hindutva,
which is an anathema for democracy. Democracy is the system which is
a prerequisite for the struggles of the downtrodden to achieve social
equality. The whole Hindutva project is aimed at subjugating the Dalit’s
agenda, culture, and rights. That it is capable of projecting itself as
nationalism shows cleverness, an essential ‘virtue’ of brahminism.
Vibhuti Patel broadens the issue into one in which the politics of
fundamentalism, communalism, and gender justice are related. Suppres-
sion of the quest for gender equality is one of the major targets of
fundamentalists, or for that matter any narrow nationalists including the
fascists. She delves in detail about the status of Hindu women, and
Hindutva politics. How Hindutva promotes the belief in gender hierarchy
through different programmes is also highlighted. There are umpteen
examples where the leaders of the Hindu right, the ones working on the
women’s front of Hindutva have defended the abominable practice of sati
(immolating a widow on the funeral pyre of her husband), women’s
primary role as mothers and the like.
While Hindutva suppresses Hindu women’s rights, it does not hesitate
in shedding crocodile tears for the plight of Muslim women. In the wake
of Shah Bano’s case, Hindutva took up the case for a Uniform Civil Code
(UCC) to ‘reduce’ the exploitation of Muslim women. The arguments of
Flavia Agnes come in the backdrop of the understanding that gender
justice cannot be achieved in a single sweep in a community, especially
when physical violence is the norm. Gender justice can be achieved by
working for reforms of personal laws, religion by religion. Her passionate
defence of the case of reforms should provide the basis of striving towards
gender justice, and just laws cutting across communities should be uniform
in the proper sense of the term.
Madrasas have been in the news for wrong reasons. The places where
the poor from the minority community study due to the lack of better
facilities have been labelled as the breeding ground of terrorism. Another
myth which has been spread is that Muslims are educationally backward.
Ranu Jain deals with this issue in earnest to show that the uniform picture
24 Ram Puniyani

of the community does not reflect this at all. The diverse trends among
the Muslims are similar to the trends amongst other communities as well.
The longing for education is guided by the sociopolitical situation. It is
true that many Muslims are satisfied with a lower level of education, a
level satisfying their needs of reading and writing and adequate for
running their business. However, there are other enlightened trends as
well, reflected by various movements for educational excellence within
the community. The purpose of this broad generalization is not to alle-
viate the lot of the community but to further political goals.
With the BJP-led government in power, the Hindu right also targeted
the second largest minority, the Christians. As per their equating of
Hindus as Indians, Christians and Muslims do not belong to this category
and so they do not deserve the status of citizens at par with those whose
religions originated in this land. The Christian missionaries in pursuit of
their religious goals have been living in remote villages amongst the
Adivasis. They have also established some of the best educational and
health institutions in cities. But the urban institutions are not the target
of the wrath of Hindu right. It is the work of missionaries in remote
villages which has come under attack, based on the propaganda that
Christian missionaries are converting the gullible Adivasis by force and
fraud. The statistical data totally refutes this concoction but that does not
matter; on such a ‘charge’ was Pastor Staines burnt alive and many other
missionaries attacked.
Hindutva’s upswing was crystallized in the state of Gujarat in the
starkest manner. Here, social and political circumstances coalesced and
‘Hindu rashtra in one state’ came into being. Gujarat was hailed as the
Hindu rashtra laboratory and a controlled experiment is underway here
to intimidate and browbeat the minorities. This was unleashed system-
atically through a genocide, in which the state played a dubious role. The
social and political backdrop of Gujarat is outlined by Uday Mehta, who
looks at the specific factors of Gujarat which made it the ideal candidate
for the experiments of Hindutva. It is a state where the reform movements
have remained weak and the middle class, the rich peasants, and traders
have remained the dominant force. The members of these families have
been minting dollars and pounds from the Indian diaspora which, due to
its own identity crisis, supports the obscurantist agenda of Hindutva. It
is also a state which witnessed the worst of the anti-Dalit riots as a prelude
to the anti-Christian and anti-Muslim violence. Gujarat in a way has
become the benchmark for Hindutva forces to emulate in other states,
and for the democratic forces to learn lessons from so that they can work
Introduction 25

in a direction which will ensure that another Gujarat does not happen
and democracy prevails.
The horrific Gujarat violence, apart from being a blot on our democ-
racy, also shamed the whole nation. It is another matter that it was
paraded by the Hindu right as the glory of Gujarat. Many human rights
groups and concerned sociologists investigated the tragedy and wrote
excellent reports on it. Rowena Robinson and D. Parthasarathy bring out
the salient features of the significant reports. The reports make it clear
that the violence was no spontaneous outburst. It was planned for a
political purpose. It took place in the backdrop of the declining electoral
fortunes of the BJP and led to the polarization of communities on religious
lines which resulted in the BJP’s victory in the following elections. The
planned nature of the violence was clear and women suffered the most.
The violence against women of the ‘other’ community is the nadir of
communal violence; driven by communal ideology, which in turn believes
that women are the property of men, it can think of no better way to
punish its enemies than violating ‘their’ women.

WAR ON TERROR

Two clearly discernible but deeply disturbing phenomena emerge from the
current political scenario. The global scene is dominated by US policies
and the so-called war on terror. Undoubtedly, terrorism itself is the
product of American policies framed in its attempts to control the world’s
oil resources. The US aim of strengthening democracy has had the
opposite result in countries where it has interfered; democratic processes
have been demolished there. While terrorism is projected to be the
product of Islam, the real reasons of its rise lie in political and social
aspects. The weakening of democracy in the oil producing countries has
been accompanied by the rise in fundamentalism there. Fundamentalism
in turn abolishes the social space and the possibility of struggles for social
and gender equality. The pretext of religion is taken for this internal
agenda, which is sustained due to the external pressure of the US and
its allies. This type of fundamentalism is a direct offshoot of the imperialist
agenda to gain control over global resources.
The world is also witness to the decline of the UN. This was one
institution which had the potential of democratizing nations the world
over. The era of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) is also on the
26 Ram Puniyani

decline. The only positive global trend during this period has been the
breaking of the boundaries of European nations, leading to the formation
of the European Union (EU) and increased interaction of those nations.
But it remains a mystery as to why this power conglomerate could not
and did not prevent the US onslaughts on Iraq and Afghanistan. The
possibility of a unipolar world, led by a single nation is promoting both
fundamentalism and terrorism.
At home the rise of Hindutva, which approves of US policies in general
and their attacks against Muslim nations in particular, is fundamentalism.
It in turn promotes fundamentalism amongst the Muslim minority mainly
due to the ghettoization subsequent to violence and genocide directed
against them. While the Hindu right fuels fundamentalism in the threat-
ened communities, its own core agenda is that of reversing the process
of caste and gender equality, which has come up in a small measure post-
independence. One understands that this cover of religion is essentially
an attempt to deprive the weaker sections of their rights in a democratic
polity. This kind of politics takes shelter in the name of religion because
it is difficult to oppose any phenomenon based on emotions, especially
emotions rooted in religion.
The core question pertains to the values of democracy, globally and
at home. Breaking the barriers of hierarchies is a very difficult task,
especially in the post-colonial states. Its deeper link to the problems
inherited from the colonial era is visible. The imperial policies are strength-
ening the same set of notions even today wherever their field of influence
goes. How do weak nations overcome religion-based politics? How do
weak communities overthrow the powers which are trying to impose
religion-based politics? These are challenges posed to those striving for
a humane and just world order. The rights of nations and the rights of
individuals are at stake. Religion-based politics is stalking the world to
trample both these rights. The need for a global movement to overcome
the stranglehold of imperialism, the need for concerted efforts to strive
for affirmative safeguards for the weak, gender and social equality for
women and Dalits respectively, and the need for an uncompromising
defence of human rights is long overdue.
 RELIGION: OPIUM OF THE MASSES OR . . . 1
RAM PUNIYANI

D
efinitions of religion are undoubtedly controversial. While most
people define religion based on their own perception of it, most
of these definitions have diverse elements. Religion is a multi-
faceted phenomenon. The last three decades have seen the rising global
dominance of religion in various forms. Since the global movements for
national liberation have gone through a new phase in their trajectory, the
global debate is centering round religion in some form or the other. In
Ayatollah Khoemini’s Islamic revolution, Taliban’s excesses in Afghani-
stan, Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilization’ theory or Hindutva’s
campaign against the weaker sections of society for building a Hindu
rashtra (nation), the language of religion is all pervasive.

RELIGION IN SOCIAL SPACE

Today one is witness to the presence of religion in the social space all
around. The sociopolitical scene in India over the last two decades has
witnessed political issues based on religion. Religious conversions, Shah
Bano case, Ram temple movement, Babri Masjid demolition, and ‘Islamic
terrorism’ present a picture of India different from the one in the earlier
decades of the republic. This scene is duly backed by the rise of religiosity
in different walks of life. Asaram Bapu, Aniruddha Bapu, Pandurang
Shastri Athwale and their ilk draw large followings. Visits to the temple
and functions there have become major events of communities. The media
28 Ram Puniyani

is devoting more space on the discourses of swamis and saints, and columns
on religious values and religious functions are aplenty. Television serials
depict the ‘guiding role’ of the clergy and there are special channels like
Astha, Sadhana, and Sanskar to propagate particular versions of religiosity.
In films the struggling middle class hero of the previous decades has been
replaced by the rich patriarch constantly in touch with the priest for
guidance in his regular affairs. ‘Current events in India reveal the continu-
ing importance of religious nationalism . . . the religious aspects of Indian
Nationalism have yet to receive adequate attention’ (van der Veer 1998).
The NRIs are importing priests, building grand temples, dime a dozen,
in the countries they live in, and helping the religious campaigns and their
associated political hate propaganda here, thereby deepening religiosity
and religion-based politics in India. Those returning from the Middle East
promote madrassas and mosques or temples as per their religious beliefs.
The global scene, though not as bad, is equally full of religion laced
language.

When President Bush used the term crusade to describe the war on
terrorism, was he inadvertently revealing religious roots in American
patriotism? In short, is religious sentiment, long considered the prime
enemy of nationalism, actually one of its founding elements? (Stille 2003)

Samuel Huntington’s thesis of ‘Clash of Civilizations’, based on the conflict

between the backward Islamic and advanced western civilization seems to
be the hallmark of American policy. ‘Almost daily, the contours of religious
nationalism change: new outbursts and incidents bring new reactions, both
hostile and conciliatory, from its secular opponents’ (Jurgensmayer 1994).
It is not only religion-based nationalism which rules the roost, but also
a type of religiosity that has gained prominence today. The understanding
of religion fluctuates between religious identities and community on one
hand, to moral values on the other. The role of the clergy, which has
generally been powerful, especially in feudal time, has become stranger.
Their social power has risen along with the rise of religious cults and their
following amongst diverse sections of society.

RELIGION: A COMPLEX ENSEMBLE

When one talks of religion per se what does one mean, which aspect of
religion is one referring to? It is very difficult to provide a comprehensive
Religion: Opium of the Masses or . . . 29

assessment and definition of religion as it encompasses the complex

reality of society itself. That is also the reason why there are so many
divergent definitions and understandings of religion. Karl Marx analysed
the concept of religion thoroughly. He said, ‘Man makes religion . . .. This
state, this society produce religion, a reversed world consciousness, because
they are a reversed world . . . . Religion is the general theory of the world,
its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in a popular form, its spiritualistic
point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn comple-
tion, its universal ground for consolation and justification . . . . Religious
distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and the protest
against real distress. Religion is the sigh of oppressed creature, the heart
of the heartless world, just as it is spirit of spiritless situation. It is opium
of the people’ (Marx 1972).
Many classical schools of thought do make a distinction between
religion as a complex organization owing its existence and influence to
state patronage and in turn being instrumental in strengthening and
consolidating the prevailing class and power structure, and religion:

as located in popular religious and social movements of the oppressed

strata of society articulating their grievances and registering their protest
against unjust, inhuman exploitative practices of the dominant classes and
striving to restore just, egalitarian social order. Religion as Marx and Engels
noted was probably the only effective and accessible institutional mech-
anism that majority of oppressed masses could use in traditional societies
for articulating their grievances. Even in modern societies, such move-
ments continue to play a revitalizing role as reflected (those struggles
inspired by liberation theology) in Latin American and social and religious
movements of the oppressed strata even in this country, right from
early period of Indian history. Numerous sects and cults right from the
Mauryan and even earlier period, such as Lokayat, Ajivikas, Buddhist,
Nath and Sidddha cults, various Tantric sects, medieval Bhakti and Sufi
movements culminating in Mahatma Phule and other social reformers in
nineteenth century, articulated the aspirations of oppressed sections of
society (Mehta 1998, p. 22).

On a similar wavelength Irfan Habib points out, ‘Religion not only has
suppressed popular movements, it has also played a role in uniting the
rebels’ (Habib 1995, p. 2).
Different sections of society look at different facets of religion. It has
two important faces, one the popular religion and two, the state religion.
‘The folk, popular religion is directly linked to the average people’s
struggles, aspirations and sorrows. It creates a faith in social life and gives
30 Ram Puniyani

solace in the times of crisis; giving it a humane face . . . . On the contrary

state religion is promoter of status quo and is against change. It plays a
role in suppressing dissent and serving the interests of ruling classes’
(Singh 1995, p. i.).

MULTIPLE FACETS OF RELIGION

It is often difficult to decipher what is being said when religion is being

talked about. What constitutes religion? While some may identify a
religion only with its texts, others bow to a deity and many consider the
clergy to be the embodiment of religion.
The genesis of religion can help us understand some core aspects of
the phenomenon. Nature worship was the predominant aspect of early
belief systems. The information about the early stages of religion comes
from archeological sources. The consciousness of ancient human beings
was oriented more towards practical matters which did not have religious
abstractions. This can be called the pre-religion phase. ‘Some Soviet
scholars maintain that the period of pre-religion lasted a long time, until
the end of Early Paleolithic period, also covering the Mousterian Period
(c. 100–40,000 years ago) when Neanderthal man hunted cave bears and
other animals’ (Tokarey 1986, p. 9). This is in contrast to the view that
religion was inherent in man.
Belief in the supernatural goes back to 60,000 years in time. ‘Archeo-
logical evidence reveals that Neanderthal man in Near East buried his
dead with flowers, tone tools and jewelry’ (Haralombos 1994, p. 455).
While it is difficult to define religion and locate the origin of all religions
in a single pattern, we can state that the main feature of religion is faith
in the existence of a supernatural power. ‘A basic feature of religion, its
defining characteristic, is the belief in the existence of souls, supernatural
being and supernatural forces’ (Desai 1993, p. 9). Anthony Wallace sums
up the essential features of religion:

First is the supernatural premise, second are thirteen universal categories

of religious behavior, which are intuitively recognized by anthropologists,
theologicians and layman alike as the elementary particles of ritual; prayer,
song, physiological exercise, exhortation, recitation of texts, simulation,
mana (touching things), taboos, feasts, sacrifices, congregation, inspiration
and symbolism. At third level, we have described the threading of events
of these categories into sequence called rituals and the rationalization of
Religion: Opium of the Masses or . . . 31

ritual by belief. Fourth, ceremonies are organized into complexes, which

we have labeled cult institutions. Finally we come to religion of society,
which is describable only as a conglomeration of ritual (both calendrical
and critical) and belief system, including pantheon, myth and values,
whose components are logically well integrated only at the level of cult
institutions (Mehta 1998, p. 15).

It is very important to take the dimensions of religion into consider-

ation to avoid confusion when the word religion is generally used. These
facts are (a) ritualistic, (b) experiential, (c) the doctrinal, (d) the mythical,
and (e) the ethical. Religious experience has been explained thus: ‘No
other aspect of religion can have religious worth unless it is enlivened by
the subject’s inner experience of the “Divine” . . . . And that means that
true religion starts only when it has become a matter of inner experience,
an ultimate concern of one’s life’ (Smart 1995, p. 68). The element of
revelation is present in all religions. It applies as much to the Vedas as
to the Quran or Bible. Transcendentalism is another important ingredient
of religious beliefs. Various beliefs are manifested in the form of rituals.
Social dimensions of religion relate to the community. Attitudes towards
the world and life are manifested in ethical and moral values, with a
specific term denoting the same in each religion like dharma in Hinduism,
din in Islam, and ethics in Christianity.
While all these are important aspects of religion, probably the most
influential one is the clergy. The degree and extent of this organization
varies in different religions, but the essential factor of the authority of the
religion is vested with the clergy. Often when one refers to religion, one
does mean the dictates or sanctions of the clergy since they function as
the final authority of the religion. Saints, however, are not vested with
any divinely ordained authority or the power that accompanies with the
political structure.
In a way the dimensions of religion can be grouped into two categories,
personal and organizational.

By personal dimension we mean not only religio-mystical experience but

also any beliefs, desires and conative responses that a religious person
has . . . . In contrast, there is organized form of religion, which in fact forms
a very major part of most people’s religion. It consists in sharing certain
rituals with one’s co-religionists, and public profession of one’s faith.
Organized religion is also dominated by priests, maulavis and gives far less
scope for individual freedom and inner experience. It is also more acces-
sible to mobilization by vested interests (Jhingran 1995, p. 77).
32 Ram Puniyani

TYPES OF RELIGIONS

Before institutionalized religion existed, religious beliefs were present in

the form of animism and naturalism. The pattern of evolution of religions
has changed over a period of time with the same religion also undergoing
change. Though the following patterns are recognized, it is difficult to say
that they succeeded each other chronologically.

ANIMISM

Many social scientists do not recognize animism as a religion, preferring

to call it a cultural element. Animism is prevalent amongst tribals and
it means belief in a supernatural power that organizes and animates the
material universe. Animism is based on man’s attempt to answer two
questions related to the difference between the living and the dead, and
what the human shapes appearing in dreams are. According to one
understanding, ‘soul is a spirit being, which leaves the body temporarily
during dreams and visions and permanently once one is dead. Once
invented, the idea of spirit was applied not simply to man, but also to many
aspects of natural and human environment’ (Haralombos 1994, p. 454).
‘Animistic images are spirits of deceased ancestors, souls of living people
and personification of forces of nature. The spirits of elements could be
benevolent, or, on the other hand they could threaten the well being of
mankind. That is why small sacrifices were offered to them, when it was
deemed necessary’ (Progress Publishers 1985, p. 19).
Animism has close affinities to naturism, a belief that forces of nature
have supernatural powers. It is likely that, awed by the power of nature,
early man might have personified nature and transformed abstract natural
forces into personal agents. Wind, lightning, rain and many such phenom-
enon became deified and continue to be worshippped.

ETHNIC RELIGIONS

Historically these came later than the animistic beliefs. The common
features of these religions are their being based on clans. They emerged
with the rise of agricultural society. They also reflect the consolidation
of various ethnic groups that later became nations. Judaism, Hinduism,
Religion: Opium of the Masses or . . . 33

Shintoism, and Confucianism are some of the religions belonging to this

group. Some of the common factors are the daily rituals and practices,
like the way food is eaten, the rules of hygiene, performance of ablution
rites, and prescription of rules and taboos for interaction within and
outside the group.

UNIVERSAL RELIGIONS

These religions were founded around the teachings of prophets. There

may not be much in common between one and the other. These are
prevalent in different parts of the world, cutting across the geographical
boundaries. Initially some of these did not have a clear-cut concept of
a supernatural power, god. Over time the followers considered the proph-
ets god (for example, Mahavir, Buddha). Jainism, Judaism, Buddhism,
Christianity, Islam, and Sikhism are the major examples of these.

CONCEPT OF SUPERNATURAL

The concept of a supernatural power has been the major component of

religions. Even in tribal cults, the spirits have powers which transcend the
limits of human perception.

POLYTHEISM

Many earlier religions venerated multiple gods and goddesses. This phe-
nomenon generally began with the disintegration of primitive society.
These gods generally represent core functions of society; a sort of division
of labour prevails among them and there is hierarchy as well. Hinduism,
religions of ancient Greece and Rome are major examples of this.
A typical feature of Egyptian religious belief was the deification of
animals and birds. The town of Memphis worshipped the bull god, Apis,
and the hawk-headed sky god, Horus, was worshipped in many towns. In
India too we have a plethora of such gods and goddesses: cow, snakes, air,
etc. In Babylonia the spirits of local rivers and canals and the spirits of the
dead were worshipped. Ancient Iran had mountains and animals as gods.
In China nature worship revolved around the earth and mountains.
34 Ram Puniyani

TRITHEISM

Some religions and religious traditions show the intermediate phase of

transition from polytheism to monotheism through tritheism. In these
there are three major gods—the creator, the preserver and destroyer
regulate the functioning of the world. The Universe and its activities
revolves between the three of them. Brahma, Vishnu, Mahesh in Hin-
duism is the major example of this. In Christianity the concept of Father,
Son and Holy Spirit prevails as an idea which is quite nebulous, describing
more the functions than the physical entities. However, the concept of
this triple identity remains subordinate to that of God. It is in this stage
that the supernatural assumes a male identity and which continues in the
concept of monotheism as well.

MONOTHEISM

One god is worshipped instead of multiple gods. Judaism, Christianity,

and Islam adhere to this concept. The initial concept of a single god
revolves around the physical being of the almighty. In due course, god
was regarded as a supreme power who is formless. Many have attributed
the status of godhood to some cherished values like truth and non-
violence (Gandhi) and Daridranarayan, god as an embodiment of the
poor (Swami Vivekananda).

RELIGION AS AN INSTITUTION

The clergy emerged in all religions in different forms. Christianity for

example attracted the poor, freemen and slaves in the beginning. The
state authorities persecuted them. These new followers were organized
under the leadership of the Roman community. In due course hierarchy
emerged in the religion with the establishment of the clergy. A powerful
organized church evolved which played an important role in the political
life of the society. Church and crown became the associate centres of
power. The division of labour between the King and clergy came to be
popularized. The example of Europe shows the role of clergy in a clear-
cut fashion. While no two social phenomena can be exact duplicates, one
can say that the basic premise of the clergy’s role remains the same,
Religion: Opium of the Masses or . . . 35

cutting across all religions. In the hands of the clergy, politics and juris-
prudence were considered branches of theology and were treated alike
according to the principles prevailing in the latter. Church dogmas were
political axioms at the same time and quoting the Bible had the same force
as that of law.
The clergy always tries to hold back rational thinking and the advance
of science as these threaten the belief systems imposed by them. These
traditional belief systems support the status quo, the prime aim of the
clergy as a political entity. ‘Many scientists had to face inquisitions,
imprisonment and other punishments for their scientific discoveries and
ideas which had the potential of increasing the role of reason in social
affairs. It is because of putting forward of these doctrines that challenged
the deeply held beliefs of the Church, that Galileo was condemned,
Giardiano Bruno and Servatus were burnt at the stake . . . Islamic science
(Koran being the source of all scientific knowledge), and Vedas being
fountainhead of most of the knowledge in general . . . are few of the
examples’ (Puniyani 2001, p. 43). It is due to this that in Pakistan, where
the hold of Mullahs is strong, the concept of djinns as the source of infinite
energy is being pushed forward. In India since the coming of Hindutva
politics astrology and karmakand (rituals) are being propagated with
greater intensity.
The role of the church in many Christian dominated countries changed
with the advent of modern democracies. Many of the clergy undertook
social service as the central part of their activities away from the alliances
with feudal lords, who got wiped out due to the process of industrialization.
As per the teachings of Islam, there is no official clergy. But de-facto
at many places the mullahs did associate with the centres of power. The
Islamic countries in most cases could not sustain democracies due to
imperialist assaults aimed at controlling their oil wealth. This external
interference has also resulted in the mullah’s role in the community
becoming stronger.

CLERGY AND SAINTS

Of all the aspects of religion, the role and power of the clergy has been
most striking. In agricultural societies with their feudal classes and king-
doms, the clergy was the defender of the system of exploitation based on
the feudal relations of production. The association of the clergy with
36 Ram Puniyani

feudal lords has been the hallmark of feudal power structures, although
expressions are different. The structure of clerical organization also re-
mains diverse. In Christianity one sees the church enjoy close relation
with the rulers. In Hinduism the king had a rajguru (royal priest) and the
landlords had the blessings of the local priest.
The revolts of poor peasants derived strength from pre-hierarchical
Christian society and medieval mysticism. This opposed the power of the
church which oppressed poor peasants. Munzer, deriving values from
mysticism, led the poor peasants and attacked the church hierarchy. He
repudiated the idea of the Bible being the only and infallible revelation.
The role of saints vis-à-vis the clergy is manifested in different forms,
there is no universal pattern in this. The opposition to exploitative
systems also assumed various forms. ‘Revolutionary opposition to feudal-
ism lasted throughout the middle ages. It took the form of mysticism,
open heresy or armed insurrection, all depending on the conditions of
the time. As for mysticism it is well known how much sixteenth century
reformers depended on it. Munzer himself was largely indebted to it’
(Engels 1972, p. 88).
The oppressed masses found sympathizers for their pain and sorrows
a healing balm in saints.

The impoverished masses who in the earlier phase of civilization were

simply slaves and who in the advanced phase, became the property-less
working class were henceforth confronted with a dual uncertainty and dual
misery; those coming from still uncontrolled nature and those coming from
the exploitative machinery of ruling class . . . . This made the life of masses
too painful of suffering and uncertainness to be born without some pal-
liative remedy, this was supplied by religion—the belief in God who alone
could assure justice, if not right now at least sometime later, if not in this
world at least in the afterworld (Chattopadhyay 1987).

It was the saints who offered solace to the deprived. In a way they
challenged the power of the clergy. But this challenge was always
articulated in a very positive language. They were critical of the estab-
lished norms of religion and they evolved their own spiritual language
which, while totally opposed to that of institutional religion, did create
a bond of harmony amongst the poorer sections. Traditions like Lokayat
opposed the caste system, the concepts of heaven and hell, and the blind
faith propagated by Brahminism. It was through this blind faith that the
dominant classes, feudal lords, exploited the poor. Lokayat called for
resorting to reason.
Religion: Opium of the Masses or . . . 37

Saints, generally, did not believe in rituals, conform just to religious

scriptures, nor invoke the established traditions. Their concept of god or
a supernatural power was that of a friend, who is not to be feared as
projected in the tradition of the clerics. Thus religion has two parallel
traditions, one of clergy and the other of saints. The clergy sides with the
oppressors and saints with the toiling masses:

To the extent that the subjugated and oppressed class is able to resist the
dominance of their oppressors, their ideological hegemony and are able to
pose a serious challenge to oppressive religious doctrines, the oppressed
can insulate their beliefs which later continue to symbolize defiance . . . .
The philosophy of Charvaks, Siddha, Nath Tantra ran parallel religious
traditions to the Brahmincal religion, more popular amongst the op-
pressed, right up to Bhakti movement (Engineer 1998).

Interestingly, in due course many of these traditions themselves are co-

opted again by the elite religious traditions. While Sai Baba is being
Brahminized extensively, Lord Jagannath who was worshipped by Adivasis
in Orissa has now become the god of the dominant classes and castes.
In India the Bhakti and Sufi saints, though coming from different
religious streams, had a strong impact on the masses. Bhakti is probably
an outstanding example of the popular trend in Indian religious history.
The Bhakti movement began in Tamil Nadu and spread northwards. The
saints came from different streams and many of them were from low
castes. Bhakti ‘opposed the institutionalization of religion, tried to decen-
tralize it, and declared that it is a private matter. It gave respectability to
the separation of state power and religion and merged the concept of God
worship with the process of getting knowledge’ (Bhadu 2003, p. 33). The
Warkari tradition of Maharashtra was a major trend. Chokhamela, a poet
saint coming from a low caste, articulates the sorrow of the poor in his
poems, reprimanding god for an unequal society, complaining to him
about the world’s cruelty to the poor. The devotion in this trend turns
away from Vedic rituals and its teaching differs from the Vedas and
Upanishads. Chokhamela in one of his Abhangs, a form of folk poetry,
says, ‘We have not read the Holy tomes, we are not experts in the
interpretation of Vedant-Dharma but the core of religious teachings, the
formless god is standing for us in the form of Vithoba. (Got standing on
the brick) and so is accessible to us’ (Sardar 1999, p. 64).
Tukaram is one of the most popular saints of Maharashtra. ‘His litera-
ture is free from the Sanskrit rich Brahminical literature, which keeps the
38 Ram Puniyani

average reader at a distance. Free from Brahminical elitism, Tukaram’s

literature has a force to assess the world from a humanistic angle. The
deep sympathies which his literature displays for the poor, contributes to
enhancing his literary prestige’ (Nemade 1983, p. 9). Travails of poor
people are the focus of his work. This Bhakti-based tradition gave respect-
ability to many low castes and also to Muslims. Thereby it was able to
pose a challenge to Brahmanism.
The Bhakti tradition had specific features. These were to oppose the
hegemony of Brahminism, rituals, and the vedic monopoly of the edu-
cated elite of society. They uniformly opposed Sanskrit and adopted the
languages more popular with the masses. They opposed the prevalent
polytheism and talked of one god. In India in particular, Hindu–Muslim
unity has been one of the concerns expressed by most of the saints.
Tukaram’s literature shows that

There was prevalence of blind faith and rational thought was rejected
by the dominant streams of society. Brahmins had a total hegemony
on the faith, worship and knowledge . . . . Bhakti tradition (Nath,
Mahanubhav, Gosavi, Warkari and Dattasampradayi) saints challenged
and opposed this Brahmincial exploitation. The inequality in the field of
spiritual attainments, which were opposed to the Shudras and women, had
religious sanctions. Brahmins had vested interests in maintaining their
own monopoly in religious arena . . . . These Brahmins had no problem in
serving loyally the Muslim rulers as Diwan, Deshpande and Kulkarni
(Ibid., p. 18).

In a way the Bhakti movements were not merely religious. They targeted
social evils and opposed the landlord-Brahmin alliance. They propagated
social equality and brotherhood.
Sufi saints also played a similar role in the social sphere. They opposed
the tyranny of the powerful and projected the popular elements of re-
ligion. Breaking the barriers of social inequality, they also united the
people and struggled against the prevalent orthodoxy and blind faith.
Their following came from the lower strata of society, irrespective of
religion. Miyan Mir, Baba Farid, Gesudraj, Sheikh Salim Chishti, and
Nizamuddin Auliya were revered by all for their humanistic preaching.
An event in Nizamuddin Auliya’s life demonstrates how he shunned
power and was close to the masses. He once received a message from
the emperor to visit his court. Auliya politely declined the invitation. The
emperor replied that he would visit Auliya’s shrine. Auliya refused to see
the emperor and sent a message that his shrine had two doors, one in
Religion: Opium of the Masses or . . . 39

front and one behind. If emperor came from the front door, Auliya would
go out from the back door.
The Brahminical stream had its grip on the whole society, fully backed
by those in power. This had its expression in the vedic rituals; in contrast
the subaltern Bhakti developed its own forms of worship away from the
Brahminic norms. ‘The reduction in the emphasis on priest compared to
his role in the sacrificial ritual of Vedic Brahmanism gradually led to
devotional worship—bhakti—becoming most widespread form of Puranic
religion. The Vedic religion had well-defined rituals and was exclusive to
the upper castes. The Puranic religion had a far wider appeal’ (Thapar
2002, p. 318). Bhakti tradition manifested in India in diverse forms, ‘As
a broad based tradition . . . for the majority religion (Bhakti) remained an
area of interplay, accommodation and contestation of a localized kind . . .’
(ibid., p. 351).
Bhakti movement gave hope and awakening to the people. People
oppressed by the spiritual tyranny of the brahmins got a feeling of their
worth in society. This movement rejected the devbhasha (language of
gods) Sanskrit and used the languages popular with the masse, like
Marathi in Maharashtra and Avadhi in Uttar Pradesh. It came as a breath
of fresh air liberating the people from the stranglehold of Brahminism.
‘The rise of Bhakti movement was a rebellion against the idol worship,
the oppression of caste system getting manifested through the rigid rituals’
(Mukherji 1999, p. 70). ‘These movements were opposed to the Vedanitst
concept of Sanyas, which involves no work. They bridged the gap be-
tween Hindus and Muslims’ (Mantri, p. 70). These also had very progres-
sive attitudes on most matters related to the position of women in society.
The scholars of syncretism have pointed out that many subaltern
traditions defy the rigid classification into Hindu or Muslim in the con-
tinent, so thoroughly intermixed are they in their social expression. The
ordinary people imbibed the prevalent traditions irrespective of their
source if they appealed to them spiritually and socially. ‘Scores of com-
munities scattered across this vast subcontinent still refuse to be neatly
categorized as “Hindu” or “Muslim” or whatever, freely borrowing from
diverse traditions to create their own way of understanding the world’
(Sikand 2003, p. 3).
Kabir and Nanak stand tall as those challenging the authority of the
clergy and in turn those in power. Their attempts to establish a religious
language which could express the woes of the masses led them away from
the power-centred Brahmins and mullahs. Kabir developed a set of values
which were against the dominant elite and tried to unite people from both
40 Ram Puniyani

religions. He denounced the caste system and was against untouchability

in particular. ‘He upheld fundamental unity of man, and was opposed to
all kinds of discrimination between human beings, whether on the basis
of caste or religion, race, family or wealth. His sympathies were with the
poor man with whom he identified himself’ (Chandra 1990, p. 127).
Nanak was a mystic and he composed and sang verses to the
accompaniment of the rabab, a string instrument played by his follower
Mardan. He visited Mecca, Medina, Sri Lanka and other places searching
for knowledge. Like Kabir he also denounced rituals, idol worship, and
formal observances. He aimed at bridging distinctions between Hindus
and Muslims in order to create an atmosphere of peace, goodwill, and
mutual interaction. ‘Nanak and Kabir both insisted that they were
neither Hindu nor Muslim, along with other similar iconoclasts, and
defied the might of Brahmins and Mullahs’ (Sikand 2003, p. 9). The
followers of both these major saints were the poor and oppressed sections
of society. The story of Nanak in which he preferred to have meals at
the house of a weaver Bhago declining the hospitality of the landlord is
fairly representative of his social affiliation. The story in a symbolic way
shows Nanak’s opposition to the landlords as their income is laced with
the blood of the oppressed.
The sufi tradition is basically derived from the teachings of Islam. The
sufis have a mystical bent of mind and deeply spiritual. They were
disgusted by the vulgar display of wealth and power. Hence they kept away
from the state. There were many similarities between the ideas of sufi
saints and Hindu Bhakti saints. They chose the Hindvai or Hindi lan-
guage to converse with the people and many of their verses are composed
in Hindi.

SECULARIZATION

At a formal level the relationship between the state and religion varies
in the modern nations. In England Anglican Christianity is the state
religion and the monarch is the head of the church as well as the state.
But British society is highly secularized. ‘The British state despite being
associated with Christian denomination, enacts laws on secular consid-
erations and is hardly motivated by Anglican Christian dogmas. Indian
state, on the other hand, is secular and is not associated with any religious
dogma but Indian society is highly religious, and the state despite its
Religion: Opium of the Masses or . . . 41

professed secularity and neutrality towards religion, its acts often come
under the influence of one or the other religion’ (Engineer 1998, p. 15).
The beginning of industrialization set into motion various changes,
which had deep and profound effects on human thought and institutions.
In Europe, the clergy started losing its grip on social and political affairs
and social thought. Social norms started developing around modern
rationality.

It marked the beginning of ‘age of reason’ and a break from the ‘age of faith’.
The former had its roots in science and technology and latter in interpre-
tation of the word of God, its imposition of ideologies in the name of
religion and the use of emotions of people to smoothen the exploitative
system of feudalism. Historically this shift first occurred in the West where
it manifested itself in the struggle between Church and state (Puniyani
2003, p. 185).

The church here represented the declining forces of feudal lords while
the rising classes of industrialists, workers and women marched forward
with the banner of rationalism. ‘This process assumed the undisguised role
of displacing aspects of religion and faith manufactured by clergy to the
private lives of the people, freeing social life from the constraints of
orthodoxy and obscurantism . ..’ (Ibid.). This was the major change in the
role and status of religion in the social life.
In the Indian context this process had a very different manifestation.
Transformation towards a secular society remained slow and weak. The
efforts of Jotiba Phule, Savitribai Phule, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar,
Periyar Ramasamy Naicker and their like were scattered all over the
country trying to get rid of the Brahminical hold. Burning of Manusmriti
was the high point of the assertion of this process. Even till date this
process is not complete with the result that the hold of Brahminism
continues. While the social stratum trying to escape the tyranny of the
clergy derived strength from reason, the politics of declining classes based
itself on Islam (Muslim League) and Brahminical version of Hinduism
(Hindu Mahasabha-RSS).
The freedom movement was the most powerful movement which
marched a bit towards secularization. The post-independence rapid change
in caste and gender relations started breaking the dominance of the clergy.
However, post-1980s the process seems to be reversing itself and retro-
grade forces are at work. Parallel to this has been the rise of the acharyas
and mahants and various gurus who have been preaching the values of
42 Ram Puniyani

the Manusmriti in modern language, even quoting an odd scientist here

and there to derive legitimacy for imposing their domination on societal
affairs. The VHP which has emerged as a major retrograde force has
politicized the sadhu clans, communalized the social space and also
created new institutions around its sociopolitical agenda.
Our neighbour Pakistan had a worse time. Right from the beginning
the grip of mullahs on the state had been strong. This became more
manifest after Zia-ul-Haq came to power. While India is being pushed
from a secular terrain to one dominated by religion, Pakistan is already
deep in that terrain.

RELIGION TODAY

Some scholars had predicted earlier that religion would decline or dis-
appear with the process of secularization. Secularization is not complete
in many parts of the world. The move of Communist party to ban
churches in the USSR was a dismal failure; with the collapse of the
socialist states, people are thronging to churches. In advanced western
countries also, the social visibility of religion persists and is growing
stronger at places.
The current ascendance of politics in the name of religion is accom-
panied by various religious people. Many of them use the prefix sant,
acharya, guru. The famous ones amongst these are Asaram Bapu, Pandurang
Shashtri Athwale, Jaya Gurudev, Aniruddha Bapu, Ma Amritanand mai,
Sudhanshu Maharaj and Sri Sri Ravishankar. These again have multiple
roles, from assuaging tense nerves in an intensely competitive society to
providing newer versions of Manusmriti-based systems. Some of them do
it overtly like Pandurang Shashtri Athwale and Asaram Bapu, while others
focus on calming nerves distressed by prevalent existential anxieties.
The medieval saints had a way of expressing the pain and sorrow of the
feudal-Brahminical system. The present genre of ‘saints’ are in a way
upholders of status quo and providing raison de etre for the retrograde
political trajectory of the society. ‘Traditional urban Brahminism is finding
a rejuvenation in the new discourses of the new preachers, so called
Maharshis, Brahmkumaris and their likes’ (Bhadu 2003, p. 129).
The current expressions of religion are an accompaniment of the
politics of Hindutva, which aims to bring back the rigid hierarchical
society in a modern garb. Mediaeval saint tradition was the high point of
Religion: Opium of the Masses or . . . 43

India’s history. The current popularity of the so-called saints is a political

accompaniment of Hindutva, its social infrastructure so to say.

REFERENCES

A Dictionary of Believers and Non-Believers (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985).

Bhadu, Rajaram, Dharmasatta aur Pritirodh ki Sanskriti (New Delhi: Rajkamal, 2003).
Chandra, Satish, Medieval India (New Delhi: National Council of Education Research
and Training, 1990).
Chattopadhyay, Debiprasad, Religion and Society (Banglore: Ma Le Publishers, 1987).
Desai, A.R., ‘Introduction’, in Uday Mehta (ed.), Modern Godman in India (Mumbai:
Popular Prakashan, 1998).
Engels, Friedrich, ‘The Peasant War in Germany’, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
On Religion (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972).
Engineer, Irfan, in A.A. Engineer and U. Mehta (eds), Religion, State and Secularism
(Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1998).
Habib, Irfan, in Kunwarpal Singh (ed.), Bhakti Andolan: Itihas aur Sanskriti (Vani, 1995).
Haralombos, M., Sociology: Themes and Perspectives (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1994).
Jurgensmayer, Mark, Religious Nationalism Confronts Secular State (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1994).
Mantri, Ganesh, Gandhi aur Ambedkar (Delhi: Prabhat Prakshan, 1999).
Marx, Karl, ‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’, in Karl Marx
and Friedrich Engels, On Religion (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972).
Mehta, Uday, Modern Godman in India (Mumbai: Popular Prakashan, 1998).
—–———, ‘Secularism, Secularization and Modernity: A Sociological Perspective of
the Western Model’, in Asghar Ali Engineer, Secularism, Secualirization and
Religion: Western and Indian Experience (Delhi: Ajanta, 1998).
Nemade, Bhalchandra, Tukaram (Delhi: Sahitya Academy, 1983).
Puniyani, Ram, ‘One India One People’, Science Society and Politics, Mumbai, January
2001.
—–———, Communal Politics: Facts versus Myths (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003).
Sardar, G.B., Social Impact of Saint Literature. Quoted in Ganesh Mantri, Gandhi aur
Ambedkar (Delhi: Prabhat Prakashan, 1999).
Sikand, Yoginder, Sacred Spaces: Exploring Traditions of Shared Faith in India (New
Delhi: Penguin, 2003).
Smart, Ninian, ‘The Religious Experience of Mankind’, in Saral Jhingran (ed.),
Secularism in India (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 1995).
Stille, Alexander, ‘Historians Trace an Unholy Alliance: Religion and Nationalism’,
New York Times, 31 May 2003.
Thapar, Romila, The Penguin History of early India (New Delhi: Penguin, 2002).
Tokarey, Sergi, History of Religion (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986).
Veer, Peter van der, Religious Nationalism (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).
 2
GLOBALIZATION AND COMMUNALISM: LOCATING
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN THE
CONTEXT OF LIBERALIZATION1

V. KRISHNA ANANTH

I
t is now over over 10 years since the idea of a ‘socialistic pattern’ of
development, the model that the Indian ruling classes had adopted
at the dawn of independence (Nehruvian socialism), and the rhetoric
associated with it were officially given up. On 21 July 1991, Finance
Minister, Manmohan Singh, obtained parliamentary sanction for his eco-
nomic policy resolution.2 The decade also witnessed a rise in the use of
idioms that accord no importance to the inequities that exist in the socio-
economic order that was perpetuated by the elite who captured the Indian
state apparatus at the time of independence. It is, hence, not mere
coincidence that political discourse began to move in a direction that
clearly attempted to negate the fundamentals of the republican Consti-
tution rooted, at least in theory, in principles of democracy and its integral
values such as the rule of law and a commitment to egalitarian values.

1
This chapter was written when the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance was in
power. Though the Congress, in alliance with a few regional outfits and the Left
parties, wrested power and a new government with Manmohan Singh as Prime
Minister was sworn in (on 22 May 2004), I do not see this change as significant at
least in the ideological sense, especially in the context of the focus of this chapter.
2
The debate over the resolution in Parliament was an occasion when the ruling party
(the Congress) received support from the main opposition party—the BJP—to this
qualitative change in the economic policy. The BJP’s floor leader had just one
qualification to make while endorsing the shift away from Nehruvian socialism.
Mr Jaswant Singh’s point was that the Congress(I) had appropriated the BJP’s eco-
nomic policy agenda.
Globalization and Communalism 45

It is necessary to look for links of this nature because turning to religious

and other denominational idioms in political discourse is taking place
during a period when the living conditions of a majority of the Indian
population has gone from bad to worse.

THE WAGES OF REFORMS

Notwithstanding the tall claims that the shift in priorities in the economic
policy since 1991 helped revive the economy, the liberalization-privitization-
globalization paradigm did not benefit India’s poor. An illustration of this
was found in a detailed study by Montek Singh Ahluwalia (incidentally,
one known for his unqualified support to the liberalization agenda) in the
course of his assignment as chairman of a task force constituted by the
Planning Commission of India.3 The report confirmed a steady fall in
employment generation and even negative growth in employment. These
trends in a country with a billion people cannot but be taken as suggesting
a deterioration in the living conditions.
The report revealed the following facts. Although there was an in-
crease in employment in the organized sector as a whole during the period
between 1993–94 and 1999–2000 from 374.45 million heads to 397
million heads, the increase was just marginal (a mere 22.55 million jobs
during the entire period). This, however, does not reveal the complete
picture. From an annual growth rate of 2.04 per cent in 1993–94 (when
the reforms programme was to have shown its positive results after the
initial problems according to the then Finance Minister’s statements)
annual growth in employment shot down to a mere 0.98 per cent in 1999–
2000.4
The data presented in the report also showed a significant negative
growth in employment in such important areas as agriculture, manufac-
turing, mining and quarrying, and electricity; even in the area of financial
services, a sector that the advocates of the reforms expected to grow in
a big way, it was found that the rate of growth in employment was falling.
Although the total number of those employed in this sector increased
from 3.52 million in 1993–94 to 5.05 million (an increase of about 1.5

3
Report of the Task Force on Employment Opportunities, Planning Commission, Gov-
ernment of India, July 2001.
4
Ibid., p. 22.
46 V. Krishna Ananth

million jobs through the period), it is significant to note that the annual
rate of growth had fallen here also from 7.18 per cent in 1993–94 to 6.20
per cent in 1999–2000. The only areas where employment grew (faster
than the earlier period) were in the construction industry, trade and
transport, storage and communication.5
The most significant aspect of this was the negative growth rate
witnessed in employment generation in the public sector. From an annual
growth rate of 1.52 per cent in 1993–94, the employment growth turned
negative in 1999–2000.6 Apart from the fact that the shrinking of job
opportunities in the public sector contributed significantly to the overall
gloom in the employment market, the narrowing down of employment
opportunities in the public sector had a direct bearing on the increasing
resort to the religious idiom by sections belonging to the ruling elite.
Those employed in the public sector, the middle classes, have indeed been
integral to the nation building project as it was undertaken by the post-
colonial ruling elite in India.
The study also revealed that unemployment rose considerably in the
rural areas during 1993–94 to 1999–2000. The percentage of labour force
unemployed in 1999–2000 was almost as high as it was in 1977 in rural
India. The progressive fall in the proportion of the unemployed as per-
centage of labour force that could be achieved in 1987–88 was not
sustained and instead, there was a steady deterioration on this front.
About 7.2 per cent of the labour force remained unemployed in 1999–
2000, which was an increase by at least 1.6 per cent between 1993–94
(which we may consider the base year for the reforms era) and 1999–
2000. It will be in order to add to this the prevalence of under-reporting
of unemployment (by those rendered jobless) or even withdrawing from
the process of seeking jobs, especially by women.
The situation in the urban areas was no different. The study showed
a marginal increase in the percentage of unemployed males while in the
case of females, the percentage of unemployed to the total labour force had
fallen, though marginally. This could suggest that the new manufacturing
units (for export purposes) have opened up avenues for employment and
that they prefer women over men to work there. But then, despite this fall
in the unemployment figures among women in the urban areas, there is
no evidence to suggest any drastic improvment in the wage levels of those
employed and their working conditions. The experience with employment

5
Ibid.
6
Ibid., p. 35.
Globalization and Communalism 47

in such manufacturing units that have come up during the reforms era
and located, as a rule, on the margins of urban towns, have hardly been
promising in terms of labour standards. Trade unions do not, rather are not,
allowed to exist in this sector. However, for want of any concrete evidence
on this count, it is prudent to refrain from making a categorical statement
on this aspect.
The experience with the reforms process in the past decade has been
the following:

• The reforms process failed to generate jobs on the scale it was

expected to. This is evident from the sharp fall in the annual rate
of growth in employment between 1993–94 and 1999–2000.
• The number of unemployed as a percentage of the labour force
increased during this period.
• The increase in unemployment was maximum in the agriculture
sector; in other words, a large number of those in rural India were
rendered jobless during this period.

THE SOCIALIST TRAJECTORY

In the early 1970s, a crisis of a much smaller dimension caused widespread

unrest across the country and took the form of a political movement
against the establishment. There are, indeed, similarities between the
crises across the spectrum—economic, social, and political—that were
witnessed in the 1970s and the scenario as it emerged in the last decade
of the twentieth century in the wake of the liberalization-privitization-
globalization programme.
The mid-1960s was a period when sections within the ruling party
attempted a pronounced shift away from the Nehruvian framework in the
economic realm. The decision to devalue the Rupee then and the at-
tempts by sections within the Congress to push the free market agenda
at that stage was, however, repulsed after Indira Gandhi managed to
dominate the Congress.
The infirmities that were integral to the manner in which the social-
istic agenda was furthered by Indira Gandhi, and also the premises on
which the Nehruvian socialist project was based, were behind the distor-
tions that set into the economic policy discourse. This in turn led to the
crisis in the late 1980s and the early 1990s that finally forced the ruling
48 V. Krishna Ananth

establishment to justify policy measures that sought the withdrawal of the

state from various welfare measures. The welfare state model was central
to the working of the democratic agenda over the years and any attempt
by the state to dilute its commitment on this front is bound to have an
impact on the democratic edifice.7
This chapter will attempt to make sense of the social basis that lends
legitimacy to the liberalization agenda from within the context of the
dynamics of Nehruvian socialism. This will be followed by a section where
I intend to argue as to how the interests of the ruling elite8 had guided,
and continue to guide, the agenda of the mainstream political establish-
ment, and establish a connection between this and the attempts now to
orchestrate a rightward shift in the political discourse in order to carry
on with the liberalization agenda. An understanding based on such an
approach will also lead us to conclude that the paradigm shift in the
economic policy initiated in July 1991 was a consequence of the Nehruvian
definition of socialism rather than a break, in any radical sense, with the
past.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES

A brief foray into the broad features of the economic policy adopted soon
after independence is in order here. It is a fact, far too well documented
in history, that the political leadership to whom the colonial masters
transferred power on 15 August 1947 consisted of men who were opposed
to any ideas involving a radical change leave alone a revolution of the
communist kind. This was clear in the attitude of the interim government
towards the incidents of working class protests; whenever the trade
unions organized industrial strikes, most often demanding better living

7
I have discussed this in greater detail in an earlier article on the subject. See
V. Krishna Ananth, ‘Political Economy of Communalism: Some Observations on the
Contemporary Polical Discourse’, Social Scientist, vol. 29, nos 7–8 (July–August), 2001.
8
I am using ‘elite’ instead of ‘classes’. This, in my view, helps explain the ease with
which the political establishment could manufacture a consensus in favour of
the reforms even among sections consisting of the organized workforce and the
salariat, despite the fact that such reforms in the long term have only affected these
sections. Take for instance the squeeze on employment, the retreat of the welfare state
and such manifestations of the liberalization agenda that have affected the living
conditions of the middle classes in a big way during the past decade.
Globalization and Communalism 49

conditions (in the post-World War II period), the political establishment

under Jawaharlal Nehru (or the provincial satraps of the Congress party)
let loose a reign of terror. They vied with each other in this and ordered
the police to ‘act’ against any mass action organized by the trade unions
or the peasantry, led by and large at that time by the communists.9
The Indian bourgeoisie, assured as it was of independence even while
World War II was still on, came out with what was known as the Bombay
Plan in 1944.10 Recognizing the need for state intervention in economic
activity, the thrust of the Bombay Plan was state investment in infrastruc-
ture, particularly in those areas involving huge capital investments and
a long gestation period apart from social overheads. Other salient aspects
of the Plan were poverty alleviation measures by the state, deficit financ-
ing, and state investments in the consumer goods sector (in those areas
which involved a long gestation period). Another aspect of this strategy
was to erect protective barriers against competition from imports.
Radical land reforms and freeing the agrarian sector of its feudal
vestiges would have served the same purpose, that is enlarging the do-
mestic market for consumer goods on the lines in which capitalism was
built in the East Asian countries. But such a strategy was fraught with
dangerous consequences from the point of view of the nationalist bour-
geoisie. Its stability could have been challenged by an uprising (even if
not a revolutionary upsurge) given the long tradition of mobilization of
the small peasantry and the landless in many parts of the country under
the leadership of the kisan sabhas.11 The influence of the representatives
of the nationalist bourgeoisie over the affairs of the Congress party was
so complete by this time, that they were in a position to ensure that the
Congress did nothing that would disturb the socio-economic ‘stability’ in
rural India. The Nehruvian era witnessed the implementation of the
Bombay Plan; a substantially interventionist state and an economy with
a sizeable public sector governed in the political sphere by a Constitution
that provided for a multi-party parliamentary democracy, was put in place.

9
This aspect has been discussed in detail by historians of the freedom struggle. See
A.R. Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism (Bombay: Popular Prakashan,
1959); R.P. Dutt, India Today (Bombay, 1949); Sumit Sarkar, Modern India (Delhi:
Macmillan, 1983).
10
Purushottamdas Thakurdas, A Plan of Economic Development for India, vols 1 and 2
(London: Penguin, 1945). The signatories to the plan included J.R.D. Tata, G.D. Birla,
Ardeshir Dalal, Sri Ram, Kasturbhai Lalbhai, A.D. Shroff, and John Mathai.
11
This, after all, marks the dynamics of the freedom movement in India and is one
of the few areas in Indian history where scholarship is rich. I do not need to elaborate
on this.
50 V. Krishna Ananth

Meanwhile, the Congress party under Jawaharlal Nehru could en-

trench itself in positions of power thanks to its unfettered claims over the
legacy of the freedom struggle.12 By virtue of this headstart, the Congress
could ensure that the power centres in rural India—the landlords, rich
peasants and other sections of the social elite—joined its ranks. At the
popular level, the Congress party was seen by the Muslims (in the im-
mediate aftermath of partition) and the Dalits (thanks to the Congress
being perceived as having inherited the Gandhian legacy) as their saviour.
All these factors meant the Congress as a party could emerge as the
natural choice; hence the need to address the challenge of poverty
reduction in a concerted manner was not considered important. After all,
the Congress party was assured of unflinching support of the poorer
sections of society even otherwise.

POVERTY OF IDEAS

A look at the broad contours of the first three five-year plans (1951–65)
will reveal that there was hardly any thrust on tackling poverty; instead,
the assumption was that growth along a wide front would translate into
poverty reduction. This assumption was not completely off the mark.
India did not have to export commercial crops to finance its budgetary
transfer to Britain (a system that contributed to an enormous drain of
wealth until 15 August 1947). This ensured an increase in foodgrains
availability and, by extension, enabled larger amount of foodgrains
consumption per head. With a substantial sterling balance India had
accumulated during the war years, there was no compulsion to export
foodgrains even in order to shore up reserves.
This strategy, however, had its own inherent weakness; it depended
on regular monsoons and normal harvests. This weakness was revealed
in the very first bad harvest after independence in 1964–65, the last year
of the Third Five-Year Plan. The 1964–65 food crisis was partly because
the year witnessed a much faster expansion of mass demand than before

12
It needs to be mentioned here that, despite playing significant roles in the freedom
struggle, the leaders who constituted the socialist block and the communists could
not establish themselves on the national political stage as much as the Congress party
under Jawaharlal Nehru. Among the reasons could be the fact that the leaders of these
two platforms could not stand up to the charisma of Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Azad
or Sardar Patel.
Globalization and Communalism 51

(the growth registered by this time in the manufacturing and the service
sectors leading to higher demands for food grains). This was compounded
further by poor harvests for two years in succession: 1964–65 and 1965–
66. For the first time after independence, parts of north India, Bihar in
particular, witnessed famine conditions. As much as 20 million tonnes of
grains had to be imported to tide over the crisis.13
The five-year plans were truncated and instead annual plans were
instituted until 1970. The thrust now was on promoting the use of
fertilizers and building irrigation projects. A new regime of grain procure-
ment, subsidised supply of fertilizers and the Food Corporation of India
(FCI) were put in place along with the public distribution system (PDS).
All these, however, did not prevent in any significant manner the con-
tinuing and rapid rise in food prices (which rose faster than the prices
of other commodities), causing substantial erosion in the real wages of
large sections in rural as well as urban India.14

A REVERSAL OF FORTUNES

The outcome of these was the reverses suffered by the Congress party in
nine state assemblies across the country in 1967–68. For the first time
after independence, the Congress party’s claim to power came under
serious threat. Indira Gandhi would see the defeat in the elections to the
state assemblies as a mandate against the measures initiated during the
brief tenure of Lal Bahadur Shastri. The Shastri era was marked by an
attempt to move away from the Nehruvian trajectory in which Indira
Gandhi’s detractors in the Congress party too had been active partici-
pants, apart from the old warhorses from the Swatantra stable. The 1967
general elections too were significant in this context. The Congress party’s
strength reduced substantially in the Lok Sabha.15 The downslide was

13
Prabhat Pattnaik, ‘On the Political Economy of Underdevelopment’, in Prabhat
Pattnaik (ed.), Whatever Happened to Imperialism and Other Essays (New Delhi: Tulika,
1995), pp. 43–44.
14
Pattnaik, ‘Recent Phase of Economic Development’, ibid., p. 166.
15
The Congress could win in only 283 out of the 516 Lok Sabha constituencies in
the 1967 general elections. The party’s strength in the third Lok Sabha (1962–67) was
361 out of a total strength of 488. The vote share of the Congress party too fell from
44.7 per cent in 1962 to 40.8 per cent in 1967. See David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and
Prannoy Roy, India Decides: Elections 1952–1995, Third Edition, 1995, pp. 110–11.
52 V. Krishna Ananth

pronounced in such states as Uttar Pradesh and Orissa where the Con-
gress party’s losses were gains registered by the socialists.16
The 1967 results had a different dimension too. The defeat of such
stalwarts as S.K. Patil (from Bombay South Lok Sabha constituency) and
the then party president, K. Kamaraj (Virudhunagar assembly constitu-
ency in Tamil Nadu) had impacted the dynamics of the Congress party.
Patil’s stunning defeat weakened the anti-Indira forces within the Con-
gress party considerably; similarly the reverses in Tamil Nadu (in the State
Assembly elections) led to Kamaraj losing his clout within the Congress
and vis-à-vis Indira Gandhi.
Patil’s attempts, even after his defeat, to push the Congress party into
adopting an economic policy that was distinct from the Nehruvian frame-
work failed to find as many supporters as it did before the 1967 elections.
The Congress Parliamentary Board held in that context turned out to be
the platform from where Indira Gandhi could position herself as the
supreme leader of the party. Her summary rejection of Patil’s assessment
(of the factors leading to the Congress reverses) was accepted without a
murmur.17

THE SOCIALIST HOBBY HORSE

In fact, the move to nationalize banks, abolition of privy purses and

other such ‘socialist’ programmes such as the determination to strengthen
the PDS and enlarge the scope of the public sector further were an
integral part of Indira Gandhi’s moves to strengthen her own hold over
the Congress party and establish herself against those who constituted the
Syndicate,18 rather than as any pointer to her earnest commitment to the

16
The socialist platform had split by this time into the Praja Socialist Party and the
Samyukta Socialist Party. Despite this, the two parties had 36 Members of Parliament
(MPs) in the fourth Lok Sabha, the highest tally until then. Ibid., pp. 120–21.
17
S.K. Patil had termed the Congress party’s reverses as a fallout of the party’s socialist
agenda and advocated a shift to the right. The Hindu, 26 February 1967, p. 7.
18
The Syndicate in the Congress had only reflected and pressed for implementing
the long-term prescriptions of the Bombay Plan, which was that the state withdraw
from playing its role in industrial activity after the initial gestation period was over
in the infrastructure sector and hand over such units in the public sector to the private
entrepreneur. See Purushottamdas Thakurdas, A Plan of Economic Development for
India, vols 1 and 2 (London: Penguin, 1945).
Globalization and Communalism 53

principles of socialism. Apart from providing her with power to deal with
her detractors, the socialistic agenda also helped stall the decline of the
Congress in the following years. The death of Zakir Hussain and the
presidential elections in 1969 and the formal split in the Congress party
with 62 Congress Members of Parliament (MPs) forming the Congress(O)
to join the opposition ranks had, even while rendering the government
into a minority, helped Indira Gandhi strengthen her hold on the
Congress.19 The landslide win by the Congress in the 1971 elections and
the defeat of a majority of those who came to constitute the Congress(O)20
provided the context for Indira Gandhi to persist further with the ‘social-
istic pattern’, and an increased thrust on public expenditure in both
industry and agriculture.21
The socialistic agenda, however, was only a strategy against the ‘Right-
wing’ in her own party. This explains the lack of enthusiasm on her part
to take the logical course in this direction, that is meaningful land reforms.
While procurement of foodgrains and building up the stock by the state
could be carried out without much of a problem, thanks to the strides
in agrarian production made possible by the Green Revolution, there was
no effective means to check the prices of foodgrains. While increase in
foodgrains prices was witnessed in 1972–73, the failure of the monsoons

19
The debate over nationalization of banks followed by Indira Gandhi’s decision to
field V.V. Giri against the Congress party’s official nominee, N. Sanjiva Reddy in the
1969 presidential elections, and the developments in that context are far too familiar
events and hence do not warrant elaborate discussion here. But they are significant
in the sense that Indira Gandhi’s socialistic agenda was influenced by these factors
more than anything else.
20
Of the 65 MPs who left the Congress to form the Congress(O) in the fourth Lok
Sabha (1967–70), only 11 could get themselves elected to the fifth Lok Sabha. See
Subash Kashyap, The Ten Lok Sabhas 1952–1991 (New Delhi: Shipra, 1992), p. 113.
21
The substantial reduction in incidence of poverty was partly the result of higher
outlays on poverty alleviation programmes and more rapid economic growth in the
1980s, and partly because we find the emergence of regional parties engaging in
competitive populism (I am not using populism in the pejorative sense here), laying
stress on supply of food at highly subsidized prices even if it meant using up resources
that could be invested in other areas of development. This was practised by, for
example, the Left-led governments in Kerala and West Bengal and the Telugu Desam
Party in Andhra Pradesh. It led to a considerable decline in the percentage of
population living below poverty line (BPL) in these states and also to a marginal extent
in other parts of the country. Public investment (as measured by gross capital forma-
tion) rose from 8.4 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1980–81 to 11.2
per cent in 1986–87 before falling to 9.5 per cent in 1989–90. See National Acounts
Statistics of India (EPW Research Foundation, 2002), p. 72.
54 V. Krishna Ananth

in the following year and the global oil price hike of 1973 led to a sharp
rise in the price index. This laid the basis for a popular perception that
the Congress government was unresponsive to the needs of the people.22
The most important point here is that, unlike the foodgrains crisis wit-
nessed across the country a decade earlier, the shortage this time was
caused by a combination of factors and the failed monsoons was only one
aspect. The 1974 crisis was more about rising prices rather than availabil-
ity of grains and the effect was felt more in the towns rather than the
countryside. In other words, there was a crisis of political legitimacy of
the Indian state and Indira Gandhi obviously was concerned.

THE MIDDLE-CLASS JUGGERNAUT

Of relevance to us in the context of this chapter is the coming into

existence of the Indian middle class, estimated to have been anywhere
between 10 and 15 per cent of the population by the turn of the century—
about 150 million people out of a population close to one billion.23 In
other words, the large network of banking as well as other financial
institutions, the large units set up under the central (as well as various
state) public sector undertakings (PSUs) and the huge army of central
and state government employees, constituting the Indian middle classes.
Their number, by all means, was large enough even in the mid-1970s and
this indeed explains the nature of the upsurge against the regime at that
stage.
This has a lot of significance in terms of understanding the new
economic policy, the domain from where it draws its legitimacy, and the
implications of these for the campaign against the liberalization-
privatization-globalization agenda as it unfolded in the past decade. It is

22
Between 1972–73 and 1974–75 (when monsoons failed), the consumer prices
increased by 53 per cent. See Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy (Mumbai:
Reserve Bank of India, 2001), p. 49.
23
S.L. Rao and I. Natarajan, Indian Market Demograhic Report, 1996 (New Delhi:
NCAER). There may have been some exageration in the figures since the objective
behind the study was to sell the idea of investment prospects in India to the foreign
investors and they needed to be presented with a rosy picture of the situation.
However, there is no reason to dismiss the number in an outright manner and the
fact is that we find India turning out to be an important destination for foreign
investors, particularly in the area of consumer durables.
Globalization and Communalism 55

now clear that one of the cardinal features of the 1991 economic policy
changes is the pronounced departure from the import substitution model
for industrialization (as it was adopted in 1947 and defined as a socialistic
pattern of development) in favour of a model where the ‘mantra’ is
integration of the Indian economy into the global market. The overarching
concern among the policy makers and managers of the Indian economy
to contain the fiscal deficit, an idea central to the prescription laid out
by the Brettonwoods institutions, assumes significance in this context.
There could be nothing wrong with such a concern—that the fiscal
deficit be brought down to somewhere between 2 and 3 per cent. But
there is indeed a problem with the specifics of the strategy adopted since
198024 for it involves, as its basic principle, the idea to curtail expenditure
towards such welfare schemes as supply of foodgrains to the poor at
subsidized prices, apart from suggestions that the state withdraw from
such development activities as education, health care, etc. The breach
in these programmes in the nature of a substantial portion of the subsidy
component not reaching the target groups (that the food subsidy for
instance does not reach the poor and instead large chunks of the subsidy
is spent in maintaining the godowns and the officials involved in these
institutions) is an argument held out by the advocates of the new regime
to rationalize the idea that the subsidy regime is put a stop to.

THE BURDEN OF PLENTY

There is indeed a lot of truth in this. It is a fact that more than half of
the resources allocated to food subsidy is consumed in taking care of the
storage and transportation costs. The cost of storage and transportation
of foodgrains to and from the godowns of the FCI has increased by leaps
and bounds and this goes up in direct proportion with the quantum of
grains accumulated. Among the reasons for such a huge stockpile is the
fact that several state governments have been refusing to take their
foodgrain allotments for the PDS. While at the apparent level this might

24
It is important to trace the origins of the 1991 economic policy to at least a decade
before the policy was formally announced. In any case, the concern over the fiscal
deficit and the need to narrow it down was voiced frequently even before 1991.
56 V. Krishna Ananth

look like the ordinary people (a majority of those who are not part of
the 100–50 million strong middle classes who articulate the political and
social issues in the popular discourse and whose members revel in
establishing that the PDS as a poverty alleviation programme has just not
worked) have climbed up the BPL ladder and hence do not need the
subsidy regime, the fact is that many of the state governments did not
lift the alloted share of grains from the FCI godowns because the poor
could not buy grains even if they were sold at subsidized prices.25 In this
sense, a larger portion of the subsidy bill is taken up to store the grains,
rather than benefitting those for whom the subsidy is intended.
The media did highlight this paradox—of starvation amidst food
mountains—in political debate once in a while.26 But then, the larger
context of the crisis was not internalized by the media. There was no effort
(by and large) to place the crisis within the ideological framework of
market economy. In other words, the linkages between the prescription—
that fiscal deficit be contained by way of cutting down ‘wasteful’
expenditure—and its impact on the offtake of foodgrains meant for such
programmes as the food for work, the annapurna and other schemes were
not discussed in any detail in the media. This flippant nature of the debate
became the basis for unreason of another kind: that there was no point
feeding the poor (even if it may help get rid of the food mountains and
save them from rotting) because such a step will make them dependant
on free lunches even after the surplus stocks are cleared. It was further
argued that free distribution of foodgrains would lead to a sharp fall in

25
There are other factors that lead to this paradox apart from the inability of the
people to buy even grains that are subsidized. An important one was the callousness
displayed by state governments, particularly in those categorized as Backward States
in terms of their performance in the area of Human Development Indices, in com-
pleting the task of identifying the BPL category for the purpose of issue of special ration
cards as envisaged in the Targeted PDS (a concept introduced by the United Front
government). This failure to identify the BPL class has left them ineligible to take
food stocks from the godowns. Among those state governments guilty of such criminal
negligence of duty are the secular dispensation in Bihar, the communal one in Uttar
Pradesh as also the Government in Orissa which, by all means, can be described as
being headed by someone who is innocent of ideology.
26
The role played by Star News (for whom NDTV was providing the news content
then) in unravelling the story of hunger and starvation amidst the food mountains
and the impact it managed to make in the minds of a section of India’s intelligentsia
was significant. However, the campaign was not carried out for long. The issue of
starvation deaths amidst food mountains ceased to concern the newsrooms after 11
September 2001.
Globalization and Communalism 57

prices of foodgrains and this would have an adverse effect on agricultural

productivity.
The idea of clearing the surplus stocks by an increased stress on welfare
measures such as the food for work programme and an efficient PDS is
objected to from another side too. The argument runs as follows: such
programmes having become sources of high levels of corruption and
mismanagement, will not lead to any poverty alleviation. Interestingly,
those who put forth this argument also happen to be from among the
100–50 million crowd. Those responsible for the distortions in these
schemes are invariably members of this crowd.

THE REAL BENEFICIARIES

The liberalization agenda was seen (and continues to be seen by a majority

articulate Indians) as nothing but a liberalized trade set-up; in other
words, a process that would allow the movement of commodities (and
in effect consumer durables) without any restrictions across countries.
Before going into the details, it is pertinent to deal briefly with a crucial
aspect of the liberalization agenda in terms of its beneficiaries.
The important point here is that one of the pronounced features of
the liberalization programme (or the Structural Adjustments Programme
or the Globalization agenda) is the shift away from the import substitution-
industrialization model towards a regime that would expose the Indian
industry, particularly the manufacturing sector, to competition from
outside. In the 1980,27 maturing bourgeosie, more confident of handling
external competition, and a burgeoning ‘middle class’ hankering after
higher levels of consumption, began pushing for a cautious integration
into the global market. The most important aspect of this is the coming
of age of the middle classes, constituting the top 10–15 per cent of the
population. They are the ones who triggerred a consumption boom (in the
1980s) leading to a significant expansion in the durable goods sector;
from an annual growth rate of 8 per cent, the durable goods sector
(consumer goods) witnessed a rise in the annual growth rate to 22 per cent

27
Some of the fundamental features of the 1991 Economic Policy can be found in
the philosophy that guided the budget proposals even a decade before that. In this
sense, it is necessary to go back at least to the 1980s to make sense of any discussion
on the economic policy changes and the crisis at the present.
58 V. Krishna Ananth

through the decade.28 This was the time when the idea of market and
market economy as the only viable model gained an added sense of
legitimacy. The disintegration of the Soviet model, associated so directly
with the socialist pattern, added significantly to this process.
In other words, the middle classes (the salariat more particularly) do
not have to depend on subsidized foodgrains and such other aspects of
the welfare state as education, health care and public transport. Instead,
a large section of the generation after those who depended on the welfare
state have come to constitute the 10–15 per cent of the population and
they are the ones who have turned out to be the most vocal advocates
of the liberalization regime and also the trenchant critics of the welfare
state agenda. Interestingly, communal rhetoric appeals to this section
more than anywhere else.

THE COMMUNAL CHALLENGE

Despite the falling standards of life across the country, only those issues
that centred around faith have dominated the contemporary discourse.
The mainstream media as well as sections that play a prominent role in
moulding public opinion devote most of their efforts to lament over the
spectre of communalism, while the not-so-progressives among the intel-
ligentsia brood over the decline of standards in the bureaucracy due to
the measures initiated on 8 August 1990 by the then Union government
to set apart a portion of jobs in the central government for members of
Other Backward Classes (OBCs).29 The other prominent feature of the
contemporary discourse is the legitimization of a militarist project re-
vealed in such blatant fashion in the wake of the Kargil conflict in 1999
and the euphoria over the BJP-led government’s decision to embark upon

28
This includes such durables as a refrigerator, two-wheel automobiles, television sets,
telephones; anyone with memories extending back to just a couple of decades will
understand the significant changes these gadgets have brought about in the nation’s
thought process.The increasing insensitivity to the larger good (more particularly to
the fall in standards of life among the poor and the unorganized sections of society)
that marks the behaviour of the middle classes, the professionals so to say, is certainly
a consequence of this.
29
Sukumar Muralidharan, Mandal, Mandir and Masjid: ‘Hindu’ Communalism and the
Crisis of the State (Madras: Indian School of Social Sciences, 1990).
Globalization and Communalism 59

a nuclear adventure in May 1998.30 While the distortion of the demo-

cratic agenda was effected in such pronounced fashion by the BJP-led
government along with the other associates of the RSS, the political
establishment, including the main opposition party the Congress(I), had
hardly shown any conviction to resist the march of the right. The chal-
lenge is sought to be defined as merely an attempt by the RSS to vitiate
the political context by infusing concerns of faith into the discourse.
There are serious problems with this approach. For instance, it fails
to explain why such slogans and idioms began yielding political dividends
in the past few years and not earlier. The right wing project based on
conjuring up images of the Hindu faith being in danger31 and the con-
solidation of the Hindu identity in the political context should have found
far greater appeal in the immediate aftermath of the partition-related
violence. That was when a section of the Hindu community had suffered
and even witnessed the killing of their brethren or had to leave behind
their wealth and property before migrating to India. The RSS and the Jan
Sangh could hardly find a place in the democratic discourse at that stage
even if it is true that its ranks were associated in a big way in the agitations
carried out in that context.32 In other words, the agitations of the 1970s

30
The striking feature of the discourse that surrounded the 11–13 May tests at
Pokhran was the wide consensus in favour of the agenda among the political estab-
lishment and the desperation shown by the leadership of a cross section of the political
spectrum to be seen as favouring the idea of exercising the nuclear option even while
wanting to distance from the BJP-led NDA government. See V. Krishna Ananth, ‘The
Politics of the Bomb:Some Observations on the Political Discourse in India in the
Context of Pokhran II’, in M.V. Ramana and C. Rammanohar Reddy (eds), Prisoners
of the Nuclear Dream (Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003).
31
This indeed is the core of the RSS agenda and the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (until
1977) and the BJP (since its inception in 1980) had articulated this line without any
let-up.
32
It is a fact that the rising tide of protests in the mid-1970s had provided the right wing
with an opportunity to enter the democratic space. But it is necessary to point out at
this stage that the leadership of these movements cannot, by any means, be attributed
to the right wing. Instead, these were instances when the mainstream Left revealed its
weakness and ideological incoherence and left the space vacant for the right wing to
appropriate. The massive railway strike of 1974, for instance, was not led by the Left
unions; see Stephen Sherlock, The Indian Railways Strike of 1974 (New Delhi: Rupa,
2001). Similarly, the role of the Left, the Communist Party of India (CPI) in particular
in the anti-corruption movement in Bihar during the early and mid-1970s was far from
positive. While the formal position of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) was to
support the JP movement, the physical presence of its own ranks in the movement was
at best marginal, notably in the Hindi speaking regions where the movement had taken
a mass character. See Minoo Masani, Is JP the Answer? (Delhi: Macmillan, 1975).
60 V. Krishna Ananth

did not help the Jan Sangh or the BJP to emerge later on as the alternative
to the Congress at that stage. While in the post-emergency situation, the
anti-Congress forces would gather only around the persona of Jayaprakash
Narayan—who was popularly known as JP—committed so firmly to the
principles of Gandhian socialism,33 the sequence of events leading out of
the dual membership controversy within the Janata Party just months
after its formation revealed a concerted attempt on the part of the
Lohiaite socialists to cleanse the scene of the Jan Sangh elements.34 This
development within the Janata experiment and the socialist agenda in
that context is significant in understanding the communalisation of the
political discourse in most parts of northern India and Uttar Pradesh in
particular.
With a fairly large number of Brahmins (over 10 per cent of the
population) and the vestiges of the vedic culture so strong, the Congress
party in Uttar Pradesh remained immune from the changes in its own
units elsewhere (Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Gujarat) where the lead-
ership passed over to members from among the OBCs. In the case of Uttar
Pradesh, the first two Chief Ministers—G.B. Pant and Sampoornanand—
were Brahmins and, more importantly, ones who were firmly committed
to the idea that the vedic civilization represented the pinnacle of India’s
‘national’ culture. Even after the Congress party began annointing non-
Brahmins as chief ministers in later years, the party organization was
dominated by Brahmin leaders even through the 1970s.35 While this
resistance within the Congress to change (in the sociopolitical sense)
assisted the growth of a socialist opposition, the record of the Congress
party in the area of governance and the overall slowing down of the
economy leading to underemployment in the agrarian sector, as well as
the distortion of the various welfare schemes by the political contractors

33
The evolution of JP from one committed to conventional Marxism and an advocate
of the socialist model as it worked in the former Soviet Union into trenchant critic
of the same in later years and his transition into a Gandhian is traced so succintly
by Minoo Masani. See Masani, Is JP the Answer? pp. 6–35.
34
The dual membership controversy was raised by Madhu Limaye and he orchestrated
a campaign within the Janata Party demanding that the two members in the Union
Cabinet from the Jan Sangh camp—Atal Behari Vajpayee and L.K. Advani—be told
to choose between their association with the RSS or their membership in the Janata
Party, and by extension their position in the Union Council of Ministers.
35
See Zoya Hassan, ‘Communal Mobilisation and Changing Majority’, in David
Ludden (ed.), Making India Hindu: Religion, Community and the Politics of Democracy
in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996).
Globalization and Communalism 61

led to the erosion of popular support to the Congress party in the region.
Although the Congress party managed to wrest political power in the
1980 elections (both at the centre and in the various states), it was not
a positive mandate in its favour; it was rather a mandate against the Janata
Party and its leaders.
The increasing violence against minority communities across the country
through the 1980s36 and the return of the Congress party to power is not
a mere coincidence. Bhiwandi (in Maharashtra), Surat (Gujarat), Bihar
Shariff (Bihar) and most importantly the anti-Sikh pogrom in November
198437 were all instances when the Congress party’s attempts to appro-
priate the Hindutva mantle was revealed so clearly. Equally significant
is the fact that this was the period when the socialistic pattern and its
accompanying rhetoric were jettisoned by Indira Gandhi and her party.
The shift was indeed dictated by the increasing reliance on aid and
assistance from the Brettonwoods institutions since 1981. The Union
Budget of 1986 revealed this shift in a categorical manner.

THE ECONOMICS OF COMMUNALISM

The middle and the lower middle classes who faced the threat of losing
their ‘secure’ jobs due to the changing concerns of the new economic
policy needed to be taken care of. This had become the priority for the
ruling elite during the early 1980s with the industrial sector hurstling into
a crisis. Evidence of this was found in the stridency shown by a cross
section of the organized working class. The call for a general strike and
the mobilization by the textile workers in Bombay in 1982–83 is just an

36
A spate of communal rioting took place in Uttar Pradesh between February 1981
and 1987 including in rural areas. More importantly, between February 1986 and June
1987, Uttar Pradesh witnessed as many as 26 instances of such violence in which more
than 200 persons, mostly Muslims, were killed and about 1,000 injured. Most of these
riots occurred in towns with a spatial concentration of Muslims and particularly in
those places—Aligarh, Varanasi, Moradabad, and Meerut—where the Muslims had
attained a measure of economic stability through their traditional artisan and entre-
preneurial skills. See Hassan, 1996, pp. 81–97.
37
The communal agenda that lay beneath the Congress party’s violent campaign in
the aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s assasination has been documented and commented
upon extensively. See Madhu Kishwar, Religion in the Service of Nationalism (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1998).
62 V. Krishna Ananth

instance.38 The case of the Bombay textile strike is an instance where the
cause of the crisis can be located, to a large extent, in the logic of the
Indian capitalist class campaigning for a policy shift that would facilitate
closing down the existing units and seeking investment opportunities in
areas other than the manufacturing sector.
The importance of the textile industry in terms of its share in the
economy and the proportion of workforce in it has been the subject
matter of extensive scholarship.39 Bombay in this context assumes a lot
of significance and the experience of industry and labour in Bombay can
be taken as reflecting the situation across the country. It was, for instance,
home to over 60 cotton textile mills apart from units in the engineering
sector, metallurgical foundries, chemical plants, and pharmaceutical plants.
This, however, is a thing of the past. The cotton textile mills were in a
crisis and on the verge of closure by 1976.40 This was taking place when
the unemployed as a percentage of the labour force stood at 7.7 per cent.
The state’s response at that stage to this crisis was two-fold. Changes were
effected in labour laws41 with a definite objective to prevent industrial
closures. This was followed by nationalization of units rendered sick in
the private sector, a measure that led to far-reaching ramifications on the

38
The general strike called by Dr Datta Samant’s union has not been called off yet.
Samant had supplanted the established unions in the Bombay textile industry in a
big way and also caused a vacuum in the political space. See Achin Vanaik,
‘Rendezvous at Mumbai’, New Left Review (Second Series), no. 26, March–April
2004.
39
The importance of the textile industry in the Indian economy can be assessed from
the following facts. It was one of the largest employers if one puts together the
workforce in the mills, the powerloom sector, and the handlooms. Add to this the jobs
provided in the garment industry established during the 1980s across the country in
the wake of its vast potential in the world market.
40
Most important among the causes for the crisis was the myopic vision of the mill
owners who refused to invest in any substantial manner in modernizing the machines
and the mills. A direct fallout of this was that the mill sector began losing out to the
powerloom sector that began flourishing in the suburbs of Bombay (Bhiwandi in
particular) during this period. The powerloom sector could poach into the export
markets and render the mills unviable.
41
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was amended and a new chapter (V-B) by which
certain regulations were imposed before an employer effects a lay-off, retrenchment
or closure of an industrial undertaking employing more that 100 workmen. The 1976
amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 specified stringent punishments,
including imprisonment of the employer in the event of a closure, lay-off or retrench-
ment effected without obtaining necessary clearance from the state government where
the industrial unit is located.
Globalization and Communalism 63

very concept of PSUs.42 The compulsions before the then government to

change the law were to be found in the overall direction of the political
discourse then. The spectre of several thousand workers being thrown out
of jobs one day and that too when the economy was not doing all that
well was the motive behind the nationalization of private sector units.
This was how the total number of PSUs added up to 244.
The 1970s was a period marked by organized resistance to the ruling
Congress and the consolidation of the political opposition. The general
strike in the railways between 2 and 28 May 1974, was perhaps the only
instance in post-independence India where the strength of organized
trade union action was on full display.43 It was also when the mobilization
of all sections of society against Indira Gandhi and her government was
at its peak and culminating in the suspension of democracy by the
Congress regime.
Beginning with the 1980s, the context is just the other way round. The
middle class had entrenched itself in the political discourse and even
determined policies to a large extent. The political establishment had
indeed learnt its lessons from the experience of the 1970s. Hence, the
succussive dispensations began ‘taking care’ of the economic needs of the
salariat even if that meant a fiscal imbalance. So much so, government
employees were over-compensated substantially which left an additional
burden of Rs 4,175 crores on the government’s wage bills for 1986–87.
Interestingly, the deficit in revenue account that year was Rs 4,162
crores.44 This had a direct and adverse impact on government spending
on poverty alleviation and other welfare schemes. It is another matter that
the ruling establishment could ensure consent by enlisting the support of

42
This indeed is the story of the National Textiles Corporation (NTC) among the
PSUs that today fall in the category of ‘chronically sick’ units. It is necessary to recall,
at this juncture, that most of these units were rendered sick even before they became
PSUs and they were nationalized at that stage only to protect those employed in those
units.
43
See Stephen Sherlock, The Indian Railways Strike of 1974 (New Delhi: Rupa, 2001)
for a detailed account on the strike and its political ramifications.
44
Eighth Plan: Issues and Perspectives (New Delhi: Planning Commission of India,
Government of India, 1988). This document put the entire issue in perspective with
the following comment: ‘The savings of Government administration have become
wages and salaries. Between 1980–81 and 1985–86, the wage bill in public admin-
istration and publicly provided services has doubled. If the average compensation per
employee in these sectors had increased only as much as the consumer price index
and if the total number of employees had remained constant, the total wage bill for
these employees would have been lower by Rs 4,500 crores.’
64 V. Krishna Ananth

middle classes (consisting the public sector employees and the salariat)
who also played a decisive role in the nation building exercise since
independence.
The core of the argument here is that the budgeoning deficit in the
revenue and the fiscal account by this time had imposed severe restric-
tions on the state’s ability to spend on welfare. This crisis had come to
the fore in the decade beginning 1991 and it was imperative for the
establishment (a condition imposed by the lending agencies as part of the
Structural Adjustments Programme [SAP]) to contain fiscal deficit. With
memories of the tumultous 1970s still fresh in the minds of the political
establishment, they were not willing to initiate any harsh measure that
could antagonize the articulate sections. In other words, the middle
classes had to be guided on a different course before implementing the
harsh measures that were rendered necessary by the terms of the SAP.
Most sections of the organized employees45 had shown signs of being
drawn into the consensus building process and were beginning to favour
the shift away from the socialist paradigm even earlier than 1991. This
perhaps was evident in the fact that the unions in such critical sectors
as the railways, telecommunications and even in the PSUs refrained from
even registering solidarity with the textile workers of Bombay when they
heeded Datta Samant and stopped work in 1982.46 But then, the salariat
could manage to ensure its economic ‘well-being’ without having to
agitate in the same manner as the workers.
There was, however, a pressing need to effect a shift in the concerns
at the policy level with the Congress government under P.V. Narasimha
Rao and Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister agreeing to the SAP; it
was no longer possible for the government to persist with the idea of
protecting employment. It was clear by this time that such policy measures
(as initiated in 1976) had led to a drain on the finances. There was no

45
I am using the term ‘employees’ rather than workers intentionally in this context.
46
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explain why the trade unions in the railways
or the telecommunications departments failed to orchestrate their demands in the
fashion of the Bombay textile workers under Datta Samant. However, one can explain
this in a limited way if one discerns the manner in which the liberalization-privitization-
globalization agenda is being orchestrated and the critical role that cultural notions
play in this exercise. The notion of choice and the illusions that the new policies have
managed to create among the middle classes through the supermarkets that have
sprung up in several corners of our towns have helped immensely in manufacturing
consent for the shift, even while rendering these very sections of the population into
victims of the change.
Globalization and Communalism 65

scope for ‘protecting’ jobs. On the contrary, it was imperative for the
regime now to restore the law regulating employment conditions to the
pre-1976 position.47 While an amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 with a view to permit closure of industrial units and retrenchment
of labour whenever the employers so desired may not be effected in the
immediate context, the fact is that the idea of sustaining employment in
the public sectors by way of paying wages to idle workers, a concept given
credence since the 1970s, has been given up. This explains the fall in
employment in the organized sectors as discussed in the beginning of this
chapter.
The liberalization-privatization-globalization process has no doubt
offered gains (real and prospective) to the organized sections of the
working class, the salariat, and others constituting the middle class. This
prevented a movement of the kind witnessed in the 1970s against the
state and its institutions. All the peace, however, could only be achieved
in the immediate context. The logic of free market economy in order to
proceed further required the ruling elite to look for means other than
the ones associated with notions and fantasies about the market. The
supermarket culture, after all, is not going to help prevent a resistance
and a political mobilization against the state, especially when avenues for
employment are shrinking.
This is the context from which the increasing resort to such idioms
as religion and caste in the political discourse needs to be seen, rather
than reducing the whole process of communalism as merely the outcome
of a conspiracy by the BJP and the other associates of the RSS. The
increasing resort to communal slogans, the thrust on militarism, the
jingoism one has been witnessing in the political discourse during the

47
In more than a decade since the policy shift of July 1991, there is one aspect of
the package on which all the regimes have refrained from acting—amending the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The amendment, as it has been thought of, is to scrap
Chapter V-B of the Act. There has been some indication in recent times of the
establishment going ahead with this change. Yashwant Sinha, the erstwhile Finance
Minister, had talked about this when he underscored government commitment (in
February 2001) to the second generation reforms. There has been differences within
the establishment on the exact nature of the change. While an Inter-Ministerial
Working Group on Industrial Restructuring had recommended (in 1992) that
Chapter V-B be completely scrapped, the political leadership seems to be veering
around the idea that an amendment be effected in such a manner to mandate a prior
approval/clearance by the state government only in case of those industrial units
employing more than 1,000 workmen (as different from the 100 workmen in the
existing Act).
66 V. Krishna Ananth

1990s are, in this sense, portends towards a fascist takeover and not just
manifestations of a sectarian agenda. An indication that the ruling elite
have managed to achieve a measure of success in this regard is evident
from the fact that the unions are no longer in a position to resist the
onslaught. The fact that those political platforms (the left parties in
particular) that were in the forefront of organizing protests against the
fallout of the SAP and also the larger implications of the liberalization-
privatization-globalization agenda had failed to bring these issues to the
centre stage of the political discourse and instead settled down to sustain
a Congress-led government at the centre (just in order to keep the BJP
out) explains this unambiguously.
 TERRORISM AND IMPERIALISM:
OF THE
TWO SIDES
SAME COIN 3
THOMAS SEBASTIAN

A
significant amount of news items, discussions in visual and print
media have been constructed around the theme of ‘war on
terrorism’ since the unfortunate incidents of 9/11. Two wars
have already been fought and millions of peoples of Afghanistan and Iraq
have been subjugated under that name. The threat of attacks on the
people Iran and Syria in the immediate future is persisting. Besides, the
administration of the world’s only super power, the United States has
been relying on this phrase ‘war on terrorism’ to justify their foreign policy
and to define the enemy one cannot afford to take this concept of
terrorism lightly.

TERRORISM: MEANING AND TYPES

The US Army manuals define terrorism as ‘the calculated use of violence

or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideo-
logical in nature . . . through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear’ (US
Army Operational Concept for Terrorism Counteraction, TRADOC Pam-
phlet No. 525–37, 1984). This definition was offered while the Reagan
administration was intensifying its war on terrorism.
Lately its coverage has been widened. Section 802 of the Patriot Act
states that a person engages in domestic terrorism if they commit any act
‘dangerous to human life’, that is, a violation of the criminal laws of a state
68 Thomas Sebastian

or the US, if that action appears to be intended to (a) intimidate or coerce

a civilian population; (b) influence the policy of a government by intimi-
dation or coercion; or (c) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.
According to the Council for Foreign Relations (CFR), the leading
think tank of the American elite, there are at least six different sorts of
terrorism: nationalist, religious, state-sponsored, left wing, right wing, and
anarchist. Their website goes on to define these various types of terrorism.
Nationalist terrorists seek to form a separate state for their own national
group, often by drawing attention to a fight for ‘national liberation’
that they think the world has ignored. Nationalist terrorism can be
difficult to define, since many groups accused of the practice insist that
they are not terrorists but freedom fighters. State terrorism is defined as
those countries that according to CFR are sponsoring terrorism and
terrorist orgnizations. The CFR depends upon the State Department for
this. According to the State Department, Iran is the primary state sponsor
of terrorism today; it also accuses Cuba, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan,
and Syria.
State-sponsored terrorist groups include the Hezbollah (backed by
Iran), the Abu Nidal Organization (which according to them has been
backed by Syria, Libya, and Iraq), and the Japanese Red Army (which
often worked on contract for Libya). Left-wing terrorists are out to destroy
capitalism and replace it with a communist or socialist regime. Right-wing
terrorists are among the least organized terrorists, often associated with
neo-Nazi street rioting in western Europe, especially in the early 1980s.
The CFR sees signs of anarchist violence in the recent wave of protests
against globalization.
These definitions and categorizations do not throw much light on the
nature of terrorism. However, they allow the US administration to call
anybody who opposes them or their policies a terrorist. I found the
definitions and categories given by George Pumphrey helpful in under-
standing the idea of terrorism and terrorist activities that the US is
attributing to Islamist organizations. According to Pumphrey, there are
three kinds of terrorism. These are ‘revolutionary’ terrorism (which most
generally comes to mind when the word terrorist is heard), friendly fire
terrorism, and false flag terrorism.1

1
Pumphrey, ‘Types of Terrorism and 9/11.’
Terrorism and Imperialism: Two Sides of the Same Coin 69

‘REVOLUTIONARY’ TERRORISM

‘Revolutionary’ terrorism is terrorism organized by people outside the

powers of the state. They are neither influenced by the state or by any
of its organs. The terrorists decide on their own how, when, and where
to strike. They are mainly intellectuals who are impatient at the slow pace
of the mass struggles for reforms. They break off from the main body of
the mass struggle and take recourse to spectacular violence with the hope
that they can extort some concessions from the ruling elite. Their ‘short
cut to revolution’ is based on the illusion that the ruling classes can be
forced to give up power or to make meaningful concessions to the
powerless.
This form of terrorism has to be distinguished from the national
liberation struggles and their guerilla warfare against the ruling elite and
against foreign occupation. There exists a lack of clarity on this point
amidst the public. This confusion is conveniently used by the propaganda
organs of the US administration to justify intervention to repress popular
uprising against a client or puppet regime under a ‘war on terrorism’
banner. The point of difference between terrorism and a national libera-
tion struggle is that the latter moves on to the phase of armed struggle
at a point where it already controls an organized infrastructure capable
of replacing the current social order. As opposed to this, terrorism lacks
popular support. It has no viable social structure that it is both defending
and solidifying. In fact ‘revolutionary’ terrorism is not revolutionary at all
as it only tries to get some meaningful changes ‘granted’ by those in power.
They have no plan of capturing power and bringing about revolutionary
changes in favour of the powerless.
The general assumption is that all forms of terrorisms conform to the
type just dscribed. Relatively small groups engaged in armed struggle
against the powerful state apparatus to provoke a change in the social
situation automatically comes to our mind when we hear of a ‘terrorist
attack’. According to the official version of the 11 September 2001
attacks, popularly known as 9/11, bin Laden and Al Qaeda are engaged
in this form of violence. It further suggests that vengeance rather than
extortion was the motivation behind the attacks. Vengeance, as a motive,
is not very typical of revolutionary terrorism.
The ambiguity about what actually constitutes ‘revolutionary’ terror-
ism among the people in general provides an opportunity for those in
power and their propaganda agents. The state organs, particularly the
70 Thomas Sebastian

intelligence departments, have decided to keep the ‘terrorist threat’ alive

by transforming it into friendly fire and false flag terrorism. They do this
to settle foreign policy issues and to extort from their political rivals and
the population concessions granting themselves more power in determin-
ing the affairs of the country.
Terrorism is a highly secretive activity requiring strict structures of
small groups with extremely limited contact between them. It also re-
quires a vast amount of blind confidence in the ‘comrades’. These aspects
also make the terrorist organization vulnerable to infiltration and manipu-
lation by the state agents. It also makes it possible for the state to recruit
them as its agents.
Another method of infiltration was to buy or blackmail terrorists to
become agents. Some terrorists, having realized their mistake and wanting
to leave the life of being hunted, are willing to remain in the terror scene,
giving information about its structure, planned attacks, and eventually
even become an influence agent for state-planned friendly fire terrorist
attacks. In exchange they were promised freedom from prosecution when
members of the terrorist organization were brought to trial. When the
state is able to take over effective control of the terrorist organization,
that terrorism is transformed into friendly fire terrorism.

‘FRIENDLY FIRE’ TERRORISM

The objectives of the friendly fire and false flag terrorism are the same.
They want terrorist attacks to be carried out so that it will create, on the
one hand, fear in the minds of the people and on the other hand a ‘public
enemy’. This in turn will create a sentiment of ‘let us come together as
one family’ to fight the common enemy among the population. The
government in turn can exploit this sentiment to win acceptance for
restrictions of civil rights. The people give up their fundamental rights
with the hope that these restrictions will bring a bit more personal
security.
Friendly fire terrorism is able to create a widespread ‘everybody can
become a victim’ type of insecurity in the population, not just among
the rulers as is the case with ‘revolutionary’ terrorism. The government
comes forward with the solution of a dictatorial ‘complete order’. The
beneficiary is the military organ of the state. State executive organs—
the police, the secret services, and the armed forces—become the primary
Terrorism and Imperialism: Two Sides of the Same Coin 71

forces running the society as the nation slips ever further into fascism.
Civilian government structures are forced more and more to the sidelines.
Liberties of expression and assembly are viewed as threatening. The
citizen becomes the potential enemy, the potential ‘terrorist’ or potential
‘terrorist accomplice’.
The propaganda machinery of the state create a media fanfare around
the arrest of ‘dangerous terrorists’ and the farcical trials that follow. This
way the government can convince both the people and parliament to give
up more ‘democratic rights in exchange for more security’. For effective
friendly fire terrorism, it is enough even if the state has control over two
or three top terrorists in an organization.

EXAMPLES OF FRIENDLY FIRE TERRORISM

The 1993 WTC Bombing: The first attempt to topple the World Trade
Center was made in 1993 when a bomb set off in its basement garage killed
five and injured more than 1,000 people. An examination of the facts
surrounding this case throws a lot of light on the role of the US officials,
their media, and their links to foreign powers operating on US territory.
It took only moments for James Fox, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), to declare that Mohammed A. Salameh was the
person who planted the explosives using a yellow Ford Econoline van for
the purpose. His biography was ready and was widely distributed. The New
York Times declared him a ‘Suspect Tied to an Islamic Fundamentalist
Sect.’2
According to one source this terrorist attack was initiated by a Josie—
or Guzie—Hadas, an Islamist who, according to the International Herald
Tribune, was ‘long established as a Mossad operative’. She had hired two
Arabs who were later arrested, Mohammed Salameh, a Palestinian, and
Nidal Ayyad.3
Salameh was Hadas’ driver. In this function he was directed by Hadas
to rent a transport van. Salameh rented the van in his own name.4 The
telephone number and apartment listed on the rental contract were those
belonging to Hadas.5

2
Schoenman, ‘Resist US Aggression!’
3
‘Police Focus on Mosque Links’, International Herald Tribune.
4
Ibid.
5
Schoenman, ‘Resist US Aggression!’
72 Thomas Sebastian

The man who proposed the bombing to followers of Sheikh Omar

Abdul Rahman (an Egyptian dissident) was Emad Ali Salem, a high level
double agent working for Egyptian intelligence and an FBI informant/
provocateur. It was Salem, who provided the FBI with taped conversa-
tions and all other evidence for the trial. It was Salem who came up with
the idea and drew up the plans to blow up the Lincoln and Holland
tunnels, the UN and other targets and also commit assassinations.
The FBI/Egyptian intelligence agent ‘provided the safe houses in
which the bombs were manufactured, helped purchase the firearms and
materials to be used in the attacks’ (Muslim World Monitor, 4 July 1993).6
Shortly after Salameh rented the vehicle, the van disappeared. Salameh
reported the ‘theft’ immediately to the police to no reaction from them.
He reported the ‘theft’ a second time. When the police refused to record
the theft, he went to the police station to personally ask that the theft
be recorded. He was outraged that the police officers—using ‘formal
grounds’—still refused to do it.
The bomb exploded the next day. Pieces of the van were discovered
in the rubble. The day following the explosion, Salameh returned to the
rental office to ask for the return of his deposit. He received a portion and
was arrested a couple hours later. The FBI found ‘tools and wiring, and
manuals concerning antennae, circuitry and electromagnetic devices’
during their search of Hadas’ apartment. ‘One expert interpreted these as
evidence that a “bomb maker” had been in the apartment—the more so
because “a dog trained in the detection of explosives” sniffed around and
“responded positively”.’ Yet Josie Hadas was never brought to trial. Where
she is today is not known. It seems not to have even interested the judge.
Time remarked: ‘If Salameh is guilty, it still must be determined how
to account for what looked like his extraordinary stupidity in renting a
van under his own name, presenting a valid New York driver’s license with
a real and traceable phone number and, instead of disappearing after the
bombing, calling attention to himself by repeatedly trying to recover the
deposit.’7
The FBI had all the documents relating to plans to blow up the WTC,
the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels and other targets in their possession
since 1990. Fifty storage boxes of documents concerning detailed plans
to blow up the WTC were in police and FBI possession, as Los Angeles
Times confirmed on 4 July 1993. Every time Salem met his stooges to

6
Ibid.
7
Church, ‘A Case of Dumb Luck’.
Terrorism and Imperialism: Two Sides of the Same Coin 73

discuss these operations, he was ‘wired’ and the FBI was fully aware that
the actions were Salem’s idea.8
In fact according to the New York Times, it was the FBI that decided
to have the bomb explode. ‘Law-enforcement officials were told that
terrorists were building a bomb that was eventually used to blow up the
World Trade Center, and they planned to thwart the plotters by secretly
substituting harmless powder for the explosives’, an informer said after
the blast.9
This is a good case of friendly fire terrorism. The FBI is happy to show
that terrorism is a threat also to the US and therefore Congress should
heighten the means of repression on Arabs.

9/11 a Friendly Fire Terrorism10: Very often, while preparing for false
flag terrorist attacks a string of evidence is laid. They are conveniently
overlooked but discovered after the attack. This helps in increasing the
credibility to the accusations of the designated scapegoat. On the 11
September attacks, the congressional enquiry said leads were there but
the various intelligence agencies failed to communicate properly. One of
these pieces of ‘evidence’ was Mohammed Atta’s (or his associate’s)
testament, found in an automobile parked near the Boston airport. A
closer examination of the testament’s text leads one to believe that it was
not even written by a Muslim, but someone who would like to appear to
be a Muslim.11
Another trail left by them was the radio communication picked up by
‘intelligence’ about two-and-a-half months before the attack, hinting that
one was being planned. The International Herald Tribune reports: ‘Ameri-
can officials now look back to intelligence received in June and July as
the starting point in their efforts to try to reconstruct the events leading
up to Sept. 11 . . . . Officials familiar with the intelligence said the CIA got
a series of intercepted communications and other indications that Qaida
might be planning a major operation. In some of their communications,
the terrorists used code words and double-talk to disguise their plans.’
What it does not tell is that this is an old trick of intelligence agencies
aimed at manipulating other intelligence agencies. It is surprising how
gullible even some intelligence officials appear to be.

8
Ibid.
9
Blumenthal, ‘Tapes Depict Proposal to Thwart Bomb’.
10
A detailed exposition of this can be found in Thomas, War against People, Chapter 1.
11
Fisk, ‘What Muslim would Write’.
74 Thomas Sebastian

Ostrovsky explains the trick of the ‘Trojan’ relay system in order to

create a false flag terrorist incrimination.12 Israel used the Trojan to pin
the blame for the bombing of the LaBelle discotheque in Berlin on Libya,
which led the US into bombing Israel’s enemy. Ostrovsky explains:

A Trojan was a special communication device that could be planted by

naval commandos deep inside enemy territory. The device would act as
a relay station for misleading transmissions made by the disinformation
unit in the Mossad, called LAP, and intended to be received by American
and British listening stations. Originating from an IDF navy ship out at
sea, the pre recorded digital transmissions could be picked up only by the
Trojan. The device would then rebroadcast the transmission on another
frequency, one used for official business in the enemy country, at which
point the transmission would finally be picked up by American ears in
Britain . . . . T he listeners would have no doubt they had intercepted a
genuine communication, hence the name Trojan, reminiscent of the
mythical Trojan horse. Further, the content of the messages, once deci-
phered, would confirm information from other intelligence sources, namely
the Mossad.

It cannot be excluded that a ‘trojan operation’ may have been used to

create a bin Laden scapegoat.

FALSE FLAG ‘TERRORISM’

When the state is unable to find collaborating ‘terrorists’, it may carry out
the attack on its own and then put the blame on an existing or an
imaginary terrorist organization.
Suicide bombers could be any of the above three categories. It is
possible that ‘revolutionary’ terrorists could have made their own deci-
sions. Potential terrorists could be manipulated to sacrifice their lives and
become martyrs for their cause, thus making it friendly fire terrorism. It
is also possible that intelligence agencies, even after learning about the
plans of the terrorists, may ignore or encourage them covertly and let it
take place. There is also the possibility of disguising a bombing to make
it appear as a suicidal act.

12
Ostrovsky, Other Side of Deception, pp. 113, 115–16.
Terrorism and Imperialism: Two Sides of the Same Coin 75

By examining the target of the attack, the expected response, the

professionality of execution and the contents of the communication, we
can generally decide which sort of terrorist act has taken place. For
example, if the target is purely symbolic, aiming to kill ordinary people
with the detailed knowledge of civil aviation procedures and no claims
later as who did it and why, it would be difficult to believe that that
particular act of terrorism belongs to the ‘revolutionary’ type.
A strong reason to believe that the attacks by Al Qaeda are ‘friendly
fire’ is the close connection the suspected terrorist organizations have
with the US administration.

THE CONNECTION

The close relationship between the US administration and organizations

they consider terrorist is all too evident. Michel Chossudovsky has ex-
posed the links between the US administration and Islamic terrorist
organizations. His findings are given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
The evidence presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 goes to show the close
collaboration of the agencies of the US government with international
terrorism. The US government has abetted the Islamic jehad, and con-
versely it has financed the flow of arms and mercenaries in US sponsored
insurgencies in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.
With the active encouragement of the CIA and Pakistan’s ISI, who
wanted to turn the Afghan jehad into a global war waged by all Muslim
states against the Soviet Union, some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 40
Islamic countries joined Afghanistan’s fight between 1982 and 1992. Tens
of thousands more came to study in Pakistani madrasas. Eventually more
than 100,000 foreign Muslim radicals were directly influenced by the
Afghan jehad.13

THE STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM

The US administration, besides organizing friendly fire and false flag

terrorisms, also sponsors terrorism in different parts of the world to
overthrow governments and put in place regimes that supports it.

13
Rashid, ‘The Taliban’.
 Table 3.1
Historical Background: ‘Links’ of US Officials to Al Qaeda and other Terrorist Organizations (partial list)
Official Circumstances
Jimmy Carter Signed first directive for covert support to the Islamic
militant network in Afghanistan in July 1979.
Zbigniew Brzezinski As National Security Adviser to Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski
was the architect of covert support to the Islamic militant
network in the Soviet–Afghan war.
Ronald Reagan Signed National Security Decision Directive 166 (1985)
which allowed for stepped-up covert aid to the Islamic
brigades in the Soviet–Afghan war.
George H.W. Bush Continued the covert support to the Islamic militant net-
work initiated under Carter and the Reagan presidencies.
Provided support to Iran Contra officials during his term
as Vice President.
Business ties to the bin Laden family through the Carlyle
Group.
Bill Clinton Ordered collaboration of the US military with Al Qaeda
operatives during the civil war in Bosnia. Supported the
KLA, which was also being supported by Al Qaeda.
Anthony Lake, National Security Ordered covert support to the Islamic terrorist organiza-
Adviser to President Clinton. tions fighting in Bosnia (1993–95).
Document or source
Interview of Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Nouvel
Observateur, 15–21 January 1998.
Interview of Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Nouvel
Observateur, 15–21 January 1998.
Washington Post, 19 July 1992.
Wall Street Journal, 27 Setember 2001; Fortune,
8 March 2002.
The New York Times, 12 February 1989; Salon.
com, November 2001.
Foreign Policy in Focus, 30 April 2002.
Republican Party Committee of the US Con-
gress, 1997.
Republican Party Committee of the US Con-
gress, 1997.
 Table 3.2
Bush Administration Officials: Links to Al Qaeda and the 9/11 Terrorists (partial list)

Name of official Nature of link Source of information

George W. Bush Business links in the 1980s when he was in the Texas oil
business to the bin Laden family including Salem bin Laden
(Osama’s brother) and Khalid bin Mahfouz (Osama’s brother-
in-law)-identified in the 9/11 victims families’ lawsuit as the
financier of 9/11.
bin Mahfouz is suspected to have funnelled millions of dollars
to the Al Qaeda network.
Intelligence Newsletter, 2 March 2000; AFP London,
7 November 2001; Salon.com, 19 November 2001;
Boston Herald, 11 December 2001; Bush Watch 2001;
In these Times, 12 November 2001.
George W. Bush Financial Scams, CRG selection of
articles.

Colin Powell, Negotiated the terms of Pakistan’s cooperation in the war on Miami Herald, 16 September 2001; Washington Post,
Secretary of State terrorism with the moneyman behind 9/11, General Mahmoud ABC News, 30 September 2001; AFP, 10 October
Ahmad, head of Pakistan Military Intelligence (ISI). Accord- 2001; The Times of India, 9 October 2001.
ing to several reports including that of the FBI, the General
was alleged to have transferred $100.000 to the ringleader of
9/11, Mohammed Atta.
Colin Powell was also involved behind the scenes in the Iran
Contra affair. Major General Powell authorized the illegal
transfer of weapons to Iran.

Richard Armitage, Involved in the covert plan to support the militant Islamic base Miami Herald, 16 September 2001; Washington Post,
Deputy Secretary of State from is inception during the Reagan administration. Also in- ABC News, 30 September 2001; AFP, 10 October
volved in the Iran Contra scandal which consisted in the illegal 2001; The Times of India, 9 October 2001.
sale of weapons to Iran to finance the Nicaraguan Contras.

(contd.)
Table 3.2: contd.
Name of official
Marc Grossman,
Under Secretary of State
George Tenet, CIA
Director
Sen. Bob Graham and
Rep. Porter Goss, Chairman
of the Select Committees on
Intellignece of the Senate
and House
John Pointdexter, heads the
Total Information Aware-
ness Program (TIA)
John Negroponte, US
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations
Nature of link Source of information
Richard Armitage also met the alleged moneyman behind United Press International, 18 July 2001.
9/11, General Mahmoud Ahmad in meetings at the State
Department on 12 and 13 September 2001.
Meetings with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief General
Mahmoud Ahmad in the week prior to 9/11.
Meetings with ISI Chief General Mahmoud Ahmad in the
week prior to 9/11.
Meetings with ISI Chief General Mahmoud Ahmad in late Miami Herald, 16 September 2001; Washington Post, 18
August 2001 and on the morning of September 11. May 2002; Council on Foreign Relations.
The Council on Foreign Relations views the ISI as a terrorist
organization.
Involved in conspiracy in the Irangate Contra scandal. In- Numerous press reports. See UPI, 13 December 1988;
dicted of ‘conspiring to defraud the government by diverting New York Times, 10 December 1988.
funds from secret US arms sales to Iran’.
John Negroponte, the US official involved in current negotia- New York Times, 13 December 1988; San Francisco
tions in UN Security Council, was involved in supporting Examiner.
paramilitary death squadrons while he was US ambassador to
Honduras in the 1980s
 The Contra were operating out of Honduras with military aid
provided from the sale of weapons to Iran. ‘As the American
Ambassador in Honduras from November 1981 to June 1985,
Mr. Negroponte was instrumental in the military buildup of the
Nicaraguan rebels [Contra]’.

Thomas Kean, Chairman of Business partner of Khalid bin Mahfouz and Mohammed Al Fortune Magazine, February 2003; Energy Compass,
the 9/11 Commission Ahmoudi in the Hess-Delta joint venture. Bin Mahfouz is, 15 November 2002.
according to the CIA, the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. Global Outlook, no 4, 2003.

Sources: Salon.com: http://dir.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/11/19/bush_oil/index.html

Bush Watch: http://www.bushwatch.com/bushmoney.htm
http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/mainarticle/
80 Thomas Sebastian

Reagan’s contra war: A notorious example of US sponsored terror-

ism was Reagan’s contra war against Nicaragua. There the Sandinistas,
a petty bourgeois revolutionary force, overthrew the dictator Somoza in
1979. Reagan began mobilizing ‘resistance groups’ of mercenaries repre-
senting bourgeois reaction against the Sandinistas when he came into
office in 1981. The contras, organized by the CIA, would not confront
Sandinista combat troops but instead carried out terrorist raids against
Nicaraguan peasants. Reagan’s dirty war also involved mining Nicaraguan
ports, strangling its economy with boycotts and an embargo, and carrying
out large-scale practice invasions in next-door Honduras.
Reagan’s terrorist policy against Nicaragua had support from both the
ruling and opposition parties in the US. In 1984 the liberal Democrat
leaders passed the Boland Amendment restricting direct military aid to
the contras, but at the same time they allowed private aid to be sent to
the contras using US military transport. They allowed Reagan to solicit
contributions for the contras’ military equipment from private sources
and also from other governments such as Israel. They also voted tens of
millions of dollars worth of direct ‘humanitarian’ aid to the contras,
supposedly for ‘refugee relief’. Reagan’s solicitation of funds for the contras
included selling American military equipment to Iran. The contra op-
eration also raised money by smuggling drugs to the US. Their planes
would transport guns from Florida to the Honduras and return to Florida
loaded with drugs.

Death squads of El Salvador: In the same period Reagan also

backed the terrorist right wing government of El Salvador. Salvadoran
revolutionary forces had organized armed guerrilla groups and had taken
control of some areas. Reagan supported the government in its war
against the guerrillas. But the government also tried to end support
for the guerrillas by terrorizing the civilian population through the use
of death squads, unofficial vigilante groups that would kidnap and kill
the leaders of workers and peasant organizations. Anyone suspected
of organizing dissent against the government was subject to being
killed. This included the Catholic Archbishop Romero, who had ex-
pressed his view that the government should take it a little easier on
the masses, and a group of Maryknoll nuns whose only offence was
they did some social work among the poor. The death squads though
operating in secret, did leave tell tale signs of their handiwork. They left
mutilated bodies out in public view to terrorize the people. This was a
classic example of state terrorism. The state has official rules against
Terrorism and Imperialism: Two Sides of the Same Coin 81

arbitrary arrest and punishment, so the government organizes a second

shadow state that violates all these norms but which cannot be publicly
condemned as government policy because the government disowns
it. Once again the US and the CIA were major supporters. The
Democrats in Congress helped Reagan by voting hundreds of millions of
dollars for military and other aid to the Salvadoran regime, ignoring its
death squads.
The remnants of this savage policy remain with us today. Central
America remains mired in poverty and political backwardness as the
reactionary, wealthy monopolists remain in power.

A school for terrorists: Meanwhile US sponsored terrorism in Latin

America continues. In Colombia, where leftist guerrillas have taken over
significant sections of the country, the government’s military forces have
organized a shadow military that carries out death squad operations on
a daily basis. Many of Colombia’s military officers were trained at the US
Army’s School of the Americas, a notorious institution that instructs
Latin American military officials in how to fight ‘instability’ in their home
countries. Nearly 60,000 military officers have been trained there,
including some of Latin America’s infamous military dictators. The
school, now located at Fort Benning, Georgia (and renamed the Western
Hemispheric Institute for Security Cooperation), instructs its students
in the fine arts of assassination and torture. State sponsored terror now
murders hundreds of trade union and peasant leaders in Colombia
every year. But it has not been enough to smash the leftist movement
there, and so the US government is now contemplating the use of
American troops in Colombia. Bush will advertise this as part of his ‘war
on terror’, but in fact it is an escalation of state sponsored terror against
the masses.

THE US: THE WORLD’S NO. 1 TERRORIST

US imperialism is the world’s no. 1 terrorist. The US is the only country

in the world that has been condemned by the International Court of
Justice for international terrorism. The words they used were ‘unlawful
use of force’ in their war against Nicaragua. That is international
terrorism. There were two Security Council resolutions supporting that
judgement.
82 Thomas Sebastian

THE REAL OBJECTIVE OF WAR ON TERRORISM

To understand why the US administration has made maintaining terror-

ism the central point of their foreign policy, we need to understand the
working of the US economy and the imperialist system as a whole since
World War II.
The law of value gives capitalism its character. In mercantilism, which
preceded capitalism, the source of profit was in exchange. People who
lived in distant areas and those who had different ways of estimating
values were brought together by middlemen. In this exchange the profit
went to the merchant or middlemen. Under capitalism the profit arises
in the process of production. The capitalist, using the money capital he
possesses, buys machinery, raw materials and labour and puts them to-
gether to produce commodities. Once commodities are produced they are
sold in the market and the money is recovered with profits. It is in the
production process that labour transfers values into raw materials. The
value of a good is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour
time. Socially necessary labour time is an average amount of labour time
required to produce a commodity. The socially necessary labour time
required to produce a commodity is determined by the market forces of
supply and demand for the product and the prevalent technology.
Any producer who is able to produce a commodity below the socially
necessary labour time is able to reap a profit. Competition in the market
acts as an outside force on the capitalist to undertake production with
labour time below that which is socially necessary. The capitalist feels
helpless before the market. In fact, since it is force beyond his control,
he starts worshipping it.
In order to produce a commodity below the socially necessary labour
time, the capitalist increases labour productivity by increasing the scale
of production. A time comes when the size of the firm has increased so
much that he is able to dominate the market and can influence the
market price of the commodity. This is the monopoly stage of capitalism.
Monopolization is an attempt to escape these laws of value. Monopoly
tries to organize everything—the supply, the demand, the price, and the
mind of the people through cultural conditioning.
However, the law of value does not leave him. It surfaces in a new form.
Remember, the capitalist was able to survive and flourish in the market
thanks to his ability to increase labour productivity. Increasing labour
productivity means getting things done with less amount of labour, which
Terrorism and Imperialism: Two Sides of the Same Coin 83

in turn means that a lesser number of people are required to produce a

commodity. This in turn leads to more unemployment and a fall in the
income of the people. In advanced countries the period from 1800–1870
was the period of competitive capitalism. During this period, capitalism
in these countries moved from the competitive stage to the monopoly
stage. The falling income of the people due to unemployment implied that
it was difficult for the capitalist to realize values embodied in the com-
modities. This leads to over-production. The solution for this is to look
for markets outside the boundaries of the country. The advanced coun-
tries of the Europe and the US did just that. There was a scramble for
world market among the capitalist countries. They divided the world
among themselves through wars between the peoples of these countries,
and among themselves. Thus capitalism was transformed into imperial-
ism. As the law of value asserted itself, the problem surfaced again.
Different imperialist countries grow at different levels and hence their
requirement of markets is different. Since by the end of the nineteenth
century the world was already carved up among different imperialist
countries, there was only one way to gain more market: re-divide the
world. Since no imperialist country was willing to give up its market on
its own, there was only one solution—war. War is the ultimate solution
to the contradictions of capitalism. That is why Lenin had said, quoting
Clausewitz, the Prussian war minister, ‘War is politics in other ways.’
The constant tensions between imperialist powers, the increasing
resistance from nationalist forces, and the success of communist parties
in overthrowing powers in some countries convinced imperialist powers
that the colonial system is not an efficient method for extracting profit.
Hence, imperialist powers granted formal independence to the former
colonies after the World War II. Imperialism thus began a new career
without colonies, a process termed neocolonialism. In fact, the method
of exploitation through neocolonialism is not new. Most of Latin America
was colonized by the Spaniards during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. After the Napoleonic wars, when Spain had become weak
politically and militarily, Latin American countries became independent.
However, they soon fell under the domination of Britain, and later the
US. The US capitalists were able to exploit these countries indirectly.
The method they adopted was to dominate these economies through
foreign direct investment. While political control remained in the hands
of the Latin Americans, investment in these countries was controlled by
foreign capital. This, the US found, was a more efficient method of
extracting surplus. What imperialists did after the World War II was to
84 Thomas Sebastian

spread this system globally. New global institutions to manage this system,
namely the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
the World Trade Organization, etc., were created. In creating the neo-
colonial system, the US had taken the initiative. The rules and regulations
of these institutions are such that the US would always retain control over
them.
Though during the last 100 years of its existence imperialism has
changed its international alignments, its class basis has remained un-
changed. It is the division of the society between a labouring majority and
a privileged elite under conditions of monopoly capitalism. The class basis
still results in the partitioning of the world by powerful countries and
economic monopolies. And the rich and powerful countries, such as the
US, still dominate and exploit the poor and weak ones. They now prefer
labour intensive activities in the neocolonies and import them. Known
as outsourcing, it is one of the ways of transferring values to the imperialist
countries from labouring people of the neocolonies. The name given to
the new international exploitation through the new division of labour is
Gobalization. That there is greater transfer of wealth from the neocolonies
to the imperialist countries is clear from the fact that the gap in the
standard of living of the people of the neocolonies and the imperialist
countries has widened during the post-War period. Colonialism was imposed
through brute force. Since neocolonialism is a more sinister and vicious
form of exploitation, it can only be enforced with still more force. For
neocolonialism to work successfully, the national bourgeoisie and their
political agents, namely the political parties, have to cooperate. Anybody
showing any kind of resistance has to be removed either through organ-
ized terrorism or external attack. The US administration refers to this as
regime change.
From Washington’s point of view, the aim of Globalization—breaking
down all barriers to capital’s worldwide exploitation—is not just ‘corpo-
rate domination’ in the general sense, but US corporate domination. To
achieve this domination, the ruling establishment often uses economic,
political, diplomatic and military means in an integrated strategy, as they
have against Iraq and Yugoslavia. ‘The basic challenge is that what is
called Globalization which is really another name for the dominant role
of the United States,’ said Henry Kissinger, secretary of state under
President Ford in a speech in 1999.14

14
Lecture at Triniy College, Dublin, 12 October 1999, cited in Gindin, ‘Social Justice
and Globalization’.
Terrorism and Imperialism: Two Sides of the Same Coin 85

Over the years US investments have become more globalized. They

depend to a greater extent than before on military power to protect these
investments. New York Times columist, Thomas Friedman noted: ‘For
globalization to work, America can’t be afraid to act like the almighty
superpower that it is. The hidden hand of the market will never work
without a hidden fist. McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonald-
Douglas, the designer of the F-15, and the hidden fist that keeps the world
safe for Silicon Valley’s technology is called the United States Army, Air
Force, Navy and Marine Corps.’15
Under the neo-colonial system of exploitation, multinational corpo-
rations (MNCs) loot the neo-colonies while the US administration cre-
ates the conducive atmosphere for it. Conquering the markets is one
thing, keeping it safe for one’s exploitation is another. To control the
resources of the neo-colonies, the imperialist countries need still more
force. General A.M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, expressed
this difficulty in the following words:

The Underdeveloped World’s growing dissatisfaction over the gap between

rich and poor nations will create a fertile breeding ground for insurgencies.
These insurgencies have the potential to jeopardize regional stability and
our access to vital economic and military resources. This situation will
become more critical as our nation and allies, as well as potential adver-
saries, become more and more dependent on these strategic resources. If
we are to have stability in these regions, maintain access to their resources,
protect our citizens abroad, defend our vital installations and deter con-
flict, we must maintain within our active force structure a credible military
power projection capability with flexibility to respond to conflict across the
spectrum of violence throughout the globe.16

The logic of the operation of globalization is this. For the imperialist

countries to continue their expansion, resources spread all over the world
are required. This cannot be attained without force. To enter an area they
need an excuse. That excuse was earlier provided by the struggle against
socialism. Today they find excuse in ‘war against terrorism’.
Today the US has military bases in 40 countries. It has control over
international trade and financial institutions. American popular culture

15
Thomas Friedman, New York Times, 28 March 1999.
16
A.M. Gray, ‘Defense policy for the 1990s’, Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 74, no. 5 (May
1990), p. 19. Quoted in Esmail Hossen-zadeh, ‘The Persian Gulf War in the context
of the debate over the political economy of US militarism’, Cambridge Journal of
Economics, vol. 17 (1993), p. 252.
86 Thomas Sebastian

and language is encircling the globe. No wonder then that some writers
compare it with the Roman empire. But Americans shied away from the
label of ‘empire’, preferring the ahistorical designation ‘superpower’ and
euphemisms like ‘globalization’ to describe US dominance. Lawrence
Summers, a reigning intellectual of the Clinton administration, liked to
say that the US is history’s only non-imperialist superpower. But all are
not as shy as Summers. In fact some of them have become so arrogant
that they do not hide their objectives and the ways by which they intend
to enforce their domination. ‘A political unit that has overwhelming
superiority in military power, and uses that power to influence the internal
behaviour of other states, is called an empire. Because the United States
does not seek to control territory or govern the overseas citizens of the
empire, we are an indirect empire, to be sure, but an empire nonetheless.
If this is correct, our goal is not combating a rival, but maintaining our
imperial position, and maintaining imperial order.’ Thus wrote S.R. Rosen,
part of the Bush administration’s inner circle on foreign policy. ‘Imperial
strategy focuses on preventing the emergence of powerful, hostile chal-
lengers to the empire: by war if necessary, but by imperial assimilation if
possible’, he wrote.
In September 2000, prior to Bush’s election to the US presidency and
one year before the 11 September attack on the WTC, the Project for
a New American Century (PNAC) (one of the many US think tanks)
published a statement called Rebuilding America’s Defense: Strategy, Forces
and Resources for a New Century. The document says the US must
‘discourage advanced industrial nations from challenging our leadership
or even aspiring to a larger regional or global role’. It refers to key allies
such as the UK as ‘the most effective and efficient means of exercising
American global leadership’. It describes peacekeeping missions as ‘de-
manding American political leadership rather than that of the UN’. It
spotlights China for ‘regime change’, saying ‘it is time to increase the
presence of American forces in SE Asia’. It also calls for the creation of
‘US space forces’ to dominate space, and the total control of cyberspace
to prevent ‘enemies’ using the internet against the US. It also hints that
the US may consider developing biological weapons ‘that can target
specific genotypes [and] may transform biological warfare from the realm
of terror to a politically useful tool’.
Michael Ledeen is a member of another of the ‘think tanks’—the
American Enterprise Institute (AEI). He published an article ‘We’ll
Win this War’ in the AEI’s The American Enterprise in December 2001.
‘We must wage revolutionary war against all the terrorist regimes, and
Terrorism and Imperialism: Two Sides of the Same Coin 87

gradually replace them with governments that turn to their own

people’s freely expressed desires as the basis of their political legitimacy’,
he wrote.
These ideas expressed by various influential people of the US elite is
reflected in the National Security Strategy published in September 2002.
In this 25-page document we find the following:

01. There is only one sustainable true and right model for all peoples
and countries, and that is based on ‘freedom, democracy and free
enterprise’ and is the non-negotiable demand from which no
nation is exempt.
02. The US will extend peace on every continent and promote
economic freedom beyond America’s shores.
03. The US will act against threats before they are formed and act
alone and preemptively, as the best defense is an offense, recog-
nizing that enemies can not be permitted to strike first.
04. Rogue states who hate the US and everything for which it stands
must be stopped.
05. Poverty is not the source of terrorism.
06. US strategy will be based on a ‘distinctly American internation-
alism’.
07. When openings arrive the US can encourage [regime] change.
08. The United States will rid the world of evil.
09. The US must dissuade any future military competition and de-
velop access arrangements for long distance deployment of US
forces.
10. The US will continue to oppose the application of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court to its personnel in the discharge of its global
commitments.

The point I wish to emphasize is that the US administration has a well

documented plan to continue the imperialist exploitation of the world for
corporate profits. In spite of their new strategy of controlling through
dominance, imperialism is willing to colonize countries temporarily, as the
examples of Afghanistan and Iraq show us. In general, the ‘war on
terrorism’ is a policy of resurgent imperialism, whereby the US seeks to
settle a series of foreign policy problems by direct military means. The US
is to decide, and then other countries are to ratify these decisions and
help the US carry out its military plans.
88 Thomas Sebastian

THE SPIN: ESTABLISH DEMOCRACY AND WAR ON TERRORISM

While the above is the truth behind the war against terror, the US public
was repeatedly told a different story by the American consciousness
industry. The war against terrors, the American public is told, is a struggle
to establish freedom and democracy and ensure security. This again is
nothing new.
It was in 1898 that the American empire ventured overseas. That year
they killed over 60,000 Filipinos in their effort to assimilate Philippines
into the US empire. At that time the US Secretary of War Elihu Root
said, ‘the American soldier is different from all soldiers of all other
countries since the world began. He is the advance guard of liberty and
justice, law and order, peace and happiness.’17 In different words George
Bush has said the same things while attacking and occupying Afghanistan
and Iraq. Since 1898, the US has conducted over 170 military interven-
tions in every region of the world. Each has been presented domestically
as a mission to redeem the targeted country, and indeed the world, for
freedom and democracy.
In the weeks after 11 September 2001, George W. Bush did not talk
of remaking the Middle East. But in successive State of the Union
addresses, commencement speeches, press conferences, and televised
appeals to the nation, Bush showed increasing faith in the ability of the
US to extirpate tyranny and implant freedom in this agonized region. As
the task of swaying public opinion grew more difficult, rhetoric around
freedom and democracy has become ever more central.
When he announced the US air strikes against Afghanistan, President
Bush Jr said, ‘We’re a peaceful nation.’ He went on to say, ‘This is the
calling of the United States of America, the most free nation in the world,
a nation built on fundamental values, that rejects hate, rejects violence,
rejects murderers, rejects evil. And we will not tire.’

IMPERIALISM AND DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS

Lenin pointed out that the imperialism of his time involved not only the
struggle to crush rivals abroad, but to crush the democratic rights of the
masses at home. He wrote in 1916 that in domestic politics as well as

16
Susskind, 12 July 2003, ‘Adjusting to Empire’.
Terrorism and Imperialism: Two Sides of the Same Coin 89

foreign affairs, ‘imperialism strives towards violations of democracy, to-

wards reaction’.
This does not mean that there would not be election or any democratic
rights under imperialism. If that was the case it would not apply to the
present times nor to Lenin’s time either. What he meant was the instability
of democratic rights under imperialism. This is exactly what we see today.
Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’ has shown that, with a stroke of the pen, the most
cherished rights can be stripped from the population. This shows how the
results of years of mass struggle for rights can be negated in a crisis.
Many governments, including the US, instituted measures to discipline
the domestic population and to carry forward unpopular measures under
the guise of ‘combating terror’, exploiting the atmosphere of fear and the
demand for ‘patriotism’. The Bush administration used the opportunity to
advance its assault against most of the population and future generations,
serving narrow corporate interests that dominate the administration.
According to Amnesty International’s report for summer 2002, Aus-
tralia, Belarus, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nepal, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Uganda,
UK, USA, Zimbabwe, the European Union, and the Arab League have
already passed new laws or amended old laws to restrict the democratic
rights of the people. In Amnesty’s words ‘from Australia to Zimbabwe,
using new laws and old-fashioned brute force, governments are sacrificing
human rights on the alter of antiterrorism’.

CONCLUSION

The Afghan and Iraq wars illustrate some of the basic features of impe-
rialism, as well as the connections between imperialism and terrorism. As
we have seen, much of Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’ is directed at forces
originally sponsored by the US. More generally, US imperialism has
repeatedly made use of death squads, dirty wars, and terrorist assassina-
tions in its struggle against popular movements and imperialist rivals. The
US is not alone in doing this. Such methods have been also used by the
major European imperialist powers and Japan, and also by lesser powers
and would-be regional bullies. So the imperialist powers are not going to
fight terrorism in general; they will only fight the terrorism of their rivals,
and they will always keep terrorism in reserve to attack uprisings of the
masses. They do not want to end terrorism, but to monopolize it.
90 Thomas Sebastian

REFERENCES

Amnesty International, Charting the ‘War on Terrorism’, Summer 2002. Available

online at http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/war_terrorism.html
Blecher, Robert, ‘Intellectuals, Democracy and American Empire David Barsamian:
An Interview’, Middle East Report Online, 1 April 2003.
Blumenthal, Ralph, ‘Tapes Depict Proposal to Thwart Bomb used in Trade Center
Blast’, New York Times, 28 October 1993.
Brown Pete, No. 1 terrorist (from Communist Voice #28, January 2002. Available online
at http://www.flash.net/~comvoice/TOC28.html
Chomsky, Noam, Who are the Global Terrorists? 19 May 2002, http://www.chomsky.info/
articles/200205—02,htmZnet
—–———, ‘Wars of Terror’, New Political Science, vol. 25, no. 1 (2003), ZNet http://
www.chomsky.info/articles/200303.htm
Chossudovsky, Michel, Expose the Links between Al Qaeda and the Bush Administration.
Available online at http://globalresearch.ca/, 15 March 2003.
Church, George J., ‘A Case of Dumb Luck’, Time, 15 March 1993.
Fisk, Robert, ‘What Muslim would Write: “The time of fun and waste is gone”?’ The
Independent, 29 September 2001. Availble online at http://www.commondreams.
org/views01/0920-07.htm
Gindin, Samin, ‘Social Justice and Globalization: Are They Compatible?’, Monthly
Review, vol. 54, no. 2 (June 2002).
Goff, Stan, The Infinite War and its Roots (The Wilderness Publications, 2000). Avail-
able online at www.copvcia.com, 21 August/août.
Green Joseph, ‘Imperialism in light of the Afghan war’, Communist Voice, vol. 28
(January) 2002. Available online at http://www.flash.net/~comvoice/28cImperial-
ism.html
Ostrovsky, Victor, The Other Side of Deception (Harper Collins, 1994).
Pha, Anna, ‘Out of Their Own Mouths: Maintaining Imperial Order’, Guardian,
2 July 2003.
Pilger, John, ‘America’s Bid for Global Dominance’, The New Statesman, 12 December
2002.
Plitnick, Mitchell, ‘Terror And History’, 16 October 2002.
Pumphrey, George, ‘Types of Terrorism and 9/11’. www.globalresearch.ca/articles/
PUM306A.html, 19 June 2003.
Rashid, Ahmed, ‘The Taliban: Exporting Terrorism’, Foreign Affairs (November–
December 1999).
Rosen, S.R. ‘The Future of War and the American Military’, Harvard Magazine (May–
June 2002).
Schoenman, Ralph, ‘Resist US Aggression! Who are the Real Terrorists?’ Available
online at http://www.igc.org/workers/to/terror.htm
Susskind, Yiffat, 12 July 2003. ‘Adjusting to Empire’.
Thomas, Sebastian, War against People (Mumbai: J&P Publishers, 2002).
 ISLAM, TERRORISM AND
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 4
JAWAID QUDDUS

T
he word terrorism is almost impossible to define. It has different
connotations for different people. Some have equated terrorism
as a fight for freedom and terrorists as freedom fighters. In recent
years it is equated with Islam without any distinction being made between
the religion and the actions of a minority of the people who follow that
religion.
According to Bruce Hoffman, the word ‘terrorism’ was first popularized
during the French Revolution. At that time it had a positive connotation.
It stood for a regime de la terreur and signified a system of governance
instituted by a government to neutralize anti-government activities of
opponents and counter revolutionaries. During the French Revolution,
the Committee of General Security and the Revolutionary Tribunal were
vested with draconian powers. They could put to death anyone convicted
of treason. This regime de la terreur may have its more recent counterpart
in the Patriot laws of the US or the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA)
recently enacted in India and other similar laws enacted elsewhere. The
turmoil in Kashmir, Palestine, Afghanistan and more recently Iraq may
represent such a regime of terruer. Justified as a necessary means for getting
rid of evil and for establishing democracy, governments use their modern
missiles, fighter planes, and tanks to enforce their agenda, whereas the
non-state terrorists use suicide bombers and time-activated explosive
devices to enforce theirs. The fact remains that both are wrong. Terrorism
to counter terrorism only leads to more terrorism!
The destruction of the Twin Towers in New York came as a shock to
all peace loving people of the world. This, in addition to various hijackings
92 Jawaid Quddus

and bombings in Israel and Kashmir, the rule of terror of the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and the Talibanization of Pakistan all point to a common
denominator, Islam. This is what Huntington has convincingly, but per-
haps mistakenly, defined as what would lead to the ‘clash of civilizations’.
The perception of many that Islam not only sanctions terrorism, but also
rewards terrorists with the promise of paradise and celestial houris are
incorrect.

THE RELIGION OF ISLAM:

A BRIEF HISTORY AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Islam is a monotheistic religion practiced by over one billion people. It

is not the religion of the Arabs alone and being an Arab does not confer
upon a Muslim any superiority at all. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) has
very clearly emphasized the global nature of Islam. ‘No Arab has any
superiority over a non-Arab, nor does a non-Arab have any superiority
over an Arab. Nor does a white man have any superiority over a black
man, or the black man any superiority over the white man. You are all
the children of Adam, and Adam was created from clay.’
Islam means peace and enjoins all its followers to work to establish
peace and justice. It is not a source of terrorism, it in fact is a solution
for terrorism. The Quran very clearly specifies: ‘So we decreed for the
tribe of Israel that if someone kills another person—unless it is in retali-
ation for someone else or for causing corruption in the earth—it is as if
he had murdered all mankind. And if anyone gives life to another person,
it is as if he had given life to all mankind. Our messengers came to them
with clear signs but even after that many of them committed outrages in
the earth’ (Surah al-Ma’ida-32). Anyone who defies this injunction defies
Allah. He may be a Muslim; his actions, however, are not Islamic.
Islam began in the seventh century in the Middle East. In addition to
Islam, this region is also the birthplace of the other two monotheistic
faiths—Judaism and Christianity. Thus Islam, Christianity, and Judaism
share a common origin and a common history as well as a rivalry that
continues to be a major factor in the turmoil that we are witnessing in
these times. The prophet of Islam, Muhammad was born in Mecca on
the 12th of Rabi’ Awal at dawn (the year 571 in the Common Era
calendar). His mother died when he was just six, his father a few weeks
prior to his birth. His uncle Abu Talib raised him and taught him the
Islam, Terrorism and the New World Order 93

caravan trade. Muhammad (PBUH) soon earned the name al-Amin (the
honest) by virtue of his honesty and character. Even before he became
a Muslim, people used to come to him for advice and arbitration. They
trusted him, his wisdom, judgement and fairness. During one of his
meditation trips to the cave called Hira, Muhammad (PBUH), who was
40 years old, received the first revelation from Allah through the angel
Gabriel. These divine revelations constitute the Quran. The Quran, in
addition to the Hadith (the deeds and the sayings of the prophet), govern
the entire Islamic world.
For 13 years Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) preached to the people of
Mecca, inviting them to join him and the oneness of God. A few people
accepted his call but there was considerable opposition to this new
religion. This was because Islam was seen as a threat to the economic as
well as social structure of the inhabitants of Mecca. Meccan society was
extremely corrupt with no concept of humanity or fair play. The position
of women was pathetic and often girls and wives were buried alive at the
whim of their husbands or families or at birth. Additionally there was
constant infighting between the various tribes. Most people had multiple
wives and slave girls who were compelled to co-habit with their masters.
The Prophet (PBUH) was determined to stop all this, and hence the
resistance. Assassination threats, continued opposition, and subsequent
persecution and violence against all those who had accepted Islam forced
the Prophet (PBUH) to send some of his followers to Abyssinia where
they were protected by the Christian King. Soon afterwards, he along with
his followers migrated to Yathrib, a city north of Mecca in A.D. 622. With
this migration to Yathrib (now known as Madina) begins the Islamic
calendar (hijrah). Madina became the Caliphate seat until Damascus
replaced it in A.D. 661. The people of Madina embraced Islam and after
a series of defensive battles and diplomacy, the Prophet (PBUH) and his
followers entered Mecca after defeating the Meccans. On his return to
Mecca, he (PBUH) forgave all his former enemies, reclaimed the Ka’abah
and destroyed all the idols present there. He then returned to Madina.
In 632, shortly after his last pilgrimage from Mecca, the Prophet (PBUH)
fell ill and died after a final sermon asking the Muslims not to ‘stray from
the path of righteousness after I am gone’.
By this time most of Arabia had embraced Islam. Its message also
spread north of the peninsula into Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and
Persia. Palestine was captured in 638, after the battle of Yarmouk against
the Romans. The Romans, during their occupation of Palestine, had
banned the practice of Judaism and Christianity and had destroyed the
94 Jawaid Quddus

Jewish Temple. In addition they had expelled the Jews from Jerusalem
(A.D. 70). After the defeat of the Romans at Jerusalem, Umar Ibn al-
Khattab (who was elected the second Caliph, after his victory at Yarmouk)
made a historic Covenant with the leader of the Christians, Bishop
Sophronious. This Covenant specified that the Christians would enjoy
unhindered rights to practice their religion, use their houses of worship,
and have access to their places of worship for all time to come. When
prayer time drew near during this negotiation, Sophronious invited the
Caliph to pray at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which he courteously
refused. The reason for his refusal was to prevent the Muslims who, in
their zeal to commemorate this event, would have destroyed the church
to erect a mosque there, an act that would have violated the directives
of the Quran.
Islam continued to spread, first to Egypt in 641 and then to all of North
Africa by A.D. 654. By the Middle Ages Islam had spread all over the
world. Islam was accepted due to the power of its vision. It gauranteed
to the believers and the non-believers rights which no other religion or
government had even conceptualized at that time. These rights included:

• The right to life;

• Respect for the chastity of women;
• The right to a basic standard of life;
• Individual’s right to freedom;
• The right to justice;
• The right to the safety of life;
• The equality of human beings;
• Rulers not being above the law;
• The right to cooperate or not to cooperate;
• Rights of enemies at war;
• The rights of the non-combatants;
• The protection of the wounded;
• The sanctity of property;
• The sanctity of a dead body;
• The return of corpses of the enemy;
• Prohibition of breach of treaties.

The above guarantees constitute only a part of what Islam is all about.
The basic belief of Islam consists of five pillars which include: (a) Affir-
mation of the faith which proclaims that there is no god but Allah and
that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah, (b) prayers five times a day,
Islam, Terrorism and the New World Order 95

(c) fasting during the month of Ramadan, (d) pilgrimage to Mecca (Haj)
once in a lifetime but only if family, relatives, neighbours and friends have
all being taken care of, and if financially feasible, and (e) Zakat—payment
of two-and-a-half per cent tax on one’s entire assets to be given to the
poor annually.

SPREAD OF ISLAM IN INDIA

Islam spread in India solely by the sword. This is what the Sangh Parivar
would have everyone believe. Lies such as these are being incorporated
into history books. According to the Sangh Parivar’s version of history,
the Muslims came to India ‘with the sword in one hand and the Qoran
in the other’ and ‘Numberless Hindus were forcibly converted to Islam
on the point of the sword. This struggle for freedom became a religious
war. Numerous sacrifices were made in the name of religion. We went on
winning one battle after another. We did not let the foreign rulers settle
down to rule, but we were not able to reconvert the separated brothers
to Hinduism’ (Itihaas Gaa Raha Hai). According to them, ‘Arabs (barbar-
ians) came to convert people to their religion. Wherever they went, they
had a sword in their hand. Their army went like a storm in all the four
directions. Any country that came in their way was destroyed. Houses of
prayers and universities were destroyed. Libraries were burnt, religious
books were destroyed. Mothers and sisters were humiliated. Mercy and
justice were unknown to them’ (Gaurav Gatha, pp. 52–53). Strangely,
there is no mention in their history books of King Harsha of Kashmir who,
in the eleventh century, had appointed a special officer known as
devotpatannayak (officer who uproots Gods) for the specific purpose of
ransacking and looting temples whenever the royal treasury ran out of
funds. The Parmar Kings (Shubhavarman, A.D. 1193–1210) who de-
stroyed numerous Jain temples in Cambay and Dabhoi and other places
are also not mentioned. Although Aurangzeb’s role in the destruction of
temples does find a place, Aurangzeb’s role in destruction of mosques
(Golconda’s Jama Masjid) and his awards of jagirs to many temples does
not. While Shivaji is defined as the great Hindu King, the fact that he
built a mosque in front of his palace and had Muslim officers and solders
in his army is not a part of their history. Also not mentioned are the facts
that the commander of Shivaji’s navy Siddi Sambal, his chief commanders
Daulat Khan and Siddi Misri, and his foreign secretary Mulla Haider were
96 Jawaid Quddus

all Muslims. Shivaji’s most trusted servant Madari Mehtar, a Muslim, who
once saved Shivaji by helping him escape from Agra, has also been
omitted from Sangh Parivar’s itihas. Maybe the Sangh Parivar is unware
of the above facts or is just too afraid to admit it lest Bal Thakarey
denounces Shivaji as a traitor and an appeaser of the Muslims and drops
him from the list of Hindu icons!
Mahmud Ghazni, the marauder who destroyed the Somnath temple,
certainly finds a place in the history books of the Hindutva supporters.
However, the fact that Ghazni had to fight with Muhammed Fath Dawood
first and had to destroy the mosque of Multan in order to get to the
Somnath temple, has been conveniently left out. Also left out is the fact
that many of Ghazni’s generals (Tilak, Sondhi, Rai, Hind and Harzan)
as well as his solders were Hindus. Such verifiable and well-recorded facts
are of no historical significance in the Sangh Parivar’s scheme of things.
For if Hindu generals and soldiers were also involved in the destruction
of temples and mosques, with or without the Muslims, then the claim of
Islam being spread by the power of the sword and intimidation is certainly
weakened. The concept of the Hindus being brutalized by just the Muslims
alone would then lose its appeal. This in turn would severely hamper the
Sangh Parivar’s propaganda machine and create impediments to their
dream of establishing a Hindu rashtra in India. Thus there has to be just
one villain in their story and that villain must be vanquished.
It is generally believed that Islam entered India with the invasion by
Muhammad bin Qasim, a young general from Iraq in A.D. 711. This
invasion was the Ummayad governor’s response to the plunder of a richly
laden Arab ship passing through the mouth of the Indus. This invasion
did not result in the permanent occupation of Sindh nor in the expansion
of or the influence of Islam to other parts of India. An earlier foray to
this region in 644 was abandoned because, in the words of the Arab
commander of this first Islamic force, ‘Water is scarce, the fruits are poor,
and the robbers are bold; if a few troops are sent they will be slain, if many,
they will starve.’ Basically there was no incentive to spread Islam by
conquest in this area for the above mentioned reasons. In addition, forced
conversions are not compatible with Islam as this Surah indicates: ‘If your
Lord had willed, all the people on earth would have believed. Do you
think you can force people to be believers?’ (Quran 10:9).
Islam actually came to India through the Arab traders. The Arabs had
been trading in the Malabar region of Kerala since the pre-Islamic days.
In fact, Malabar even derives its name from the Arabic ma’bar which
means passage. Many of these Arabs, some of whom later converted to
Islam, Terrorism and the New World Order 97

Islam, also married locally in Kerala. The Sufi saints who often accom-
panied these traders actually played a major role in the spread of Islam
in India and beyond.
Muhammad bin Qasim’s invasion was followed by other invasions such
as those by Shihabuddin Ghauri and Mahmud Ghaznavi, mostly in the
north. Many of these invaders, who came as marauders, did demolish
temples but had no direct role in the spread of Islam. Their main interest
was not Islam but loot. Islam does not allow for the destruction of places
of worship, looting, rape or pillage. This is clear from the following
injunctions: ‘O People who Believe! Do not enter the houses except your
own until you obtain permission and have conveyed peace upon its
inhabitants; this is better for you, in order that you may ponder’ (Surah
al-Noor 24:27). These ‘Islamic’ invaders simply hijacked Islam to mo-
bilize volunteers to conduct un-Islamic acts in exactly the same way the
destroyers of the Babri Masjid used Hinduism to mobilize the stormtroopers
to bring it down. Additionally, many of these invaders were actually
invited by Hindu rulers to help preserve their kingdoms by defeating other
Hindu rulers. The Sangh Parivar’s claim that Hindus were subjected to
conversion by force seems unlikely considering the fact that most of these
Muslim rulers worked in conjunction with the Hindu rulers and that a
vast majority of their soldiers and generals were Hindus. A policy of
forced conversion would have destroyed the cohesion of their armed
forces and would have hampered, rather than facilitated their accession
to the throne of all of India. Also, if the story of forced conversion was
true, the population of Delhi, the capital of the Muslim empire for several
hundred years, should have been predominately Muslims, but it is not.
Anyone curious enough to study the population demographics of India
will find that areas with substantial numbers of Muslims, for the most
part, are outside the locations that were under direct Muslim rule. Muslim
rule in these peripheral areas was mostly dependent upon local rulers
who were predominantly Hindus. If Islam was imposed by force, should
there not be more Muslims in areas where the Muslim rulers had the most
control?

ISLAM AND TERRORISM

Islam is increasingly being equated with terrorism. Quotations from the

Quran, cited out of historical context, are being used to prove the
98 Jawaid Quddus

contention that Islam is by nature and design a violent religion. A closer

look will reveal that these overnight propaganda merchants posing as
Islamic scholars have little knowledge of Islam. Their forays into the study
of Islam has been very superficial, biased and without critical thinking.
Islam does not condone violence but like other religions does believe
in self-defence. The Quran specifically states that ‘permission to fight is
given to those who are fought against because they have been wronged—
truly God has the power to come to their support those who were expelled
from their homes without any right, merely for saying “Our Lord is God”’.
(Surah al Hajj: 39–40). This clearly implies that Muslims are allowed to
wage war only if they were oppressed and subjected to violence. The
Quran further defines limits and prescribes a strict code of behaviour for
conducting a war; ‘fight in the way of God against those who fight you,
but do not go beyond the limits. God does not love those who go beyond
the limits.’ The limits refer to the conduct of Muslims at war as per rules
framed by Islam to make war civilized and more humane. These include
not attacking a wounded person, not attacking or killing non-combatants
such as any old person, any child or women, monks in monasteries or
people sitting in places of worship. In addition, it is specifically prohibited
to kill a prisoner of war, indulge in loot or plunder, destruction of villages,
cattle, cultivated fields, trees and gardens. Muslims are prohibited from
taking anything from the general public (even of a conquered country)
without paying for it. Needless to say, Muslims are also prohibited from
mutilating the corpses of the enemies and are to return the bodies of dead
enemy soldiers without delay or compensation. Although people of the
Islamic faith around the world have violated all of the above rules some
of the time, they have done so despite Islam and not because of Islam.
Herein lies the difference.
The deadly suicide attack in the US and recent events in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Israel, Turkey and a number of other places, all conducted by people
who supposedly follow the Islamic faith, have led many non-Muslims to
indict Islam as a violent religion. The contention is that Islamic religion
is the root of all evils and needs to be reformed or banished from the face
of the earth. Verses from the Quran are used to create a paranoid fear
about Muslims. Forgotten in this hoopla are the following facts: most of
the victims of terrorism, Islamic or non-Islamic, are Muslims. Almost
200,000 Muslims were slaughtered in Bosnia by Serbian Christians; 22,000
Muslim females aged 9–82 were raped by Christian militiamen; more than
a million Iraqi children died as a result of US imposed UN sanctions.
Palestinians continue to die and starve in the filth of the refugee camps
Islam, Terrorism and the New World Order 99

under Israeli occupation. In India, terrorism and counter-terrorism have

killed over 60,000 Muslims and several hundred Hindus in Kashmir.
Perpetrators involved in the destruction of the Babri Masjid, and now at
the helms of the government in India, have continued with their agenda
of subjugation of the minorities as evidenced in the recent riots in Gujarat.
This pogrom against the Muslims has killed over 2,000 and driven over
200,000 of them from their homes into squalid refugee camps. These
displaced Muslims are now not being allowed to return to their homes
by the Hindu fanatics who demand they must either convert to Hinduism
or live elsewhere. Over 300 mosques and old historical monuments and
dargahs have been burnt to the ground and temples erected over some
of them. Those arrested for the killing of Muslims have been acquitted
after a sham trial. Many Muslims have been incarcerated under the
draconian POTA laws without proof or cause, while not a single Hindu
perpetrator of the carnage in Gujarat has been arrested under this same
law. In Pakistan, terrorism by Shia and Sunni groups against each other
continues to take innocent lives, whereas in the Philippines and in
Chechnya, Muslims are being subjected to ethnic cleansing. Muslim
despair, anger, helplessness, and frustration are growing. Victims of terror
themselves, the Muslims for the most part are being further victimized
in many parts of the world.
‘Islamic’ terrorists may feel that the end justifies the means; however,
Islam forbids this. The Quran specifically indicates ‘And seek not occa-
sions for mischief in the land: for Allah loves not those who do mischief’
(Surah 28:77). Islam forbids destruction of and violence against places
of worship be they Islamic or non-Islamic; ‘Who commits a greater wrong/
The one who hinders prayers/And tries to ruin in his zeal/The places of
worship of others’ (Surah al-Baqara, verse 117). Islam also prohibits
suicide and by extension suicide bombers. The Prophet had very clearly
mentioned this on many occasions. His admonition that ‘He who kills
himself with anything, Allah will torment him with that in the fire of Hell’
and ‘Do not be delighted by the actions of anyone, until you see how he
ends up’ very clearly indicates that there should be no second thoughts
on this issue.
To judge Islam by the conduct of a minority of its people is misleading
and is fraught with danger. It stigmatizes a vast majority of law abiding
peaceful citizens and defames a religion that is one of the fastest growing
religions in the US and in many other parts of the world. In addition, it
creates deep resentment in the hearts of Muslims and non-Muslims and
makes the Muslims targets of non-Muslim wrath. When David Koresh
100 Jawaid Quddus

created the chaos in Waco, Texas, President Clinton defined him as a mad
man. Timothy McVeigh, the bomber of the Murrah building in Oklahoma
was never defined as a Christian terrorist despite his Christian fundamen-
talist ties. Likewise no one blamed Hindu terrorists for the destruction
of the Babri Masjid, or for the riots in Mumbai or Gujarat, or Buddhist
terrorists for the gas attack in Tokyo. Certainly they were all terrorists,
but were they representatives of Christianity, Hinduism or Buddhism? No
religion allows for such unjust violence.

FACTORS INFLUENCING TERRORISM AND POSSIBLE CAUSES

It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to fully elucidate the causes of

terrorism. This is because of the complex and multidimensional nature
of terrorism. Certain generalities can, however, be made. Terrorism results
from what can be characterized as ‘the battered peoples’ syndrome. This
may be a manifestation of state action or inaction, involve religious
fanatics or people engaged in the fight for national liberation, inter or
intraethnic conflicts, response to occupation, world domination and
imperialism and globalization.

WESTERN IMPERIALISM

The first half of the twentieth century was an era of turmoil with about
half the world’s population under alien rule. Britain and France and the
Dutch were the main three worldwide empires during the 1900s and in
that order. The British empire controlled over 350 million people, the
French about 56 million and the Dutch 35 million people. The US was
the most rapidly expanding empire with 10 million people. In 1898 most
of the US assets were in the form of naval bases on the continent of North
America. In return for these bases the inhabitants were to be provided
with statehood and US citizenship. After the war with Spain in 1898,
Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines were also added on to this list.
Hawaii and Wake Island were then annexed and partial control over
Samoa was also established. US also took control of the Panama Canal
Zone in 1903 and bought the Virgin Islands from Denmark for $25
million. The scramble for control of land, shipping lanes, oil and other
natural resources was on. With the advent of the 1900s, most of Africa,
Islam, Terrorism and the New World Order 101

Southeast Asia and the Pacific were divided up into colonies, protector-
ates, and spheres of influence. Effective control was maintained through
military conquest and punitive measures and rewards. Suffice it to say that
the world was divided between different masters and in different ways.
Western imperialism was and is based on world domination to ensure
the following: new markets, access to natural resources, secure and safe
routes to colonies in the Middle East, Africa, India and East Asia. With
the discovery of oil, this compulsion for control became even more vital.
The policy has been to install and support friendly governments that are
almost always oppressive of their own people. The idea is to make these
countries dependent on oil sales and import of western products. The
wealth that the oil sales bring to these countries generally go into the
coffers of the royal princes and the elite, rarely trickling down to the
general public. The west’s expenditure on the procurement of oil is then
recovered many times over by export of western products especially arms
and ammunition.
Like the ‘Islamic’ terrorists who use Islam for their nefarious activities,
the west uses democracy as a ploy to impose its domination all over the
world. It is, however, not democracy that they are interested in, it is
control. Visualize what would happen if Saudi Arabia becomes a democ-
racy and after a national referendum decides that they will sell only a
fraction of their oil and that too only to their neighbouring Arab countries.
Chances are that the western governments would not accept this kind of
democracy. A dictatorship or a monarchy (both of which is in direct
violation of Islamic laws) that will guarantee oil supplies will certainly be
preferable to a democracy that does not give such a guarantee. A repres-
sive government in Saudi Arabia is thus being kept in power despite the
fact that the only freedom that exists there is confined to the members of
the ‘royal’ family. In 1956 Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh of Iran
was assassinated by the CIA and replaced by Raza Shah Pehlavi. To protect
the west’s economic interest, Mossadegh, who was about to nationalize
the Iranian oil industry, had to be eliminated and a puppet installed in his
place. In direct contrast to this, when people voted to elect representative
governments in Turkey and Algeria, democracy was nipped in the bud by
western pressure. The Refah party and the Islamic Front were banned
because of the fear of Islamic fundamentalism. No consideration was
given to the fact that if people had the power to vote any particular party
in, they would also have had the power to vote them out. At the least, it
would have perhaps prevented the killing and turmoil that followed in
Algeria and still continues as a result of this unjustified interference.
102 Jawaid Quddus

During 1948 nearly 800,000 Arabs were expelled from Israel following
the massacre in April of that year of over 250 Arab villagers at Deir Yasin
by Irgun terrorists under Menachem Begin. These refugees, who now
number several millions, have had all their land confiscated and handed
over to Jewish settlers. Israel furthermore, has not restricted itself to the
territories that were legally sanctioned by the UN. After the 1967 war
Israel annexed the West Bank of Jordan, the Golan Heights and started
a massive settlement plan. In addition, in the 1970s it took over the
control of southern Lebanon up to the Littani River, an area always
considered by the Zionists as belonging to them. The attempt to create
a Jewish state and with total disregard for the human rights of the
Palestinians has resulted in most of the terrorism that plagues the world
today. While the west has no problems in dealing with the Begin, or in
dealing with Sharon, the mastermind behind the Shatilla and Sabra
refugee camp massacres, or in condemning Palestinian terrorism, they
generally look the other way when Palestinian homes are bulldozed and
Jewish settlements built in their place. The rhetoric has always been
that ‘the Palestinian terrorists kill innocent people, the Israelis only kill
terrorists’.
Osama bin Laden was a CIA front man during the Russian occupation
of Afghanistan. The Taliban was intially allied with the US and the other
western powers and so was Saddam Hussein. The west continued sup-
plying Saddam Hussein with arms and ammunition despite the well
known fact that Saddam had gassed hundreds of innocent Kurdish vil-
lagers opposed to his regime. The reasons as to why he had to be stopped
so suddenly for attacking Kuwait are not clear. Hussein had fought with
Iran for almost a decade without any effort by anyone to stop this war,
not by the US, by the British, or even by the UN. There was no talk of
taking him out then, possibly because he was killing the Iranians or
perhaps the west needed the oil that they could not get from Iran any
longer. US, British and soldiers from other freedom loving countries died
defending Kuwait and ensuring that a despot leader (similar to Saddam)
remains in power in Kuwait. Western economic interests superceded the
rights of almost a million children who died as a result of the decade-old
embargo of Iraq. This in addition to all the innocent Iraqis killed in the
two Gulf wars.
A situation analogous to that in Iraq is going on in Afghanistan as well.
Both countries are under ‘friendly’ occupation, but without freedom for
its citizens. Karzai has received a minuscule fraction of the funds that he
was promised for reconstruction of Afghanistan. Not only that, while he
Islam, Terrorism and the New World Order 103

was in the US, the Congress rebuked him when he tried to remind them
of this. Just like the Palestinians and the Iraqis, the Afghani people are
angry, hungry, and desperate. Karzai only controls a very small portion
of Afghan territory, the tribal lords control the rest. Across the border
in Pakistan, President Pervez Musharraf gets $3 billion for his cooperation
in the fight against Al Qaeda. The fact that he overthrew an elected
government in Pakistan by force, jailed or exiled his opponents and has
introduced a system of government whereby his rule is assured for a long
time to come, has been brushed aside.

GLOBALIZATION

Western imperialism in conjunction with globalization is creating global

economic systems not only favouring a few core states but also being
controlled by them. Opponents of globalization believe, and with some
justification, that globalization is nothing but imperialism in a different
context. Although the full impact of globalization is still to be felt, a recent
analysis by Mark Wiesbrot and his colleagues, indicates that the effect of
globalization has generally been negative. All parameters studied includ-
ing economic growth, income, child mortality, progress in health as well
as life expectancy have been significantly reduced.
The worst sufferers have been farmers. The WTO, under the direct
control of the west, mandates that poor countries must open their
agriculture markets to rich countries and cut support to farmers. This has
resulted in many farmers going out of business, some even committing
suicide. It also allows the multinational agriculture companies to patent
plant varieties or genetic sequences of animals. This policy prevents the
poorer countries from having control over their own products. An
example would be the patent by RiceTec on basmati rice. The story is
similar for other commodities such as diary products, wheat, sugar, soya,
maize, and coffee. In addition to agriculture, small business owners are
also rapidly losing their business to multinational companies because of
price fixing. The multinational companies can pick up commodities
from any part of the world and sell them at a much lower rate than
the indigenous business owners. Thus globalization generally benefits the
rich, the sophisticated, the educated and those well connected at the
expense of the poor. This unbalanced economic reality is polarizing
society with the potential to cause great social upheaval around the
world. Globalization in the words of Akindele et al. ‘is the final conquest
104 Jawaid Quddus

of capital over the rest of the world’ and because of the ‘lopsidedness in
the rules of the game therein, cannot benefit Africa and her people. This
is so and would continue to be so because globalization is a new order
of marginalization and recolonization in a neo-neo-collonial fashion’
(2002).

RELIGIOUS TERRORISM

There is no such thing as religious terrorism although we have seen time

and again religion being used for terrorism. The fact that criminals have
hijacked religion is apparent, yet we continue to believe in the fallacy of
religious terrorism. The so called ‘religious’ terrorists, in their blind quest
to further their cause, go against and disregard the teachings of the
religion they claim to uphold. Some of them are common criminals who
will use any opportunity to enrich themselves, others imbibed with re-
ligious fervour become criminals in the process. For most, the end justifies
the means and morality, ethics, and religious edicts cease to have any
meaning. This is what we see in Palestine, in Kashmir, Pakistan, Chechnya
and in other parts of the world.
The crusaders, in their attempt to liberate the Holy Land, were
involved in brutal massacres of the Muslims and Jews and in ransacking
Solomon’s Temple in Jerusalem. They were not following any Christian
laws from the Bible. The Protestant Ulster Freedom Fighters or the Ulster
Volunteer Force involved in the fight for dominance with the Catholics
in Ireland are not following any Christian laws. And neither are the
Catholics! In the US, the white supremacist militia groups and hate
groups such as the Christian Patriot paramilitary groups are not uphold-
ing the banner of Christianity high, they are actually insulting it. The
assassin of Yitzhak Rabin who belonged to an ultra-orthodox Jewish sect
claimed that his orders to kill Rabin came ‘from God’. This terrorist act
cannot be in compliance with the laws of Judaism. The Taliban who
destroyed the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan and the Hindutva
Taliban who destroyed the Babri Masjid are certainly terrorists, but not
religious terrorists. In Gujarat, the recent pogrom against the Muslim
population, sponsored and abetted by the state government and white-
washed by the central government can be classified as state terrorism
but certainly cannot be defined as religious terrorism. As already
discussed, the suicide bombers and other terrorists in Palestine, Kashmir,
Islam, Terrorism and the New World Order 105

Pakistan, Chechnya and elsewhere are in not fighting a jehad as defined

by Islamic laws.

CONCLUSIONS

There is a worldwide crisis perception regarding Islam. It is incumbent

upon Muslims to convince the world that Islam is not the domain of the
few who indulge in violent acts against innocent people, foreign embas-
sies, diplomats and non-Muslims. They can do so by countering the
media’s projection of Islam and by living a life that is in agreement with
the advice of the Prophet (PBUH): ‘Three kinds of people destroy Islam,
the ill-behaviour of a scholar, the polemics of a hypocrite in the Quran
and misleading Imams’ (al-Firabi, Sifat an-Nifaq).
When Europe was in its mediaeval state, Islam thrived as the most
advanced civilization with the exception of China and India. The Mus-
lims excelled in the arts and science. They were among the first to
discover, expand on, and extend the frontiers of science and mathematics
to areas beyond what had been achieved by the Indians, Chinese, and
the Greeks. Muhammad Bin Musa Al-Khwarizimi for example, expanded
the knowledge of Arithmetic into Algebra. Girard of Cremona translated
Khwarizimi’s thesis into Latin. European universities until the sixteenth
century used this translated version of Khwarizimi’s thesis as their
main mathematical text book. Similarly, advances in areas of chemical
research (Jabir Ibd Haiyan), physics and trigonometry (Ibn Haytham),
botany (Ibn al-Baitar), anatomy (AbdAl-Malik Ibn QuraibAl-Asmai)
revolutionized the world of science and critical thinking. The Umayyad
Caliph Al-Wahad established the first Medical School in Damscus in
A.D. 706. Tipu Sultan (1783–99) invented and designed the first (war)
rockets, two of them on display at the Woolwich Museum of Artillery in
London. In addition to advancements in science, the Muslims also ex-
celled in architecture and art, the examples of which can be seen all over
the world and exemplified in the Taj Mahal and the Humzanamah.
In the words of Robert Briffault, physician and poet laureate of England:
‘It is highly probable that but for the Arabs, modern European civilization
would never have arisen at all; it is absolutely certain that but for them,
it would not have assumed that character which has enabled it to tran-
scend all previous phases of evolution’ (1919).
106 Jawaid Quddus

The decay of the Muslim ummah is a consequence of the Muslims

having abandoned the path of true religion. This was the apparent reason
for the decline of the Ottoman empire. Since then, despotic leaders or
monarchs are ruling most of the Muslim land, determined to stay in power
at the expense of the ummah. The legacy of the colonial and post-colonial
policies of the US and the Europeans in supporting such unrepresentative
governments has resulted in considerable anger against the west. The
blind support for Israeli occupation has not helped as well. Some of this
anger has been channelled by vested interests such as the Hamas or the
Al Qaeda or the Hezbullah for jehad against the oppressors. Left in the
lurch are the innocent civilians who are being decimated by the terrorists
as well as by the west’s campaign against the terrorists. This vicious cycle
is destined to create more terrorists, not less. Considering the fact that
the technology for building weapons of mass destruction is easy to come
by, the consequence of not providing aggrieved populations with a way
out can be disastrous.
The world of Islam is in turmoil today. Muslims should look within
and take concrete steps to create a society consistent with the moralistic
values of Islam. Blaming others will not solve problems, nor will violence.
They should strive for a society that is as far removed from jahiliah as
possible. It is jahiliah that is the root cause of the violence. Jehad should
be against illiteracy, against poverty, against subjugation of women, against
lack of health facilities, lack of schools and educated mullahs and for a
more democratic mode of discourse. Muslim youth should be inspired to
shun fundamental values (not to be confused with Islam), engage in social
work and in nation building. Additionally, there should be unity of
purpose among Muslims to prevent the radical Islamists from hijacking
Islam. All this and much more can be done if a more democratic society
with emphasis on equality for all, modern education, removal of poverty,
hunger and freedom is put in place. How this can be done without
clashing with the powerful western countries in control of the despotic
rulers worldwide is anybody’s guess. ‘Islamic’ monarchs and emirs will
certainly not give up their thrones simply because monarchy is prohibited
in Islam. In addition, unjustified bias by governments who are subjugating
a particular ethnic/religious group and subjecting them to violence and
discrimination as is happening in India, Bangladesh or Pakistan cannot
be resolved without their being a change in heart. What is needed is a
commitment to justice and rule of law. Failing this terrorism will continue
as long as tyranny continues.
Islam, Terrorism and the New World Order 107

REFERENCES

Akindele, S.T., T.O. Gidado and O.R. Olaopa, ‘Globalization, Its Implications and
Consequences for Africa’, Globalization, vol. 2, no. 1 (2002). Available online
at http://globalization.icaap.org/content/v2.1/01_akindele_etal.html
Briffault, Robert, The Making of Humanity (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd,
1919).
Eaton, Richard M., ‘Temple desecration in pre-modern India’, Frontline, vol. 17,
nos 25 and 26 (2000 and 2001).
Gaurav Gatha for Class IV (RSS Shishu Mandirs).
Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
‘In the Name of History: Examples from Hindutva-inspired School Books in India’,
South Asia Documents Online at http://www.indowindow.com/akhbar
Itihaas Gaa Raha Hai for Std V (RSS Shishu Mandirs).
Lewis, Bernard, Islam and the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
Mandar, Harsh, ‘Counterfeit Peace: The Settled Injustices in Gujarat’, The Times of
India, 17 July 2003.
Mathur, Somesh K., ‘Globalization and Development: Some Issues and Empirical
Facts’, 2002. Available online at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/
developmentpaper.html
Maududi, Abul A., Human Rights in Islam (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1983).
Pointing, Clive, The 20th Century: A World History (New York: Henry Holtan Com-
pany, 1999).
Punyani, Ram, Communal Politics: Facts versus Myths (New Delhi: Sage Publications,
2003).
Varshney, Ashutosh, Ethnic Conflit, 2nd. Edition (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 2003).
‘We Have No Orders to save You’. State Participation and Complicity in Communal
Violence in Gujarat’, Human Rights Watch Publication (April) 2002, vol. 14,
no. 3(C). Available online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/india/gujarat.pdf
Weisbrot, Mark, ‘The Score Card of Globalization 1980–2000’. Center for Economic
and Policy Research, 2001. Available online at http://www.cepr.net/globaliza-
tion/scorecard_on_globalization.htm
Zahoor, Akram, Muslim History: 570–1950 C.E. (Gaithersburg: ZMD Corporation,
2000).
—–———, Muslims In The Indian Subcontinent (Gaithersburg: ZMD Corporation,
2000).
 SYNCRETISM AND COMMUNAL
HARMONY IN BENGAL 5
J.J. ROY BURMAN

I
n India communal riots between Hindus and Muslims are a common
phenomenon. According to some Muslim leaders, about 3,000 riots
take place annually in different parts of the country. But the figure
can be interpreted in another way. In a country of about 1,000 million
people of which Muslims comprise arond 12 per cent, the figure of 3,000
skirmishes rather seems insignificant. More importantly, the Hindu–
Muslim communal conflagrations are very rare in the rural areas. It is
mainly in the towns and cities with large number of migrant Muslim
workers and petty business communities that the communal tensions
reign high. Religious laxity, close economic ties and interdependence are
often ascribed to the communal amity. There is another view that inter-
religious exchanges and composite culture at the grass roots and even at
higher echelons provide a basis for harmonious living in India. In the case
of West Bengal this is even more effective. The state has very few records
of communal conflagrations compared to other states.
Although composite culture is quite an important feature in India
portraying a synthesis of Hindustani and Islamic music, dance, art and
language, the eclecticism is confined mainly to the elements evident in
North India and Pakistan. Besides, to brand something Islamic is a
misnomer, since what is termed as Islamic basically refers to the cultural
traits of Central and West Asia. Roots of these lie in the pre-Islamic age.
It is usually ignored that majority of the Muslims of the world live in South
and Southeast Asia and that they have cultural elements significantly
different from Central and West Asia. The Manipuri Muslims, for in-
stance, unlike the Muslims of Saudi Arabia, do not indulge in parallel
Syncretism and Communal Harmony in Bengal 109

cousin marriage. The Mappillas of Kerala follow the rule of matrilineal

descent unlike the Muslims of Central Asia.
According to certain quarters (Roy Burman 2002), it is the syncretism
between Hindu and Muslim religions that play a crucial role in maintain-
ing communal amity at the grass roots. The phenomenon of syncretism
refers to an age-old social fact which received little attention in the realms
of anthropology or sociology. It conveys the fusion or blending of religions
by identification of gods, taking over observances, or selection of what-
ever seems best in each other. Often it relates to juxtaposition of two
religions as well. The Dictionary of Religion (1944) defines syncretism as
the process of amalgamation of conflicting or at least different parts or
principles of cultures, more specifically assimilation of foreign groups. The
foreign elements disappear as psychological and cultural entities of the
other majorities enter into the minority, and the majority adopts both
minority individuals and a selection of their cultural traits. This conveys
certain elements of power dynamics. The definition provided by the
Oxford English Dictionary makes this amply clear, ‘An attempt to sink
differences and effect union between sects of philosophical schools—
Thus it conveys strategy to contain conflict and promote tolerance.’ Asad
(1983) tries to link syncretism to the growth of the concept of ‘natural
religion’—a belief in and worship of a supernatural power which is found
among all human beings.

THE CONCEPT OF ISLAM

When dealing with the Hindu–Muslim syncretism, it is imperative that

we briefly touch upon the concept of Islam and Hinduism. Steatite (as
cited by Roy Burman 2000) states that, ‘Essential dogma of Islam is belief
in the absolute unity of Allah, the creator of the world, who neither begot
nor was begotten and whom nothing resembles. Allah causes all actions
of men as well as every happening in the world according to his eternal
predestination. At the same time men are capable of free actions, for
which they are rewarded or punished. Among the prophets accredited by
miracles the last and most eminent was Muhammad.’ Trimingham (1971)
and Ahmad (1992) state that Islamic society is extremely varied and it
has different ways in different parts of the Muslim world.
Lokhandwalla (1987, pp. 104–6) states that Islam itself is highly
syncretic, ‘In the early phase of Islam, local cultural elements of Arabic
110 J.J. Roy Burman

tribal mores were deliberately integrated with elements derived from the
Judaic and Christian traditions.’ He also avers that at the theological level
there were regional differences, however slight they might be, and each
region had its own authoritative commentaries of the Quran, books on
traditions of the Prophet and authoritative legal compendium.
Miller (2000) similarly states that Islamic practices are attuned to the
local cultures and traditions, more than 80 per cent of the Muslims
inhabit different parts of the world outside the Arab region. He avers that
though Islam is proclaimed to be monotheistic, faith on other supernat-
ural powers—angels and evil spirits—is very common. In fact, Islam has
incorporated many of the pre-Islamic traits of Arabia. Prophet Muhammad
himself did not destroy the Kaaba, a pre-Islamic shrine in Mecca; rather
he cleansed it. The pilgrims of Haj also kiss the black stone (a meteorite),
another pre-Islamic shrine, placed next to the Kaaba. They also pelt
pebbles seven times at the three stone structures representing the devils,
located at Mina near Mecca. Male circumcision among the Muslims is
again a carry over from the pre-Islamic ritual and so are the animal
sacrifice rituals that we see today. Lewis (1984) too has shown many of
the pre-Islam tribal traits evident among the Muslim tribes of Somalia.

THE CONCEPT OF HINDUISM

Similarly, with regard to Hinduism it must be stated that the term Hindu
is a misnomer. Jawaharlal Nehru realized this and stated that Hinduism
is vague, amorphous, many-sided, devoting various things to various men.
It is hardly possible to define it. Unlike Islam, Hinduism is restricted
mainly to India. Hinduism prevails in countries like Nepal, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Java, Sumatra, and Bangladesh. In Nepal Hinduism mixes with
Buddhism. The Newar and Tamang communities are two good examples
of this. In Southeast Asia, the people have their own versions of the
Ramayana.
Habib (1999) states, ‘Hinduism, just like the name “Hind”, is an
entirely Iranian word. The style of writing “Hinduism”, as if it is a Sanskrit
word meaning “land of Hindus” is a modern invention; the word in this
form is unknown to classical Sanskrit. It was taken from the Iranians by
the Arabs and Muslims in general, among whom upto the time of Albaruni
there was little reason to distinguish between those who were Indians, and
those who, besides being Indians, followed religious sects other than
Syncretism and Communal Harmony in Bengal 111

Islam. Once the Muslims established themselves in large parts of India,

especially from the 13th century onwards, the latter restrictive meaning
of the word began to predeterminate and “Hindu” assumed a religious
colour. But by the Hindus themselves the name was not accepted before
the latter half of 14th century, when the Vijaynagar ruler and, later, the
ruler of Mewar are found styling themselves “Hindu” sultans.’
Frykenberg (1997, p. 83) strongly refutes the existence of an all India
character of Hinduism, ‘There has never been any such a thing as a single
“Hinduism” or any single “Hindu community” for all India.’ Nor for that
matter, can one find any such thing as a single ‘Hindu’ or ‘Hindu com-
munity’ for any one sociocultural region of the continent. Furthermore,
there has never been any one religion—nor even one system of religions—
to which the term ‘Hindu’ can accurately be applied. Frykenberg identifies
many forms of Hinduism, such as ‘Popular Hinduism’. ‘Temple Hinduism’,
‘Bhakti Hinduism’, ‘Village Hinduism’ and ‘Tribal Hinduism’.
Frykenberg, taking a cue from Romila Thapar, further states that
modern Hinduism is a form of corporate and organized ‘syndicated’
religion which, for example in South India, grew during the colonial
period through the manipulation of the influential Brahmins and other
upper caste Hindus. The government in Madras too facilitated this
process. Importantly, many of the Dalit castes in Madras were opposed
to the idea of devolving power to the Brahmins and high castes non-
Brahmins. Thapar (1997) states that the present politicians using the
Hindu card are trying to project Hinduism in the lines of Islam and
Christianity and proselytizing the so-called backward classes—the Dalits
and the Scheduled Tribes. The point of reference of this brand of Hin-
duism is the Brahminical Hinduism. She calls it ‘Syndicated Hinduism’.
Rasheeduddin Khan (1987) considers the notion of Hindu religion a
misnomer. According to him, the term includes people of different reli-
gious ways which ‘gives Hinduism a flexibility and resilience and a trad-
ition base wide enough to cover the syndrome of Indian culture. Hinduism’s
religious content has been generally referred to as Brahminism, while the
term Hindu which was used by the ancient Persians, Greeks and later by
the Arabs and the central Asia people, referred essentially to the ethnic
geographic identity of inhabitants in and around Indus valley.’ Khan
further states that the term Hindu does not occur at all in our ancient
literature, the first reference of it being in a tantrik book of the eighth
century.
Stietencron (1997) views that the notion of Hinduism is a western
construct. During the period of renaissance in the fifteenth century when
112 J.J. Roy Burman

the Christian missionaries became a part of colonial expansion, there grew

an interest to study the heathen ‘natural religions’ for the purpose of
conversion. The missionaries and the orientalists could not differentiate
the different forms of heathen religions in India and put them together.
Stietencron also states that the independent government of India, follow-
ing the administrative lead of the British colonial government, had lumped
various religions under the term of Hinduism. It was a negative culmin-
ation so that if one was not a Muslim or Christian, he/she had to be
enumerated as a Hindu in the Census.
Mohiuddin (1987) writes that the British as a part of their divide and
rule policy distorted the facts and created new identities, ‘Before the
advent of the British, Indian rulers were not designated denominationally
as Hindus or Muslims but ethnically as Cholas, Chalukyas, Rajputs or as
Pathans, Turks, Mughals. James Mill was the first British writer of Indian
history, and in his book History of British India, he periodized Indian
history in terms region—the Hindu period, the Muslim period and the
British period.’
Partha Chatterjee (1995) similarly views Hinduism as a modern de-
velopment but, in contrast to Stietencron, argues that the ‘Hindu’ term
was a nationalist construct. The nationalism which emerged in India was
a Hindu nationalism. ‘The idea that “Indian nationalism” is synonymous
with “Hindu nationalism”. . . . Its appeal is not religious but political . . . .
In the present context the majority politics of Hindu nationalists is
presenting Hinduism in an altered manner.’
Sontheimer (1995) considers that folk religion is widely prevalent in
rural India. But the modern Hindus would not accept it as Hinduism. He
takes the example of jatra, which is an annual feature in many rural areas
of Maharashtra. These jatras take place according to the agricultural cycles
and not according to the Brahminical calendar of rituals. Many jatras end
with a procession by the god who, with the help of a medium, declares
the prospects for rains and harvest, formerly the possibility of wars.
Kancha Illaiah (1996) presents a subaltern, Dalitbahujan view on
Hinduism. He states that his parents belonged to the Kumatoolu Banjaras.
They shared the Peerila festival (Muharram) equally with the Turukoolus
(Muslims). But today with the rise of Hindutva, they are suddenly being
told that they are Hindus. What Illaiah is trying to convey is that the
majority of the Dalitbahujan peoples Scheduled Castes (SC), Other
Backward Classes (OBC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST)—just by worship-
ping stone images do not become Hindus though they have been drawn
into the jajmani system.
Syncretism and Communal Harmony in Bengal 113

In India the element of syncretism is quite old and deeply entrenched.

Kabir Panthi is the name of an old sect of followers of Sant Kabir. Kabir
is believed to have been born to a Hindu family and raised by a Muslim
weaver. Kabir roamed among the people and preached the philosophy of
life indicating the similarities in all religions. He spread the message of
communal harmony among the masses. Hindus and Muslims both con-
sidered Kabir to belong to their religion.
Apart from the Kabir Panthi, India witnessed the emergence of a major
syncretic religion—the Sikh religion. Guru Nanak, the founder of this
religion was maimed by the Hindu–Muslim conflicts; he started revering
and taking cues from both the religions and thus evolved the Sikh
religion.
Mohiuddin (1987) states that Islam could gain its footing in India in
no time, mainly due to the influence of the Sufi saints. The saints led a
simple life and adopted a very liberal form of Islam. ‘They were not very
particular about formal prayers and fasting, duties that are regarded as
essential in Islam. They believed in “wahdut-ul-wajood” (A sort of pan-
theism) and in “sulhe-kul” (Peace with all). Sufism came to India from
Iran and was greatly influenced by Buddhism, Vedanta and Yoga.’ Ashgar
Ali Engineer too spoke of Islam in India similarly and stated that Sufi
saints were assimilative rather than rejectionists. Thus many of the Vedantic
traditions representing different visions of life tended to become part of
Indian Islam (Khizer 1990).
The numerous Sufi orders, some localized and some with wide net-
works, flourished between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries by adopting
the indigenous cultures and made a very significant impact on the society.
The Sufi cults revolving around the pirs or saints were able to garner
support from both the rulers and the populace. The Sufi tombs where the
annual urs or the death ceremonies of the founding pir was performed
became major social and political institutions.
M.S. Gore (1995) states in this regard that both Islam and the Bhakti
tradition played a symbiotic role for each other:

Islam seems to have strengthened the de-ritualizing and egalitarian trends

in Hinduism while Hindu philosophy seems to have strengthened the
mystical spiritual strain in Muslim religious thought. It could not be an
accident that during the long period of Muslim rule the Bhakti movement
gathered considerable following in Islam. Neither of these variants in the
two religions could be said to owe its origin to the other. . . . The Bhakti
movement, which indirectly weakened the hold of the priesthood and de-
emphasized religious ritual and status hierarchy among the followers, must
114 J.J. Roy Burman

have found strength in the context of Islam and Muslim dominance.

Similarly the mystic and devotional strain in Islam must have found a
responsive strain among Indian Muslims. The saints of the Bhakti move-
ment gathered considerable following among the middle and lower castes
in the Deccan and in north between the 12th and the 16th centuries which
was the major period of strong Muslim dominance. This was also the period
of the spread of Sufism in India through the teachings of Chisti saints.

In India, the Hindu–Muslim syncretic trends were not limited only

to Sufism and Bhakti. There were some other sects also which fully
adopted the local systems into their fold. The Ismailis are one such sect.
Lokhandwalla (1987) states:

The Ismailis without taking recourse to political apologies or excuses,

accepting the truth of every religion and interpreting Islam as the latest
efforts to substantiate, support and revitalize the ancient truth that had
been imparted to humanity. They stressed that every community and
every book had its own share of truth and no book of religion should be
ignored for one’s search of truth and wisdom . . . . It was mainly the Khoja
branch of Ismaili religion that used the eclectic tradition of Islam to
understand the Indian ethos, attitude and tradition. Islamic concepts were
explained as a continuation of the old ancient faith . . . . Many parallels
were drawn between Islamic personalities and Hindu pantheon. The word
‘Om’ written in Sanskrit was equated with ‘Ali’ written in Arabic, and the
similarity between the two was stressed to convey the correspondence and
resemblance of the two faiths. The Hindu pantheon of nine avatars was
accepted readily and the tenth, the Kalkai avatar, which is awaited, was
claimed to have appeared in Arabia. The word Kalkai was transferred to
‘Nakalanki’ meaning spotless, pure. To correspond their belief of Imam
and Prophet being sinless and pure (mas’um) the Quran was preferred as
Atharva Veda and the five Pandavas were equated with five pure bodies
(panjatan). Muhammad was at times placed parallel to Mahadev, and Ali
seen as Vishnu.

SYNCRETISM IN BENGAL
Bengal saw the largest concentration of Muslims in the Indian subcon-
tinent (about 34 million in 1980) and their present aggregate in undivided
Bengal (Bangladesh and West Bengal taken together) makes them the
second largest Muslim population (about 100 million) after Indonesia
(140 million). In Bengal syncretism between Hinduism and Islam appears
almost ubiquitious. The first traces of syncretism can be traced here
Syncretism and Communal Harmony in Bengal 115

from the very inception of Muslim rule in the region since the thirteenth
century.
The first contact between Muslims and Bengal are recorded since the
eighth century with the coming of the Arab merchants. But the first
Muslim rule was started with the reign of Bakhtiar Khilji in 1204. The
rule continued till 1765 when Siraj-ud-daulah was defeated at the battle
of Plassy. The rule continued for 562 years. The syncretic trend could
become possible mainly due to the entry of Sufism in every nook and
corner of the region. Sheikh remarks that Sufism entered not only into
big cities and townships but also to villages and established their settle-
ments. The specific structure of Bengali society marked by extreme
poverty stricken untouchable castes, the diminishing role of Buddhism
and downfall of maritime trade, as well as the rise of Muslim power were
responsible for this.
The entry of Islam to Bengal was greatly aided by the Sufi saints
belonging to different family orders, namely Quaderia, Chistia, Naqshbandi,
Shattari, Madari, and Qualandari. It is a fact that even the high-caste
Bengalis of the region showed remarkable receptivity to Sufism and
praised the saints highly in their religious lores. Many have written about
the rapprochment to the Muslims during the early proliferation of Islamic
power in Bengal in forms, ceremonies, rites and usages. The religious
mantras of Satyanarayan include praising of the Satya Pir. Satyanarayan
puja is done more particularly to ensure well being of the villagers.
According to history, Raja Ganesh of Gaur Pandua (near Malda) was
strongly against the Islamic forces and is believed to have created diffi-
culties for the Sufi saints. But his son, Sultan Jal al-adin, adopted Islam
and patronized the Sufi order, which was actively involved in proselytization.
He became closely associated with Pandua’s leading Chisti saint, Sheikh
Nur Qutub-I-Alam. Ever since a number of Sufi saints from Iraq, Iran,
Arabia and West Asia have entered Bengal and spread the message of
Islam. But the Sufi saints in the process of their mission adopted a very
liberal and dynamic approach whereby they did not find anything wrong
in permitting the converts to retain many of their original cultural ele-
ments. This approach of the Sufis led to a rapid spread of their influence
even among the non-converted Hindu population. No wonder that
Pirism became widely accepted in Bengali society, Hindu or Muslim.
Among the Muslims this was possible particularly as the majority converts
adopted ‘Hanafi’ faith of the Sunni sect.
Apart from the liberal stance, Sufism also actively enjoined the
Vaishnavite movement, which was opposed to caste hierarchy in the
116 J.J. Roy Burman

Hindu society. According to Asim Roy (1983) many of the Muslim pada
composition strongly resemble those of Hindu Vaishnavites. Many such
Muslim authors were regarded as Vaishnavites themselves. According to
history many of the Muslim rulers also patronized Vaishnavite authors.
The Kayastha poet Maladhar Basu, for instance, is believed to have been
patronized by Sultan Rukn-al-Din Barbak (1459–74) for composing his
book Sri Krishnavijaya.
Though the Muslims entered Bengal around the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries, the Muslim rulers did not try to enforce Islam through
the might of the sword. In fact, the Mughals were altogether opposed to
any conversion. Eaton (2000) writes, ‘Islam Khan, the Mughal governor
in Bengal, is known to have discouraged the conversion of Bengali Hindus
and on one occasion he actually punished one of his officers for allowing
it to happen.’
Roy (1983) states that there were a number of factors due to which
Islam could become popular in Bengal. One of them is that a lot of
Buddhists embraced Islam due to relentless persecution by the Brahmins.
But he also cautions that it may not be the only factor for such large-
scale conversions. One also referred to the nebulous structure of the
rather recently introduced Hinduism in the region and the oppressive
caste system as well. The convert to Islam could not of course expect to
rank with the higher classes of the Mohammedans, but he would escape
the degradation which the caste system imposed on him.
Eaton (1994) points out a great paradox of Bengali history, namely that
although Muslim regimes had ruled Bengal since the early thirteenth
century, a noticeable community of Muslim cultivators did not emerge
there until the late sixteenth century, under a regime that did nothing
to encourage the conversion of Bengalis to Islam and in fact opposed such
conversions. First settlement of Muslim cultivators in the Dhaka region
was reported in 1599 at a time when the local zamindars were losing their
grip in favour of the Mughal imperial authorities. Muslim cultivators
gradually became more numerous in the Noakhali and Rangpur region
in the 1630s and 1660s respectively.
Eaton considers that the pirs or the saints played a very important role
in the colonization of these regions. They were the ones responsible for
recruiting the cultivators and controlling them through the religious tenor:

These pioneers played decisive roles in the religious development of the

region, since one of the conditions for obtaining a grant was to build on
the land a mosque or temple, to be supported in perpetuity out of the
Syncretism and Communal Harmony in Bengal 117

wealth produced on site. Grants made to Hindu institutions tended to

integrate local communities into a Hindu-ordered cultural universe, whereas
grants authorizing the establishment of mosques or shrines tended to
integrate such communities into an Islamic-ordered cultural universe.
Subsequent demographic patterns evolved from these earlier processes.
Since most pioneers were Muslims, however, mosques comprised the
majority of institutions established, with the result that the dominant
mode of piety that evolved on East Bengal’s economic frontier was Islamic.

The mosques, of course, lacked the size and structure of the West Asian
style. They were humble structures made of mud and bamboo thatching.
But many of the humble pioneers later acquired the status of powerful pirs.
While the pirs like Satya Pir, Manik Pir or Panch Pir are fictitious
mythical figures, there were others who gained the position of pirs due
to their extraordinary powers or the halo created around them. While
there are some living pirs, others are dead and their commemorates are
worshipped. We will be referring to some of the mythical pirs and those
who are considered to have been real figures.

SATYA PIR

The cult of Satya Pir is extremely popular in the whole of West Bengal.
Satya Pir is obviously a fictitious character and there are a number of
myths about him. Roy (1983) states, ‘The identity of Satya Pir seemed
rather obscure, indeed even more than others. Although a few shrines
bearing the name could be found, on examination of the relevant litera-
ture and tradition on the pir categorically rejects the historicity of the pir.
Some traditions quite arbitrarily linked Husain Shah, a fifteenth-century
sultan of Bengal, with the introduction of the cult.’ According to a myth
a Brahmin was advised by god appearing in the guise of a Muslim men-
dicant to worship Satya Pir. God then appeared to him in the form of
Krishna and again suggested he should worship the pir, and the Brahmin
was then convinced to do so.
According to another motif, a Hindu sea merchant and his son-in-law
were, despite their initial scant regard for Satya Pir, able to save their
entire fleet from a storm (due to the devotion of the daughter to Satya
Pir). Both these versions are considered to be part of a process of a higher
caste Hindu acceptance of the Satya Pir cult. Eaton (1994) writes on
the other hand that in early literature written in praise of Satya Pir, one
would note the impact of pirism on Hinduism. It portrays a folk society
118 J.J. Roy Burman

innocent of hardened communal boundaries and one that freely assimi-

lated a variety of beliefs and practices that were in the air in Bengal’s pre-
modern religious environment. Though the ambience has changed, the
contents have not made much significant change, particularly in the rural
areas. The credo of Satya Pir has now transcended into the faith of
Satyanarayan. One of the early verses of Satyanarayan’s ‘panchali’ (reli-
gious poetry) reads: Satyanarayan took the form of Satya Pir and solaced
a poor Brahmin beggar and asked him to pray to him seeking his desires.
But there was a face of uncertainty on the Brahmin’s face. Noticing him
the pir told him that there was no difference between Veda and Quran.
No wonder that the dargahs and mazars of Satya Pir are abundant all over
the state of West Bengal. There is a prominent dargah of his right on the
main road of Raja Bazar in the heart of Calcutta.

MANIK PIR

Quite like Satya Pir, another saint who is very commonly worshipped by
both the Hindus and Muslims is Manik Pir. He is considered to be a
guardian pir—protecting from sickness, protecting cattle, and ensuring
fertility. Muslim mendicants and village bards sing ballads glorifying the
pir. Manik Pir’s identity cannot be easily established. While sharing some
of the characteristics of the Hindu god Shiva, he also resembled
Gorakshanath. The linkage with Shiva is made because it is believed that
Manik Pir had visited Kalu Ghose’s house uttering ‘Vam’, as one does
in the worship of Shiva. Kalu’s mother gave him five coins in the name
of panch pirs, but the pir refused to accept it and asked for milk. But
she played a trick and Manik Pir in vengeance killed all the cattle and
the milkmaids. The lady then apologized to Manik Pir to retrieve all that
she lost.
The Hindu–Muslim syncretic ties and communal amity are manifest
best through the dargahs and mazars which are frequented by people of
both the faiths. Here we will describe a few of them.

GHUTIARI SHARIF: THE DARGAH OF GHAZI SAHEB

Given the ambience prevalent in Bengal, it is not surprising that the Sufi
saint Hazrat Ghazi Mubarak Ali Shah is so popular in the Sunderban
area and is commonly known as Ghazi Saheb among the people. He is
Syncretism and Communal Harmony in Bengal 119

commonly propitiated along with the cults of Bon Bibi and Shah Jungli
by the woodcutters and honey collectors of the region. The exact
antecedence of Ghazi Saheb is not known, but he is believed to have come
from Arabia and lived in the region some 300 years back. After his death
a dargah was built at Ghutiari Sharif.
Hazrat Ghazi is popularly known by various names like Ghazi Baba,
Barkhan Ghazi, Ghazi Saheb, Mubarak Shah Ghazi, etc. There are many
myths about Ghazi, but his war with Dakshin Ray—a forest deity—is
legendary. It is believed that the war between the two was over the
political control of the hitherto unpopulated forest region. In the fierce
war Ghazi killed over seven thousand tigers and at the end he beheaded
Dakshin Ray with his sword and gifted to Muhammad himself. But
Dakshin Ray too possessed supernatural powers. His head reverted to the
torso as many times as it was felled. The war led to severe misery of the
people and god descended in the shape of Paygambar (Prophet) and
Krishna and effected a truce between Ghazi Saheb and Dakshin Ray.
With the truce it was decided that Barkat Ghazi would possess the
southern Bhat coastal areas of Sunderbans and Dakshin Ray would rule
over the rest. Since then, the cult of Krishna-Paygambar too gained
popularity in the area.
What is apparent from the above is that syncretic religion in the area
has a distinctly political-economic overtone, and much of it can be traced
to the settlement history of Sunderbans where human habitation started
only in the nineteenth century because of the rapid clearance of the forests
by both Hindus and Muslims. Conflicts must have ensued between the
contending groups. But the harsh terrain, replete with fast moving rivers,
estuaries, creeks full of sharks and crocodiles, and deep thick forests and
marshes full of tigers certainly rendered it inhospitable for habitation. No
wonder this necessitated strong mutual cooperation between all and
sundry. Roy (1983) writes in this regard, ‘Taken together, the ferocity of
nature and the anarchical conditions in the active delta, aggravated the
conditions of institutional inadequacies in social and cultural terms,
focused on the dire need of some binding forces of authority, stability,
and assurance in a largely unstable physical and social situation. The
deified animistic spirits like tiger-god, the serpent-goddess, and the croco-
dile goddess found some psychological answers to the problems of the
peasants, the wood-cutters, the fishermen, and the boatmen of the delta.’
Besides, in an area devoid of centralized authority, mutual cooperation
culminated into a political system, which gave primacy to the moral
values and principles of reciprocity. This gains credence from the legend
120 J.J. Roy Burman

of the relationship that existed between Ghazi Saheb and Madan Roy
Choudhury, the zamindar of the area.
The legend states that once Madan Roy Chowdhury was summoned
by the Nawab of Dhaka called Murshid Kuli Khan as he was unable to
pay tax to the tune of Rs 303,000. But Madan Roy Choudhury had no
money to pay, and in that moment of crisis Ghazi Saheb helped him out
by entering into the court of the nawab in the form of a beetle and erasing
the old cash book. He, in fact, manipulated the records in such a manner
that the nawab had no option but to return a sum of half paisa to the
zamindar. As a mark of gratitude Madan Roy Choudhury gifted 1,356
bighas of land to Ghazi Saheb. He also assisted in the construction of the
dargah of Ghazi at Ghutiari Sharif. Besides, he constructed a number of
mazars of Ghazi Saheb in the vicinity wherever he owned landed property,
like the ones at Payali and Kurali villages. These mazars are supposed to
be commemorates of Ghazi Saheb as his ‘baithak khana’ or seats where
he had rested. In political realms, these suggest efforts made by the
zamindar to keep his subjects (both Hindu and Muslim peasants) in good
humour. Till now the first ‘sirni’—sweet offerings—are sent from the
descendants of Madan Roy Choudhury to the dargah of Ghazi Saheb at
the time of annual urs on 17 Ashar (30 June) when Amubachi mela is held.
People from far-flung places throng the dargah for paying their obei-
sance. Many also visit the shrine seeking boons and fulfil the mannat,
promises made at the time of seeking boons. The mannat can include
offering of sweets, fowls, or even symbolically floating infants in vessels
in the sacred pond adjoining the dargah (particularly after seeking boons
by barren women). Many devotees float flowers on clay plates in the pond.
Miniature terracotta horses are also sometimes offered as mannat. Dis-
gruntled people suffering from family feuds frequent the dargah. Even the
mentally challenged are brought to the shrine for a cure, particularly to
the mazar of Pagla Baba located within the dargah complex.

SYNCRETISM AND NATURE WORSHIP

In the Sunderbans, Bon Bibi (Bon means ‘forest’ in Bengali and ‘Bon Bibi’
means ‘goddess of the forest’) and Dakshin Ray are two popular syncretic
deities worshipped by both Hindu and Muslim woodcutters and hunters
before entering the forests. In many villages Bon Bibi has been trans-
formed into a tutelary deity. However, the images of the deity are of two
Syncretism and Communal Harmony in Bengal 121

kinds. In the Muslim dominated villages she wears a cap of herbs and
shrubs, knitted hair, necklace, kurta pyjamas and a saffron scarf. She also
wears socks and shoes. The deity invariably has a magic wand in her
hands. A cock or tiger is her carrier. In Hindu areas, the deity wears a
crown, necklaces and other ornaments. But she carries no magic wand.
Nature worship by both Hindus and Muslims is further evident in the
Ganga puja, whereby river Ganges is worshipped. In North Bengal both
Hindu and Muslim boatmen and fishermen perform the Ganga puja. This
again is a manifestation of attempts by the toiling masses to harness the
fury of nature as a whole community. On the day of the puja, the devotees
collectively float toy boats on the Ganges in the evening. Lamps are
kindled and placed in the boats.

HINDU–MUSLIM SYNCRETIC COMMUNITIES

Apart from the syncretic religious traits, there are syncretic communities
as well in West Bengal. The Bauls form an important community who
move around singing ballads. There have been many famous Bauls in the
past, but among them Lalan Fakir was most renowned. Not much is
known for certain about Lalan’s early life, but both Hindus and Muslims
claim him as belonging to their religion. Lalan did not appreciate when
anybody sought to learn about his caste and religion. On the basis of this
inquiry, Lalan framed a song for himself—Sab loke kay Lalan ki jat sangsare:

Everyone asks ‘Lalan what’s your religion in this world?’

Lalan replies, ‘How does religion look?’
I have never laid eyes on it.
Some wear malas (Hindu rosaries) around their necks,
some tabiz (Muslim rosaries), and so people say
they belong to different religions.
But do you bear the sign of your religion
when you come or when you go?

CONCLUSION

Though syncretic shrines are present all over West Bengal, they are to
be seen more in the central and southern parts of the state, both in rural
122 J.J. Roy Burman

and urban areas. In the northern districts of the state like Jalpaiguri and
Cooch Behar very few dargahs are seen both in the rural and urban areas.
This does not mean that North Bengal is any more communal than the
rest of the state. In fact, the area seems to be even more liberal as large
tracts of the region are inhabited by the Rajbansis, Rabhas and the Koch
people. They all are like tribals and were incorporated into the Brahminical
fold in a very loose way. They were not so much oppressed by the caste
Hindus. Eaton (1994) of course states that majority of the people pros-
elytized into Islam in the eastern parts of the region belonged to these
communities. It is difficult to be certain in this regard as most the area
he speaks of now is within Bangladesh.
Many different reasons may be attributed to the existence of Hindu–
Muslim syncretism. However, most significantly, it is perhaps due to the
lack of penetration of the state apparatus to the grassroots. After all, the
people of West Bengal mostly stay in rural areas and the rule of the
administration is only marginal. It is the customary laws which are much
more virile and effective. In places where there are no roads or effective
means of communication, people have to mainly survive on the basis of
their mutual cooperation. Religious exchanges among the toiling masses
are very common and the rural masses do not consider them exceptional.
When the pirs like Satya Pir and Manik Pir can be praised in the religious
texts—Laxmi Thakurer Panchali—which Hindu housewives recite every-
day, what more evidence of syncretism is required?

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Asad, T., ‘Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz’, Man
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Von Stietencron (eds), The Construction of Religious Traditions and National
Identity (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995).
Eaton, R.M., The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier 1204–1760 (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1994).
—–———, Essays on Islam and Indian History (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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Frykenberg, R.E., ‘The Emergence of Modern Hinduism’, in G.D. Sontheimer and
H. Kulke (eds), Hinduism Reconsidered (New Delhi: Manohar, 1997).
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Gellner, E., ‘Doctor and Saint’, in A.S. Ahmed and D.M. Hart (eds), Islam in Tribal
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(September–October 1999).
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Hart (eds), Islam in Tribal Societies: From the Atlas to Indus (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1984).
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(ed.), Composite Culture and National Integration (Shimla: Indian Institute of
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Roy Burman, J.J., ‘Hindu-Muslim Syncretic Trends in West Bengal’, Indian Journal of
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 RSS AND THE RAJ 6
SHAMSUL ISLAM

W
hat role the RSS played in the freedom movement since its
inception in 1925 was not debated much till the election of
an old and seasoned ‘Swayamsevak’ of RSS, Atal Behari
Vajpayee, as Prime Minister of India in 1999. In fact, the RSS itself never
claimed to have played any anti-colonial role as a thorough perusal of its
literature/documents would make out.1 This could not have been other-
wise as the RSS was ideologically averse to the whole concept of a fight
against the British rule in India. This was made clear by none other than
M.S. Golwalkar (Guruji) to whom the founder of the RSS, K.B. Hedgewar
(Doctorji), bequeathed the leadership (1940), and is till date regarded as
the philosopher and guide of RSS. While explaining the reasons for
staying aloof from the anti-British struggle and not espousing a nation-
alism with anti-British or anti-imperialist content, Golwalkar said: ‘The
theories of territorial nationalism and of common danger, which formed
the basis for our concept of nation, had deprived us of the positive and
inspiring content of our real Hindu Nationhood and made many of the
“freedom movements” virtually anti-British movements. Anti-Britishism
(sic.) was equated with patriotism and nationalism. This reactionary view

1
For instance RSS archives till quite recently had two small booklets titled RSS: A
Stooge of British (Bangalore: Jagarna Prakashana, 1972) and Rashtriya Andolan and
Sangh (New Delhi: Suruchi Prakashan, 2000) on the theme. Interestingly, in both the
booklets more than two-thirds of the space is devoted to the post-independence
incidents and there are only vague and unsubstantiated claims of participation in the
freedom movement.
RSS and the Raj 125

has had disastrous effects upon the entire course of the freedom move-
ment, its leaders and the common people.’2
Thus, according to Golwalkar anti-British patriotism and nationalism
were ‘reactionary’ in character which hindered the growth of ‘positive’
Hindu nationalism. Truly, the RSS as a vehicle of the resurgence of Hindu
nationalism could not be part of the freedom movement that aimed at
overthrowing the British raj.

NEED TO ‘MANUFACTURE’ ROLE IN THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT

However, with the ascendancy of RSS cadres as rulers of India for the
first time after independence, there arose a crucial problem of legitimacy
for them. India was being ruled by a group which did not share its anti-
imperialist and secular heritage. It needed to be ‘constructed’ at the
earliest and the process did not take long to start.
Erstwhile Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee issued a commemora-
tive postage stamp to mark the 110th birth anniversary of ‘freedom
fighter’ and founder of the RSS, Dr K.B. Hedgewar, on 18 March 1999
in New Delhi. It was the first instance since India’s independence that
a postage stamp was issued commemorating the birthday of the founder
of the RSS or any other leader of this organization. On this occasion, the
Prime Minister, while addressing a gathering mainly of RSS cadres, took
credit for the fact that by issuing the postage stamp his government had
corrected an injustice whereby the great freedom fighter and patriot
Dr Hedgewar was denied his due place in the history of independent
India. Rajendra Singh, the then chief of RSS, and Union Home Minister
L.K. Advani, too spoke on the occasion and described Dr Hedgewar as
a great revolutionary.3
The search for a honourable place for RSS in the freedom movement
also led to the release of a biography of K.B. Hedgewar4 by the Prime

2
M.S. Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts (Bangalore: Sahitya Sindhu Prakashana, 1996),
p. 138. This is a collection of writings/speeches of Golwalkar and is considered the
Gita of RSS cadres. The problem with this collection is that for most of the items no
source or date is given.
3
The Hindu, 19 March 1999.
4
Rakesh Sinha, Dr Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (New Delhi: Publications Division,
Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 2003). This biography in Hindi was released
under the series, Builders of India.
126 Shamsul Islam

Minister on 7 April 2003 in New Delhi in the presence of reigning RSS

head or Sarsangh-chalak, K.S. Sudarshan as the guest of honour and
Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, as the chief guest. Well aware of
the fact that it was an uphill task to establish the credentials of Hedgewar
as a great freedom fighter, Vajpayee admitted while releasing the biogra-
phy: ‘I would not blame the people for not knowing much about Dr
Hedgewar, even the Sangh swayamsevaks do not have much information.
Whatever information that have been churned out is only through critics,
which is negative and compromises with truth.’5 According to a report
in the RSS mouthpiece, Organizer, he went on to claim that, ‘Dr Hedgewar
knew only one language to deal with imperialism—that is struggle—
either through violence or through non-violence. In fighting imperialism,
Dr Hedgewar was completely devoted like a Yogi to the task of standing
the Sangh on the nationalist soil.’6 In order to push forward names of
Hedgewar and Golwalkar in the ‘honourable’ list of great freedom fighters,
a few weeks earlier a senior ideologue of RSS, D.B. Thengadi had refused
to accept the Padma Bhushan conferred by Government of India. In a
letter to the President of India he wrote that it would ‘be inappropriate
on my part to accept the award, so long as revered Dr Hedgewar and
revered Shri Guruji (Golwalkar) are not offered the “Bharat Ratna”’.7
This is not the place to go into the issue whether revolutionaries and
freedom fighters who challenged the might of the British rulers need the
honours of this government or for that matter any other government.
However, the fact of the matter is that the Prime Minister, the Home
Minister, and the RSS chief were talking dishonestly. They were trying to
pass off a pre-independence political trend represented by the RSS as a
legacy of the anti-colonial struggle, whereas in reality RSS was never part
of the anti-imperialist struggle. On the contrary, since its inception in 1925,
the RSS only tried to disrupt the united anti-imperialist struggle of the
Indian people against the British colonial rulers by inciting communalism.

WHAT DO THE RSS DOCUMENTS TELL?

The RSS claims to be the greatest embodiment of nationalism in the

country today. There has been a concerted attempt to market it as being

5
As quoted in Organizer, 20 April 2003, p. 7.
6
Ibid.
7
As quoted in Organizer, 2 March 2003, p. 3.
RSS and the Raj 127

synonymous with patriotism in India. It is also a fact, though, that the

claims of the RSS in this regard have always been challenged by individu-
als and organizations who were in the thick of the freedom movement.
There is no dearth of writings exposing the negative role of the RSS during
the freedom struggle. However, it has been attempted here to collect facts
of the freedom movement era from the documents of the RSS itself. It
has been the intention here that the documents of the RSS should be
allowed to speak for themselves. The findings are surely going to disil-
lusion those who believe that the RSS played any role in securing free-
dom. We will hear from the horse’s mouth that not only was a silence
maintained about the evils of foreign rule, but also that concerted at-
tempts were made to sabotage the fight against British imperialism.
In order to find out the truth hidden in the RSS documents, a method
of thematic scanning has been followed in which the available RSS
literature pertaining generally to the period of the freedom movement was
scrutinized keeping in view certain themes relevant for this study. For
instance, we looked for references where the RSS might have given a call
to the British rulers to leave India or supported the fight of the revolu-
tionaries against the British imperialists, or written something on events
which proved to be milestones in the history of the freedom struggle like
Jallianwala Bagh tragedy, martyrdom of Bhagat Singh, Rajguru, Sukhdev,
Chandershekhar Azad, Udham Singh and other revolutionaries. Through
thematic scanning attempts have been made to reveal the actual attitude
of RSS towards Khilafat Movement, Non-Cooperation Movement, Quit
India Movement, Royal Indian Navy Revolt and movement of Indian
National Army (INA) led by Subhas Chandra Bose. The final picture that
emerges from this exercise is presented below with astonishing results.

HEDGEWAR WENT TO JAIL AS A CONGRESSMAN

It is not generally known that the ‘contribution’ to the freedom struggle

for which the government led by Vajpayee honoured Dr Hedgewar was
made by him as a Congressman and not on any call of RSS. He went
to jail for the first time for giving an inflammatory speech in support of
the Khilafat Movement (1920–21), long before the establishment of RSS.
It is also a mystery why he went on to participate in the Khilafat
Movement. An RSS publication tells us, ‘Doctorji disapproved of Gandhiji’s
policy of launching the non-co-operation movement with Khilafat as its
128 Shamsul Islam

major plank. The Khilafat agitation aiming to restore the Caliphate in

Turkey, Doctorji argued, would only breed extra-territorial religious
fanaticism among the Muslims here. But he was not the one to stand
aloof as a passive spectator during a national struggle merely because it
did not come up to his expectations on all points.’8 It is interesting to
learn that a person like Hedgewar who brooked no compromise with his
principles went on to make inflammatory speeches in favour of the
Khilafat Movement!
He was subsequently sentenced to one year’s rigorous imprisonment.
There were two other significant incidents related to this episode that
need attention. First, he hired a well-known lawyer to defend himself,
thus openly violating the directive of Gandhi and the Congress that all
those caught while participating in this movement would not hire a lawyer
or offer any legal defence. Hedgewar, who is paraded as a strict disciplin-
arian, thus violated this important directive. This could be the outcome
of a feeling of cowardice but RSS has the following explanation for it:
‘Doctorji felt that no occasion should be missed to broadcast the message
of Independence. Accordingly he decided to engage a defense lawyer.’9
Second, despite a year’s imprisonment with hard labour in the Ajani Jail,
on the day of his release on 12 July 1922, ‘when he removed the prison
uniform and tried to wear his old cloths, his old shirt and coat felt too
tight! He had gained 25 pounds (+11 kilograms) in weight, in spite of
the rigours of the prison life.’1 0 This could happen probably because he
was very friendly with the British jailor. According to the publication of
the RSS, ‘When Doctorji entered the prison, the jailor Sir Jathar had been
newly appointed. And it was Doctorji who helped him to understand the
jail manual in detail . . . Jathar was so much moved by the courteous and
winning manners of Doctorji that he remarked: “… we were so much
drawn to Doctorji by his amiable behaviour that after his release, when-
ever we went to the city (Nagpur), our feet would automatically move
in the direction of his house.”’11 It is a pity that other political prisoners
in the history of the freedom struggle in India were devoid of ‘courteous’
and ‘winning manners’ like Hedgewar and as a consequence had to suffer
immensely at the hands of British jailors!

8
H.V. Seshadri (ed.), Dr Hedgewar the Epoch Maker (Bangalore: Sahitya Sindhu,
1981), p. 50.
9
Ibid., p. 51.
10
Ibid., p. 57.
11
Ibid., p. 56.
RSS and the Raj 129

According to one of the biographies of Hedgewar published by the

RSS, ‘the experiences gained by him in the freedom movement till now,
gave rise to a number of questions in his mind. He felt that some other
way should be found.’12 It is further mentioned in the same book that
Dr Hedgewar was attracted towards Hindutva by 1925 and ‘through his
talent he found a new method of Shakha, different from the ways then
prevalent, of doing public work and the type of efforts then being made
for gaining freedom’.13 The truth is that Dr Hedgewar by then had openly
taken the path, which Mohammed Ali Jinnah was to take later, of
breaking the united movement of the Indian people against the British
rulers and splitting it along religious lines.

THE ULTERIOR MOTIVE

Dr Hedgewar was sent to jail a second time by the British government.

This was the last time that he went to jail. The reason for his second
imprisonment has been described in the same biography in the following
words: ‘[In 1930] Mahatma Gandhi had called upon the people to break
different laws of the government. Gandhiji himself launched Salt Satyagraha
undertaking Dandi Yatra. Dr Saheb [Hedgewar] sent information every-
where that the Sangh will not participate in the Satyagraha. However
those wishing to participate individually in it were not prohibited. This
meant that any responsible worker of the Sangh could not participate in
the Satyagraha.’14 However, rather surprisingly, Hedgewar decided to
participate in Gandhi’s Dandi Salt Satyagraha as an individual. Of course,
he had an ulterior motive. We learn about this from the same biography
published by the RSS: ‘Dr Saheb had the confidence that with a freedom
loving, self-sacrificing and reputed group of people inside with him there,
he would discuss the Sangh with them and win them over for its work.’15
In this context it is further stated in the biography, ‘Doctor Saheb did not
let the work of the Sangh get away from his mind (aankhon se aujhal nahin
hone diya) even for a moment during his imprisonment. He established

12
C.P. Bhishikar, Sangh-viraksh Ke Beej: Dr Keshav Rao Hedgewar (New Delhi: Suruchi
Prakashan, 1994), p. 9. Translated into English by the author.
13
Ibid., p. 11.
14
Ibid., p. 20.
15
Ibid.
130 Shamsul Islam

close links with all the leaders and activists [of the Congress] who were
in prison, made them understand the work of the Sangh and obtained
from them promise of cooperation in work for the future. He came out
of the prison only after making plans for a big leap for work expansion.’16
It is clear that Dr Hedgewar chose to go to jail this time not because he
was convinced of the cause but in order to break the ranks of the Congress
cadre. These cadres were participating in the Non-Cooperation Move-
ment and going to jails upholding the banner of a united struggle by the
people of all religions of the country. In fact, the Congress leadership soon
realized that communal and sectarian organizations were bent upon using
the cadre of Congress for their vicious designs. In 1934, the All India
Congress Committee passed a resolution forbidding Congress members
from becoming members of the RSS, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the
Muslim League.
It needs to be underlined here that on the two occasions that Hedgewar
went to jail, it was at the call of the Congress. If it is true that the Vajpayee
government honoured him for his participation in Congress-led move-
ments this should have been clearly stated. On the other hand, if he was
being honoured as the founder of the RSS then the only ‘contribution’
for which he could claim credit was that of propagating the communal
and disruptive ideology of Hindu rashtra—an ideology which divided and
undermined the freedom movement.
The people of this country would like to know which movements were
launched by the RSS before 1947 to free India from British imperialism.
Who amongst its leaders and cadres suffered repression under colonial
rule? Who amongst them went to jail or became martyrs for the cause
of the freedom of the country?
The truth is that the foundation of anti-imperialist people’s unity,
especially unity of the Hindu and Muslim masses, was firmly laid by the
great struggle of the Indian people for independence in 1857. This unity
formed the basis of the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920–22), in the
course of which India’s struggle for freedom underwent a qualitative
change. The single most important feature of the immediate post-World
War I period was the politics of mass mobilization that Gandhiji initiated.
The period following the Non-Cooperation Movement witnessed the
growth of workers’ and peasants’ movements which strengthened the
united anti-imperialist struggle.

16
Ibid., p. 21.
RSS and the Raj 131

COMMUNAL MOBILIZATION AIMED AT

WRECKING UNITED ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE

At the same time, an unfortunate feature of the national movement

during the mid-1920s was the growing tendency of some of the prominent
leaders to take positions along communal lines. This was a development
which suited the British and the imperialist rulers left no stone unturned
to encourage this trend. Hindu and Muslim chauvinists undermined the
unity which had been built up during the Non-Cooperation Movement.
The communal stance of the Hindu Mahasabha, which had the support
of the Congress right wing, made things difficult for communal amity. As
for the Muslim chauvinists, particularly the more obscurantist and reac-
tionary sections among them, they tried to project the Khilafat issue as
one concerning the Muslim community alone. By stressing on the reli-
gious aspects of the issue they diluted the political and anti-imperialist
content of the movement. After the Non-Cooperation Movement some
of them took to communal politics, while several others like Maulana
Azad and Saifuddin Kitchlew, who were dedicated to the cause of Hindu–
Muslim unity, became part of the Congress leadership. The Hindu and
Muslim communalists thus complemented each other’s politics, and British
imperialism nurtured both of them.
It is against this background that Dr Hedgewar formed the RSS in
1925. Dr Hedgewar was born in 1889 in Nagpur. After completing his
school education he went to Calcutta (1910–15) to study medicine.
Although RSS publications claim that he was in touch with revolutionary
terrorist groups there, no independent confirmation of this is available.
Almost nothing is known of his political activities for nearly five years after
he returned to Nagpur in 1915. It seems that Dr Hedgewar did not set
up a medical practice. The details of the ‘formative’ period of his political
career are vague. He was briefly associated with the Congress and as we
have seen he was imprisoned during the Non-Cooperation Movement.
In the Congress, Dr Hedgewar was close to the extreme right wing
Hindu Mahasabha leader Dr B.S. Moonje. Dr Moonje was at that time
in the Congress, though he was opposed to Gandhi’s programme for
building Hindu–Muslim unity and was also willing to go in for limited
cooperation with the British.
After coming out of prison Dr Hedgewar criticized Gandhiji for his
views on Hindu–Muslim unity and equated nationalism with a Hindu
132 Shamsul Islam

rashtra. A major theme of the RSS since its inception was the ‘disloyalty’
of the Muslims and other minorities to the nation. According to
Dr Hedgewar, ‘As a result of the non-cooperation movement of Mahatma
Gandhi the enthusiasm in the country was cooling down and the evils
in social life which that movement generated were menacingly raising
their head . . . . The yavana-snakes [i.e. Muslims] reared on the milk of
non-cooperation were provoking riots in the nation with their poisonous
hissing.’17
With the aim of propagating these views among youngsters, mainly
teenage boys, he formed the RSS in 1925. The RSS concentrated on
disseminating Hedgewar’s views of Hindu rashtra among youth. The
organization was not engaged in undertaking any movement or launching
any struggle against the British. Whereas on the one hand the revolution-
ary activities of Bhagat Singh and his comrades were shaking the foun-
dations of British rule, on the other hand official documents of the late
1920s contain no reference to any anti-British activities of the RSS. The
main task of the Sangh was to carry on a hate campaign against the
minorities. It sought urban middle class Maharashtrian Brahmin boys for
its audience, and in the early years this remained the main social base
of the organization. It is pertinent that a spurt in the membership of the
organization came soon after a riot in Nagpur in 1927.
While the RSS embarked on its hate campaign the freedom struggle
was, by 1927–28, ready to enter a new phase. The 1920s had witnessed
the rise of a left movement in India with the formation of socialist groups
and the founding of the Communist Party. A strong trade union move-
ment had also come into existence. Towards the end of the 1920s a
number of working class strikes swept the country. 1927 saw another
development. This was the announcement by the British of another
commission to go into the question of constitutional reforms for India—
the Simon Commission. The nationalists opposed the Simon Commission
and the Congress gave a call to boycott it. The boycott of the Simon
Commission developed into a major mass agitation. The British relied
upon the growing aggressiveness of Hindu and Muslim communalists to
disrupt the unity of the anti-imperialist mass upsurge of the late 1920s
and hoped that this would enable them to impose a constitutional ar-
rangement which would safeguard British interests.

17
Quoted in Tapan Basu, Pradip Dutta, Sumit Sarkar, Tanika Sarkar and Sanbudh Sen,
Khaki Shorts, Saffron Flags (Hyderabad/New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993), p. 14.
RSS and the Raj 133

There is a vast amount of archival material and other documentation

that provide detailed information about the activities of the Congress, the
revolutionary terrorists and various other groups, which were engaged in
the anti-imperialist struggle. The Communists, who throughout this period
had to work secretly and remained underground due to severe imperialist
repression, have already published a large part of the voluminous source
material pertaining to their activities in this period. This source material
is corroborated by the official and semi-official records, and can be easily
verified and cross-checked. The revolutionary terrorists too, even though
they worked in utmost secrecy, have left behind extensive evidence of
their activities. However, no similar documentation has been forthcoming
from the RSS. Nor is it possible to locate material in contemporary records
which would shed light on the anti-British role of the organization. We
have to rely exclusively on what we are told by RSS propagandists in their
publications. Is the RSS not in a position to produce a volume containing
documents that have a bearing on the role of the organization in the
freedom struggle?

HEDGEWAR AND GOLWALKAR HAD TO

CONFESS THE BETRAYAL

The contemporary writings and speeches of RSS leaders have a very

different story to tell. These leaders showed little enthusiasm for the anti-
British struggle. In the words of Golwalkar which is nothing but a con-
fession for keeping aloof from the freedom struggle:

There is another reason for the need of always remaining involved in

routine work. There is some unrest in the mind due to the situation
developing in the country from time to time. There was such unrest in
1942. Before that there was the movement in 1930–31. At that time many
other people had gone to Doctorji. This ‘delegation’ requested Doctorji
that this movement will give independence and Sangh should not lag
behind. At that time, when a gentleman told Doctorji that he was ready
to go to jail, Doctorji said, ‘Definitely go. But who will take care of your
family then?’ That gentleman replied—‘he has sufficiently arranged re-
sources not only to run the family expenses for two years but also to pay
fines according to the requirements’. Then Doctorji told him—‘if you have
fully arranged for the resources then come out to work for the Sangh for
134 Shamsul Islam

two years’. After returning home that gentleman neither went to jail nor
came out to work for the Sangh.18

This incident clearly shows that the RSS leadership was bent upon
demoralizing the honest patriotic persons to run away from the cause of
freedom movement.
At the time of the Quit India Movement Golwalkar stated: ‘There are
bad results of struggle. The boys became militant after the 1920–21
movement. It is not an attempt to throw mud at the leaders. But these
are inevitable products after the struggle. The matter is that we could not
properly control these results. After 1942, people often started thinking
that there was no need to think of the law.’19 There was great resentment
amongst the RSS cadres against this indifferent attitude of the RSS
leadership towards the Quit India Movement which is thus described
without any remorse by Golwalkar. ‘In 1942 also there was a strong
sentiment in the hearts of many. At that time too the routine work of
Sangh continued. Sangh decided not to do anything directly. But
swayamsevaks of Sangh were greatly puzzled. Sangh is the organization
of inactive people, their talks have no substance was the opinion uttered
not only by outsiders but also our own swayamsevaks. They were terribly
angry also.’20 However, there is not a single publication or document of
the Sangh which could throw some light on the great work the RSS did
indirectly for the Quit India Movement.
As we have seen, Hedgewar participated in the salt Satyagraha in his
individual capacity and that too with an ulterior motive. The RSS scrupu-
lously avoided any political activity which might be construed as being
against the British authorities: ‘After establishing Sangh, Doctor Saheb in
his speeches used to talk only of Hindu organization. Direct comment on
Government used to be almost nil.’21 We need to compare such facts avail-
able in the archives of the RSS with the claim of Vajpayee that Hedgewar
knew only one language against imperialism and that was ‘struggle’!
Though it is possible, given the mass upsurge of that period, that
some members of the RSS might have individually participated in some
anti-British movement, these would have been isolated instances. The

18
Shri Guruji Samagr Darshan (Collected Works of Golwalkar in Hindi, henceforth
referred as SGSD), vol. 4 (Nagpur: Bhartiya Vichar Sadhna, 1974), pp. 39–40.
Translated into English by the author.
19
Ibid., p. 41.
20
Ibid., p. 40.
21
Bhishikar, Sangh-viraksh Ke Beej, p. 24.
RSS and the Raj 135

RSS as an organization never launched any struggle or campaign against

British colonial rule or for the rights of the oppressed people. Nor was
the top leadership of the RSS part of the freedom struggle. The political
antecedents of Golwalkar, who headed the organization after the death
of Hedgewar in 1940, reveal that he too was not associated with the
national movement.
Golwalkar took over the leadership of the RSS in 1940, at a time when
the Muslim League’s Pakistan resolution had provided fertile ground for
heightened communal propaganda. Under his leadership too, the RSS
aggressively campaigned for a Hindu rashtra, but stayed aloof from the
anti-British struggle. Golwalkar, in fact, made it clear that the variety
of nationalism which the RSS espoused had no anti-British or anti-
imperialist content whatsoever.
Virulent opposition to Hindu–Muslim unity and to a united people’s
struggle against British rule was the programme pursued by the RSS
throughout the 1940s. Gandhiji was projected as the villain who was a
hurdle to the establishment of Hindu rashtra. Significantly the British, who
encouraged Jinnah’s communal politics and used the Muslim League as a
convenient tool for imposing partition on the Indian subcontinent, were
never condemned by the RSS, whereas Gandhi who worked ceaselessly to
prevent partition was demonized. This demonization of Gandhi culmin-
ated in his assassination in 1948. The RSS has never been able to shake off
the allegation that it was involved in the conspiracy to kill the Mahatma.
The RSS thus can be seen as having played an extremely dubious role
throughout the freedom struggle. All evidence points towards its disrup-
tiveness and the fact that the organization and its leadership was not a
part of the freedom struggle. The single most important ‘contribution’ of
the RSS was to consistently disrupt the unified struggle of the Indian
people against British imperialism through its extreme exclusivist slogan
of Hindu rashtra.
In all fairness to Guru Golwalkar, he did not claim that the RSS had
been opposed to the British. During the course of a speech at Indore in
1960 he said, ‘Many people worked with the inspiration to free the
country by throwing the British out. After formal departure of the British
this inspiration slackened. In fact there was no need to have this much
inspiration. We should remember that in our pledge we have talked of
the freedom of the country through defending religion and culture. There
is no mention of departure of the British in that.’22

22
SGSD, vol. 4, p. 2.
136 Shamsul Islam

Golwalkar, the Sarsangh-chalak of the RSS, was never able to hide his
opposition to any movement against foreign rule. As late as March 1947
when the British had decided to go away from India, Golwalkar while
addressing the annual day function of the RSS at Delhi declared that
leaders with narrow vision were trying to oppose the state power of the
British. While elaborating the point he said that it was wrong to hold the
powerful foreigners responsible for all our ills. He decried the tendency
of ‘initiating the political movements on the basis of our hatred towards
our victors’.23 While narrating an incident in the course of his speech he
got more original on the issue:

Once a respectable senior gentleman came to our shakha (the drill). He

had brought a new message for the volunteers of the RSS. When given
an opportunity to address the volunteers of the shakha, he spoke in a very
impressive tone, ‘Now do only one work. Catch hold of the British, bash
them and throw them out. Whatever happens we will see later on’. He
said this much and sat down. Behind this ideology is a feeling of anger and
sorrow towards state power and reactionary tendency based on hatred. The
evil with today’s political sentimentalism is that its basis is reaction, sorrow
and anger, and opposition to the victors forgetting friendliness.24

The RSS was not even willing to regard colonial domination as an

injustice. In a speech on 8 June 1942, just prior to the call of ‘Quit India’
of Congress, Golwalkar had declared: ‘Sangh does not want to blame
anybody else for the present degraded state of the society. When the
people start blaming others, then there is weakness in them. It is futile
to blame the strong for the injustice done to the weak . . . Sangh does not
want to waste its invaluable time in abusing or criticizing others. If we
know that large fish eat the smaller ones, it is outright madness to blame
the big fish. Law of nature whether good or bad is true all the time. This
rule does not change by terming it unjust.’25

HATRED FOR REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION

No one can beat RSS in ‘manufacturing’ facts. Recently it has churned

out literature claiming that Hedgewar met Bhagat Singh, Rajguru and

23
SGSD, vol. 1, p. 109.
24
Ibid., pp. 109–10.
25
Ibid., pp. 11–12.
RSS and the Raj 137

Sukhdev in 1925 and continued attending meetings with these revolu-

tionaries and even provided shelter to Rajguru in 1927 when he was
underground after killing Sanders.26 We need to compare these claims
with the memoirs of Balasahab Deoras (real name Madhukar Dattatreya
Deoras who was the third chief of RSS) in which he narrated an incident
when Hedgewar saved him and others from following the path of Bhagat
Singh and his comrades. Interestingly these memoirs appeared in a pub-
lication of RSS itself.

While studying in college (we) youth were generally attracted towards the
ideals of revolutionaries like Bhagat Singh. Like Bhagat Singh we should
do some or the other act of bravery, this came to our mind often. We were
less attracted towards the Sangh (RSS) since current politics, revolution
etc that attracted the hearts of youth were generally less discussed in the
Sangh. When Bhagat Singh and his companions were awarded death
sentence, at that time our hearts were so excited that (we) some friends
together vowed to do something directly and planned something terrible
and in order to make it succeed decided to run away from homes. But to
run away without informing our Doctorji will not be proper, considering
it we decided to inform Doctorji about our decision. To inform this fact
to Doctorji was assigned to me by the group of friends.
We together went to Doctorji and with great courage I explained my
feelings before him. After listening our plan Doctorji took a meeting of
ours for discarding this foolish plan and making us to realize the superiority
of the work of Sangh. This meeting continued for seven days and in the
night from ten to three. The brilliant ideas of Doctorji and his valuable
leadership brought fundamental change in our ideas and ideals of life.
Since that day we took leave of mindlessly made plans and our lives got
new direction and our mind got stabilized in the work of Sangh.27

Moreover, there is ample proof in the documents of the RSS that conclu-
sively establishes the fact that RSS denounced movements led by revo-
lutionaries like Bhagat Singh, Chandrashekhar Azad and their associates.
Here is a passage from Bunch of Thoughts decrying the whole tradition
of martyrs: ‘There is no doubt that such men who embrace martyrdom
are great heroes and their philosophy too is pre-eminently manly. They

26
Rakesh Sinha, Dr Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (New Delhi: Publications Division,
Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 2003), p. 160.
27
H.V. Pingle (ed.), Smritikan-Param Pujiye Dr Hedgewar Ke Jeewan Kee Vibhin Gahtnaon
Ka Sankalan (a collection of memoirs of persons close to Hedgewar in Hindi) (Nagpur:
RSS Prakashan Vibhag, 1962), pp. 47–48. Translated into English by the author.
138 Shamsul Islam

are far above the average men who meekly submit to fate and remain in
fear and inaction. All the same, such persons are not held up as ideals
in our society. We have not looked upon their martyrdom as the highest
point of greatness to which men should aspire. For, after all, they failed
in achieving their ideal, and failure implies some fatal flaw in them.’28
Could there be a statement more insulting and denigrating to the martyrs
of the Indian freedom movement than this?
It will be shocking for any Indian who loves the martyrs of the freedom
movement to know what Dr Hedgewar and the RSS felt about the
revolutionaries fighting against the British. According to his biography
published by the RSS, ‘Patriotism is not only going to prison. It is not
correct to be carried away by such superficial patriotism. He used to urge
that while remaining prepared to die for the country when the time came,
it is very necessary to have a desire to live while organizing for the freedom
of the country.’29 It is indeed a pity that ‘fools’ like Bhagat Singh, Rajguru,
Sukhdev, Ashfaqullah, Chandrashekhar Azad did not come into contact
with this ‘great patriotic thinker’. If they had the great opportunity to
meet him, these martyrs could have been saved from giving their lives
for ‘superficial patriotism’. This also must be the reason that RSS pro-
duced no martyrs during the freedom movement.
Even the word ‘shameful’ is not appropriate to describe the attitude
of the RSS leadership towards those who had sacrificed everything in the
struggle against the British rulers. The last Mughal ruler of India, Bahadur
Shah Zafar, had emerged as the rallying point and symbol of the Great
War of Independence of 1857. Golwalkar while making fun of him said:
‘In 1857, the so-called last emperor of India had given the clarion call—
Gazio mein bu rahegi jub talak eeman ki/takhte London tak chalegi tegh
Hindustan ki (Till the warriors remain faithful to their task/Indian swords
will reach London). But ultimately what happened? Everybody knows
that.’30 What Golwalkar thought of the people sacrificing their lot for the
country is obvious from the following words also. He had the temerity to
ask the great revolutionaries who wished to lay down their lives for the
freedom of the motherland the following question as if he was represent-
ing the British: ‘But one should think whether complete national interest
is accomplished by that? Sacrifice does not lead to increase in the thinking
of the society of giving all for the interest of the nation. It is borne by

28
Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, p. 283.
29
Bhishikar, Sangh-viraksh Ke Beej, p. 21.
30
SGSD, vol. 1, p. 121.
RSS and the Raj 139

the experience up to now that this fire in the heart is unbearable to the
common people.’31

HINDU NATIONALISM MODELLED ON HITLER’S

IDEALS ONLY HELPED THE BRITISH MASTERS

This equation of Indian nationalism with Hindu religion often drew flak
from many Hindus as is evident from an incident narrated in a publication
of the RSS. The incident occurred at a meeting at Banaras Hindu
University in 1929–30, where both Hedgewar and Golwalkar were present:

Doctorji explained to the gathering the meaning of the oath and asked
those who were in agreement with its aims to take the oath. Doctorji used
to keep always a small iron idol of Hanuman and a saffron flag. After the
meeting, in the presence of Hanuman idol and saffron flag he used to go
through the process of oath taking for the willing persons. The same day
he used to appoint Sanghchalak and Karyavah also.
When the time for the oath taking ceremony approached, some people
got impatient. In the meeting some college professors and scholars were
present. They said Sangh is undoubtedly good but they cannot agree to
the mention of Hindu Rashtra. Doctorji refused to make any change in
the oath. When people present in the meeting stressed on changing the
text of the oath and offered to take the oath only after the changes were
affected [Golwalkar intervened and said], ‘Doctorji has put before us a
definite work and programme. Those who feel good about it should accept
it, otherwise they should refuse. But there is no need to teach lessons to
Doctorji. If he starts implementing all those suggestions which he receives
while touring the country, then the coming into existence of the organ-
ization will be impossible.’32

After the meeting Golwalkar was appointed the Sanghchalak of the

shakha of Banaras Hindu University.
It is revealing that there is not a single line challenging, exposing,
criticizing or confronting the inhuman rule of the British masters in the
entire literature of the RSS from 1925 to 1947. It seems it had only one
task to accomplish and that was minority bashing or, to be more specific,
Muslim bashing.

31
Ibid., pp. 61–62.
32
SGSD, pp. 173–74.
140 Shamsul Islam

RSS published Golwalkar’s book We or Our Nationhood Defined out-

lining its concept of nation 1939. This controversial book elaborated for
the first time RSS thinking on the issue. In this book Golwalkar, while
presenting his thesis of Indian nation (equated with Hindu nation), began
by idealizing the Nazi cultural nationalism of Hitler in the following
words: ‘German Race pride has now become the topic of the day. To keep
up the purity of the Race and its culture, Germany shocked the world
by her purging the country of the Semitic Races—the Jews. Race pride
at its highest has been manifested here. Germany has also shown how
well-nigh impossible it is for Races and cultures, having differences going
to the root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for
us in Hindusthan to learn and profit by.’33
Golwalkar unhesitatingly wanted to model his Hindu rashtra on Hitler’s
totalitarian and fascist pattern as is clear from the following words of his
in the same book:

It is worth bearing well in mind how these old Nations solve their minor-
ities problem. They do not undertake to recognize any separate element
in their polity. Emigrants have to get themselves naturally assimilated in
the principal mass of the population, the National Race, by adopting its
culture and language and sharing in its aspirations, by losing all conscious-
ness of their separate existence, forgetting their foreign origin. If they do
not do so, they live merely as outsiders, bound by all the codes and
conventions of the Nation, at the sufferance of the Nation and deserving
no special protection, far less any privilege or rights. There are only two
courses open to the foreign elements, either to merge themselves in the
national race and adopt its culture, or to live at its mercy so long as the
national race may allow them to do so and to quit the country at the sweet
will of the national race. That is the only sound view on the minorities
problem. That is the only logical and correct solution. That alone keeps
the national life healthy and undisturbed. That alone keeps the nation safe
from the danger of a cancer developing into its body politic of the creation
of a state within a state.
From this stand point, sanctioned by the experience of shrewd old
nations, the foreign races in Hindusthan must either adopt the Hindu
culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu
religion, must entertain no idea but those of the glorification of the Hindu
race and culture, i.e., of the Hindu nation and must lose their separate
existence to merge in the Hindu race, or may stay in the country, wholly

33
M.S. Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood Defined (Nagpur: Bharat Publications, 1939),
p. 35.
RSS and the Raj 141

subordinated to the Hindu Nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privil-

eges, far less any preferential treatment not even citizen’s rights. There is,
at least should be, no other course for them to adopt. We are an old nation:
let us deal, as old nations ought to and do deal, with the foreign races who
have chosen to live in our country.34

There is not a single word in the thesis about the British rulers who
were then plundering the Indian people and nation. The book outlines
only one programme, namely to subjugate the minorities who neither
controlled the state nor shared any political or economic power. More
than 95 per cent of them were artisans, poor peasants, landless agricul-
tural labour or wage-earners. Golwalkar’s Super Hindu Race seemed to
have no antagonism towards the British rulers who in fact were foreigners
in the real sense of the term and who had given only misery, hunger,
poverty, and death to multitudes of Indians, the vast majority of whom
were Hindus.

HATRED TOWARDS TRICOLOUR THAT SYMBOLIZED

UNITED FREEDOM STRUGGLE

The RSS during the freedom struggle hated anything which symbolized
the united struggle of the Indian people against British rule. The case of
the tricolour is the most pertinent one. In December 1929 Congress at
its Lahore session adopted Purna Swaraj as the national goal and called
upon the people to observe 26 January 1930 as Independence Day by
displaying and honouring the tricolour (it was the flag of the national
movement by this time). In response to this historic united call for all the
people of the country, Dr Hedgewar as Sarsangh-chalak issued a circular
to all the RSS shakhas to worship the bhagwa jhanda (saffron flag). The
circular said: ‘. . . all the branches of RSS should arrange a congregation
of all swayamsevaks in their sanghasthans [places where Sangh meets] at
6 p.m. on Sunday, the 26th January 1930 and salute the National Flag,
that is Bhagwa Dhwaj. A speech should be arranged to explain the true
concept of independence . . . .’35 This circular makes it very clear that when

34
Ibid., pp. 47–48.
35
As quoted in RSS: A Stooge of British, p. 20.
142 Shamsul Islam

the whole nation was saluting the tricolour as a symbol of a united struggle,
RSS was raising sectarian issues to divide the people in the name of
religion. This circular is often presented by RSS as a proof of its partici-
pation in the freedom struggle. On the contrary, it only shows its running
away from any struggle against the foreign rule. Moreover, it directed the
leading cadres to ‘explain the true concept of independence’ which meant
creation of a Hindu state and not the goal of a secular India for which
Congress was fighting.
Golwalkar while addressing a Gurupurnima gathering in Nagpur on 14
July 1946, stated that it was the saffron flag which in totality represented
their great culture. It was the embodiment of God: ‘We firmly believe that
in the end the whole nation will bow before this saffron flag.’36 Even after
independence when the tricolour became the National Flag, it was the
RSS which refused to accept it as the National Flag. Golwalkar while
discussing the issue in an essay entitled ‘Drifting and Drifting’ in Bunch
of Thoughts has the following to say: ‘Our leaders have set up a new flag
for our country. Why did they do so? It just is a case of drifting and
imitating. . . . Ours is an ancient and great nation with a glorious past.
Then, had we no flag of our own? Had we no national emblem at all these
thousands of years? Undoubtedly we had. Then why this utter void, this
utter vacuum in our minds?’37
The RSS leadership has always tried to defend its inactivity against
British rule by taking the plea that theirs was a cultural organization and
could not have possibly taken up political issues. Pro-RSS people in the
media work overtime to strengthen this impression. The RSS keeps on
changing its face as per its political convenience. On the issue of minor-
ities, secularism and Hindu nationalism, they are extremely political. But
the moment the issue of the inhuman British raj crops up, they are
transformed into a cultural organization. Irrespective of the public pos-
tures of the RSS leadership, it may be worthwhile to know the ideas of
Golwalkar on the subject of participation in political activities. While
addressing senior activists of the RSS in a training camp, he said, ‘We
know this also that some of our volunteers work in politics. There
according to the needs of the work they have to organize public meetings,
processions etc., have to raise slogans. All these things have no place
in our work. However, the actor should portray the character given to
him to the best of his capability. But sometimes volunteers go beyond

36
SGSD, vol. 1, p. 98.
37
Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, pp. 237–38.
RSS and the Raj 143

the role assigned to an actor as they develop over-zealousness in their

hearts, to the extent that they become useless for this work. This is not
good.’38

RSS DILEMMA

What did the British rule mean to an average patriotic Indian? It sym-
bolized repression, plunder, and pauperization of the people of this coun-
try. It meant the divide and rule policy of the foreign rulers through which
they encouraged communal and sectarian divisions in Indian society. And
what could be the moving spirit behind any struggle against such a British
rule? What could have been the essence of the freedom movement
against British rule? It could not have been anything other than unity of
all people and a call to throw the British out.
The BJP leadership is very keen to project the RSS as a component
of the freedom struggle. This is the outcome of a desperate attempt to
gain greater respectability and wider acceptance. For a party which claims
to be the touchstone of patriotism there is a lot in history which just
cannot be wished away. The BJP finds it embarrassing that the RSS—
to which the top leadership as well as the overwhelming majority of the
cadre of the BJP belongs—was not a part of the freedom movement. It
is really shameful for an organization like the RSS which constantly refers
to its glorious past, that it has no legacy of an anti-colonial struggle—the
mightiest struggle of the Indian people in the last century. The RSS lacks
the courage to categorically state that it did not participate in the freedom
struggle because its ideology prevented it from doing so. The political
stream of the Hindu right wing has, of course, accumulated enormous
experience in falsifying history. It is hardly surprising then that all manner
of falsehoods are resorted to with the aim of distorting the history of the
freedom struggle. Will a great nation, which has a glorious tradition of
anti-imperialist struggles, fall prey to this attempt?

38
SGSD, vol. 4, pp. 4–5.
 HINDUTVA AND INDIAN DIASPORA 7
JAWAID QUDDUS

hat defines the Indian diaspora? Why do people migrate?

W
way of life?
What are the forces in play that create the need for or compel
people to migrate, sometimes at great peril to life, property and

India is a country rich with its diversity of cultures, religions as well

as genetic make-up. The biological diversity of India stems from its
location at the tri-junction of the African, the northern Eurasian and
the Oriental realm. An interesting study based on an analysis of mito-
chondrion sequences of 101 Indians and examined in relation to the
linguistic and anthropological pattern indicates that the Indian subcon-
tinent has been populated by a series of migrations. These included the
Austric language speakers, the Dravidian speakers, the Indo-European
speakers and the Sino-Tibetan speakers. India, thus, is a potpourri of
cultural and ethnic diversity due to waves of migrations mandated by
its geographical position and biological diversity. Streams of people
have migrated to India from different directions and have created
the most genetically and culturally diverse country in the world. Gadgil
et al. of the Center for Ecological Sciences, Indian Institute of Science,
Banglalore, seem to suggest that the ‘Indian population has been
put together by people drawn from many different streams ultimately
derived from the major expansion of non-African Homo Sapiens.’ The
current estimation is that these people streamed into the country over
50,000 years ago.
Hindutva and Indian Diaspora 145

MIGRATION OUT OF INDIA

The Indian diaspora is the third largest diaspora in the world, second only
to the British and Chinese. It extends to each and every part of the world.
There is considerable evidence to suggest that India’s link to Europe
probably dates back to the tenth century B.C. Records exist to indicate
that there was significant trading in ivory, peacocks, and spices during
the time of King Solomon. In addition, India was also a very important
market for gold, cotton, cloth, beads and other manufactured items, as
well as slaves. King Ashoka (268–39 B.C.) and King Kanishka (A.D. first
century) were alone responsible for the spread of Buddhism to Southern
India, Eastern Iran, Central Asia, China, Greece, Kandahar, Southeast
Asia and Indonesia. Indian settlements were also in existence in north-
eastern Africa at the time of Alexander the Great (356–23 B.C.). There
also existed significant trade partnerships with Arab traders at the trade
centres of Mogadishu and Mombassa. Indian traders, both Hindus and
Ismailis and Bohra Muslims, were also concentrated in Zanzibar. India,
in addition, had significant trade relations with countries in Southeast
Asia. Java was colonized between the first and seventh centuries, with
many Javanese converting to Hinduism. Indonesia, as well as parts of
Afghanistan, also came under the influence of Hinduism. However,
despite emigration during the early periods, no significant permanent
settlements were established.

MORE RECENT MIGRATIONS

During more modern times, there were three patterns of emigration:

emigration during the 1830s to the British, French and Dutch colonies,
emigration during post-World War II period to the industrially developed
countries, and the final surge of emigration to West Asia. During the
periods of 1846–1932 about 28 million Indians immigrated, mostly to
British controlled territories. A vast majority of them, however, returned
home. Abolishment of slave trade by the British empire in 1834, by the
French in 1846 and by the Dutch in 1873 resulted in severe manpower
shortage for labourers working in sugar, coffee, tea, cocoa, rice, and rubber
plantations run by the colonists. This led to the introduction by the British
of the indentured Indian immigration based in Calcutta and Madras.
146 Jawaid Quddus

The indentured labourers worked under a contract for five years. They
worked for money plus accommodation, food rations, and medical facil-
ities. At the end of the contract the worker was free to reindenture or work
elsewhere in the colony. At the end of 10 years, if the contract allowed
it, he was either given free passage home to India, or a piece of land in
lieu of ship fare. The work involved was strenuous and many of these
young males were recruited by unscrupulous methods that included lying
and kidnapping. Since most were men, this also led to legal prostitution
and subsequent intermingling among various other ethnic groups, includ-
ing those from Africa.
About 1.5 million people migrated under this system, mostly from
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Of these, 86 per cent was Hindu, 16 per cent
belonged to the upper caste and 14 per cent were Muslims. Most did not
return home after the indentured system was discontinued in 1917. As
far as the Sikhs are concerned, they initially immigrated to East Africa
as indentured workers to lay the Kenya–Uganda railway line, and then
later as traders, policemen, and army men. Workers from South India
were also contracted under the Kangani (Tamil for ‘overseas worker’ or
‘foreman’) programme to work in the tea plantations in Ceylon (now Sri
Lanka).

MOST RECENT MIGRATIONS

The Indian diaspora of recent years initially went to the Gulf countries,
followed by emigration to the US, UK and beyond. This group, who
numbered more than 20 million, are highly diverse in terms of ethnic,
social, and religious as well as educational backgrounds. The incentive
for most of these émigrés was economic gain. Those less endowed with
education and sophisticated skills made a beeline for the Gulf countries
where the sudden oil wealth-mediated economic boom led to a huge
demand for labourers, construction workers and other short-term semi-
skilled and unskilled workers. People with more sophisticated skills,
education, as well as those with a desire for furthering their education
at overseas universities chose to immigrate to the US, Canada, UK, and
to a smaller extent, France and Germany. In Canada, in addition to the
skilled and professional émigrés, the early immigrants also consisted of
thousands of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. A vast majority of them
were Sikh farmers from Punjab.
Hindutva and Indian Diaspora 147

The main incentive for Indians to leave their homeland was financial.
Thus the income earned abroad, for the most part, ended up in India in
support of the family members left behind. The concept of establishing
a permanent settlement in a foreign land was the last thing on their minds.
For those who could not take their families with them (either due to
financial or visa restrictions), the objective was to work for 10–15 years,
save enough money to buy or build a house for their family in India, and
marry off their daughter or daughters on their return home. For those who
were lucky enough to leave the shores of India along with their wives or
family, the situation was a lot more different. Although the incentive to
go back home was also as strong as ever, most knew in their hearts that
this was just an illusion. An illusion because they realized that with better
schools, easier access to better nutrition, health care and prospects for
a better life for their children, a return to their motherland was unlikely.
In the US, the influx of Sikhs and Muslims between 1907 and 1924
was followed by a much larger wave of students and technocrats that
continues to the present day. Sikhs were also among the first immigrants
to Canada followed by other Indians; Hindus from Gujarat, Bombay and
Delhi as well as Christians from Kerala, Parsees from Bombay and Muslims
from various parts of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Immigration to
the UK and the Europe started with the influx of factory workers in the
1950s and 1960s. By the 1980s South Asians constituted almost half the
population of the UK.
Immigration in many instances bettered the lives of the émigrés, but
also created many problems. As the influx continued and increased in
numbers, so did hostility. Loneliness and alienation often played into the
psyche of the new immigrants. Alienation resulted in enclaves of Indians,
such as Indian student organizations in almost every university campus
in the US, most funded by the university as part of their international
student programme. These associations provided an opportunity for the
community to get together and celebrate Holi, Diwali, Eid and other
Indian festivals, and of course watch Indian films. Such gatherings were
fairly integrated at first, very diverse in terms of religion, ethnic origin,
and language. Eventually as this Indian diaspora grew larger and wealthier,
nationalistic ties gave way to regional, ethnic and religious ties. Thus the
Bengalis formed their own organization, so did the Biharis, Punjabis, the
Keralites, Gujaratis, etc., followed by various religion-based organizations
comprising the Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, and Christian Indians.
With the perceived notion that the mores and moral standards of their
host society presented a significant danger to the proper upbringing of
148 Jawaid Quddus

their children and for the generations yet to come, organizations specif-
ically tailored to the spiritual needs of the people came into being. It was
apparent to all that the counter force to a culture that promoted dating,
pre-marital sex and pornography had to be a structured religious upbring-
ing. Temples, mosques, gurudwaras and churches came into being, first
in individual homes and then as sprawling complexes. Apparently, the
various religious denominations comprising the Indian diaspora were not
any more religious than those that they had left behind. They, however,
had a greater need to concentrate more on the spiritual aspects of their
lives than their counterparts in India. They may have chosen to live in
a foreign land; however, they were still reluctant to give up their Indian
ways.

RISE OF HINDU FUNDAMENTALISM

The continued insurgency in Kashmir largely sponsored by Pakistan, the

success of the Afghan freedom fighters against Russian occupation, and
various other conflicts such as those in Chechnya, Bosnia, the Middle
East, and the Philippines, have perhaps provided encouragement to
groups around the world to seek answers through violent means. In recent
years there has been an increase in the growth of fundamentalism within
the major religions of the world. In India, Hindutva, neo-fascism in the
guise of religion, right wing politics and nationalism are being forced upon
the people. They have established themselves as a counter force to and
inspired by the rabid fundamentalism of the jehad groups in Pakistan and
elsewhere.

OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES OF THE SANGH PARIVAR

The Vishnu Hindu Parishad of America (VHPA) and other related Hindu
organizations such as the Hindu Student Council (HSC) have actively
propagated the Hindutva movement worldwide. They have done this
successfully by playing on the emotions of the Hindu Indians living
abroad. By organizing youth camps and by providing a distorted version
of history and culture that they believe defines India. The destruction of
the Babri Masjid and the construction of the Ram temple and the hatred
of Muslims and Christians have become the centre of all issues involving
India. This is an apparent attempt to convey a sense of urgency to the
Hindutva and Indian Diaspora 149

new generation of foreign-born Indians about the inherent danger the

jehadis pose to India. The implication is that the survival of over 800
million or more Indian Hindus is at stake because the 120 million plus
Indian Muslims exist only for the sole purpose of destroying the infidels.
The fact that not one Indian Muslim was involved in any of the terrorist
attacks in Kashmir, on the Parliament, or on Akshardham is irrelevant
to this issue. The fact that not one Indian Muslim terrorist was caught
by the US forces in Afghanistan and interned at Guatanmo Bay in Cuba
is also irrelevant. It also does not matter that the vast majority of those
caught spying against India and for Pakistan are Hindus. However, the
fact that a few stupid Muslims burst crackers when Pakistan wins a cricket
match is evidence enough to hang them all as traitors.
The VHP has used religion as the driving force to generate a mass
following of volunteers. The stated goal of the VHP is to promote the
Hindu religion and create a Hindu rashtra in India. Large proportions of
the Hindus, in their desire to faithfully follow their religion, either do not
understand or ignore the subtle ways of the VHP. The VHP and other
related organizations appropriate certain emotive, albeit non-issues,
to mobilize Hindus. In the early 1900s, in Mauritius, for example, the
movement for propagation of Hindi was used by the Arya Samaj and
other Hindu organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha, to create a unified
Hindu elite that would after independence dominate the political and
power structure in that country. The propagation of Hindi thus became
associated with the preservation of the ‘ancestral language’, although a
majority of the Indians in Mauritius spoke Bhojpuri and Creole. Thus
Hindi was associated with goddess Hindi Ma ‘Mother Hindi’ and Saraswati,
the Hindu goddess of learning. Language was used to enforce the concept
of one language, one culture, and one religion, the subliminal message
being that India, Hindi, and Hinduism are one single entity.
The destruction of Babri Masjid greatly empowered the Sangh Parivar
activists to take their cause of the Hindu rashtra worldwide. Whether or
not the Babri Masjid was the actual site of the birth of Lord Ram was
irrelevant. That they believed it to be so was justification enough to
replace it with a Ram temple and rectify the wrong that was done to them
by the forefathers of the present-day jehadis. A campaign to collect money
and gold bricks was used to motivate the Hindus to give up their ‘Hin-
duism of inclusion’ for the Sangh Parivar’s ‘Hindutva of exclusion’. VHP
leaders such as Ashok Singhal and others talked at different world forums
about the Hindu diaspora, fictionalized Indian history, Indian culture,
and an Indian nationalism based on religion.
150 Jawaid Quddus

Hindu temples abroad, mostly run by the VHP, started and supported
numerous campaigns for the proposed Ram temple in Ayodhya. Guru
Dakshina Days and World Hindu Conferences were organized overseas
with the intention of promoting Hinduism, collecting donations, and
influencing friends and supporters in politically high places. The VHPA
is a tax exempt organization in the US. The laws there do not permit
an organization with tax exempt status to indulge in politics or lobby
politicians. This law, however, did not stop the Sangh Parivar from doing
so. They continue to do this in the cover of numerous Hindu front
organizations that they have created specifically for this purpose. For
example, in Southern California, an organization called the Federations
of Hindu Association was formed in Artesia, Orange County. Many other
organizations such as Overseas Friends of BJP, the Friends of India Society
International also exist around the world and function under the direct
control of the Sangh Parivar. All function as the political arm of the VHP,
entrusted to pursue Hindu political interests in the US by influencing
public and world opinion for the cause of a Hindu rashtra in India.

HYPOCRISY AND THE HINDUTVA CAUSE

Members of these front organizations are usually wealthy technocrats who

generate millions of dollars for the Hindutva cause by actively financing
the fascist agenda of the Sangh Parivar. They support the Sangh Parivar’s
agenda of a Hindu rashtra in India. But the hypocritical paradox is that
despite their support for this philosophy, they still choose to and continue
to live in the western secular democracies. While they may not shy away
in demanding from the authorities in their adopted countries their right
to build temples and propagate their religion, they want to prevent the
Christians and Muslims in India, who are born Indians, their right to do
so. As newly naturalized citizens in an alien country, they vote for political
candidates of their choice but support organizations who stand for denial
of these citizenship rights to minorities in India who are Indians by birth.
This is because they endorse the Sangh Parivar’s contention that minor-
ities in India, who have for generations been lawful Indian citizens, are
foreigners or jehadis. These burger-eating expatriates who wear jeans and
skirts, proudly drive their flashy cars, date western or westernized Indian
men or women, and frequent bars and dance studios, also concomitantly
support organizations in India that oppose by violence and threat of
violence cow slaughter and social issues such as dating, the right to
Hindutva and Indian Diaspora 151

romance in the parks, Valentine’s day or New Year’s day celebrations,

skirts and jeans. While they may propagate the drinking of urine for its
medicinal properties, they frequent only the most technologically ad-
vanced hospitals if someone from their family needs medical attention.
Some who support the idea of a Hindu rashtra in India prefer to live and
work in secular countries such as the US and Britain. Among them, some
who love their money more than their gods even prefer to live in the Gulf
Muslim countries. Their hypocrisy is that although they may condemn
the jehadis and the fundamentalists among the Muslims, they have no
qualms about supporting fundamentalists among the Hindus.
Shukla (2003) has very effectively chronicled the philosophy of the
Hindu Taliban. They mimic the jehadis in their action and philosophy.
These pseudo-religionists, the Hindu Taliban and the Muslim Jehadis, are
birds of the same flock. Although they may condemn each other and
claim to hate each other, the fact remains that they are in actuality very
similar to each other. They empower each other. In order to carry on with
their agenda of establishing their distorted utopian ideas, they create the
necessary scenarios to justify their actions. Be it the destruction of Babri
Masjid, the attack on Akshardham or the destruction of the Bamiyan
Buddhas. A culture of hate and mutual suspicion based on falsehood,
innuendoes, distortion of history is created and propagated. Human
beings are transformed into zombies who, as evidenced recently in Gujarat,
can rip foetuses from the wombs of mothers, indulge in beheadings, gang
rape and other unspeakable atrocities.

FUNDING THE HINDU RIGHT

A report in The New York Times (14 May 2003) indicates that according
to Merrill Lynch there are 200,000 Non-Resident Indian (NRI) million-
aires in the US alone. A recent report in The Indian Express (3 April 2003)
indicates that overseas Indians have remitted to India over $10 billion
dollars in 2001. The bulk of this came from the US and Saudi Arabia.
Recently certain groups made assertions against the Sangh Parivar in the
US and France regarding overseas funding of the Sangh Parivar’s Hindutva
agenda in India. It seems that these funds from the Hindu diaspora maybe
responsible for funding hate crimes against the minorities in India. Al-
though the Sangh Parivar denies this and claims that these allegations
are concocted by the pseudo-secularists, the evidence does appear to be
fairly substantial.
152 Jawaid Quddus

Consider a simple fact. The General Secretary of the VHP, Mr Praveen

Togadia, claims to have recently distributed about 5,000 trishuls in Gujarat
and another 5,000 in New Delhi. His goal is to distribute about 500,000
trishuls by the end of 2003. If we assume that so far he has only distributed
10,000 and estimate the cost of one trishul to be about at least Rs 20,
then 10,000 trishuls will cost about Rs 200,000, and 500,000 trishuls
would cost about Rs 10,000,000. Where is all this money coming from?
Surely, not from Togadia’s pocket! One thing, however, is for sure. We
will never find out! No accounting has ever been made by the income
tax authorities or by any other government agency in India to look into
the finances and sources of funds being released to these groups. There
has been no accounting also in regard to where and what projects the
Sangh Parivar is funding!
According to one released report of the VHP’s audited accounts,
Mr Kapil Sibal, AICC(I) spokesperson had indicated that while VHP
received Rs 2.70 crores in 1999, only Rs 10,101 was spent on charitable
causes (The Hindu, 17 August 1999). Mr Sibal’s demand of the govern-
ment to conduct a CBI enquiry to determine whether or not the dona-
tions were put to use only for the purpose that they were collected for
fell on deaf ears. No investigation to date has been done to find out
whether these organizations have fulfilled the conditions spelled out in
Section 11 and 12 of the Income Tax Act. Indians and the world need
to know, for example, who financed the genocide in Gujarat or the
training camps where volunteers trained for months on the mechanics
of bringing the Babri Masjid down. In Gujarat, according to eyewitness
reports, rioters came in trucks, used cell phones and computer-generated
voter lists to identify and target minorities, minority homes and business
interests. Who paid for the thousands of cooking gas cylinders that were
used as bombs? How and where was this entire operation planned, and
who trained these criminals in the technology of converting cooking gas
cylinders into bombs? Is it possible that the pogrom in Gujarat was
financed by funding from overseas Hindus, with or without their knowl-
edge? That some of the money sent by overseas Gujaratis and others for
earthquake relief were spent instead on ethnic cleansing?
In an article published in the 22 July 2002 issue of Outlook entitled
‘Deflections to the right’ the author Mr A.K. Sen has enlightened the
readers about various organizations providing funds to the Hindutva
groups. Among groups identified are the India Development and Relief
Fund (IDRF) that raises funds in the US to support the RSS, and
organizations such as Sewa International. This report and the recent
Hindutva and Indian Diaspora 153

expose entitled ‘The Foreign Exchange of Hate’ detailing the use of

overseas funds in support of Hindutva activities in India has been strongly
denied by all those implicated. However, Mr Shankar Talwandi, the RSS
convener (foreign cell), has on record indicated that UK’s Sewa Inter-
national and US IDRF have both collected donations in the past from
Hindus to help victims of calamities in India from time to time. He has
also reaffirmed that Sewa International has also been funding the edu-
cation of 2,500 poor children in India (The Times of India, 12 June 2000).
It is certainly noble to help earthquake victims and educate poor children.
What is not noble is the fact that these funds are collected and distributed
specifically to help only a certain section of the population with inherent
vested interests.
Sewa International is the largest Indian charity organization in the UK.
It is a product of the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS) which in turn
is the international wing of the RSS. The millions of pounds that the Sewa
International has collected in the UK have gone into the coffers of Sewa
Bharti, the Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram, the Kalyan Ashram Trust and the
Hindu Vivek Kendra. All Sangh Parivar affiliates. Sewa International’s
advertisements for funds, however, do not indicate that it is associated
with any Sangh Parivar organization. The IDRF has also denied any
association with the Sangh Parivar. However, applications submitted by
these organizations to the various US agencies for issuance of tax exemp-
tion certification very clearly identifies them as organizations that the
IDRF has set up to receive the funds. Of the 75 sister organizations listed
by the IDRF, 60 are Sangh Parivar organizations. In addition, the founders
of IDRF including Ved Parakash and Bhishma Agnihotri, who is also the
BJP-appointed ambassador at large, and several other high ranking offi-
cials of the IRDF are either all Sangh Parivar men or have been associated
with it. Despite the spin and a futile attempt by the Hindutva forces to
refute the above charges, the facts remain substantiated.
In UK, the South Asia Solidarity Group has also started a campaign
to expose the funding sources of the Sangh Parivar. In response to their
efforts and efforts of other organizations in Britain, the British Charity
Commission is now investigating the activities of the HSS and the VHP
(UK). Sewa International raised £ 748,355 in 2000 and £ 217,571 in 2002
for Gujarat earthquake related relief work. There has, however, been no
accounting regarding how much of that money was utilized for actual
relief work. An article in The Hindu (23 March 2002) by Kalpana Wilson
indicates that a BBC Channel 4 report on the Gujarat violence broadcast
on 12 December 2002 implicates one of the organizations, the Vanavasi
154 Jawaid Quddus

Kalyan Ashram in the pogrom in Gujarat. This organization is a direct

recipient of funds from Sewa International and its leaders have been
actively involved in the genocide in Gujarat. Of note is that none of these
organizations ever launched a single fund drive to collect funds for the
displaced refugees of the Gujarat violence, or contributed a single paisa
to rebuild some of the homes and the historic monuments (mazars) that
were destroyed by the Hindutva storm troopers.

CONCLUSION

Hindutva is not Hinduism. It is a fascist political system that places the

upper-caste Hindus at the top with the rest of the population subjected
to the laws of Manusmriti that stipulates ‘Whatever exists in the world
is the property of the Brahmana; on account of the excellence of his origin
the Brahmana is indeed, entitled to it all’ (II–100). In the lexicon of the
Sangh Parivar, the concept of tolerance, diversity or plurality needs to be
redefined in terms of the laws of Manu, which exist, like the rest of the
non-Brahmana world, only to serve the Brahmana.
History is being changed to reflect a myopic and distorted view of
India. The philosophies of the saffron nationalists mirror the European
fascists of the 1930s. The ideology is the same. Their intent is not to glorify
Hinduism or unify Hindus but to demonize the non-Hindus and to
convert India into their version of a Hindu rashtra. The genocide in
Gujarat was just such an experiment that will be implemented all over
India. The VHP has warned of a ‘storm ahead which was not going to be
limited to Gujarat’ (The Hindu, 18 December 2002). They have organized
themselves like Hitler’s Storm Troopers and as the recent Gujarat pogrom
indicates, they have done this very successfully, with impunity and with
official government sanction. Their ‘Gaurav Yatra’ will therefore traverse
the country looting, slaughtering, raping, and destroying all opposed to
their fascist ideology of ‘one country, one religion, one language and one
culture’. These Hindu Talibans will then glorify Hinduism by building a
magnificent Ram temple for themselves, low-cost Swastika temples for
the Dalits and for those Muslims and Christians who have realized the
errors of their ways and have reconverted and come ‘home’.
India appears to be on the abyss of destruction. It must reject the
totalitarian and fascist agenda of the Hindu right and embrace what have
always been its glorious tradition: cultural pluralism and tolerance. The
Hindutva and Indian Diaspora 155

Sangh conspiracy against our people and our nation must be rejected
completely. The recent national elections culminating with the defeat of
the BJP reflect the fact that the Indian people may have finally come to
realize that the Hindutva assassins of Gandhi must not be allowed to set
India ablaze. It is now incumbent on the present government to desaffronize
our education system, our institutions and make it truly secular. Perpetuators
of violence need to be punished, and all sections of our society, no matter
what their religion, caste or creed, guaranteed all the benefits afforded
to them as per the Constitution. Only then can Bharat be mahan and
‘shining’ as well.

REFERENCES

Bhat, Chandrashekar, India and the Indian Diaspora: A Policy Issue (University of
Hyderabad: Department of Sociology, 1986).
‘BJP for Better Control of Overseas Friends’, The Hindu, 13 March 2002.
‘Congress(I) Demands CBI Probe into VHP Funds’, The Hindu, 17 August 1999.
Eisenlohr, Patrick, ‘Mediating Diaspora across the Indian Ocean: Conflicting Projects
of Ethnolinguistic Purification in Mauritius’, paper presented at a conference
on ‘Cultural Exchange and Transformation in the Indian Ocean World’, UCLA,
5–6 April 2000.
Elliott, John, ‘India Moves to “Talibanise History”’, New Stateman, 17 December 2001.
Engineer, Asghar Ali, The Role of Minorities in Freedom Struggle (Delhi: Ajanta Pub-
lications, 1986).
Gadgil, N.V., U.V. Joshi, Shambu Prasad and Suresh Patel, The Peopling of India,
Demographic History, Global, Genetic History, Mitochondrial DNA Base Sequences.
In the Indian Human Heritage (Hyderabad: University Press, 1997).
Islam, Shamsul, The Freedom Movement and the RSS: A Story of Betrayal (New Delhi:
Joshi-Adhikari Institute of Social Studies, 2000).
—–———, Know the RSS (New Delhi: Media House, 2002).
Kandar, Mira, ‘The Struggle for India’s Soul’, World Policy Journal, vol. XIX, no. 3
(2002).
Mahajan, Romi, ‘Malign Money and Misguided Multiculturalism’, 5 December 2002.
Available online at http://counterpunch.org/mahajan1205.html
Mander, Harsh, ‘Cry the Beloved Country: Reflections on the Gujarat Massacres’,
South Asia Citizens Web. Available online at http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/
sSARKARonSANGHPARIVAR.html, 1993.
Mody, Anjali, ‘US Corporations Funding Hate’, The Hindu, 21 November 2002.
Narayan, K. Laxmi, Indian Diaspora: A Demographic Perspective (University of Hyderabad:
Center for Study of Indian Diaspora). Available online at http://www.uohyd.ernet.
in/sss/cinddiaspora/occ3.html
156 Jawaid Quddus

Puniyani, Ram, The Other Cheek: Minorities Under Threat (New Delhi: Media House,
2000).
—–———, Communal Politics: An Illustrated Primer (New Delhi: Safdar Hashmi
Memorial Trust, 2001).
—–———, Communal Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003).
Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, Ministry of External
Affairs, Foreign Secretary’s Office, 18 August 2000.
Sarkar, Tanika, ‘Ethic Cleansing in Gujarat. An Analysis of a Few Aspects’. Available
online at http://www.indowindow.com/akhbar, July 2002.
Shukla, I.K., Hindutva: An Autopsy of Fascism as a Theoterrorist Cult and Other Essays
(Delhi: Media House, 2003).
Singh, K.S. and S. Manoharan, People of India, National Series, Volume IX, Languages
& Scripts (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Taneja, Nalini, ‘Hindu Rashtra in Action’, South Asia Citizens Web. Available online
at http://www.indowindow.com/akhbar 2, 2002.
Tharoor, Shashi, ‘India for Indians’, The Hindu online, 28 April 2002.
The Foreign Exchange of Hate: IDRF and the American Funding of Hindutva (Sabrang
Communications Pvt. Ltd, Mumbai and The South Asia Citizens Web, France,
2002).
Wolpert, Stanley, New History of India (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
 HINDUTVA ANDWEAKER SECTIONS: CONFLICT
BETWEEN DOMINANCE AND RESISTANCE 8
PRAKASH LOUIS

R
eligious fundamentalism is an emerging phenomenon in the world
at large. But at different sociopolitical milieus it assumes different
forms. One common trend of religious fundamentalism is that in
almost all cases it tends to be fascist in nature. In the South Asian context
the emergence of Hindutva forces1 in India, the Islamization attempts in
Pakistan, the Buddhist dominated Sinhalization in Sri Lanka, all state the
fact that many countries are caught in the web of communal, fundamen-
tal, and fascist forces. The emergence of fundamentalist forces threaten
the very existence of minorities in a country and pose a danger to the
very core of any nation-state. Significantly, many of these fundamentalist
forces claim to be the guardians of national interest. But their ideology
and activities are contrary to the interest of any nation. A deeper analysis
of the emerging trends of fundamentalism unravels the fact that in reality
they want to uphold the hegemony and the monopoly of the dominant
segment of the population.
India also has been witnessing the emergence of communal, funda-
mental, and fascist forces in the recent past. The fundamentalist stream
within the majority Hindu community is usually known as Hindutva
forces. Since the term Hindutva forces is yet to be defined adequately,

1
Hindutva forces is a generic term used to describe the right wing fundamentalist
or fascist trends in India. One can also hear terms like Sangh Parivar, the RSS related
groups which refer to the same phenomenon. Sangh Parivar refers to the various forces
that are motivated by similar right wing fundamentalist ideology supposed to be based
on Hinduism.
158 Prakash Louis

let us briefly deal with some of the features that go with the phenomenon
Hindutva. Those who propagate Hindutva argue that Hindutva means
Hinduism, that is, the total aspect of Hindu-ness. By constantly using the
term Hindutva, the proponents of this ideology want to bring in an
upsurge within the Hindu majority community who adhere to Hindu
religious beliefs and practices.2 However, today the identity of the Hindutva
force has moved from being religious fundamentalists to cultural nation-
alists. Those who adhere to this philosophy call themselves cultural
nationalists, but in reality their actions have nothing to do with Hinduism
or nationalism. On the other hand, it is using religion for carrying out
a political agenda.
Those who have carefully examined the debilitating consequence of
Hindutva forces contend that Hindutva is the politics of the Hindu elite,
drawn from Brahminical Hinduism. While Hinduism in general is the
collation of multiple traditions, Hindutva is an attempt to construct a
Hindu rashtra. Further, while Hinduism in principle is based on the tenant
of tolerance and non-violence, Hindutva forces are essentially fascist in
nature and operation.3 If one delves deep into the factors behind the
emergence of Hindutva forces in India, one also realizes that the
construction of the Hindutva force is an attempt to enforce the upper-
caste hegemony, monopoly, control, dominance in general and Brahminical
caste structure in particular on the exploited and oppressed. Stated in
another way, the scheme behind the emergence of the Hindutva force
is to present the socio-political-economic ideology under the garb of
religious ideology, especially through religious symbols and slogans.
Romila Thapar, in her analysis of the Hindutva force, argues that, ‘The
new Hinduism which is being currently propagated by the Sanghs, Parishads
and Samajs is an attempt to restructure the indigenous religion as a
monolithic uniform religion, rather paralleling some of the features of
Semitic religions. This seems to be a fundamental departure from the
essentials of what may be called the indigenous “Hindu” religions. Its form
is not only in many ways alien to the earlier culture of India but equally
disturbing is the uniformity which it seeks to impose on the variety of
“Hindu” religions.’4

2
Prakash Louis, The Emerging Hindutva Force: The Ascent of Hindu Nationalism (New
Delhi: Indian Social Institute, 2000).
3
Ram Punyani, Fascism of Sangh Parivar (Bombay: Ekta, 1999).
4
Romila Thapar, ‘Syndicated Moksha?’, Seminar, 1987, p. 14.
Hindutva and Weaker Sections 159

WEAKER SECTIONS

In the Indian context, the Dalits,5 tribals and women are considered to
be the weaker sections. Interestingly, the Constitution does not define the
term weaker sections. But in clear terms it identifies what needs to be
done to those who constitute the weaker sections and thus in extension
identifies those who are weaker sections. ‘The State shall promote with
special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections
of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Sched-
uled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of
exploitation’ (Article 46). From the perspectives of the framers of the
Constitution, the SCs and the STs constitute specially marginalized and
discriminated segments of the population.
The Constitution of India has demanded in clear terms that all the
citizens be provided with the basic minimum facilities and their rights be
protected. Article 14 of the Constitution speaks about equality before law;
‘The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.’ Following in
the same line, Article 15 says, ‘The State shall not discriminate against
any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, places of birth
or any of them.’ The framers of the Constitution did not remain at that,
but went still further and reformulated their vision in favour of the weaker
sections by amending it. Article 15(4) declares, ‘nothing in this article
shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advance-
ment of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or
for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes’.6 Having located the
status of the weaker sections within the constitutional framework, let us
examine their social profile and then relate their struggles and aspirations
with the emergence of Hindutva forces.

5
The term ‘Dalit’ is and has been defined exclusively and inclusively. There are some
Dalits and non-Dalits who, under exclusive definition, refer only to the SCs or
erstwhile untouchables. There is another group of Dalits and non-Dalits which
includes SCs and STs under the category Dalits. Thus, 160 million SCs and 80 million
STs are at times clubbed together and called Dalits. This group of people at times
also includes all the exploited masses. In this book, the term Dalit has been used only
in an exclusive sense.
6
For the Constitution and for details on the amendment refer to The Constitution
of India (as on the 1 June 1996) (Government of India: Law and Justice Ministry,
1996).
160 Prakash Louis

SCHEDULED CASTES: A PROFILE

According to the 1991 Census, the SCs constitute over 14 crore, that is,
they comprise about 16.48 per cent of the total population. It is an
established fact that the SCs are the most disadvantaged segment of
Indian population. They continue to be subjected to social exclusion,
economic deprivation, political marginalization and caste discrimination.
This social fact had compelled the founding fathers to provide affirmative
action, introduce stringent laws like Prevention of Atrocities Act, insti-
tution of National Commission for Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes, etc. But all these provisions have not made the impact they were
supposed to. A brief examination of some of the social indicators related
to this disadvantaged community highlight this phenomenon.
Education and literacy are two indicators through which the partici-
pation of a community in national development is measured. In the case
of the SCs, even after five decades of independence, their literacy rate
is just 37.82 per cent. While the male literacy rate among the SCs is
reaching the century mark, literacy rate of women is abysmally low at just
23.76 per cent. A comparison of the literacy trend among the SCs over
four decades unravels the fact that the literacy level of this segment of
the population has not even moved at a snail’s space (Table 8.1). The
significant factor with regard to the literacy and educational indicators
among the SCs is that all the children in this community do not get
enrolled in schools. Among those who are enrolled, over 79.88 per cent
of them drop out by the time they reach high school. This is also another
factor for the persistent low level of literacy rate among the weaker
section.
It is expedient to highlight some of the factors that are responsible for
maintaining a low level of literacy among the SCs. A probe team which

Table 8.1
Sex-wise Literacy Trend among SCs, STs and Total Population—India

Year Total Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes

Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
1961 34.44 12.95 24.02 16.96 3.29 10.27 13.83 3.16 8.54
1971 39.45 39.45 29.46 22.36 6.44 14.67 17.63 4.85 11.39
1981 65.60 65.50 43.67 31.12 10.93 21.38 24.52 8.05 16.35
1991 64.13 64.13 52.21 49.91 23.76 37.41 40.65 18.19 29.60

Source: National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Fifth Report,
1998–99, vol. 1, p. 66.
Hindutva and Weaker Sections 161

investigated this matter, highlighted, ‘First, what needs to be considered

is not just physical distance but also “social distance”, taking into account
various barriers that may prevent a willing child from reaching the local
school. In many areas, for instance, villages are divided into separate
hamlets, and children from one hamlet may be reluctant or unable to go
to school in another hamlet, e.g., due to caste tensions. Only half of all
hamlets in rural India have primary schools, and in states like Uttar
Pradesh the proportion of such hamlets is as low as 30 per cent. For girls,
restricted freedom of movement further enhances the problem of social
distance.’7 Thus girl children suffer double discrimination. While the
Dalits and the downtrodden are struggling to become literate, the Hindutva
forces are busy saffronizing education, which would further deny social
mobility among them.
At the economic front since employment opportunities are limited to
the SCs, they continue to live in rural areas. The landed gentry also block
any opportunities that could benefit the weaker sections so that they
continue to work as agricultural labourers for them and above all be
dependent upon them. In the 1991 Census about 50 per cent of the SC
population were agricultural labourers. But the reality is that more than
two-thirds (76.22 per cent) of this population is engaged in agriculture
and allied activities. Further in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, over 72
per cent of the SC population are landless agricultural labourers. Access
to resources, control over labour, participation in political processes are
the central demands of the Dalits. Hence, they do not figure in the agenda
of the Hindutva forces.

SCHEDULED TRIBES: A PROFILE

There are over 6.78 crore tribals in India, who constitute 8.08 per cent
of the total population (1991 Census). It is repeatedly stated that they
are supposed to be the original settlers of India. Keeping this historical
fact in mind, the framers of the Constitution placed them under Sched-
uled Areas. This was another way of providing them a protective cover
from the exploitation of non-tribal population and also a way of main-
taining their sociocultural identity. This protective discrimination also
could not save the tribals from being displaced and marginalized.

7
National Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Commission Report, New Delhi,
1991.
162 Prakash Louis

Natural resources constitute the very lifeline of the tribal population.

These resources make up the economic, social, cultural, political, and
religious universe of the tribal community. The tribal women, in a special
way, had a say and control over these resources. With the introduction
of development-induced displacement, vast segment of the tribal popu-
lation are displaced from their natural habitats and also are subjected to
innumerable forms of exploitation. While land alienation and displace-
ment have become an integral part of tribal history, rehabilitation does
not seem to be part of the national agenda. Table 8.2 highlights the fact
that over 74.10 lakh tribals have been displaced in Jharkhand alone due
to displacement carried out in the name of development.8 Out of them
only 18.45 lakh have been resettled leaving over 76 per cent of the
displaced people in no man’s land. Thus, the tribals who lived in symbiotic
relationship with nature are reduced to aliens in their own land. Women
lose control over resources and this increases their burden in terms of
finding fuel, fodder, and food.

Table 8.2
Estimate of the Total Number of Persons and Tribals Displaced and Resettled
by Various Development Projects in India: 1951–90 (number in lakhs)

Type of Total Tribals Tribals dis- Total Percentage Tribal Percentage

projects displaced displaced placed (%) resettled of resettled resettled of resettled

Dams 164.0 63.2 38.5 41.0 25.0 15.8 25.0

Mines 25.5 13.3 52.2 6.5 25.4 3.3 24.8
Industry 12.5 3.1 25.0 3.8 30.4 0.8 25.8
Wild-life 6.0 4.5 75.0 1.3 21.6 1.0 22.2
Others 5.0 1.3 25.0 1.5 30.0 0.3 23.0
Total 213.0 85.4 40.1 54.0 25.4 21.2 24.8

Source: Annual Report 1991–92. Ministry of Rural Development, New Delhi: Government
of India, 1991.

There is also another perception about development-induced displace-

ment. ‘For those who are displaced, these development projects usually
have overwhelmingly negative consequences, resulting in social and
psychological disruption, and often long-term economic improverishment.
They have effectively become what one might call “people in the way of
progress”, having to move to make way for, and to suffer for, the kind of

8
Prakash Louis, ‘Jharkhand: Marginalisation of Tribals’, Economic and Political Weekly,
vol. 35, no. 47 (18 November 2000), pp. 4087–91.
Hindutva and Weaker Sections 163

infrastructural development that is, for many people, the hallmark of

progress. It is seen as unfortunate, but nevertheless as expedient, “for the
sake of the nation”, that some should suffer.’9 Those who favour the
developmental approach fail to take into account the marginalization of
the tribal communities. Thus, land alienation and displacment have
become burning issues for the tribals. But the Hindutva forces are busy
with ghar vapasi, that is, reconverting them from other religions.

WOMEN: A PROFILE

According to the 1991 Census, women comprise over 40.78 crores of the
population of India. Since women are also a marginalized and discrim-
inated segment of the population, it was necessary to make special pro-
visions for them in the Constitution. Article 15(3) of the Constitution
enjoins upon the government to provide adequate conditions for the
empowerment of women. ‘Nothing in this article shall prevent the State
from making any special provisions for women.’ Once again like the other
weaker sections, women also have been victims of planned development.
While legal provisions grew in leaps and bounds, the condition of majority
of women is extremely deplorable. Significantly, empowerment of women
was one of the primary objectives of the Ninth Five-Year plan.
It needs to be stated here that any talk of women’s empowerment is
encountered with cynicism. ‘The declaration by the Finance Minster in
the middle of his budget speech, that the year 2001 would be the “Year
of Women’s Empowerment” elicited hardly any reaction from the general
public, and was greeted with bored scepticism by most women’s groups.
This was not surprising—announcements of this kind are fairly routine,
and any hopes that might be raised soon succumb to natural causes in
the absence of significant financial outlays to back up the grand new
schemes proposed.’10
Even basic human needs like sanitation and health have been denied
to the weaker sections.

A majority of India’s population does not have access to toilet facilities

in their dwellings and lacks sanitation facilities or the disposal of waste

9
Chris De Wet, ‘Economic Development and Population Displacement: Can Every-
body Win?’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 36, no. 50 (2001), pp. 4637–46.
10
Kalyani Menon-Sen, ‘Towards Equality’, Seminar, vol. 505 (September 2001),
pp. 12–15.
164 Prakash Louis

water. Apart from the availability of safe drinking water, lack of sanitation,
particularly sewage and disposal of solid waste including ‘night soil’ has
been observed as among the main reasons for prevailing ill health and
morbidity levels in the country. As per the 1991 census, less than one-
fourth of the households in the country had toilet facility within the
premises of their residence, the proportion was less than 10 per cent for
rural households and around 64 per cent for urban households. Among
the various population segments, access to toilet facilities for Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes households was lower than that of other
households in almost all States.11

ONSLAUGHT OF HINDUTVA FORCES ON

WEAKER SECTIONS

The 1996 election manifesto of the BJP, which is the political face of the
Sangh Parivar, promised to work ‘For a Strong and Prosperous India’. The
agenda of the Hindutva forces are clearly spelt out in the manifesto.
‘Hindutva or cultural nationalism, shall be the rainbow which will bridge
our present to our glorious past and pave the way for an equally glorious
future; it will guide the transition from swarajya, that is, self-rule to
surajaya, that is, good-governance . . .. Hindutva is a unifying principle,
which alone can preserve the unity and integrity of our nation. It is a
collective endeavour to protect and re-energize the soul of India, to take
us into the next millennium as a strong and prosperous nation.’12 These
electoral utterances clearly indicate the agenda of the Hindutva forces.
Though self-rule and good governance are spoken as desirable ends, the
ultimate aim is to build a monolithic, hierarchical, and unequal Hindu
nation.
According to Jayant Lele, the Hindutva project has three essential
characteristics of all its past manipulations. First, it is hegemonic, in the
sense that it seeks to create a political constituency. The aim behind the
building up of this constituency is that this can be regularly mobilized into
an ongoing structure of support for electoral and other political activities.

11
National Human Development Report (New Delhi: Planning Commission, Govern-
ment of India, 2001).
12
T.B. Hansen and C. Jaffrelot, The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).
Hindutva and Weaker Sections 165

Those who are consciously engaged in the political project of Hindutva,

the leaders of BJP in particular, know that the managing institutions of
the global economy will actively cooperate with the Hindu nation if and
only if it fulfils some basic requirements. The second feature is hom-
ogenizing. The political community that emerged under Gandhiji and was
nurtured by Nehru had taken into account the enormous diversity of the
emerging nation. But this was challenged by the majoritarian Hindu
construct. The colonial rulers nurtured all of these as politically ‘equal’
interest groups. But from 1980s onwards there was an attempt by the
Hindutva forces to create a new hegemony. It aims at a national consen-
sus based on a homogenized Hindu identity. This is similar to the earlier
project of Brahminization, that is, of homogenizing the diverse creative
and critical impulses in the Indian tradition. Third, the Hindutva forces
have followed the pedagogy of recapturing and releasing the power of
symbols and deities that have lived this dual, pan-Indian and local ex-
istence in the memories and aspirations of the people. This fabrication
is aimed at bringing in an illusion of security and trust and a sense of
historically persistent solidarity, into a world that is increasingly charac-
terized by anxiety, uncertainty, and disorder. The selection and the use
of these symbols, events, and actors are also associated with pedagogic
violence.13 Thus, in the ultimate analysis, the agenda of Hindutva forces
is to continue to maintain the dominance of the caste and class elite.
Further, it is an all round attempt to repress any form of resistance
emerging from those who were subjected to dominance for centuries.
An additional social fact also needs to be laid bare here. The emer-
gence of the RSS and the ascent of BJP have their origin in the rise of
Brahminism. The once socially, politically, and economically powerful
Brahmin fold was losing out to other caste groups. They not only per-
formed the typically mental jobs for the rulers in the past, they engaged
in martial functions when necessary. They slowly realized that their
fortunes were on the decline. Gandhi’s political mobilization too threat-
ened the Brahminical values. In the western part of the country, Marathas
and Gujarati banias were gaining the upper hand and the Brahmins were
losing out to these socially mobile castes. It was at this juncture that the
RSS came onto the scene. It is said that the RSS attracted many
Maharashtrian Brahmins because it embodied their particular culture,
one characterized by a combination of Brahminical and martial values.

13
Jayant Lele, Hindustan: The Emergence of the Right (Madras: Earthworm Books,
1995), p. xvii.
166 Prakash Louis

In the past, they had performed Kshatriya functions, in particular by

serving in Shivaji’s armies. However, they slowly realized that their for-
tunes were on a decline.14 Hence, the Brahminical social fold immediately
sprang into action and formed the RSS. The venom with which the Sangh
Parivar attacks the Dalits, tribals, women, backward castes and the
minorities is a clear indication of the ‘threat’ envisaged from these castes
and communities who are resisting subjugation by the upper-caste forces
and revolting against Brahminical superiority.

DALITS AND HINDUTVA FORCES

The Hindutva forces and the Dalits constitute two opposing ideologies,
ways of life, and processes in this country. As argued earlier, the Hindutva
forces are hegemonizing, homogenizing, manipulative, and destructive. In
contrast, the Dalits are the creative, non-owning but producing class.
Irrespective of the fact that the Dalits were and are subjected to unpre-
cedented and unimaginable cruelty and oppression, they continue to
uphold the Indian polity and society. Whether it is the Chakwara incident
where the Dalits were denied the right to enter the village pond or the
Jhajjar incident where five Dalits were lynched to death while they were
carrying out their traditional occupation of processing animal hide, all go
to state that the Dalits can be disposed off by the dominant castes. While
this is a historical reality, the most intriguing factor is that the Hindutva
forces exploited these incidents to establish their base in the region.15
The barbaric and beastly behaviour exhibited towards the Dalits and
the downtrodden by the dominant castes could be directly understood
from the glorification of caste by the proponents of Hindutva. Savarkar’s
views on caste expresses this in a telling manner.

And thus we find that the institutions that were the peculiar mark of our
nation were revived. The system of four varnas which could not be wiped
out even under the Buddhistic sway, grew in popularity to such an extent
that kings and emperors felt it a distinction to be called one who estab-
lished the system of four varnas . . . . Witness the definition that tries to
draw a line of demarcation between foreigners and us—the land where the

14
Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925 to the
1990s (New Delhi: Viking, 1993), p. 47.
15
Prakash Louis, ‘Dalit utpeedan: Chakwara se Jhajjar tak’, Hindustan, 29 October
2002.
Hindutva and Weaker Sections 167

system of four varnas does not exist should be known as the Mlechcha
[impure] country. Aryavarta lies away from it.16

Going further, it needs to be stated that the Hindutva forces not only
upheld the anti-human, exploitative and oppressive caste system but also
engaged in cultural manipulations of the weaker sections. It is expedient
at this juncture to present briefly the various game plans employed by the
Sangh Parivar to maintain its hold over the Dalits. To cite an example,
the RSS has initiated different educational and developmental activities
in the slums of Chennai. A youth of Munnusami Nagar of Chennai stated,
‘the RSS introduced North Indian ceremonies like Rakshabandan and
Ramnavami in our slum to show that we are all Indians; our Ambedkar
Night School was renamed into Hindu Samrajya School, where classes
would begin with the slogan of “Jaybeem” and end with abusing the
Muslims. They taught us to say that RSS is our mother and the BJP our
father. They also claimed that Ambedkar was a[n] RSS activist and
distributed key chains bearing the image of Ambedkar.’17
The Dalits and the downtrodden clearly and categorically see the
manoeuvring that goes on in the name of building a strong and prosperous
nation. A Dalit youth of Triplicane, another slum in Chennai asserted
that, ‘The Brahminical oppression is pervasive in all fields. They control
the cultural sphere like carnatic music. But above all, to divide the Dalits
they have corrupted our leaders. Despite political differences, the Brah-
mins keep their caste unity intact. Our Chief Minister takes pride in
starting her caste in the Legislative Assembly. It is their unity and pride
of belonging to an upper caste which give them the strength to hold on
to power and deprive us of our right to organise and assert.’18 Since the
Dalits are deprived economically, politically, socially and culturally they
cannot adequately counter the move of the Hindutva forces.
The Sangh Parivar’s game plan to bring the Dalits into the Hindu fold
is clearly expressed by the VHP’s leader Ashok Singal, ‘For us Hindu
means all those religions which have come up from this soil of Hindustan.
Dr Ambedkar upheld the spirit of this country when he stopped the flow
of Dalits into foreign religions like Christianity and Islam by propagating
the Ideals of Buddhism. That way he contributed greatly to the Hindu

16
V.D. Savarkar, Hindutva (Mumbai: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1989), p. 27.
17
S. Anandhi, Contending Identities: Dalits and Secular Politics in Modern Slums (New
Delhi: Indian Social Institute, 1995), p. 37.
18
Ibid., p. 45.
168 Prakash Louis

Dharma. And that is why we consider him one of the pioneers of our
ideology and our movement.’19 By this statement, the VHP leaders have
achieved more than one goal. He has tried to co-opt Ambedkar too into
the Brahminical fold. This can be called ‘Brahminization’ process.20 They
have also made it appear that there is no antagonism between Brahminism
and Buddhism. Above all, they have established this myth that except
the Christians and Muslims the rest belong to the Hindu fold. By pro-
jecting the Muslims and Christians, the Sangh Parivar leaders have also
kept intact their regular vote bank.
Pralay Kanungo in his perceptive analysis presents the reason why
Nagpur became the centre of RSS. Nagpur had many educational insti-
tutions and hence made greater impact. Newspapers like Hitavada and
Maharashtra were published from here. One-fourth of the educated stu-
dents in the province were from Nagpur and all of them were Maharashtrian
Brahmins. Nagpur was the seat of political power under the Bhonslas in
which these Brahmins had a dominant position. They continued to
maintain their superiority vis-à-vis the non-Brahmins even under the
British. But their dominance was challenged by the non-Brahmins. Nagpur
was emerging as site of non-Brahmin assertion and consolidation. The All
India Depressed Classes Conference was organized at Nagpur on 30
April–1 May 1920 and Dr Ambedkar emerged as a militant leader of the
community challenging the leadership of V.R. Shinde, an upper caste
social worker, who was dedicated to the cause of the depressed classes.
In this background, Hedgewar a Maharashtrian Brahmin founded the
RSS at Nagpur.21 Thus it can be argued that cultural nationalism is
another name for continuing the culture of dominance.

TRIBALS AND HINDUTVA FORCES

Prabhakar Tirkey while analysing the substitution of the term Jharkhand

with Vananchal exposes the exploitative factors and forces behind this

19
Ashok Singhal. Interview in Frontline, 31 December 1993.
20
By Brahminization what is indicated is the attempt of the brahminical forces to co-
opt any one leader who was in the other end of the spectrum and posed a challenge
to the very hierarchical brahminical order. The brahminical forces co-opt the leader
so as to bring to the mainstream those who followed him. This is also being done with
Ravidas and Dr Ambedkar.
21
Pralay Kanungo, RSS’s Tryst with Politics: From Hedgewar to Sudarshan (New Delhi:
Manohar, 2002).
Hindutva and Weaker Sections 169

sinister move. The Jharkhand struggle itself found its base in the concept
‘Jharkhand’ right from 1950, though the self-determination struggle is a
few centuries old. But when the Hindutva force realized that the Jharkhand
struggle as well as Jharkhand itself was slipping out of its hand, it projected
Vananchal from 1990. The main social base of the Vananchal movement
is the big business companies. But they managed to mobilize the small
traders, petty businessmen (teli, sahu, bania) around the notion of
Vananchal. It is these petty traders who are the exploiters of the tribals
in the rural areas. The mobilizational initiatives came from the RSS. The
Vananchal proposal came as a major boon for the petty traders whose
activities have been restricted due to the emergence of All Jharkhand
Students Union (AJSU) struggles. With the weapon of Vananchal these
forces created division within the tribals in the name of tribals and
Christian tribals.22
The Sangh Parivar carefully and consistently built on these opposing
trends and roped in the non-tribal as well as the Sarna tribal communities
as its basic constituency in the Jharkhand region. It is this social reality
which provided a political platform for the BJP to establish its roots in
Jharkhand. The Hindutva forces also succeeded in offering justification
to the Hinduizing process. This process also, in a latent way, offered fertile
ground to the Sangh Parivar to consolidate its membership. Interestingly,
it is from the drought-prone and poverty stricken Palamu district of
Jharkhand region, that the highest number of Dalits and tribals were
taken to function as ‘Kar Sevaks’ at Ayodhya.23
Examining the assertion that is emerging from the tribals, John Lakra
states that a few years ago the Hindu zealots went about writing on the
walls all over the country, ‘garv se kaho hum Hindu hain’ (say with pride,
‘We are Hindus’). To this slogan, the tribals in Ranchi retaliated with their
slogan, ‘garv se kaho hum Sarna hain’ (say with pride, ‘We are Sarna’). The
Sarna intellectuals went one step ahead and in March 1997 declared,
‘Sarna adivasi na to Hindu hain, na to Sikh-Isai hain, aur na to Musalman
hain’ (the Sarna Adivasis are neither Hindus, nor Sikhs-Christians, nor
Muslims). Thus from the above presentation it is clear that the tribals are
not Hindus. The jargon ‘tribals are Hindus’ is directed by the Hindus
against the influence of the Christian missionaries on the tribals, yet it

22
Prabhakar Tirkey, In Tribal Unity: A Political Perspective (Ranchi: R.T.C., 1999),
p. 30.
23
This was reported by a leader of the BJP who led a group of tribals and Dalits from
Palamu for the demolition of Babri Masjid.
170 Prakash Louis

ultimately goes against them, because by imposing their own values on

the tribals these Hindus negate the very existence of their identity and
religion.24

WOMEN AND HINDUTVA FORCES

Whether it is in the Chipko movement or the Uttranchal movement of

the hills, the fisherfolk movements at the coastal areas all over the
country, the Jharkhand movement, the peasant movements, the naxalite
movements, anti-liquor movements, spontaneous outbursts or the women’s
movements per se, women moved away from short-term political interests
to challenge the very patriarchal system on which gender inequality is
based. This has led the women’s movement to come into direct conflict
with the powers that be. Patriarchal system draws its sustenance from
the male dominated religious beliefs, religious traditions and scriptures.
The emergence of fundamentalism has given a new lease of life to
male domination, which was being dismantled in the recent past due to
the rise of women’s movements. But the ascent of the Hindutva force
is once again trying to drive the women to the homes and hearth. It is
appropriate to view the fear of women and women’s movements towards
the Sangh Parivar or the reactionary Hindu right wing forces from this
backdrop.
To understand the conflict that is going on between the women’s
movement and Hindutva forces, let us look at the mindset of the Hindutva
forces. Mridula Sinha, ex-President of BJP’s Mahila Morcha, in an inter-
view stated that (a) a woman should not work outside the home unless
her family is financially very deprived, (b) I gave dowry and received
dowry, (c) I oppose women’s liberation, as it is another name for ‘loose
morals’, (d) we oppose equal rights for both sexes, (e) there is nothing
wrong with domestic violence against women; very often it is the women’s
fault. We advise women to try and adjust, (f) women’s future lies in
perpetuating the present, because nowhere else are women worshipped
as we are in India, and (g) for us women’s liberation means liberation
from atrocities. It does not mean they should be relieved of their duties
as wives and mothers.25

24
Ibid.
25
The Telegraph, 27 December 1992.
Hindutva and Weaker Sections 171

Veena Poonacha while spelling out the reasons why women are fright-
ened of Hindutva forces argues,

Lots of goddesses are worshipped but religious discourses do not proceed

from the vantage point of the women but predominantly from the male
point of view. The Saptapada and the Kanyadan rituals of marriage devalue
women. The garbhadan ritual makes women only the receptacle for the
‘seed’ planted by the father and hence he becomes the natural guardian
of the child and thus property flows from father to son. Paradoxically the
ideology of motherhood extols the duties and virtues of mother without
giving any real authority over the child. The revival of sati at Deoralas was
more to assert the Rajput ideology and to draw political clout than to
highlight any religious sentiments. This is based on the stree-dharma. The
presentation of Ramayana serial has helped in projecting a monolithic
Hindu identity and has relegated women to an inferior place. Among all
the variants of Hinduism the present attempt to homogenize the Hindu
way of life has the least scope for the liberation of all women.26

From the above debate it becomes clear that Dalits, tribals, and women
have not been part of the Indian society. With the emergence of Hindutva
forces, these weaker sections are promised citizenship under the Hindu
nationalism but in reality they are co-opted for maintaining this oppres-
sive edifice. Sumanta Banerjee has the following analysis about the un-
derstanding of Hindutva by its various constituencies:

The Hindutva ideology inspite of the tactical differences among the BJP,
RSS, VHP and the Shiv Sena leaders and the ranks, a general consensus
has emerged among them about the definition of Hindutva: a highly
structured belief system involving the interpretation of the past, an analy-
sis of the present, and a set of precepts and imperatives for future conduct.
Under this they stress the inimical traits of Hindu religious myths and
imagery and personalities like Rama, Hanuman, Ayodhya and denying and
depreciating traditions like Buddhism, Islam and Christianity, which have
been part of Indian tradition. These are translated into coherent set of
metaphors, idioms and emotionally laden expressions in order to elevate
them to a position of authority to impose unity over an amorphous Hindu
community.27

26
Veena Poonacha, ‘Hindutva’s Hidden Agenda: Why Women Fear Religious Fun-
damentalism’, Economic and Political Weekly (13 March 1993), p. 438.
27
Sumanta Banerjee, ‘“Hindutva”—Ideology and Social Psychology’, Economic and
Political Weekly (19 January 1991), pp. 97–101.
172 Prakash Louis

Arguing in the same vein, Ajit Roy states:

The traditional communalism except the Muslim League variety was based
on the politics of bargaining within the existing system for a better position
and greater benefits. Hindutva by contrast is aimed at capturing power
through sort of a coup with a view to fundamentally altering the character
of the polity that is shifting from the participatory democracy to a form
of authoritarian regime under the upper caste hegemony. Thus it will
initiate the rule of B-3, that is the Brahmins, the Banias and the Bhumihars/
Babu Sahebs. There is also a meeting point of the obscurantist Sangh
Parivar and the ultra modernist business houses and both stand to benefit
from each other. So the urgent task today is to expose and combat the
political essence of the Sangh Parivar’s present offensive, that is, to go
beyond the framework of fighting against communalism of the traditional
variety. The pronouncements of the Sangh spokesperson have made it
clear that the logic of their politics implies not only suppression of the
rights of the minorities but also of the weaker section within the Hindu
fold and especially women.28

It is of seminal significance to state here that the Gujarat pogrom

which not only shook Gujarat and the nation but shocked the entire
world was the outcome of careful planning by the Hindutva forces. It was
reported in the 2000, that the RSS’ slogan, ‘One village, one shakha’ is
aimed at saffronizing the entire state of Gujarat by 2005. The new mantra
for the RSS expansion will be explained at a three-day Sankalp Shibir
(pledge camp) to be held at Kathwada in Ahmedabad district. The
organizers are expecting about 27,000 swayamsevaks to attend the camp.
This has led to communal tension in the state.29 The destructive conse-
quence was the murder and the mayhem that was unleashed on Muslim
minority community in Gujarat.

AMBEDKAR’S ALTERNATIVE TO NATION BUILDING

Against the communal and fascist forces, Dr Ambedkar presents an

alternative form of nation building. Dr Ambedkar developed his social

28
Ajit Roy, ‘Hindutva’s Political Agenda’, Economic and Political Weekly (20 March
1993), pp. 499–500.
29
Asian Age, 7 January 2000.
Hindutva and Weaker Sections 173

and political thoughts around the central concept of the individual and
his/her rights. He stated that ‘the individual has certain inalienable
rights’. In his view the individual and not the state is the object of supreme
value and the state is only a human organization to promote the individual’s
good. He wrote, ‘to protect itself against external aggression, maintenance
of law and order against internal disturbance and guarantee to its subjects
minimum standards of administration and welfare, which are expected
from a modern state’.30 He insists that some kind of good government is
essential for maintaining peace and prosperity among men, particularly
when people fail to abide by law and order. For him this is the mission
of a good government.
Dr Ambedkar clearly understood the hold of caste on the Indian social
order. He argued, ‘The effect of caste on the ethics of the Hindus is simply
deplorable. Caste has killed public spirit. Caste has destroyed the sense
of public charity. Caste has made public opinion impossible. A Hindu’s
identity is his caste. His responsibility is only to his caste. His loyalty is
restricted only to his caste. Virtue has become caste-ridden and morality
has become caste-bound. There is no sympathy to the deserving. There
is no appreciation to the meritorious. There is no charity to the needy.
Suffering as such calls for no response. There is charity but it begins with
caste and ends with caste . . .. There is appreciation of virtue but only
when the man is a fellow caste-man.’31 Having exposed the hold of caste
on Indian social order, Dr Ambedkar raised a vital question, which is
relevant even today. ‘Have not the Hindus committed treason against
their country in the interests of their caste?’
In spite of this, Ambedkar opted for democracy because he felt from
his experience and readings that it is in a democratic form of government
that an individual’s liberty is protected. But he went on to argue that ‘a
democratic form of government presupposed a democratic form of soci-
ety. The formal framework of democracy is of no value and would indeed
be misfit if there was no social democracy.’32 Ambedkar also realized the
fact that with caste system democracy can never work; hence his slogan,
‘Educate, Agitate and Organize’. To carry out this objective he founded
the following organizations: the Bahiskrit Hitakarni Sabha, the Samaj

30
B.R. Ambedkar, Writings and Speeches, vol. 1 (Government of Maharashtra: Edu-
cation Department, 1990), p. 381.
31
Ibid., pp. 56–57.
32
B.R. Ambedkar, Ranade, Gandhi and Jinnah (Jullundhar: Bheem Patrika Publica-
tions, n.d.), p. 30.
174 Prakash Louis

Samta Mandal, the Independent Labour Party, the S.C. Federation, the
Republican Party of India, People’s Education Society etc., to promote
education, to advance the economic conditions, and to represent the
grievances of the depressed classes.
Ambedkar insisted on the economic welfare of the poorer sections of
society and regarded economic values as only a means but not an end.
Hence, he declared that, ‘if the machine and modern civilization have
not benefited everybody, the remedy is not to condemn machinery and
civilization, but to alter the organization of society so that the benefits
will not be usurped by a few but will accrue to all’.33 He further argued
that a society that does not believe in democracy might be indifferent to
rational human relationships. He stated that a non-democratic society
may well content itself with a life of ‘leisure and culture’ for the few and
a life of ‘toil and drudgery’ for the many, but in reality a democratic society
must assure a life of leisure and culture to everyone.
Dr Ambedkar insisted upon the fact that the rational norms based on
liberty, equality and fraternity can provide us with a sound social order.
With regard to liberty he argued that everyone should be able to enjoy
freedom from want and freedom from fear. It is with this clear thought
in mind that he wholeheartedly supported the fundamental rights of
individuals in the Constitution. He demanded liberty in the sense of a
right to property, tools and materials as being necessary for earning a
living. Respect for the free will of every individual is the cornerstone of
Ambedkar’s social order. This is clearly spelt out in the Directive Prin-
ciples of State Policy, ‘State shall strive to promote the welfare of the
people by securing and protecting, as effectively as it may, a social order
in which justice, social economic and political, shall inform all the
institutions of national life.’
Ambedkar was aware of the fact that mechanical equality is not a
possibility. But he insisted on sociopolitical equality. He demanded adult
franchise for all as a fundamental right because he believed that the poor
masses will become educated and will become aware of their rights so that
the rich cannot usurp their productive labour. By equality what he meant
was ‘equality of opportunity’. With regard to fraternity, he argued that if
it is to function, it must involve the flow of the people, ideas and events,
and shun all rigid human relations.34 While Dr Ambedkar envisaged and
worked for an egalitarian, democratic, pluralistic social order, the Hindutva

33
Ibid., vol. 9.
34
Ibid., p. 23.
Hindutva and Weaker Sections 175

forces are bent on constructing a Hindu nation on the grave of the weaker
sections.
It is pertinent to conclude this debate by presenting the inherent
pluralistic Indian ethos.

For Chhedilal and Mohammed Matin, their friendship was more important
than all the communal hatred their cities have witnessed in the past few
years. Friends for more than 50 years, Chhedilal, a Hindu, lived in Ayodhya
and Matin a Muslim, in Faizabad. When the news of Matin’s illness
reached him on Friday, Chhedilal rushed to his house. But the old friend
had already died, and at the sight of his friend’s body an apparently shocked
Chhedilal collapsed and died a few hours later. At the Rakabganj crossing,
the funeral processions of two friends met yesterday and the bodies were
placed there for some time. Later, Matin’s body was buried in a graveyard
and Chhedilal’s cremated at a burning gha’t.35

The Hindutva forces are bent on creating crisis and conflict leading
to subjugation of those who do not adhere to their agenda. The common
masses of this country continue to struggle to build an egalitarian, demo-
cratic, and pluralistic form of polity and society. It is the task of the civil
society to enhance the rights of the common masses to carry out their
agenda of building a better India for all.

35
The Hindu, New Delhi, 14 April 1997. Quoted in Partha S. Ghosh, BJP and the
Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: From Periphery to Centre (New Delhi: Manohar, 1999).
 MOBILIZATION FOR HINDUTVA 9
MANJARI KATJU

O
ver the last two decades Hindutva, characterized by an aggres-
sive, communal, and authoritarian streak, has etched an influ-
ential place for itself in Indian politics. Venomous campaigns
against minorities and an equally vituperative propaganda against secular
and plural values have marked this forward march of Hindutva. It would
be misleading to see this forward drive as a spontaneous mass outburst
against a secular-democratic set-up and for religio-cultural nationalism.
To identify it so ‘suppresses a whole history of meticulously organized
efforts towards a Hindu Rashtra’ (Basu et al. 1993, p. 1). Rather than
being a sudden upsurge, the spread of ideas represented by Hindutva is
attributable to gradual and meticulous mobilizational work combining
multiple strategies that are alert to contextual and social differences.
Present-day Hindutva, both as a movement and as an idea, has a past
that goes back to the colonial period. As a political movement its history
can be traced back to the early twentieth century, to the founding of the
Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS. As an idea, it can be traced to the
nineteenth-century writings of influential icons of the socioreligious re-
form and national movements like Vivekananda, Tilak, and Savarkar
among others. But it was the RSS which made Hindutva a mass phenom-
enon in the post-independence period. Hindutva’s present spread has
been the result of years of meticulous planning, organization and
mobilizational activism of the RSS. A lot of work has gone into broad-
ening Hindutva’s mass appeal and this chapter attempts to study this ‘hard
work’.
Mobilization for Hindutva 177

THE RSS AND ITS OFFSHOOTS

Floating of front organizations was one of the important ways of ideo-

logical expansion undertaken by the RSS. Accordingly, the Rashtra Sevika
Samiti (1936), Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) (1948), the
Bharatiya Jana Sangh (1951, which subsequently became the BJP), the
Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (1955), the Vishva Hindu Parishad (1964),
the Bajrang Dal (1980s), etc., were floated. Launching of these organ-
izations was an effective way of mass work and ideological dissemination.
These organizations work in tandem with each other, but have their
own specific purpose to fulfil. For instance, the Rashtra Sevika Samiti was
floated to work among women. The ABVP was set up to contain the
influence of communism in college campuses and develop cadre for
the RSS. The labour unit was also floated to contain the influence of
communist trade unions among industrial labour. The VHP was set
up to handle mass mobilizational work and to organize the ‘Hindu’
diaspora. A political party was indispensable to politically fortify Hindutva
in state institutions and hence, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh became the
electoral front. In 1980, after the debacle of the post-emergency coalition,
it was re-incarnated as the BJP. The Bajrang Dal was formed in the early
1980s to organize the youth for the Ramjanmabhoomi agitation.
The membership of these organizations is fluid, that is, their members
move with ease between them. For instance, a member of the RSS can
be a member of the VHP as also that of the BJP. The only exception is
that women members cannot be part of the RSS, whose membership is
restricted to men. These organizations work under the aegis of their
parent—the RSS—mobilizing popular opinion in the name of Hindu
religion.
The RSS, on its part, calls itself a cultural organization engaged in
character building and preparing volunteers in service of the Hindu
nation.1 These organizations are collectively known as the Sangh Parivar
and they articulate a right-wing Hindu supremacist ideology called
Hindutva, which has found resonance among large sections of the citi-
zenry at a time when economic and social relations are experiencing major
shifts. India’s body politic is seeing a shift from a one-party dominant
system to a coalitional set up. There are not only different parties in power

1
For a detailed account of the RSS see Goyal (1979) and Andersen et al. (1987).
178 Manjari Katju

at the centre and the states, but also a singular set-up at the level of the
central government is absent. It has become imperative for parties rep-
resenting varied interests and regions to come together to run govern-
ments in the absence of an absolute majority for any single political party
in Parliament. This is also a time when the Indian state is in retreat, trying
to move from the welfarist position it had adopted after independence
to a minimalist position. It is a period when developments like globaliza-
tion are opening the domestic economy to uncertainities brought upon
by the ups and downs of global trade and pricing, coupled with the harsh
stance taken by the world financial institutions in favour of removing the
few welfare nets provided by the state. In this backdrop, Hindutva has
found acceptance among large sections of the middle and the working
classes, and among both the upper and the disadvantaged castes.

INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

Communalism interprets history in a particular way so as to advance

communal politics. For communalism, religious prejudice rather than an
objective view of history forms the basis of historical analysis. Here,
religion and religious conflict are given centrality and their role exagger-
ated to such an extent that even simple rivalries over secular issues are
seen through a religious-sectarian prism. The religious communities are
considered primary historical agents and are perceived as internally
undifferentiated. Historical narratives and memories of communities
perceived thus are prone to distortions and de-contextualizations. It is
possible to assert that Hindutva’s historical memory consists of deliberate
picking and choosing of facts and peddling of half-truths to fit their world
view. Such a communal interpretation is used as a ‘powerful ideology for
creating communal solidarity’ (Panikkar 1991, p. 2).
This sectarian vision of the past legitimizes Hindu communalism by
laying maximum claims on Indian antiquity (Thapar 1991, p. 5). This
interpretation of history politically fortifies Hindutva by equalling Indian
history with Hindu history. The Hindu religion and Hindu community
are depicted as going back to the earliest times (Panikkar 1991, p. 2). An
ancient cohesiveness is attributed to them which is then paraded as
superior status and an exclusive claim over Indian territory. India be-
comes a land of the Hindus who then acquire exclusive claim over rights
of citizenship. The Hindus, according to this interpretation, become an
Mobilization for Hindutva 179

ancient cohesive race and the original inhabitants of India. Conversely,

the Muslims and Christians become outsiders or foreigners.
Indian history is divided into historical periods based on the religion
of the rulers. It is a history which does not take into account the complex
currents and cross-currents that make up the historical process. This
periodization of history—Hindu, Muslim, and British—is borrowed from
James Mill’s, History of British India.2 It depicts ancient India as Hindu,
medieval India as Muslim and colonial India as British. Besides officially
endorsing and exaggerating the Hindu–Muslim antagonism, this British
periodization creates monoliths out of religious communities giving them
a non-existent cohesiveness.
The votaries of Hindutva use the insider-outsider stereotype repeat-
edly for Hindus and the minority communities, respectively. This binary
is then extended in branding the Hindus as members of the nation and
the Muslims/Christians as excluded from this nation. The ‘Hindu’ be-
comes ‘Indian’ and vice versa. The religious minorities are also given
stereotypes of voracious proselytizers, fanatics, violent and as having
extra-territorial loyalties. Hindutva propaganda specifically targets Mus-
lim men, who are accused of marrying four times, having innumerable
children as well as abducting and forcibly marrying Hindu girls, all for
the evil purpose of overtaking the Hindu population of India. History is
used to build such stereotypes and consequently generate hatred for and
fear of minorities in present times precisely because such a demographic
threat is non-existent.

SIMPLICITY OF MESSAGE AND CAREFUL

SELECTION OF CULTURAL SYMBOLS

It is noteworthy that though the Sangh Parivar uses religion for political
mobilization, there is no scriptural mastery needed to comprehend its
worldview. Even the Sangh Parivar programmes are so planned as to
generate an enthusiastic and unhesitant participation. One of the reasons
that its appeal becomes attractive is ‘the basic simplicity of its ideological
message, preached in a style that deliberately avoids complexities and
debates . . .’ (Basu et al. 1993, p. 36). An analytical or a critical faculty

2
For a thorough analysis see Panikkar (1991) and Thapar (1991).
180 Manjari Katju

is not a requirement for imbibing its message. Simplicity is a strategy used

by the Sangh Parivar to take forward Hindutva, which includes a careful
selection of cultural symbols. The symbols and icons picked up are not
only objects of reverence but are also characterized by an easy recogniz-
ability. They are devotional rallying points possessing local sacred status
with legends and folklore attached to them. Also, they have acceptability
across regional and caste boundaries. This makes them potent in the
hands of those wanting to deploy them for political mobilization. Myths
built around these symbols are communally enveloped before dissemina-
tion. Gaumata, Gangamata, Bharatmata, Rama, Krishna, and Shiva are
some of the symbols used by the Sangh Parivar for mobilizing the masses.
These Hindu symbols and myths when combined with communal mes-
sages have socially damaging implications. But this is how communal
hatred is generated and Hindutva strengthens its hold.
Gaumata, or mother cow, a Hindu symbol signifying nurture, gener-
osity, care and prosperity became a rallying symbol of the cow protection
agitation of 1966 led by the Jana Sangh along with the Hindu Mahasabha
and the Arya Samaj. The immediate result of this cow agitation, which
had a strong political content, was that the Jana Sangh reaped a rich
political harvest in the general elections that followed, especially in the
northern Hindi-speaking states. It more than doubled its strength in the
Lok Sabha from 14 seats in the 1962 elections to 35 seats in 1967. A
significant feature of this agitation was an active participation of spear and
trident carrying sadhus, whose tactical involvement in the subsequent
mass programmes of the Sangh Parivar has been politically gainful. The
cow protection agitation was of importance for building support for the
Jana Sangh among socially orthodox Hindus in North India.3
The three symbols—Bharatmata (portrayed as a Hindu goddess often
as an incarnation of Durga/Kali, the symbol of sakti), Gangamata (the
river Ganges) and to some extent Gaumata—were used extensively during
the Ekatmata Yatra programme in 1983. They became the three mother
symbols on which this organized mass campaign was built by the RSS
through one of its offshoots, the VHP. Through the month long yatras
criss-crossing the country, undertaken ostensibly for the unity of the
country, the Sangh Parivar aimed to broaden its social base and brush off
the urban, upper caste label attached to it. The three mother symbols
were used as symbols of Hindu unity, in other words, national unity, thus
fusing ‘the Hindu’ with ‘the national’. The yatras aimed to popularize the

3
For details on this agitation see Graham (1993).
Mobilization for Hindutva 181

idea of a united Hindu society in the wake of regional secessionist

movements and the Dalit assertions.
The yatras did work out well in using religious sentiments for large-
scale mobilization. Popular devotional participation occurred in an osten-
sibly religious event suffused with political messages. The yatras were met
with a tremendous devotional response in course of their processional
routes.4
Encouraged by the throbbing response to its Ekatmata Yatra programme
the VHP-RSS launched the Ramjanmabhoomi ‘liberation’ campaign from
1984. The issue was communally sensitive, this was widely known. It had
generated serious communal tension in the past, but it matched well with
the sectarian goal of Hindu nationalism.
Rama, a revered Hindu deity of North India, was an important symbol
of mobilization. Some factors seem to have contributed to the VHP’s
selection of Rama and to indicate that it was not a random choice. The
dispute over Rama’s so-called birthplace was already a local issue of
considerable importance when the VHP took up Rama and the cause of
‘Ramjanmabhoomi’s liberation’. Rama is a familiar name in India and he
figures as one of the most important deities within popular Hindu trad-
itions at the local level in North India. Rama and his exploits have been
integrated into the myths and legends of people over a large part of India,
except perhaps in some areas of the south. Local songs, stories and
histories are replete with references to the life of Rama and every region
in India has been touched by some episodes of the mythical Ramayana.
Apart from the orthodox Hindu versions of Valmiki and Tulsidas, the
various other living traditions of the Ramayana make Rama a widely
known deity.
Another factor, which facilitated the VHP’s bond with Rama, is that
in the mid-1980s there was a tremendous growth of the electronic media
in India, though under state control and supervision. In 1987–88 the
serialized telecast of the Ramayana on the national television network
encouraged the VHP to accelerate its campaign for turning Rama into
the supreme moral ideal for the Hindus. Rama was presented by the VHP
as a rashtrapurusha and also a maryadapurshottam. The calmness or shanta
rasa with which Rama is traditionally associated came to be replaced by
an aggressive or ugra bhava (Kapur 1993, p. 85). Rama was transformed
from a tranquil, tender figure to an interventionist warrior (Kapur 1992,
p. 48).

4
For more details see Katju (2003).
182 Manjari Katju

The VHP itself admitted that Rama’s name is not only a symbol of
devotion, but also of power, that it was the most potent and reliable way
of galvanizing and unifying the Hindus.5 The consistent calls to ‘virility’
for the protection of the motherland by the VHP fitted perfectly its choice
of Rama as a rashtrapurusha who could protect the holy and vulnerable
Bharatmata from the ‘sinister’ Muslims, just as he saved his wife Sita from
Ravana. Every Hindu was called upon to be like Rama and protect
Bharatmata. Mobilizations in the name of Rama by the VHP and the
Sangh Parivar led to the demolition of the Babri mosque in December
1992. The BJP’s electoral successes in the late 1980s and early 1990s and
its becoming a mainstream party have much to do with Ramjanmabhoomi
agitations.
Added to this are the efforts of the VHP to construct the Krishna
temple at Mathura, the Kashi-Vishwanath temple at Varanasi, and the
Baba Budhan dargah, a sufi shrine in the Chikmagalur district of
Karnataka—the rallying points of more communal upsurges for the ad-
vancement of Hindutva. The Sangh Parivar has been making attempts
to whip up anti-Muslim passions through building communal propaganda
about these sites.

ABSENCE OF A STRONG SOCIO-ECONOMIC AGENDA

Social conservatism and the economically modernist positions of the

urban upper castes ensure support for Hindutva as it is an ideology that
does not disturb the entrenched caste and class hierarchies. This non-
subversiveness attracts to it the support of the upper castes among the
middle class. What is significant is that Hindutva has a substantial
following among the OBCs and it is growing among the Dalits. This is
because, for the upwardly mobile sections, Hindutva brings hopes of social
honour and political position to parallel their growing economic self-
confidence.
However, the inherent proximity of Hindutva ideology to the estab-
lished social hierarchies and positions of economic privilege make it
difficult for the Sangh Parivar to articulate a socio-economic agenda
which would mobilize the larger masses. Issues like land reforms, right

5
Kotiya 1990, p. 7. This article was first published on 5 November 1989 in Rajasthan
Patrika.
Mobilization for Hindutva 183

to livelihoods, equitable distribution of resources and entitlements, right

to education, health and gender equality, etc., lie outside the ‘core-
competence’ of the Sangh Parivar.
In the absence of such issues, which can effectively mobilize the
masses, the Sangh Parivar needs an agenda that can rally the masses in
its support. This agenda is provided by raising religious issues which are
part of the emotional baggage of the people, and are raised in a manner
which is sectarian. These religious issues while sharpening the communal
divide obfuscate the hierarchical lines of division inside the Hindu com-
munity and eclipse the existent social oppression. These issues become
ideal tools for mass mobilization as they galvanize the community behind
the Parivar and help it to establish itself in power.
Themes such as ‘Hinduism in danger’, ‘unity and brotherhood of
Hindus’, ‘liberation of Ramjanmabhoomi’, ‘minorities growing in num-
bers’, ‘illegal conversions’, etc., are communal themes that are indispens-
able for the Sangh Parivar to whip up anti-Muslim and anti-Christian
sentiments to bring their political affiliate, the BJP, to power. The question
that arises is, have these sectarian themes of mobilization become redun-
dant for the Sangh Parivar with the BJP’s rise to power? Are they of no
utility to the Parivar now? It seems that this issue has not even been
settled within the RSS Parivar as the heated debates about the cause of
defeat in the 2004 general elections within the BJP and between its
fraternal organizations indicate.
My answer to these questions is that the importance of such issues
cannot diminish for the Sangh Parivar. Non-communal themes of mo-
bilization, even if deployed, have a transient status. For instance, the
secular theme of development does not have the same perpetual hold as
the more communal themes of ‘Hindu society in danger’ and ‘Muslims—
an anti-national community’, etc. Development as a mobilizational issue
is being used of late but its ranking is secondary and it has a status of
transience. The RSS and its frontal organizations have no other sustain-
able model of mass mobilization than the use of Hindu-specific themes.
The urge to use these themes, in fact, becomes irresistible once they bring
political power.
Further, socio-economic issues are not integral to the Sangh Parivar’s
ideology. Hindutva is not a plan for socio-economic transformation. It is
a view of society that is pledged to building a Hindu rashtra in India by
removing the secular, democratic, and plural values which formed the core
of the freedom struggle and have formed the bedrock of the Indian state
since. This is not to say that the Sangh combine does not or cannot talk
184 Manjari Katju

of social oppression or economic exploitation. At times it does, but these

issues do not form the core of its ideology or even the main agenda of its
politics. These issues are raised, if at all, mainly as supplements to the
Sangh Parivar’s core agenda during elections. In other words, they serve
a purely electoral purpose. Therefore, it becomes that much more difficult
for them to sustain a long-term campaign on these issues, however much
they may speak about making ‘development’ their electoral agenda.
The potential of Hindu communal themes for political mobilization
has and will remain intact even when the BJP is in power. Additionally,
such issues are needed:

• To keep the energies of the ground cadre, like the Bajrang Dal and
the VHP engaged. The cadre force, which makes for social presence
and social force has to be constantly involved to prevent the
organization from becoming loose and dispersed.
• Hindutva has to be maintained as a live movement lest it vanish
from public attention. Its going into oblivion means taking the wind
out of the Sangh ideology. Communal issues have to be made live
issues because they help in keeping the support base intact and also
lead to polarization along narrow religious lines and bring votes.
• Emotive religio-communal-nationalist campaign themes are needed
during elections to counter rival political parties, and such themes
have to be made more mobilizationally effective if the opposition
is highlighting socio-economic issues, that is, the real issues that
affect people or is becoming politically formidable.

VIOLENCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

AS A STRATEGY OF MOBILIZATION

The violence against the Christians, especially during 1998 and thereafter,
has to be seen in this light. The wrath of the VHP and Bajrang Dal against
the Christians represent all what I have just discussed. It was the issue
of conversions that became the pretext on which the Christian commu-
nity was targeted. Conversions by minority religious communities (and
this time especially the Christians) was communally interpreted and
dubbed as anti-national. The Christians, thus, once again became the
victims of Hindu revival under the VHP, much like the 1960s and 1970s
when the early VHP was consolidating itself on an anti-Christian agenda.
Mobilization for Hindutva 185

Hence, the Christian conversion question is not a new issue for the VHP,
but a new kind of militancy was added to it, a militancy that was more
physical than verbal.
The BJP’s electoral victory definitely made an impact on the Sangh
affiliates in the sense that there was an obvious upward mood swing,
which was manifest in the flurry of sectarian activity and propaganda
directed against the minorities. The Christian community was consis-
tently targeted in the late 1990s. The expression of antagonism and
distrust against it was marked by low intensity violence with its intentions
openly flaunted. The sustained charitable work of the Christian missions
among the tribal community within India prompted the ire of the Hindu
militant groups and acted as a tool to mobilize the urban middle class.
What was evident was that these attacks were as much political as
ideological. The central agenda on which the BJP built its election
campaign in 1999 was Sonia Gandhi’s Italian-Christian birth. The polit-
ical nature of the brutal violence on Christians in tribal areas made it
evident that it was not merely a Hindu versus Christian issue. The
objective of building an opposition to the Congress by a propaganda that
it was led by a Christian outsider and dubbing the Christians as ‘anti-
national’ was a handy strategy of containing the Congress’ influence in
tribal areas and mobilizing the Hindu votes for the BJP. Targeting Sonia
Gandhi served a political purpose. She was targeted more as a Christian
‘outsider’ than a Congress party leader.
The Christians were accused of starting the destructive sprees and also
for torching their own places of worship to help Gandhi and her Congress.
This attitude of disowning an involvement in the violence on the part
of the Hindu Jagran Manch, VHP and the Bajrang Dal was peculiar. The
main reason for this denial seems to be doubts about popular support on
the issue. Unlike the Rama temple issue, where the VHP went forth with
the assumption of popular support, it did not seem sure of concrete mass
support on the Christian conversion issue. It was not sure regarding the
direction public opinion would take on the matter. While the Christian
conversion issue was important for the VHP to keep the energies of its
ranks occupied, and Sonia’s entry into politics provided it with an oppor-
tunity to direct its energies against the Christians, it also had to tread
cautiously to gauge popular opinion. The missionary contribution to
education in modern India especially of the middle classes and also
recognition of its services towards the destitute made this uncertainty and
doubt about public opinion very real. In case of an adverse response, the
Sangh Parivar affiliates had to make sure that they did not to alienate the
186 Manjari Katju

middle class support bases, especially at a time of political consolidation

by their sibling, the BJP.
Also, the BJP’s being in power at the centre meant that it should not
face embarrassment6 on the minority question with its coalition partners
and the Parliament which would jeopardize its career as a ruling party
heading a coalition government. The common governance agenda of this
coalition also restricted the BJP’s open association with overt minority
bashers. Moreover, the focus of international media on India on account
of the anti-Christian violence and the Pope’s visit to India in 1999 further
made the VHP and Bajrang Dal leadership refute any suggestions of their
involvement in the violence against the Christian community. Again,
embarrassing the BJP before the international community and world
opinion had to be avoided, especially in an era of economic reforms
towards liberalization.
In any case, it is interesting that the denial of involvement in anti-
Christian violence went along with militant utterances and certain dictats
to the minority communities. These were accompanied by statements,
which attributed demonic and fanatical traits to the minority communities
and went on to assert that it is these traits in the Christian and Muslim
communities that beget a violent response from the VHP. This use of
weapons, however, is always stated to be in self-defence or defence of the
Hindu dharma. These statements were accompanied by serious allegations
that Christians are engaged in ‘an international conspiracy to divide India’,
they nurture ‘anti-national sentiments’ and ‘encourage separatism’.7
Blaming the victimized Christians of burning their own churches and
assaulting the Christian nuns and missionaries seems absurd, but it does
strengthen the common impression that the already aggrieved and threat-
ened Hindu community is further endangered due to the actions of
minority religious communities especially when such communities are
‘anti-national’ and ‘separatists’—allegations which are loaded with serious
implications in the context of strained Indo-Pakistan relations. It is not
without implications that the RSS and its affiliates are parading them-
selves as defenders of national security where this ‘national security’
in both their words and actions acquires a Muslim/Christian versus
Hindu interpretation—the anti-national/anti-Hindu element versus the
innocent Hindu victim, respectively. The RSS commemorating the
completion of 75 years held a camp in October 2000 with the aim of

6
An emotion it let go by the time Gujarat happened.
7
Kang 1999, p. 25.
Mobilization for Hindutva 187

conveying its claim that it is a mass organization of the Hindus, and

interestingly the camp was called Rashtriya Raksha Mahashivir. A few
months before, the Bajrang Dal was described by the VHP as ‘synonymous
with security’ and as an organization which is a terror for anti-Hindus.8
It is noteworthy that the attacks on minorities are not so much attacks
on individuals as on the identity of minorities as distinct communities.
The target of anti-minority violence might be a Christian missionary or
a tribal or a Muslim maulvi or a poor Muslim slum dweller, but what needs
to be emphasized is that through all these assaults it is the minority
community which forms the target of the Sangh Parivar.9 In fact, one can
go a step further and say that the existence of minority communities as
distinct entities forming an integral part of India is what the Sangh Parivar
is averse to. A Christian or a Muslim who professes his faith as a com-
munity member having political rights of an Indian citizen is what the
Sangh Parivar cannot stand. And a misconception that minority commu-
nities are monolithic political entities adds to this aversion. In other
words, pluralism does not fit into the worldview of the Sangh Parivar. In
Ashok Singhal’s words, ‘Islam has a future in this country only if it
completely submerges itself among the hundreds of sects that already exist
in India.’10 And again, ‘The interpretation of the Quran in this country
must be set right. It [the Quran] should be adapted according to the great
traditions of India.’11 These statements make it clear that giving up the
community identity is the demand which the Parivar makes of the mi-
nority communities.
The Godhra incident changed the political currents in Gujarat. The
incident along with the subsequent anti-Muslim violence at the hands of
the Sangh Parivar members and sympathizers brought the BJP back to
power in the assembly elections in December 2002. The party based its
electoral mobilization on a public stance, which made Hindutva synony-
mous with security, and terrorism as another name for the Muslim
community. Under the banner of national security, the Sangh Parivar
affiliates campaigned for the BJP in Gujarat.
This political mobilization was preceded by a carnage which some say
can only be compared to the post-partition riots in their brutality and
suffering. The difference is that this time it was the Muslims who were

8
Joshi 2000, p. 25.
9
I am indebted to Professor Javeed Alam for this insight.
10
Rajesh Joshi, interview with Ashok Singhal, Outlook, 22 February 1999, p. 16.
11
Ibid., p. 17.
188 Manjari Katju

ruthlessly targeted in what can be compared to genocide. Hindutva (and

violence for Hindutva) played an influential role in the elections and
helped the BJP win an overwhelming majority at a time when local issues
of development and rehabilitation (of earthquake and riot victims) had
made the balance tilt heavily against it. In the year 2000, the BJP had
lost major support in the local body elections. It had won only 27 per cent
of the zilla panchayat seats compared to 82 per cent it had won in 1995.
Most importantly, it had lost the Ahmedabad and Rajkot municipal
elections and had suffered a few by-election defeats.
The Sangh affiliates put their energies behind an aggressive communal
campaign and publicized the Godhra train burning, the attack on Parlia-
ment and Akshardham as instances of Muslim ‘terrorism’. The BJP in
Gujarat led by Chief Minister Narendra Modi, focused on the heavily
communalized theme of ‘security’ which they put before ‘development’.
The word that went around was that only when security is ensured can
there be development.
The 2002 Gujarat assembly election results12 display that the BJP did
gain much through the pogrom in Gujarat. The BJP’s vote share rose from
44.81 per cent in 1998 to 51 per cent in these elections. In places of worst
rioting—Panchmahals (which includes Godhra), Dahod, Vadodara dis-
tricts of central Gujarat—the BJP won all the seats. It won 42 out of 50
seats in central Gujarat, the worst affected area, a big leap forward
considering the fact that it had won just 15 seats here in 1998. In 1998,
it was the Congress and its ally the RJP who formed the dominant force
in central Gujarat. In the total 19 seats of Ahmedabad, where the Muslims
were hunted unsparingly, the BJP stood victorious in 17 and the Congress
ended up with 2. In 65 riot-affected constituencies the BJP won 52 seats
and the Congress 13. In the 116 unaffected constituencies also the BJP
performed better than the Congress and won 74 seats while the Congress
won 38 and others 4. However, in the riot-torn constituencies the BJP’s
vote share was higher than in the unaffected constituencies. It was 56.4
per cent in the 52 seats it won in the riot-affected constituencies and 45.6
per cent in the 74 seats it won in the unaffected ones, which indicates
the gains it reaped through the communalization of the electorate. The
Congress vote share on the other hand was 37.6 and 40.4 per cent in the
affected and the unaffected ones, respectively.
Gujarat has witnessed some intense caste and communal violence since
1969, but ‘it was not until the 1980s that frequently violent political

12
Election Data Sources: India Today, 30 December 2002 and Frontline, 3 January 2003.
Mobilization for Hindutva 189

assertion of the upper castes and classes became routine in Gujarati

politics’ (Desai 2002). The success of the Kshatriya, Harijan, Adivasi and
Muslim (KHAM) alliance has much to do with it. The KHAM electoral
formula of the Congress in 1980 threatened ‘the higher caste guardians of
the dominant culture’ who then ‘found in the Hindutva-based Gujarati
culture an effective and acceptable alternative’ (Parekh 2002, p. 29). The
Hindutva ideology provided the upper caste entrepreneurial/middle classes
a ‘sanction to pursue their own agenda of greater political, economic and
social control’ (Yagnik 2002, p. 21). It hardly raised ‘any ethical questions
for its supporters’ (Ibid.). Thus, the attack, allegedly by Muslims, on
Hindutva activists at Godhra generated such intense anger among these
classes that brutal violence on the Muslims was openly supported and
justified. Also, the Dalit and Adivasi participation in this violence was
something unprecedented, the reasons for which can be found in eco-
nomic hardship and the need for social recognition. The ground work by
the VHP since 1980s among the Dalit and Adivasi communities of Gujarat
also explains their involvement in the anti-Muslim attacks in 2002.
The startling recovery of the Congress in the 2004 general elections
in Gujarat are further proof that for the BJP and its fraternal organizations,
‘development’ and economic issues can never become a substitute for the
mobilizational strength of Hindutva issues.

CONCLUSION

Contrasting 2004 with the Gujarat elections of December 2002, where

the BJP trounced the Congress in the backdrop of the February–March
2002 massacres, foregrounds the Sangh Parivar’s successful strategies of
mobilization. These strategies are contingent upon an internally cohesive
Hindu community reacting in fear and hatred against anti-national ‘out-
siders’ who are portrayed as threatening the very existence of the Hindus.
This mass psychology is itself based on a communal interpretation of
history and the use of religious themes and symbols as social markers
which create a homogenized Hindu community where caste hierarchy is
left intact but glossed over.
Anti-minority violence, both verbal and physical, is an inseparable part
of Hindutva’s mobilizational strategies. Attempts are made to generate
hatred between the Hindus and the minority religious communities
depicting the latter as foreigners with a false claim to Indian citizenship.
190 Manjari Katju

This violence goes hand in hand with the villianization of minorities

portrayed as fanatics, intolerant, anti-national, and terrorists.
What is most worrisome is the steady acceptance of Hindutva among
marginalized communities like the Dalits and Adivasis, as well as its
growth in popularity among other oppressed sections like women and the
urban working classes. The mobilization of large sections among these
demographic groups for Hindutva is a trend which needs greater study
and immediate action.

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Manohar, 1991).
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Panikkar (ed.), Communalism in India: History, Politics and Culture (New Delhi:
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 FUNDAMENTALISM, COMMUNALISM AND
GENDER JUSTICE 10
VIBHUTI PATEL

INTRODUCTION

I
t is my firm belief that if we do not engender our understanding of
fundamentalism and communalism, women’s lives will be endan-
gered. Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India have guaran-
teed freedom and equality to women irrespective of their caste, class,
creed, race and religion. But fundamentalists prevent them from being
realized in Indian women’s lives. Communal conflicts in the civil society
create permanent scars in the psyche of women of different communities/
religious/ethnic groups and prevent their united efforts to realize gender
justice in the personal and public domain.
Fundamentalism has a connotation of a religious dogma that aggres-
sively promotes, rather imposes, traditionalist beliefs and practices, in-
cluding patriarchal gender roles (Kramarae and Spender 2000). It is
oppressive because it asserts that women should be confined to the care
of the home and children and must always submit to male rules and
regulations. It insists that patriarchal control over women’s sexuality,
fertility, and labour are god given and should not be contested. It rein-
forces its ideology by using vehicles such as family and kinship networks,
media, state apparatus, criminal justice system and cultural constructs.
Fundamentalism is a response to modernization, socio-economic changes,
demographic shifts and multiculturalism.
Two centuries back, communalism had a connotation of identity
based on community. In the post-colonial discourse, communalism is
192 Vibhuti Patel

understood as an antagonistic collective mobilization on the basis of

religion leading to the partition of the subcontinent into India and
Pakistan and recurrence of communal conflicts (Maheshwari 2000).

BACKGROUND

The issue of fundamentalism, communalism and gender justice acquired

prominence in the political agenda during the mid-1980s, globally as well
as in India. The UN Decade for Women (1975–85) Conference in Nairobi
brought to fore first hand experiences of women who were at the receiving
end of fundamentalist backlash. In several Latin American countries, the
Philippines, Spain, and Italy Christian fundamentalists had penalized
women who used contraceptives or underwent abortions. In many Islamic
countries, the Muslim fundamentalists demanded denial of higher edu-
cation for women. When women’s rights activists of Kuwait were actively
taking part in the deliberations of the Nairobi Conference, back home
their government had trampled upon Kuwaiti women’s right to higher
education as the fundamentalist forces felt that higher education made
women uncontrollable. In Algeria, female-headed households were burnt.
The fundamentalists felt, ‘How dare women divorcees, widows, deserted
and single women and minors stay without male protection? In the North
African countries, women’s groups that opposed clitoredectomy of the
African girls were witch-hunted. Dr Naval Saddavi, who as a medical
practitioner refused to perform clitoredectomy and wrote best-seller books
on the subject, was imprisoned’ (Saadawi 1982). Women scholars, writers,
novelists, and professionals had to leave their native countries and live
under exile due to fundamentalist backlash. Dr Tasleema Nasreen from
Bangladesh is still leading a nomadic life as fundamentalists are after her
life. In several Asian countries, women rights activists who demanded
gender-just family laws were penalized and implicated in false charges of
sedition. In South Asia, Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim fundamentalists im-
posed strict dress code. They punished women who cut their hair by
throwing acid, physical assaults and social boycott. Antiquated, atrocious,
mediaeval and anti-women family laws dealing with important issues such
as marriage, divorce, custody of children, alimony, maintenance, right to
stay in the matrimonial or parental homes were imposed. The list is endless.
It is in this context that all those interested in women’s dignity were
forced to examine gender question in identity politics. For the past two
Fundamentalism, Communalism and Gender Justice 193

decades, it has remained one of the central concerns of the women’s

movement. During the last quarter of the twentieth century only two
movements have gained strength simultaneously. They happen to be
feminism and fundamentalism.
Disintegration of the organized working class movements have forced
the toiling poor to search for new identities. In the contexts of homogen-
izing influence of corporate capitalism supported by the economic global-
ization, religion, ethnicity and caste-based identities have become
aggressively assertive. All patriarchal powers perceive women as a reposi-
tory of their identity and honour. Hence women end up shouldering the
greater burden of identity politics. Scores of power struggles of identity
politics are settled over women’s bodies by control (dress-code, restriction
on mobility, code of racial purity and punishment for mixed marriages of
intercaste, interreligious and interracial varieties), violence (rape and
assault), forced fertility (ethnic cleansing) and psychological damage (by
terrorizing, humiliating, and subjugating women continuously).

GENDER QUESTION IN IDENTITY POLITICS

Communal forces had strengthened their hold on important spheres of the

state and civil society which include the subversion of constitution and
judiciary and communalization of culture, media, religion and lifestyle.
Women are the major casualties in the bargain. Communal politics has
always played the major role in determining the rights and limits of
women. From the beginning of the constitutional debates, the question
of personal laws that govern important areas of the man-woman relation-
ship, viz., marriage, divorce, custody of children, guardianship rights,
maintenance, alimony and property has remained controversial. On the
one hand, the Constitution of India guaranteed equality to all its citizens
irrespective of caste, class, religion and sex, while one the other, in the
name of respecting all religions, it formulated discriminatory family laws
for women from different religions. The majority of communalists are
demanding a UCC from a Hindu perspective. The Bharatiya Janata Party’s
concern for Shah Bano’s plight and its criminal indifference and abetment
of sati as in the Roop Kanwar case should be seen from this perspective
to Hinduize the democratic norms of the UCC. This also creates genuine
fear in the minds of minority communities that takes a perverse form in
194 Vibhuti Patel

increasing rigidification and restrictions on women who are demanding

gender justice in the personal arena.
Any fundamentalist propaganda that concerns itself with identity
makes use of the gender question to impose rigid norms on women who
are identified as repositories of culture and tradition. These norms mani-
fest themselves in son preference and female infanticide (quotation from
Hindu scriptures: Be thy the mother of 100 sons; questions like ‘Did any
heroes of Ramayana or Mahabharata have daughters? That shows daugh-
ters are inauspicious!’), glorification and sati (widow-burning)—thou-
sands of sati temples have flourished all over India and Global Association
for Glorification of Sati has its headquarter in Chicago—witch hunting
of widows as they are perceived to be inauspicious, dress code, general
demeanour and the social construction of the ideal woman who submis-
sively accepts the patriarchal norm imposed by fundamentalists agendas.
In the last Kumbh Mela 60,000 women devotees were deserted by their
brothers, sons, and relatives. Allahabad police tried its best to take them
to their respective families but the family members refused to accept
them. Now, the government has made a special budgetary provision for
abandoned widows at the pilgrimage centres and for women in difficult
circumstances.
The fundamentalist belief also takes the form of forced marriage of a
widow to her brother-in-law (known as chader-nawazi) among Sikhs to
stop division of property. Among Muslims, the same fundamentalist
forces (qazis and agents) organize mutta (temporary) marriages with ready
nikahnamas and talaqnamas. Young girls are traded by their poor, illiter-
ate, parasitic and unemployed relatives in these marriages that are not
registered and hence have no legal status. The main attraction for such
contract marriages is Meher amount (cash as well as kind). The girls are
mostly cheated and sexploited (Jawadekar 2003). Thus prostitution, under
the garb of a religious ceremony, is perpetuated. The criminal justice
system of the demanding countries and supplying countries do not take
stern measures as currency received through tourism is the most crucial
concern in this religious form of flesh trade. The kinship network is used
by the fundamentalist forces for cross-country trafficking of women.
Young, frail, weeping and hungry girls are wrapped in burqas while being
transported from South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and
Bangladesh) to the Gulf countries. Many die or disappear in the process.
Those who survive the torturous assault are brought back to the native
country by the same nexus after they become physically unusable due to
sexually transmitted diseases or HIV-AIDS, and mental illnesses.
Fundamentalism, Communalism and Gender Justice 195

VALORIZATION OF BARBARIC BEHAVIOUR WITH

WOMEN OF MINORITY COMMUNITIES

In the riots after the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the use of video
cameras to capture the gory details of the rape of Muslim women in Surat
in the presence of military and paramilitary forces revealed the most
horrific dimensions of the brutalization of the psyche of the civil society.
Screening these films in front of jeering crowds left permanent scars on
the minds of women and the children of minority women. Their sense of
shame was complete. Even in Somalia, the fundamentalist forces used the
videotapes capturing weeping and wailing, naked, violated women rape
victims to terrorize, humiliate and intimidate other women and to show
them their place of restricted existence. Cleansing operations in Bhopal
(1992) and Gujarat riots (28 February 2002 onwards) have created a
nightmarish situation for the Muslim women who experienced the worst
forms of sexual violence (Engineer 2003). While rape is a crime perpe-
trated during communal conflicts, the use of media to record, duplicate
and even sell videos of rape is unprecedented and speaks of the dangerous
use of media. Apart from this, the insular feelings created after each riot
results into confinement and restriction of the mobility of women and girls.
The nation-states in all parts of the globe have proved to be ruthlessly
against the minorities. In England, when temples and mosques are de-
molished by all types of chauvinist forces, Hindu, Muslim and skinheads,
the state machinery chooses not to address these issues on the grounds
of non-interference with minorities. The policy of ‘multi-culturalism’ in
Britain and ‘respect for all religion’ in India should be seen in this light.
Patriarchal bias of the state always compromises women’s interests so that
the ruling party can fetch block votes by pleasing the patriarchs of the
minority/migrant communities. ‘Non-interference’ by the state when adult
‘girls’ are confined by their family members so that they do not run away
with their boyfriends and can be hurriedly forced into an arranged marriage
is part of this game.

ROOT OF COMMUNALIZATION OF THE MINORITIES

During the last two decades the SAP and economic globalization at
the behest of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and MNCs have
196 Vibhuti Patel

perpetrated tremendous human miseries by super-exploiting women work-

ers and by attacking basic sources of livelihood and sustenance of large
majority of the urban, rural and tribal poor people. Insecurity in day-to-day
survival has opened the avenues for religious sectarian forces that promote
‘dog eating dog culture’. ‘Catch them and kill/maim/burn/rape them’ policy
of the custodians of law and order in Gujarat has resulted into complete
erosion of faith from the state administration and the criminal justice
machinery. The labour, factor and product markets are segmented to
sustain super-exploitation of women from the minority communities in the
sweatshops situated in the stigmatized working class areas. Dual economy
thrives on fundamentalist/communalist supported discrimination based on
gender, caste, religion, language and migratory status of the workers (Patel
2003). Revolutionary mass movements of the working class and oppressed
nationalities have faced tremendous crisis of leadership and the void thus
created has opened the avenues for the flourishing of fascist forces.
This phenomenon has now become global as is apparent from the
deteriorating situation in Somalia, Bosnia and the Middle East. In this
unipolar world, the aggressive stance of the Orvellian big brother, the US,
in its economic and foreign policies to retain its hegemonic power aids and
abets these fascist forces. The US after Kabul’s overthrow of Mujaheedins,
made women’s liberation a major issue. At the same time, the US allowed
fundamentalist warlords into positions of power. In Iraq, the US is joining
hands with the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq, a
conservative Islamic group tied to the clerics of Iran. Patriarchs of the
Pentagon in charge of Iraq’s reconstruction have appointed only male
judges and male lawyers to develop a legal code for Iraq (Basu 2003).
Educated women in Iraq feel that the power vacuum left by Saddam’s fall
will be massively filled by Shia Muslim political figures who may seek to
impose conservative social mores such as the hijab, weeding out of women
from the public life, and double standards of sexual morality (King 2003).
International networking of the chauvinist forces of all hues, racist,
casteist and religious, have posed a threat to all secular forces wedded to
the ethos of pluralism in social, cultural, educational and political govern-
ance of human existence as never before. They are making extensive use
of the media and internet. They are poisoning young minds with xenopho-
bia. The ‘catch them young’ policy of fundamentalist forces snatch away
milk and textbooks from children and groom them to be gun-totting
terrorists. Science and technology in their hands generate death and
devastation. Women suffer the most in this destructive game. Their hate
campaigns generate endless human miseries. Thousands of women become
Fundamentalism, Communalism and Gender Justice 197

widows and thousands of children become orphans. In the absence of

economic independence (as fundamentalists do not approve of working
women), women are forced to marry surviving and already married men.
After each war/riot/carnage polygamy flourishes with the blessing of
religious bigots. It happened in Afghanistan during the last decade (Chenoy
2001). At present, it is happening in Iraq. The chasm generated due to
identity polities come to the fore even in the relief operations for natural
disaster (such as Latur and Kutch) or man-made disasters as the communal
ideological weapon of ‘we’ versus ‘they’ prevents minorities from taking any
advantage. After every disaster, the minorities get further marginalized and
get thrown in the stigamized labour market for intensive capital accumu-
lation by the economically and politically dominant groups.

FUNDAMENTALISM, COMMUNALISM AND

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

Denial of human rights and fundamental rights enshrined in the Consti-

tution of India by the fundamentalists by imposition of dress code, not
granting right to work and attacks on female-headed households have
been objected by women’s rights groups. Extreme form of punishment
meted to women by the fundamentalists is in the form of stoning to death
‘an adulterous woman’ by the assembled community. During the last
decade innumerable women in several countries have lost their lives in
a painful and undignified manner at the hands of self-appointed ‘custo-
dians of morality’. ‘Honour killing’ has become most widespread among
all types of fundamentalists and communalists throughout Asia, Africa
and the Middle-East not only among the tribals, but among so called
civilized sections of the nation states. Recently, the law court of Shariat
in Nigeria has passed a judgement of stoning to death Amina Lowal, the
mother of an infant, for adultery. There has been an international uproar
against the judgement. As a result, for the first time, the state has not
executed the decision of the Shariat.

SEX SEGREGATION

The fundamentalists forces have prevailed upon the state to enforce sex
segregation in Iran, Albania, Sahel in West Africa, Pakhtun, Malaysia,
198 Vibhuti Patel

and Turkey (Hjarpe 1983). ‘Women in Saudi Arabia live complex exist-
ence which mingles strict traditions and codes of conduct with modern
demands of education and freedom’ (Megalli 2002). Non-entry of women
in the stadium and sports complexes are practiced in several theocratic
states. On 22 January 2003, the chief justice of Afghanistan ordered a
nationwide ban on cable television and coeducation (WLUML 2003). Al
Badr Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Jabbar, an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Toiba,
pasted a poster outside the government Higher Secondary School in
Kashmir, asking girls to discontinue their studies on 19 December 2002.

DRESS CODE

Kashmir conflict has created a situation of great fear and insecurity in

women’s lives (Dewan 2002). Those who opposed the imposition of burqa
by Kashmiri militants had to face dire consequencies. Under Taliban rule,
Afghanistan went to absurd lengths to implement Islamic laws that made
women’s life a never-ending punishment. It imposed ban on drivers of all
types of vehicles from carrying women not wearing chador or chadri. It
also prevented women from washing their linen in rivers and deserts
(Pevrin 1997). A senior Shiv Sena leader, Mr Nanak Ram Thavani has
urged the federal and state governments to formulate and implement a
dress code for girls in all schools, colleges and other teaching institutes
(WLUML 2003).
Within hours of the expiry of their deadline for Muslim women and
girls to wear the burqa, Kashmiri fundamentalist militants killed three
women, including two students and a teacher on the morning of 20
December 2002 at Hasiyot in Thanamandi tehsil of Rajouri district (The
Indian Express, 27 December 2002).

RIGHT TO WORK

Women were the first targets of theocratic states in the neo-colonial phase
and the post-liberation phases in the Middle Eastern, the Mediterranean
and the Northwest Frontier countries. In all these countries, women
bravely fought along with their male comrades against the imperialist
forces. But once, the ‘revolution’ or ‘the national liberation’ was attained,
the fundamentalist forces dumped women into the four walls of domes-
ticity. Arab News, the Saudi English language daily has revealed that
Fundamentalism, Communalism and Gender Justice 199

Saudi women are more concerned about finding good work in tough jobs
than being veiled. The Kashmiri militant group, Lashkar-e-Jabbar has
asked muslim women to quit their jobs and stay home, or face punish-
ment, including death (The Times of India, 21 January 2003).
In spite of the threats by the fundamentalists, women are entering male
bastions such as foreign services, diplomatic missions, judiciary, military,
police force, sports such as soccer, political bodies, academic institutions,
industrial chambers even in the theocratic states.

FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS

Fundamentalists perceive female-headed households as an eyesore and

make all efforts to persecute, stigmatize, isolate, marginalize and terrorize
deserted, divorced, single and separated women leading an independent,
economically self-sufficient life with dependent children or senior citi-
zens. They do not accept women as heads of the household. Wherever
the fundamentalist forces have become powerful, the female-headed
households face persecution and witch hunting.

COMMUNALIZED EDUCATION

In the Xth National Conference of The Indian Association of Women’s

Studies the issue of communalization of school and college textbooks was
discussed at length as representatives of different states reported that
there was ‘a systematic attempt by the Sangh Parivar to “educate” young
and old through schools, shakhas, temple networks, satsangs, etc.
Through such education which encompasses a whole range of institu-
tions, the Sangh Parivar has managed to draw into its fold large number
of women, who in turn seem to transmit this hatred to their children’
(IAWS 2003).
Changes in the curriculum that is being pushed through the National
Curriculum Framework and the new National Council of Educational
Research and Training (NCERT) textbooks portray women only in highly
regressive patriarchal terms within the framework of the family. They
have targeted women’s movement as being responsible for the break up
of the family. Many women’s studies scholars have interpreted the Gujarat
tragedy as a failure of education that created brutalized masculinity.
200 Vibhuti Patel

The Kashmir situation has jeopardized education of women. The same

happened in the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) affected areas
in Assam and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) prone areas in
Jaffna (Sri Lanka). The Christian fundamentalists in Latin America are
no different. All of them use young women in suicide squads and as
cannon fodder for their barbaric agenda. In the camps of the VHP young
girls are brain-washed first with an ideological investment of communal
education (‘Muslims will outnumber Hindus’, ‘Muslim men are lustful and
Muslim women are breeders’, ‘Muslims are born criminals’, ‘Caste system
is crucial for racial purity’, ‘Shudras and ati-shudras are pollutants’) and
at the same time given training to use weapons (lathis, swords, and
daggers) (Vaz 2003).
Communal mindset created by Hindutva forces is so powerful that
young college students of Wilson College got a humorous article based
on stereotypes about ‘Muslim’ as a murderer, drug seller, a cheater in
cricket, kidnapper, terrorist, published. Its title is ‘Pakistani Math Ques-
tion Paper’. The very first question signifies man–woman relationship
among the Muslims. It goes like this: ‘Abdul was sent to jail for murder.
He has seven wives in his house. Abdul distributed money to his wives
in such a proportion that the youngest and the most recent wife receives
maximum and oldest wife gets minimum, and each wife gets double of
her former competitor. Abdul has 1700 Rupees left in his house. Abdul’s
oldest wife needs at least 25 Rupees per month. Find out the time when
Abdul will have to break jail to come out so that his wives don’t have
to starve.’ There are innumerable websites with similar constructions that
demonize Muslim men.
The most widely circulated cassettes of the speeches and slogans by
Sadhvi Ritambhara, the crudest version of Hindutva ideology provides a
Ram-centred and RSS-led perspective that has nothing in store for
women but ‘Agni pariksha’ (i.e., enter the fire to prove chastity and purity).
Sadhvi Ritambhara’s speeches and pet slogan ‘If there has to be blood-
shed, let it happen once and for all’ during Ram Janmabhoomi campaigns
organized by Hindutva forces between 1986 and 1990 played a crucial role
in massacre of Muslims in the 1992 riots (Sarkar 2001).

BAN ON INTERCASTE, INTERRELIGIOUS AND INTERRACIAL MARRIAGES

Obsession about racial, caste and religious purity are deep in the psyche
of fundamentalists that have strong aversion against inter-mixing and
Fundamentalism, Communalism and Gender Justice 201

inter-marriages among citizens of different caste groups, religious com-

munities and racial backgrounds. Newspapers are full of incidences of
torture, abduction, forced abortion, lynching, murder of newly married
couples with different caste, religious, ethnic or racial backgrounds. Even
the state and criminal justice system miserably fails to provide adequate
protection to such love marriages. Such couples have to face social
boycott, cannot easily get jobs, accommodation and school admissions
for their children. Conversion of husband or wife as a conditionality for
‘allowing’ couples to get married is a logical extension of an inward
looking mentality generated by the fundamentalist mindset.

COMMUNALIZED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

The communalized violence women have experienced recently in Gujarat

is unprecedented in terms of the degree of state complicity, the un-
ashamed valorization of these acts of depravity, the horrific participation
of women in the violence and the creation of an implacable wall of hatred
that provides the reason and then the justification for its spiral effect.
It took us 50 years to document excesses against women during the
partition. One wonders how much longer it will take now.
The following poem by Lara Jesani vividly captures the pain and pathos
of women victims of fundamentalist wrath and communal carnage whether
they were women victims in the 1992–93 Mumbai riots or women in
refugee camps of Gujarat 10 years later, in 2002–03.

Eyes raining, without mere control,

Scruples hurt, thus dew drops roll.
Lightened, piercing, still with grief,
Forever, staring in disbelief.
Hearts melting, defences down,
Afflicted feelings, all around.
Timeless moments, of unending sorrow,
Darkened scars, that none can borrow.
Deep in hurdles, full with distress,
Pleasures replaced, by pure sadness.
Love’s demise, of responsive pain,
A day’s repose, then it starts again.
202 Vibhuti Patel

In response to rising communal violence, several women’s organizations

in Bombay have formed a united front to coordinate work regarding relief
and rehabilitation based on the reports of fact finding committees of riot
affected areas in the rural, urban and tribal regions of Gujarat. Aawaaz-
E-niswan, Akshara, All India Democratic Women’s Association, Docu-
mentation, Research and Training Centre—Justice and Peace Commission,
Forum Against Oppression of Women, Forum For Women’s Health,
Maharashtra Mahila Parishad, Maharashtra Stree Abhyas Vyaspeeth,
Mahila Daxata Samiti, Majlis, NFIW, Sakhya, Special Cell for Women
and Children, Stree Manch, Stree Mukti Sangathana, Stree Sangam,
Swadhar, Vacha, Women’s Centre, Young Women Christian Association
joined the commemoration of national protest day on 13 May 2002 against
sexual assault, beating, rape and burning of women and young girls, the
cutting open of a pregnant woman and killing of her foetus, the burning
of babies and children. They condemned this violence and demanded
that First Information Reports (FIRs) should be registered, especially in
all reported cases of sexual assault and violence against women, accepting
testimonies of survivors as witnesses, in all police stations with copies made
available to public groups. Because of the state and central governments’
complicity, the women’s groups felt the necessity of organizing a special
public hearing on Gujarat carnage in front of an independent Women’s
Human Rights Commission (Nainar and Uma 2003).
A crisis centre to deal with violence against women and housed in the
Bombay Municipal Corporation Hospital, Dilaasa, that visited refugee
camps for women victims of the Gujarat carnage has recommended that
trauma counselling for the victims needs to be undertaken on a long-term
basis (Bhurte et al. 2003)

GLOBAL INITIATIVES

In March 2003, the International Criminal Court was established for the
local groups spread all over the globe who seek justice at the international
level when there is no hope in the domestic system.
A dramatic development shocked most delegates and observers on the
last day of the 47th session of the UN Commission on the Status of
Women (CSW) in New York. Only half an hour before the 15-day session
was to end, Iran’s representative, supported by delegates from Egypt and
Sudan, rose to register his government’s objection to paragraph (o), which
Fundamentalism, Communalism and Gender Justice 203

read: ‘Condemn violence against women and refrain from invoking any
custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligations with
respect to its elimination.’ They were not prepared to have their reser-
vations on the paragraph officially recorded after the document had been
adopted by consensus in its entirety. Nor were other delegations willing
to drop the paragraph so that the rest of the document could be adopted
by consensus. The session was suspended in the absence of consensus on
the ‘agreed conclusions’ relating to women’s human rights and the elimin-
ation of all forms of violence against women. Delegates were told they
would be informed about a fresh date for the resumption of work. The
crisis was caused by the inflexibility of a tiny minority and some observers
felt that efforts towards the elimination of violence against women had
been sacrificed at the altar of a few male egos.
By the time the session is reconvened, most non-US based delegates
and NGO representatives, who had come for the CSW, will not be around
to keep a watch on the document. The agreed conclusions emerging from
the CSW are meant to provide direction to policy and action at the
national and international levels to promote women’s human rights.
Women’s human rights and the elimination of all forms of violence
against women was one of the two themes addressed by the commission
this year. However, the final document that will presumably be adopted
(with or without the ‘controversial’ paragraph) includes several signifi-
cant features, such as the recognition that economic and social sector
policies which increase economic disparities among and within countries
can also exacerbate gender-based inequalities and violence; the recogni-
tion that violence against women is intimately linked to gender-based
discrimination and stereotypes; and that men can play an active part in
preventing violence against women if they are enabled to recognize their
role and responsibility through education and sensitization.

CURRENT DEBATES

Women are not victims of their gender alone. They also bear the brunt
of a patriarchal system that operates at the level of the community too,
even a besieged community. The very same community which stuck
together in terrified solidarity for its survival has also sometimes turned
its back on women who have been ‘defiled’ by the enemy. Women’s rights
activists have seen this prejudice in operation before and this should not
204 Vibhuti Patel

come as a surprise. Yet, it does seem rather unfortunate that a community

that has intimate knowledge of large-scale violations does not hesitate
to further marginalize its women. It is therefore a complex situation.
Creating women-specific safety nets, autonomously managed by women
become crucial in this context.
Women’s groups such as Majlis (Mumbai) and Masum (Pune) are
spearheading The Campaign to Stop Funding Hate ‘to bring an end to
electronic collection and transfer of funds from the US to organizations
that spread sectarian hatred in India’. (http://www.stopfundinghate.org)

WOMEN AND FAMILY LAWS

For the past two decades, women’s groups providing support to women
in distress have been demanding gender-just family laws in the Asian,
African and Latin American countries (Akhtar 1989). Migrant women
from the developing countries settled in the industrialized world should
also be governed by the gender-just family laws.
In India, a majority of secular women’s groups support reforms in the
family laws to ensure gender justice to the women of different religious
group (Agnes 2003). Hindu communal organizations are demanding the
UCC. Due to pressure of women’s groups, there has been reform in the
antiquated Christian Divorce Act. Hindu Undivided Property Act has
been reformed to give daughters a share of the ancestral property. The
state of Andhra Pradesh has granted land rights to women. In the post-
independence period, the only act directly concerning Muslim lives passed
is the notorious Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act,
1986. The Act takes Muslim women out of the purview of Section 125
of Criminal Procedure Code that ensures maintenance to a divorced wife.
‘The 1986 Act empowers the magistrate to order mehr, maintenance
during iddat (3 months following divorce) and a fair provision to be paid
within a month of application. Following this payment, the husband is
absolved of any financial responsibility and the onus of maintenance of
the woman falls on the parental family, or as a last resort on the Wakf
Board’ (WRAG 1997). Hence, the secular women’s rights groups have
evolved a slogan ‘All women are Hindu, all minorities are men, but Some
of us are Brave.’ It signifies double burden of ‘patriarchy that controls
women’s sexuality, fertility and labour’ and ‘communalism that brutalizes
minority and dalit women’ shouldered by women in the identity politics.
Fundamentalism, Communalism and Gender Justice 205

On 6 January 2003, women’s groups in Bahrain demonstrated outside

the Justice and Islamic Affairs Ministry to press for the establishment of
civil courts to handle divorce and family cases (Jordan Times, 6 January
2003).
Hindutva and discourse on equality have been at loggerheads in the
current past. Domestic Violence Act, 2002 generated heated debate
around the issue of whether casual/occasional beating should be con-
sidered as ‘domestic violence’ (Kapur and Cossman 1996).
Centre for Women’s Development Studies (Delhi) and Majlis (Mumbai)
organized a national seminar for women activists and lawyers on ‘Main-
tenance Rights of Muslim Women—Issues and Concerns’ during 6–7 May
2001 in Delhi. The seminar concluded with the three broad statements.

1. The personal laws of all communities should be strengthened to

make them more gender just and weed out gender discrimination.
2. The Muslim Women (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act, 1986
must be strengthened to uphold positive and gender just interpre-
tation.
3. The ceiling under Section 125 should be removed.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Globalization has made civil society more inward looking. Fundamentalist

and communal elements are using caste, religious and kinship networks
for their sectarian, short-term and narrow motives. Chauvinist forces all
over the world have been supported by an equal number of women as
men (Patel 1998). All networks with global connections are executing the
projects of xenophobia, misogyny and jingoism. In this situation, only
women’s rights activists with a multicultural perspective can play an
important role as catalysts for women’s empowerment by promoting
education, capacity-building programmes, employment and economic
self-sufficiency, political and legal rights for women. Without ensuring
women’s rights, no civilization can have a human face. We should not
forget that globalization has widened the income gap between the re-
source poor and resource rich countries. Free play of market forces have
made a majority of Indian women more vulnerable. We need both dis-
tributive justice in the political economy and gender justice in the civil
society, the state apparatus and the political structures. NGOs have
206 Vibhuti Patel

provided islands of security in some pockets. Inspiring experiences of

Moholla Committee movement in which people and police work in
collaboration for communal amity should be replicated (The Movement
2003). In this situation, affirmative action by the democratic institutions
and the nation state in secular areas of human governance is the only
answer. Because women are considered to be the repository of culture and
tradition, women will have to evolve creative ways of dealing with identity
politics. New symbols, icons, imagery representing multicultural ethos
and praxis of gender justice will have to be actively promoted to counter
fundamentalists and communalist forces.
Building solidarity and sisterhood transcending religious barriers is a
major challenge. At an interpersonal level, in schools, offices, commu-
nities, restaurants a pluralism in food, dress and recreationl activities has
come about. But the political use of religion creates an artificial barrier.
We need to stress that one can be ‘religious’ and ‘plural’. Liberative aspect
of religion can be highlighted and symbols of Bhakti movement, Sufism
and liberation theology in Christianity can be popularized by us. Sweeping
generalizations about secularism become platitudes. We need to generate
alternatives in our socialization patterns, celebrations and overall lifestyle
(Patel 1995).

REFERENCES

Agnes, Flavia, Feminist Jurisprudence—Contemporary Concerns (Mumbai: Majlis, 2003).

Akhtar, Farida, ‘Family Laws and the Women’s Movement: Perspectives from
Bangladesh’, in Claudia Von Braunnmhl (ed.), Towards Progress in Women’s Rights
and Social Status in Developing Countries (Berlin: German Foundation for Inter-
national Development, 1989).
Basu, R., ‘Iraqi Women On Edge’, The Asian Age, Mumbai, 17 June 2003.
Bhurte, Aruna, Qudsiya Contractor and Lorraine Coelho, ‘Keeping Hope Alive’,
Urdhva Mula, vol. 1, no. 1 (November 2002).
Chenoy, Anuradha, ‘Forever Victims: No Post War Role for Afghan Women’, The
Times of India, 7 December 2001.
Dewan, Ritu, ‘What does Azadi Mean to You’, in Urvashi Butalia (ed.), Speaking
Peace—Women’s Voices from Kashmir (Delhi: Kali for Women, 2002).
Engineer, Asghar Ali (ed.), The Gujarat Carnage (Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003).
Hjarpe, Jan, ‘Attitude of Islamic Fundamentalists towards the Question of Women in
Islam’, in Bo Utas (ed.), Women in Islamic Societies—Social Attitudes and Historical
Perspectives (London: Curzon Press, 1983).
Fundamentalism, Communalism and Gender Justice 207

Indian Association of Women’s Studies (IAWS), Newsletter, Pune, April 2003.

Jawadekar, Prachi, ‘Nikah Now, Talak Later: Tourist Marriages Flourish’, The Asian
Age, Mumbai, 27 April 2003.
Kapur, Ratna and Brenda Cossman, Feminist Engagement with Law in India (New Delhi:
Sage Publications, 1996).
King, Laura, ‘Freedom to be Veiled’, The Indian Express, Mumbai, 3 May 2003.
Kramarae, C. and D. Spender, Routledge International Encyclopedia of Women—Global
Women’s Issues and Knowledge, vols I & II (New York: Routledge, 2000).
Maheshwari, A.P., Communalism—Handled with a Difference (Delhi: Ajanta Books
International, 2000).
Megalli, Mona, ‘Saudi Women Face Complex Choices’, available online at www.
amanjorden.org.19-11-2002
Nainar, Vahida and Saumya Uma, Combatting Impunity—A Compilation of Articles on
the International Criminal Court and Its Relevance in India (Mumbai: Women’s
Research and Action Network, 2003).
Patel, Vibhuti, ‘The Shah Bano Controversy and the Challenges Faced by Women’s
Movement in India’, in Asghar Ali Engineer (ed.), Problems of Muslim Women
in India (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1995).
—–———, ‘Campaigns against Gender Violence, 1977–93’, in Shirin Kudchetkar and
Sabiha Al-Issa (eds), Violence against Women, Women against Violence (Delhi:
Pencraft International, 1998).
—–———, Women’s Challengers of the New Millennium (New Delhi: Gyan Publication,
2002).
—–———, ‘Inevitable Trends of Economic Globalization’, People’s Reporter, Mumbai,
25 March–10 April 2003.
Pevrin, Jean-Pierre, ‘Afghanistan Goes to Absurd Lengths to Implement Islamic Laws,
Women Living Under Muslim Law’, Dossier 17, Paris, June 1997, pp. 106–10.
Saadawi, N., The Hidden Face of Eve—Women in Arab World (London: Zed Press,
1982).
Sarkar, Tanika, Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation—Community, Religion and Cultural Nation-
alism (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001).
The Movement, Newsletter of Moholla Committee Movement, Mumbai, January–
March 2003.
Vaz, Hubert, ‘The VHP Back in Training’, The Indian Express, Mumbai Newsline,
19 May 2003.
Women Living Under Muslim Law (WLUML), Newsheet, ‘Shiv Sena Calls for “Dress
Code” for Girls’, Shirkat Gah Women’s Resource Centre, vol. XV, no. 1, 2003,
p. 19.
WRAG, Women, Law and Customary Practice (Mumbai: Women’s Research and
Action Network, 1997).
 HINDUTVA AGENDA AND DALITS 11
ANAND TELTUMBDE

INTRODUCTION

T
he fact that the Dalits and tribals were foot soldiers of the
Hindutva brigade in the heinous carnage of Muslims in Gujarat
sent shockwaves across the length and breadth of secular India.
Many people lamented this unfortunate development which drowned the
facts about the losses the Dalits suffered during these gory times. It is now
clear that the massacre of Muslims in Gujarat had also a little Dalit blood
accompanying it. The Dalits lost 108 lives in Gujarat; 38 deaths alone
in the city of Ahmedabad, which makes not an insignificant percentage
of the official death toll of Muslims.1 The heartrending devastation that
visited Muslims during this macabre campaign of communalists was also
shared by the Dalits, albeit in a small way. The experience of agony,
the tears and tribulations, the pangs of pain that overwhelmed the
Muslims had besieged the Dalit community too. Even the camps for
victims from both the communities resounded the similarity of their
pathetic condition. Despite the seemingly ‘connected’ people frequenting
these ‘Hindu’ camps, their condition was not a shade better than the
Muslim camps that were run by the community volunteers. The condition
of Dalits in these camps thus clearly mirrored the material reality that

1
Anand Teltumbde, ‘Damning the Dalits for the Bania-Brahmin Crimes in Gujarat’,
available online at http://www.ambedkar.org
Hindutva Agenda and Dalits 209

Dalits, irrespective of what label they are given, cannot be part of Hindutva
privileges. Whatever their contradictions with their Muslim neighbour-
hood, they could not really escape their predicament. The Gujarat vio-
lence clearly highlighted the truth that communities do not make much
difference in people’s suffering; their classes do.
The communal conflagration in Gujarat has thrown up many issues
of vital importance. The issue of Dalit participation is of particular
importance, not because it magnifies the menace of communalism, but
because it decimates potential opposition to it. It was plausibly explained
away by the fact that the Gujarati Dalits did not have ‘Dalit’ consciousness
created by the Ambedkarian movement elsewhere. But recently, when
reports on Bheemshakti-Shivashakti alliances started coming from the
heart of the Ambedkarian movement—Mumbai and Aurangabad in
Maharashtra—it sent shudders down the spines of those who had some
hope for the secular future of India. Some people thought that ‘hegemonic
Hindu nationalism’ harboured ‘certain genuine cultural concerns’ and
might result in dampening the caste system. ‘The new organizational,
quasi-ecclesial structure that is emerging within Hinduism, is an attempt
to meet the need.’2 A series of incidents that followed the Gujarat
carnage, particularly the most infamous of them all, lynching of five Dalits
in broad daylight at Jhajjar in Haryana, proved it wrong. The Hindutva
brigade that silently co-opted Ambedkar into its sanctum sanctorum, did
not hesitate to call him a ‘false god’3 and has recently stooped so low as
to show him as anti-Muslim. While on one hand, Hindutva seems to woo
the Dalits into its fold, its cohorts are exceeding all previous limits of
exploitation.
This chapter seeks to expose the real face of the Hindutva agenda vis-
à-vis the Dalits, delineate its ill impacts on their project of emancipation,
and tries to indicate ways to mitigate them. The first part exposes the caste
connection of Hindutva, how it is a product of the anxiety of the Hindu
hegemon about the vulnerability of the margins of Hindudom. The
second part exposes the fascist pedigree of contemporary Hindutva and
its predominantly fascist character. The third part attempts to articulate
the ideology of Hindutva as that of neo-Brahmanism. In the fourth part,
an attempt is made to show how injurious Hindutva is to Dalit interests,
by mapping its impact. The fifth part takes stock of Dalit resistance to

2
S. Kappen, ‘Hindutva—Emergent Fascism’, in M. Muaralidharan et al. (eds), Un-
derstanding Communalism (Bangalore: Visthar, 1993), pp. 60–67.
3
Arun Shourie, Worshipping False Gods (New Delhi: Bilblia Impex, 1997).
210 Anand Teltumbde

Hindutva. The final part sums up by emphasizing the need to create a

peoples’ resistance movement against Hindutva, possibly with the Dalits
in the vanguard, and provides certain tips derived as the learning through
history as to how to go about doing it.

CASTE CONNECTION OF HINDUTVA

The genesis of Hindutva lies in the Hindu revival movements that took
place in the nineteenth century. Muslim rule, for nearly eight centuries,
had suffocated Hinduism. Although it uniquely survived the onslaught
of Islam, mainly on account of its caste organization, it could not go
unbruised and unhumiliated. Islam came as a message of equality for the
masses of lower castes, particularly the Dalits.4 It came as their salvation
from oppressive Hinduism.5 They converted in large numbers to Islam.
In this process Hinduism lost nearly one-fifth of its population to Islam.6
This exodus of the low-caste people was arrested only when the egalitar-
ian zeal of Islam was mostly eclipsed by the caste-like inequality brought
into Muslim society by the converts from the upper-caste Hindus, who
were readily absorbed into the Muslim ruling class. Those who stayed on
as Hindus were also culturally attracted towards Islam under the influence
of Sufism, the mystic sect of Islam that propagated equality and universal
brotherhood. Its influence among the Dalits was particularly deep and
widespread. The wounded psyche of Hindu hegemons had congenial
space for the first time during British colonial rule.
With the advent of British rule, another onslaught on Hinduism began
in the form of conversions to Christianity. The humanitarian work of
Christian missionaries was attracting the tribals and the Dalits in large
numbers.7 It is this visible drift of Dalits and tribals towards Islam and later

4
Swami Vivekanand, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekanand, vol. I, 21st reprint
(Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1995), p. 483.
5
Ibid., vol. III, 17th reprint (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1997), p. 294.
6
Swami Vivekanand had written, ‘It would be the height of madness to think that
it was all the work of sword and fire’, ibid.
7
‘. . . from the 1860s onwards missions in various parts of India began to focus their
efforts on the conversions of low caste and tribal groups. Groups were often converted
en block, following the decision of caste or tribal elders to take the step.’ (D.B.
Forrester, Caste and Christianity: Attitudes and Politics on Caste of Anglo-Saxon Protestant
Missions in India (London: Curzon Press, 1970), p. 69. This trend has been termed
Hindutva Agenda and Dalits 211

towards Christianity that impelled the Hindus to start the Hindu Sanghatan
(the unification of Hindus) when opportunity for it arose.
The Hindu Sanghatan movement, though basically revivalist, pre-
sented itself in the form of Hindu nationalism by the English educated
bhadralok of Bengal who pioneered it. Its nationalism, however, was not
against British subjugation. Right from Keshab Chandra Sen, who is
generally identified among the first proponents of Hindu nationalism, to
Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, to the later day Hindu nationalists of the
RSS in Maharashtra and its present day cohorts, the compromise with
imperialism can be seen as the characterizing theme of the movement.
It was only concerned with the sustenance of its own imperialist hege-
mony over the Indian social structure of which the Dalits constituted an
important part. The questionable status of the Dalits and tribals in
relation to Hinduism made them particularly important to the Hindu
nationalist discourse, which always sought to articulate clearly the limits
of Hinduness, whilst at the same time maintaining the marginality of such
groups in terms of sociopolitical power. The Hindu nationalist mind has
always been oversensitive about the vulnerability of the Hindu margin,
a la borders of their empire that the Dalits and tribals defined. Any
attempt at independent organization by such groups—religious, social,
political—therefore has been vigorously opposed by Hindu nationalism.
The Dalits and tribals therefore occupy a critical position in the articu-
lation of Hindu identity.8
Generally, the origin of Hindutva is attributed to V.D. Savarkar, who
had coined that word and provided its definition. But at a conceptual
level, it goes back to Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who not only saw
the potential of religious ideology in political mobilization for the first
time, but effectuated it by starting public celebrations of Ganeshotsava
and Shivaji Jayanti, the latter as a protector of cows and Brahmans. The
basic motivation for it was to win back the celebration-loving masses of
the lower castes that had adopted Islamic festivals like Muharram, etc.,
under the Sufi influence. Tilak had also propounded the intellectually
juvenile ‘Aryan Theory of Race’ that claimed a white racial stock for upper

‘mass movement’. Census figures confirm rapid increases in the Christian population
between 1871 and 1901, and most reports record the predominance of low caste and
tribal converts as a feature of this increase (Census of India 1901, vol. 1, India, Pt. 1:
Report [Calcutta: Government Printing Office, 1903], pp. 387–92).
8
John Zavos, ‘Conversion and the Assertive margins: an analysis of Hindu nationalist
discourse and the recent attacks on Indian Christians’, South Asia, vol. XXIV, no. 2
(2001), pp. 73–89.
212 Anand Teltumbde

caste Indians and accepted the Vedas as their core literature. Essentially
Tilak represented the contemporary Chitpawan struggle, to revive the lost
glory of Brahmanism that had nothing for the lower castes other than
their assigned caste rungs. The motive force behind the entire Chitpawan
struggle against the British, the militancy of which misled many to class
it as revolutionary, was provided by the intense desire to win back their
lost kingdom called Peshawai, infamous for its degenerate casteist and
reactionary character. The humiliation and oppression of the Dalits in
Peshawai had reached legendary heights. Dalits were not allowed to use
public roads before 9 A.M. and after 3 P.M. lest their elongated shadows
during these hours pollute any Brahmin walking on the road. They were
required to tie a pot at their neck to contain their spit and a sweep stick
to their back for erasing their polluting footprints. When we talk of
Hindutva in relation to the Dalits, this revivalist context can never be
ignored!

THE FASCIST AGENDA

The Fascist fangs of Hindutva were never really hidden. Hindutva is a

product of an evil integration of Hindu majoritarian communalism and
the fascist programme imported from Italy and Germany. The Italian
researcher of Indian politics, Marzia Casolari has done pioneering work
in tracing fraternal links between the RSS founders on the one hand and
fascism and Nazism on the other. Savarkar was admittedly inspired by
Italian fascist Giuseppe Mazzini in founding his secret society in 1904
called ‘Abhinav Bharat’, which was just an Indianization of Mazzini’s
‘Young Italy’. He had great liking for Hitler’s Nazism and Fascism of
Mussolini, which surfaced consistently during World War II. His justifi-
cation of Hitler’s anti-Jewish pogroms almost applies to the Muslim
problem in India when he said: ‘A nation is formed by a majority living
therein. What did the Jews do in Germany? They, being in minority, were
driven out from Germany.’9
Dr K.B. Hedgewar, who founded the RSS, was a follower of the famous
Hindu Mahasabhaite B.S. Munje, an associate of Tilak. Munje had
specially visited Italy to study Fascism and had a personal audience with

9
R.A. Ravishankar, ‘The real Sarvarkar’, Frontline, vol. 19, no. 15 (20 July–2 August
2002), available online at http://www.flonnet.com/fl1915/19151160.htm
Hindutva Agenda and Dalits 213

Mussolini on 19 March 1931. His account of this visit vividly describes

how impressed he was by Mussolini’s fascist organization. On his return,
he started to work for the militant reorganization of the Hindu society.
M.S. Golwalkar, RSS supremo after Hedgewar, is too well known a Hitler
fan to require elaboration. He often eulogized Hitler’s model of racial
cleansing and even adopted it as his own. He unhesitatingly wanted to
model his Hindu rashtra on Hitler’s totalitarian and Fascist pattern. His
book We or Our Nationhood Defined is replete with idealization of the Nazi
cultural nationalism (the phrase being used lately to describe the strategy
of communal programmes by the BJP) of Hitler. It is not a coincidence
that the Sangh Parivar’s slogan ‘one nation, one culture, one religion, one
language’, exactly resonates the Nazi slogan ‘Ein volk, ein Reich, ein
Fuehrer’ (one people, one state, one leader). Even Nehru noted in 1947
that the RSS was ‘a private army which was proceeding on the strictest
Nazi lines’.10
After independence, the RSS spread its tentacles through a host of
mass organizations11 and created a Sangh Parivar that variously followed
the Fascist dictums in its virulent anti-communism, organized terror
against ‘internal enemies’ (minorities in India in place of Jews in Ger-
many), rumour-mongering and whipping up a mass frenzy. The fascism
of the Sangh Parivar is also manifest in its revivalism (revival of vedic glory
like Fascist revival of the ancient traditions of the race, of imperial
Rome, of ‘Aryan pride’), absolute statism, expansionist foreign policy
(Akhand Bharat that includes not only Afghanistan, Pakistan and entire
South Asia but also Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, etc., in the Far East!).
As the Nazi slogan provided motivation for the most inhuman forms of
destruction, the Hindutva slogan has already succeeded in symbolically
incapacitating the Indian state when it demolished the Babri Masjid
and enacted an unprecedented carnage of Muslims in Gujarat. As in
Fascist Germany, the Sangh Parivar has effectively created a ‘we-ness’
identity based on Hindu tradition and rituals and in corollary, created ‘the
other’, apparently comprising Muslims, Christians, communists and those
who could be in apparent disagreement with them like, Ambedkarite
Dalits.

10
Christopher Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics (New
Delhi: Viking, 1996), p. 87.
11
A list of 75 organizations is provided by Louis Prakash, The Emerging Hindutva Force:
The Ascent of Hindu Nationalism (New Delhi: Indian Social Institute, 2000), pp. 298–
301, but by some accounts the figure is far higher than this number.
214 Anand Teltumbde

Insofar as Fascism blocks the democratic revolution, insofar as ‘fascism

is a most ferocious attack by capital on the mass of the working people;
fascism is unbridled chauvinism and predatory war; fascism is rabid re-
action and counter-revolution; fascism is the most vicious enemy of the
working class and of all working people’,12 the Dalits shall be at unique
disadvantage.

IDEOLOGY OF NEO-BRAHMANISM

The ideology of Hindutva represents a Brahmanical counter-revolution

to pre-empt the democratic aspirations of the downtrodden people. It is
based on brahminical Hinduism duly adjusted for the new reality of
parliamentary democracy. The core of that order, upper caste supremacy,
is embedded in the majoritarian concept of the Hindu national commu-
nity, of which Dalits and Adivasis, although excluded socially, are made
to be a part. While Hindutva cries hoarse about ‘one people’, it neither
shows any remorse for its oppressive past, nor has any programme to undo
it in the present. If at all, it is proud of its ‘glorious’ past and tends to
trivialize its problematic present. The fog of Hindu unity could never
really hide the revivalist agenda of neo-brahminism to re-subjugate Dalits.
One gets a glimpse of the ideological proclivities of the Parivar occa-
sionally. The Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), one of the
active organizations in it, had presented its vision for the governance of
the Hindu rashtra. It consisted of a Guru Sabha instead of the Consti-
tutional parliamentary democracy that we have. Its five-point plan in this
regard provides a clue to the ideological schema of the Parivar. These five
points are: (a) bringing about a brahminical social order, (b) the majority
(poor) shall not have voting rights, (c) reservation shall only be for the
elites, (d) the minorities shall become second class citizens, and (e) the
Supreme Court shall be subservient to the Guru Sabha.13 The professed

12
‘CPI (ML) Red Flag, Imperialism and the growth of fascism: a case study of India’,
paper presented in the International Communist Seminar on ‘Imperialism, Fascization
and Fascism’ at Brussels, 2–4 May 2002, available online at http://www.wpb.be/icm/
00en/seminar/india_rf.html
13
The Indian Express, 20 August 2000. Cited in Lazar Thamzraj Stanislaus, The
Hindutva and the Marginalized: A Christian Response. Available at http://www.
missionstudies.org/IACM/Papers/Hindutva%20and%20Marginalizd.doc, accessed on
9 February 2005. Also see Rajesh Ramachandram, ‘The Constitution as ABVP would
have it’, The Times of India, 7 August 2000.
Hindutva Agenda and Dalits 215

goal of the Parivar is to form a Hindu rashtra, which may not necessarily
be a religious state, as the likes of Mr Advani assure us, but it will certainly
be a state reflecting the essence of brahminism in the garb of modernity,
with the pre-modern social hierarchies imposed on all sections of society.
It has clear-sighted aim to establish a Hitleresque Aryan rule in India with
the concomitant code of Manu.
The hegemonic, homogenizing and pedagogic14 Hindutva essentially
reflects a fascist ideology of which neo-brahminism is a specific feature.
As a matter of fact, Hindutva could be potentially worse than the familiar
variety of fascism in Italy, Germany and Spain. Unlike these countries,
it has a well-established caste-ridden and hierarchy-structured social base
and a well proven oppressive ideology at its service. In our semi-feudal,
semi-colonial society, fascism is essentially an anti-democratic agenda
implemented through mass frenzy around certain fabricated myths. The
myth of unity of Hindus and Hindutva’s response to its problems in caste
are but a subterfuge to deny the Dalits whatever little space the Indian
Constitution has given them. It tends to trivialize the entire Dalit history,
Dalit culture and the Dalit struggle for emancipation.

IMPACT OF HINDUTVA ON THE DALITS

The impact of the fascist revivalist neo-brahminic Hindutva on Dalits can

be seen as follows.

DEMOLITION OF THE DALIT SOCIAL AGENDA

The Hindu rashtra campaign successfully took away the social agenda of
Dalits, comprising eradication of untouchability, poverty, inequality, and
discrimination. Along with it, the concepts of rights and dignity en-
shrined in the Constitution are being sought to be replaced by the notion
of obligations inherent in Brahmanism. It does not relate even remotely
with the inhuman condition that the Dalits live in. Worst, it tends to
deny the existence of these evils as though they were mere propaganda
of the pseudo-secularists. As for castes, its ambivalence could not manage

14
P. Louis, The Emerging Hindutva Force (2000), pp. 76–77.
216 Anand Teltumbde

to adequately hide its support to the institution of Varnashramdharma as

a ‘scientific’ institution of division of labour and its agenda of its
revivalism. In the myriad of voices issued from hundreds of outfits of
the Sangh Parivar, one does not find a trace of apology. On the contrary,
there is a full-throated advocacy of the system externalizing the blame
for its evils to ‘them’. None other than the Shankaracharya helps us to
see the fangs of the current proselytizing Hindutva. While providing the
solution to the problem of placing the newly converted Hindus, the
Shankaracharya of Govardhan Peeth in Puri had stated that ‘low-cost’
temples should be built for the Dalits and tribals who convert from
Christianity and Islam. He advocated that they should not enter the
existing Hindu temples and they should also not marry other Hindus.15
How true Ambedkar sounds when he says that Hinduism cannot exist
without castes!
To the extent gullible Dalit masses fall prey to the allure of instant
brahmanization from Hindutva, the social agenda of Dalits gets eclipsed.

SUBJUGATION OF DALIT IDENTITY

Although originally a movement of revivalist brahmins, which is poten-

tially antithetical to the Dalit interests, Hindutva could never enact its
agenda by ignoring the Dalits and tribals who numbered approximately
one-fourth of the total population of the country. It is neither feasible
from the electoral logic of securing political power nor from the fascist
imperative of creating mass hysteria by launching street battles. With this
realization, the shrewd Sangh Parivar had commenced working among
the tribals and successfully Hinduized their tribal identity. The efficacy
of this transformation is only realized in the recent Gujarat experiment.
Later, they launched a skillful co-optation programme for the Dalits.
The co-optation process started from the systematic inclusion of the
greatest Dalit icon, Babasaheb Ambedkar into the Sangh Parivar icons.
They made him Pratah Smaraniya and variously propagated him as though
he was a staunch Hindutvawadi. They started celebrating his birth an-
niversary, organizing festivals and seminars, publishing books with the
systematic vision of saffronizing him. Although they chose the day of his

15
A.J. Philip, ‘Low Cost for Low Caste: Letting the Cat Out of the Bag’, The Indian
Express, 9 June 2000.
Hindutva Agenda and Dalits 217

death anniversary for their infamous demolition of the Babri Masjid, they
have been celebrating the demolition day with the images of Ram and
Ambedkar placed alongside. For the gullible Dalit masses reared on
symbolism by the degenerate post-Ambedkar Dalit leadership, the co-
optation of Ambedkar meant change in attitude of the brahmin camp.
If Ambedkar symbolized concern for Dalits, Sangh Parivar did not lack
in resources in making exhibitionist demonstration of this concern. It
helped certain eager Dalit elites to cross over to the resource rich Sangh
Parivar through its Samarasata Manch. Although, Dalit masses did not
follow these opportunist Dalit elites it certainly helped in softening the
anti-Dalit image of the Sangh Parivar and at the same time blurring the
Dalit identity. The efficacy of the process is seen in the unthinkable
discourse of alliance between the Dalits and Hindutva in various forms
these days.

SUPPRESSION OF DALIT CULTURE

Culture is the most potent weapon in the hands of fascism to subjugate

masses. As fascism constructs its culture as a blend of the old traditions,
norms and values of the ruling class that were getting eclipsed by the
progressive culture and the artifacts of modernity required for their
luxurious living, Hindutva has created its cultural cocktail with a selective
mix of brahminic traditions and imperialism-ordained modernity and has
promoted it as national culture. At the level of civil society, there is a
renewed zeal in the promotion of Kumbh Melas, Vaishno Devis, Santoshi
Matas, etc., and the old and the newly invented festivals. Some of them
are being planted to divert people from the secular engagements. For
example, for some years now, there has been visible spate of public
Satyanarayan pujas performed on Republic day in Mumbai. There have
of course been rath yatras and kar sevas that galvanize vast masses of
gullible people and intoxicate them with Hindutva. The Sangh Parivar
has been running thousands of schools that have been silently accultur-
ating people to their creed. Their Vanvasi schools in the tribal areas well
exemplified the cultural conversion in the recent Gujarat experiment.
Now, having had the reigns of power in their hands, they have been
emboldened to saffronize entire school syllabi.
Dalits and tribals, as working class people, have a distinct culture from
the parasitic dwija castes, which has provided them a motive to wage
struggles for their emancipation. Hindutva does not tolerate cultural
218 Anand Teltumbde

diversity.16 Suppression of the Dalit culture would mean putting a lid on

the aspiration for emancipation.

DALIT AS CANNON FODDER OF HINDUTVA

Hindutva’s core rests on the upper-caste/class rich farmers, the business-

men and industrialists, and multiple segments of middle classes that
constitute bureaucrats, professionals, traders, etc., who have latched on
to the big capital. However, these are not the people who could them-
selves execute the socio-economic and political agenda of dominance.
Fascism enforces its writ through physical force, which typically requires
foot soldiers from the lower strata. In the name of ‘Hindu Unity’ the Dalits
and tribals are brainwashed and made to perform this role. Inevitably,
they become Hindutva’s cannon fodder in any communal conflagration
as illustrated in the case of Gujarat.

SPECTRE OF SLAVERY

The contradictions between the Dalits and the upper-caste/class Hindus

that constitute the core of Hindutva can be glossed over merely through
the emotional slogans of Hindu unity. The need for polarization into ‘us’
and ‘they’ is prompted by the process of gaining political power within
the prevailing political framework. Once this objective is accomplished,
the agenda could shift to the next higher level, to enforce strict hierar-
chical social structure, not quite strictly, one hopes, as based on birth
as ordained in the varnashram dharma, but one that is externally based
on secular considerations and which internally corresponds to the age
old caste lines. The simple dictum that is passed in the name of global-
ization that only the select few should have access to higher education,
as the Ambani-Birla framework for reforms in education proposed, will
effectively exclude all the Dalits from the realm of higher education
and ensure their confirmation to Manu’s dictum without actually pre-
scribing so.

16
As Golwalkar puts it in the context of his ‘others’, either to merge themselves in
the national race and adopt its culture, or to live at its mercy. M.S. Golwalkar, We
or Our Nationhood Defined, Fourth Edition (Nagpur: Bharat Prakashan, 1947).
Hindutva Agenda and Dalits 219

INCREASING ATROCITIES
With increasing revivalistic fervour, the contradictions between the Dalits
and the non-Dalits are bound to increase. The atrocities are but the
manifestation of these contradictions, the recent statistics expectedly
shows a dramatic rise in all types of atrocities on the Dalits during the
1990s that could be identified with the rising onslaught of Hindutva as
compared to those during the previous decade.

STATE OF RESISTANCE

Unfortunately, there is no resistance to this fascist onslaught to be seen

from the Dalits. For many years now, the real issues of peoples’ lives have
been taboo in the Dalit politics that has been getting propelled by the
emotional outburst of its self-seeking leaders. Whereas this virtualization
of the Dalit issues has fragmented the Dalit movement into innumerable
outfits, it also has given rise to a phenomenon known as Bahujan Samaj
Party (BSP) that enthroned a Dalit lady in one of the casteist and
conservative states of India. The numerous outfits literally operate as
petty shops dealing in Dalit interests in the political super bazar of India.
BSP relatively distinguished itself in terms of its vision (it had certainly
a longer term vision of securing political power than most others), organ-
ization structure (BSP has essentially emulated the organization model
of the RSS), acute pragmatism indistinguishable from crass opportunism
(it has elevated opportunism to an ideological level in the name of
promoting Dalit interests), and novelty of discourse (it talked of pitting
all Dalits, tribals, religious minorities, and backward castes against the
upper castes comprising Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaishyas). It created
a lot of hope among the Dalits. But eventually the inevitable happened;
this phenomenon too betrayed the rising Dalit hope by coming in full
support of Hindutva. Mayawati’s canvassing in Gujarat in support of
Narendra Modi was the last straw on the back of the hopeful Dalit camel.
Some progressive groups among Dalits strove to work among them-
selves in the wake of the Gujarat carnage but they could not even scratch
the Hindutva imprint on the minds of the Dalits. Even the Jhajjar
incident17 could not shake the Dalit organizations beyond a certain point.

17
Editorial, ‘A Dastardly Killing’, Working Class, November 2002, available online at
http://citu.org.in/wclass_nov02_ed.htm
220 Anand Teltumbde

It was responded to by the religious conversions that were organized by

the Lord Buddha Club under the leadership of Udit Raj. He has been by
far the clearest anti-Hindutva Dalit voice in the political arena. Osten-
sibly, Udit Raj has followed the low-risk, high-return model of Kanshiram
so far. He distinguished himself in two respects, one, his emphasis on
Buddhism as the path shown by Babasaheb Ambedkar and two, his
relatively radical stand on the contemporary issues. Although he has
taken the inevitable step of launching a political party—Swaraj Party—
recently and set himself to plunge into the whirlpool of electoral politics,
it must be said to his credit that he has taken an uncompromising stand
against Hindutva so far.
The voices from the Parivar confirm its commitment to get Dalits into
the Hindutva fold. Recently, Mr Vinay Katiyar, the ex-General Secretary
of the Bajrang Dal and current President of the BJP, Uttar Pradesh,
propagandized through his yatra that Dr Ambedkar was anti-Muslims that
he called the Muslims terrorists, etc. Anyone who has even perfunctory
acquaintance with the writings of Ambedkar can say that these are pure
lies. But then the entire Hindutva myth is based only on such lies. While
these developments shock even the non-Dalit secularists, paradoxically
the Dalit political establishment appears to be receptive to the Hindutva
overtures. The recent discourse on Bheemshakti-Shivashakti alliance in
Maharashtra, the very centre of Ambedkarite movement, amply illus-
trates this trend. Whether all the Dalit parties eventually go with the Shiv
Sena or not, the tenor of the discourse itself spells the worrisome degen-
eration of Dalit politics.
While this apathetic attitude of the Dalit movement is a reality, it
would be wrong to single it out on that count. As a matter of fact, there
is almost no resistance to Hindutva in the country from any corner. The
activity of resistance is only confined to certain progressive intellectuals
and the leftist organizations. But even they could not articulate their
resistance creatively enough to appeal to the masses. This disturbing
apathy perhaps characterizes the current phase of history. The forces of
imperialist globalization have successfully pulverized society into a mass
of autonomous individuals who are too engrossed with the immediate
crisis of living to consider the possibility of their long-term salvation. The
cultural onslaught of globalization moreover, has been systematically
disorienting their minds from such possibilities and miring them into
incessant consumption. It is interesting to note that the spread of glo-
balization is associated with the rise of religious fundamentalism, rightist
and fascist movements all over. Even the rise of Hindutva can well be
Hindutva Agenda and Dalits 221

correlated with the process of liberalization initiated after the second

coming of Indira Gandhi through her successor, Rajiv Gandhi, to the
formal adoption and implementation of a policy package of neoliberal
globalization in 1991. This strong correlation cannot be ignored when one
is confronted with the horrific reality of the absolute fascist rule.

BY WAY OF SUMMING UP

In the war against Hindutva, there is no more potent and proven a

weapon than Ambedkar’s thoughts. Dalits have been the natural heir to
it. It is a pity that they never realized its power and let it be misused by
vested interests. While chanting devotion to Ambedkar, they have totally
forgotten the revolutionary import of his ideology. It is one of the most
unfortunate paradoxes of history that the so-called disciples of Ambedkar
should be inclined to join hands with the forces that represent the very
antithesis of what Ambedkar stood for, that they should be willing foot
soldiers of the brigade whom Ambedkar had declared as his enemy and
relentlessly fought against.
Dalits must realize that they have basic and antagonistic contradic-
tions with the forces that Hindutva represents. They must remind them-
selves that Ambedkar had identified their enemy as brahminism and
capitalism. They have since let these enemies grow into monsters of fascist
Hindutva and imperialist globalization. Both are devouring the lives of
the people. It is not only myopic but utterly suicidal to think that these
monsters would help them or that they would be able to use them in their
endeavour. The Dalits must realize that the path of their emancipation
goes over the corpses of these monsters. It is not in their power, however,
to fight them alone. They must join others who relate with them, by
similarity of suffering and pain. It needs to be understood that this
relationship transcends caste cleavages, this relationship alone would
pave the way for annihilation of castes. Hindutva can only be resisted and
won over by building an effective peoples’ movement against it.
In order to build this movement certain crucial learnings through
history may be summed up as follows:

1. Hindutva is a myth. Myths are mere symbolic interpretations of the

reality in terms of transcendent events; it is never a rationally
constructed project. Myths are a precept not a concept. Myths
222 Anand Teltumbde

therefore cannot be effectively countered by other myths even if

the latter is about secularism. Myths are exploded only by facts,
concrete reality. The reality is that Hindutva is murderous, it is
devastating peoples’ lives, it is poisoning peoples’ minds. People
need to be awakened to the material reality; they need to liberate
themselves from their intoxicated state, they need to rely on their
lived experience.
2. Hindutva is a political mass movement and can only be effectively
countered by a similar political mass movement. The masses for this
movement can be mobilized from the working strata of the Dalits,
tribals, and the religious minorities like Muslims, Christians, Sikhs,
etc., and particularly from their womenfolk who have potential
contradiction of some kind or the other with Hindutva.
3. Hindutva is not a religious movement. It is essentially a political
movement and can therefore be effectively resisted by only a po-
litical mass movement. Some people, both Hindus as well as Muslims,
tend to diagnose the religious propaganda as being responsible for
rousing communal passions in people. Consequently, their pre-
scription leads to launching a movement to spread correct teach-
ings and tenets of the respective religions. Unfortunately, this is
wrong. Likewise, the religious conversions of Dalits that have taken
place in protest of Hindutva may be said to be misdirected. It is
enough here to remind that the Bheemshakti-Shivashakti syn-
drome is created not by the Hindu Dalits but the Ambedkarite
Buddhists!
4. Hindutva is a fascist myth. As Dimitrov pointed out, ‘Fascism acts
in the interests of extreme imperialists but presents itself to the
masses in the guise of a champion of an ill-treated nation, and
appeals to outraged “national sentiments”.’18 Fascism relies on false-
hood because truth will never favour it. While on one side they kept
people in a state of confusion with their Swadeshi rhetoric, on the
other side they have accelerated the globalization process to the
benefit of imperialists. It therefore follows that the movement
against Hindutva will have to be based on the unity of the lower
classes/castes potentially in contradiction with not only Hindutva
but also imperialist globalization.

18
Georgi Dimitrov, The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International in
the Struggle of the Working Class against Fascism (2 August 1935). Available at http//
www.ex.ac.uk/projects/meia/dimitrov/1935-rep.htm, last accessed 9 February 2005.
Hindutva Agenda and Dalits 223

5. Hindutva and globalization are complementary and mutually

sustaining. Neo-liberalism that provides the philosophical base
for imperialist globalization has given rise to fundamentalist and
fascist forces the world over, through atomization of the individual
and autonomizing its enterprise in the ‘market’ sans any moral
precepts. Globalization has been directly responsible for galloping
unemployment and consequent lumpenization of youth that
produce and reproduce Modis and Zadaphias. It is not a mere
coincidence that the rise of Hindutva (even including the Congress
variety followed after the second coming of Indira Gandhi
through Narasimha Rao) has been closely correlated to the progress
of liberalization, privatization, and globalization followed by the
government. The BJP with a strength of two MPs in 1984 gets
catapulted to power with 182 MPs in 1999. The resistance to
Hindutva must necessarily target the forces of globalization also as
its enemy.
6. Hindutva is the ideology of the ruling class and therefore it is futile
to expect any alternative out of the mainstream politics. The last
Gujarat elections have clearly shown that the hard Hindutva of the
BJP cannot be countered by supporting the soft Hindutva of the
Congress. It must be remembered that the egg of this monster was
laid during the reign of Indira Gandhi and it became a recognizable
reptile during Rajiv Gandhi’s times. The Parivar just hijacked it and
made it into a monster that we face today! Therefore, the effective
counter to fascism can never be articulated through a conventional
parliamentary medium.
7. Hindutva is a fascist movement. Fascism relies on mass frenzy
whipped around certain myths. It does not leave any space for
reason. History shows that fascism can only be effectively countered
in street battles. The mass movement against fascism has to be
proactively directed to battle on the streets. These street battles
may orient and influence parliamentary processes, but the latter
cannot be relied upon as a primary counter.
8. While Hindutva could be resisted by people coming on the streets,
its ally—imperialism—brings in the state in its support. The
resistance to Hindutva has to necessarily take into account this
composite force. It might necessitate a viable defensive strategy to
the military offensive of imperialism. Exact methods to create this
defensive apparatus will depend on the state of mass organization,
gravity of the situation and the available resources.
224 Anand Teltumbde

9. The root cause for Hindutva lies in the weakness of leftism in this
country. The leftist forces have consistently refused to learn through
history. Their doctrinaire approach has variously reflected the essence
of brahminism, which is antithetical to the cause they intend to
espouse. In the semi-feudal, semi-colonial country, the contradic-
tions between peasantry and land owning gentry are distorted by
fault lines of caste. Its manifest form is always Dalits versus all
others, as the pattern of atrocities on Dalits reveal. It is imperative
for the leftist forces therefore to have a conscious programme to
combat caste integrated within the agenda of class struggle. Rather
the class struggle in India must necessarily embed caste struggle.
They have to come clearly in support of the Dalits against all upper
castes without any vacillations. That alone can win them Dalit
confidence. That alone shall decide the fate of the anti-Hindutva
struggle.
 THE SUPREME COURT,
MEDIA AND UCC DEBATE 12
FLAVIA AGNES

INTRODUCTION

P
eriodic pronouncements by the Supreme Court urging the state to
enact a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) have received wide media
publicity. The myriad opinions expressed in support of the UCC
are governed by three distinct undertones—gender equality, national
integration, and concepts of modernity embedded within notions of
middle-class morality.
The gender concerns project the demand for an all-encompassing and
uniform code as a magic wand which will ameliorate the woes and
sufferings of Indian women in general and Muslim women in particular.
This concern places gender as a neutral terrain, distanced from contem-
porary political processes. From this point of view, the agency for change
within communities becomes highly suspect. Minority women are pro-
jected as lacking a voice and an agency either in their own communities,
or through the process of litigation to claim their rights within existing
structures, or to bring in changes which are egalitarian and gender
just. It projects state intervention in the form of an enactment of a
uniform code as the only option to bestow gender justice upon minority
women.
At another level, for the liberal, modern, English educated, middle
classes (both from the majority and minority communities), the demand
is laden with a moral undertone of abolishing polygamy and other ‘bar-
baric’ customs of the minorities and extending to them the egalitarian
226 Flavia Agnes

code of the ‘enlightened majority’. This position relies upon the western
model of the nation state and liberal democracy, and scorns simultaneous
sexual relationships in the nature of polygamous marriages in the name
of modernity, but at the same time endorses sequential plurality of sexual
relationships (through frequent divorces), and also the more recent trends
of informal cohabitations which have gained legitimacy in the West.
Within a communally vitiated political climate, the demand also
voices concerns of ‘national integration’ and ‘communal harmony’ and
projects Muslims as the ‘other’, both of Hindus and the nation. At times
the distinction between these two terms collapses and they become
interchangeable. It is projected that in order to be one country, one
nation, and in order that citizens receive equal treatment, everyone has
to be governed by the same laws.
It is indeed a matter of grave concern that this position, advocated
by the Hindu right wing, received a boost through judgements pro-
nounced by the Supreme Court of a secular state, and more often than
not by the presiding chief justice, carrying either veiled or direct infer-
ences which were often totally out of context to the issues litigated before
it. It is interesting to note that no matter what the core issue litigated
before the apex court, the comments regarding the enactment of a UCC
are always made in reference to ‘national integration’ and either a veiled
or direct insinuation against Muslim law, thus creating a myth that
Hindus are governed by secular, egalitarian, and gender-just family code
and it was high time that this code was extended to Muslims to usher
in modernity and gender equality among them. This posture of the apex
court gets affirmed when we examine the constitutional challenges to
archaic provisions under the Hindu law. For instance, when in 1984 the
Delhi High Court affirmed an archaic provision of restitution of conjugal
rights under Hindu Marriage Law which was challenged on the basis that
it violates the provision of equality under Article 14 and freedom under
Article 21, not only was there no mention of a UCC and ‘national
integration’ but the court went further and ruled: ‘Introduction of con-
stitutional law in the home is most inappropriate. It is like pushing a bull
into a china shop. It will prove to be a ruthless destroyer of the marriage
institution and all that it stands for. In the privacy of the home and
married life, neither Art. 21 nor Art. 14 have any place.’1 Later in the
same year, the Supreme Court affirmed this decision in the Saroj Rani2

1
Harvinder Kaur v Harminder Singh, AIR 1984 Del 66.
2
Saroj Rani v Sudarshan, AIR 1984 SC 1562.
The Supreme Court, Media and UCC Debate 227

case and overruled the Andhra Pradesh ruling which had struck down
this provision as unconstitutional.3
While the blame for igniting the controversy must lie primarily with
the Supreme Court, the blame for repeatedly fanning it and keeping the
issue alive in popular parlance lies with the media as this controversy
makes a ‘good copy’. While the Shah Bano4 judgement provided the first
impetus for highlighting the polarized opinions into mutually exclusive
segments—those in support of a UCC as modern, secular, rational, and
gender just, and those opposing it as fundamentalist, orthodox, male
chauvinist, communal, and obscurantist—it has continued to frame the
issue within these binaries even when the lines between these two sections
have become blurred. In the two decades since the Shah Bano ruling,
the ground realities have changed considerably. The demolition of the
Babri Masjid, the rise of the Hindu right wing, the attacks on Christian
and Muslim communities and, more particularly, the gruesome sexual
violence upon Muslim women during the recent Gujarat carnage, the
altered situation of Muslim women’s economic rights after the Supreme
Court ruling in the Daniel Latifi5 case have all been factors that have
necessitated a re-examination of the earlier call for a UCC, ostensibly to
secure the rights of minority women. Many progressive groups and some
women’s organizations no longer support this demand. Even the Muslim
intelligentsia, which during the Shah Bano controversy spoke out in
favour of UCC, has changed its position in the context of a threatened
Muslim identity. What is even more relevant is that the BJP, the dominant
segment of the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition,
itself did not foreground the debate during the five years that it was in
power, though this was one of its major election planks (along with the
building of the Mandir at Ayodhya and abolition of Article 370 of the
Constitution—a cultural thrishul—the three pronged attack against
Muslims). This demand was not included in the NDA election manifesto
during the last polls in which the NDA alliance was voted out of power.
It almost seemed as if the BJP had to dilute its Hindutva card for the sake
of keeping the NDA coalition intact.
Despite this, polarization in the media continues and the same old
controversy gets whipped up time and again and is savoured with relish
by the English speaking urban, liberal, middle class. This class, which is

3
T. Sareetha v T. Venkatasubbiah, AIR 1983 AP 356.
4
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shahbano Begam, AIR 1985 SC 945.
5
2001 CriLJ 4660.
228 Flavia Agnes

otherwise indifferent to political processes of the country, becomes the

ardent defender of the demand for the UCC. Every time the Supreme
Court makes a comment, what one sees in the media are images of purdah
clad Muslim women and opinions of Muslim religious leaders opposing
the demand. Many times in the media reports, the core issues litigated
before the Supreme Court are blurred and the call for a UCC is projected
as a pronouncement against the Muslim minority.
My concern in this chapter is to examine the core issues litigated before
the court in each of these cases, their co-relationship to the demand for
a UCC, and the subsequent media projection of the cases which rendered
the rulings as anti-Muslim pronouncements. The first and as yet the most
widely acclaimed among these is the Shah Bano6 judgement pronounced
in 1985 by a Constitutional Bench headed by the then Chief Justice Y.V.
Chandrachud; the second, the Sarla Mudgal7 judgement pronounced in
1995 by the Division Bench headed by Justice Kuldip Singh; and the most
recent, by a Division Bench headed by Chief Justice V.N. Khare in the
John Vallamattom case pronounced in 2003. The judgements are analysed
not only within their legal entirety but also their social, political and
economic ramifications to gender equality and minority identity.

JOHN VALLAMATTOM JUDGEMENT ON TESTAMENTARY

DISPOSITION FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES BY CHRISTIANS

Let me begin this exploration with the most recent and least known
Supreme Court pronouncement. On 21 August 2003, Chief Justice V.N.
Khare gave a call for the enactment of the UCC. The remarks for enacting
the UCC were part of a ruling which held S.118 of the Indian Succession
Act as unconstitutional and discriminatory. Who had filed this writ
petition, what was the core issue before the court, whether it had any link
to gender justice or national integration became immaterial in the wake
of the renewed fervour to highlight the UCC debate. The newspapers and
magazines solicited comments from two mutually exclusive groups—
spokespersons of the Muslim religious leadership and women’s rights
activists. But before jumping into the bandwagon of UCC, few journalists

6
Supra, n. 4.
7
Sarla Mudgal v Union of India (1995), 3 SCC 635.
The Supreme Court, Media and UCC Debate 229

and ‘experts’ paused to shed some light on the co-relationship between

the Supreme Court verdict, gender justice, national integration, and the
UCC.
The petitioner, a Roman Catholic priest had challenged S.118 of the
Indian Succession Act which is reproduced below: ‘Bequest to Religious
or Charitable uses—No man having a nephew or niece or any nearer
relative shall have power to bequeath any property to religious or chari-
table uses, except by a will executed not less than twelve months before
his death, and deposited within six months from its execution in some
place provided by law for the safe custody of the will of living persons.’
The underlying principle contained in Section 118 of the Act indis-
putably was to prevent persons from making ill-considered death bed
bequest under religious influence. This section had its roots in an ancient
British statute of 1735 known as ‘Charitable Uses Act, 1735’ and was
enacted for the purpose described earlier, at a time when the church
regulated all land transactions and wielded great influence upon its flock.
Through this, the British Crown sought to curtail and regulate the power
of the church over its flock. In 1888 the earlier statute was repealed and
this provision was included in another statute titled Mortmain and Chari-
table Uses Act, 1888. Ultimately, since the statute had lost its relevance
(basically, since the church had ceased to exercise such power over its
people) the British Parliament, by an Act known as Charities Act, 1960
repealed this provision.
Interestingly, despite the severe restrictions against bequests of land
for religious-charitable purposes, the Mortmain statute had exempted
gifts of land of any size for public parks, museums, universities, colleges
or to any local authority, etc. The Indian Legislature, while enacting the
Indian Succession Act, 1925, advertently or inadvertently, omitted these
exemptions and hence S.118 of the Indian Succession Act was even more
restrictive of personal freedom than the parent statute.
Such archaic remnants of the English principles are found in almost
all Indian (or for that matter, South Asian) statutes. The Indian Contract
Act, the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Transfer of Property Act and many
other statutes contain a generous sampling of irrational, outdated, and
sexist provisions which have been retained even after they have been
either struck down or amended in the country of origin. The exemption
in favour of marital rape8 and the sexist provision of adultery9 under the

8
Exception to S.375 of IPC.
9
S.497 of IPC.
230 Flavia Agnes

IPC, the out dated and sexist provisions of public morality under the Indian
Contract Act10 which prohibits ante-natal contractual agreements regard-
ing settlements in favour of women in the eventuality of a divorce, etc.,
are merely the tip of the iceberg. Some of these have been upheld despite
litigations challenging the constitutional validity of these stipulations11 or
have been retained even after the relevant section has been amended.12
The petitioner, John Vallamattom, through the present petition,
challenged the violation of personal freedoms on the ground that since
the original statute upon which this stipulation was based had been
repealed in England, there could not be any reasonable justification for
retaining the same in the Indian statute. Since this discriminative pro-
vision had already been struck down by the Division Bench of the Kerala
High Court in 1998,13 the task before the Supreme Court was a simple
and easy one.
Answering the short question before it regarding the constitutional
validity of S.118 of the Indian Succession Act, the Supreme Court ruled:

A charitable disposition of property for the benefit of the public in the

advancement of religion, knowledge, commerce, health, safety, or any
other object beneficial to the mankind has specifically been acknowledged
not only in different religious texts but also in different statutes. Charitable
purpose includes relief to poor, education, medical relief, advancement of
objects of public utility, etc. Charitable purposes are philanthropic and
since a person’s freedom to dispose of property for such purposes has
nothing to do with religious influence, the impugned provision treating
bequests for both religious and charitable purposes is discriminatory and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Assuming that the purpose of
Section 118 of the Act is to prevent bequest of property under religious
influence, there is no justification in restricting testamentary disposition
of property for charitable purpose. Once it is held that the underlying
purpose for enacting the said provision was merely to thwart influence
exercised by people professing religion resulting in death-bed disposition,
having regard to the fact that such a contingency has adequately been
taken care in other provisions under the Act, the purpose and object of
the Act must be held to be non-existent.

10
S.23 of ICA.
11
This provision was challenged and the Supreme Court upheld its constitutional
validity in Revati v Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 835.
12
For instance, the amendment to rape law in 1983 retained the exemption of marital
rape despite opposition from women’s groups.
13
Preman v Union of India, 1998 (2) KLT 1004.
The Supreme Court, Media and UCC Debate 231

Based on this reasoning, the Supreme Court struck down S. 118 of the
Indian Succession Act as being unreasonable, arbitrary, and discrimina-
tory and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. While
striking down the provision, the court also relied upon the Declaration
on the Right to Development adopted by the World Conference on
Human Rights of which India is a signatory, and on Article 18 of the
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 which
provides as follows:

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and

religion. This right shall include freedom to have or adopt a religion or
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching. Freedom to manifest ones own religion
or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law
and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedom of others.

As one can observe from these discussions, the question before the
court was not of gender justice or national integration, but that of
personal freedom of a Christian priest. Contrary to popular belief, through
this petition, the petitioner-priest sought to protect his right of religion
freedom and the right to follow the dictates of one’s religion. While
defending cultural plurality of belief, worship and practice by invoking the
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, the court
ruled in favour of religious minorities, by upholding their right of religious-
charitable bequests. The court held that violation of this right amounted
to discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution.
Yet, this judgement became popularly known as one in favour of the
Hindu right wing’s anti-minority demand for a UCC. How did this
happen? The blame lies not just with the courts and the media but also
with the petitioner. In order to strengthen his case, the petitioner ad-
vanced a rather unwarranted argument that it is an essential and integral
part of Christian faith to contribute for religious and charitable purpose,
and the stipulation under S.118 violates the right to freedom of con-
science guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.
It is in this context that the court explained:

Article 25 provides freedom of ‘profession’ meaning thereby the right of

the believer to state his creed in public and freedom of practice meaning
his right to give it expression in forms of private and public worships. A
232 Flavia Agnes

disposition towards making gift for charitable or religious purpose may be

a pious act of a person but the same cannot be said to be an integral part
of any religion. It is not the case of the petitioners that the religion of
Christianity commands gift for charitable or religious purpose compulsory
or the same is regarded as such by the community following Christianity.
Disposition of property for religious and charitable purpose is recom-
mended in all the religions, but the same cannot be said to be an integral
part of it. If a person professing Christian religion does not show any
inclination of disposition towards charitable or religious purposes, he does
not cease to be a Christian. Even certain practices adopted by the persons
professing a particular religion may not have anything to do with the
religion itself. Article 25 merely protects the freedom to practice rituals
and ceremonies etc. which are only the integral parts of the religion.
Article 25 of the Constitution of India will, therefore, not have any
application in the instant case.

Had the petitioner not pressed the argument of violation of rights

under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, he would still have won
the case and secured his rights (and that of others in his community) of
testamentary bequests for religious charitable purposes. At the other end,
even if the issue had been raised, the court could have answered the issue
in the negative and the matter would have ended there. But out of the
blue, Chief Justice Khare went on to add a comment, totally out of
context to the core issue before him in the following words:

Before I part with the case, I would like to state that Article 44 provides
that the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code
throughout the territory of India. The aforesaid provision is based on the
premise that there is no necessary connection between religious and
personal law in a civilized society. Article 25 of the Constitution confers
freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of
religion. The aforesaid two provisions viz. Articles 25 and 44 show that the
former guarantees religious freedom whereas the latter divests religion from
social relations and personal law. It is no matter of doubt that marriage,
succession and the like matters of a secular character cannot be brought
within the guarantee enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Consti-
tution. It is a matter of regret that Article 44 of the Constitution has not
been given effect to. Parliament is still to take step in for framing a common
civil code in the country. A common civil code will help the cause of
national integration by removing the contradictions based on ideologies.

The link between the Christian priest’s personal freedom to make a

bequest of religious charitable nature and the issue of national integration
The Supreme Court, Media and UCC Debate 233

through the enactment of a UCC was not explained and the reader was
left guessing. But this comment provided the fuel for the media to
interpret the judgement as one that was anti-minority and pro-UCC,
rather than a judgement in defence of personal freedoms and cultural
plurality. Ironically, the next day and through the weeks that followed,
the newspapers were flooded with reports and editorials on UCC with
quotes from Muslim religious leadership and Muslim intelligentsia on one
end and women’s rights activists at the other, while the judgement itself
was of relevance neither to the Muslim identity nor women’s rights.

THE SARLA MUDGAL14 JUDGEMENT ON

CONVERSION AND BIGAMY

The second significant judgement on this issue is the Supreme Court

verdict on conversion and bigamy by Hindu men in the Sarla Mudgal
case. Here again, neither Muslim law nor rights of Muslim women were
the core issues before the court. The court was examining the validity of
a Hindu marriage contracted between a Hindu man and a Hindu woman,
and the subsequent marriage by this man to a subsequent woman, also
a Hindu, contracted after a fraudulent conversion to Islam. But the
parties to both marriages continued to be Hindus and practiced Hindu
religion and rites. It was not the claim of any of them that they are now
Muslims. So in a nutshell, the court was examining the rights of two
Hindu wives of a bigamous Hindu husband. There was no Muslim before
the court and the gender inequality within Muslim law was not an issue.
But unfortunately, the judgement and the media publicity that followed
focused primarily on the issue of UCC in the context of nation, national
integration, and minority identity.
Yet, in the much publicized judgement delivered by Justice Kuldip
Singh, the court commented:

Since Hindus along with Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains have forsaken their
sentiments in the cause of the national unity and integration, some other
communities would not, though the Constitution enjoins the establish-
ment of a common civil code for the whole of India . . . . Those who

14
Supra, n. 7.
234 Flavia Agnes

preferred to remain in India after the partition, fully knew that the Indian
leaders did not believe in two-nation or three-nation theory and that in
the Indian Republic there was to be only one Nation, the Indian Nation
and no community could claim to remain a separate entity on the basis
of religion. In this view of the matter no community can oppose the
introduction of common civil code for all citizens in the territory of India.

The obvious reference to partition and to the choice to remain in India

are targeted towards the Muslim minority as Parsis and Christians did not
have any choice in the matter. The discourse of choosing to remain in
India after partition has long been a warning to Indian Muslims from the
Hindu right. The reference to civilized and human in relation to the UCC
suggests that those who oppose the code (read Muslims) are barbaric and
uncivilized. The comments also seem to suggest that Hindus are governed
by a secular and gender-just family law and that Muslims as a community
are the uncivilized enemy to national integrity because they follow their
own personal law.
Kapur and Cossman15 have argued that the language of the judgement
in deflecting attention away from the continuing religious and discrim-
inatory aspects of Hindu personal law and in attacking the Muslim
community is disturbingly similar to the political rhetoric of the Hindu
right. In this view, all religious communities must be treated the same and
it is the dominant Hindu community which is to be the norm against
which equality is judged.
But the norm of monogamy of the Hindu society, which was the issue
under scrutiny before the apex court, escaped all public debate. The
spotlight was turned on polygamy of Muslim men and the plight of
Muslim women and solution offered to liberate Muslim women was the
immediate enforcement of a UCC. There was also a hint that the uniform
code would render Hindu marriages more stable by curbing the bigamous
tendencies of Hindu men. A reading of the judgement seemed to indicate
that the only breach of monogamy among Hindus was by conversion to
Islam. To quote from the judgement, ‘. . . there is an open inducement to
a Hindu husband, who wants to enter into a second marriage to become
a Muslim . . . .’
The norm of Hindu monogamy presumed by the judgement needs
further scrutiny. Monogamy was introduced among the Hindus through

15
Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman, Subversive Sites (New Delhi : Sage Publications,
1995).
The Supreme Court, Media and UCC Debate 235

the Hindu Marriage Act in 1955. Prior to this, Hindu men were absolved
of the criminal consequences of bigamy under S.494 of IPC. After 1955,
a Hindu wife could divorce her husband on the ground of bigamy and
also prosecute him under the penal law.
The right to dissolve the marriage on the ground of bigamy is also
available to a Muslim wife under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages
Act. The additional relief that the Hindu wife can avail of is criminal
prosecution for bigamy. But since only the first wife can initiate prosecu-
tion, a popular notion prevails that a Hindu husband can remarry with
the consent of his wife and at a practical level, this notion is not far from
the truth. So although on paper the position of a Hindu wife appeared
slightly better than a Muslim wife in respect of her husband’s bigamy, the
statistics of bigamous marriages among Hindus and Muslims are compa-
rable. By declaring that the earlier marriage was valid, the only legal
remedy (apart from a petition for divorce on the ground of bigamy) that
the litigating women were entitled to is a prosecution for bigamy.
It is in this context that judicial attitude towards bigamy by Hindu men
has to be posed as the central issue. The judgement seemed to indicate
that the judiciary has dealt severely with all breaches of monogamy among
the Hindus and the only loophole through which a husband can escape
is conversion. But an examination of the decisions of the Supreme Court
and the various High Courts reveal that bigamy of the Hindu male persists
despite statutory restrains and judicial attitude has been extremely lax
towards Hindu bigamy.
Ten years after the provision of monogamy was introduced, the
Supreme Court dealt with the case of Bhaurao Lokhande.16 The errant
husband was convicted by the lower courts. But the apex court acquitted
the husband on the ground that essential ceremonies for a valid Hindu
marriage—vivaha homa and saptapadi (invocation before the sacred fire
and the seven rounds) had not been performed in the second marriage.
The court ruled that the bare fact of a man and a woman living as husband
and wife does not give them the status of husband and wife unless valid
ceremonies of a marriage have been performed and hence such cohabi-
tation would not warrant conviction under S.494 of IPC.
This principle was followed by the Supreme Court in 1966 in the
Kanwal Ram17 and in 1971 in the Priya Bala cases.18 While acquitting the

16
Bhaurao Lokhande v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 1564.
17
Kanwal Ram and Ors v The H.P. Administration, AIR 1966 SC 614.
18
Priya Bala Ghosh v Suresh Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1971 SC 1153.
236 Flavia Agnes

errant husbands, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that proof of essential

ceremonies is a precondition for conviction. The court further ruled that
this condition must be met even when the husband and the second wife
admit the marriage or the fact of cohabitation.
In the intervening period of 30 years from Bhaurao in 1965 to Sarla
Mudgal in 1995, the various High Courts not only followed the trend set
by the Supreme Court, but in their zeal advanced the logic to absurd ends,
stumping out all hopes of justice and fairness in criminal prosecutions.
Ceremonies performed in a temple, registration with the caste panchayats
or temple authorities or even with a civil registrar fell short of the degree
of clinching proof which the first wife was expected to produce. The
paternity of the child of a second marriage if proved could only lead to
its bastardization and not proof of bigamy by its father. The complainant
wife could also lay herself open to the risk of invalidating her existing
marriage.19
The decisions ignored the reality of a pluralistic Hindu society and
thrust upon it an absurd notion of uniformity. The second marriages of
lower castes were judged by the yardstick which can only be applied to
marriages of upper caste virgin brides. The lower castes did not follow the
brahminical rituals, permitted divorce and remarriage prior to the Hindu
Marriage Act and followed distinct ceremonies to distinguish the first and
the second marriage. Hence a remarriage of a lower caste person could
never meet the high judicial standards set by the courts in coordination
with the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act.
A discernible pattern emerging from prosecution for bigamy is convic-
tion by the lower judiciary and leniency by the apex court. The higher
judiciary rescued the errant husbands by applying the standards of
brahminical rituals of homa, saptapadi, and kanyadan. The complexities
of bigamous Hindu marriages and the afflictions of both the first and
the second wife were addressed neither by the courts nor by the media
while the focus continued to remain on Muslim bigamy. The Supreme
Court declined to address the issue of various fraudulent means which
the husbands’ adopt to escape the stipulation of monogamy under the
Hindu Marriage Act and restricted itself to a pronouncement on the
unpatriotic approach of the Muslim community in holding on to their
own personal law.

19
For a detailed discussion on this issue see Flavia Agnes, ‘Hindu Men, Monogamy
and the Uniform Civil Code’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XXX, no. 50 (1995),
p. 3238.
The Supreme Court, Media and UCC Debate 237

SHAH BANO JUDGEMENT20 AND RIGHTS

OF DIVORCED MUSLIM WOMEN

The earliest among the three judgements discussed in this chapter, was
delivered by a Constitutional Bench headed by the then Chief Justice Y.V.
Chandrachud in 1985 in the Shah Bano case. This judgement set the tone
for communalization of the demand for a UCC and for projecting the
Muslim law as backward and anti-women. Until then, and more particu-
larly in the 1950s when the debate around the Hindu Code Bill was raging,
it was the Hindu law that was projected as ‘archaic and anti-women’ and
in comparison, the laws of the minorities were far more progressive and
modern.
The ruling is significant also because, among the three rulings on UCC,
this alone had a Muslim woman at its centre and hence the controversy
it created surpassed the others. In fact the media debates following the
subsequent ruling were only churning up the old hash and remarketing
it as new debates. The facts of the case are now history and hence do
not merit an elaborate discussion at this juncture. For the purpose of this
chapter, it would suffice to mention that the Supreme Court elected to
comment upon Islam and the Muslim Personal Law while deciding the
right of maintenance under a secular and uniform statute for the first time
since independence. But this was not the first instance of the apex court
upholding the rights of a Muslim woman for maintenance under S.125
Cr.PC. Two significant decisions of the Supreme Court delivered by
Justice Krishna Iyer in 197921 and 198022 had placed the divorced Muslim
woman’s right of maintenance under this provision upon a secure footing
without arousing a political controversy These decisions examined the
right of Muslim women from the context of social justice.
The unwarranted comments and the uncalled for demand for UCC,
while debating the rights under a secular statute in the Shah Bano ruling
evoked a communal backlash. Relenting to the pressure exerted by the
Muslim orthodoxy, the government introduced the Muslim Women’s Bill
which sought to exclude divorced Muslim women from the purview of
S.125 Cr.PC. This move by the ruling Congress party headed by Rajiv

20
Supra, n. 4.
21
Bai Tahira v Ali Hussain Fissali, Air 1979 SC 362.
22
Fuzlunbi v K. Khadir Vali, AIR 1980 SC 1730.
238 Flavia Agnes

Gandhi, came to be projected as the most glaring instance of the defeat

of the principle of gender justice for Indian women, as well as the defeat
of secular principles within the Indian polity.
This move met with severe opposition from secular and women’s rights
groups. As the debate progressed, the media projected two insular and
mutually exclusive positions, those who opposed the Bill and supported
the demand for a UCC as modern, secular and rational, while those in
the opposing side as fundamentalist, orthodox, male chauvinist, commu-
nal and obscurantist. To be progressive, modern and secular was also to
be nationalist and conversely the opposing faction could be labelled as
anti-national. As the controversy escalated, the Muslim was defined as
the other, both of the nation and of Hindus. Muslims in turn could be
mobilized to view this as yet another threat to their tenuous security. The
rigid approach of the Muslim leadership provided further fuel to the
Hindu right wing forces in their anti-Muslim propaganda. The Muslim
intelligentsia distanced itself from the opinion of the Muslim religious
leadership and approached the government with a Petition supporting the
judgement and opposed the proposed Bill.
Ironically, the fury which was whipped up seemed to be divorced from
the core component of the controversy, a paltry sum of Rs 179.20 per
month, far too inadequate to save the 73-year-old ex-wife of a successful
Kanpur-based lawyer, from vagrancy and penury. The raging controversy
and the communal turn of events finally led Shah Bano herself to make
a public declaration renouncing her claim, strengthening the popular
misconception that Islam subverts economic rights of women. If this
entitlement was against her religion, she declared, she would rather be
a devout Muslim than claim her right of maintenance. A sad comment
indeed, warranting reflection from campaigners on both sides of the
divide.
The statute, passed under a party whip, led to a further strengthening
of the Muslim appeasement theory in judicial discourse and in popular
media at one end and crystallized the anti-UCC position among Muslim
religious leadership at the other. Once the Act came into effect, the
protesting groups were left with no option but to appeal to the judicial
sensitivity to set right the wrongs caused to Muslim women by the
legislature.
The hurriedly drafted and hastily enacted statute was full of contra-
dictions and loopholes. But despite its limitations, the Act was of immense
historical significance as the first attempt of independent India to codify
the Muslim Personal Law. But the positions across the divide were so rigid
The Supreme Court, Media and UCC Debate 239

by then, that they left no space to contemplate upon this milestone in

the history of personal laws in India. It is when the dust raised by the
controversy settled down that one could examine the relevance of this
statute titled, Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986
(MWA for short) to the divorced Muslim woman. But since it was
enacted amidst protests from women’s rights groups and progressive social
organizations, it was viewed with suspicion and foreboding by these
sections. Hence the first response of the protesting groups was to chal-
lenge its constitutionality, rather than examine its viability.
While the writ petitions were pending in the Supreme Court, the Act
gradually unfolded itself in the lower courts. Appeals from the decisions
of various High Courts gradually started accumulating along with the
original writ petitions. What was intriguing was that while the writ
petitions were filed by groups agitating for women’s rights, the appeals
were from husbands aggrieved by the verdicts of various High Courts.
Since the Act was passed amidst protests from rights lobbies, writ petitions
challenging its constitutionality by these segments seemed to be in order.
But difficult to rationalize were the appeals, which were filed by husbands,
that started accumulating from the rulings of various High Courts.
If indeed the Act was depriving women of their pre-existing rights
and was enabling husbands to wriggle out of their economic liability
towards their ex-wives, why were the husbands finding themselves ag-
grieved by the orders passed under a blatantly anti-women statute? Lurk-
ing beneath this observation was a faint suspicion that perhaps the ways
in which the Act was unfolding itself in the lower courts, was indicative
of a different reality defying the premonitions. This fascinating phenom-
enon provided the first indication that perhaps the ill-famed Act could
be invoked to secure the rights of divorced Muslim women. Hence, it
became expedient to examine whether the new Act provided Muslim
women with a more viable and feasible alternative to the prevailing
remedy under S.125 Cr.PC. by invoking Islamic principles of a ‘fair and
reasonable settlement’.
A seemingly innocuous clause, which had missed the attention of
protesters and defenders alike, had been invoked by a section of the lower
judiciary to pronounce judgements which provided greater scope for
protection against destitution. Section 3(1)(a) of the Act stipulated that
a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to ‘a reasonable and fair provision
and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by
her former husband’. This clause, along with the preamble, ‘An Act to
protect the rights of Muslim women who have been divorced by, or have
240 Flavia Agnes

obtained divorce from their husbands . . . .’, had been invoked by the
judiciary in defence of Muslim women’s rights.
Though initially just a trickle, the judgements were a pointer towards
a possibility. They affirmed that the new Act was to protect the rights of
divorced Muslim women and not deprive them of their rights. They
further stressed that any ambiguity within Clause (1)(a) of Section 3, must
be interpreted in such a manner as to reconcile with the proclamation
contained in the title of the Act. Banishing divorced women to a life of
destitution would not amount to protecting their rights as stipulated by
the statute, they declared.
Suddenly, the lump sum provisions for future security, which the
courts were awarding within the framework of Islamic principles, seemed
to be a better safeguard against destitution than the meagre sums which
women were entitled to under S.125 Cr.PC through a monthly recurring
entitlement. A reading of the judgements indicates that the Act had rid
itself of the agenda of alleviating vagrancy and destitution among di-
vorced women and had extended itself to the claims of women from a
higher social strata, than merely those who live below the poverty line.
The statute enacted in haste, at the insistence of the conservative lead-
ership, seemed to have boomeranged.
In a significant number of cases, a concerned and sensitive judiciary
carved out a space for the protection of women’s rights from what
appeared to be an erroneously conceived, badly formulated, and blatantly
discriminatory statute without invoking a political backlash. Endorsing
the spirit of Islam and the shariah and reflecting the sensitivity of the
Prophet, who is hailed as the greatest champion of women’s rights the
world has ever seen, the courts read into the statute, notions of justice
and equity. Doing precisely what the Act in its title proclaimed, protec-
tion of rights of divorced Muslim women, the judiciary turned what had
initially appeared to be a misnomer and a mockery into a factual reality
and ushered in a silent revolution in the realm of Muslim woman’s rights.
It would indeed have been tragic if these concerted efforts were invali-
dated through a single stroke of the pen from the apex court.
The most significant issue which emerged out of the enactment re-
volved around the stipulation of ‘a fair and reasonable provision’. Drawing
on the Islamic concept of mataaoon bil ma’aroofe (fair and reasonable
provision), several High Courts opened a new portal for the protection of
divorced Muslim women. The remedy, which the courts so carefully
crafted out of the controversial legislation, in fact, seems to provide a better
safeguard, than the earlier anti-vagrancy provision under S.125 Cr.PC.
The Supreme Court, Media and UCC Debate 241

The first significant judgment on this issue was pronounced by Justice

M.B. Shah, then presiding over the Gujarat High Court, on 18 February
1988.23 But even before this, the dice was cast in women’s favour by a
woman judicial magistrate in Lucknow on 6 January 1988. The woman
concerned, Fathima Sardar, was awarded Rs 85,000 as maintenance
during iddat period, mehr entitlement and fair and reasonable provision.
Following the judgement of the Gujarat High Court, the Kerala High
Court upheld this view in two significant rulings.24 These judgements
were pronounced in the months of July and August 1988 respectively. In
another unreported judgement, the Kerala High Court upheld the woman’s
right to Rs 300,000 as a fair and reasonable provision and also awarded
Rs 7,500 as maintenance during the iddat period.25 Soon several High
Courts followed suit.
In the years that followed, the full benches of Punjab and Haryana and
Bombay, the division benches of Bombay, Kerala, Madras and Calcutta
and single judges of several other High Courts upheld this view. The
courts ruled that even when a wife has some source of income the right
under S.3 of the MWA is not extinguished.
But the controversy regarding the constitutional validity of the Act
prevailed and not just the media, but also secular and progressive groups
and women’s rights lobbies continued to drum the same old tune that the
Act has deprived divorced Muslim women of their crucial rights. Also
certain High Courts had given a contrary ruling and rights of Muslim
women varied depending upon the High Courts under whose jurisdiction
they happen to reside. Finally, the entire controversy was laid to rest and
uniformity was assured through a ruling of the apex court pronounced on
28 September 2001. A five judge bench headed by Justice G.B. Pattanaik
unanimously declared that the Act is constitutionally valid and upheld
the positive interpretations given by various trial courts in respect of fair
and reasonable settlement for a life time!

MUSLIM WOMEN, DOMINANT IDEOLOGIES AND THE MEDIA

Law is not merely a statute, but its essence lies in the manner in which
it is unfolded in law courts. The empty words of a statute come to life

23
Arab Ahemadhia Abdulla v Arab Bail Mohmuna Saiyadbhai, AIR 1988 Guj 141.
24
Ali v Sufaira 1988 (2) KLT 94 and Aliyar v Pathu, 1988 (2) KLT 172.
25
P.K. Saru v P.A. Halim.
242 Flavia Agnes

in the trial courts where they are contested, interpreted, and validated.
Right from 1988, the courts have engineered women’s rights through
innovative interpretations, ushering in a new set of rights within the
established principles of Muslim law. The lower judiciary gave a clear
verdict in favour of a ‘fair and reasonable provision’ for the divorced
Muslim woman. Several judges in trial courts declared that ‘provision’
contemplates ‘future needs’ and that the Parliament has replaced one
set of obligations of a Muslim husband with another. The claim under
the MWA does not operate through a rider of sexual purity or post-
divorce chastity, unlike S.125 of Cr.PC the original provision under
which Shah Bano was awarded maintenance. The judicial pronounce-
ments delivered divorced Muslim women from the cumbersome burden
of recurring monthly dues, which hinged upon post-divorce chastity.
The historic ruling of the Constitutional Bench in Daniel Latifi case
finally put its seal of approval on the interpretations given by the lower
judiciary.
But rather unfortunately, within the communally vitiated atmosphere,
the advances made by divorced Muslim women under the provisions of
the MWA have been made invisible and glossed over by the media.
During the Shah Bano controversy, the denial of rights of a meagre
maintenance dole was lamented by all and sundry, not withstanding the
fact that the maintenance awarded to the wife of an advocate with a
flourishing practice was just Rs 25 in the first instance and Rs 179 in
appeal. So long as the debate could be used as a stick to beat the
community with, these minor details did not seem to matter. What did
matter is the fact that a communal campaign could be mounted upon a
patriarchal paradigm and thereby legitimized.
The demand for a UCC was couched as a ‘liberal and modernizing
mission’. The irony lay in the fact that the groundwork for mounting this
campaign was laid by the women’s movement, with genuine gender
concerns, but firmly located within the cultural ethos of the mainstream.
Within this framework, a similar appeasement of Hindus, by strengthen-
ing coparcenaries by various legislative measures, could be deliberately
ignored. The ‘modernizing mission’ is an important tool for establishing
racial and communal superiority and is used constantly by dominant
classes and hegemonic cultures.
During the colonial rule, the introduction of the Anglo-Saxon legal
structure was seen by the British administrators as an important forte
of its civilizing mission. Through this structure, it was projected that
the Hindu society could rid itself of its barbarism and enter an era of
The Supreme Court, Media and UCC Debate 243

‘civilization’. An image of the cruel and superstitious native who needed

Christian salvation was deliberately constructed by the evangelists.
Lata Mani, in her pathbreaking work on the colonial Sati discourse
comments: ‘Tradition was not the ground on which the status of women
was being contested. Rather the reverse was true—women in fact became
the site on which tradition was debated and reformulated. What was at
stake was not women but tradition. Women were neither subject, nor
object but the ground . . . .’26 In another context, while discussing the
discourse around Rukhmabai case on the colonial legal remedy of resti-
tution of conjugal rights (decided by the Bombay High Court in 1884),
Sudhir Chandra argues that it was not simply a ‘civil war’ involving
different groups within the Indian society, but within the colonial ambi-
ence a war between the rulers and the ruled in which the two sought to
distinguish their respective institutions, ideals, and values with regard to
women, marriage, and family in order to claim superiority over the other.
The issue of law and justice which figured prominently in the ensuing
controversy, deepened the civilizational encounter between the ruled and
the rulers.27
This discursive practice of using women’s rights and status in society
as the ground on which tradition is reformulated was also deployed by
the nationalist project to emancipate India from colonial rule. As was
the case in the nineteenth century, tradition became the site for the
elaboration of state power and in this instance, the power of the national
state. The conflicts and contests between the orthodox/reactionary, the
imperialist, and the reformist helped to carve out a new woman for the
new nation. As Partha Chatterjee28 points out, the distinctiveness of the
national culture and tradition was built around the conceptualization of
a new form of femininity. This process inaugurated a new patriarchy to
which the new woman was subjected. It explicitly distinguished itself from
the patriarchy of indigenous tradition. The new woman, the bhadramahila
or respectable woman was contrasted with the characteristic of the

26
Lata Mani, ‘Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in colonial India’, in
Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid (eds), Recasting Women (New Delhi: Kali for
Women, 1989), p. 118.
27
Sudhir Chandra, ‘Enslaved Daughters’, in Flavia Agnes, Sudhir Chandra and
Manmoyee Basu (eds), Women and Law in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2004).
28
See Partha Chatterjee, ‘The Nationalist Resolution of the Women’s Question’, in
Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid (eds), Recasting Women (New Delhi: Kali for
Women, 1989), pp. 233–53.
244 Flavia Agnes

‘common’ woman who was coarse, vulgar, loud and quarrelsome, sexually
promiscuous and subjected to brutal physical oppression by males.
Since the reform of women’s lives came to symbolize national sovereignty
and the project of reform addressed the lives of Hindu middle class
women, this demographic section came effectively to constitute the
‘nation’.
Chatterjee also shows that the nationalist resolution of the women’s
question, built on a system of dichotomies of the inner/outer, spiritual/
material, feminine/masculine, gave birth to a national state and a notion
of rights and citizenship which was exclusive in that it applied to the new
middle class. The project of reform, which located the state in the
nationalist resolution of the women’s question, excluded those sections
of the middle class which felt themselves culturally left out of the specific
process of formation of the ‘nation’. Indian Muslims, for example, were
left out of this hegemonic cultural construct of the nation. The hege-
monic ‘national culture’ that was built through the above process also
excluded vast masses of people who could never be culturally integrated
with this concept.29
One needs to examine the invisibilizing of the Muslim woman’s struggle
within the cultural construct of hegemonic claims. The communal fervour
could be sustained only by denying the fact that the Act provided for an
alternate remedy, far superior to the one that had been denied to Muslim
women under S.125 Cr.PC; by negating the fact that since 1988, the Act
was being positively interpreted by various High Courts in the country
by awarding substantial amounts as ‘settlements’; by glossing over an
important development in the realm of family law, that of determination
of economic entitlements upon divorce, rather than the prevailing right
of recurring maintenance. So even while homes of poor Muslim women
were looted, gutted, and razed to the ground in various communal riots
which broke out in the country, while teenage sons of Muslim women
were killed at point blank ranges in police firings, while Muslim women
were raped under flood lights in post-Babri Masjid demolition riots, the
mainstream continued to lament over Muslim appeasement and denial
of maintenance to ‘poor Muslim women/the Shahbanos’.
One could overlook even this. Perhaps there was a justification. Denial
of maintenance by husbands was perhaps as loathsome as rape of women
in communal riots. In the ultimate analysis, it was the ‘poor Muslim

29
Ibid., p. 251.
The Supreme Court, Media and UCC Debate 245

woman’ who suffered. So far so good. But how can one logically explain
the recurring motif of ‘Muslim appeasement’ even after the Supreme
Court decision in Daniel Latifi30 case, when the controversy was finally
laid to rest by upholding the constitutional validity of the Act and
simultaneously securing for the Muslim women maintenance rights which
in actual terms are superior to the rights bestowed upon a Hindu woman?
Yet, the rhetoric continues and is used yet again, in defence of the
Gujarat carnage. ‘They had it coming. . . they have been ‘appeased’ be-
yond tolerance. Why should they demand a separate law in a secular
country? Why should they be allowed to marry four times? Why are
Hindus alone bound by an obligation of maintenance?’ What is startling
is that the grievances are mouthed not only by Hindu extremists but also
by centrists, the liberals, the people who inhabit my social space, the
urban, cosmopolitan, middle class. Within the cultural ethos of the
mainstream, an injustice to a Muslim wife gets magically transformed into
a Hindu injury which could be invoked to justify communal carnage.
Without this tacit approval by the middle class, the recent Gujarat
carnage could never have spread so wide nor so deep.
The rhetoric conveniently overlooks the fact that abandonment and
destitution of wives is as rampant among Hindus; that the matrimonial
faults of adultery and bigamy are evenly distributed across communities
and that Hindus, Christians and Parsis, with equal zeal, guard the patri-
archal prerogatives within their respective personal laws. Further, around
80 per cent of all women burnt in their matrimonial homes are urban
middle class Hindus! That patriarchal prerogatives cannot be abandoned
even when a law is being codified is something we have learnt in the
process of Hindu law reforms. Even when codification is sought in the
name of either ‘uniformity’, ‘national integration’ or as a ‘civilizing mis-
sion’ these prerogatives will be retained. The saving of Hindu undivided
family (HUF) property under the Hindu Succession Act is a glaring
example of this. The Hindu urban and rural propertied class and family
business establishments have gained the maximum concessions of tax
benefits due to this. Any move to abolish this even under the guise of
a UCC will be opposed vehemently by this class, as it will upset their apple
cart. For them, the UCC debate is confined to abolishing the ‘barbaric’
Muslim culture of polygamy and to liberate the Shah Banos, while simul-
taneously turning a blind eye to the sexual promiscuity and multiple
sexual relations among them. The women bound in these relations can

30
Supra, n. 5.
246 Flavia Agnes

easily be discarded as ‘concubines’, ‘mistresses’ or partners of contractual

agreements, maitreyee karars (this is the modern term for these alliances)
lacking legal validity and devoid of any rights, as one experiences during
contested claims of maintenance by these women.
The symbolism becomes even more stark when one is confronted with
the gruesome sexual violations of women during the recent carnage in
Gujarat in 2002. While exploring possible legal portals to place these
blood curdling barbarities, one hits a dead end at each turn. As one hears
the narratives of young women, running helter-skelter, slipping, falling
and becoming prey to the marauding mobs, their violated and mutilated
bodies being thrown into open fires, the question keeps haunting: where
and how does one pin the culpable?
When violence of this scale supercedes the confines of criminal juris-
prudence which is bound by conventions of proof and evidence, medical
examinations and forensic reports, when criminal prosecution itself is a
closed-end process in the hands of the state machinery, what legal
measures can be invoked to bring justice to the dead and the surviving?
It is then that the covenants of equality and equal protection mock you
in the face. At the other end, there is a danger that these violations do
not form part of ‘official records’ they can be conveniently negated as
baseless allegations or normalized as routine occurrences.
Viewed within this background, the struggles of individual divorced
Muslim women who defied their culture and tradition and dictates of
patriarchy have to be acknowledged as acts of assertion. But the struggle
has not been easy. Divorced Muslim women had to fight every inch of
the way for their rights, from the trial courts in small district towns right
up to the Supreme Court. Their crucial right of survival hinged upon
interpretations and explanations of simple words like ‘within/for’ ‘and/or’
‘maintenance/provision’, disjunctures and conjuctures of words and phrases.
The ambiguities which surfaced due to callous drafting, posed hurdles to
women in their struggle to claim their rights. The Act provided ample
scope to husbands to exploit the situation which led to protracted liti-
gation beneficial to husbands and a nightmare to women. But women
withstood the ordeal with courage and determination, with patience and
perseverance and overcame the seemingly unsurmountable hurdles.
Through this laborious process, the criteria for the civil right of divorce
settlement has been taken out of the earlier legal premises such as ‘inablity
to maintain’, ‘prevention of vagrancy’, ‘a dole to hold together body and
soul’. After a decade-and-a-half, the end results of this persistent struggle
are clearly discernible.
The Supreme Court, Media and UCC Debate 247

In the final battle in the Supreme Court, both sides, the women’s rights
groups who had challenged the constitutionality of the Act as well as the
Muslim religious leadership who had pressed for their claim that the
Muslim woman’s entitlement ought to be limited to three months of iddat
period lost out. Who emerged victorious was the divorced Muslim woman
who had waged a relentless battle to defend her rights. It is time the media
took note of this silent revolution waged by individual Muslim women
and acknowledge the fact of their agency in bringing about changes
within their personal laws.
 13
EDUCATIONAL BACKWARDNESS AMONG THE
MUSLIMS IN INDIA: A CASE OF
MISREPRESENTATION?

RANU JAIN*

H
indutva politics portrays Muslims as educationally backward and
links this to the religious orientation of the community. Project-
ing the Muslims as a homogeneous unit, it depicts the commu-
nity as being under the control of the religious leaders, for whom edu-
cation is a tool for inculcating fundamentalist notions. In this ideological
framework, madarasas promote terrorism and do not give much space to
progressive learning. The view is ahistorical and does not accommodate
the heterogeneity existing among the Muslim population. This chapter
submits that just like other religious communities, the Muslim community
has divergent educational experiences and contextual requirements. It
states that when placed on class dimensions, one does not find much
difference among the Muslims and other communities in the initial stage
of educational achievements. However, the differences are conspicuous
in the later stage. Further, the educational behaviour of the Muslims has
regional and cultural variations. One feels that these variations and the
levels of achievements have not been adequately captured in the text,
which dwells on the political reaction, orthodoxy and backwardness
among the Muslims, not bringing forth the progressive dimensions and
also not exposing the political economic forces that have resulted in
backwardness in the community.

* The author is grateful to Prof. Ram Puniyani’s encouragement while writing this
chapter, to Dr Abdul Shaban for critical comments, and to Mr Sai Prakash for assisting
with statistical details.
Educational Backwardness among the Muslims in India 249

In this chapter attempts would be made to deconstruct the homoge-

neous image of the Muslims in India, especially the component of edu-
cational backwardness associated with it. Dwelling on the historically
developed variations in the life situations and their impact on the edu-
cational behaviour of the individuals and the community, the chapter
would submit a need to look at the educational backwardness of the
Muslims beyond the religious orientation to the class character of the
community. Due to the absence of substantial authentic data, the sub-
missions are made at a hypothetical level.

A REACTIONARY IMAGE

Failure to capture heterogeneity is rooted in the difficulty in procuring

authentic data on the various segments of the Muslim population in a
historical-spatial perspective. Although the Census of India, 2001, pro-
vides data on literacy by religion, these were not available in the earlier
reports since 1931. This lacuna has made it difficult to draw trends across
the Muslim population. Lately, certain independent studies have been
conducted on the Muslim community. Although providing valuable insights
on the local character of the community, these studies do not generate
a national-level profile of the community.
The writings on the Muslims in India focus on Uttar Pradesh and West
Bengal. This can be explained in terms of the concentration of the Muslim
population in Indian states. According to Census 2001, 22.2 per cent of
Muslims are in Uttar Pradesh and 14.6 per cent in West Bengal, followed
by 9.9 per cent in Bihar. Together these constitute 46.7 per cent of the
Muslim population in India. Other than these, Maharashtra holds 7
per cent, Assam 6 per cent, Kerala 5.7 per cent and Jammu & Kashmir
4.9 per cent of Muslims. Altogether these states hold around 70 per cent
of Muslims (Bose 2005, p. 371).
Concentration on Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal has created a major
lacuna in developing a theory on the Muslims of India as the historical
profile and life situations of the Muslims varies in different parts of the
nation. The North Indian story is the story of invasions and of developing
an identity reactionary to colonialism and two nation theories, while the
decisive factors for East India are migration of the landed gentry to
Pakistan/Bangladesh and the staying back of the poor converted class in
India. In comparison, the history of South Indian Muslims focuses on
250 Ranu Jain

trade; hence, it has a high possibility of depicting a picture of cooperation

and peaceful coexistence that forms an integral part of trading culture.
The continuing trade relations with the Gulf countries, however, have
a possibility of developing a pan-Islamic identity. Although in the absence
of authentic data it is difficult to make definite statements on the
historical forces that might have shaped the Muslim community in India,
one feels that focus on the three forces of trade, conversion, and active
participation in politics might help in explaining differential power equa-
tions and acceptance levels of the community in India.
As has been stated earlier, the image of Muslims in North India is
mainly shaped in the political context of the two-nation theory. Some-
what reflecting the Hindutva ideology, the theory projects Pakistan as an
aspiration and a role model for the Indian Muslims. Backwardness among
the Muslims in this part of India is explained in terms of voluntary
rejection of the state-offered opportunities by the community in memory
of lost glory and in non-acceptance of the loss of power. For the non-
Muslims of North India, the disintegration of India into India and Paki-
stan is an evidence of disloyalty and non-identification of the community
with the Indian nation. Such a perception makes them hesitant towards
extending minimum citizenship rights to the Muslims. They feel that
having voted for Pakistan, the Muslims should reside in Pakistan. The fear
of prosecution and discrimination, on the other hand, has obstructed the
process of mass mobilization for citizenship rights within the Muslim
community. Smith (1957, p. 264) has described the social conditions that
have shaped the community in North India in an appropriate manner,

The community in its present form was born in bloodshed and hatred . . . the
gradually intensifying and shrill animosity that had gripped the land as the
two great communities suffered misunderstanding and estrangement, then
fear and acrid anger. The rejecting and being rejected of strident, frenzied
communalism provided the background from which this community came,
. . . to be a minority in a dominion whose general populace they considered,
and who considered them, alien and bitterly hostile.

Smith talks about easy acceptance of some Muslims especially those who
were recognized as nationalist, ‘The bulk of their community, however,
neither trusting nor trusted, held aloof. It continued to cower; rejected,
mistrusted and afraid’ (Ibid., pp. 264–65).
In this atmosphere of distrust and rejection, the Muslims of North
India have evolved their identity—an identity that is bound to extend
negative influence on availing the opportunities offered to them. The
Educational Backwardness among the Muslims in India 251

problem magnified due to the migration of Muslim leaders out of India,

which left the people deprived of effective leadership. Although migration
of leaders was a process that affected the Muslims of entire India, its
influence was severe in Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The migration
not only deprived the community of those who could have led it to
progressive changes but also of those who could have funded the relevant
programmes. In the words of Smith (Ibid., p. 277).

. . . most of the productive centres of Islamic culture in India—from a semi-

classical institution such as the Nadwah at Lucknow to a Westernizing
journal such as Islamic Culture of Hyderabad—were chiefly financed
either from landed property or from the largesse of princes; that is, from
obsolescent remnants from an earlier age . . . . [The migration] left Muslim
feudal institutions unprotected in an industrial-technological age.

The withdrawal of the power of the native princes and abolition of

zamindari system were two other processes that drained the community
resources to a large extent. Even when these policies affected other states
of India, their impact was conspicuous on the Muslims of North and East
India as the general trend in these states was of rejection of the state-
offered opportunities, which meant falling upon earlier accumulated
resources. To quote Sonalkar (1993, p. 1345),

Unlike among the Hindus, there was no indigenous Muslim capitalist class
that developed under the British into a modern one. Those that did,
migrated to Pakistan in 1947, with an exception of some Gujarati speaking
Muslims in western India. They too did not go for industrialization in a
big way but remained largely in trade or extension of traditional occupa-
tions. In the countryside, the post-independence land reform, incomplete
though it may have been, impoverished many a Muslim landlord more
thoroughly than it did many a Hindu zamindar.

Throwing light on how the image of backwardness got associated with

the Muslims, writings on the Muslims of West Bengal, depict dynamics
different from that of North India. These works also help in deconstructing
the myth of the Muslims being a closed community. Ahmed (1981, p. 1)
describes the intermixing among the non-Muslims and the Muslims
vividly;

A striking feature of the 1872 census of Bengal—the first ever to be taken

in the area—was the discovery that Bengal proper, hitherto considered
principally the domain of the Hindus, was inhabited by an unexpectedly
252 Ranu Jain

large number of Muslims. Contrary to all expectations, the census revealed

that nearly half, or 48 per cent, of the total population in Bengal proper
were Muslims, the majority of whom lived in the marshy, low-lying tracts
of eastern Bengal—the area covering roughly the present state of Bangladesh.

This means that the cultures of the Muslims and the Hindus were
assimilated to such an extent as to make conspicuous visibility of the two
religions difficult. In some parts of the state, especially the northeastern
area, even the names, in particular the first names, were similar (Roy
1983, p. 30). Further, the concentration of the Muslim population was
not found in the centres of Muslim power like Dacca, Malda or
Murshidabad; rather, the members of the religion were found dispersed
all over the state. Above all, Ahmed claimed the Bengal Muslims as
belonging to the cultivating classes with only a handful being non-
cultivating land owners. These facts support the theory of conversion and
help in understanding the status and socio-economic profile of the Bengal
Muslims, in general considered as converts without pressure.
The theory of conversion holds the affluent Muslims in Bengal as
migrants from the outside world, who had racial, linguistic as well as
class differences with the converted Muslims of Bengal. The affluent
Muslim migrants did not identify with the converted indigenous popu-
lation. The deep-rooted strife between the two communities is recorded
as, ‘Ashraf (sing sharif) meaning “noble” or “persons of high extraction”,
included “all undoubted descendants of foreigners and converts from the
higher castes of Hindus . . . . All other Muhammadans including the
functional groups . . . and all converts of lower rank, are collectively
known by the contemptuous term “Ajlaf” [or its Bengali corruption atraf],
“wretches” or “mean people”’ (Ibid., p. 59). The distance among the two
is conspicuous in a statement of Maulawi A. Wali, a late nineteenth-
century Bengali Muslim scholar with marked sharif leaning (Ibid.,
pp. 63–64).

As no Brahman concerns himself about the controversies between Baidyas

and Kayasthas, so no Ashraf Muhammadan of India cares what the
majority of the Muslims are called. To them, they are wine-vendors,
weavers etc., with all their pretensions. Some of the writers go so far as
to say that they are not truly Musalmans, but for political and other reasons
it is well that they should be called Muslims.

Roy has mentioned that the Bengali Muslim press in the late nine-
teenth and the early twentieth centuries often expressed concern at ‘the
Educational Backwardness among the Muslims in India 253

sense of Brahmanism among high-born Muslims’, who were given to

‘social exclusiveness’ and ‘cultural and educational monopoly’ and were
also gripped by the ‘fear’ that the commoner ‘might aspire after the
aristocracy status’. This exclusive behaviour strengthened the Bengali
cultural base of the converted Muslims. There are evidences of their
interest in Hindu Puranas and other religious text like Ramayan and
Mahabharat as well as of their preference for the Bengali language, while
the Ashraf favoured Arabic, Persian and Urdu languages. Roy (1983,
p. 67) has talked of fatwas being issued ‘by the Muslims divines castigating
Bengali as the “language of Hindus”, and also to the prevailing prejudice
against the holy books, like the Quran and the hadith being translated to
Bengali as well as against any Islamic matter being discussed in this
language’. According to a nineteenth century sharif (Ibid., p. 71), ‘The
refusal or inability of the higher Mosalmans to adopt the Bengali has
greatly affected the relation between them and the lower Mosalmans. We
do not learn the Bengali—whilst our lower orders cannot learn the
Persian, cannot learn even the Hindustani. There are thus no means of
fellow-feeling or of acting together. The knowledge we possess does not
reach down to our lower neighbors—our character, ideas and habits of
thought do not affect them.’
The Muslims of Bengal were identified as backward since the late
nineteenth century. Hunter Commission Report explained this back-
wardness as rooted within the community structure in terms of pride of
race, a memory of bygone superiority, religious fears and a natural attach-
ment to the learning of Islam. In the words of Basu (1974, p. 151),

It is a generally accepted theory that Muslims held aloof from the new
system of education because it was opposed to their tradition, unsuited
to their requirements and hateful to their religion: that they kept away
from English schools because of the want of Muslim teachers, the absence
of any provision for teaching the Muslim languages and the absence of
religious education in these schools. Every succeeding report on Muslim
education accepted without question these explanations offered by Hunter.

Not rejecting the possibility of religious prejudice and fear of conversion

to have deterred many Muslims of aristocratic birth from attending
English schools, Basu feels that the cultural reasons provided above do
not explain acceptance of western education among many, in particular
rich Muslims of Bengal. She feels that main reasons for backwardness
among the poor were their caste and class compositions, inaccessibility
254 Ranu Jain

of schools, and impoverishing of the community in the British period. To

quote her (Basu 1974, pp. 150–51),

The administrative reforms of Cornwallis dealt the first major blow . . . since,
under the new system, the higher executive posts were reserved for
Englishmen. The Permanent Settlement, by placing English Collectors in
each district and elevating Hindu Collectors to the position of landlords,
allowed them to accumulate wealth which otherwise would have gone to
the Muslim tax collectors. Upper class Muslims who held a considerable
proportion of the Government posts under Muslim rule and even after
1757 were affected by the 1837 decision to substitute English for Persian
as the language in courts and offices, as well as by the Resolution of 1844,
which gave preference in all future appointments to those who had
received an English education.

One agrees with Basu that backwardness among the Bengali Muslims
cannot be understood only in terms of a historically developed structural
gap between Ashrafs and Ajlafs and that the British political economic
policies like the Permanent Settlement, change of official language from
Persian to English and Bengali, preference given to Englishmen and
Hindus for bureaucratic positions further deprived the community of its
resources almost as badly as observed in the case of Muslims of Uttar
Pradesh.
Very few works of sociological nature are available on the Muslims of
South India and these works reflect prevalence of cordial atmosphere in
the region. The differences between the South and North Indian atmo-
sphere has been adequately captured by Varshney (2002, pp. 119–48).
Comparing the North Indian town of Aligarh with the South Indian town
of Calicut, he mentioned better intercommunity trust and communica-
tion in the civic life in Calicut of Kerala. He found many similarities in
the two towns. Both had somewhat similar proportion of Muslim popu-
lation (36–37 per cent in Calicut and 34–35 per cent in Aligarh) and
witnessed significant improvement in the educational involvements and
economic profile of the Muslims due to migration to the Middle East after
the oil price increase in 1973. Yet, to quote Varshney (Ibid., p. 121),

Calicut and Aligarh, however, are also a world apart. A deep intercom-
munal civic engagement marks life in Calicut. Neighbourhoods are re-
markably integrated, and so is the city’s business and professional life. In
Aligarh, Hindu–Muslim civic engagement is minimal. Calicut has not had
a single communal riot in a century, although it came desperately close
Educational Backwardness among the Muslims in India 255

to breaking its harmony in 1921 during the so-called Malabar rebellion.

Aligarh is infamous for frequent outbreaks of Hindu–Muslim violence. It
is among the most riot-prone cities of India . . . .

Salamatullah (1994, pp. 35–36) holds a somewhat similar view for the
South Indian cities in general. He feels that the social atmosphere of these
cities does not reflect insecurities and rejection.

Reactions of Muslims to western education in north and south India were

different. While there was a lot of active opposition in the north in the
beginning, Muslims in the south accepted the modern system of education
without resistance. This is obviously due to the fact that British rule
adversely affected economic and social positions of Muslims living in the
northern provinces of the country. But in the Nizam’s territory, it was not
so; this was true also of other parts of southern India, where Muslims took
interest in developing trade and commerce, and were not as dependent
on government jobs as the Muslims in the north. Nor did the Britishers
impose on southern India such a disastrous measure as the Permanent
Settlement to pauperize the peasantry.

HISTORY OF MUSLIM EDUCATION

As has been mentioned earlier, Muslim education1 has been projected as

religious education lacking space for progressive secular learning. How-
ever, the historical contributions of the Muslims to the body of knowledge
are significant, whether in the field of administration, mathematics,
medicine, astronomy, architecture, or philosophy. India has gained from
the services and scholarship of the members of the Muslim community,
especially of the ‘progressive’ ‘socialist’ writers and poets, who were radical
in their orientation and who kept pace with the changing world. The
community has given three Presidents to India and has distinguished itself
by providing eminent jurists. The contributions in the field of information
technology can also be mentioned in this context. Then, why is the
community identified as backward and inward looking? And why are the
roots of this backwardness being located in the Islamic religion?

1
‘Muslim education’ in this chapter indicates education being provided by the
Muslims mainly for the Muslims.
256 Ranu Jain

Traditional Muslim education is associated with institutions like Maktabs

and Madrasas. Both of these institutions are projected by Hindutva
politics as breeding grounds for fundamentalism and terrorism. However,
it would be incorrect to relate the two exclusively with religious education
and separatist tendencies. Rather, these institutions should be seen as
community based educational institutions like pathshalas and gurukuls.
The writings on the Maktab and Madrasas of earlier days give an impres-
sion of a balanced curriculum comprising Arabic language and literature
along with mathematics. For instance, Imam Ghazali (1058–1111), an
eminent philosopher and educationist, recommended vocational educa-
tion following which agriculture and industrial crafts were introduced.
Ibne Khaldun (1333–1406), an educationist, recommended the study of
Arabic language to facilitate understanding of the Quran, but this study
was supposed to be undertaken along with that of geometry, arithmetic
and industrial craft (Salamatullah 1994, p. 10). Akbar is claimed to have
an integrated approach towards education. To quote Salamatullah (Ibid.,
p. 12).

The reign of Akbar, during the sixteenth century, stands out as a unique
period in the history of Muslim education in India. Akbar was the first
monarch to set up a separate department of education, and paid attention
to the education of his subjects, irrespective of their caste, colour or creed.
Both Hindus and Muslims were taught together, though a part of their
respective courses of studies was separate, catering to the needs of their
specific faiths. Mathematics, including arithmetic, geometry and mensu-
ration, history, geography, economics, political science, physics, philoso-
phy, logic and agriculture, were common subjects of study. Muslims and
Hindus pursued their theological studies separately. The curriculum for
Hindu students included vedantic philosophy, Patanjali grammar.

Capturing the historical trends, Salamatullah states, (Ibid., p. 11)

. . . upto the fourteenth century, there was no trace of the rational sciences
in the curriculum of Muslim educational institutions in India . . . . However,
the predominance of theological teaching in educational institutions, later
in the sixteenth century, was leavened by introducing secular elements,
such as, philosophy, logic, mathematics, etc. in the curriculum. So much
so, that teaching in Madrassas came to be dominated by philosophy; and
it was only towards the end of the eighteenth century that the dominance
of rational sciences was reduced. During the reign of Aurangzeb, in the
seventeenth century, a course . . . Dars-i-Nizamia, was adopted. It included
such subjects as arithmetic, algebra, astronomy and physics . . . .
Educational Backwardness among the Muslims in India 257

Even when the statements of the above nature provide an overall

trend, one has to be cautioned against sketching a homogeneous image
of the Muslims of the entire nation. One does find regional variations in
the attitude towards ‘other cultures’ in the religious population. For
instance, as early as the thirteenth century there are evidences of Bengali
Muslims translating Indian epics into Bengali. Presence of such an atti-
tude has a high possibility of affecting the curriculum of educational
institutions in the area.
Undue religious orientation of the educational institutions of the
Muslims started only after the disintegration of the Mughal Empire. Shah
Walliullah (1703–62) initiated the first movement among the ulema and
launched a powerful campaign to recapture the lost glory of Islam and
reinstate the political power of the Muslims in India. Hasan (1988, p. 4)
feels that Shah Walliullah was apprehensive about the possibility of the
establishment of British rule. Further, being deeply concerned about the
excesses of the Marathas, he did not want the Muslims to become a part
of the general milieu of the subcontinent. He wanted them to keep alive
their relations with the rest of the Muslim world so that their ideals remain
located in Islam. Shah Abdul Aziz (1746–1824), son of Walliullah, pur-
sued the dreams of his father. His approach, however, was neither negative
nor exclusive towards Indians belonging to other religions including
Hinduism. Referring to the British in India he considered India a Dar-
Al-Harb (enemy territory). He issued a fatwa prohibiting Muslims to learn
English. He found lots of similarities between Hindus and Muslims and
recommended cooperative interaction between the two communities.
In fact, in the period 1763–1898, Muslims of India witnessed many
movements led by religious leaders. Nizami (Ibid., pp. 2–3) has classified
these religious movements in six categories. Only two of the six men-
tioned by Nizami focus on religious and spiritual issues per se. In general,
these movements deal with political and economic changes in order to
reinstate the lost power and glory of the Muslim people. Such movements
can be seen in all religious groups especially when confronted with weak
political leadership.
The period mentioned above should not be associated solely with
religious orientation. Muslim is a heterogeneous category and one finds
evidence of divergent activities in the population including in the sphere
of education. For our interest, the most important are the activities
indicating interest in promoting English education. For instance, in 1781,
a prosperous merchant of Hoogly (West Bengal), Haji Muhsin, advanced
a substantial amount of money to the East India Company for promoting
258 Ranu Jain

secular education among the Muslims. Thus, the madrasa Aliyah of

Calcutta came into being (Salamatullah 1994, p. 13). Salamatullah (Ibid.,
p. 12) has mentioned many centres of general education for the Muslims,
like the Delhi College established in 1824 which illustrated interest in
western education. English was introduced in the college in 1831 and at
that time the college had an enrolment of 300 students. The famous
Calcutta Madrasa was established in the year 1781. It was a Persian college
teaching Muslim law and related subjects. English was introduced as a
subject of study in 1829. Hindus were also admitted in the college till 1833.
Till 1837, both Hindus and Muslims of the upper class followed Persian
education mainly for its utilitarian value. Proficiency in the language
held the promise of lucrative jobs in the Mughal empire. Even in the
British period it continued as an official language till 1837 when English
replaced it.
Succinctly, one finds evidence of both extremist and liberal attitudes
towards western culture and education among the Muslims in contem-
porary India. In the aftermath of the 1857 revolt, these attitudes led to
two very different approaches towards education as evidenced in the
establishment of Darul-Ulum at Deoband and M.A.O. College at Aligarh.
Guided by the ideas of Shah Waliullah, Darul-Ulum, Deoband, was
established in 1866. Although focused on religious education, the madrasa
was not averse to western learning. According to Salamatullah (Ibid.,
pp. 27–28),

. . . one of the most important founders of the institution, Maulana

Mohammad Qasim Nanautawi, was not averse to western learning, he
held the view that it could not be combined with religious studies. He did,
however, allow western education to be acquired after completing the
religious education. One of the fundamental principles of Darul-Ulum was
that the government and rich people could not be associated with the
institution, as their influence was considered detrimental to the best
interests of education . . . .

The Darul-Ulum, from the very beginning, had been following the theo-
logical studies and had international reputation for the same. Later,
however, it introduced secular subjects like arithmetic, geography, his-
tory, Hindi and general science.
On the other hand, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, who aimed to promote
western education among Indian Muslims, established M.A.O. College.
The process started with the establishment of the Scientific Society in the
year 1864 to translate textbooks of western science into Urdu. The
Educational Backwardness among the Muslims in India 259

contributions of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in the field of education of Indian

Muslims are remarkable; however, it is sad to note that he did not see any
need for education for the girls or even for the poor (Minault 1998, p. 19).
M.A.O. College, founded in 1886, aimed to prepare the Muslims of
India for government employment and to make them ‘worthy and useful
subjects of the crown’. The college was elevated to the status of Aligarh
University in 1920, which is recognized for playing an important role in
promoting the idea of the two-nation theory and creation of Pakistan.
However, it had its share of progressive and socialist thoughts. The themes
of capitalist exploitation, class conflict, and of revolt against imperialism
were popular in the writings of former Aligarh graduates like Hasrat
Mohani, Sazzad Hyder Yaldaram, Vilayat Ali ‘Bambooq’, Qazi Abdul
Gaffar and Abdur Rahman Bijnori. The younger generation, whom
Mohamed Ali described as the men of Nai Raushni, promoted their own
version ‘Islamic Socialism’. It is stated that, disillusioned with the apol-
itical stand of the management, a few radical students moved out of the
Aligarh Muslim University to establish Jamia Millia Islamia University.
However, the pro-Congress orientation of the students of the Aligarh
Muslim University continued even after the establishment of Jamia Millia
Islamia University. In fact, pro-Pakistan and Muslim League attitude
became prominent in Aligarh Muslim University only by the late 1930s
and even at that time it was only one of the trends.
Jamia Millia Islamia was established in the year 1920. The vision was
to create a synthesis of the traditional, modern, and national schools of
thought. It drew from Gandhi’s concept of basic education and focused
on vocational education. Most office bearers and the students of the
University were radical in orientation and were anti-British and pro-
Congress.
In the year 1874, the Anjuman-i-Islam was founded in Bombay. It
established a chain of schools and at present is administering many
centres of higher education, which include polytechnics and engineering
colleges. The educational efforts of the Anjuman-i-Islam should be ap-
preciated for extending educational facilities to the women and the poor
especially in view to the fact that it was operating in the period of Sir
Syed Ahmad Khan who, though active in the field of education, excluded
the same for the women and the poor.
Hyderabad was noticed for its liberal approach. It had many schools
that conducted both theological and scientific courses. The state was
neither averse to western education nor to the efforts of Christian mis-
sionaries in promoting it. Salamatullah has mentioned various schools
260 Ranu Jain

including a medical school that was established to promote western

education. Mention should also be made of a translation bureau and a
printing press that were established in the year 1834 for the purpose. As
early as 1859–60, a scheme to establish two schools—one Persian and one
vernacular—in each taluka (block) was implemented. These schools
offered lessons in mathematics, history and geography in addition to the
languages. In 1878, a public school on the pattern of the English public
school was established for meeting the needs of the affluent from both
the Hindu and the Muslim communities. In 1881, the first Hindu Anglo-
Vernacular Girls’ School was established to cater to the needs of both the
Hindu and the Muslim communities.
The education system for Muslims in Bengal also had a secular com-
ponent. According to Mondal (1997, p. 77), the fields of study covered
at a madrasa during the mediaeval period included religious subjects like
tafsir (exegesis), hadish (tradition), fiqh (jurisprudence). kalam (scholas-
ticism), tasawwuf (mysticism), tajrid (art of quranic pronunciation) along
with general subjects like grammar, literature, logic, philosophy, arith-
metic, geometry, algebra, and astronomy. Although not very successful,
since 1836 attempts were being made to promote English and western
education for Bengali Muslims. These efforts had a setback in 1937 when
the official language in the state was changed to English and Bengali.
As a reaction to ceased power, the Ashraf continued education in
their indigenous institutions like maktabs and madrasas. ‘The result was
that upto the year 1854 the Muslims were not found in considerable
number in schools set up by the British Government’ (Ibid., p. 81). Since
the 1860s, one finds efforts to promote English and western education
among the Ashraf Muslims. For instance, Calcutta Muhammadan Liter-
ary Society (CMLS) was established with the aim, ‘. . . t o change the
conservative attitude of the Muslims and to convince them of the need
to accept the knowledge of western education’ (Ibid., p. 83). Although
promoting rational spirit of the times, the society also advocated con-
tinuation of traditional learning through madrasas, creating a balance
between modern and religious knowledge systems. Fifteen years after the
establishment of CMLS, Central Muhammadan Association came into
being under the leadership of Sir Sayed Amir Ali for promoting English
and the process of modernization among the Muslims. It established its
branches in all districts of Bengal and maintained friendly relations with
the Hindus.
It is important to note that as all of these movements were oriented
towards Ashrafs, the Ajlafs did not draw much benefit from the same. The
Educational Backwardness among the Muslims in India 261

poor Muslims continued to send their children either to the village

maktabs for Arabic and religious learning or to a pathshala for education
in Bengali (Mondal 1997, p. 81).

STATISTICAL DATA ON THE MUSLIMS

Salamatullah (1994, p. 40) explains the low educational statistics asso-

ciated with the Muslims due to their resistance towards formal education
till the mid-nineteenth century. The scenario changed by 1870. He
mentions an improvement in the rate of enrolment from 22.8 per cent
in 1871–72 to 27.7 per cent (population 25 per cent) in 1931–32. Aparna
Basu confirms the development. Discussing the situation in Madras, she
states, ‘Between 1871–72 and 1880–88, while the number of Hindu
pupils under instruction doubled, the number of Muslim pupils qua-
drupled’ (Basu 1974, p. 148). Referring to certain reports of the local
governments on Muslim education produced in the mid-nineteenth
century, she ascertains that ‘Muslims were not an educationally backward
community everywhere. In Madras, the percentage of Muslim boys in
schools to Muslim boys of school-going age was 15.1 per cent while
the percentage of Hindu boys in schools to those of school-going age was
13.7 per cent’ (Ibid.). Further, ‘In Broach District . . . of the pupils in
government and private-aided schools in 1877, 9.7 per cent were Brah-
mins and 19.43 per cent were Muslims. The Gujarati Bohras, Shias and
Sunnies were quite advanced in literacy since they were trading castes
and a minimum of education was necessary for their livelihood’ (ibid.,
p. 149). The urbanized non-agriculturalist community Muslims of the
United Provinces of Agra and Oudh were found to be educationally
ahead of the Hindus. ‘The Muslims here were not even backward in
higher education. The percentage of Muslims to the total population of
United Provinces was 14.1, but the percentage of Muslim pupils in
colleges was 18.6 in 1896–97, 19.7 in 1901–02 and 20.8 in 1916–17’
(ibid., p. 150).
As the census does not provide community based data on education
since the 1930s, it is not possible to make available current national level
educational profile for the community. One, however, can attempt to
construe some impressions from two sample surveys conducted at na-
tional level. The first was conducted by National Sample Survey Organ-
ization (NSSO) in the year 1987–88 and the other by National Council
262 Ranu Jain

of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) in the year 1994. The NCAER

survey covers six social groups from 1,765 villages of 16 states in the year
1994. Although small in size, the survey, conducted almost six years after
the National Sample Survey (NSS), provides the latest comparative base
and helps in developing insights on interstate variations in the Muslim
community. The following discussion dwells on the educational and other
relevant data that would help in understanding the educational behaviour
of the community. A deliberate attempt has been made to provide
comparative data on the Hindus in order to understand class character
of the two communities, a feature generally ignored in Hindutva political
projections.
The NSS (1987–88) data shows more than 50 per cent of the Muslim
population (57.5 per cent in rural and 53.4 per cent in urban area) to
be self-employed. Further, 28.9 per cent were found to be in the salaried
class and only 13.4 per cent in casual labour in the urban area. The
percentage falling in the category of casual labour in rural area was
comparatively higher (34.3 per cent). It is important to note that culti-
vation forms major part of self-employment in the rural area. However,
NSS data records more than 50 per cent (54.9 per cent) of Muslims as
holding less than 2 acres of land that in the year 1987–88. Even NCAER
survey shows that Muslims held less land (2 acres average per household)
than Hindus (3 acres average per household) and other minorities (3.1
acres average per household).
According to NCAER survey, the average household income of Mus-
lims was stated to be Rs 22,807 in comparison to the national average
income of Rs 25,653. The per capita income for Muslims was Rs 3,678
p.a. against national average figure of Rs 4,485 p.a. Further, as shown in
Table 13.1, in agriculture including allied activities, the average annual
income earned by the Hindus was Rs 20,828 p.a. in comparison to
Rs 16,388 p.a. earned by the Muslims. In case of craft and industrial work,
Muslims earned a sum relatively better (Rs 12,260 ) in comparison to the
national average of Rs 11,044 and the earnings of the Hindus (Rs 10,806).
In the organized business, gap between Hindus (Rs 26,761) and Muslims
(Rs 22,591) was found to be comparatively bigger. Interestingly, Muslims
were found to be earning Rs 17, 444 p.a. against Hindu’s Rs 15,965 p.a.
in qualified professions. Data contradicts the myth of professional back-
wardness among the Muslims. Again, it is interesting to note that in
almost all of the other fields the difference in income is marginal with
Hindus earning slightly better. However, due to higher concentration in
the categories of agricultural and allied activities, artisan and industrial
Educational Backwardness among the Muslims in India 263

Table 13.1
Percentage Distribution by General Education, Household Religion and Area

Urban
Education level Hindu Muslim
Male Female Total Male Female Total

Not literate 25.3 42.2 33.4 42.4 59.5 50.5

Literate and below primary 18.8 17.2 18.1 20.9 18.5 19.8
Primary 16.6 15.0 15.8 16.3 11.4 13.9
Middle 13.9 10.3 12.2 10.0 5.4 7.8
Secondary 17.2 10.7 14.1 8.0 4.3 6.2
Graduation and above 7.9 4.2 6.2 2.3 0.8 1.6
Not recorded 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1

Rural
Not literate 51.3 75.0 62.8 58.2 76.1 67.0
Literate and below primary 19.0 11.8 15.5 18.6 13.1 15.9
Primary 13.5 7.5 10.6 12.2 6.9 9.6
Middle 9.2 3.7 6.5 6.9 3.0 5.0
Secondary 5.7 1.7 3.8 3.4 0.8 2.1
Graduation and above 1.2 0.2 0.7 0.6 – 0.3
Not recorded 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

Source: NSS, 43rd Round, Sch-10: 82–87.

work as well as petty trade and small business, the overall average income
of the Muslims (Rs 22,807) fall much shorter to that of the Hindus
(Rs 25,712). The national average income was mentioned as Rs 25,653.
Table 13.1 provides NSS data on general education for Hindus and
Muslims by sex and area. The table projects national average illiteracy
rate as 35.5 per cent in urban and 62.5 per cent in rural area. Hindus
were somewhat closer to the national average while the Muslims were
found to be far behind (50.5 per cent) in urban areas and comparatively
closer in rural areas (67 per cent). The table reveals four trends: first,
Muslims of rural areas had better educational statistics in comparison to
those from urban areas; second, males from both the communities were
at par till primary level; third, differences in the educational statistics
between the two communities increased with the advancing levels of
education to the extent that the Hindu population at the level of gradu-
ation almost doubled in case of rural areas and trebled in urban areas;
and fourth, Muslim women were far behind Muslim men in their edu-
cational achievements.
264 Ranu Jain

Table 13.2 is extremely revealing as far as interstate differences in the

educational achievement of the Muslim population is concerned. The
literacy rate of the community ranged from 27.8 in case of Rajasthan to
86.9 per cent in case of Kerala. Although behind the Hindus by around
1 per cent even while having a high literacy rate in Kerala, the community
had left Hindu community behind in cases of Tamil Nadu by around 17
per cent, Andhra Pradesh by around 10 per cent and Karnataka by around
4 per cent. Not only in South India but also in West India the community
was stated as ahead of the Hindus by 0.02 per cent in the case of Gujarat
and 5 per cent in the case of Maharashtra. Even in Madhya Pradesh the
difference was mentioned as around 5 per cent to the advantage of the
Muslims. Again, it is important to note that both Hindus and Muslims

Table 13.2
Social Group-wise Literacy Rate of Indian States

States ST & SC Hindus Muslims Other minorities

North India
Harayana 46.0 55.9 29.7 71.0
Himachal 63.2 68.3 57.6 84.6
Punjab 46.5 61.7 32.7 60.2
Upper Central India
Bihar 28.2 44.5 43.2 31.8
Uttar Pradesh 32.5 48.2 35.0 65.8
Lower Central India
Madhya Pradesh 31.6 43.6 48.9 59.1
Orissa 35.1 54.4 53.9 59.6
Rajasthan 29.9 41.7 27.8 33.4
East India
Northeastern 74.5 45.8 46.0 86.2
West Bengal 53.9 61 52.1 55.4
West India
Gujarat 46.6 59.2 59.4 91.3
Maharashtra 43.1 58.4 63.7 53.1
South India
Andhra Pradesh 38.5 49.4 60.5 54.6
Karnataka 43.7 54.4 58.6 75.5
Kerala 77.5 88.2 86.9 94.8
Tamil Nadu 47.6 63.0 79.7 75.6
All India 40.8 53.3 49.4 65.2

Source: NCAER 1999, p. 267.

Educational Backwardness among the Muslims in India 265

were at par in case of Bihar, Orissa, Gujarat and Northeastern region.

However, in Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, where Muslims have con-
centrated for decades, the community was found to be lagging far behind.
In fact the trend is similar for the Northern and Central states. Never-
theless, the table confirms the hypothesis that the community should not
be treated as a homogeneous unit.
Bose has discussed differences in the literacy rate among Hindus and
Muslims for those Indian states which have districts having more than
30 per cent of Muslim population. The relevant data from Census 2001
is given in Table 13.3.

Table 13.3
Hindu–Muslim Literacy Gap in States/UT having more than
10 per cent of Muslim Population

States/UT Literacy gap (H–M)

Hindu Muslim
Male Female Total Male Female Total

India 9.4 3.0 6.4 11.6 10.7 11.2

Uttar Pradesh 13.6 6.1 10.3 22.3 20.6 21.7
West Bengal 14.4 7.8 11.2 16.5 19.1 17.2
Bihar 9.7 2.0 6.2 10.8 7.1 9.3
Assam 20.9 18.5 19.7 13.7 17.0 15.3
Kerala –0.4 0.3 0.0 1.6 3.6 2.7
Andhra Pradesh –7.8 –5.5 –6.7 4.6 1.8 3.2
Jammu & Kashmir 22.2 22.3 22.6 18.4 25.0 22.2
Jharkhand 0.5 –3.6 –1.4 3.5 –1.0 1.6
Haryana 22.6 32.4 27.2 23.7 31.7 26.6
Uttaranchal 28.5 23.0 24.7 24.3 28.3 26.1
Pondicherry –9.6 –15.8 –12.1 –3.4 –6.1 –4.4
Lakshadeep 2.6 15.0 9.1 4.6 14.4 9.9

Source: Bose (2005: 372–73).

Table 13.3 shows higher literacy gap between the Hindus and the
Muslims of urban area and again higher in the case of males than among
the females. Regional differences in the literacy gap is apparent with very
high gap recorded for the states like Haryana, Uttaranchal, Jammu &
Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Assam. It is important to note
that in certain states and union territory like Pondicherry the literacy rate
among the Muslims is reported to be high at times as high as 15.8 per
cent as in the case of rural females. Again, higher literacy rate is recorded
for South Indian states like Andhra Pradesh and for rural women of
266 Ranu Jain

Kerala. Jharkhand also reports high literacy rate for rural Muslim popu-
lation in general and for females of both rural and urban Muslim popu-
lation in particular. Bose has also discussed differences in the literacy gap
among the two communities in districts within states. For instance, in
Uttar Pradesh, which has high literacy difference to the disadvantage of
the Muslims, one district Balrampur shows higher Muslim literacy in
comparison to that of the Hindus among the rural population. Only three
districts have been mentioned for Kerala and the literacy gap in these
districts is negligible if not higher for rural Muslim population. One does
not find much difference even in the case of urban population. Mari Bhat
and Zavier have discussed differences in the literacy rates of the Muslim
women population of two states of Kerala and West Bengal. Data reflects
remarkable differences to the advantage of the Muslims of Kerala. The
relevant table is given below.

Table 13.4
Percentage of Muslims (aged 15 and above) in Kerala and West Bengal

Educational categories Total literacy rate

Kerala West Bengal

Illiterate 28.5 38.3

Below middle 25.1 21.1
Below matric 20.6 10.8
Below graduate 9.7 5.3
Graduate and above 4.7 2.2

Source: Mari Bhat and Zavier (2005, p. 392).

The NCAER data reveals an enthusiasm in the community towards

literacy.
The Table 13.5 states that the Muslims shared with STs the second-
best participation rate in literacy programmes; however, they appeared to
have made optimum use of the programme by having maximum people
in the fourth level of achievement (6.8 per cent), which indicates fluency
in the reading and writing skills.
Despite performing well in adult literacy programmes, which might be
indicative of recent interest in education and also implies short-term
involvement in the field of education, Muslims did not appear to have
good achievement rate in higher levels of learning. In fact, researches and
personal experience reveal higher the educational level poorer the per-
formance of the community. Table 13.6 reveals poor completion rate of
the Muslims in the middle and matric levels of formal education.
Educational Backwardness among the Muslims in India 267

Table 13.5
Social Group-wise Participation in Literacy Programmes and
Achievement of Non-Enrolled Children in the Age Group 6–14

Religion Participation Level of achievement

rate 1 2 3 4

ST 1.3 74.0 18.5 02.6 4.9

SC 1.6 47.2 11.2 41.6 Nil
Hindu 1.4 57.7 17.6 24.0 0.7
Muslim 1.6 33.3 18.8 41.1 6.8
Christian 2.2 25.9 Nil 74.1 Nil
All India 1.5 53.1 18.0 27.3 1.7

Source: NCAER 1999, pp. 296 and 197.

Notes: Level 1—cannot read or write.
Level 2—can read but not write.
Level 3—can read and write with difficulty.
Level 4—can read and write fluently.

Table 13.6
Proportion of Population Completing Middle and Matriculation Level
Education by Population Groups

Social groups Middle level Matric level

(aged 15 and above) (aged 17 and above)
Person Male Female F/M Person Male Female F/M

Caste
STs 9.2 12.7 5.4 0.43 4.9 7.3 2.3 0.31
SCs 10.1 14.6 5.1 0.35 4.9 7.3 2.3 0.31
Religion
Hindus 13.0 16.9 8.6 0.51 8.5 12.0 4.7 0.39
Muslims 12.0 15.8 7.6 0.48 5.9 8.3 3.2 0.38
Christians 21.2 22.5 19.9 0.88 18.7 19.0 18.4 0.97
Other minorities 12.3 15.7 8.6 0.55 11.5 15.3 7.3 0.48
All India 13.0 16.9 8.7 0.52 8.6 11.9 4.9 0.41

Source: NCAER 1999, p. 118.

Table 13.7 shows around 49 per cent of the Muslims to have enrolled
in the government schools; 37 per cent in government aided schools and
the remaining 13 per cent in private schools. It is important to note that
the community had maximum entries in the categories where fees had
to be paid.
268 Ranu Jain

Table 13.7
Percentage Distribution of Students in the Age Group of 6–14 Years by States
Social groups Govt. school Govt-aided schools Pvt schools
Person Male Female Person Male Female Person Male Female
STs 67.1 64.0 72.2 29.2 31.7 25.2 3.2 3.8 2.3
SCs 71.5 71.2 71.8 22.6 21.7 23.8 5.8 6.9 4.2
Hindus 70.3 69.4 71.5 20.2 20.0 20.5 9.3 10.4 7.7
Muslims 49.4 51.4 46.9 37.3 34.2 41.3 13.3 14.4 11.9
Christians 42.9 41.6 44.3 47.5 48.7 46.2 9.6 9.6 9.5
Other
minorities 80.4 78.4 82.8 6.6 7.5 5.5 12.3 13.1 11.3
All India 67.9 67.4 68.7 22.1 21.6 22.8 9.8 10.8 8.3
Source: NCAER 1999, p. 279.

Table 13.8 reveals national level preference for private schools in the
community. However, expenditure pattern is difficult to understand as it
ranges from nil to Rs 4,808 per year and is difficult to associate with the
educational achievement of the community within the state. Still it is
important to note that the Muslims of six states—Haryana, Punjab,
Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu—have
spent a substantial sum on private schooling. Again, in three out of these
six states—Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka—the com-
munity appears to have spent substantial amount in state education also.
Even in the states of West Bengal, Kerala and Bihar, the expenditure
on private schooling was substantial. Muslims of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh,
Northeastern region and West Bengal had spent a substantial sum in state
schooling. One notices presence of all the four states of South India and
left-oriented state of West Bengal in the 10 states mentioned above for
incurring substantial expenditure on education.
It is unfortunate that Shariff has not provided explanation of the rich
data mentioned above. The reasons for greater expenditure on education
may be varied including non-availability of government schools, inacces-
sibility to school, preference for quality education or even preference for
specific schools. Anyhow, the tendency in the community to incur ex-
penditure reflects their interest in education.
Table 13.9 on the ever enrolment, discontinuation and non-attendance
rates for the age group 6–14 further strengthens the submission on the
interest and involvement of the community in general education. The
table records ever enrolment rate in the community as higher in compari-
son to that of the Hindus. Similarly, discontinuous rate is higher and non-
attendance rate much lower in comparison to the Hindus.
 Table 13.8
Household Expenditure on Education by Social Groups and States in India
Regions/States Household expenditure (Rs) on education in Household expenditure (Rs) on education in
age group 6–14 years in government schools age group 6–14 years in private schools
Social groups Social groups
ST & SC Hindus Muslims Other minorities ST & SC Hindus Muslims Other minorties
North
Haryana 1,017 1,090 679 1,762 1,351 2,179 2,327 4,321
Himachal 1,444 1,550 1,441 1,520 2,657 2,760 Nil 2,960
Punjab 644 884 300 934 1,371 1,702 2,618 2,260
Upper Central
Bihar 397 523 609 448 1,191 1,781 1,062 2,034
Uttar Pradesh 401 493 496 367 573 926 501 672
Lower Central
Madhya Pradesh 388 430 703 634 932 1,051 2,480 1,827
Orissa 272 421 309 482 79 596 Nil 138
Rajasthan 585 793 469 556 1,305 1,225 450 Nil
East
Northeast Region 549 445 853 627 534 5,362 155 Nil
West Bengal 401 488 568 Nil 1,672 1,469 1,345 710
West
Gujarat 368 434 356 772 1,988 2,042 Nil Nil
Maharashtra 450 518 385 421 677 834 616 Nil
South
Andhra Pradesh 231 Nil 318 467 468 1,547 4,808 600
Karnataka 421 500 525 705 1,376 1,285 2,677 551
Kerala 701 856 687 1,093 2,362 1,666 2,047 1,661
Tamil Nadu 436 481 71 361 1,139 1,233 2,900 2,282
All India 434 619 515 719 840 1,728 968 1,990
Source: NCAER 1999, pp. 288 and 292.
 Table 13.9
Age-Specific ever Enrolment, Discontinuation and Non-Attendance Rates (%) in Age Group 6–14

Religion Ever enrolment rates Discontinuation rates Non-attendance rates

Age group 6–9 6–11 12–14 6–14 6–9 6–11 12–14 6–14 6–9 6–11 12–14 6–14

Hindus
Person 66.90 59.40 62.70 60.30 1.10 3.10 16.80 7.20 10.50 10.20 9.80 10.10
Gender disparity 0.81 0.78 0.72 0.76 0.81 1.10 1.37 1.20 1.25 1.27 1.12 1.24
Muslims
Person 55.60 59.30 66.80 61.60 0.40 1.40 17.70 6.90 7.80 7.60 7.10 7.50
Gender disparity 0.86 0.83 0.91 0.86 1.60 0.55 1.34 1.21 0.59 0.77 0.62 0.73
All India 66.10 69.60 75.10 71.40 0.80 2.10 13.50 6.00 7.80 7.40 6.20 7.00
Gender disparity 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.84 1.41 1.60 1.58 1.56 0.95 0.98 1.03 1.00

Source: NCAER, p. 105.

Educational Backwardness among the Muslims in India 271

The above discussion reveals interest of the Muslims in education at

least till the primary level. The less preference for the higher education
may be due to the occupational nature of the community. One can have
some reservations in drawing conclusions on the NCAER data, which
is at least a decade old data and the situation might have changed
considerably given the drive of universalization of education witnessed
in the nation today. However, at least in case of five villages belonging
to the three states of West Bengal, Assam and Uttar Pradesh, a similar
trend was revealed in a recent study conducted by Jha and Jhingran. They
mentioned similar occupational profile for the Muslims of these villages.
To quote them (2002, p. 138), ‘The majority of Muslim households in
rural areas are marginal agriculturalists, wage earners and petty craftsmen
or traders. Traditionally, they survived more on skill-based craftsmanship
and, except for a few households in certain areas, did not possess much
land.’ They have discussed the linkages between the low socio-economic
status and poor educational profile. They state, ‘that formal education
does not have much value for those who do not have the means to
complete higher education and access to those who are powerful and
control resources’ (Ibid., p. 145). Further, ‘One of the clear reasons for
preferring religious education, emanating from the village reports and
discussions held with Muslim parents, is highly perceived employment
linkages . . . . While formal school education does not provide any long-
term benefits e.g. jobs, the scope for getting employment as a religious
teacher . . . on completion of religious education is good’ (Ibid., p. 150).
In this context, one has to remember that the Madrasas can provide
the little knowledge required for low skilled jobs. Besides, the quality
of education offered to the poor in formal schools leaves much to
desire. ‘The government primary schools in all these five villages
function irregularly . . . inadequate infrastructure characterizes them all . . . .
Teachers are irregular at all these schools . . . all these schools function as
single-teacher schools where all classes are held together’ (Ibid., p. 146).
Further,

As against indifferent and irregular government schools following rigid

procedures and norms, madrassas, . . . are much more flexible and suit
poor families. The absence of grades and fixed time-frames for completing
the curriculum offers flexibility that suits parents. Children could be
irregular in attendance and could also be withdrawn at any time . . . .
The maulvis or teachers in madrassas generally belong to the same village
and generate greater trust. This is especially important for sending girls
(Ibid., p. 152).
272 Ranu Jain

It would be pertinent to note here that a comparative study2 of a

madrasa and an Urdu medium municipal school revealed a desire for
general education and higher learning among the students of both edu-
cational institutions. The researcher found the students of the Madrasa
more open and willing to participate in general/secular public programmes.
Above all, the students of the Madrasa were found to identify with the
Indian nation and no evidence of any kind of terrorist activities or attitude
was witnessed.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, attempts have been made to critically look at the myth
of educational backwardness among the Muslims and its attribution to
the religious orientation of the community. The chapter reveals that
the Muslims do not make a homogeneous unit and reflect regional and
cultural variations. Just like members of other religions, they have a
notion of individualism reflected in the choices that they make in accord-
ance to their occupational bearings and perceived capacity to utilize the
resources offered by the government and other sources. Educational
backwardness among the Muslims should not be considered a universal
phenomenon, applicable to the entire Muslim community and should be
comprehended in its class character. Although emphasizing on religious
education, all madrasas should not be taken as averse to general learning
programmes. Not only in the historical text but also in the real life
situations, madrasas have been seen as a means of extending education
to the poor. Again, studies conducted on madrasas do not support the
fear of it being a breeding ground for terrorism. In fact, as seen in many
cases, they have created a fine balance between the religious and non-
religious courses and have offered their services to both, the Muslims and
the non-Muslims.
The concentration in the writings on the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh
and West Bengal has generated the error of universalizing the particular,
that is, building an image of the entire community on particular experi-
ences developed in specific historical and cultural junctures. The error
has in its roots non-contextualization of the text and absence of adequate

2
M. Phil. dissertation of Nibedita Datta on ‘Muslim Education’ submitted to the Tata
Institute of Social Sciences in 2002.
Educational Backwardness among the Muslims in India 273

writings from other parts of India. This homogenized image is vulnerable

to political manipulations as seen in the case of the Sangh Parivar. The
chapter aims to contextualize the educational behaviour and experiences
of the Muslims; however, it suffers due to an inadequate database. It
pleads for authentic work, which would bring forth regional and indi-
vidual variations in the Muslim population.
In the absence of adequate data, though it is difficult to make definite
statements on the historical forces that might have shaped the identities
and related behaviour pattern of the Muslims in India, focus on the three
forces of trade, conversion, and active participation in politics might help
in understanding the differential power equations and acceptance levels
of the community in the wider context of India.
The Hindu–Muslim politics in North India has resulted in developing
an identity reactionary to colonialism and two-nation theories. It is rooted
in alienation and distrust; ‘in rejecting and being rejected’. The paradigm
of ‘the other’ has denied basic citizenship rights to the community. The
natural outcome of this identity is withdrawal or an aggressive stance
against the Indian state, which might build a resistance towards optimum
utilization of meagre resources and opportunities offered by the state and
the society. Educational backwardness witnessed among the Muslims of
Uttar Pradesh is the obvious assumption in such circumstances.
Religious conversion implies sociocultural reaction to an unfavourable
political economy. It is rebellious in nature; however, this rebellion does
not challenge the status quo. The structural gap continues between the
haves and the have-nots along with the lack of identification of the
powerful with the converts. In such circumstances, as seen in the case
of Bengal, the structures and constraints of deprivation continue. Edu-
cational backwardness in this case also is an obvious assumption.
The assumption of rejection or non-availability of resources to improve
one’s position cannot be made in case of a non-reactionary cordial
atmosphere facilitating business transactions. One perceives spontaneous
cultural dynamics and exchanges in such a situation creating a healthy
atmosphere facilitating intercommunity links and economic returns. This
creates a positive atmosphere encouraging adaptation to social changes
and utilization of non-governmental resources for one’s promotion and
communitarian development. The educational achievement of the Muslims
of South India especially Kerala, substantiates the above-mentioned thesis.
The above discussion should not be considered indicative of homo-
geneous trend in these regions. Local circumstances and individual as-
sertions affect the Muslims just the way these affect other communities
274 Ranu Jain

in the world. The myth of unchallenged control of the Imams and the
Ulemas subsumes individualism and impact of local as well as cultural
forces. The evidence provided in history of the challenges thrown by the
Muslim individuals to the prevalent ways of life deconstruct the myth.
Instances can be given of progressive socialist writers and poets like Ghalib
and Nazrul as well as of radical individuals taking a stand not only in the
matter of politics as seen in the case of Aligarh Muslim University but
also in the field of education as seen in the cases of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan
and Mohamed Ali. Movements evident in Bengal for western education
and in Uttar Pradesh for traditional education again reflect individual will
and independent thinking which, somehow or the other, does not get
credit in the discourse on Muslims.
The independence of the intellect and decision making also reflects
in the educational choices being made by the members of the Muslim
community. As shown in the chapter, Muslims are interested in education
however limited the extent. The data portray the Muslims to be mainly
involved in petty business and self-employment, where practical rele-
vance of education gets limited to enable minimum reading and writing
for business purpose. Hence, one finds good participation of Muslims at
the primary level and then discontinuance of education. Nevertheless, in
recent years a trend towards secular education is visible. The reasons for
the same may be gradual evolving of a Muslim middle class in post-
independence India. In the absence of empirical data it is difficult to make
a definite proposition. One still can deduce with confidence that the
trend reflects independent decision making in case of individuals espe-
cially when they exercise their choice in getting enrolled in non-minority
educational institutions or in demanding education in non-Urdu, Arabic
or Persian languages. However, it is important to note that individualism
can best be practiced in an atmosphere of trust and security—an atmos-
phere that India failed to provide to Muslims in certain states in the
immediate post-independence period and to the entire nation in the post-
Gujarat period. In the post-Gujarat period, ghettoization appears to be
on the increase, which has a higher possibility of subsuming newly evolved
individualism under the pressures of collectivity and the process should
not be taken as a voluntary practice but as an imposed choice in a failed
democracy.
The imposition of a homogenized identity of a closed community on
the Muslims can cause tremendous harm to the community, especially
when this identity locates the problems of the Muslims as rooted within
the structure and culture of the community. This refers to the religious
Educational Backwardness among the Muslims in India 275

and non-progressive orientation of the leaders and their control on the

community. Such an approach puts the onus of change and problem
solving on the community and its meagre resources, without any refer-
ence to the impact of the outside forces on the same. Further, projection
of a false image of suffering due to one’s own doing reduces the involve-
ment and commitment of the wider society in helping the community,
many a times even obstructing the activities of those community members
who appear interested in challenging the prevailing system. The ap-
proach, one fears, might result in the withdrawal of the outside support
to the community, whether financial or moral.
Acquiring knowledge on the heterogeneous local base and accultur-
ated adjustment practices among the Muslim community is the political
need of the day and the first support that can be extended to the 12
per cent of Indian citizens. This requires reading and observing the
community in its context, keeping it at par with other community mem-
bers of the similar socio-economic background. Such an understanding
would deconstruct the myth of the community being a closed and non-
progressive one under the control of Ulemas producing fundamentalists.
Treating the individual members in their own rights, providing them
opportunities to develop their potentials and giving them a chance to live
a life of their own choice is yet another support that can be extended to
the Muslims of India. Such practices, one feels, would provide confidence
to the individual members of the society and would make the community
less vulnerable to political manipulations.

REFERENCES

Ahmed, Rafiuddin, The Bengal Muslims 1871–1906: A Quest for Identity (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1981).
Basu, A., The Growth of Education and Political Development in India, 1898–1920
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1974).
Bose, A., ‘Beyond Hindu–Muslim Growth Rates: Understanding Socio-Economic
Reality’, Economic and Political Weekly, 29 January 2005.
Hasan, Q., Muslims In India: Attitudes, Adjustments and Reaction (New Delhi: Northern
Book Centre, 1988).
Jha, J. and D. Jhingran, Elementary Education for the Poorest and Other Deprived Groups:
The Real Challenge of Universalization (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research,
2002).
276 Ranu Jain

Mari Bhat, P.N. and F rancis Zavier, ‘Role of Religion in Fertility Decline: The Case
of Indian Muslims’, Economic and Political Weekly, 29 January 2005.
Minault, G., Secluded Scholars: Women’s Education and Muslim Social Reform in Colonial
India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).
Mondal, S.R., Educational Status of Muslims: Problems, Prospects and Priorities (New
Delhi: Inter-India Publications, 1997).
National Sample Survey, 43rd Round (Delhi: Govt of India Press, 1987–88).
Roy, A., The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1983).
Salamatullah, Education of Muslims in Secular India (Chandigarh: Centre for Research
in Rural and Industrial Development, 1994).
Shariff, A., India Human Development Report (New Delhi: National Council of Applied
Economic Research and Oxford University Press, 1999).
Sonalkar, S., ‘The Muslim Problem: A Perspective’, Economic and Political Weekly,
26 June 1993.
Smith, W.C., Modern Islam in India (New Delhi: Usha Publication, 1979).
Varshney, A., Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002).
 VIOLENCE AGAINST THE CROSS 14
SARTO ESTEVES

F
or over 50 years since the country attained Independence in 1947,
a liberal, secular democracy of sorts was being established in this
subcontinent. The spirit that impelled the Indians to take to the
streets to challenge the colonial powers, to suffer and even die so that
at least their children could regain their self-respect, live in peace, har-
mony, and free of dictatorial firmans, man-made slavery and fascist actions
of the powerful seemed to be in sight. All this, and its likely psychological
ramifications on a society that had never really experienced the type of
freedom that was held out to them, was generally not forgotten by those
who inherited the mantle of a free nation.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF CITIZENS

After detailed discussions the Constituent Assembly framed, among

other provisions, Part III of the Constitution which embodies the Fun-
damental Rights of the citizens. Every religious community, linguistic
group, social and cultural section of our society was represented in it and
every member was taken into confidence and allowed to freely express
his views which were carefully noted and respectfully considered for all
their worth. Thus Article 14 and several others that follow it provide for
complete equality of all the citizens before the law. Arbitrary action
against any citizen, group or section of citizens is a negation of equality
278 Sarto Esteves

which many of these Articles guarantee to the citizens. Under our

Constitution, equality must become a living reality for the masses. In
Article 15, the Constitution further provides that ‘the State shall not
discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, place of birth or any of them’. The entire Part III of the Constitution
is the Magna Carta which the people of India have given to themselves
freely and without any interference or pressure from any quarter. These
Rights, it is provided, are to be enforced by the government1 at all times,
throughout India, whoever or whichever political party or group may be
in power.
There have been numerous instances, particularly since 1998, when
the various offshoots of the RSS like the VHP, BD, BJP, HJM, etc., have
been giving orders to the Christian community to leave the country by
a fixed date;2 the Christians have been called ‘traitors’, ‘foreigners’,
‘thieves’, ‘second-class citizens’;3 they are asked to win the ‘goodwill’ of
the Hindu community if they wish to continue to live in India;4 they are
denied the full right to avail of the freedom of religion given to the citizens
of India in Article 25. In this connection it will be good for everyone
in the country to get a few basic facts right. The country does not
belong to the Sangh Parivar, to any of its outfits, to any single religious
community, majority or minority, to any sociocultural group, or to any
other group, however powerful it may be. The country belongs to all the
citizens of India, with citizenship as defined in the Constitution; no other
meaning or interpretation of it can be accepted or entertained. There
is no law in the country that empowers any citizen or any group of citizens
like the members of the Sangh Parivar to make any laws and try to
enforce them. The government in recent years has failed in its duty to
protect its citizens and to call upon these self-styled rulers to behave
themselves. Any religious community has a right to take no notice of any
such instructions if ever given by rulers of the type described. The
political parties will do well to note that India has not gone to sleep. The
result of this harassment of the community will be known when elections
come around.

1
See Part III, Article 32.
2
The Asian Age, 6 September 1998.
3
M.S. Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood Defined and a detailed study of the subject
in A.G. Noorani, ‘RSS and Christians’, Frontline, 1 January 1999.
4
V.B. Rawat, ‘Trading the Religion’, Indian Currents, 31 March 2002, pp. 8–11.
Violence against the Cross 279

CHRISTIANS, NOT TRAITORS

The Christians of India are its committed, loyal, citizens. They have been
Christians for 2,000 years. At no time have they given any cause to anyone
to even remotely imply that they can be lumped with those to whom the
appellation ‘traitors’, ‘second-class citizens’, etc., may apply.
Christian missions are scattered all around, in remote villages of
Rajasthan, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkand, Uttar Pradesh,
Andhra Pradesh and other states running orphanages, hospitals, hostels,
homes for the old, dying, disabled, those suffering from incurable diseases,
the deserted and forsaken women, running schools, colleges, universities
and institutes of higher learning, to mention a few. ‘As Christ went about
the towns and villages healing every type of sickness and infirmity, as a
sign that the kingdom of God had come’ (The Gospal according to St.
Mathew, The Acts of the Apostles), so the Church, through its children,
joins itself with men of every condition, but especially with the poor and
the afflicted, and willingly spends itself for them(cf 2 Cor. 2:12–15). 5 This
is Christianity. It is practised at every moment of their lives by its
followers; every activity of the Church is a sincere effort to practise what
it preaches.
The Constituent Assembly did not succumb to the temptation of
catering to the whims of religious bigots, fanatics, feudal merchants,
zamindars, and the twentieth century obscurantists. What they have
turned out is the framework for a genuinely secular, open, liberal, demo-
cratic Constitution where every citizen has equal rights, where every
citizen has complete freedom to hold his own views on religions and
religious traditions. He has the ‘right freely to profess, practise and
propagate religion’ (Article 25). This right to practise a religion of one’s
choice and propagate it was discussed and debated to allow everyone to
have a say, along with the views of those leaders who insisted that the
right to practise and propagate a religion, among others, must ensure for
the citizens the right to change one’s views, opinions, beliefs or convic-
tions just as one can change one’s views on a political or a social ideology.
Christianity also has the mandate of Christ to carry his message to all
human beings in the world whatever one’s religion or beliefs may be. This

5
‘Decree on the Church’s Missionary Activity’, Chapter ii, Vatican Council ii (Mumbai:
St. Paul Publications, 1965).
280 Sarto Esteves

is what the Church does or teaches. There is nothing in it to shock

anyone. The Church does not engage in any surreptitious activities, in
coercion, in fraudulent methods, to convert people, or in denigrating any
of the other religions prevalent in India or in any other country of the
world. The hallmark of Christianity is love personified. Its innumerable
activities in our country and in every part of the world among the suffering
and the socially or economically disadvantaged to come up in life, to be
useful to themselves, to their families and to the society at large are a
standing testimony of all this and more. The Church does not engage in
forced or mass conversions. The very idea of it is foreign to real Chris-
tianity. It is fully conscious that conversion, true and genuine, is the result
of a deep, personal conviction which can come about with profound
knowledge of a religion, examples of those who practise it, and a sincere
desire to emulate it. Any attempt to bring about conversions through
force, fraud, bribes and crooked methods to obtain quick, startling results
will ultimately prove fruitless. This approach of the Church is highly
rational and faultless; it can only evoke admiration of any impartial
observer and not rouse any ‘sense of outrage’.6

ANTI-CHRISTIAN VIOLENCE

Equality before the law is guaranteed to every citizen of India, and

everyone has a right to freely practise any religion one chooses to and to
change one’s religious beliefs if one chooses to do so. This is an intensely
intimate, personal decision which one is free to take in our free, liberal,
democracy and no one has any right to question that personal decision
of any individual. The RSS and its cohorts are not empowered by any law
of the land to dictate to Christians or to any citizen of India whether and
which religion he should believe in and practise, whether he should
change his religion, whether anyone professing a non-Hindu religion
should be brought forcibly into the Hindu religion because someone in
the Sangh Parivar thinks that, before he embraced Christianity or any
other non-Hindu religion, he was a Hindu. No member of the Parivar can
issue any instructions to any citizen in this regard, and if issued, they will
have to be ignored.

6
Sumit Sarkar, EPW Special Articles, 2 June–2 July 1999.
Violence against the Cross 281

Christianity, according to them, is a ‘fake religion’ and Christ is ‘an

artifice of aggression’, ‘junk’.7 All responsible citizens of India should,
however, know a little more about the nightmare faced by the followers
of this ‘junk’ since 1997–98 when the BJP formed a government in
Gujarat and later at the centre. The Minister of State for Home informed
the Lok Sabha on 28 August 2001 that there were 417 attacks on
Christians in India since 1999 in which 33 persons were killed and 283
were injured.8 They should know also that during the first 50 years of
independence, there were just 35 incidents of a minor nature involving
the Christian community. In the months and years after the statement
referred to above was made by the Minister in the Lok Sabha, the attacks
have increased and multiplied, and are occurring in every part of the
country, Bombs have been planted for the first time in the history of
Christianity in India in its churches in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and
Goa; bodies of the dead have been exhumed from the cemeteries and left
at the Church entrance by VHP/BD workers in Gujarat; principals of
schools, teachers, priests, religious, nuns and missionaries all over India
have been attacked, murdered, maimed, and even paraded naked on
public streets; copies of The Bible have been torn to pieces, burnt and
strewn on the streets.9
Above all, what has been happening in Gujarat since 1997, the
murderous attacks on the Christians and their institutions on 25 Decem-
ber 1998 is what even primitive races were not known to be resorting to.
The entire holocaust has been documented in all its detail in innumerable
reports, books, articles in national and foreign press, and in a Report
prepared with meticulous care and precision by the Citizen’s Commission
on the persecution of Christians in Gujarat 1998–99 entitled Hindu Jago,
Christi Bhago.10 After the BJP came to power in Gujarat in 1997, the
various offshoots (29 of them) of the RSS and the government headed
by the Chief Minister Keshubhai Patel began accusing the Christian
community and its missionaries, virulently and consistently, of ‘forcible
conversions’ of Dalits, Hindus and others of the Dangs district. The
officials, police and the bureaucracy, the reports confirm, were made to

7
See Noorani, ‘RSS and Christians’, and Sarto Esteves, Freedom to Build, Not Destroy,
pp. 65–68.
8
The Free Press Journal, 2 September 2002.
9
Sarto Esteves, Freedom to Build, Not Destroy, see Appendices, pp. 253–88.
10
John Dayal (ed.), Gujarat 2002, Untold and Retold Stories of the Hindutva Lab,
vol. 1, January 2003 edition, pp. 772–839.
282 Sarto Esteves

work on Sangh Parivar’s instructions. The Hindu Jagran Manch (HJM)

organized a rally on 25 December 1998 for which preparations had begun
some weeks earlier; slogans like Hindu Jago, Christi Bhago (Hindus awake,
Christians run away), Gali Gali Me Shor He, Padri Sab Chor Hai (there
is a public outcry that all Christian priests are thieves), and others were
being freely coined by ‘commission agents’ and publicized through print
and other media to whip up communal frenzy.
A highly reputed school, Deep Darshan High School, which had
started about 24 years earlier at the specific request of the Collector of
the Dangs district and other government officials to the Christian com-
munity to do so, was accused of forced conversions and anti-national
activities; a play on communal harmony enacted and staged by the school
eulogizing the unique services rendered by Mahatma Gandhi was given
an entirely false, unconnected twist: that it desecrated Lord Krishna
which would arouse communal passions. This misrepresentation, a con-
cocted story by the HJM spread like wild fire all over the state. The
Principal of the School, Sr Carmen Borges (a Goan but the world around
told that she is a foreigner), reported the true facts of this play and the
way the school was being harassed by communal elements, to Prime
Minister Vajpayee when she met him during his visit to Gujarat on 10
January 1999; he, of course, listened to her but took no action against
anyone, nor showed any dissatisfaction with the way creative, educational
activities of this nature are being blatantly turned and twisted to serve
RSS’s partisan objectives.
At about 4 P.M. on Christmas day a violent mob of 125 men ‘armed
with trishuls, lathis and sacks filled with stones’ attacked the school and
damaged boy’s hostel, smashed window panes.11 This is what the Citizens’
Commission has to say on this subject: ‘We have ourselves seen the video
recording of the play, and there could not be any objection from anyone,
as it purported to preach communal harmony and the futility of vio-
lence.’12 In 1998–99, the school had 840 children of which only about
100 were Christians, the rest were non-Christians; and out of 24 members
of staff, only seven were Christians. There is a stampede to secure
admission in the school by Hindus every year. Almost all students
are successful in the school leaving examination each year. Professional
training imparted in computers, etc., is appreciated by even the most
backward, illiterate people of the Dangs district.

11
Ibid., p. 787.
12
Ibid., p. 786.
Violence against the Cross 283

The rest of the Christmas day and the night that followed witnessed
several attacks on Christian institutions, including 37 churches, houses
of Christian families, looting and confiscation of their belongings includ-
ing cash. Navjyot High School (a Catholic School run by Jesuits) was
similarly attacked; a jeep and a motor cycle parked in the compound were
set on fire; a school room where grain was stored for students was smashed
and the ration was looted. When the students were asked by the Com-
mission whether Christians had made any attempt to convert them to
Christianity, they denied this and pointed out that the large majority of
them in the hostel (only 30 out of 225 boys are Christians) were non-
Christians.13
The Commission maintains that there was no provocation by the
Christians to cause any violence on 25 December 1998, or prior to or after
that date. But the pamphlets distributed by the HJM to the public openly
all over the state asking the Hindus to ‘teach a lesson to Christian priests
and put them in their place’, the campaign conducted in all its ferocity
by the Gujarati language press and other such threats did; they created
a hatred for Christians among the ignorant masses; the officials of the
government who were requested by Christian organizations to withhold
permission to the HJM to hold the rally on Christmas day ignored it. The
violence against Christian tribals and their prayer halls and other insti-
tutions on 25 December 1998 was an ‘organized crime’; the HJM and
other RSS organizations told the Hindus that the Christian population
had increased by thousands in the Dangs district because of forced
conversions of Adivasis and Hindus, although there were no forced
conversions. If anyone is forcibly converting anyone it is the members of
the VHP/BD/HJM/RSS who are forcibly ‘Hinduizing’ the Christians; 14
they are making them believe that they were Hindus before they became
Christians; that all Dalits, SCs, STs, OBCs, Adivasis and the poor,
downtrodden people of India were Hindus for centuries before they
embraced Christianity. They have been threatening these weaker sections
of Christians to either come back to the Hindu fold or face dire conse-
quences if they do not ‘re-convert’ themselves to Hinduism. They were
attacked by hooligans and, what is worse, those members of their families
who are not Christians and are still practising their traditional religions
like animism, natural religion, etc., are made to suffer by the Sangh Parivar.
The tribals are not and have never been Hindus, and hence the question

13
Ibid., p. 789.
14
Ibid., pp. 791–99.
284 Sarto Esteves

of ‘reconversion’ or ‘home coming’ does not arise; the Adivasis were never
Hindus. The role of the Gujarat government has been equally ‘biased
and arbitrary’ with even the Chief Minister and the Minister of State for
Home trying to ‘minimize and play down reports of assualts on Christians’;
they repeatedly criticized the English language media, the Christian
community, the opposition parties of exaggerating the attacks on Chris-
tians. The entire fraternity of the Sangh Parivar, spoke with one voice to
the Commission that the forcible conversions brought about with foreign
money are responsible for the trouble in Gujarat.
It is the duty of the media to uphold the Constitution, to come to
the rescue of the community, to expose the unwarranted interference
with the rights of the weaker sections of the community by religious bigots
and obscurantists, and demand that the law of the land be respected, and
not be twisted and mutilated to satisfy the hooligans masquerading as
leaders of the country; to ensure that honesty and integrity of the media
are not thrown into the outer regions because the powers that be are in
a position to buy any individual, any organization, with public money,
whatever the cost. The press in Gujarat, but in particular the leading
Gujarati language dailies like Sandesh, Gujarat Samachar and Nav Gujarat,
carried on a relentless campaign for months with highly inflammatory,
hatred-ridden, communal propaganda and reports of forcible conversions.
This went on for months as if the media which is expected to defend
people’s democratic freedoms and consistently work to defend the
Constitution and establish democracy in the country had been purchased
by the Sangh Parivar to propagate its partisan, Hindu ideologies.

FORCED CONVERSIONS AND ‘HOME COMING’

The word ‘Conversion’ is a creative expression, very much applicable to

all rational, intelligent human beings. It shows the pragmatism of a person,
that he is capable of thinking practically and deciding what he wants to
do with himself, what is good for himself, and even formulate his philoso-
phy of life. But in India during the last few decades it has been turned
into one of the dirtiest, despicable and uncivilized words or ideas. Today
not even an educated and enlightened person wants to have much to do
with it, much less the illiterate and ignorant masses. It has been made
so by the Sangh Parivar conglomerate entirely to malign the Christian
Violence against the Cross 285

community and achieve its political objectives. It tried to come to power

through all types of strange ideological formulations and subterfuges for
nearly 40 years after independence. Christians are accused of forcibly
converting Dalits, Adivasis, Hindus, SCs, STs and the weaker sections of
our society through bribes, coercion, fraudalent methods, cash doles, free
admissions for children in their schools and colleges, jobs for youth, luxury
cars. The people are made to believe, by constant, endless repetition, a
la the Nazi fashion, that millions of Dalits, Hindus, Adivasis, etc., are
being converted everyday and that soon the Hindus will be reduced to
a negligible minority and that Christians will be the majority community
in India! It will be helpful for everyone to look straightaway at the most
authentic, official figures of the Christian population in India provided
by the Census from 1951 to 2001:

Census figures of the year Percentage of Christian

1951 2.35
1961 2.44
1971 2.60
1981 2.44
1991 2.32
2001 2.21

These figures are not picked up from the roadside. They are part of
the highly dependable statistics that the country gathers every ten years
on the various aspects of life, of people residing in the country, its natural
resources, etc. If the Sangh Parivar is unable to appreciate such weighty
statistics and information about our country and make sense out of them,
then no one will be able to help it. Christianity has been practised and
propagated in India for 2000 years and if during the last 50 years since
the country attained independence the population of Christians is seen
as actually diminishing, then anyone with a little common sense will admit
that this talk of Christian population overtaking other communities is
bogus; it is a figment of the imagination of the Sangh Parivar. It is a white
lie for the gullible to swallow.
The Christian community is not wasting its time and resources to
convert anyone forcibly. For centuries it has practised what it preaches,
and in the process has taught many to live in peace and harmony, love
one’s neighbours, clothe the naked, feed the hungry, shelter the homeless,
care for the dying. The Citizen’s Commission which investigated the
attacks on Christians in Gujarat found the charge that the population of
Christians would soon outnumber Hindus was ‘false propaganda’ only to
286 Sarto Esteves

instigate Hindus to attack Christians. It states: ‘We found no evidence

of any forcible conversion to Christianity. The established institutions like
the Deep Darshan High School at Ahwa, and Navjyot School at Subir
run by the Jesuits have at no time indulged in any act of conversion.’15
There are several statements made by police officers, public leaders,
government officials, NGOs, and others in their testimony before the
Citizen’s Commission. What comes out clearly from them is that it is the
Hindus, that is the members of the VHP, BD, HJM, RSS are busy
‘Hinduizing’ the Christians in large numbers. They are forcibly converting
Adivasis who have been Christians for many years to Hinduism by threats,
force, fraud and allurement which is a violation of human rights under
the Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the UN,
and Article 25 of our Constitution. They call those activities Ghar Vapsi,
‘home coming’, and all types of other phrases are coined to give the
impression to the world at large that these are honourable, constitutionally-
sanctioned deeds and actions. But they cannot make anyone with some
common sense believe this tripe. The Adivasis, Dalits, SCs, STs and even
many OBCs are not Hindus. The religion they practise is animism or a
natural religion to which they were born and which their forefathers had
practised for centuries. Writers, scholars and leaders of the community
like Dr B.R. Ambedkar have written volumes to prove this beyond a
shadow of doubt. In their ignorance, however, some of the weaker sections
may be even calling themselves Hindus because they were born in
Hindustan, and because the finer aspects of different religions and reli-
gious traditions may not be known to them; they may also be finding it
in their interests to do so in order to avail of the educational, economic
and other facilities made available to them under the Constitution if
they declare that they are Hindus. The purification ceremony which
the RSS/VHP/BD members and their sants carry out at these ‘home
coming’ functions is nothing but forcible conversion,’16 they do not accept
also that the Adivasis deserve ‘equal status in conservative Hindu society’.
The Sangh Parivar does not agree that the term ‘Adivasi’, is the right
word to describe them; they refer to the tribals as ‘vanvasis’. The Adivasis,
however, are indeed happy to be what they have been, and actually
‘admit that they experience a sense of liberation, be it educational, social,
moral or spiritual on becoming Christians. Such an experience cannot be

15
Ibid., p. 802.
16
Ibid., p. 814.
Violence against the Cross 287

considered as forcible conversion’.17 If any reason for this new-found love

in recent years of the high caste Hindus for Dalits is to be found, it is
their anxiety to make the Dalits, the weaker sections of our society, and
the world believe that Dalits are Hindus, then claim that an overwhelm-
ing majority of the people of India are Hindus and make the Dalits vote
for the BJP by preaching hatred against the Christians. They want to come
to power, with an absolute majority, to establish Hindu rashtra in India.
The RSS knows quite well that the old feudal elite, the high caste Hindu
society is a vanishing tribe. It is now trying to ‘derive legitimacy through
religion’18 by claiming that Buddhists/Jains/Sikhs/Dalits/SCs/STs/OBCs/
Adivasis and many more are all Hindus which make up an overwhelming
majority in the country.
The Fundamental Rights which guarantee, among other things, the
right ‘freely to profess, practise and propagate religion’ were framed in
the manner they are after discussing every aspect of it. Everyone in the
country has a right to propagate one’s religion. The decision to embrace
any religion is a personal decision which the individual concerned
alone can make. The Christians are showing by example, by actually living
their Christianity what Christianity is. It is for the individual to see what
it is as it is lived, as it is practised by its followers and ‘embrace’ it if he
so chooses. That decision of his cannot be challenged because he is a
rational human being who is free to decide for himself what he wants to
do with himself. Our Constitution has acknowledged his right to think.
Article 14 of the Constitution has given him equality before the laws. The
Christians in India are its full-fledged citizens equal in every respect to
any other citizen of India including members of VHP/BD/SS/RSS. When
a person is prevented from embracing another religion if he decides to
do so, he is denied the freedom which Articles 14 and 25, among others,
give him. This cannot be allowed; when the government yields to pres-
sures in various ways to prevent an individual from availing of the freedom
granted to him in these Articles, it fails to defend and uphold the
Constitution. Moreover, the very concept of freedom of religion has no
meaning whatsoever if what is granted to the citizens in Article 25 is taken
away by the various so-called Freedom of Religion Acts which are passed
and are being enforced in five different states with more to follow. The
nine-judge bench which delivered the landmark judgement dealing with

17
Ibid., p. 803.
18
Ram Puniyani, The Second Assassination of Gandhi, p. 29.
288 Sarto Esteves

the Babri Masjid demolition case and the subsequent developments has
dealt with a number of issues of far-reaching importance which are of
relevance here:

• Secularism is one of the basic features of the Constitution.

• No political party can simultaneously be a religious party.
• Politics and religion cannot be mixed.
• Any state government which pursues unsecular policies or unsecular
course of action acts contrary to the Constitutional mandate and
renders itself amenable to action under Article 356.
• Democracy stands for freedom of conscience and belief, tolerance
and mutual respect.
• India being a plural society with multi-religious faiths, diverse creeds,
castes and cultures, secularism is the bastion to build fraternity, and
unity with dignity of person as its constitutional policy.
• The state guarantees individual and corporate religious freedom
and deals with an individual as citizen irrespective of his faith and
religious belief and does not promote any particular religion nor
profess one against another.
• The concept of the secular state is, therefore, essential for successful
working of the democratic form of government.19

DUTY OF GOVERNMENT

In the larger interests of the nation, and in order to ensure that the liberal,
secular, democratic system of governance that the nation has chosen for
itself and has been struggling to establish firmly and permanently, these
divisive forces in our society have to be disciplined and curbed. In the
early part of this chapter, it has been shown in sufficient detail that ours
is a country where equality of all citizens and their right to profess, practise
and propagate a religion is guaranteed to all the citizens of India. This
is a right we have given to ourselves. It is not a gift from any section of
Indians to anyone or a favour done to anybody by any political party.
There is no restriction of any kind on this freedom of the individual to

19
See Stanley J. Tambiah, ‘Secularism in India: The Recent Debate’, in Rajeev
Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and its Critics, p. 449.
Violence against the Cross 289

decide for himself which religion he should practise, change his beliefs
or convictions if necessary, and switch over to another religion if one so
wishes as long as this is done within the limits laid down by the laws of
the land. If any citizen transgresses any law of the land or fails to carry
out any obligations that he is expected to fulfil, then the duty to take
action for the violation of the law is of the government, and not of any
private citizen or group or any non-official, social, cultural, communal or
sectarian organization. We have only one duly elected and legally con-
stituted government and not half a dozen of them. Therefore, members
or sympathizers of these largely self-constituted, sectarian organizations
like the RSS/VHP/BD/HJM/SJM and others have no right under any law,
or locus standi to issue orders or firmans to Christians not to convert others
to their faith, to leave the country, to ask their priests, religious and
missionaries to stop their activities, to make totally false, unfounded
accusations against them of bringing foreign money and other resources
to bribe, influence, defraud and convert Dalits and other sections of
people, of a conspiracy to colonize India from the backdoor and of anti-
national activities of Christians who have been loyal, patriotic, commit-
ted, peace-loving and law-abiding citizens. In a multi-religious country,
it is the foremost duty of the Government to work at all times to bring
about peace and harmony among the various communities. Communal
harmony cannot be established by antagonizing the helpless minorities
and conniving at the deliberate, concocted accusations against them
without any basis in fact. The minorities have lost all faith and confidence
in the government because it is actually helping the hooligans to imple-
ment the Sangh Parivar’s communal agenda and not protecting the
weaker sections. All this has to stop. The government is not to presume
that it can shield anyone in this regard, however good a ‘friend’ he may
be of the ruling party. If the Sangh Parivar wants to find a place for itself
in our political horizon it has to do so through democratic methods and
within the four corners of our secular Constitution, and not with muscle-
power and fascist methods. The BJP and its cohorts will have to renounce
its communalism; democracy has taken roots deep enough to defeat its
communalism in the elections to come.
 GUJARAT—HINDU RASHTRA LABORATORY 15
UDAY MEHTA

T
here is no dearth of appraisals that seek to explain why and how
the Sangh Parivar could succeed in making deep inroads in the
social, cultural, administrative, judicial, economic and political
set up in Gujarat, extending its influence from urban to rural and tribal
areas, and in provoking a series of violent anti-Dalit, OBC and especially
anti-minorities disturbances culminating in the ghastly post-Godhra geno-
cide in 2002. This is an attempt to briefly review the findings of some of
the significant studies that bring out the nature of subjective and objective
factors contributing to the success of the Sangh Parivar in making Gujarat
a model laboratory for the realization of their future project of establishing
the Hindu rashtra in this country.
Gujarat has witnessed a reformist, revivalist trend in social, cultural and
religious spheres of civic society right from the mediaeval period. Along
with the liberal, humanist trend represented by Narsingh Mehta, Akho,
Dalpatram, we find the revivalist current manifested among Dayaram,
Govardhanram Tripathy, and others. Narmad, who advocated social re-
form in casteist Gujarat society, succumbed to the pressure of the dominant
conservative upper-caste lobby and retracted from his earlier position.

CONTRAST WITH MAHARASTRA

In sharp contrast to Gujarat, Maharashtra, for instance, witnessed a
radically different situation right from the mediaeval period. During the
mediaeval period Maharashtra saw the emergence of several eminent
Gujarat—Hindu Rashtra Laboratory 291

saints like Tukaram, Eknath, and others who came from lower castes,
but exercised profound influence on the religious and social spheres.
The Varakari sect, which still has a strong presence even in present
Maharashtrian society, is the outcome of the impact of the teachings of
these mediaeval saints.
OBC and Dalit movements also played significant roles in contesting
the hold of the upper castes in Maharashtra during the nineteenth century.
Maharashtra has a rich tradition of the Dalit along with Muslim Marathi
writers. There were also a number of progressive and radical literary figures
of great eminence who dominated the Marathi literary scene during the
freedom struggle. The state also has a history of a powerful working class
movement and heroic leadership subscribing to communist and socialist
ideology. Unfortunately, Gujarat has no such parallel in any of these
directions. Gujarat has no history of either OBC or the Dalit movement.
The left movement could not make any headway here. Similarly, Gujarat
has not witnessed any strong presence of progressive, radical or Dalit
writers during either the pre- or even post-independence period.
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising to find that society in
Gujarat has traditionally been quite conservative, based on strict adher-
ence to norms and rituals of the caste hierarchy. Gujarat is also notorious
for its extensive practice of untouchability, molestation of Dalit women,
suppression of women and the consequent high rate of women’s suicides.
Saurastra, known for its large number of princely states, was dominated
by feudal values and institutions for ages. Traditionally Gujarat has ac-
quired a distinct reputation for the dominance of the traders’ lobby and
culture. Despite the rapid industrialization and modernization witnessed
by the state, especially over the last three decades, feudal values, and
institutions and trading culture still exercise dominant influence in Gujarat
society. In order to better appreciate the success acquired by the Sangh
Parivar in the state, it is imperative to keep in mind the prevailing social
and economic structure of the society in Gujarat.
In the absence of any political-socio-economic radical movement, as
Girishbhai Patel aptly argues, the Dalits remained outcasts and the Adivasis
remained marginalized, creating almost a political ideological vacuum.
The Hindutva forces under the leadership of the BJP, VHP and RSS found
an open field for their unhindered propaganda and indoctrination and did
succeed in penetrating these communities substantially. Instead of Marx,
Ram became a rallying point.1
1
Patel Girish, ‘Narendra Modi’s one-day cricket, what and why?’, Economic and
Political Weekly (30 November 2002), pp. 4827–28.
292 Uday Mehta

Though OBCs constitute as much as 40 per cent of the population,

they are defragmented into cluster of castes and sub-castes which are
highly heterogeneous, having no link with each other. The freedom
movement hardly made any impact on them. As an overwhelming ma-
jority of these communities were small and backward, also recruited from
erstwhile nomadic tribes, there was little scope for any political or social
movement. Some of the traditional occupations of OBCs could transform
themselves into modern occupations in a new bourgeois society, such as
tailors, cobblers, barbers, carpenters, etc., while others lost their signifi-
cance. The Jan Sangh and the BJP could get entry easily and could recruit
any number of leaders from OBCs, as the latter sought upward mobility
in the Hindu hierarchy through sanskritization. The BJP exploited their
socially lower position and gave them status by appointing many of them
to various offices of their organizations. In contrast to the Dalits and
Adivasis among whom there were some movements and conflicting
ideologies, there was no movement of any kind or any working ideology
among the vast masses of amorphous backward classes, numbering almost
two crores cutting across their different communities of castes or opera-
tive even in the major community. They were neither untouchables nor
marginalized, but very much part of the Hindu society, of course forming
the lower stratum. Their ambition was to be a part of the Hindu main-
stream either through upward social mobility or economic advancement,
but not to be part of any depressed and oppressed communities.2
Gandhi’s approach to industrial relations deserves serious consider-
ation. Ahmedabad actually became a model of his philosophy of labour-
employer relation based on the principles of class harmony and class
reconciliation in place of the Marxist perspective of class conflict and class
struggle. Gandhi’s concept of trusteeship implies submission of labour, and
under the INTUC leadership labour became a docile force. The same
approach was extended to agricultural and sugar cane workers in south
Gujarat where most of those recruited from the tribal areas were exploited
as bonded labour, known as Hali for decades.
Similarly, the peasant movement during the pre-independence period
was dominated by rich patidar farmers under the leadership of Vallabhbhai
Patel. It never adopted any radical programme promoting the demands
of agriculture labour and poor kisans and always stood for peaceful agi-
tation. Thus the Gandhian influence on trade unions, kisans and Adivasis

2
Ibid., p. 4834.
Gujarat—Hindu Rashtra Laboratory 293

curbed the growth of any radical organization, or militant struggle in

Gujarat.
These peculiar features of the social history of Gujarat obstructed the
growth of the left, progressive or radical movement of the oppressed in
the state. As against this peculiar background, there were other factors
which facilitated the growth of the Sangh Parivar in Gujarat. We shall
briefly narrate some of these features, which helped in promoting its hold
over the state and civic society. Gandhi’s upholding of Varnashramdharma
and the caste structure promoted the influence of Hinduism, which
indirectly helped the Sangh Parivar in promoting its advocacy of its
concept of the Hindutva and the Hindu rashtra. Apart from this, the
extensive influence of both Jainism and the Swaminarayan sect among
patidars and NRIs with their fad for vegetarianism and anti-Muslim bias
respectively have proved useful in extending the hold of the Sangh Parivar
in Gujarat civic society.
Even in the political sphere the conservative, rightist leadership domi-
nated the Congress party since its inception. Sardar Patel, Morarjee Desai
and their disciples had decisive voices in shaping the policy and programme
of the party since its formation in the state. Not surprisingly, the first major
challenge to the Congress came from the further right, reactionary feudal
and pro-industrial lobby for free enterprise and against the state interven-
tion in economy. The political formation, designated as the Swantra Party,
posed a serious challenge to the Congress in the 1960s and in the 1962
and 1967 elections the party came quite close to capturing power in the
state assembly. Some of the important leaders of this party who came from
princely Rajput families and the patidar caste switched their support to
the erstwhile Jan Sangh and subsequently to the BJP, and were instrumen-
tal in consolidating the hold of the Sangh Parivar in Gujarat.
Keeping in view the existing socio-economic structure of Gujarat,
Madhav Singh Solanki extended the KHAM policy, consisting of the
alliance of Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis and Muslims, together consti-
tuting around two-third of Gujarat’s population. This advocacy could
prove effective for some time, but as Girishbhai Patel rightly points out,
as it remained merely an expedient combination of four castes or
communities without any broad ideological framework, it would be
fragile, opportunistic, ad hoc and would not transcend caste or religious
loyalties. The alliance was a double-edged sword—it could lead to a
radical movement or it might entrench caste and community loyalties
and identities. As a matter of fact, exclusions of higher castes/classes from
political power and threat to their hegemony alienated them and forced
294 Uday Mehta

them to fight back. This actually happened after 1980. This first SC/ST
anti-reservation agitation by the higher intermediate castes—Patels,
Brahmins, Baniyas—against the reservation policy for admission to in-
stitutions of higher education and in promotion erupted violently and
resulted in open riots between the two. This prevented, to some extent,
the upward mobility of Dalits and Adivasis belonging to better economic
strata, and forced them to go back to their poor brethren. When an
attempt was made for increasing reservation for OBCs from 10 per cent
to 27 per cent, it led to the second anti-reservation agitation in 1983 and
1985 wherein more than 39 per cent of OBCs were brought into conflict
with the privileged classes. The agitation was so violent and hostility
(between higher castes, OBC and Dalits) so intense, coupled with strong
vested interests of the builders’ lobby dominated by Patels and led by ex-
Chief Minister Chimanbhai Patel and the BJP, that Rajiv Gandhi with
his elitist background opted for appeasement of the dominant sections
of Hindus, particularly the middle class. He advised Solanki to resign as
Chief Minister and installed Amar Singh, Chaudhari, the Adivasi leader,
instead. The KHAM experiment was over, leaving behind only dangerous
caste conflict and bitterness. The Congress(I) lost its moorings. Chimanbhai
with his Janata Party/KMPP represented some sections of Patels and
builders, while the BJP, being roped in, spread its nets particularly among
Dalits, OBCs and subsequently Adivasis—the politically rootless commu-
nities which can easily fall prey to temptations of higher mobility through
sanskritization and higher political participation through opportunism.
The Muslims, confused by the Hindu caste conflicts and losing faith also
in the Congress, had hardly any space in Chimanbhai’s party and could
not join the BJP. Slowly and gradually Gujarat politics and society moved
towards its final goal, Hinduism.3
Apart from the above factors, the erstwhile Jan Sangh and RSS policy
of indulging in anti-Muslim propaganda and fomenting communal dis-
turbance in the state also played significant roles in extending the Parivar’s
influence in Gujarat. The anti-Muslim bias prevalent among the upper
caste Hindus, especially among the Rajputs, Brahmins and Banias,
facilitated this process. Local party functionaries fuelled these sentiments
through speeches, circulation of rumours and attachment of charged
symbols to localized conflict between the two communities. According
to official figures there were as many as 2,938 instances of communal
violence between 1960 and 1969 in Gujarat. Some of them were major

3
Ibid., pp. 4831–32.
Gujarat—Hindu Rashtra Laboratory 295

riots in Saurashtra and Kutchha. The Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 further

aggravated tensions and provided fertile ground for rumour mongers.
Anti-Pakistan sentiments could often be transformed into hatred against
local Muslims. In 1968, the RSS organized a rally attended by 1,615
volunteers from different districts of Gujarat. M.S. Golwalker, while
addressing the rally, stressed that only Hindus were secular. They had
tolerated all sorts of suffering at the hands of various ‘others’. He pleaded
for the making of a ‘Hindu rashtra’, a concept on which there had already
been extensive discussions in the press in Gujarat. The major thrust of
the debate was that Muslims had destroyed Hindu culture and now
enjoyed special favours in the country. Further, Hindu rashtra was iden-
tified with Indian nationalism. Some religious leaders and the Jan Sangh
formed the Hindu Dharma Raksha Samiti (Committee to defend the
Hindu religion) in Ahmedabad in 1968. The committee played a very
important role in fomenting anti-Muslim feelings in the city before the
1969 communal riots. The tension between two communities culminated
in the large-scale communal riots in September–October 1969, which
spread to several cities. The Jan Sangh and RSS workers were actively
involved in spreading unrest either by provoking the people, taking
initiative in leading mobs, or simply by providing money or material to
the rioters. The Congress, which was in power, not only failed to control
the riots, but its leaders also shared a good deal of the Hindu communal
outlook. Not surprisingly, they also participated directly or indirectly in
the strife, and were instrumental in helping the Jan Sangh to expand its
support base in urban areas.4
The tension between Hindus and Muslims, as Shah argues, was at a high
emotional peak in the late 1980s on the issue of the Ram Janmabhoomi.
In 1989, the Sangh Parivar organized the Ram shila Pujan, a campaign
aiming at collecting and consecrating foundation bricks for the future
temple in Ayodhya. Religious sentiments were fanned by recitals of
bhajans, slogans, legends, myths, movies and rituals.
L.K. Advani started his dramatic rath yatra from Somnath in Saurashtra
in September 1990, and several mini rath yatras were organized by the BJP
to spread the message of Ayodhya. Trishuls, saffron flages and caps, sticker
inscribing slogans like, ‘Say with pride that I am a Hindu’, and slogans
swearing by Ram that the temple would be constructed at the same place

4
Ghanshyam Shah, ‘The BJP’s Riddle in Gujarat’, in Thomas B. Hansen and Christophe
Jaffrelot (eds), The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India (Delhi: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1998), pp. 245–46.
296 Uday Mehta

appeared in the cities and towns and captured the public imagination
for Hindu unity and nationalism. During the rath yatra, communal riots
occurred at 26 places, killing 99 persons between 1 September and 20
November 1990. Repeated communal clashes, high pitched campaigns for
Hindutva and the issue of the construction of Ram Mandir at Ayodhya
helped the BJP a great deal in the 1991 Lok Sabha elections.
The next phase of the campaign for the demolition of the Babri Masjid
and construction of a Ram Mandir at Ayodhya began in November 1992.
Several hundreds of kar sevaks from various castes including the OBCs,
Dalits and tribals were deputed from Gujarat for Ayodhya. Gujarat ac-
tually sent the largest member of kar sevaks to Ayodhya.
Following the demolition of the Babri Masjid communal riots took
place on a large scale in different parts of Gujarat; communal holocausts
were most intensive in Surat, where they continued for over six months
and claimed more than 200 lives. 1993 proved very tense in Gujarat. This
emotionally highly charged year helped the BJP to sweep the state assem-
bly elections in 1995.5
In the recent assembly elections as well, the BJP could win largely
through taking advantage of the post-Godhra genocide, registering an
unprecedented success in riot-affected areas. There were 13 electoral
districts out of the total 25 that were affected by post-Godhra communal
violence. These 13 riot-affected districts have 66 per cent of the total
3,213 million electors in Gujarat and 62 per cent of them exercised their
rights to vote in the 2002 assembly elections. 71 per cent of the total votes
obtained by the BJP in Gujarat were obtained from riot-affected areas,
these (Ahmedabad, Panchmahals, Vadodara, Mehsana, Dahod, Anand
and Saberkantha, etc.) accounting for 116 assembly seats and mandated
BJP with 91 seats, 50 per cent of the total seats in the state. Congress
presented a quite dismal picture in 2002 election, getting only 8 seats
and 36 per cent of the total votes in these riot affected districts.6
Apart from the above multitude of factors that contributed in consoli-
dating and expanding the Sangh Parivar’s influence in the state, there are
some significant processes operating at a national level, which also facili-
tated the emergence and growth of the Sangh Parivar in Gujarat. Along
with politico-economic changes ushered in India since independence, the
contours of Hinduism as practised by the urban and rural middle classes

5
Ibid., pp. 247–49.
6
Aseem Prakash, ‘Re-imagination of the State and Gujarat’s Electoral Verdict’,
Economic and Political Weekly (19 April 2003), p. 1604.
Gujarat—Hindu Rashtra Laboratory 297

especially in Northern India have also been rapidly changing over the past
several decades, providing a favourable context for intervention by the
organized forces of Hindutva.
Even before the VHP came into its own, there was an upswing in
certain new modes of worship and sacred symbols. These included, among
many other things, a proliferation of Jagarans around mother- cults like
Jai-Mata Di in places without such cults so far, a media invented goddess
like Santoshi Ma; devotional popular music; a rush to modern ‘hi-tech’
pilgrimages for the upper middle classes, like Vaishno Devi, and charis-
matic gurus or godmen, each with a distinct interpretation of Hinduism
and salvational strategies for well defined clienteles.
The new forms of religiosity from the 1950s and 1960s coincided with
a visible decline in the importance of traditional sanyasis, sants and
mahants within the middle class milieu. Perhaps this accounts for the easy
success of the VHP mobilization drive, which invests them with renewed
authority.
Certain tentative connections may also be suggested between the
growth of Hindutva and the specific pattern of north Indian city and
small town development in recent years. The new urban middle class,
spreading out fairly deep into rural hinterlands, has based itself largely
on the rapid growth of relatively small industrial enterprises and an
attendant trade boom. Government planning since the 1970s has pro-
moted small private industries through training, initial support, and bank
loans granted on an individual basis. This new sector has achieved a
significantly higher growth rate than that of the large-scale industrial
units, whether public or private. The Green Revolution in parts of Uttar
Pradesh has increased rural purchasing power significantly. These feed
into the boom in urban enterprises, consumerism and trade. These small-
scale units flourish without the concomitant growth of the organized
working class, since individual work places are far too small to consolidate
the labour force and enable effective unionization. The recent growth
of small towns has depended largely upon such developments. Even a
metropolitan giant like Delhi is crucially dependent on these strata.
Growth of this kind was accelerated under Rajiv Gandhi with the boom
in ‘screwdriver’ technology. In significant contrast to the credit and trade
networks based on kinship and the caste structure which had character-
ized earlier phases of Indian capitalist development (especially Marwari
enterprises), the new middle class tends to be fragmented into smaller,
more individual units. They are marked by intense internal competition,
the steady pressures of new opportunity structures, ever expanding
298 Uday Mehta

horizons for upward mobility, and a compulsive consumerism that keeps

transcending its own limits. The very pressure of growth is disturbingly
destabilizing; the brave new world of global opportunities creates anomie
and existential uncertainties.
The more reckless the concrete material fact of competition and
fragmentation, the greater, perhaps, is the need for an image of shared
anchorage and a theory of collectivity, for disciplined commitment to a
system of values that would never, however, challenge the basic material
interests and aspirations of these classes. New cults have therefore flour-
ished and godmen are created, while the RSS shakhas, which had worked
primarily among urban trader groups since the 1920s, remained highly
relevant with their disciplined solidarity, routine actualization of brother-
hood, and claims to a pure, traditional system of samskaras. But more,
perhaps, as so aptly suggested, came to be needed. The relatively quiet
shakhas with their long-term character-building perspective had probably
reached a plateau by the 1970s. Militant rhetoric found little outlet in
action, and there seemed small hope of dramatic political success. The
BJP electoral performance reached its nadir in 1984. The cadres of
Hindutva needed a new activist programme, the social groups from which
they came could not be entirely satisfied with Jai Mata Di, Vaishno Devi,
or godmen. They were still too individualized, unable to convey a sense
of intense solidarity and collective life. Organized Hindutva was able at
this conjuncture to effectively insert the new, aggressive, Ram-centred
communalism, which raised solidarity to a new intense emotional level
through its inherent militancy. One of its major departures compared, say,
to godmen cults, is the continuous invocation of a threatening ‘other’
with whom an endless war has been joined through the campaign for Ram
Janmabhoomi; far beyond Ayodhya looms Mathura, Benaras and the vista
of around 3,000 temples still to be regained. The Muslim ‘other’, despite
the propaganda about its threatening presence, is in real life a minority,
grossly under-represented in the bureaucratic, military, professional and
business elites, while Hindutva can rely on complicity from many ele-
ments in the state apparatus. The court judgements about Ayodhya in
1949 and 1946, the PAC involvement in innumerable Uttar Pradesh riots,
the role of the television serial Ramayan, and the prominence of ex-army
men and retired civil servants in BJP today are just some illustrations of
these crucial linkages.7

7
Tapal Basu, Pradip Datta, Sumit Sarkar, Tanika Sarkar and Sambudha Sen, Khaki
Shorts Saffron Flags (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993), pp. 111–13.
Gujarat—Hindu Rashtra Laboratory 299

The same authors conclude that the conjuncture of the 1980s crys-
tallized into today’s powerful wave, not automatically, but because an
ideological formation had emerged already over a long process of histori-
cal development which they have tried to trace. This formation, again,
is far from being free of contradictions and inadequacies, and opportu-
nities still remain for effective secular-democratic interventions to block
the thrust towards Hindu rashtra.
What is true of the North Indian scenario is probably more relevant
and applicable to the prevailing situation in Gujarat today. Economic
development in Gujarat since the 1970s has proceeded along this line and
it has witnessed a mushrooming growth of small capitalists especially in
the golden corridor (Ahmedabad, Vododara, Surat, Mehsana, Anand and
Navasari district) and traders, along with a new class of professionals who
have emerged as strong supporters of the Sangh Parivar and the BJP.

GROWING ECONOMIC CRISIS

The impact of the deepening recessionary trend in the Indian economy

and specially in Gujarat (where the earlier boom has disappeared) in
vitiating the atmosphere of communal harmony cannot be overstressed.
As K. Nag remarks, with the pressure on agriculture, both Ahmedabad
and Vadodara have seen large-scale migration from rural areas in recent
years. Vadodara, which was on par with cities like Pune and Bangalore
in the early 1970s, is now a stagnating city. All the large central public
sector units of companies like Indian Oil and IPCL survive but many of
them are in bad shape. Ancillary units in nearby industrial estates are
closing down. All this means that no new jobs have been created to absorb
the migrants or even the new generation locals. After the decline of the
textile industry, Ahmedabad, which was once called the Manchester of
the East, has been left bereft of any substantial manufacturing activity.
Apart from this gloomy scenario, the size of the organized industry like
the diamond industry, polishing and power looms in the city, is too small
to absorb all the manpower available. Neither has retailing or construc-
tion activities of any substantial size been spawned in Ahmedabad. All
this has given rise to a class of young, unemployed persons in the two
cities, full of energy and without any work to do. Many of these young
persons have fallen prey to the ideology of hate spread by certain political
300 Uday Mehta

formations and without any thought have participated in the dance of

death seen on the streets of Ahmedabad and Vadodara recently.8

RE-IMAGINATION OF THE STATE

Since the last several decades, as we could see from our earlier discussion,
social and political space in Gujarat has been gradually used by reaction-
ary politics, allowing political mobilization only around the idioms of
religion and caste. As aptly argued by Aseem Prakash, Congress tries to
strategically mix both while the Sangh Parivar has embarked on its project
of ‘re-imaginating the state’ through weaving a matrix of the ‘Hindu’
religion under the ideology of Hindutva. The re-imagination project
entails restructuring the social domain—consolidating all social groups
except the minorities for dominating electoral politics so as to contribute
to its objective in the material domain, sanctioning certain castes/class
to own and control productive assets and sustain the existing hierarchy
in social relationships through control of the state apparatus.
Nearly 13 per cent of Gujarat’s population, as we stated earlier, com-
prises of Patidars or Patels. They initially constituted the social and
political base for the Swantra Party and then deserted it in favour of the
Congress, and towards the end of 1980s switched their loyalty completely
to BJP. Patels as a caste were originally cultivaters. Their present prosperity
has become possible largely because of the government’s land reforms
programme, Green Revolution policies, state subsidy given to agriculture
and resources of numerous cooperative societies. The surplus generated
through agriculture allowed them to diversify in other trades and shift
their economic base to fast growing urban areas while also keeping a close
link with rural areas. Patels and Banias benefited tremendously by the
state subsidy given to small-scale industries (SSIs) and became a powerful
entrepreneurial class. Banias constitute only 3 per cent of the state
population but dominate in business and industry. Brahmins who occupy
top positions in educational institutions and dominate the professions of
doctors, architects and engineers constitute 4 per cent of the state popu-
lation. Recently they have also moved into business. As indicated earlier,
forward castes together constitute 26 per cent of population but occupy

8
K. Nag, ‘Tinderbox—Gujarat—Economic Woes Fuel Flames’, Times of India, April
2002.
Gujarat—Hindu Rashtra Laboratory 301

75 per cent of the middle class and 95 per cent of rich class. Rajputs, with
small exceptions, stand closer to backward classes in terms of their
economic status (Shah 1998, 31, Patel 2002 4828).9 These are the castes
that have benefited the most from institutionalization of market-led
growth. The prime aim of the material domain of the re-imagination
project, as Prakash suggests, is to preserve the social and economic
positions of these castes.
In this context, Takashi Shinoda’s appraisal of the social composition
of entrepreneurs with the help of their surnames across all the districts
of Gujarat in 9 SSIs deserves special consideration. Takashi notes that
Brahmins and Banias, including Jains and Patidars, are found to be owners
in all types of industries in all districts, though their concentration is
highest in central Gujarat. Their presence is more pronounced in the
units that are capital intensive. Artisan castes, Muslims, Rajputs, followed
by Dalits and Adivasis, have presence either in the type of industries with
which they have some traditional linkages or in a industry that required
a low amount of capital to enter and is labour intensive. Shinoda also
notes that agro-based and rural based industries, as well as the construc-
tion industry have also played a very important role in the entrepreneurial
development of the Patidars.10
The other face of burgeoning entrepreneurial caste/class of Gujarat
is represented by urban traders, that is, owners of modern showrooms,
hotels, shopping malls, share brokerage, large and medium grocery shops,
architectural firms, construction companies, trade in electronic goods,
transport, jewellery shops, etc. Prakash, on the basis of his field work,
suggests that the dominance of the Patidars and Banias is followed by
Brahmins in the commercial and trading activities of Gujarat. His survey
also reflects that Patidars, Banias and Brahmins largely control trade and
commerce. Koli Patels, Panchals and Sonis coming from OBCs have only
marginal presence in these activities. Patidars, Banias and Brahmins
though constituting around 20 per cent of the state population, today rule
the state.
As the same author argues that it is in the interest of political and
economic elites (who mostly come from upper castes) to preserve the

9
Reproduced from Prakash, ‘Re-imagination’, p. 1606.
10
Shinoda Takashi, ‘Institutional Changes and Entrepreneurial Development in the
SSI Sector of Gujarat’, in Indira Hirway, S.P. Kashyap and Amita Shah (eds), Dynamics
of Development in Gujarat (Ahmedabad: CFDA, 2002). Reproduced from Prakash’s
article, p. 1606.
302 Uday Mehta

economic order, that they seek refuge in a social ideology that legitimizes
the status quo. The Hindutva ideology in all its manifestations has never
questioned caste and class inequality. The Hindutva-envisaged social
order and neo liberalism both rely on the beliefs that one has to be satisfied
with whatever endowment one originally had. The political manifestation
of this logic is BJP and its social forms are RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal and
numerous other institutions and religious orders. This is probably the
reason for the affinity of trading class with right-wing social and political
formations. The majority of sampled traders were members of any one
of the social collectives representing the Sangh, particularly the VHP.
Majority of Brahmin traders were found to be members of the RSS. The
sampled small traders, for instance grocery shop owners, stationery mer-
chants, milk dealers, etc., were found to be members of the Bajrang Dal.
Nearly 70 per cent of the owners reported that the membership of the
social collectives preceded their political choice of the party.
Individual traders are not only members of collectives represented by
the Sangh, but at times are also important district and state-level func-
tionaries of these collectives. If these collectives and the political execu-
tives managing the state understand the society, politics and economics
from the same vantage point—which is precisely the case in Gujarat—
then the strength of the former translates into the might of the latter and
vice versa. Thus state policies are efficient in spearheading the growth
of commercial capital with the help of tax concessions and cost-related
incentives, comprehensive infrastrutural support and eliminating red-
tapism and bottlenecks. For such a growth most of these initiatives have
come after 1996.11 The beneficiaries of these policies are primarily the
three dominant castes. State loans and subsidies are important for the
growth of SSIs. Such enterprises owned by Dalits grew at nearly 4 per cent
after 1992–93 but declined steeply in 1996–97.12 The BJP, not surprisingly,
came to power with an absolute majority. State subsidy given to economic
sectors like industry, irrigation, power and agriculture is much higher
compared to the social sector as education, health, water, welfare of Dalits
and Adivasis, where subsidy is reduced.13 During the course of field

11
Ravindra H. Dholkia, ‘Liberalization in Gujarat: Review of Recent Experience’, in
Indira Hirway, S.P. Kashyap and Amita Shah (eds), Dynamics of Development in Gujarat
(Ahmedabad: CFDA, 2002), pp. 197–223.
12
Shinoda, ‘Institutional Changes’, p. 223.
13
Archana, Ravindra H. Dholkia, ‘Non Tax Revenues and Subsidies in Gujarat Issues
and Evidences’, in Indira Hirway, S.P. Kashyap, Aminta Shah (eds), Dynamics of
Development in Gujarat (Ahmedabad: CFDA, 2002), pp. 145–50.
Gujarat—Hindu Rashtra Laboratory 303

interviews conducted by Prakash, almost all traders hesitantly accepted

that membership of the social collectives representing the Sangh, along
with their monetary contribution to their activities, permits proximity to
the state power, which in turn allows them to speedily pursue their interest
with the state government, deter frequent sale tax raids and demolition
of business space beyond the legal limit.
It is the livelihood activities of OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis that has the
last chance to be integrated with this nature of growth process. Gujarat
is witness to the declining quality of employment due to the informalization
of labour, thereby making urban poverty in the state higher than rural
poverty.14 The (un)planned capitalist growth and the ownership pattern
of the forests coupled with the absence of any infrastructural support for
private commercial activities has resulted in the highest urban and rural
poverty in the eastern adivasi districts of the state.15 The agricultural
sector in Gujarat is also heading towards stagnancy, while it has benefited
the class of rich farmers who can cultivate rich cash crops.16 The second-
ary sector that used to provide the bulk of employment have started
offering diminishing wages and lower number of working days. NSSO
35th round data also reveal that in Ahmedabad, Vadodara and Surat the
absolute number of the unemployed has come down but at the same time
there is increase in the number of casual labourers coupled with a decline
in regular salaried employees between 1993–94 and 1999–2000.17 If we
keep in mind the fact that these cities had nearly 41 per cent of the small-
scale industries in the state in the year 199718 and nearly 61 per cent of
the total state’s investment in the factory sector in the year 1996,19 the
gravity of the situation becomes quite evident. As Prakash suggests, the
state policies not only creates conditions for the growth of commercial

14
Indira Hirway and Piet Terhal, ‘The Contradictions of Growth’, in Ghanshyam
Shah, Morio Rutten and Hein Streefkerk (eds), Development and Deprivation in Gujarat
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 36–53.
15
Ibid., p. 48.
16
Niti, Manthur and S.P. Kashyap, ‘Agriculture Development in Gujarat: Problems
and Praspeals’, in Indira Hirway, S.P. Kashyap and Amita Shah (eds), Dynamics of
Development in Gujarat (Ahmedabad: CFDA, 2003), pp. 238–67.
17
NSSO, Employment and Unemployment Situation in India, 1999–2000, NSS 55th
Round, Government of India, June 2000.
18
Shinoda, ‘Institutional Changes’, pp. 220–22.
19
N. Dinesh Awasthi, ‘Recent Changes in Industrial Economy of Gujarat: Issues and
Evidences’, in Indira Hirway, S.P. Kashyap and Amita Shah (eds), Dynamics of
Development in Gujarat (Ahmedabad: CFDA, 2002), p. 187.
304 Uday Mehta

capital, but is also prompt in removing market anomalies as understood

from the standpoint of private capital. But at the same time it refuses to
address the adverse effects of market on the assetless. The contradiction
of growth allows certain castes/classes to sustain their domination in the
market, which in the face of the state-nurtured exclusion of other castes/
classes also preserves the hierarchy in social relationships.20
BJP could win the 2002 assembly election with two-thirds majority on
the basis of the Hindutva platform for establishing the Hindu rashtra
based on the alliance of upper castes/class with OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis.
But this alliance is fragile and cracks within this formation have become
visible umpteen number of times, culminating in a major spilt within the
party with the departure of Shri Shankar Singh Waghela, erstwhile BJP
president, from the party. The Sangh Parivar has sought to accommodate
OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis in their organizational set-up. However, their
presence is quite marginal as the party and other affiliates of the Parivar
are dominated by the higher caste/class leadership. Apart from this,
contradictions in their material interests are so sharp that this alliance
would be unstable and remain in a state of perpetual tension and conflict
all the time, although attempts are made to provide opportunity for
upward mobility to some sections of OBCs especially through the Hindutva
platform and sanskritization process.
Moreover, one should not overlook the fact that the BJP could register
a decisive gain in OBC, Dalit and especially Adivasi districts only in those
areas which were deeply affected by the post-Godhra riots, and the overall
gain obtained in increasing their voting percentage compared to the
Congress among OBC Dalits and Adivasis is only marginal. Voting figures
and the BJP’s gain in the 2002 assembly election could be only explained
in terms of the party’s ability, in total connivance with the state power,
in vitiating the atmosphere in the riot-affected areas and gaining an
overwhelming majority of the assembly seats from these communally
charged districts, viz., Ahmedabad, Vadodara, Panchmahal, Dohad,
Mehasana, Godhra, Sabarkantha, etc.
Unfortunately, the Congress hardly provides any kind of viable alter-
native to the politics and strategy adopted by the Sangh Parivar and
the BJP in Gujarat. As a matter of fact, there is hardly any qualitative
difference between mindsets of the BJP and the Congress voters in terms
of their response to the Godhra incident of train burning and post-Godhra

20
Prakash, ‘Re-imagination’, p. 1608.
Gujarat—Hindu Rashtra Laboratory 305

riot retaliation. Even during the 2002 assembly elections and earlier, since
the mid-1960s, the Congress by and large has followed soft Hindutva
policies that have really helped the BJP and the Sangh Parivar to con-
solidate its position in the state. In this sense there is hardly any alter-
native to the BJP in Gujarat. During this election, voters categorically
rejected the rest of the political parties by reducing them to the status
of non-entities. In this context, any suggestion for building an indepen-
dent movement of OBCs, Dalits or Adivasis as an alternative to both the
Congress and the BJP hardly makes much sense, because the identity
politics and struggles based on these issues have almost reached a dead
end. This becomes quite evident from the political scenario in Uttar
Pradesh, Bihar, and now even in Tamil Nadu. Whatever relevance the
‘Social Justice Platform’ under the leadership of V.P. Singh acquired in the
late 1980s is now more or less completely lost. With the adoption of the
new economic policy of globalization and liberalization, especially since
the 1990s, and the resultant gradual withdrawal of the state from social
welfare, education and public health arena, the space for political ma-
noeuvre on this basis has shrunk drastically. Hence, in the context of the
nation and especially in Gujarat, only the collective struggle and orga-
nizations built around the demands and grievances of all oppressed and
exploited sections of society could pave the way for an effective alterna-
tive to the Sangh Parivar and the BJP (with their dream of building up
the Hindu rashtra) in the state.
 16
‘AFTER GUJARAT . . .’: MAKING SENSE OF
REPORTS ON THE POST-GODHRA VIOLENCE
AND ITS AFTERMATH

ROWENA ROBINSON AND D. PARTHASARATHY

W
hile dealing with a theme of this nature, it may be expecting
too much from an exercise such as this to come up with
radically new insights into the relationship between commu-
nal riots, the state and law. It is difficult for a theoretical understanding
of communalism to be more advanced than the struggle against commu-
nalism. It is only when the struggle against fascist and communal forces
reaches an advanced stage that it becomes possible to understand the
forces that aid and abet such phenomena. That stage has not yet been
reached in India. What is needed now is the presentation of detailed,
clinical descriptions regarding the ways in which communal forces are
fostered, and the actual role played by different sections of the state and
civil society before, during, and after communal riots. The series of reports
that have come out after the 2002 Gujarat violence provide detailed
descriptions on these (Concerned Citizens’ Tribunal 2002; Dayal 2002;
Varadarajan 2002).1
Enquiry commission reports and those of other people constitute good
reference material for scholars starting out on research on the relationship
between communal riots and the agents of the state. More importantly,
by documenting accurately the actual role of the law enforcement agen-
cies during communal riots, those participating in the struggle against

1
These books contain several of the fact finding and inquiry commission reports.
Details of these are provided in the references at the end of the article.
Reports on the Post-Godhra Violence and its Aftermath 307

communalism will be enabled to take up a clearer position against the

institutions of the state.
Media reports as well as reports of inquiry commissions in the after-
math of the Gujarat violence have pointed out the planned rather than
the spontaneous nature of the pogrom, police complicity (rather than
apathy), the large-scale sexual violence and mutilation of women’s bodies,
participation of (Hindu) women, Dalits, and Adivasis in the attacks on
the Muslim community, the spread of violence to rural areas, the role
played by the vernacular media in fomenting violence, and the absence
of government rehabilitation for victims of attacks.
While doing some work on issues confronting Muslims in contempo-
rary India in recent months, one of us has been meeting various relief
organizations and social activist groups as well as attending their meetings.
Everywhere conversations and talks are prefaced by the pregnant and
poignant words, ‘After Gujarat . ..’. What is the significance of this loaded
phrase? This chapter analyses several reports on the the Gujarat carnage
following the Godhra train burning incident and tries to uncover the
syntagmatic and paradigmatic shifts in political culture and violence
signalled by the trauma of 2002.

GUJARAT 2002: PORTENTS FOR THE FUTURE?

There are many things ‘exceptional’, so to speak, about the violence of

2002 but not all of them are the ones commonly, and sometimes mistak-
enly, pointed out, for instance by the media. For one, not too much should
be made of the amazement sometimes expressed that such intercommu-
nity violence could play itself out in Gandhi’s homeland. Despite being the
famed land of Gandhi’s birth, Gujarat has had a long history of communal
violence including that against Dalits, even though the high level of
violence there has been punctuated by long periods of quiet. Indeed,
Varshney’s data (2002, pp. 95–107) shows that it is Gujarat that has
had the highest per capita rate of deaths in communal incidents between
the years 1950–95. Gujarat also has the largest number in terms of total
deaths in riots; this number is higher than for the states of Uttar Pradesh
or Bihar, states commonly considered prone to communal violence.
One of the implications of the phrase ‘After Gujarat . ..’ is immediately
brought home. The year 2002 saw extremely high violence but also
violence that continued for many months, rather than conflict which
308 Rowena Robinson and D. Parthasarathy

peaked and died soon after. Violence continues to plague the state: every
few days or weeks smaller incidents take place; every now and then
tension is reinforced by the declaration of bandhs or by aggressive public
celebrations of festivals. Clearly, Gujarat’s history of being a state prone
‘to big violence amid long stretches of peace’ (Varshney 2002, p. 100) has
changed and for the worse. It is definite that for Muslims in Gujarat,
whatever their class, caste, linguistic or sectarian background, the re-
sumption of and retreat into ‘normalcy’ in the experience of the ‘everyday’
has not been achievable.
In other words, the radical distinctiveness of the 2002 violence lies
both in what took place and how (process), as well as what it implies or
has come to stand for (paradigm, model to be replicated and followed
elsewhere). Further, it lies in both the violence itself as well as the
aftermath of the violence, the processes of dealing with the violence and
the violated. Indeed, the massacre and the attacks on property may be
said to have taken the form of a pogrom against the Muslims of the state.
It seems almost perverse then to talk in calm tones of how the Gujarat
violence this time was ‘different’. From the perspective of the sufferer or
the victim, do such finely nuanced distinctions make any sense? They do.
Sufferers of the violence in Gujarat 2002 return again and again to the
point, if in varying ways and diverse voices: ‘In the past, violence was
never like this. This time it was different.’ What made it different? From
their point of view, the fact that Muslims were safe nowhere, the fact that
neighbours turned on them and the fact that the violence continued so
long they could not return to their homes for months. For some of them,
the return has become impossible.
As violence victims in Vadodara said: ‘Earlier, if there were riots there
was stabbing or stone-throwing in the streets. If Muslims stayed at home
they were safe. This time it was not like that. They came to destroy
houses, loot and burn.’ ‘Our neighbours were involved in the violence;
we have lost our trust.’ ‘We could not return home for months after the
violence.’ In some cases, people returned to their devastated houses and
shattered lives over a year after the first outbreak of violence. This was
without precedent in the long history of aggression and conflict in Gujarat.
The scale of the violence and the length of time over which it
continued, the participation of social groups across the spectrum, the
scale and intensity of brutality and inhumanness, the spread of the attacks
in rural as well as urban areas, the management of the carnage by state
and law and order functionaries, the processes of rehabilitation—all these
have rendered the experience of the violence irrevocably different. And
Reports on the Post-Godhra Violence and its Aftermath 309

these were not all. There was a larger political and public context, which
shaped the response to the violence in markedly specific ways. In saying
all this, and we shall elaborate on these aspects further, there is one
disquieting thought to note. This violence has been different from prior
attacks; there is no reason to believe it will be different from future ones.

PATTERNS AND SCALE OF VIOLENCE

It is not enough to say that the state machinery distinctly collapsed in

Gujarat, permitting the violence to assume proportions it would otherwise
have not, or to state that the police and authorities behaved in a partisan
manner. The partisan role of the police, state authorities and even para-
military forces has been pointed out in riots over the decades and in
different regions. The pogrom against the Sikhs in 1984 in Delhi has made
us acutely aware of such possibilities. What needs emphasizing is the
legitimacy that has been publicly accorded and bestowed on the state: the
outcome of the December 2002 elections is only one expression. Other
aspects are outlined. The state in this instance and functionaries of the
ruling party openly expressed justification for the attacks on the Muslim
community and abandoned its constitutional obligation to protect the life
and property of citizens.
It is true that social analysts had earlier not paid much attention to
the signs of social strife in Gujarat that might have given indication of
the tumult to come. A depressed working class and non-existent Dalit
movement, growing sanskritization among tribals and the frustration of
their economic aspirations, vicarious participation in a globalizing economy:
these and other elements can no doubt feed the success of hate cam-
paigns. In any case, there is evidence that tribals and Dalits were paid
in cash and kind to kill; loot was, moreover, the reward of the marauders
(Human Rights Watch 2003). It must be stated without any ambiguity
whatsoever though, that no matter how high passions run or to what
extent groups and communities are willing to go in committing acts of
aggression against one another, a state, a police force, and an army pledged
to maintain peace and protect the law can control the violence without
difficulty. Where the state and the police fail, the army has to be sent
in without delay. In Gujarat this did not happen: stemming the violence
was not a priority, leading and participating in the carnage was an
objective for the government and political leadership.
310 Rowena Robinson and D. Parthasarathy

Places of worship have been attacked and destroyed in all intercom-

munity conflicts. Rebuilding these by local state authorities together with
the people has been part of the typical mechanisms of peace building
followed over the decades. The first major place of worship to be de-
stroyed and not rebuilt is, of course, the Babri masjid. It is not surprising
that after the demolition, the then Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao,
had committed himself quite unequivocally, perhaps even automatically,
to the reconstruction of the masjid; the assurance later vanished from the
rhetoric of the Congress. Rebuilding masjids, dargarhs and temples after
violence has been part of Gujarati state practice. It is a practice on which
people repeatedly commented because of its striking absence following
the 2002 carnage. At this time, hundreds of small sacred places were razed
to the ground; debris was removed and the areas tarred over. Where this
did not occur, the authorities have manifestly refused to accept the
obligation to rebuild Muslim sacred sites.
In other words, standard administrative procedures for ‘riot’ manage-
ment, however problematic these may occasionally be, were not followed
in 2002 in Gujarat. Such was the implicit faith of Muslims in the law,
such their trust in democratic procedure that raped and assaulted women,
tortured and almost naked, trudged to police stations in remote areas to
file FIRs. Medical assistance was sought afterwards, the reports filed first.
Of course, we now know that many of these reports were not properly
filed by officers; the accusations were toned down or minimized (Human
Rights Watch 2002).
An analysis of the Gujarat violence combined with the struggle against
communalism not only lead to a better understanding of the phenomenon,
but also brings out the real character of our ‘democratic’ institutions. The
constant self-praise regarding India’s successful retention of democratic
institutions and norms now stands exposed. Amidst all the current discus-
sions regarding good governance, the decline into prejudice and partiality
of our executive and judicial bodies, and the general decay of ‘civil society’
organizations and associations of various forms have not been given
much attention. Likewise, the debates over communitarianism have
neglected to note that many of India’s oppressed classes have frequently
discarded their ‘autonomous’ consciousness in favour of externally derived
and imposed laws which promised them something that they did not have
as a matter of right—freedom from arbitrariness. It is a matter of the
maturing of the real character of ‘democratic’ institutions in India today
that one by one each of these once hallowed institutions are crumbling.
What remain in the relations between classes and communities are forms
Reports on the Post-Godhra Violence and its Aftermath 311

of domination determined to an extreme degree by arbitrariness. It is a

matter of the immense possibilities inherent in modern legal institutions
for a progressive transformation of society, that the current dispensation
in power has consistently run down the potential of these institutions for
dispute resolution and democratic governance. The Ambedkarite move-
ment for social justice and the long struggle of the Dalits had shown how
changes in social and political power structures could be brought about
through influencing state structures and legal institutions. When minor-
ities demand the rule of law therefore, they threaten the ruling elites of
this country as never before. That is why the forces of fundamentalism and
communalism are undermining each institution in India one by one.
The series of reports that have documented the Gujarat violence and
pogrom against Muslims, and similar reports that have come out earlier,
constitute evidence of the deliberate undermining of democratic institu-
tions, and the direct complicity of the law enforcement agencies and the
state in communal riots targeting the minority communities. When agents
of the state are neither impartial nor effective, it is highly ‘mischievous’
(Ansari 1997) to ask the usual question that law enforcement agencies
and judicial commissions take up to resolve—‘who started the riots?’ By
focusing on the immediate incidents leading to the outbreak of riots, such
questions elide the provocative behaviour of members of the majority
community. When rioting is often a part of the political agenda of ruling
forces, one has to pose a counter question—how is it that aggressive
behaviour by the Hindus does not turn into a riot? In fact the very term
communal riots often conjures an image of members of two communities
engaging in conflict which spontaneously originate from a precipitate
cause. This is essentially a ‘police’ statement of the problem useful for
developing an evenhanded case of rioting against members of two com-
munities. What is usually the case, and this is something which is becom-
ing more and more obvious, is the deliberate planning and targeting that
goes into ‘creating’ a riot. This can be understood and even perceived only
if we recognize what is referred to as the ‘communalization’ of the police,
and the pattern of police lawlessness and attacks on members of the
minority community during communal riots over the last three decades.
We need to closely scrutinize the role of the civil administration during
riots, the character and behaviour of the security forces, and the process
of administration of justice, all of which are documented in the many
enquiry reports that have come out post-Gujarat violence.
The brittleness and lack of vitality of many bourgeois democratic
institutions in post-colonial countries is something that has not been
312 Rowena Robinson and D. Parthasarathy

adequately studied. Perhaps the fact that most post-colonial nation states
adopted ‘modern’ form of governance and state/legal institutions which
were not shaped by long periods of struggles by the oppressed and the
exploited, by the struggles of emerging capitalist classes as it were, are
partly responsible for this. Thus in situations of crisis, as during communal
conflagrations, in cases involving violence against women or Dalits, the
real nature of these institutions comes to the fore.
In Gujarat, the spread of violence beyond the traditional geographical
confines of communal trouble beyond the walled city to middle class
localities, has paralleled the participation of women, Dalits and Adivasis
in these attacks. The theory of lumpen elements being involved in acts
of rioting and arson in a ‘spontaneous’ manner has always been suspect
in the case of many riots in India. However, mobilization for targeted
violence has really come into its own as part of the Ram Janmabhoomi
movement, though targeted violence has been a feature in some cities
earlier also.
While scholars like Tanika Sarkar have provided a lot of insight into
the increasing participation of women in Hindu fundamentalist bodies
and movements, women’s participation in violence is something that
requires more attention (Parthasarathy 2002). Much of the literature on
this relate women’s violence to mobilization and wooing by Sangh Parivar
organizations.2 At the height of the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, and
during the destruction of the Babri masjid, women did participate in large
numbers in destructive and violent activity, especially in Mumbai and in
several cities in Gujarat. But the kind of violence we are observing now
where entire families, with women and children included, participate in
arson, looting, and murder, points to a situation where violence has
become a ‘normal’ social activity. In a society where kinship and family
norms do not even permit women to show their faces outside of their
homes, what changes have led to women participating in an activity on
equal terms with men? Has the legitimacy given to violence provided
legitimacy to changes in women’s behaviour as well?
Similarly, what prompts and motivates Dalits to join their upper caste
oppressors in carrying out attacks on members of the Muslim community?
Do strategies of the Sangh Parivar in bringing women, Dalits, and Adivasis
into their fold lead to their greater participation in violence? Is it possible
to make a direct connection between political and social mobilization for

2
See articles in Sarkar and Butalia (1995).
Reports on the Post-Godhra Violence and its Aftermath 313

a cause and the readiness to indulge in violence? Women often bear the
brunt of violence from their husbands, kinship group members, etc. Given
this fact, what changes occur in their ‘collective mentalities’ that they are
able to so quickly transform themselves into supporters and perpetrators
of communal violence? Is it possible to explain violent activity by women
on members of another community, as just pent up emotions being
released, given an opportunity and a situation where one is not likely to
be admonished/punished?
These are issues that have to be understood in the context of what
has been happening in the Indian polity and society roughly over the last
two decades. Particularly, two discrete but interrelated streams of dis-
course and action seem to be at the heart of socio-political transforma-
tion. One is the reactionary mobilization of upper castes to increasing
empowerment of the Dalitbahujans, reflected especially in the anti-
reservation movements in the second half of the 1980s and the early
1990s. The first time that large-scale violence took place in Ahmedabad
outside the walled city, and which involved the middle classes actively
participating in violence, was during the anti-reservation riots in 1985
which turned communal. During the anti-reservation violence against
the Mandal Commission report as well, large-scale violence was mostly
treated benignly by the state machinery, and it was for the first time that
many middle class young people, especially women, were involved in
violence. For many, it was probably the first time that they came out into
the streets and participated in public protests. The transformation of anti-
reservation riots into attacks on members of other communities has been
observed in other areas as well.3 It is not an accident that the rise of
the BJP in coastal Andhra Pradesh has occurred in those areas notorious
for ‘atrocities’ on Dalits.4 The political linkages between the movement
for a mandir and the anti-mandal agitation are of course well known.
Scholars have also established the ways in which the ‘manuvadi’ forces
have reacted to the Ambedkarite movement and their role in the growth
of the Hindutva bodies. However, we also need to understand the

3
The vast number of sociological studies on communal violence, and the relative lack
of serious studies on violence against Dalits is worthy of sociological attention.
4
The infamous Chundur incident had a little known aftermath wherein the upper
caste–Dalit conflict was transformed into an attack by upper castes on Christians. The
Reddis organized other upper caste communities and led an attack on the Andhra
Christian College in Guntur, not just because the institution provided shelter to the
refugees from Chundur, but also because it had played a significant role in educating
and imbuing Dalits in the district with a new found confidence.
314 Rowena Robinson and D. Parthasarathy

particular ways in which the anti-Mandal agitation marked a watershed

in Indian politics. Especially to be noted is the language of rights which
dramatically shifted political action away from a focus on marginalized
groups, and cast empathy for the underprivileged in a derogatory frame-
work. Pride in one’s status and derision for the Dalit was now openly
expressed. More important, the movement opened up new possibilities
of action including forms of violence against the state and other com-
munities which were regarded as legitimate or which were not con-
demned or put down in unequivocal terms.
It is this absence of a negative sanction and the permitting of violence,
the sanctioning of violent activities as it were, that also perhaps explains
women’s violence—as part of family violence. Women are not likely to
face oppression as result of partaking in violence against members of other
communities. This is one activity where perhaps the male members
cannot or will not impose restrictions or force reprisals. Just as fear of
reprisal keeps women in check and ensures their conformity to dominant
norms, the very absence of fear in this case makes them do things which
they would otherwise not do. Perhaps violence is just a catharsis, a release
for these women. Perhaps it also provides them feelings of empowerment.
What is important is that they get feelings of being ‘included’—into the
family and into a community—in whatever way it is defined.
This points to the second stream of events namely the manner in
which new ways of belonging and feelings of inclusion are produced for
individuals by the Hindutva movements.5 As Arvind Rajagopal has pointed
out, more emphasis has been given to their disruptive effects, compared
to the possibilities of increased inclusion generated by these movements.
The puzzle of increased participation in the Hindutva movements of
groups such as Dalits, OBCs, and women—who have had to bear the
brunt of Brahminical violence—is explained by precisely this kind of
analysis. In Gujarat of course, inclusion was accompanied by an attain-
ment of pride. The open expression of pride in aggressive and brutal
behaviour reached its apogee in Gujarat. Hence it would not be quite
appropriate to call the carnage in Gujarat ‘animalistic’ behaviour. Apart
from the usual argument that animals kill only for food, the ‘animalistic’
behaviour view misses out on the social sanction, the pride, the pleasure,
and the carnivalesque character of violence, all of which came about due
to the absence of fear and the support of state structures.

5
Several of the articles in the volume edited by Sarkar and Butalia (1995) deal with
these issues.
Reports on the Post-Godhra Violence and its Aftermath 315

If legitimacy for violent action on members of other communities has

played an important role in enabling women’s participation in violence,
the failure to de-legitimize domestic violence is another reason why
women, by not differentiating between different types of violence, actively
collaborate with perpetrators with violence. The lack of support struc-
tures for women are frequently used to explain why women are afraid to
actually confront violence within the family. This does not, however,
explain how women are able to overcome their antipathy to male violence
and become active collaborators in violence. One explanation could be
related to the way in which the majority of people in this country, male
and female, view domestic violence. Despite the long history of legal
action to protect women’s rights and constant attempts by women’s
organizations to get laws passed and courts intervene on issues related to
violence against women, a majority of women themselves perceive do-
mestic violence as a ‘social evil’ at best, and not as a crime defined by
law. This is partly an outcome of the way in which political parties have
related to such issues. Even left parties have ‘ghettoized’ the women’s wing
of their parties, refusing to mainstream women’s issues, leaving them to
be taken up by the women’s wing (AIDWA, Mahila Dakshata Samiti,
etc.). Many women’s organizations affiliated to political parties have just
not had the political support to launch struggles to change the law, even
though there has been no dearth of attempts to do so. Thus struggles
relating to women’s issues were often reduced to ‘social’ struggles in the
form of public awareness campaigns, taking up individual issues for redressal,
etc. Also as is well known, women leaders in the Hindutva movement
have themselves spoken about the ‘normality’ of male domestic violence,
the need (for women) to ‘adjust’ to violent domestic life.6 Viewing do-
mestic violence by men in this manner, effectively takes it out of the
sphere of law.
Likewise, the so-called atrocities on Dalits have usually been seen as
‘civil’ conflicts, ignoring the power structures that allow and perpetrate
such atrocities. As in the case of violence against women, most men who
commit such acts get away with them. It is also important to remember
that women are often complicit in caste violence and oppression.
The combined effect of legitimacy for attacks on members of other
communities and the failure to label domestic and caste violence as
criminal or illegitimate, has thus created a situation where women and

6
On this, see especially Anitha et al. (1995) and Sarkar (1999).
316 Rowena Robinson and D. Parthasarathy

Dalits may find it much easier to collaborate with their own oppressors
in inflicting violence upon others. In India in the past few decades there
has not been adequate condemning of various forms of violence including
those related to caste, lumpen and political violence, police atrocities,
and even casual violence between individuals and groups deriving from
minor incidents. Social codes relating to violence, and the meanings of
legal codes have changes making it easier for people to indulge in
violence. While legitimacy and the knowledge that illegitimate acts will
not be punished are significant in explaining why people are violent,
socialization practices, levels of exposure to violence, and political
mobilization—all determined by ones location in social space—are also
equally important in explaining how people become violent actors. The
turn towards violence for most individuals, but especially for women, is
not a simple act, and the participation of women, Dalits, tribals, and the
middle classes in general in communal violence marks a dangerous and
disturbing turn.
One of the tragic but inevitable outcomes of the conflict in Gujarat
in 2002 and the way in which it was handled by the state is that violence
as a norm for settling disputes of any kind or as a valid mode of reaction
to stress, within or outside the family, seems to have grown enormously.
One sees evidence of this in the high number of suicides and that often
by whole families that Gujarat has seen in 2002 and 2003. It is also seen
in the recurring violence between groups of all kinds, castes or religious
communities that has been recorded over this period by the media, a
phenomenon that Allen Feldman calls the ‘militarization of everyday life’
(2002).
Second, what has been established is a sinister model of violence that
can be unleashed or withheld as political manoeuvre may demand. Vio-
lence as aakrosh or pratishodha legitimized by the state for a crime that
can be pinned on a particular community enabled the dividing of society
on religious lines and reaped unlimited benefits in the elections. However,
subsequent crimes, in Akshardham for instance, which could also so easily
have been used in the same way, was not. There was clearly more political
mileage to be made at that point in time by proving Gujarat could remain
calm in the face of seeming militancy than in unleashing once again the
forces of lawlessness.
What this indicates is that violence has become part of the semantics
and language of dominance and power, of intercourse between commu-
nities. Violence is being used as a means of communicating messages, as
codes by the dominant group, gaining a spurious legitimacy from the spiral
Reports on the Post-Godhra Violence and its Aftermath 317

of violence among and between groups of all kinds. Thus the issue of state
complicity should not blur the focus on the changed spatiality or geog-
raphy of violence. State violence in police stations and prisons, and in
encounter deaths which can be presented in ‘sanitized’ and ‘legitimized’
forms are now replaced or supplemented by attacks in the streets and in
victim’s houses and workplaces. Sanitization and legitimation are no
longer necessary where there is majority public approval and state and
political support for genocide and attacks on the weak, and where no
action by the majority and the powerful is labelled is illegitimate.
Third, one needs to analyse more closely than we are able to do in
this chapter, the caste and class linkages of the violent groups, the
processes of the creation of new dominant groups in rural areas and their
connections with the urban class network in order to uncover the broader
developments that might have, in part, fed the violence as well as the
long-term consequences of it.
Finally, and this stems from our last point, it becomes clear that efforts
to build communal harmony in Gujarat will have little effect until we are
able to address larger struggles for development and to bring under
purview the concerns of the Dalits, unemployed, and working classes.

REFERENCES

Anitha, S., Manisha, Vasudha and Kavitha, ‘Interviews with Women’, in Tanika Sarkar
and Urvashi Butalia (eds), Women and the Hindu Right (New Delhi: Kali for
Women, 1995).
Ansari, Iqbal A., Communal Riots, the State and Law in India (New Delhi: Institute
of Objective Studies, 1997).
Concerned Citizen’s Tribunal—Gujarat 2002, Crime against Humanity: An Inquiry into
the Carnage in Gujarat, Findings and Recommendations, vols 1 and 2 (Mumbai:
Citizens for Peace and Justice, 2002).
Dayal, John (ed.), Gujarat 2002: Untold and Re-told Stories of the Hindutva Lab (New
Delhi: Media House, 2002).
Devy, G.N., ‘Adivasis and Dalits: Tribal Voice and Violence’, in Siddharth Varadarajan
(ed.), Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy (New Delhi: Penguin, 2002).
Dutt, Barkha, Women’s Panel, PUCL—Vadodara and Shanti Abhiyan, ‘“Nothing
New?”: Women as Victims’, in Siddharth Varadarajan (ed.), Gujarat: The Making
of a Tragedy (New Delhi: Penguin, 2002).
Fact Finding by a Women’s Panel, ‘How has the Gujarat Massacre Affected Minority
Women? The Survivors Speak’, in John Dayal (ed.), Gujarat 2002: Untold and
Re-told Stories of the Hindutva Lab (New Delhi: Media House, 2002).
318 Rowena Robinson and D. Parthasarathy

Feldman, Allen, ‘X-Children and the Militarization of Everyday Life: Youth, Victimage
and Violence in Transitional Societies’, International Journal of Social Welfare,
vol. 11, no. 4 (2002), pp. 286–99.
Human Rights Watch Report in John Dayal (ed.), Gujarat 2002: Untold and Re-told
Stories of the Hindutva Lab (New Delhi: Media House, 2002).
Human Rights Watch, ‘We have no orders to save you: State participation and
complicity in communal violence in Gujarat’, vol. 14, no. 3 (2002), pp. 1–68.
—–———, Compounding injustice: The government’s failure to redress massacres in
Gujarat’, vol. 15, no. 3 (2003), pp. 1–72.
Independent Fact Finding Mission, ‘Gujarat Carnage 2002: A Report to the Nation’,
in John Dayal (ed.), Gujarat 2002: Untold and Re-told Stories of the Hindutva Lab
(New Delhi: Media House, 2002).
Interim report, Interim order and Final report on Gujarat, National Human Rights
Commision, in John Dayal (ed.), Gujarat 2002: Untold and Re-told Stories of the
Hindutva Lab (New Delhi: Media House, 2002).
Namishray, Mohandas, ‘The Violence in Gujarat and the Dalits’, in Siddharth
Varadarajan (ed.), Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy (New Delhi: Penguin, 2002).
Parthasarathy, D., ‘Women, Communal Violence, and Rights Rhetoric’, Manushi,
no. 129 (2002).
People’s Union for Democratic Rights, ‘No Relief, No Rehabilitation’, in Siddharth
Varadarajan (ed.), Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy (New Delhi: Penguin, 2002).
Rajgopal, Arvind, Politics after Television: Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping of the
Public in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
Sarkar, Tanika, ‘The Gender Predicament of the Hindu Right’, in K.N. Panikkar (ed.),
The Concerned Indian’s Guide to Communalism (New Delhi: Viking, 1999), p. 148.
Sarkar, Tanika and Urvashi Butalia (eds), Women and the Hindu Right: A Collection
of Essay (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1995).
Varadarajan, Siddharth (ed.), Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy (New Delhi: Penguin,
2002).
Varadarajan, Siddharth, Rajdeep Sardesai, PUCL—Vadodara, Shanti Abhiyan and
Anil Chamaria, ‘The Truths Hurts: Gujarat and the Role of the Media’, in
Siddharth Varadarajan (ed.), Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy (New Delhi:
Penguin, 2002).
Varshney, Ashutosh, Ethnic conflict and civic life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
 ABOUT THE EDITOR A N D

CONTRIBUTORS

THE EDITOR

Ram Puniyani was a Professor in Biomedical Engineering at the Indian

Institute of Technology, Mumbai. He is also Secretary, Centre for the Study
of Society and Secularism, and a member of EKTA, Committee for
Communal Amity, Mumbai, and has been associated with different secu-
lar initiatives for many years. He has been working on the themes related
to communalism and the rise of fundamentalism. He has contributed
articles to various magazines and journals on these themes. He is also the
author of Communal Politics: Facts versus Myths (2003), Fascism of Sangh
Parivar, The Other Cheek: Minorities Under Threat and Communal Politics:
An Illustrated Primer (2001).

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Flavia Agnes is a lawyer and activist, engaged in women’s movements.

She is Secretary, Majlis, an organization working amongst women with
a focus on legal issue. She is a prolific writer, and contributes regularly
to newspapers, magazines and journals.
320 Religion, Power & Violence

V. Krishna Ananth, a student of history from Jawaharlal Nehru Univer-

sity, was formerly with The Hindu. He is currently a freelancer and teaches
at the Asian College of Journalism.

Sarto Esteves is a Ph.D. in Political Science from Bombay University. He

has been a freelance journalist for over 50 years, contributing original
articles to various publications all over India. He has also authored several
books, including Freedom to Build, Not Destroy (2002); Nationalism, Secu-
larism and Communalism (1996); and Prospects of Indian Democracy.
Shamsul Islam teaches Political Science at Satyawati College, University
of Delhi. As an author, columnist and street theatre activist, he is known
for his unrelenting opposition to the politics of religious intolerance,
communalism, de-humanization, imperialism and the persecution of
women and Dalits. He writes in English, Hindi and Urdu, and has
authored several books on the above issues.
Ranu Jain is Reader, Unit for Research in Sociology of Education, Tata
Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai. Her Ph.D. dissertation was on
boundary fixation and maintenance processes of ethnic groups. Her
research interests include related phenomena like communalism,
minority–majority issues, plural society and polity, and culture and
education. She is currently pursuing a study to understand the process of
hegemony-building, as well as the possibility of multi-culturalism in the
era of cultural nationalism in India.

Manjari Katju teaches Political Science at the University of Hyderabad.

She is the author of Vishva Hindu Parishad and Indian Politics (2003), and
is keenly pursuing the issue of the rise of communal politics.
Prakash Louis was Executive Director, Indian Social Science Institute,
New Delhi. His major publications are People Power: The Naxalite Move-
ment in Central Bihar, and Political Sociology of Dalit Assertion. He contrib-
utes regularly to journals like The Economic and Political Weekly, Mainstream,
Social Change, Vikalp and Seminar, and national dailies like Hindustan,
Jansatta and Rashtriya Sahara.
Uday Mehta is a retired Vice Principal of Mithibai College, Mumbai. He
is a sociologist and his main work is in the arena of peasant studies,
religion and society. He is also an activist associated with issues related
to the struggle against Hindu fascism, and the housing rights of slum-
dwellers.
About the Editor and Contributors 321

D. Parthasarathy is Associate Professor in Sociology at the Department

of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Bombay. He has published widely
on issues related to collective violence, caste conflicts, law and govern-
ance, social impacts of technology, and agricultural change.
Vibhuti Patel is Professor and Head, Post-Graduate Department of
Economics, S.N.D.T. Women’s University, Mumbai. She was awarded the
Association of Commonwealth University Fellowship to be visiting fac-
ulty at the Development Studies Institute, The London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science, in 1992–93. She is a Trustee of the Centre
for Enquiry into Allied Themes (CEHAT), Women’s Research and Action
Group (WRAG), Satya Vijay Seva Samaj (SVSS), and Vacha in Mumbai.
She has authored many essays and books on issues related to economics
and gender.
Jawaid Quddus completed his doctorate in Medicine from The American
University of the Carribbean, Montserrat, British West Indies, and went
on to obtain his postdoctoral training at the University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor. He is now a Board Certified Family Practitioner at the Kenosha
Community Health Center in Kenosha, Wisconsin. He is a social activist
and a prolific writer on human rights issues around the world.
Rowena Robinson is Associate Professor in Sociology, Department of
Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Bombay. She is the author of
Sociology of Religion in India (2004), Christians of India (2003) and editor
(with Sathianathan Clarke) of Religious Conversion in India: Modes,
Motivations and Meanings (2003).
J.J. Roy Burman is at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai. His
research interests centre around the Adivasi and other ethnic issues. He
has also done a lot of work on syncretic traditions in various parts of India.
His work on syncretic traditions of Maharashtra, Hindu–Muslim Syncretic
Shrines and Communities, was published in 2002.
Thomas Sebastian teaches in a Mumbai College and is associated with
social movements related to democratic and economic rights. He has
worked on the policies of imperialism, and is the author of the path-
breaking War against People (2002).
Anand Teltumbde is a Mumbai-based management professional. He has
been associated with various peoples’ movements for more than three
decades. His work on globalization, human rights, Dalit issues, Hindutva,
and so on have been widely translated in most Indian languages.
 INDEX
Aawaaz-e-niswan, 202
Abhangs, 37
Abhinav Bharat, 212
Abu Nidal Organization, 68
Abu Talib, 92
Adivasis, 24, 214, 189–90, 283, 285–87,
292–93, 303–5
Advani, L.K., 125–26, 215, 295
Agnes, Flavia, 23, 204
Agnihotri, Bhishma, 153
Ahluwalia, Montek Singh, 45
Ahmad, Mahmoud, 77–78
Ahmed, Rafiuddin, 251
Akbar, 256
Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad
(ABVP), 177, 214
Akhtar, Farida, 204
Akshara, 202
Akshardham temple, terrorist attack on,
151, 188, 316
Al-Ahmoudi, Mohammed, 79
Al Badr Mujahideen, 198
Al-Khattab, Umar Ibn, 94
Al-Khwarizimi, Muhammad Bin Musa,
105
Al Qaeda, 16, 20, 69, 75, 103,
106; US official links to,
76–79
Al-Wahad, 105
Albaruni, 110
Ali, Mohamed, 259, 274
Aligarh Muslim University, 259
All India Democratic Women’s
Association, 202
All India Depressed Classes Conference,
168
All Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU),
169
Ambedkar, B.R., 41, 167–68, 209,
216–17, 220–21; on alternative to
nation building, 172–75
American Enterprise Institute (AEI), 86
Amnesty International, 89
Ananth, Krishna, 20
Anarchist terrorism, 68
Anglican Christianity, 40
Animism, concept of, 32
Aniruddha Bapu, 27, 42
Anjuman-i-Islam, 259
Annapurna scheme, 56
Anti-Muslim violence, 24
Armitage, Richard, 77–78
Arya Samaj, 149, 180
Aryan Theory of Race, 211
Asaram Bapu, 27, 42
Ashfaqullah, 138
Athwale, Pandurang Shastri, 27, 42
Atta, Mohammed, 73, 77
Auliya, Nizamuddin, 38–39
Aurangzeb, 95
Ayyad, Nidal, 71
Azad, Chandershekhar, 127, 137–38
Azad, Maulana, 131
Aziz, Shah Abdul, 257
Index
Babri Masjid, destruction of, 27, 100,
104, 148–49, 152, 182, 213, 217,
227, 244, 288, 296, 310, 312
Babur, 13
Bahiskrit Hitakarni Sabha, 173
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), 219
Bajrang Dal, 19, 177, 184–85, 220, 278,
281, 283, 286–87, 289, 302
Bamiyan Buddhas, destruction of, 104, 151
Banerjee, Sumanta, 171
Banks nationalization, 52
Barbak, Rukn-al-Din, 116
Basu, A., 249, 253–54, 261
Basu, Maladhar, 116
Basu, Tapan, 176, 179
Battered peoples’ syndrome, 100
Begin, Menachem, 102
Bengal syncretism, 114–20; Ghazi Saheb
dargah, 118–20; Ghutiari Sharif,
118–20; Manik Pir, 118; Satya Pir,
117–18
Bhakti Hinduism, 111
Bhakti movement, 37–39, 206
Bhakti saints, 37–40
Bhakti tradition, 21, 38–39, 113–14
Bharati, Uma, 18
Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 177, 180
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 13–14, 18,
22–25, 58–60, 65, 142, 153, 155,
164–65, 169–70, 177, 183–89, 193,
213, 220, 223, 227, 278, 281, 283,
287, 289, 291–93, 294–98, 300, 302,
304–05, 313
Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh, 177
Bhat, Mari, 266
Bhaurao Lokhande case, 235–36
Bheemshakti-Shivashakti alliance, 209,
220, 222
Bhurte, Aruna, 202
Bigamy, Supreme Court verdict on, 228,
233–36
Bijnori, Abdur Rahman, 259
Bombay Plan (1944), 49
Bombooq, Vilayat Ali, 259
Bose, Subhas Chandra, 127
Brahminical Hinduism, 111, 158
Brahminism/Brahmanism, 36, 38–39,
111, 212, 215–16
323
Brahminization, 165, 168
Briffault, Robert, 105
British Charity Commission, 153
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 76
Buddhism, 33, 110, 113, 115, 145,
167–68, 220
Bunch of Thoughts, 137
Bush, George H.W., 76
Bush, George W., 12, 28, 77, 86, 88–89
Calcutta Muhammadan Literary Society
(CMLS), 260
Campaign to Stop Funding Hate, 204
capitalism, 82–84
Carter, Jimmy, 76
Casolari, Marzia, 212
caste system, Hindutva and, 210–12
Central Muhammadan Association,
260
Centre for Women’s Development
Studies, Delhi, 205
Chandra, Sudhir, 243
Chandrachud, Y.V., 228, 237
Charitable Uses Act, 1735, 229
Charities Act, 1960, 229
Chatterjee, Bankim Chandra, 211
Chatterjee, Partha, 112, 243–44
Chaudhari, Amar Singh, 294
Chenoy, Anuradha, 197
Chipko movement, 170
Chishti, Sheikh Salim, 38
Chistia order, 115
Chitpawan struggle, 212
Chokhamela, 37
Chossudovsky, Michel, 75
Choudhury, Madan Roy, 120
Christian Divorce Act, 204
Christians/Christianity, 24, 33–34, 36,
92–93, 167; anti-Christian violence,
24, 280–84; conversion to, 210;
forced conversions, 284–88;
government’s role to bring harmony,
288–89; liberation theology in, 206;
violence against, 277–89
Christians’ testamentary disposition for
charitable purposes, Supreme Court
Judgement on, 228–33
Church, role of, 34–36
324
Citizen’s Commission on the persecution
of Christians in Gujarat, 281–83
Civilizations, clash of, 28
Clergy, 31, 34–41; saints and, 35–40
Clinton, Bill, 76
Colonialism, 84
Committee of General Security,
France, 91
communal violence, pattern and
scale of, 309–17
Communalism, 126, 178; amongst
minorities, 195–97; barbaric
behaviour with women of minority
community, 195; challenge of,
58–61; Dalits and, 209; economics
of, 61–66; fundamentalism and
gender justice, 191–206; politics of,
23; violence against women and,
197–202
Communist Party, 132
Confucianism, 33
Congress party, 20, 49–52, 59–60, 185,
188–89, 293–94, 300, 304–5; anti-
Indira forces in, 52; communal
challenge and, 58–61; defeat in
elections, 51–52; RSS and, 129–32,
136; split in, 53
Congress(O) party, 53
Constitution of India, Article 14, 159,
191, 226, 230–31, 277, 287; Article
15, 159, 163, 191, 277; Article 18,
286; Article 21, 226; Article 25,
231–32, 278–79, 286–87; Article 26,
231–32; Article 44, 232; Article 46,
159; Article 356, 288; Article 370,
227
Conversion, Supreme Court verdict on,
228, 233–36
Council for Foreign Affairs (CFA),
US, 68
Crossman, Brenda, 205, 234
Cultural nationalism, 140, 142, 168, 213
Dalitbahujan, 112
Dalits, 182, 189–90; atrocities on, 24,
219; cannon fodder of Hindutva,
218; Christian missionaries and,
210–11; conversion issue, 281, 283,
Religion, Power & Violence
285–87; convert to Christianity and
Islam, 167, 216; culture, 217–18;
Hindutva agenda and, 23, 166–68,
208–24; impact of Hindutva on,
215–19; Islam and, 210; movement,
291–92, 303–5; oppression of in
Peshawai, 212; politics, 219–21;
social agenda, 215; subjugation of
identity of, 216–17
Dandi Yatra, 129
Daniel Latifi case, 227, 242, 245
Darul-Ulum, Deoband, 258
Dawood, Muhammed Fath, 96
Death squads, of El Salvador, 80–81
Deep Darshan High School, Ahwa,
282–83, 286
Democracy, imperialism and, 88–89;
use as ploy to impose control,
101–2; war on terrorism and, 88
Deoras, Balasahab, 137
Deoras, Madhukar Dattatreya, 137
Desai, Morarji, 293
Desai, Radhika, 189
Dimitrov, Georgi, 222
Directive Principles of State Policy, 174
Disposition of property for religious and
charitable purpose, Supreme Court
judgement on, 228–33
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 235
divorced Muslim women rights,
Supreme Court judgement on,
227–28, 237–41
Djinns, concept of, 35
Domestic Violence Act, 2002, 205
Dwija castes, 217
Eatom, R.M., 116–17, 122
economic policy, communalism and,
61–66; middle classes and, 48–50,
54–55, 63–65; poverty and, 50–51;
reforms in, 45–47; socialist
programmes and, 52; socialist
trajectory, 47–48
Egypt, religious belief in, 33
Ekatmata yatra programme, 180–81
employment, in public sector, 45,
64–65; rate of growth in, 45–46;
reform process and, 47
Index
Engineer, Asghar Ali, 113, 195
ethnic religions, 32–33
False flag terrorism, 68, 70, 74–75
family laws and women, 204–5
fascism, 212–15, 217–18, 222–23
Federation of Hindu Association, 150
Feldman, Allen, 316
Food Corporation of India (FCI), 51,
55–56
food crisis (1964–65), 50, 53–54
Food for work programme, 56–57
foodgrains, burden of plenty, 55–57;
crisis, 53–54; prices, 53–54;
starvation amidst plenty, 56;
subsidy issue, 55–56
Forum Against Oppression of Women, 202
Forum For Women’s Health, 202
Fox, James, 71
Freedom of Religion Act, 287
French Revolution, 91
Friedman, Thomas, 85
friendly fire terrorism, 68, 70–75
Friends of India Society International,
150
Frykenberg, R.E., 111
Fundamental Rights and equality of
citizens, 277–78
fundamentalism, 170; barbaric behaviour
with women of minority
communities, 195; communal
violence and, 201–2; communalism
and gender justice, 191–206; identity
politics and, 193–94; intercaste,
interreligious and interracial
marriages, 200–201; politics of, 23,
25–26; violence against women and,
197
Gadgil, N.V., 144
Gaffar, Qazi Abdul, 259
Gandhi, Indira, 47, 51, 61, 221, 223
Gandhi, Mahatma, 129–32, 135, 165,
259, 282, 292–93, 307
Gandhi, Rajiv, 221, 223, 294, 297
Gandhi, Sonia, 185
Gandhian socialism, 60
Ganesh, Raja, 115
325
Ganeshotsava celebration, 211
gender justice, 23; fundamentalism,
communalism and, 191–206; identity
politics and, 193–94; violence
against women, 197
Gesudraj, 38
Ghalib, 274
Ghazali, Imam, 256
Ghazni, Mahmud, 96
Global Association for Glorification of
Sati, 194
globalization, 84; as cause of terrorism,
103–4
Godhra genocide, 12, 14, 290, 296, 304
Golwalkar, Madhav Sadashiv, 17, 22,
213, 295, 124–26, 138–42;
confession of betrayal, 133–36
Gore, M.S., 113
Gos, Porter, 78
Graham, Bob, 78
Gray, A.M., 85
Grossman, Marc, 78
Gujarat, Adivasis in, 294, 303–5;
anti-reservation agitation in, 294;
carnage, 12–14, 18, 99, 104, 152,
154, 188, 208–9, 219, 227, 245–46,
290–99, 304; communal riots in, see,
carnage; contrast with Maharashtra,
290–99; economic crisis, 299–305;
Hindutva campaign in, 296–97, 300,
302; OBCs in, 294, 301, 303–5;
pattern and scale of violence in,
309–17; peasant movement in,
292–93; post-Godhra violence,
306–17; Sangh Parivar influence in,
290–305; social history of, 291–99
Gujarat Muslim Revenge Group, 17
Gujarat Samachar, 284
Guru Dakshina Days, 150
Guru Sabha, 214
Habib, I., 110
Hadas, Josie (or Guzie), 71–72
Haider, Mulla, 95
Hamas, 106
Hanafi faith, 115
Hedgewar, K.B., 22, 124–27, 138–39,
141, 168, 212–13; confession of
326
betrayal by, 133–36; views of Hindu
rashtra, 132; went to jail as
Congressman, 127–29
Hezbollah terrorist group, 68
Hezbullah, 106
Hindu Anglo-Vernacular Girl’s School,
260
Hindu Code Bill, 237
Hindu Dharam Raksha Samiti
(Committee to defend the Hindu
religion), 295
Hindu fundamentalism, 17;
communalism, 178; funding Hindu
right, 151–54; hypocrisy and
Hindutva cause, 150–51; overseas
activities of Sangh Parivar and,
148–50; rise of, 148–54
Hindu Jago, Christi Bhago, 281–82
Hindu Jagran Manch, 185, 278,
282–83, 286, 289
Hindu Mahasabha, 21, 41, 130–31, 176,
180, 212
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, 226,
235–36
Hindu–Muslim syncretic relations,
114–22
Hindu nationalism, 13, 139–41, 171,
181, 209, 211
Hindu rashtra, concept of, 132, 135,
140, 149–50, 154, 158, 176,
214–15, 290, 293–95, 304
Hindu right, funding for, 151–54
Hindu Sanghatan movement, 211
Hindu Student Council (HSC), 148
Hindu Succession Act, 245
Hindu Swayamsevak Singh (HSS), 153
Hindu Taliban, 151, 154
Hindu Undivided Property Act, 204
Hindu Vivek Kendra, 153
Hinduism, 17, 21, 32–33, 36, 41, 97,
99, 109–14, 149–50, 154, 158,
209–10, 294, 296–97; influence of,
145; Islam syncretism, 114–17
Hindutva, 13–14, 16–19, 22–23,
26–27, 42–43; agenda, 208–24;
campaign for, 296; caste connection
of, 210–12; Dalits and, 166–68,
208–24; fascist agenda, 212–14;
Religion, Power & Violence
fascist movement, 223; fascist myth,
222; funding for, 151–54;
globalization, 223; growth of, 297,
313; history interpretation and,
178–79; ideology, 157–59, 182, 189,
200, 214–15, 300, 302; Indian
diaspora and, 144–55; learnings
through history, 221–24; message
and cultural symbols, 179–82;
mobilization for, 176–90;
organizations working for, 177–78;
political movement, 222; RSS and,
177–78; resistance to, 219–21;
Sangh Parivar and, 148–51, 179;
Scheduled Castes and, 160–61;
Scheduled Tribes and, 161–63;
168–70; socio-economic agenda,
182–84; violence against religious
minorities, 184–89; weaker sections
and, 157–75; women and, 163–64,
170–72
History of British India, 112, 179
Hitavada, 168
Hitler, 23, 139–40, 212–13
Hunter Commission Report, 253
Huntington, Samuel, 13, 27–28
Hussein, Saddam, 20, 102
Ibne Khaldun, 256
Illaiah, Kancha, 112
imperialism, 83–84, 87, 126–27;
democratic rights and, 88–89; Islam
and, 14–17; terrorism and, 89
Independent Labour Party, 173
India, diaspora and Hindutva, 144–55;
migration out of, 145–48
India Development and Relief Fund
(IDRF), US, 152–53
Indian Association of Women’s Studies,
199
Indian Contract Act, 229–30
Indian National Army (INA)
movement, 127
Indian Penal Code (IPC), 229–30
Indian Succession Act, 228–31
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, 65
International Monetary Fund, 84
Iraq-Iran war (1980), 13
Index 327

Islam, 33–34, 41, 167; Bhakti tradition Katju, Manjari, 22, 320
and, 113–14; concept of, 109–10; Kean, Thomas, 79
crisis perception about, 95–97, 105; Khan, Daulat, 95
dalits and, 210–11; five pillars of, Khan, Murshid Kuli, 120
94–95; guarantees constituted in, 94; Khan, Rasheeduddin, 111
Hinduism and, 114–17; history and Khan, Syed Ahmad, 258–59, 274
historical perspective, 92–95; Khare, V.N., 228, 232
imperialism and, 14–17; in Bengal, Khilafat Movement (1920–21), 127–28
114–17; religion of, 92–95; spread in Khilji, Bakhtiar, 115
India, 95–97, 105; terrorism and, Khoemini, Ayatollah, 13, 16–17, 27
12–14, 97–100 Kisan sabhas, 49
Islam, Shamsul, 21, 320 Kissinger, Henry, 84
Islamic Front, 101 Kitchlew, Saifuddin, 131
Islamic fundamentalism, 13, 16, 101 Koresh, David, 99
Islamic socialism, 259 Krishna Iyer, 237
Islamic terrorist organizations, link with Krishna-Paygambar cult, 119
US administration, 75–81 Kshatriya, Harijan, Adivasi and Muslim
Ismailis, 114 (KHAM) alliance, 189, 293–94
Kumatoolu Banjaras, 112
Jain, Ranu, 23, 320
Jainism, 33, 293 Laden, Osama bin, 12–14, 16, 20, 69,
Jajmani system, 112 77, 79, 102
Jallianwala Bagh tragedy, 127 Laden, Salem bin, 77
Jan Sangh, 59–60, 180, 292–95 Lake, Anthony, 76
Janata Party, 60–61, 294 Lakra, John, 169
Jatras, 112 Lalan Fakir, 121
Jawadekar, Prachi, 194 land reforms, 49, 53
Jaya Gurudev, 42 Lashkar-e-Jabbar, 198–99
Jesani, Lara, 201 Lashkar-e-Toiba, 198
Jharkhand movement, 170 Laxmi Thakurer Panchali, 122
Jinnah, Mohammed Ali, 129, 135 Left Wing terrorism, 68
John Vellamathom case judgement, Lele, Jayant, 164
228–33 Lenin, 83, 88–89
Judaism, 32–34, 92–93 Liberalization, beneficiaries of, 57–58
Justice and Peace Commission, 202 Liberalization-privatization-globalization
paradigm, 45, 47, 54, 65–66
Kabir, Sant, 39–40, 113 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam
Kabir Panthi, 113 (LTTE), 200
Kamaraj, K., 52 Lokayat, 36
Kangani programme, 146 Lokhandwalla, S.T., 110, 114
Kanshiram, 220
Kanungo, Pralay, 168 M.A.O. College, Aligarh, 258–59
Kanwal Ram case, 235 Madari order, 115
Kapur, Anuradha, 181 Madrasas, 23, 256, 258, 271–72
Kapur, Ratna, 205 Maharashtra Mahila Parishad, 202
Karzai, 102–3 Maharashtra Stree Abhyas Vyaspeeth, 202
Kashmiri militants, 17 Maheshwari, A.P., 192
Katiyar, Vinay, 220 Mahfouz, Khalid bin, 77, 79
328
Mahila Daxata Samiti, 202
Majlis, Mumbai, 202, 204–5
Maktabs, 256
Mandal Commission, 313
Manik Pir, 117–18
Manipuri Muslims, 108
Manusmriti, 41–42
Marx, Karl, 29
Masum, Pune, 204
Mayawati, 219
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 212
McVeigh, Timothy, 13, 100
Megalli, Mona, 198
Mehta, Uday, 24
Mehtar, Madari, 96
mercantilism, 82
middle class, economics of, 63–65;
emergence of, 48–50; liberalization
and, 54–55, 57–58
Mill, James, 112, 179
Miller, R.E., 110
Minorities, barbaric behaviour with
women of, 195; communalization of,
195–97
Modi, Narendra, 18, 188, 219
Mohani, Hasrat, 259
Mohiuddin, M., 112–13
Moholla Committee, experiences of, 206
Mondal, S.R., 260
Monotheism, 34
Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act,
1888, 229
Mossadegh, Muhammad, 101
Muhammad, Hira, 93
Muhammad, Prophet, 92–93
Muhsin, Haji, 257
Musharraf, Pervez, 103
Muslim communalism, 17
Muslim Jehadis, 151
Muslim League, 21, 41, 130, 135, 259
Muslim Personal law, 237–38
Muslim ummah, decay of, 106
Muslim women, dominant ideologies
and, 241–47; media and, 241–47;
rights of divorced women, 227–28,
237–41, 246
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on
Divorce) Act, 1986, 204–5, 239–42
Religion, Power & Violence
Muslims, achievement of non-enrolled
children, 266–67; distribution of
students in 6–14 years age group,
267–68; educational backwardness
among, 248–75; enrolment,
discontinuation and non-attendance
rate among, 268, 270; expenditure
pattern on education, 268–69;
history of education of, 255–61; in
India, 249–55; literacy rate, 264–65;
proportion of population completing
middle and matriculation level
education, 266–67; reactionary
image, 249–55; socio-economic
educational statistics on, 261–72
Mussolini, 212–13
NFIW, 202
Naicker, Periyar Ramasamy, 41
Nanak, Guru, 39–40, 113
Naqshbandi order, 115
Narasimha Rao, P.V., 64, 223, 309
Narayan, Jayaprakash, 60
Nasreen, Tasleema, 192
Nation building, Ambedkar’s alternative
to, 172–75
National Commission for Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, 160
National Council of Educational
Research and Training (NCERT),
199
National Democratic Alliance (NDA),
227
National Security Strategy, US, 87
Nationalism, 125–26
Nationalist terrorism, 68
Naturism, 32
Nav Gujarat, 284
Navjyot High School, Subir, 283, 286
Nazism, 212
Negroponte, John, 78–79
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 49–50, 110, 165, 213
Nehruvian socialism, 44, 48
Neo-colonial system, 84–85
Neo-colonialism, 83
Nicaragua, Regan’s contra war against,
80
Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), 25
Index
Non-Cooperation Movement, 127,
130–31
non-resident Indians (NRIs), 22
Organizer, 126
Other Backward Classes (OBCs), 58, 60,
182, 283, 287, 290–92, 301, 303–5
Overseas Friends of BJP, 150
Pagla Baba mazar, 120
Panikkar, K.N., 178
Pant, G.B., 60
Parakash, Ved, 153
Parekh, Bhikhu, 189
Parliament, terrorist attack on, 188
Parthasarathy, D., 25
Patel, Chimanbhai, 294
Patel, Girishbhai, 293
Patel, Keshubai, 281
Patel, Vallabhbhai, 292–93
Patel, Vibhuti, 23, 196, 205–6
Pathshalas, 256, 261
Patriot laws of the US, 67, 91
Patriotism, 125, 127
Pattanaik, G.B., 241
Peerila festival (Muharram), 112
Pehlavi, Raza Shah, 13, 16, 101
People’s Education Society, 173
Pevrin, Jean-Pierre, 198
Phule, Jotiba, 41
Phule, Savtri Bai, 41
Planning Commission of India, 45
Pointdexter, John, 78
Polytheism, 33
Poonacha, Veena, 171
Popular Hinduism, 111
Poverty, 50–51
Powell, Colin, 77
Prakash, A., 300–301
Prevention of Atrocities Act, 160
Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA),
India, 91, 99
Privy purses, abolition of, 52
Priya Bala case, 235
Project for a New American Century
(PNAC), 86
Public distribution system (PDS),
51–52, 55, 57
329
Qasim, Muhammad bin, 96–97
Quddus, Jawaid, 20–22
Quit India movement (1942), 22, 127,
134, 136
Rabin, Yitzhak, 104
Radicalism, 15
Rahman, Sheikh Omar Abdul, 13, 72
Rajguru, 127, 136–38
Ramjanmabhoomi agitation, 17, 27, 177,
181
Ramayan, 181, 298
Ramdeo Baba Pir, 21
Rashtra Sevika Samiti, 177
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),
18–22, 41, 59, 65, 152–53,
165–68, 172, 176–77, 181, 183, 186,
211–13, 219, 278, 280–83, 286–87,
289, 291, 294–95, 298, 302;
anti-imperialist struggle, 130–35;
betrayal by leaders of, 133–36;
campaign for Hindu rashtra, 132,
135, 140; communal mobilization,
131–33; denounced movements led
by revolutionaries, 137–38;
dilemma, 143; documents, 126–27;
hatred for revolutionary tradition,
136–39; hatred towards tricolour,
141–43; Hindu nationalism, 139–41;
opposition to Hindu–Muslim unity,
131–32, 135; Raj and, 124–43;
role in freedom movement, 125–26,
133, 138, 141–42
Rath Yatra, 13, 295–96
Reagon, Ronald, 76, 80–81
Reagan’s contra war, against Nicaragua,
80
Reform movements, 24
Religion, as institution, 34–35; based
nationalism, 28; clergy and saints,
35–40; complex ensemble, 28–30;
definition, 27, 29; dimensions of, 31;
ethnic religion, 32–33; facets of,
29–31; features of, 30– 31; genesis
of, 30; in social space, 27–28;
organizataional dimension of, 31;
personal dimension of, 31; popular
religion, 29–30; secularization,
330
40–42; state religion, 29–30; types
of, 32–33; universal religion, 33
religion-based politics, 22, 28
religious fundamentalism, 157
religious minorities, violence against,
184–89
religious terrorism, 68, 104–5
Republican Party of India, 173
Revolutionary terrorism, 69–70
right wing terrorism, 68
Ritambhara, Sadhvi, 200
Robinson, Rowena, 25
Roop Kanwar case, 193
Roy, Ajit, 172, 252–53
Roy, Asim, 116–17, 119
Roy Burman, J.J., 21, 109
Royal Indian Navy Revolt, 127
Rukhmabai case, 243
rupee, devaluation of, 47
Sabra refugee camp massacre, 102
Saddavi, Naval, 192
Saints, 35–40, 42–43; Bhakti saints,
37–40; clergy and, 35–40; Sufi
saints, 37–39
Salamatullah, 255–56, 258–59, 261
Salameh, Mohammed A., 71–72
Salem, Emad Ali, 72
Salt Satyagraha, 129
Samaj Samta Mandal, 172–73
Samarasata Manch, 217
Sandesh, 284
Sangh Parivar, 22, 95–97, 164, 166–70,
177, 179, 199, 213, 216–17; concept
of Hindutva and Hindu rashtra, 290,
293; influence in Gujarat, 290–305,
312; overseas activities of, 148–55;
violence against Christians and, 278,
282, 284–86, 289
Sarkar, Tanika, 200, 312
Sarla Mudgal case judgement, 228,
233–36
Saroj Rani case, 226–27
Sati, practice of, 23
Satya Pir, 21, 117–18
Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar, 17, 166,
176, 211–12
Scheduled Castes, 159–61, 283, 285–87
Religion, Power & Violence
Scheduled Castes Federation, 173
Scheduled Tribes, 159, 161–63, 283,
285–87
Sen, A.K., 152
Sen, Keshab Chandra, 211
Sewa Bharati, 153
Sewa International, UK, 152–54
Shah, Hazrat Ghazi Mubarak Ali,
118–20
Shah Bano case, 17, 23, 27, 193;
judgement, 227–28, 237–42
Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 51
Shatilla refugee camp massacre, 102
Shattari order, 115
Shintoism, 33
Shiv Sena, 220
Shivaji, 95–96
Shukla, I.K., 151
Sibal, Kapil, 152
Sikh religion/Sikhism, 33, 113
Simon Commission, 132
Singh, Bhagat, 127, 136–38
Singh, Kuldip, 228, 233
Singh, Manmohan, 44, 64
Singh, Rajendar, 125
Singh, V.P., 305
Singhal, Ashok, 149, 167, 187
Sinha, Mridula, 170
Smith, W.C., 250–51
Social Justice Platform, 305
socialism, 15, 85
Solanki, Madhav Singh, 293–94
Sonalkar, S., 251
South Asia Solidarity Group, UK, 153
Special Cell for Women and Children,
202
Staines, Graham, 14, 19, 24
state-sponsored terrorism, 68, 75,
80–81
Stietencron, H. von, 111
Stop Funding Hate campaign, 22
Structural Adjustments Programme
(SAP), 57, 64, 66, 195
Sufi saints, 37–38, 40, 113, 115
Sufism/Sufi cults/orders, 21, 40,
113–15, 206
Sukhdev, 127, 137–38
Summers, Lawrence, 86
Index
Sunni sect, 115
Super Hindu Race, 141
Supernatural, concept of, 33–34
Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution, 196
Supreme Court judgements, on
conversion and bigamy, 233–36; on
rights of divorced Muslim women,
237–41; on testamentary disposition
for charitable purposes by Christians,
228–33; urging state to enact UCC,
225–41
Swantra Party, 293, 300
Swaraj party, 220
syncretism, 39; between Hindu–Muslim
religion, 109, 114; dargah of Ghazi
Saheb, 118–20; definition of, 109;
Ghutiari Sharif, 118–20; Hinduism-
Islam, 109, 114–17; in Bengal,
114–20; Manik Pir, 118; nature
worship and, 120–21; Satya Pir,
117–18
syndicated Hinduism, 111
Teltumbde, Anand, 23, 321
terrorism, causes of, 100–104;
connection, 75–79; factors
influencing, 100–104; false flag, 68,
70, 74–75; friendly fire, 68, 70–74;
globalization and, 103–4; Islam and,
97–100; meaning and types of,
67–68, 91–92; national liberation
struggle and, 69–70; objectives of
war on, 82–88; religious terrorism,
104–5; revolutionary, 69–70;
state-sponsored, 75, 80–81; US and,
76–82; war on, 25–26, 67, 69,
82–88; Western imperialism and,
100–103
textile workers strike, Bombay, 61–62,
64
Thackarey, Bal, 96
Thapar, Romila, 111, 158, 178
Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 176, 211–12
Tipu Sultan, 105
Togadia, Praveen, 152
Transfer of Property Act, 229
Tribals, Hindutva forces and, 168–70
331
Tukaram, 37–38, 291
Tulsidas, 181
UN Commission on the Status of
Women (CSW), 202–3
UN Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1966, 231
UN Decade for Women (1975–85), 192
UN Human Development Index, 18
Ulster Freedom Fighters, 104
Ulster Volunteer Force, 104
Unemployment, in rural areas, 46; in
urban areas, 46; labour force, 46,
62
Uniform Civil Code (UCC), 23, 193,
204; Supreme Court judgement
urging enactment of, 225–41
United Liberation Front of Assam
(ULFA), 200
United States, as terrorist, 81; links
with terrorist groups, 75–81;
objective of war on terrorism,
82–87; sponsored terrorism, 75,
80–81
Vajpayee, Atal Behari, 18, 22, 124–27,
134, 282
value, law of, 82–83
Vananchal movement, 169
Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, 153–54
Varnashramdharma, institution of, 216
Varshney, A., 254
Vaz, Hubert, 200
Vishnu Hindu Parishad of America
(VHPA), 148, 150
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), 18,
42, 149–50, 152–54, 167–68, 177,
180–82, 184–89, 200, 278, 281, 283,
286–87, 289, 291, 297, 302
Vivekananda, 176
Waghela, Shankar Singh, 304
Wallace, Anthony, 30
Walliullah, Shah, 257–58
War on terrorism, 67, 69, 82–88;
democracy and, 88; objectives of,
82–87
Warkari tradition, Maharashtra, 37
332
weaker sections, Ambedkar and,
172–75; Dalits, 166–68; Hindutva
and, 157–75; onslaught of Hindutva
forces on, 164–72; Scheduled
Castes, 160–61; Scheduled Tribes,
161–63; women, 163–64, 170–72
Western imperialism, and terrorism,
100–103
Women, ban on intercaste, interreligious
and interracial marriage, 200–201;
barbaric behaviour with, 195;
communalized education, 199–200;
communalized violence against,
201–2; current debate, 203–4; dress
code, 198; family laws, 204–5;
female-headed households, 199;
global initiatives to curb violence
against, 202–3; Hindutva forces
and, 170–72; identity politics and,
193–94; movement, 170; Muslim
women, 227–28, 237–47; of minority
Religion, Power & Violence
communities, 195–97; profile,
163–64; right to work, 198–99;
rights, 23, 227–28, 237–41; sex
segregation, 197–98
Women’s Human Rights Commission,
202
World Conference on Human Rights,
231
World Hindu Conferences, 150
World Trade Center (WTC), terrorist
attack on, 12–13, 20, 69, 71–74, 86
World Trade Organization (WTO), 13,
84, 103
Yagnik, Achyut, 189
Young Italy, 212
Young Women Christian Association,
202
Zafar, Bahadur Shah, 138
Zia-ul-Haq, 17, 42