EVIDENCE

Preliminary considerations:
RULE 128

 What is evidence (Sec. 1): it is the means of ascertaining through judicial proceedings the truth
respecting a matter of fact
 Scope (Sec.2): GENERAL RULE – the rules on evidence shall be the same in all courts
o EXCEPTION:when provided for by law or rules of court
 Admissibility of evidence (sec.3): when is it admissible?
o When it is relevant or material
o When it is competent or not excluded by law
o When it is not timely objected to (sec.5 rule 10 in relation to amendment of the pleadings base
on objected evidence)
 What is relevant evidence? Those that have the tendency to established the probability
or improbability of the facts in an issue
 What is material evidence? Those that tend to prove the fact in issue as determined by
substantive law as reflected in the pleadings.
 What is competent evidence? Not excluded by the rules
 i.e: marital disqualifications, privilege communications, etc.
 Relevancy (sec.4): evidence must relate to the facts in issue
o GENERAL RULE: collateral matters are not admissible (collateral matters means not pertaining
to facts in issue or circumstantial evidence)
o EXCEPTION: when it tends to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue
 To be relevant it must be: prospectant, concomitant, restrospectant
o Funk vs. US (in passing only): the fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest,
if they are to rest upon reason, is their adaptation to the successful development of the truth.
 In other words, evidence must be conclusive and disputable at the same time.
o Factum probandum: the fact or proposition to be established
o Factum probans: the facts or material evidencing the fact or proposition to be established.
Ong chia vs These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
republic insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
Zuluetavs CA Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
People Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on
vsyatar mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more
than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a
"plus value." This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters
of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence
without "plus value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is
incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the
likely harm that would result from its admission.
Tatingvs There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the
Marcella admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item
of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within
the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as
hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses
his own language in writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for
being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
 thereon.
SCC chemical As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does
vs CA admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is
admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-
examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that
the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be
waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of
such right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the
other party’s witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No
error was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial courts finding
that petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party’s witness. It is now too
late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.

RULE 129
What need not be proved:
 Judicial notice
 Judicial admission
 Presumption
Judicial notice
Sec.1: judicial notice is mandatory in matters concerning
o existence and territorial extent of states,
 their political history,
 forms of government and
 symbols of nationality,
o the law of nations,
o the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
o the political constitution and history of the Philippines,
o the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines,
o the laws of nature,
o the measure of time, and
o the geographical divisions.
 Sec. 2: judicial notice is discretionary on matters
o of public knowledge
o capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
o ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions
 Sec.3: when hearing is necessary
o The function of judicial notice is to abbreviate litigation by the admission of matters that
need no evidence. It takes the place of proof and is of equal force. It displaces evidence
and fulfills the purpose for which the evidence is designed to fulfill.
o Judicial notice is not equal to judicial knowledge or actual knowledge
Judicial admissions: Sec.4
 Requisites
o Verbal or written
o Made in the same proceedings
 Defense: The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made
 In relation to Sec. 8 of Rule 10: admissions made in the original pleading is no longer a judicial
admission once it is amended and not incorporated in a subsequent pleading. Such admissions need to
be admitted/incorporated as evidence and prove, otherwise it is deemed waived.
LBP vs banal Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court or before the same judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection and
with the knowledge of the opposing party.
People vskulais True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in
other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have
been heard and are actually pending before the same judge. This is especially true in
 criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him.

Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of
the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases
against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction
was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims,
namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were
subjected to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by appellants counsel. At best, then,
the trial courts mention of Lieutenant Felicianos testimony is a decisional surplusage which
neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.
Laureanovs CA Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the
Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore
Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the
Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that
claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.
Maquilingvs The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,which must be presented as public
COMELEC documents of a foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof."
Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in
deciding a case.
People It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are
vsbaharan admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court
ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial
confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators.

We must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial

confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused
as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is
admissible against the declarants co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to
cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to
extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely
affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercenes admission
implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence
against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same
offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence
against the latter
Republic General rule: courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records
vsSandiganbayan of other cases even when it is pending in the same court and/or same judge.
662 SCRA
Exceptions:
(1) As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of
the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending
before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party,
reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated.
(2)when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from
the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and
admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.

(3) Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where
sufficient basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the
latter case.

First, the supporting cases the petitioner cited are inapplicable either because these cases
involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts
from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases. Second, the
 petitioner’s proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The
petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all
likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioner’s
argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the
admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in
another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the
petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in
support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court.
Ligtasvs people It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other
courts or even records of other cases that have been tried or are pending in the same court
or before the same judge.

Rule 130
Object/real evidence Sec.1
Concept: are those pieces of evidence that addressed the senses of the court. It is the real thing itself.
How to present in court: when it is relevant, it may be exhibit and viewed by the court
 “viewed of court”: includes ocular inspection, but must be conducted during trial not personally
ascertained by the court.
Requisites for admissibility:
 Relevant
 Competent
 Authenticated by a competent witness and must be able to identify it
 Formal offer
No right of self-incrimination: there is no testimonial compulsion on the part of the witness. The right of self-
incrimination, guaranteed under the fundamental law had no application in this because no testimonial
compulsion was involved.
Demonstrative evidence: representation of the real thing. The basic issue here will be “does the demonstrative
evidence sufficiently and accurately represent the object it seeks to demonstrate?”. Example: photograph, map,
video, film, etc.
Categories:
 Unique: readily identifiable marks
 Made unique: made readily identifiable marks
 Not unique: no identifiable marks and cannot be marked
o Relevance of distinction: for purpose of authentication (what needs to be authenticated)
o Prove chain of custody for “not unique” objects such as illegal drugs and DNA
 Chain of custody under RA 9165 sec.21:
 (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof;
 (2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same
shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
 (3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be
done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within
twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s
 (4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72)
hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall within twenty-four
 (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official.
 (5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction
or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative
sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having
jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be
kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;
 (6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to
personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not
constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or
fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or
his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or
destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a
member of the public attorney's office to represent the former;
 (7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the
representative sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial
prosecutor shall inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in
turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over the said representative
sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within twenty-four
(24) hours from receipt of the same; and
 (8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of
this Act, dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of
law enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in
the presence of representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH)
and the accused/and or his/her counsel, and, b) Pending the organization of the
PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of
seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be
implemented by the DOH.
 Chain of custody in DNA evidence AM 06-11-05 SC:
 How the biological samples were collected, how they were handled and the
possibility of contamination of the samples
 The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analysing
the samples
 The forensic DNA laboratory, including its accreditation and the qualification of
the analyst.
 The reliability of the testing result
Mallillinvs We laid down the chain of custody requirements that must be met in proving that the seized
people drugs are the same ones presented in court: (1) testimony about every link in the chain, from
the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence; and (2) witnesses
should describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of
the item.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission
of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be.It would include testimony about every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it
was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link
in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential
 when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its
condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to
alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words the
exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether
the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the application of the
chain of custody rule.
People We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
vspagaduan may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied
conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling
of confiscated evidence. For this reason, the last sentence of the implementing rules provides
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.] Thus, noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case; police procedures in the handling of
confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present case. These lapses,
however, must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been
preserved.

What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
Salas We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
vsmatusalem competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth
certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition
in a public instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.

As to the Baptismal Certificate (Exhibit “B”) of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner
as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the
dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries
therein with respect to the child’s paternity.

As to the handwritten notes (Exhibits “D” to “D-13”) of petitioner and respondent showing
their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to
establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and
contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus,
even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article
175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an
admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued
only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
People vs For the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5,
posing Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti.

“Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
 each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody
of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the
course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
People vsgani Jurisprudence has decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to
make a physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the
sachets at the place of arrest, do not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or
automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accussed

Documentary evidence Sec.2

Concept: consists of writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression offered as proof of their content.
2 kinds: (1) recognizable document (2) not traditionally considered as writing
To distinguish from object evidence: check the purpose of the presentation of evidence, if proof of the content
then documentary, if others then object.

Best evidence rule Sec.3

General rule: when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document.
 Original document Sec.4: 3 kinds (all are original documents)
o Original document itself which is the subject of the inquiry
o When a documents is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical
contents
o When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at
or near the time of transaction, all entries are regarded as originals.
 Ratio for best evidence: the court needs the exact words of the document, where slight
variation of it might result to a great difference in the rights of the parties. To avoid
possible erroneous interpretations and fraud.
 Secondary evidence rule Sec.3: except in the following cases, secondary evidence (copies of the
original) may be presented in lieu of the original document:
o When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;
o When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence
is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
o When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
o When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office
 How to present secondary evidence: how to lay your basis:
 When document is unavailable(sec.3a) Sec. 5:prove existence, due execution,
fact of lost or destruction without the offeror fault and the contents thereat.
o Due execution: by anyone who saw the document executed/written.
That the handwriting or signature thereof is genuine.
 When document is in adverse party (sec.3b) sec.6: prove Due execution, the
document is in the custody of the adverse party to the evidence. Reasonable
notice was given to produce the document to the adverse party. After such
notice and satisfactory proof of the existence and the possession of the
document, the still custodian of the document still fails to produce the
document
o Reasonable notice: may be a form of motion for production of original
or subpoena ducestecum
 When documents consists of numerous accounts Sec.3c: prove that original
consists of numerous accounts or other documents, that they cannot be
 examined without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole.
o Here, the proponent need to present only the summary of the
documents and the pertinent facts that needs to be established.
 When document is in public record (sec.3d) Sec.7:manifest that the original
document is a public record, that the certificate of true copy is issued by the
public officer who is in custody of the public record.
 Hierarchy/order of secondary evidence: copies of the original, recital of the contents of the document
in some other authentic document, testimonial of a witness
Citibank vsteodoro Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must
prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the
part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original
can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss,
and contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this order may be changed if
necessary.
Loon vs power While we generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied
master documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should
prompt the adverse party to present the original documents for inspection. It was
incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals, especially in this case where
the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents
effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the
alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left with no
option but to rule that the respondents’ failure to present the originals raises the
presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
Dimaguilavsmonteiro Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides
that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the
same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the
record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody or the record.

Parole evidence sec.9:

Concept: when the terms of an agreement are reduced into writing, there is no other evidence of the terms
except those which are in writing.
 If you try to explain that there are other agreements not included in the document, those are not
accepted.
 Exception: a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement.
But must be put in issue in his pleading that:
o an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the agreement
o the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto
o the validity of the written agreement
o the existence of other terms agree to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
NATURE: founded on substantive rights of the parties, rule of substantive law, oral or verbal testimony of a
witness in relation to unwritten agreement
 It varies, modifies or alter the written agreement
 There is a presumption that the parties have mutually agreed to the terms of the agreement
What agreement does it apply:
 General rule: it applies only to prior or contemporaneous agreements
 Exceptions: integration of agreement rule
 o Does not apply to subsequent agreement
o Even if it is a subsequent agreement it does not apply to oral and contemporaneous agreement
 Exception to the exception of oral and contemporaneous agreement:
o When the oral and contemporaneous agreement is separate and distinct from the written
agreement
o Test:
 Is the subject matter different
 If the same subject matter, is it separable from the written agreement
Ortanezvs CA Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve
the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." No
such fraud or mistake exists in this case.

Lapu-lapuvs CA As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tans
claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank
on the payment of the obligation. Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties
and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.

In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent
Bank. These promissory notes contained maturity dates as follows: February 5, 1978, March
28, 1978, April 11, 1978 and May 5, 1978, respectively. That these notes were to be paid on
these dates is clear and explicit. Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed
on a year-to-year basis or rolled-over annually until paid from the proceeds of petitioner
Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten
agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the
promissory notes.
Leoverasvsvaldez To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to
present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement
to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable
conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the
parties.

Electronic evidence:
AM 01-7-01 SC Rules on electronic evidence
 Section 2. Cases covered. – These Rules shall apply to all civil actions and proceedings, as well as quasi-
judicial and administrative cases.
 "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols
or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established
or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally
signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately
reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term
"electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message".
 Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom
sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence
of which is not recorded or retained.
 Original of an electronic document. – An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an
original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other
means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
 Copies as equivalent of the originals. – When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about
the same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the
original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical
 reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies
or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.
o Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to the same extent
as the original if:
 (a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
 (b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit the copy in lieu of the
original.
 Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
o (a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the
same;
o (b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by
the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the
document; or
o (c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
 Audio, video and similar evidence. – Audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or
transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall
be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other
person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
 Ephemeral electronic communications. – Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence
or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted.
o A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral electronic communication shall be
covered by the immediately preceding section.
o If the foregoing communications are recorded or embodied in an electronic document, then the
provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.
RA 8792 E-commerce law
 Section 4. Sphere of Application - This Act shall apply to any kind of data message and electronic
document used in the context of commercial and non-commercial activities to include domestic and
international dealings, transactions, arrangements, agreements contracts and exchanges and storage of
information.
 "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means.
 Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols
or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established
or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be prove and affirmed, which is receive, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
Heirs Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact
vssabanpanvscomorposa copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of
determining whether they are genuine or authentic.

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the
admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
Torres vs PAGCOR A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy
preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of
determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and
was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham
pleading.

Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence

under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v.
Ssangyong Corporation, We determined the question of whether the original
facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents"
within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act, and We said:
 We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a
facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered
as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the
Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
Angvs republic Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message
constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an
electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene
picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since
he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time
it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such
ground for objection.

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.

People vsenojas As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity
with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi,
posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in
order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and
to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such
messages and was competent to testify on them.
Syhunliongvsrivera There can be libel only if the words used are calculated to induce the hearer or
reader to suppose and understand them as impeaching the honesty, virtue or
reputation of another. The question is not what the writer or speaker meant by his
words but what they convey to those who heard or read them.

We hold that the text message is not actionable libel. It does not serve to cast a
shadow on [Syhunliong’s]character and integrity[,] there being no direct and
personal imputation of a venality to him. At best, the statement that [Syhunliong]
should understand the meaning of the mass suggests that [Syhunliong] should be
more compassionate and caring to the employee. But is being the converse of
compassionate and caring suggestive of a vice or defect in the person alluded to?
We do not think so. Otherwise, even courts should be exposed to contempt and
ridicule for reaching at times decisions in favor of capital and against labor. x xx To
follow the intent of the message as ordinarily conveyed by the words and the
context in which they are said, it can only suggest the intention of [Rivera] to
describe [Syhunliong] as strict and selfish. But[,] there are legitimate reasons why a
person who acts in the interest of the employer may appear strict and selfish to the
other side. One may have to be so to protect the interest of his company and,
indeed, the outcome of the labor case vindicates the stand of [Syhunliong] against
giving [Rivera] the claims she sought after.

The matter contained in the text message is privileged communication under Article
354 of the Revised Penal Code which [negates] the existence of malice in – a private
communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
[moral] or social duty. x xx It was Lumapas who told her of the stand of [Syhunliong]
on the matter of her wage claims, and her reaction through the text message may
be deemed a part of her duty to seek redress of her grievances through the same
source. She was speaking in response to duty and not out of an intent to injure the
reputation of the person who claims to be defamed. There was no unnecessary
 publicity of the message beyond the necessity of conveying it to the party
concerned.

Testimonial evidence
 SEC. 20 (Who may be witnesses):
o those that can perceive and perceiving; and
o can make known his perception to others.
 Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be ground for disqualification; but may
affect credibility of a witness.

Disqualification:
Marcos vs heirs Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies
of Navarro those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders
them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts
of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on privileged
communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but
it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was
called.
There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking the
witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an exception.
The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of
disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and
merit in the construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause
excludes other exceptions. As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these
comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be
implied. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.

Mental incapacity or immaturity (Disqualification)

 Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others.
 Mental incapacity: capability to make known of their perception at the time of their production as
witness
 Mental immaturity: relating them truthfully, incapable of perceiving facts
 Child witness rule: the child is always presumed qualified to testify.
o The court shall permit a child to use testimonial aids.
o If the adverse party contest the qualification or the capacity of the child to testify, he has to
cause the competency examination of the child, which must be before a judge and facilitator.
 In the competency examination, the court must determine if the child knows the
distinction between truthfulness and falsehood.
People A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness,
vsgolimlim her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that
intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the
competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable
narrative of the matter testified to.

Marital disqualification:
 During their marriage neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse
 Except: in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal case committed by one against the other
or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants
Alvarez vs The reasons given for the rule are:
Ramirez
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
 3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the other.

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in
civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against
the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the
excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital
and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor
peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and
tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home
People vs This case falls under the exception to the Marital Disqualification Rule. The defendant lost his
Castaneda privilege under the rule he breached his wife’s confidence which gave rise to the criminal
offense charged and when his wife filed the complaint.

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too narrow; and the rule
that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the exception is too broad.
The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY
IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that
one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed (by) one against the other.

With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime
and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person
but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the effect of directly and
vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act Of the wife in
personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her
insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order
disqualified her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the
witness-wife under a core the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and
the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have
occasion to point out in previous decisions, "identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that Identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be
nothing but Ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial disqualification rule.

Death or insanity (dead man’s statute) sec.23:

 Who is disqualified: parties or assignor or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
 Who is protected: executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or against a
person of unsound mind
 When may be invoked: upon an action base on claim or demand against the estate of such deceased or
unsound person
 What kind of testimony is excluded: any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind
o The plaintiff cannot testify with regards to ammeters that happened prior to the death of a
party, but the plaintiff may present other pieces of evidence to prove his claim.
 Purpose: prevent perjury
Razonvsca The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or
his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased
person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the
latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to
 false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the
surviving party.

The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case
against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of
the deceased person. (See Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927])

In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant
(petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent
Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed
in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually
owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which
never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan
Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T.
Chuidian.
Sunga- The Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from
chanvschua testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to
the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of
testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:

1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.

2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased

person or a person of unsound mind;

3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against person of unsound mind;

4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.

Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Mans Statute to this case.

First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondent in their answer before
the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively
removed this case from the ambit of the Dead Mans Statute. Well entrenched is the rule that
when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the
counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death
of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim,
respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the
death of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or
representatives of the deceased.

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Mans Statute for the simple
reason that she is not a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted. Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to
establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners
insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor
because the term assignor of a party means assignor of a cause of action which has arisen,
and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen. Plainly then,
Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.
Bordalbavs CA It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith,
and does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a
means to enrich oneself at the expense of others.
 As to the alleged violation of the dead mans statute, suffice it to state that said rule finds no
application in the present case. The dead mans statute does not operate to close the mouth
of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through
personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the
witness.

Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present
case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and
not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were
properly admitted by the trial court.

Privileged communication Sec.24

The following persons cannot testifyas to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a
civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter's direct descendants or ascendants;

(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by
the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor
can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he
may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to
enable him to act in capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient;

(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be examined as to
any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional character in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs;

(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made
to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure.
 General rule: there is a presumption that the communications between spouses, attorney-client,
physician-patient, public officers, priests/ministers are privilege.
 Exception: When it is made in the presence of a third person / when the communication is intended to
be communicated to a third person
 RULES to consider
o If the communication was not intended to be heard by anyone, but was overheard, the
communication is still privilege but the third person may testify.
o If the communications comes into the possession of a third person, legally or illegally, it is still
privilege but the third person.
o A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public
interest would suffer by the disclosure.
o A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be
examined as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional character
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs
o A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
 information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity,
which information was necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient;
Chan vschan 702 The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician
scra who gets information while professionally attending a patientcannot in a civil case be
examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s
reputation.

This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him
the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make
a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a
physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had
transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting
his own health at great risk.

Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged
since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged.
Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their professional conversation. The
privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of
the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the
results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the
advice or treatment he gave him—would be to allow access to evidence that is
inadmissible without thepatient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in
the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician
to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the
latter’s prior consent.
Lacuromvsjacoba The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the
claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as
implied consent.
Samalavs Valencia The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of
public policy and good taste. It springs from the attorneys duty to represent his client with
undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the clients confidence as well as from the
injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged
communications of his client.

An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him
but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. The bare attorney-client
relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment
from the clients adversary either in the same case or in a different but related action. A
lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when
the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the
subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.
Almontevs At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to
Vasquez state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based
upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the
individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the
plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.

On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect
military, diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in
the confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to find in the Constitution an
absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena considered essential to the
enforcement of criminal laws.
Syhunliongvsrivera The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on
any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has
 a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty."

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged
communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his
own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or
a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power
to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made
in good faith and without malice

In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial of the
latter's claims for payment of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera
expressed through the subject text message her grievances to Lumapas. At that time,
Lumapas was the best person, who could help expedite the release of Rivera's claims.

Prescinding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA' s declaration that
Rivera's text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since
she "was speaking in response to duty [to protect her own interest] and not out of an
intent to injure the reputation" of Syhunliong. Besides, "[t]here was no unnecessary
publicity of the message beyond [that] of conveying it to the party concerned."
Senate vsermita The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must,
488 scra as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest.

The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose

information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to
outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it
must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions,
the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
Nerivs senate Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the
committee President. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its
purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will receive the benefit of candid,
objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of information between the
President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving
at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution.

The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is

akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right
to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the
constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers.

Senate v. Ermitaexpounds on the constitutional underpinning of the relationship between

the Executive Department and the Legislative Department to explain why there should be
no implied authorization or presumptive authorization to invoke executive privilege by the
President’s subordinate officials, as follows:

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power - the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
 reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on he being the
highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch
of governments which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when

invoked by the President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said
presumption dictates that the same be recognized and be given preference or priority, in
the absence of proof of a compelling or critical need for disclosure by the one assailing
such presumption. Any construction to the contrary will render meaningless the
presumption accorded by settled jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege. In fact,
Senate v. Ermita reiterates jurisprudence citing "the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications."

Testimonial privilege
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other
direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. (20a)
 A son or daughter may testify against their parents but they cannot be compelled to do so.
Admissions Sec. 26 – 32:
Sec.26:
 What does it constitute: act, declaration or omission of a party
 It is receivable as evidence if it is against the party making it.
 Self-serving evidence: not admissible as evidence because it is hearsay, testimonies that is in favor of
the party making it, unless the testimony is made by the accused himself (he is open for cross-
examination)
Sec.27
 When compromise is not an admission of guilt:
o An offer of compromise in civil cases
o In criminal cases when allowed by law to be compromised and those under quasi-offenses
 As a general rule, an offer to compromised in a criminal case is an implied admission of
guilt.
o A withdrawn plea of guilt or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
o An offer to pay or the payment of medical hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury
Res inter aliosacta rule
Sec.28 (first part)
 Admission by third party: the rights of the party cannot be prejudiced by the acts, declarations,
omissions of another.
o The acts, declarations, omissions of a party is only to that party and when he impugn others it
will be inadmissible as evidence
 Exceptions: sec.29-31
o Admissions by co-partner or agent or joint interest
 The act or declaration of a partner is within the scope of authority
 The act or declaration was made during the existence of the partnership/agency and
the person making the declaration is still a partner or an agent
 The agency/partnership must be established by independent evidence other the act or
declaration of the admitting partner
o Admissions by Conspirators in relation to conspiracy
 The conspiracy must be established by independent evidence
 The act or declaration is made during the existence of the conspiracy
 The act or declaration is in relation to the common object
o Admission by privies
 There must be a relation of privity between the party and the declarant;
 The admission was made by the declarant, as predecessor in interest, while holding title
to the property;
  The admission is in relation to said property.
Sec.32: Admission by silence (implied admission)
 Requisites in order for acts or declaration to be admitted as evidence
o The acts or declaration is made in the presence of the party
o The facts are within the knowledge of the parties
o The facts are material to the issue
o The acts or declaration is heard and understood by the party
o The acts or declaration is in the nature where the party ought to call for action or comment if
not true
 Exceptions:
o When the silence is made during the course of custodial investigation
o When under the advise of the counsel
o When silence is privilege
o When the party had no opportunity to comment.
 Other forms of implied admission
o Laches
o Flight of the accuse
o An attempt to influence the witness
o Effort of the accuse to drop the case through relatives of the complainant
o Unreasonable refusal to submit himself to medical examination
o Lifestyle check
 Implied admissions are not absolute, they are subject to an explanation
Constantinovs Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial
heirs admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for
pedroconstantino under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the
pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and
limiting the issues to be tried. In Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., this Court
emphasized that:

Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels,
they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of
the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be
allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are
a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also
removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made
in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are
conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should
be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements
or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.
People vsgandia The trial court’s decision in so far as Damaso, Ramirez and Dante are concerned had before
become final and executory after they withdrew their appeal. Separate entries of judgment
with respect to them had in fact been made. As such, the appellate court is bereft of the
power to modify the trial court’s judgment as to them. Even if the trial court erred in not
awarding exemplary damages in the first place in light of the established presence of an
aggravating circumstance, the award thereof by the appellate court cannot affect Damaso,
Ramirez and Dante as, in effect, they did not appeal and it is not favorable to them. So
Section 11, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court directs:

SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. –

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
the latter.
Doldolvs people Except for his bare testimony, the petitioner offered no competent and credible evidence to
prove that the missing funds were actually cash advances of employees in the municipality.
 The petitioner could have offered in evidence the documents evidencing the names of the
recipients and amounts of the cash advances, but failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner
wrote the Provincial Auditor and offered to refund the missing funds as follows:
P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, P200,000.00 on or before October 31, 1995, and
P884,139.66 on November 30, 1995. He was able to pay only P200,000.00 on September
15, 1995, and failed to remit the balance of his shortage. Such partial restitution of the
petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of the missing
funds. The ruling of the CA on this matter is correct:

As We have already stated hereinabove, on September 15, 1995, not too long after the
shortages in the municipal funds were discovered, appellant made a partial
payment/settlement in the amount of 200,187.80 pesos as evidenced by Official Receipt
No. 436756 (Exhibit 8, Record, Volume III, p. 6). With respect to the balance of the missing
funds, appellant promised to pay the same in installment basis. Appellant, though, failed to
comply with his undertaking (Record, Volume I, p. 457; TSN, Amando T. Sison, July 27, 1998,
pp. 32-33). Said payment is of no moment and could not have legally brought acquittal for
the appellant. On the contrary, as guided by Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence,
We hold that said payment, particularly when taken in conjunction with appellants
commitment to gradually pay the remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of
compromise which must be treated as an implied admission of appellants guilt that he
embezzled or converted the missing funds to his personal use.

Confession (judicial vs extra-judicial) Sec.33:

 The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein.
 Is an acknowledgement of the offense charged (extra judicial confession)
 In relation to extra-judicial confession, it is not enough that a party confesses to a crime or
acknowledges the commission of the crime in order to have a conviction. Until and unless the corpus
delicti is established or the fact of commission and the chain of custody rule is proven.
Ladianavs The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police
people from the accused without the assistance of competent and independent counsel during a
custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused
during the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be
used as evidence against the affiant.

There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner
in his Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the
undisputed facts that it was not exacted by the police while he was under custody or
interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation as
embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not at issue in this case.

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a

statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent
to commit the offense with which one is charged.Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the
accused admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was
done with criminal intent is an admission, not a confession.

In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were
made by mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the admission
was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of
the true state of facts. Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such admissions
had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In addition, admissions made under oath, as
in the case at bar, are evidence of great weight against the declarant. They throw on him the
burden of showing a mistake.
People vsulit As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses
because of the improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the sole basis of the
condemnatory judgment. However, where the trial court receives, independently of his plea
 of guilty, evidence to determine whether the accused committed the crimes charged and the
precise degree of his criminal culpability therefor, he may still be convicted if there is ample
proof on record, not contingent on the plea of guilty, on which to predicate conviction.

In this case, the prosecution had already rested its case when the appellant decided to change
his plea. In fact, the trial court granted the prosecutions motion that the evidence it had
presented be considered proof of the degree of culpability of the appellant. It is, thus,
incumbent upon this Court to determine whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution in
Criminal Case No. 97-385 is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the appellants
guilt for qualified rape.

In determining the guilt of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by the following
considerations: (a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove,
but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime which usually involves two persons, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence of the defense. It, likewise, bears stressing that in all criminal
prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the
burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the
barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him
because he was not under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his
statement.

The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. As intended by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers investigation conducted by police authorities
which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and
such other police agencies in our government. The barangay chairman is not deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that the appellants
statement before the barangay chairman is inadmissible.
People Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The
vssayaboc condition for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the
constitutional requirements safeguarding an accused’s rights during custodial investigation
have been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has been
denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being
investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment
that is inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to
have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged
intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a
custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.

The stereotyped advice appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of a legal form or model. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with the curt Opo as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or
even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does
not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused.
The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.

The right to be informed requires the transmission of meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. It should
allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of
these rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational
 attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the
control of the police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another
offense.
Tanenggeevs However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of
people Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule
under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.

Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by
his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course
of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in
evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no
constitutional impediment to its admissibility.

Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already
prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his
supposition is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his
claim of duress and intimidation.

Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the
contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary." Petitioner
failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to
have been executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement
were of such nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details
contained therein attest to its voluntariness.

One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of petitioner’s extrajudicial statement is

that it contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could not have known
and could not have supplied without the knowledge and information given by him.

Conduct and character

Sec.34: similar acts as evidence (res inter aliosacta part2)
 Sec.34 prohibits the admission of evidence which tends to show that what a person has done at one
time is probative of the contention that he has done a similar act at another time.
 But it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit,
custom or usage and the like.
Sec.35 unaccepted offer: An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument
or specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause, equivalent to the actual production and tender
of the money, instrument, or property.
 A rejected offer in writing without valid cause is equivalent to actual tender of payment and it is in itself
evidence of payment.
People Alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused, not only because it
vssantos 221 is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate without much
scra 715 opportunity to check or rebut it. To establish alibi as a valid defense, an accused must show
that he was at some other place for such a period of time and that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the place of the crime during its commission. In the present case,
appellant failed to establish the physically impossibility of his presence at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. He anchored his defense on the fact that at that time, he
was in his house which was only about 500 meters from the Ambre residence.
People vsnardo Well settled is the rule that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and scrutiny via an
open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. A young girls revelation that she has been raped, coupled with
her voluntary submission to medical examination and her willingness to undergo public trial
where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity by, as in this
 case, her own father, cannot be so easily dismissed as a mere concoction. Courts usually give
credence to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, particularly if it
constitutes incestuous rape because, normally, no person would be willing to undergo the
humiliation of a public trial and to testify on the details of her ordeal were it not to condemn
an injustice. Needless to say, it is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are
given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
RP vs heirs We begin our resolution of this issue with the well-settled rule that the party alleging fraud or
alejaga mistake in a transaction bears the burden of proof. The circumstances evidencing fraud are as
varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It may assume different shapes and
forms; it may be committed in as many different ways. Thus, the law requires that it be
established by clear and convincing evidence.

First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the procedure laid
down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Under Section
91 thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
material facts set out in the application are true.

Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was conducted is not sustained
by the Verification & Investigation Report itself, which bears no signature.

Third, the report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not been successfully
rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted an
investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagenas statement on Recios
alleged admission may be considered as independently relevant. A witness may testify as to
the state of mind of another person -- the latters knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith --
and the formers statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without
violating the hearsay rule.

Testimonial knowledge - Hearsay evidence rule Sec.36:

 A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided.
 To what facts may a witness may testify: those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge that is
derived from his own perception.
 Any testimony which that does not originate from the witness’ personal knowledge or derived from
his own perception while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted is hearsay.
o Take note: of the purpose of which the hearsay statement is offered, not all hearsay are
inadmissible.
o To be hearsay:
 There must be an out of court statement
 that the statement made out of court is repeated and offered by the witness in court to
prove the truth of the matters asserted by the statement.
 The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a
witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were
actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it
(a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.
 Ratio for hearsay: there is no opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom statements or writings
are attributed. The court is without opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements by
observing the demeanor of the person who made them.
Patulavs It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any
people particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to
explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the
simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent
author. Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath
 and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity
to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as
evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of
inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the
witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance
is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth
of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a
prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief,
this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to
show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but
is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was
made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.

We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns
about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under
oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the
opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-
court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement
depends.
Espenelivs Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency
people and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce.
However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person
given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly
hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is
merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made.
Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such
statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be
shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but
primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant
as to the existence of such a fact. This is known as the doctrine of independently relevant
statements.

Dying declaration (exceptions to hearsay rule):

 Requisites in order to be admissible:
o The declaration pertains to the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death
o It is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death
o The declarant would have been competent to testify
o The dying declaration is offered in a case where the subject of the inquiry involves the
declarant’s death
o The statement is complete in itself
People When EdmundoOllanes asked his brother Perlito who shot him, Perlito replied three times
vsmontanez that it was the appellant. Perlito himself told his brother Edmundo that he was about to die. In
fact, the victim died on the way to the hospital.

Perlitos statement that it was the appellant who shot him was a dying declaration. The
statement is highly reliable, having been made in extremity when the declarant is at the point
of death and when any hope of survival is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced,
and when the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. Even if
the declarant did not make a statement that he was at the brink of death, the degree and
seriousness of the words and the fact that death superseded shortly afterwards may be
considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full
realization that he was in a dying condition.
Declaration against interest: (exception to hearsay)
Requisites to be admissible:
People With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present provision, it is
vsbernal safe to assume that declaration against interest has been expanded to include all kinds of
interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
(3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was
contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
(4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His
confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with
Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed
to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
Declaration about pedigree (exception to hearsay)
Meaning of pedigree: includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these facts occurred and the name of the relatives and facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree.
Tizonvs CA Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an
exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the
following conditions:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry;
(3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.

One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not from, the
declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding claimants pedigree, he
may not do so by declarants own statements as to declarants relationship to the particular
family. The reason is that declarants declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving
nature. Accordingly there must be precedent proof from other sources that declarant is what
he claimed to be, namely, a member of the particular family; otherwise the requirement to
admissibility that declarants relationship to the common family must appear is not met. But
when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to claim directly from the
declarant or the declarants estate, the situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite
different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in controversy, that he
was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible without other proof of the fact of
relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then disserving, that is not the real ground
for its admission. Such declarations do not derive their evidential value from that
consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the class to which
the declarations belong. The distinction we have noted is sufficiently apparent; in the one
case the declarations are self-serving, in the other they are competent from reasons of
necessity

Family reputation (exceptions to hearsay):

 A statement by a member of the family ether by consanguinity or affinity
 The statement is about the reputation or tradition of the family in respect to the pedigree of any
member of the family
 The reputation or tradition is one existing previous to the controversy
Jisonvs CA It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid
of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third
person. Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g.,
supplying the information himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or
registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of the
father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latters part. In like manner,
FRANCISCOs lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and
D) and school records (Exhs. Z and AA) renders these documents incompetent to prove
paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the administration of the sacrament
of baptism on the date so specified. However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records
per se to prove paternity, they may be admitted as part of MONINAs testimony to
corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent for her education.

As to Exhibits S, T, U and V, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives,
namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly
attesting to MONINAs filiation, while their due execution and authenticity are not in issue, as
MONINA witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section
39, the contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the
declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the
declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question. As to the
admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, Section 40, however, this requires further
elaboration.

Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of
the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
pedigree. (underscoring supplied)

It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the
first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents
in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and
the section containing the second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is
whether Exhibits S to V, as private documents, fall within the scope of the clause and the like
as qualified by the preceding phrase entries in family bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rights [and] family portraits.

We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision,
in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as
family possessions, or those articles which represent, in effect, a familys joint statement of its
belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been described as objects openly exhibited
and well known to the family, or those which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as
giving a family tradition. Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a
familys reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones,
monuments or coffin plates.

Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family possessions" as

discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these
exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation, it
having been observed that:

[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the
common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a
material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx [Thus] matters of pedigree may
be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity,
except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common
 reputation in the community.

Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits S to V, inclusive, may, in like manner as

MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her
claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter.

Common reputation (exception to hearsay):

 Common reputation is admissible as evidence where the reputation refers to matter of public or general
interest of more than 30 years.
 Marriage or moral character

Res gestae:
 spontaneous statements
o requirements to be admissible:
 There is a startling event or occurrence taking place
 A statement was made while the event is taking place or immediately prior to subsequent
thereto
 The statement was made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood
 The statement relates to the circumstances of the startling event or occurrence
 Verbal acts
o Requisites to be admissible:
 The principal act to be characterized must be equivocal
 The equivocal act must be material to the issue
 The statement must accompany the equivocal act
 The statement gives a legal significance to the equivocal act.
People A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to
vslobrigas the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur:
(1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

All these requisites concur in the case at bar. The principal act, the mauling of the victim, was
a startling occurrence. The declarations were made shortly after the mauling incident while
the victim was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, without any prior
opportunity to contrive a story implicating accused-appellant. The declaration concerns the
circumstances surrounding the mauling of Felix Taylaran. However, the declaration made by
the victim to his daughter does not satisfy the second requirement of spontaneity because
they were made a day after the incident and the exciting influence of the startling occurrence
was no longer present. Nevertheless, we hold that Rosa Solartes testimony on what her father
told her constitutes independent relevant statements distinct from hearsay, and are thus
admissible not as to the veracity thereof, but as proof of the fact that they had been uttered.
People The term res gestae refers to those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a
vsvillarico particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act. In a general
way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main
fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous
with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res
gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made
as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there
was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration,
or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
 characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it
clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
People Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
vspalmones victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was
no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.

Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the victim,
we rule that these statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal
allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount of time had
already elapsed from the time that he was shot as the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m.
but he only uttered the statements attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later.
Moreover, he allegedly made these statements not at the scene of the crime but at the
hospital where he was brought for treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime
to the hospital constituted an intervening event that could have afforded the victim
opportunity for deliberation. These circumstances, taken together, indubitably show that the
statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for these to
be admitted as part of the res gestae.
Entries in the course of business (exception to hearsay)
 The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify
 The entries were made at or near the time of transactions to which they refer
 The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries
 The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral or religious
 The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Phil. Airlines In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary evidence presented to
vsramos corroborate the testimonies of PAL's witnesses are prima facie evidence of the truth of their
allegations. The plane tickets of the private respondents, exhs. "1," "2," "3," "4," (with
emphasis on the printed condition of the contract of carriage regarding check-in time as well
as on the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately
upon the check-in of private respondents) and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh.
"5," (which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go and the private
respondents)are entries made in the regular course of business which the private respondents
failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies.
Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made
contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue,
when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of
greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon
memory and recollection (20 Am Jur S 1179, 1029 cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in
the Philippines Annotated, 1973 Edition, Volume VII, Part II, p. 654). Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable as against a written document that speaks a uniform language (Spouses
Vicente and Salome de Leon v. CA., et al., G.R. No. 95511, January 30, 1992). This dictum is
amply demonstrated by the diverse allegations of the private respondents in their complaint
(where they claimed that no one was at the counter until thirty (30) minutes before the
published departure time and that the employee who finally attended to them marked them
late, Records, p. 2) and in their testimonies (where they contended that there were two
different PAL personnel who attended to them at the check-in counter. TSNs of November 17,
1986, pp. 41-45 and of May 18, 1987, pp. 5-6). Private respondents' only objection to these
documents is that they are self-serving cannot be sustained. The hearsay rule will not apply in
this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main
transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the
act, are admissible as apart of the res gestae (32 C.J.S., S. 411, 30-31). Based on these
circumstances, We are inclined to believe the version of PAL. When the private respondents
purchased their tickets, they were instantaneously bound by the conditions of the contract of
carriage particularly the check-in time requirement. The terms of the contract are clear. Their
failure to come on time for check-in should not militate against PAL. Their non-
accommodation on that flight was the result of their own action or inaction and the ensuing
 cancellation of their tickets by PAL is only proper.

Entries in official records(exception to hearsay):

 The entry was made by a public officer or by another person specifically enjoined by law to do so
 It was made by the public officer, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law
 The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated, which must
have been acquired by the public officer or other person personally or through official information.
Lao vs Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially
standard enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value
insurance may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. Although police
blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the
absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.

In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the information subject of the
controversy. Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was driving the insured truck with
plate number FCG-538. This is unlike People v. Mejia, where we said that entries in the police
blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value, since the Court there
found that the entries in question are sadly wanting in material particulars.

Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence.
The person who made the entries was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified
as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by
the investigating officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was
presented to him. No explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the
alleged interchange of names.
Sabilivs we explained that the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records
COMELEC to be admissible in evidence:

(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to
do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him,
which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to
keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay. Regarding the second requisite, we
have explicitly recognized in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, that it is the business of a
punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay. Anent the third
requisite, the Barangay Captains exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position
requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.

Commercial lists(exception to hearsay):

Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register,
periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so
stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein.

Meralcovsquisimbing Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be
admitted only "if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in
our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and
not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no
persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were
presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that
businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no
 evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in
touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable.
Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the same
manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when
the source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of
such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can
be easily made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance with
certain governmental requirements.

Learned treatises(exceptions to hearsay):

A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science or art is admissible as tending
to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject
testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or
calling as expert in the subject.

Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding(exception to hearsay):

 The witness is dead or unable to testify
 His testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative between
the same parties or those representing the same interest
 The former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different cause of
action
 The issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case
 The adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.

People vs Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or deposition of
Ortiz-miyako a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence
against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of
confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-
examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of
the witness while testifying.

This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall
or produce a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his
previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to
the hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the
administration of justice orderly and expeditious.
People 677scra

Child witness rule

People vs That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that
Ibanez 706 scra every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of
proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motuproprio or on
motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.
People As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can
vsesugon communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age,
religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social stat us are not necessary to
qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as
 listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is
apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for disqualification.

That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness
with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased.
Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000),
every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden
of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt
exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth
from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motuproprio or
on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court. All
questions bearing on the credibility of witnesses are best addressed by the trial court by
virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial and often incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses’ deportment while testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court
because of the nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique advantage of
actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the
witnesses. Hence, the trial judge’s assessment of the witnesses’ testimonies and findings of
fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify
the reversal of the trial court’s assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts and
circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is
generally bound by the former’s findings. The rule is even more stringently applied if the
appellate court has concurred with the trial court.

Opinion rule Expert witness

Section 48. General rule. — The opinion of witness is not admissible, except as indicated in the following
sections.
 General rule: The opinion of a witness is not admissible
 Exception: expert opinion / lay opinion on handwriting / short-hand opinion

Section 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge,
skill, experience or training which he shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
 Meaning:opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training
 No special training is required to be an expert witness
 Expert witness may testify based on hypothetical or assumed facts
 How an expert witness be examined: direct examination = present his qualifications
o How to cross: question his knowledge on the subject matter by referring to other known
opinion.
o Probative value: it is of general knowledge = same as anyone who have similar knowledge.
People vsabriol We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a
licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort
Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of
Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven (27)
murder and homicide cases all over the country. An expert witness need not present
comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his findings.
Examination under a comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the evidence
bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient. Moreover, the ballistician conclusively found
similar characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and slugs.
Bautista vsca As a general rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. In Heirs of Severa
P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, we held that due to the technicality of the procedure involved
in the examination of the forged documents, the expertise of questioned document
examiners is usually helpful; however, resort to questioned document examiners is not
 mandatory and while probably useful, they are not indispensable in examining or comparing
handwriting.

Hence, a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts.
Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the
issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of
the handwriting expert.

The authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions
concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters
of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a
questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered
by a specialist on a highly technical issue.

In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of
forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was
physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the
testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.
Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of Absolute Sale, confirmed the genuineness,
authenticity and due execution thereof. Having been physically present to see the decedent
Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista affix their signatures on the document, the
weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioners.
Avelinovs Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires
people expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the
petitioner failed to make the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during
trial.

Ordinary witness
Section 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may
be received in evidence regarding —
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
People It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental
vsduranan condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the
speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that
the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can
testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: A non-expert witness may give
his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings
which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon
his mental condition, with the witness own knowledge and observation, he having first
testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for
his opinion.

Character evidence:
Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is pertinent to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
(b) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in civil case is admissible only when pertinent to the issue of
character involved in the case.

(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Section 14, (46a, 47a)
People We now deal with the more substantial arguments raised by accused-appellant in his brief. He
vsdeopita tenaciously maintains that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime charged
since he is a person of good moral character, holding as he does the position of "Ministerial
Servant" in the congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous
person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God.

We are not impressed. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling"
qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his
having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any
sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an
emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to
rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good
moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be
resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his
guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is
more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is
unavailing.

Accused-appellant likewise bewails and assigns as reversible error the failure of the trial court
to give credence to the testimonies of the defense witnesses. He argues that these are
Jehovah’s Witnesses, and as such, they are God-fearing people who would never lie as to his
whereabouts at the time in question. This argument is as puerile as the first. We quote once
more, and with approval, the pertinent portion of the trial court’s ruling on this point -

It is so easy for witnesses to get confused as to dates and time. The precision with which the
witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovah’s Witnesses, quoted the
respective hours when the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at
best, self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the facility with which it may
be concocted and fabricated.

Burden of proof vs burden of evidence:

Section 1. Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
 Meaning: duty or obligation of the party to establish the truth of the given proposition, claim or
allegations (does not shift during trial)
 Risk of non-persuation:
 Vs. burden of evidence: duty that rests upon a party by means of evidence to create or meet a prima
facie (duty of going forward with evidence) (shifts or passes side by side)
 Who has burden of proof:
o Civil cases: upon the party who, by pleading, asserts the affirmative
 Eiincumbitprobatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove)
o Criminal cases: lies in the prosecution
 Evidence need not be given in support of a negative allegation except: when such negative allegation is
an essential part of the statement of the right or title on which the cause of action or defense is
founded, nor even in such case when the allegation is a denial of the existence of a document the
custody of which belongs to the opposite party.
 Affirmative allegation needs to be proved by evidence except: judicial notice/admission, presumption
of fact
FEBTC Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely:
vschante (a) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden; and
(b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or
simply the production burden or the burden of evidence.

In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by such a
quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises. In its other
concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent stage of
trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its
second concept passes from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first concept it
rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue.

In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is
given on either side. This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility
of investigating and presenting the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely
upon the respective parties. The burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the
defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in
the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or
impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if
proved, would exculpate him from liability.

PRESUMPTIONS:
 Meaning: inference to the existing of a fact not actually known, but arises out in its connection to other facts
which is fully proven.
 Establish the facts to which the presumption can be inferred.
 Classification:
o presumption of law:(2 kinds conclusive and disputable) and
o Presumption of fact: at the liberty of court to draws its conclusion

Conclusive Presumptions:
Section 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led to another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission,
be permitted to falsify it:
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of commencement of the relation of landlord
and tenant between them.
 Meaning: cannot be contradicted (rule of substantive law)
 2 kinds:
o Estoppel in Pais: whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.

o Estoppel Against a Tenant: the tenant is not permitted to deny title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them .
A. Estoppel in General: a principle which bars a person from denying or asserting anything to the contrary of that which has
been established as the truth arising from his own acts or representations. It may be: (1). Estoppel in Pais or equity (2).By
deed i.e document and (3). By Record or Judgment i.e those found and established as true by a court of competent
jurisdiction
B. Estoppel in Pais: The essence is intentional misrepresentation
1. Requirements:
a). As to the party estopped: (i). a conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts (ii). an
intention that the conduct be acted upon or that it will influence the other party and (iii) knowledge of the true facts
b). As to the party claiming estoppel: (i) an absolute lack of knowledge or of the means of knowledge as to the true facts,
not lack of diligence (ii) reliance in good faith upon the conduct of the other party and (iii) the action or inaction resulted to
his damage or injury
C. Estoppel Against a Tenant
1. The relationship is that between parties to an original contract of lease ( not sublease) involving a real property . The
tenant refers to the lessee. What is deemed conclusive as to the tenant is the ownership of the lessor over property.
2. The lessee cannot use his physical possession over the property as basis to dispossess the lessor of the latter’s
ownership. The law seeks to protect owners of real property from being deprived of their ownership by those in
actual physical possession who are their own lessees.
3. However the downside of the law is that it does not jibe with the proposition that the land should be owned by those
who actually till and utilize the land over those whose sole connection to the land is merely a piece of document.
4. However, the lessee may assert ownership if after the lease, he acquires the property is in his own right, such as when
he buys it in an execution sale
Sec. 3.Enumerates the disputable presumptions which are applicable in civil, criminal, political, commercial and remedial
laws.

Ibaan rural When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the
bank vs CA Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and
its contents. For two years, it did not object to the two-year redemption period provided in
the certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption
period specially since it had time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to
speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be
construed as consent. By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to
believe that they had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two
years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only one year
and that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts,
representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out,
intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to
exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if
the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
Alcaraz vs The issue of ownership is precisely what the petitioner spouses raised to justify their non-
tangga-an payment of rent and to resist eviction from the house they leased from respondents. Being
indispensable to the resolution of the issue of possession, we herein render a provisional
ruling on ownership.

Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that:

Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify
it; xxxxx

After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are
barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the
respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.
University of A corporation is estopped by its silence and acts of recognition because we recognize that
Mindanao vs there is information asymmetry between third persons who have little to no information as to
PSP what happens during corporate meetings, and the corporate officers, directors, and
representatives who are insiders to corporate affairs.

There can be no apparent authority and the corporation cannot be estopped from denying
the binding affect of an act when there is no evidence pointing to similar acts and other
circumstances that can be interpreted as the corporation holding out a representative as
having authority to contract on its behalf.

Annotations are merely claims of interest or claims of the legal nature and incidents of
relationship between the person whose name appears on the document and the person who
caused the annotation. It does not say anything about the validity of the claim or convert a
 defective claim or document into a valid one. These claims may be proved or disproved during
trial.

Thus, annotations are not conclusive upon courts or upon owners who may not have reason
to doubt the security of their claim as their properties' title holders.

Disputable presumptions
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
 Scope:
o Presumption of innocence
 Good faint, honesty, morality, decency, good reputation, legality of contract(this can be
overcome by another presumtion), legality of marriage
 (a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
o Presumption of knowledge of the law
 (b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
 (c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;
 (e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
 Wigmore: Nonproduction of evidence by a party is one of the factors, and a highly
significant one, that the trier takes into account in the quest for the truth.
 The suppression is willful / the suppression is done not in the exercise of his privilege /
the evidence suppressed is not corroborative / the evidence is at the sole disposal of the
suppressing party.
 (j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possess, or exercises
acts of ownership over, are owned by him;
 Committed recently, found in the possession of the accused and cannot explain, the
goods were looted at the same time, same place and same occasion as that of the
crime.
 (x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable
to the law or fact;
o Presumption of regularity
 (l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
 (m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
 (n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was
acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
 (o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and
passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute
submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
 (k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the
delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;
 (v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;
 In relation to Rule 13 ROC: when does it deemed served? When the presumption arise?
 (p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
 (q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
 (f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
 (g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
 (h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
 (i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is
produced;
 (d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns
 (r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
 (s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
 (t) That an endorsement of negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was
overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated;
 (u) That a writing is truly dated;
  (y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary
nature habits of life;
 (z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartneship;
 (aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage;
 (bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other
and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
 (cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry
each other and who have acquire properly through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits
of money and evidences of credit are equal.
 (dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within
three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the
absence of proof to the contrary:
 (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even
though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage.
 (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even
though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage.
 (ff) That the law has been obeyed;
 (gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public
authority, was so printed or published;
 (hh) That a printed or published book, purporting contain reports of cases adjudged in
tribunals of the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;
 (ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular
person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of
such person or his successor in interest;
o Presumption of continuity
 (ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of the nature;
 (w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.

The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the
estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;

(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has
been missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and
whose existence has not been known for four years;

(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that
the absent spouse is already death. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of
death the circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case,
before marrying again, the spouse present must institute a summary proceedings as
 provided in the Family Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
o Presumption of survivorship / simultaneous death
 (jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no
particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following
rules:
 1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have
survived;
 2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
 3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have
survived;
 4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is
deemed to have survived, if the sex be the same, the older;
 5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the
latter is deemed to have survived.
 (kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed
each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other,
shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same
time. (5a)
NOTA BENE:
Effect of presumption: presumptions are not evidence, it is only for the determination as to who among the parties has the
duty to present evidence
Burden of proof does not shift / burden of evidence does
Rosaroso vs Petitioners argue that the second deed of sale was null and void because Luis could not have
soria validly transferred the ownership of the subject properties to Meridian, he being no longer
the owner after selling them to his children. No less than Atty. William Boco, the lawyer who
notarized the first deed of sale, appeared and testified in court that the said deed was the one
he notarized and that Luis and his second wife, Lourdes, signed the same before him. He also
identified the signatures of the subscribing witnesses.

Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions:
(1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has
been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract.

These presumptions operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut
them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they
created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The
burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is
relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because
the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.

In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare
allegation that the sale was made without a consideration, they failed to supply clear and
convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is elementary in procedural law that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of
Court.
Heirs trazona As will be shown below, the assailed deed is a forgery. Assuming it were genuine, petitioners
vs heirs of have a right to the rest of the property not covered by the purported sale. If the procedure for
Canada the issuance of tax declarations was followed – if care had been observed to make sure that
all papers were in order and understood – this irregularity would not have taken place.

It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due
execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this
presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and
more than merely preponderant. Here, contrary to the conclusion of the CA, we find clear and
 convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed
deed.

First, the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed
had been forged. No issue has been raised about his expertise.

Second, the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged.

Third, the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 11 April 1953 brings into question the
regularity of the assailed deed. This deed was never disputed by respondents at any stage of
the proceedings, and was in fact admitted by them in their Comments to Plaintiffs’ Additional
Formal Offer of Exhibits.

etc
Uy vs ere, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is
lacsamana anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption established
in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other
evidence.

Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias, we held
that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been
held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.

Documentary evidence may also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we held that the
best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. Under Act No. 3613
or the Marriage Law of 1929, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114, which is applicable
to the present case being the marriage law in effect at the time Uy and Rosca cohabited, the
marriage certificate, where the contracting parties state that they take each other as husband
and wife, must be furnished by the person solemnizing the marriage to (1) either of the
contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of the Municipal Court of Manila or the municipal
secretary of the municipality where the marriage was solemnized. The third copy of the
marriage contract, the marriage license and the affidavit of the interested party regarding the
solemnization of the marriage other than those mentioned in Section 5 of the same Act shall
be kept by the official, priest, or minister who solemnized the marriage.

Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have
sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where
the marriage allegedly took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show
a single relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca.
Diaz vs people

Suppression of testimony rule 131 sec3e

That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
People vs Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that evidence willfully suppressed
padrigone would be adverse if produced does not apply if
(a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties;
(b) the suppression was not willful;
(c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and
(d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.

Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the
opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness.
Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified to
be suffering from Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition and thus cannot stand judicial
 proceedings yet. The non-presentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful. Third, in any
case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation
committed on her sister.

Appellant cannot claim that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of Rowenas
statement as recorded in the police blotter. His conviction was based on the trial courts
findings of facts and assessment of the witnesses credibility. Well-settled is the rule that the
findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial
court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is
denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of
conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full
realization of an oath, all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness
honesty and sincerity. The trial courts findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in
the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of
the case.

Besides, in rape cases where the offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages
of twelve to sixteen, we have consistently held that the victims version of what transpired
deserves credence, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and
embarrassment to which such a grueling experience as a court trial, where they are called
upon to lay bare what perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy, exposed them to. This is not to
say that an uncritical acceptance should be the rule. It is only to emphasize that skepticism
should be kept under control.
Metrobank vs
CA 333scra

Official duty Rule 131 sec3m

That offcial duty has been regularly performed
De los santos Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption
vs COA of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the
presence of an explicit rule that was violated. For instance, in Reyna v. CoA60 (Reyna), the
Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered
claims of good faith, since their actions violated an explicit rule in the Landbank of the
Philippines’ Manual on Lending Operations. In similar regard, the Court, in Casal v. CoA
(Casal), sustained the liability of certain officers of the National Museum who again,
notwithstanding their good faith participated in approving and authorizing the incentive
award granted to its officials and employees in violation of Administrative Order Nos. 268 and
29 which prohibit the grant of productivity incentive benefits or other allowances of similar
nature unless authorized by the Office of the President. In Casal, it was held that, even if the
grant of the incentive award was not for a dishonest purpose, the patent disregard of the
issuances of the President and the directives of the CoA amounts to gross negligence, making
the [“approving officers”] liable for the refund [of the disallowed incentive award].

Just as the foregoing public officers in Reyna and Casal were not able to dispute their
respective violations of the applicable rules in those cases, the Court finds that the petitioners
herein have equally failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of existing auditing
rules and regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners’ neglect to
properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual
payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by
both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne out by the
referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. Had there been an internal control system
installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been exposed, and the hospital would
have been prevented from processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from
the said PDAF. Verily, petitioners cannot escape liability for failing to monitor the procedures
implemented by the TNT Office on the ground that Cuenco always reminded them that it was
 his money. Neither may deviations, from the usual procedure at the hospital, such as the
admitted bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in the qualification of the indigent-
beneficiaries, be justified as “a welcome relief to the already overworked and undermanned
section of the hospital.”

In this relation, it bears stating that Delos Santos’ argument that the practices of the TNT
Office were already pre-existing when she assumed her post and that she found no reason to
change the same remains highly untenable. Records clearly reveal that she, in fact, admitted
that when she was installed as the new Medical Center Chief of VSMMC sometime “in the late
2003,” Antoni disclosed to her the irregularities occurring in the hospital specifically on pre-
signed and forged prescriptions. Hence, having known this significant information, she and
Antoni should have probed into the matter further, and, likewise, have taken more stringent
measures to correct the situation. Instead, Delos Santos contented herself with giving oral
instructions to resident doctors, training officers, and Chiefs of Clinics not to leave pre-signed
prescriptions pads, which Antoni allegedly followed during the orientations for new doctors.
But, just the same, the falsification and forgeries continued, and it was only a year after, or in
December 2004, that Delos Santos ordered a formal investigation of the attendant
irregularities. By then, too much damage had already been done.
People vs In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the
candidia narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers
who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is
evidence to the contrary.

Further, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the
judge has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they
are telling the truth or not. Applying the foregoing, we affirm the findings of the lower court in
the appreciation of facts and credibility of the witnesses.

Upon review of the records, we find no conflict in the narration of events of the prosecution
witnesses. In her direct testimony, Trayvilla testified that both of them asked Cadidia to
remove what was inside her underwear when she and Bagsican brought the accused to the
comfort room to check what was hidden inside. However, in her re-direct, she clarified that it
was really Bagsican who particularly made the request but she was then also inside the
cubicle with the accused. This clarification is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the two
of them were inside the cubicle when the request to bring out the contents of the underwear
was made and the concealed illegal drug was discovered.

The other inconsistency alleged by the accused pertains to what happened during the
confiscation of the illegal drug at the cubicle. The accused alleges that Bagsican and SPO3
Appang differed in their statements. Upon review, We find no such inconsistency. Bagsican
testified that after confiscation, she put the two plastic sachets of shabu in her blazer for
safekeeping. She further narrated that afterwards, she turned over the accused and the
plastic sachets to SPO3 Appang. SPO3 Appang, in turn, testified that when the two female
friskers went out of the comfort room, they handed to him what was taken from the accused.
The statements can be harmonized as a continuous and unbroken recollection of events.

Even assuming that the said set of facts provided conflicting statements, We have consistently
held time and again that minor inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses’ positive
identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As long as the testimonies as a
whole presented a coherent and believable recollection, the credibility would still be upheld.
What is essential is that the witnesses’ testimonies corroborate one another on material
details surrounding the commission of the crime.
Cohabitation rule 131 sec3aa to dd
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.

(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under void marriage, has
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.

(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and
who have acquire properly through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such
contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are
equal.

(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred
days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the
contrary:

(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days
after the termination of the former marriage.

(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days
after the termination of the former marriage.
People vs accused-appellant raises the issue of the character of complainant AAA. It is argued that a
edualino responsible and decent married woman, who was then three (3) months pregnant, would not
be out at two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a
man to accompany her to drink beer. It is contended that complainant merely concocted the
charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs
and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accused-
appellant on 11 May 1994 while she was under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

At the outset of this discussion, it should be pointed out that the moral character of a rape
victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has ruled
that prostitutes can be the victims of rape.

In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations that the victim was drunk and
under the influence of drugs and that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and
responsible married woman, were true, said circumstances will not per se preclude a finding
that she was raped.

Accused-appellant cannot successfully argue that no rape occurred because no medical

examination was conducted to confirm the presence of spermatozoa in her private parts.

Survivorship; absence; legitimacy Rule 131

Section 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. — There is no presumption of legitimacy of a child born
after three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses. Whoever
alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation.
Presentation of evidence Rule 132
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak,
or the questions calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a)

Section 2. Proceedings to be recorded. — The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing, including the
questions propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, the statements made by the judge or any of the
parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype
or by other means of recording found suitable by the court.

A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and
certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings. (2a)

Section 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. — A witness must answer questions, although his answer
may tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness:

(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting
demeanor;

(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;

(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;

(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise
provided by law; or

(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it to be the very fact at issue or
to a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact of his previous
final conviction for an offense.

Order of presentation of evidence

Section 4. Order in the examination of an individual witness. — The order in which the individual witness may be
examined is as follows;
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by theopponent.

Section 5. Direct examination. — Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party presenting
him on the facts relevant to the issue.

Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. — Upon the termination of the direct examination, the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to many matters stated in the direct examination, or connected
therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or
the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
 Purpose: to determine the fullness and accuracy of testimony / to test the truthfulness whether it is free of bias /
to elicit all important facts in issue
 Scope:any matter that is direct or connected therewith (English rule) / any matter that is direct (American rule)

Section 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. — After the cross-examination of the witness has been
concluded, he may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or supplement his answers given during the cross-
examination. On re-direct-examination, questions on matters not dealt with during the cross-examination, may be allowed
by the court in its discretion.
  Purpose: for the witness to explain or supplement his answer in the cross

Section 8. Re-cross-examination. — Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examination, the adverse party may re-
cross-examine the witness on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and also on such other matters as may be
allowed by the court in its discretion.
 Purpose: to determine the truthfulness in the re-direct

NOTA BENE: NATURE OF CROSS EXAMINATION: constitutional right (the right to confront the witness against him)

Section 9. Recalling witness. — After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the witness cannot
be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may
require.
People vs fabre The defense argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added
strength for the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to
present any rebuttal evidence. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the
party against whom the witness is called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth
or accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct examination. The party against
whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely
on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be
believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give
full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not
cross-examined by the other party.

The alibi of appellant itself would not appear to be deserving of serious consideration. His
account that at the time of the alleged rape he was working at a coconut plantation, just
about one kilometer away from the place of the crime, hardly would amount to much. Nor
would the testimony of Adela Fabre, his wife, merit any better regard. At first, she testified
that on the day of the rape incident, she had left their house at four oclock in the afternoon.
Later, however, she changed her story by saying that she had left the house in the morning
and returned only at ten oclock that same morning, staying home the whole day thereafter. In
any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough for an accused to prove
that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he would have to demonstrate
likewise that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Clearly, in the instant case, it was not at all
impossible nor even improbable for appellant to have been at the crime scene.

Leading and misleading question

Section 10. Leading and misleading questions. — A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the
examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of
tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or
of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or contrary to that which he
has previously stated. It is not allowed.
People vs As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when
perez 397 scra the witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts
without prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of
their reluctant lips. In the case at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing leading questions
to Mayia as she was evidently young and unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if
not uncertain. As explained in People v. Rodito Dagamos:

The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the
questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a
 Child Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the
ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to
the developmental level of the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue
embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of
a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of justice.

The Court has repeatedly stated that it is highly inconceivable for a child of tender age,
inexperienced in the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a
medical examination of her private part, subject herself to public trial, and tarnish her familys
honor and reputation, unless she was motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the
wrong committed against her.

Impeachment
Section 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he
was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad, or by
evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present, testimony, but not by evidence of
particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment,
that he has been convicted of an offense. (15)
 What? Attack on the credibility of the witness
 “An evidence may be admissible but may not be credible”
 How to impeach? 3 ways
o By contradictory evidence:evidence that the witness’ testimony is wrong or untrue. Predicate need not
be laid.
o By evidence that his general reputation is bad: evidence that the witness’ general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad. Exception to hearsay (Rule130 sec41) / opinion rule R130 sec.50
o By prior inconsistent statement with his present testimony: evidence that the witness has made at other
times statement inconsistent with his present testimony. (lay the predicate)
 Improper way to impeach? By evidence of particular wrongful act unless convicted of an offense

Section 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. — Except with respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d)
and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing of his adverse
interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by the party
presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. He may
also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject
matter of his examination-in-chief. (6a, 7a)
 May party impeach his own witness (sec12)?General rule: NO, except: unwilling/hostile witness, adverse party
 What(when) is hostile/unwilling witness? So declared by the court upon adequate showing of reluctant to testify,
mislead into calling the witness in the witness stand.
 Two ways to impeach own witness: the party presenting him presented the witness as if it was called by the
adverse party/ cross examination

Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. — Before a witness can be impeached
by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be
related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he
made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the
witness before any question is put to him concerning them. (16)
 How to lay the predicate:
o the statement must be related to him with circumstances of the times and places and the person present
o ask whether he made the statements
o let him explain.
 Laying the predicate(meaning):means that there must be an evidentiary reason to allow the thing you are trying
to get admitted, admitted into evidence / provide for a foundation
 Effect if there is no predicate: the impeachment is not complete
 Effect of impeachment:
Section 14. Evidence of good character of witness. — Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible
until such character has been impeached. (17)
 Why?: There is a presumption that the witness is telling the truth
 Evidence of good character of a witness is not admissible unless the witness has been impeached

Section 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from the court
any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses. The judge may
also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing with one another until all shall have been
examined. (18)

Section 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder, the remainder admissible.
— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the
same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is
given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be
given in evidence. (11a)

People vs On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the
castillano testimony of Luz, the prosecutions principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony
during the preliminary examination before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn
statement given to the police investigators for the reason that the transcripts and sworn
statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the appellants nor admitted in
evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony
during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz
was not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies, as mandated
by Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:

How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement. - Before a witness can be

impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the
times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be
shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.

The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. Before the credibility of a witness
and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior
statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay
the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the
witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain
the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under
which they were made. This Court held in People v. Escosura that the statements of a witness
prior to her present testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching her credibility unless her
attention was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given an
opportunity to explain said inconsistencies. In a case where the cross-examiner tries to
impeach the credibility and truthfulness of a witness via her testimony during a preliminary
examination, this Court outlined the procedure in United States vs. Baluyot, thus:

...For instance, if the attorney for the accused had information that a certain witness, say
Pedro Gonzales, had made and signed a sworn statement before the fiscal materially different
from that given in his testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon the attorney when
cross-examining said witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did
not make such and such statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement
different from that delivered in court. If the witness admits the making of such contradictory
statement, the accused has the benefit of the admission, while the witness has the
opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the other hand, if the witness denies
making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove that the witness
did make such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the
document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. This process of
 cross-examining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in the
practice of the American courts laying a predicate for the introduction of contradictory
statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid upon cross-
examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to impeach a witness;
though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the discretion of the court.

In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any
discrepancies between her present testimony and her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. The appellants did not even mark and offer in
evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for the specific purpose of impeaching her
credibility and her present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted
by the trial court, said transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.

Reference to memorandum
Section 16. When witness may refer to memorandum.— A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting
a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately
thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and knew that the same was correctly written or
recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if
he chooses, cross examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such
writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record
correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution. (10a)
 In order to refresh his memory
 General rule: His testimony is the evidence and not the memorandum, the memorandum was only use to help
him recollect his memories.
 Except:best evidence rule

Present memory revived

People vs The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed.
plasencia
Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this
case, the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained
that she merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like details.

Appellants see inadvertency on Francisca's appearing to be "jittery" on the witness stand.

Nervousness and anxiety of a witness is a natural reaction particularly in the case of those
who are called to testify for the first time. The real concern, in fact, should be when they show
no such emotions.

Past recollection recorded

Canque vs CA Under the above provision (Rule 132, 10), the memorandum used to refresh the memory of
the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple
reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In
other words, where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been
refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as
corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any
written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he
supports his open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did
prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing
memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied,
the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if
only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is
doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of
such evidence .
Section 18. Right to respect writing shown to witness.— Whenever a writing is shown to a witness, it may be
inspected by the adverse party. (9a)
 Purpose: for the adverse party to cross examine
Authentication and proof of documents
Section 19. Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their presentation evidence, documents are either public or
private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)
 Two kinds of documents: public(enumeration in sec19) / private(all other writings are private)
 In relation to letter b of sec.19:sec30 r132 – the acknowledgement of the notary is the authentication / except will
and testament – wills need to be authenticated or proven
 Importance for the distinction of documents: for authentication, only private documents need to be
authenticated(due execution and authenticity)

Section 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. (21a)
 How to prove authenticity and due execution of private document:
o By anyone who saw the document executed or written
o By evidence of genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker
 Sec.22 – how genuineness of handwriting proved: by witness who has seen the person
write…xxx(second statement is opinion rule) or by comparison by the witness or the court to
other writings (expert witness / opinion rule)

Section 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary. — Where a private document is
more than thirty years old, is produced from the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is
unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be given. (22a)
 exception to sec.20
 Documents more than 30 years old(at the time it is presented in court) that is produced from where it is naturally
found and unblemished by any alterations

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness
who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting
to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge

Section 23. Public documents as evidence.— Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents
are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. (24a)
 Public document made by public officer: prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
 Not made by a public officer:
 WHAT: official records / acknowledged documents / public records of private documents
Evidential nature: prima facie evidence, even against third person
Iwasawa vs As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
gangan execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the
sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued
them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due
execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible,
they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted
since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the
 contrary.

This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case
Asian terminal The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
vs philam presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132
insurance of the Rules of Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to
be presented as evidence in court.

In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private
person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a
public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires
authentication.
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may
be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office. (25a)
 How is it proved? Evidenced by official publication or copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record.

Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if
he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)
 Important statement: that the copy is a correct copy of the original or a specific part thereof
 The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer

Section 26. Irremovability of public record.— Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in evidence,
must not be removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is
essential to the just determination of a pending case. (27a)
 Public records may not be removed from the office in which it is kept unless with a court order and the inspection
of the record is essential to the just determination of a pending case.
The reason why certified true copy is acceptable because official copy of such record must not be removed from the office
which it is kept. (one of the exception of best evidence rule)

Section 27. Public record of a private document.— An authorized public record of a private document may be proved
by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate
that such officer has the custody. (28a)
 How to present evidence: original record or by a copy attested by the legal custodian with certification that the
legal custodian has custody.

Section 28. Proof of lack of record.— A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record
or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry. (29)
 How? Written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or his deputy, that no record or
entry can be found or exist in the records of his office accompanied by a certificate that such officer has the
custody of official record
 Effect: the certificate of no record exist is in itself admissible as evidence that the officer who supposed to have
records has no record in such office.
Section 29. How judicial record impeached. — Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want of
jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the record, in
respect to the proceedings. (30a)
 How to impeach judicial records: present evidence to prove the enumeration.

Section 30. Proof of notarial documents. — Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided
by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence
of the execution of the instrument or document involved. (31a)
 Documents acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country is admissible as evidence provided that such
acknowledgement was made before the Philippine consul or embassy or by a foreign notary recognize by their law
to acknowledge such documents, provided that the notary submits a certificate stating the circumstances and have
the same authenticated by the Philippine .

Section 31. Alteration in document, how to explain.— The party producing a document as genuine which has been
altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must account for
the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the
consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocent made, or that the alteration did not change the
meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall not be admissible in evidence. (32a)
 Effects of alteration: it will affect the document’s admissibility when the document that is being offered is genuine
/ the alteration was made after the execution of the document / the alteration is in a part material to the question
in dispute

Section 32. Seal.— There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed private documents insofar as their
admissibility as evidence is concerned. (33a)
 Whether seal or unseal it makes no difference on its admissibility.

Section 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. — Documents written in an unofficial language shall
not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of
proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial. (34a)
 Unofficial language in a written document is not admitted as evidence unless accompanied by translation either in
english or Filipino

OFFER AND OBJECTION

Section 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. (35)
 Effect when no offer was made
Aludos vs Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which
suerte has not been formally offered. "The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the
court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered
by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes
for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative
weight."

Although the contract was referred to in Lomises’ answer to Johnny’s complaint and marked
as Exhibit "2" in his pre-trial brief, a copy of it was never attached. In fact, a copy of the May 1,
1985 lease contract "surfaced" only after Lomises filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA
decision. What was formally offered was the 1969 permit, which only stated that Lomises was
permitted to occupy a stall in the Baguio City market and nothing else. In other words, no
evidence was presented and formally offered showing that any and all improvements in the
market stalls shall be owned by the Baguio City Government.
Westmont A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and
investment vs their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its
francia function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent
is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the
evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court
 will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.
Evidence not formally offered during the trial can not be used for or against a party litigant.
Neither may it be taken into account on appeal.

The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer
within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, any
evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.

Prescinding therefrom, the very glaring conclusion is that all the documents attached in the
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court and all the documents attached in
the defendant-appellant’s brief filed by defendant-appellant Wincorp cannot be given any
probative weight or credit for the sole reason that the said documents were not formally
offered as evidence in the trial court because to consider them at this stage will deny the
other parties the right to rebut them.

The arguments of defendant-appellant Wincorp that the plaintiffs-appellees made an

erroneous offer of evidence as the documents were offered to prove what is contrary to its
content and that they made a violation of the parol evidence rule do not hold water.

It is basic in the rule of evidence that objection to evidence must be made after the evidence
is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of
the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is
being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary
evidence may be made.

Section 35. When to make offer.— As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the
witness is called to testify.

Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall
be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing. (n).
 When to make an offer
o Testimonial evidence: at the time the witness is called to testify
o Documentary / object evidence: after presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence (after all witnesses
have testified to the documentary/object)

Section 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the unless a different period is
allowed by the court.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (36a)
 When to object: immediately the offer was made
 Objection to questions propounded: as soon as the grounds shall become reasonably apparent
 Objection to evidence in writing: within 3 days after notice of offer unless different period is allowed by court.
 Grounds for objection must be specified

Section 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. — When it becomes reasonably apparent in the course of the
examination of a witness that the question being propounded are of the same class as those to which objection has been
made, whether such objection was sustained or overruled, it shall not be necessary to repeat the objection, it being
sufficient for the adverse party to record his continuing objection to such class of questions. (37a)

Section 38. Ruling.— The ruling of the court must be given immediately after the objection is made, unless the court
desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall always be made during the
trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the
ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated. However, if the objection is based on two or more
grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of them must specify the ground or grounds relied upon. (38a)
 When to rule on the objection: immediately after the objection was made unless otherwise provided by court
 The reason for the rule on the objection need not be stated unless the objection is based on two or more
grounds.

Section 39. Striking out answer.— Should a witness answer the question before the adverse party had the
opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, and such objection is found to be meritorious, the court shall sustain
the objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the record.

On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise
improper. (n)

Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. — If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court,
the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may
state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed
testimony. (n)
 Purpose: allows said party to raise on appeal the exclusion of such evidence. / appeal

Tender of excluded evidence

Fortune The rule is that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded by the
tobacco vs com court. If a party's offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move or
of int. rev. 761 request that it be attached to form part of the records of the case. If the excluded evidence is
scra 173 oral, he may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness
and the substance of the proposed testimony. These procedures are known as offer of proof
or tender of excluded evidence and are made for purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment
is eventually rendered against the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of
the excluded evidence.

It is of record that the denial of the excluded evidence was never assigned as an error in this
appeal. Thus, this Court cannot pass upon nor consider the propriety of their denial.
Moreover, this Court cannot and should not consider the documentary and oral evidence
presented which are not considered to be part of the records in the first place. Thus, Exhibits
"G", "G- 1" to "G-7" and Exhibit "H", together with the testimony of petitioner's witness
thereon, cannot be admitted and be given probative value.15

It has been repeatedly ruled that where documentary evidence was rejected by the lower
court and the offeror did not move that the same be attached to the record, the same cannot
be considered by the appellate court,16 as documents forming no part of proofs before the
appellate court cannot be considered in disposing the case.17 For the appellate court to
consider as evidence, which was not offered by one party at all during the proceedings below,
would infringe the constitutional right of the adverse party – in this case, the CIR, to due
process of law.

It also bears pointing out that at no point during the proceedings before the CTA En Banc and
before this Court has petitioner offered any plausible explanation as to why it failed to
properly make an offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence. Instead, petitioner harps on
the fact that respondent CIR simply refused its claim for refund on the ground that RR 17-99
was a valid issuance. Thus, for its failure to seasonably avail of the proper remedy provided
under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, petitioner is precluded from doing so at this
late stage of the case. Clearly, estoppel has already stepped in.

In this case, as explained above, petitioner utterly failed to not only comply with the basic
procedural requirement of presenting only the original copies of its documentary evidence,
but also to adhere to the requirement to properly make its offer of proof or tender of
excluded evidence for the proper consideration of the appellate tribunal.
 Indeed, to apply technical rules strictly against the CIR because it simply relied on the validity
of RR 17-99 – but not be strict with respect to petitioner’s shortcomings, would be unfair. For
this would go against the principle that taxation is the rule, exemption/refund, the exception.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt

People vs
caliso
People vs
patentes

Clear and convincing

Supreme court
vs Delgado
Government of
hongkong vs
olalia 521 scra
People vs
fontanilla 664
scra

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS