PERSONS

V. Marriages exempt from Marriage License

Ninal vs. Bayadog

328 SCRA 122

Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito
resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986
stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.

Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the
counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.

Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity is unbroken.

Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.

In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.

The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”.

Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Manzano vs. Sanchez

A.M. MTJ-00-1329, March 8, 2001

Facts: Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him in San Gabriel Archangel
Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. However, her husband contracted another marriage with
one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same
was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano
was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit
of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised
the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack
of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.

Issues:

1) Whether or not convalidation of the second union of the respondent falls under the purview of Article 34 of the Family Code.

2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Ruling: For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1! of !9
 PERSONS
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have
no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years and are without legal impediment
to marry each other; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and
that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993
and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.
Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting
previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. Neither can respondent Judge take
refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven
years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Mariategui vs. CA
G.R. No. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS:

This is a case for partition of several pieces of land belonging to Lupo Mariategui, who died without a will.

During his lifetime, Lupo contracted three (3) marriages. The first wife died, so he contracted a second marriage. The second wife also passed
away so he contracted a third marriage. The third wife also preceded Lupo in death.

The issue in this case arose because at the time of his death, Lupo left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Later,
Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves a
certain lot of the Muntinglupa Estate and title was issued. Now, Lupo’s children by his third marriage filed a complaint with the lower court,
contending that since they were co-heirs of Lupo’s estate they were deprived of their respective shares in the lot mentioned. In answer, the other
party said that the complaint was not really for annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition but for recognition of natural children.

The lower court ruled in favor of Lupo’s heirs from the first and second marriage. Thus, the case was elevated to the CA, where they raised the
issue of their parents’ lawful marriage and their legitimacy as children.

CA ruled that all the heirs of Lupo were entitled to equal shares in the estate. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
◦ Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed
◦ Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to successional rights over the said lot

HELD:

The case is really one for partition. The question of the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the
estate of the deceased.

Existence of the Marriage

Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo to
his son who testified that “when his father was still living, he was able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before
a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal.” The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere
fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all the requisites for its validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there
being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and
the ordinary habits of life.

Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale:

“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is
a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
towards legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
2! of !9
 PERSONS
evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.”

So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption
of their being married must be admitted as a fact.

Filiation

Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto’s birth certificate was a record of birth referred to in
Article 172 of the Code. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of
the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172
but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.

Prescription of Action for Partition

In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo and therefore,
the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run
against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked,
have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the
co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner.

Petition dismissed.

Republic vs. Dayot

G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS: On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the execution of a sworn affidavit attesting
that both of them had attained the age of maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an
action for bigamy against Jose. Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had
lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. The RTC
rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for the ground that the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of
Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from
a marriage license under Article 34 of the New Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition
that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?

RULING: Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements of valid marriage in which the sworn
affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper because they started living together five months before the celebration of
their marriage. That according to the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 34 “No license shall be necessary
for the marriage for a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediments to marry each other… “ it means that a five years period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage,
and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the
day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years and
continuity that is unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for
the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended
Decision that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.

3! of !9
 PERSONS
VI. Void and Voidable Marriages

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA

266 SCRA 324

FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage contract. After the
celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsoi’s mother. There they slept together on the same bed in
the same room for the first night of their married life.
Gina’s version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that night of their marriage, or
having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There
was no sexual intercourse between them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife they went to
Baguio City. But they did so together with Ching’s mother, uncle and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual
intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But
during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husband’s private parts
nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that Gina is healthy, normal and
still a virgin while Ching’s examination was kept confidential up to this time.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she had observed him using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man
Ching’s version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does not
want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant,
was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she
always removed his hands.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage entered into by
Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.

The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and
the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children basedon the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction
therefore is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage
is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It
is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572

Facts: Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged that they were married at Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate
and marriage license, unknown to her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz which is still valid and existing. She came to
know the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and, as a consequence,
to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him.

Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition of declaration of nullity is unnecessary.
It added that private respondent has no property which in his possession.
4! of !9
 PERSONS

Issue: Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against petitioner on the
ground of bigamy.

Ruling: There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one
Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of
their marriage. The Court had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage.

The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according
to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage
is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.

Article 36

Republic vs. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997

FACTS:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of
“immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and
squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel
consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and
affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

HELD:The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil
laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct
in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but
appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing
any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly
explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be
clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their
children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal
and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Louell Santos vs. CA

G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995

Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met Julia Rosario Bedia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with
Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to their son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julia’s parents, as
averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarreled about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from
Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she
promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training.
5! of !9
 PERSONS
During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed a petition to
nullify their marriage due to Julia’s alleged psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julia’s failure to return home or at least
communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia filed an opposition; she said that it is Leouel who is
incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouel’s petition is however denied by the lower and
appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.

HELD:
No. Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term “psychological incapacity”, which is
adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted
with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI
for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC
would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term “psychological incapacity” defies any precise definition since psychological causes
can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly
shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.

Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano

G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004

Facts: Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a
Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in
Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November
16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.

On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to
respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the
marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his
family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never
responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their
child.

Issue: Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity.

Ruling: The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind
of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.

Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the
context of legal separation. It cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical

6! of !9
 PERSONS
and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the
norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

Choa vs. Choa

G.R. No. 1473376, November 26, 2002

Facts: Leni Choa, petitioner, and Alfonso Choa, respondent, were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children
were born. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Also filed an
amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage based on her alleged psychological incapacity. The case went on
trial with the respondent presenting his evidence. However, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the evidence. RTC denied
petitioner’s demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner must controvert the established quantum evidence of respondent.
Petitioner elevated the case to CA after the motion of reconsideration was denied. CA held that denial of the demurrer was merely
interlocutory and petitioner in her defense must present evidence.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s obligated to present her evidence despite the inadequate evidence of respondent in the
annulment of marriage case grounded on psychological incapacity.

Ruling: The petition is meritorious. However, the evidence against petitioner is grossly insufficient to support any finding of
psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.

Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latter’s psychological incapacity
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage
and deportation.

The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife.
It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply
because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule
that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of
discretion bordering on absurdity.

Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability. The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. There
was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union.

Dedel vs. CA
G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004

In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. They’ve had four children since then. David then found out that Sharon is
irresponsible as a wife and as a mother because during the marriage Sharon had extra-marital affairs with various other guys
particularly with one Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim. David averred that
Sharon is psychologically incapacitated and David submitted the findings of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed
psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by
her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her
the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven.

HELD: PI is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not sufficient. PI is intended to the most serious cases of personality
disorders which make one be incapable of performing the essential marital obligations. Sharon’s sexual infidelity does not
constitute PI nor does it constitute the other forms of psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one

7! of !9
 PERSONS

of those contemplated in law. Until further statutory or jurisprudential parameters are set or established, SI cannot be appreciated
in favor of the dissolution of marriage.

Republic vs. Rodolfo O. De Gracia

G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014

In 1969, Rodolfo De Gracia and Natividad Rosalem married each other. Their first child was born in the same year. In 1972, they
begot a second child. However, after giving birth, Natividad left their conjugal home, even selling said house, and then had an
affair with an engineer. She bore a child with the said engineer. In 1991, she left the engineer and cohabited with another man.
In 1998, Rodolfo filed a petition to have their marriage be declared void on the ground that Natividad is psychologically
incapacitated. Rodolfo engaged the services of Dr. Cheryl Zalsos to evaluate both parties. In court, Zalsos testified that both
parties are psychologically incapacitated; that Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a
son with another woman; that Natividad lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters; that
both suffered from “utter emotional immaturity which is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered as deviant from persons
who abide by established norms of conduct”; that the mental condition of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration
of marriage, although it only manifested after.
The RTC gave weight to Zalsos testimony hence the marriage was declared void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity was proven in this case.

HELD: No. The evidence presented failed to support a finding of psychological incapacity. The psychiatric evaluation report of
Dr. Zalsos does not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and
incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence (Molina Guidelines).
The Supreme Court also ruled: Although expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of
parties are usually given considerable weight by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by
independent evidence.

Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez

G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015

FACTS:
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits,
when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage on
the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they
relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every
instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must
not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity”
obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours”
with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are
concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the
malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered

8! of !9
 PERSONS
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution
only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void
ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what
is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.”
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed
in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative
value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay
that would justify their exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional temperaments

The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and examine
the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing
the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.
The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment,
least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts
sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code.
We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and
should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in
cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or absence of
psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood
at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along
her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their
moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly
on her very young children.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties,
but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on
every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her
own personal and escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a
parent to safeguard and protect her children.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September
19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.

9! of !9