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Prasenjit Duara
Journal of World History, Volume 12, Number 1, Spring 2001, pp. 99-130
(Article)
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The Discourse of Civilization
and Pan-Asianism*
prasenjit duara
University of Chicago
* Thanks are due to the many people who made pertinent and constructive comments
at the various places I have presented this paper. I am particularly grateful to the following
who sent me written comments: Jerry H. Bentley, Timothy Cheek, John Fitzgerald, Joshua
Fogel, Joan Judge, and David Ownby.
99
100 journal of world history, spring 2001
even more potent source of moral authority. The essay considers the
ways in which the ideas of Asian civilization, East Asian civilization,
and eastern civilization were expressed, realized, and embodied in var-
ious intellectual, political, cultural, and social movements during the
interwar years in East Asia. The critical problem in understanding civ-
ilization during this period is the extent to which it could be identi-
fied with or appropriated by a nationalist goal. Although nationalism,
too, sought its ultimate meaning in civilization, it tried equally to
manipulate it for expansionist purposes. As long as nationalists were
able to deploy civilization as a supplement to nationalism, the civili-
zational idea could scarcely realize its promise as the higher authorita-
tive principle from which the nation-state itself could be judged.
1 The embodiment of Civilization in legal form had the effect of universalizing it, or
in other words, of disassociating it from the particular soil or conditions of its emergence
(such as Christianity) in the West. It was in this particular legal incarnation that countries
like Japan and Turkey could aspire to the status of a Civilized nation and, indeed, sought
very hard to do so.
102 journal of world history, spring 2001
tion was the emergence of the idea of a world religion. Heinz Bechert
has identified the emergence of “Buddhist modernism” in the last quar-
ter of the nineteenth century beginning with the Christian-Buddhist
debates in Sri Lanka, the initiatives taken by Sri Lankan Buddhists and
their Western supporters in the Theosophical Society, and the forging
of international links between Buddhists in Sri Lanka, Japan, and the
West. Indeed, Sri Lankans and Japanese Buddhist thinkers have
remained in the forefront of contributions to contemporary Buddhist
thought (Bechert 1984, 274–275).2 In East Asia, James Ketelaar has
demonstrated how Buddhism could survive the persecution of a new
Shinto national cult during the Meiji period only by refashioning itself
as a “world religion.” In all of these cases, the end product resembled
much less any particular or lived experience of Buddhism or Hinduism
than an abstract, rationalized, modernized, and, perhaps most of all,
Christianized body of thought that served to represent the core of
another civilization. Central to this development was the 1893 Chi-
cago Congress of World Religions in which each of these traditions
first gained publicity—indeed, were publicly produced as world reli-
gions (Ketelaar 1990).3
Finally, there is a European—specifically German—intellectual
current, identifiable in part with Herder’s notion of Kultur/culture that
transmuted into the new idea of civilization by the end of the Great
War. Herder’s notion of Kultur is well known and I will trace no more
than its broad outlines here.4 This intellectual tradition can, signifi-
cantly, be found in what may be the most important intellectual state-
ment of the new conception of civilization, Oswald Spengler’s Decline
of the West. Ironically, if not unexpectedly, Spengler does not refer to
the entities of his world history as Civilizations, but Cultures or Kul-
tur. This is because he reserves Civilization for a stage, the final stage,
the frozen stage of a dynamic, evolving Culture.5 At any rate, for our
purposes, his cultures are equivalent to what we have been calling the
alternative conception of civilization: multiple, spiritual, and —as the
highest expression of a people’s achievements, virtues, and authentic-
2 The same reconstruction of Hinduism was taking place in India under the auspices
of the Theosophical Society and thinkers like Sri Aurobindo and Swami Vivekananda.
3 See Welch for China and Taixu. Despite this remaking in universalist terms, Bud-
dhism continued to play a role in nationalism and imperialism (Ketelaar 1990; Becher t
1984).
4 For the relationship of this notion to the ideas of Humboldt and Boas on culture, see
Bunzl.
5 One cannot but be reminded of the German association of the word ‘civilization’
with an effete and superficial French cult of manners and courtesy (see Elias 1978).
Duara: The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism 103
tures, and would become, or perhaps already reflected, the most salient
characteristic of the new conception of civilization. Ideas of Eastern versus
Western civilizations which increasingly accompanied the Great War
were premised upon this ideal of civilizational spirituality. In the West,
the most influential scholar to propagate and develop these ideas was
Arnold Toynbee. In the course of over forty years (1920s–1960s) dur-
ing which he wrote the twelve volumes of A Study of World History,
Toynbee broke with the vestigial progressivist vision of (essentially
Western) civilization and even departed in some measure from Spen-
gler’s view of hermetically closed organic civilizations (McNeill 1989
103, 165; Bentley 1996, 7). But perhaps most significant was his con-
ception of the role of religion in civilizations. In contrast to Gibbon
and others, who often associated Christianity with barbarism as the
destroyers of Civilization, Toynbee, in his earlier volumes, already
viewed religion as a kind of aid to civilization, as a chrysalis which pre-
served the germs of an older civilization. By the 1940s, he began to see
the rise and fall of civilizations as subsidiary to the growth of religion
(Toynbee 1948, 230–234). In this way, Toynbee came to reverse ear-
lier notions of Civilization which were frequently founded upon a
notion of disenchantment. Thus did Toynbee seek to counter James
Fraser’s view of religion in the West—that, according to him, echoed
Gibbon’s—as having sapped the manliness of early Europe (Toynbee,
228). For Toynbee, from now on, the goal of history, the historical
function of civilization, was to seek ever-deeper spiritual insight (Toyn-
bee, 238–239). In the final years of his life Toynbee was drawn to ideas
of a common global civilization originating in the technological
achievements of the West, but spiritually regenerated by the major
world civilizations. It is not surprising to find his ideas fall on fertile
ground in Japan where he was accepted as a major public thinker and
conducted a series of dialogues with the leader of the Soka Gakkai, a
new religion nourished precisely on such ideas of the blending of East
and Western civilizations (McNeill 1989, 269–273).
What were the conditions for the emergence of this new view of
civilization? The view surfaced in tandem with the disillusionment
produced during the Great War with the idea of the “civilizing mis-
sion.” “The nature of the battle on the Western Front made a mock-
ery of the European conceit that discovery and invention were neces-
sarily progressive and beneficial to humanity,” writes Michael Adas
(Adas 1993, 109). Writer after writer denounced the materialism and
destructiveness of Western Civilization. At the same time, the wider
political forces produced by the end of the war and the new balance of
power, namely, the beginnings of decolonization, the emergence of new
Duara: The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism 105
Given the thrust, timing, and references in the work, the reader
may well be led to believe that this transmutation of civilization has
much to do with the European national wars that enveloped the world
in the twentieth century. This may thus prefigure the shift from a sin-
gular notion of Civilization to multiple civilizations, at least within
Europe. At the same time, I believe that Elias tends to conflate civi-
lization with nation a little too readily, particularly when these nations
face societies perceived as radically different. In doing so, he elides a
very significant ambiguity in the new conception of civilization: that
territorial nations are lesser than the civilizations from which they
emanate; that the principle of civilization is generative of value for the
territorial nation; that the principle of territoriality may also be in
conflict with the principle of civilization; and that nations spend a lot
of energy seeking to match the formal sovereignty deriving from terri-
torial or civic nationalism with the source of authenticity or truth of
the nation deriving from civilization.
I seek to build my own understanding of the new “civilizations” by
reformulating Elias’s insights. First of all, it is necessary not only to sus-
tain but also highlight the distinction implied in Elias’s analysis,
between civilization as equal to the nation and civilization as transna-
tional.6 Indeed, nations require this duality because they often need to
move between the two positions. New nations seek the transnational
conception of civilization because it is only as a transterritorial, uni-
versal ideal—of say, Islam or Confucianism —with its potential capac-
ity to reveal the truth of the human condition and embrace all of
humanity, that this (civilizational) self can achieve recognition from
the Other. At the heart of the critique of Civilization, launched by
both Western and non-Western intellectuals after the Great War, was
the betrayal of the universalizing promise of the “civilizing mission”—
a mission which exemplified the desire not (simply) to conquer the
Other, but to be desired by the Other. In this critique, Civilization had
forfeited the right to represent the highest goals or ultimate values of
humanity and was no longer worthy of being desired, or even recog-
nized, by the other. In so opposing the legally articulated notion of the
good and valuable posed by Civilization, the alternative civilizational
self had to counterpose a still higher good and a truth that was authen-
tically universal. Note here the close relationship, indeed, mirroring,
by civilization of the older Western conception of Civilization. It is
the spiritual, moral, and universal core of civilizations that furnishes
nations with the same kind of authenticating and authorizing function
that Civilization furnished for Western imperialist nations. Note fur-
ther that the gap between the territorial nation and civilization is not
only territorial, but principled. Because the spiritual impulse of a civ-
ilization tends to be universalizing, national boundaries are ultimately
artificial and limiting. The transcendent stance of civilization thus
may permit a critique of the nation and, as we shall see, can produce
the problem of loyalties divided between those to the nation and those
to civilization. 7
At the same time, there is no doubt that the territorial nation seeks
to equate itself with a civilization. Elias is surely right about the role
of the bourgeoisie—loosely defined—in formulating this exalted and
noble vision of the nation and promoting it as a means of exercising
its hegemony both within and without the nation. In this aspect, civili-
zation does become the highly self-conscious ideology of the nation.
One might argue that for nations such as China or India, just as for
France or England, one can stretch the nation to fit the civilization—
territorially, if not in principle. But how can smaller nations do so? I
believe there are several narrative strategies within the historiography
of nations that can be deployed by many nations to be the true repre-
sentative or the leader of, if not equivalent to, a certain civilizational
tradition. The most powerful of these—at least in terms of its impact
on the domestic population—was the Japanese claim of inheriting the
leadership of Asian civilization because of its success in mastering
Western Civilization; we shall deal with this in the next section. But
one can think of how Sri Lankan intellectuals went about construct-
ing a Buddhist civilization in a way that made it the leader of such a
project. Consider also the promotion of pre-Columbian civilizations
among the relevant Latin American nations or pre-Islamic civiliza-
tions among Middle Eastern nations. Civilization in the era of nation-
states thus needs to both transcend and serve the territorial nation.
We have noted that civilization both opposes the Civilization of
imperialism, but also depends on it in the way that it authorizes this
opposition for nations. This is most evident in the selection of those
elements and themes from the history of this alleged civilization and
8 Born in reaction both to the Western and imperialist character of Civilization, the
idea of “Asian” civilization necessarily possessed an anti-imperialist rhetoric of liberation
and egalitarianism that was often in tension with the celebration of Asian traditionalism.
We see this particularly in the case of Manchukuo.
Duara: The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism 111
(badao) of the hegemon (the way of the West). Sun was rhetorically
skillful in being able to draw the Japanese into a discourse of solidarity,
simultaneously retaining a Chinese centrality by invoking the imperial
Chinese tribute system. Wangdao was based upon the recognition of
the Chinese emperor through the hierarchical system of reciprocities
of the tribute system. Thus Sun appealed to the Japanese to renounce
the Western methods of badao and return to the Asian method of
peaceful solidarity. As it turned out, the Japanese military appropri-
ated the language of wangdao and used it to rule China instead. The
political interest in pan-Asianism in China is also indicated by the
convening of two successive Asian People’s conferences: in Nagasaki
in 1926, and in Shanghai in 1927. To be sure, these conferences hardly
demonstrated much solidarity, because the Chinese and Korean dele-
gates understandably used the forum to argue that the condition for
Asian unity must be Japanese renunciation of imperialism (Mizuno
1994).
In any event, Sun’s discourse of civilization developed in two direc-
tions which exemplify nationalism’s aporetic relationship to the idea
of civilization. On the one hand, the Goumindang (GMD) actively
propagated the idea of two civilizations of the East and West by the
1930s. This notion is perhaps best expressed in its New Life movement
of the 1930s through which it sought to revitalize material modernity
represented by the West by means of an ascetic Confucian spirituality
and morality. Chen Lifu, the theorist of the New Life movement made
a classical statement of the East-West synthesis. Creatively employing
the framework of evolutionism, Chen outlined a parallel material and
spiritual evolutionism. Without spiritual progress, the evolution of
material civilization would inevitably lead to the enslavement of man-
kind by things. The role of the New Life movement was to infuse the
moral qualities from the essence of Chinese civilization into the evo-
lution of material life. Thus will history be propelled into the civiliza-
tional ideal of datong or the Great Unity (Chen 1976, 128, 133).
Note, however, that Chen’s civilization is uniquely a Chinese civili-
zation; it represents that aspect of the new doctrine of civilization that
becomes tied to the nation-state. But for several reasons, the GMD’s
equation of civilization and nationalism could not always work even
for its own statist purposes. Sun Yat-sen’s conception of a Pan-Asian-
ism was also centered on Confucian virtues of the “kingly way,” but he
saw these ethical and moral goals as fully Asian in opposition to
Chen’s conception. This strand of thought in the GMD was picked up
by another leading GMD theorist and leader, Dai Jitao, who created
an institute and a journal in 1930 by the name of Xin Yaxiya to keep
alive Sun’s ideas. The publication well expressed the tensions of the
Duara: The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism 117
10 Given the paucity of Chinese data on these societies, the best we can do is to inter-
rogate the Japanese records. While we can assume that the Japanese researchers may have
wanted to exaggerate the numbers in these groups, there was also a concern for accuracy
since these surveys were conducted principally to assess the potential for support and oppo-
sition to their rule. The figures cited above refer to the spread of these societies all over
China largely before the Japanese occupation. Most of the surveys were marked “secret” or
for internal consumption. Note that a similar mystery of exaggerated numbers accompanies
the rise of such redemptive societies as the Falungong or the Zhonggong today. Given the
climate of suppression and secrecy in which these societies had to operate during both peri-
ods, the resemblance is perhaps not accidental.
Duara: The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism 119
Thus, for instance, the Way of the Temple studied by Ownby, like many
others (see note 11 below), cooperated with the Japanese, but battled
the G M D and the Chinese Communist Party (C CP), presumably
because the latter opposed their transcendent vision. Nationalism and
modern ideas of society were seen by them as restrictive and repressive
of their activities; in this sense, the Japanese military-sponsored ideas
of “clash of civilization” often made sense to them even if they did not
earlier see themselves self-consciously as representing a civilization in
conflict.
At the same time, however, it is also abundantly clear that their
trans-territorial or transcendent goals were just as clearly appropriated
and subverted by the Japanese puppet state, no matter what its rhet-
oric. But this raises a different set of issues. How far can we hold a peo-
ple responsible for the state’s manipulation of their ideals? Does this
responsibility authorize our dismissal or condemnation of the varied,
and even mixed, motives of people—like people everywhere—who
pursue their goals and ideals as they might in any society? Several soci-
ety leaders believed that an East Asian regime committed to their
vision of civilization was preferable to a national regime hostile to their
goals. Indeed, when it was possible, the redemptive societies cooper-
ated with the Japanese only to the extent to which they saw them fur-
thering their goals. In the rural and peripheral areas, wherever the soci-
eties saw the Japanese-backed regime as inimical to their ideals and
goals—whether towards their transcendent vision or towards their
conception of ideal community—the opposition to the regime was
quite sustained (Ōtani 1937, 27–32, 38, 46, 58–60, 97, 104–108; Taki-
zawa 1937, 89–92, 95). These societies had no need for a state which
did not further their goals.11
The new discourse of civilization, however derivative from the old,
carried with it a redemptive and egalitarian utopianism. The thrust of
my essay has shown that this potential was repeatedly lost in the twen-
tieth century as the expansionist and exclusive tendencies of national-
ism tended to transform civilization from a process of the Self ’s desire
to be desired by the Other through the latter’s emulation of the “civi-
lized” Self, to a mark, however defensive, of superiority and distinc-
tiveness. Elias emphasized the utter nationalization of the idea of civ-
ilization among the French and Germans on the eve of the second
World War. Recent scholarship on civilization, such as the writings of
Huntington, has tended not to see the tension between the two, but
rather, taken their conflation for granted. And yet we must recognize
that the ideological relations between nationalism and civilization
require some separation of the two. There are many social groups and
forces or tendencies which espouse civilizational ideals in the world.
Most dramatically, the recent appearance—or rather, visibility—of
the Falungong and related movements in China testifies to the persis-
tent search for transcendence.12 It is not the business of historians to
support or oppose such groups, but by acknowledging and sustaining
the relative autonomy of civilization, we may hold nationalism to a
higher standard than it has been in the past.
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