MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs.
GSIS, MANILA HOTEL the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, BELLOSILLO, J.
SELF executing provisions
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the
subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written
in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding
rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution.
Facts:
GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government decided to sell through public bidding
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). Two bidders participated: Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
the shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, Manila Prince matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share. Perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid, Manila Prince came
to the Supreme Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Issue:
Whether GSIS is mandated to abide the dictates of the
Constitution on National Economy and Patrimony.
Ruling:
YES. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm
offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The
bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only
be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere
tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest
bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they
under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in
choosing the awardee, respondents are mandated to abide by the
dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested
parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,
the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly
written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the
bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It
is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land.
Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason
enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the
foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger
reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
Mabanag vs. Vito Case Digest (Consti-1)
Amendmenet to the constitution
En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate
opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 1 filed separate
opinion
Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had
been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission
on Elections as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946.
The three senators were suspended by the Senate
shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress
following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The eight representatives
since their election had not been allowed to sit in the
lower House, except to take part in the election of the
Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not
been formally suspended. A resolution for their
suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted
upon definitely by the House when the petition for
prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three
senators and eight representatives did not take part in
the passage of the congressional resolution, designated
"Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to
ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned
within the computation of the necessary three-fourths
vote which is required in proposing an amendment to
the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary
three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The
petition for prohibition sought to prevent the
enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is
allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of
the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the
Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Eight senators,
17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic
Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth
Party.
Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the
irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing
an amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation
of authorities that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power
to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the
courts by express constitutional or statutory provision.
This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the
separation of powers, a principle also too well known to
require elucidation or citation of authorities. The
difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the
meaning of political question. The term is not
susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and
authorities are not always in full harmony as to the
scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to
meddle with the actions of the political departments of
the government. If a political question conclusively binds
the judges out of respect to the political departments, a
duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges
under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If
ratification of an amendment is a political question, a
proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a
scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be
noted that the amendatory process as provided in
section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification." There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from the
other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
political function performed by the Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its
charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this
power is even in dependent of any intervention by the
Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous
attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public
interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the
validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.
*Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No.
160261, November 10, 2003.
(Impeachment; Judicial Review; One-Year Bar)
Facts:
-On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada
filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was
endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August
5, 2003.
-The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13,
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
-To date, the Committee Report to this effect has
not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
-Four months and three weeks since the filing on June
2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a
day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was
filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District,
Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,
Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr.
-This second impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed
by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.
-Pertinent to the impeachment proceedings, Sections 16
and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
provide:
“Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the House files a
verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a
verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the
House through a resolution of endorsement against an
impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution against such official, as
the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the
date the House votes to overturn or affirm the
finding of the said Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is
not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by
at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at
the time of the filing of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with the Secretary
General.
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the
date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated
as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment
proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same
official.”
-Petitioners then went to the SC via petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition to stop a purported
unconstitutional impeachment.
-Respondents’ contentions: (1) impeachment is a political
action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence,
any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of
the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of
judicial review; (2) the one-year bar prohibiting the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide
and seven Associate Justices had not been “initiated”
as the House of Representatives, acting as the
collective body, has yet to act on it.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not questions relative to impeachment are
beyond the scope of judicial review;
(2) Whether or not the one-year bar prohibiting the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials applies under the circumstances;
(3) Whether or not the provisions of Sections 16 and 17
of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules are
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
(1) No.
The major difference between the judicial power of the
Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only
impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power
but also a duty, and it was given an expanded
definition to include the power to correct any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any government
branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with
respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation, our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides
for several limitations to the exercise of such power
as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of
filing, required vote to impeach, and the one-syear
bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter
of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in
the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the
contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components
of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the
Constitution.
(2) Yes.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to
the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term “to
initiate” refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial
action of said complaint.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father
Bernas clarified that the word “initiate,” appearing in
the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period
of one year”
refers to two objects, “impeachment case” and
“impeachment proceeding.”
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the
common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first
sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the
second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following
the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term
"cases" must be distinguished from the term
"proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-
quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote
of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the
Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive
power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other
body can do it. However, before a decision is made to
initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be
followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must
be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin
word initium, means to begin. On the other hand,
proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a
middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but
in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is
the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of
the House of Representatives or by a private citizen
endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this
complaint by the proper Committee which may either
reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the
resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the
complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the
House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of
Representatives which either affirms a favorable
resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary
resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at
least one third of all the Members upholds the
complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the
House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this
point that an impeachable public official is successfully
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged
with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as
impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment
proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is
the end of the House proceeding and the beginning
of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already
been done. The action of the House is already a further
step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning.
Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating
step which triggers the series of steps that follow. x x x x
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by
the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3
(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October
23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
(3) Yes.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules which state that
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated: (1) if
there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient
in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient
in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before
the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of
a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at
least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give
the term “initiate” a meaning different from “filing.”
*CHREA v. CHR, G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004.
(CHR; Fiscal Autonomy; Reclassification of Personnel
Positions; Salary Standardization Law)
Facts:
-On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-
0555 providing for the upgrading or raising of salary
grades of certain positions in the Commission.
-To support the implementation of such scheme, the
CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the
augmentation of a commensurate amount generated
from savings under Personnel Services.
-The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and
upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno
denied the request.
-In light of the DBM's disapproval of the proposed
personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National
Capital Region Office, through a memorandum,
recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBM's
disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
-Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in
representation of the rank and file employees of the
CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
-However, the CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's
request and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured.
-CHREA then went to the CA via Rule 43, then to the SC
via Rule 45.
-CHR’s contention: The CHR has the authority to cause
the upgrading, reclassification, plantilla creation, and
collapsing scheme without the approval of the DBM
because CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the CHR can validly implement an
upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of
plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior
approval of the Department of Budget and Management;
(2) Whether or not the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Ruling:
(1) No.
The approval of the DBM must first be sought prior to
implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of
positions in government. This is consonant to the
mandate of the DBM under the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
“SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of
Budget and Management shall assist the President in
the preparation of a national resources and expenditures
budget, preparation, execution and control of the
National Budget, preparation and maintenance of
accounting systems essential to the budgetary process,
achievement of more economy and efficiency in the
management of government operations, administration
of compensation and position classification systems,
assessment of organizational effectiveness and review
and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary
or organizational implications.”
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to
disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its
finding that such scheme lacks legal justification. x x x x
Rep. Act No. 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary
Standardization Law, dated 01 July 1989, which
provides in Sections 2 and 4 thereof that it is the DBM
that shall establish and administer a unified
Compensation and Position Classification System. Thus:
SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. -- It is hereby declared the
policy of the State to provide equal pay for substantially
equal work and to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities,
and qualification requirements of the positions. In
determining rates of pay, due regard shall be given to,
among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for
comparable work. For this purpose, the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby directed to
establish and administer a unified Compensation and
Position Classification System, hereinafter referred to as
the System as provided for in Presidential Decree No.
985, as amended, that shall be applied for all
government entities, as mandated by the Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 4. Coverage. – The Compensation and Position
Classification System herein provided shall apply to all
positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time
basis, now existing or hereafter created in the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and government financial institutions.
The term “government” refers to the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the
Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but
shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus, offices,
boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils,
authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state
colleges and universities, local government units, and
the armed forces. The term "government-owned or
controlled corporations and financial institutions" shall
include all corporations and financial institutions owned
or controlled by the National Government, whether such
corporations and financial institutions perform
governmental or proprietary functions. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The disputation of the Court of Appeals that the CHR is
exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization
Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof, as
defined above, encompasses the entire gamut of
government offices, without qualification. x x x x
This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in
character as erroneously held by the Court of Appeals.
The word to administer means to control or regulate in
behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution,
application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct
public affairs, as to administer the government of the
state.
(2) No.
Article IX of the Constitution states in no uncertain
terms that only the CSC, the Commission on Elections,
and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as
Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right
to fiscal autonomy. Thus:
“Sec. 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.”
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in
Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on Distribution
of Powers of Government, the constitutional
commissions shall include only the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit, which are granted independence
and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29
thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the
other bodies including the CHR. Thus:
“SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The
Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional
Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance
with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a
Commission on Human Rights, and independent central
monetary authority, and a national police commission.
Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may
establish an independent economic and planning
agency.”
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative
Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among
the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in
the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or
consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise,
expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed
puts an end to what is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention
that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal
autonomy entails freedom from outside control and
limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the
freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in
accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and
dispatch its needs may require from time to time. In
Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon, it is
understood that it is only the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission
on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which
enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a
member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal
autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable
by membership.
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional
creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of
offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or
legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the
grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all
government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the
Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind
with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not
vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade,
and create positions without approval of the DBM. While
the members of the Group are authorized to formulate
and implement the organizational structures of their
respective offices and determine the compensation of
their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must
be exercised within the parameters of the Unified
Position Classification and Compensation System
established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
Compensation Standardization Law. x x x x
The Salary Standardization Law has gained impetus in
addressing one of the basic causes of discontent of many
civil servants.27 For this purpose, Congress has
delegated to the DBM the power to administer the Salary
Standardization Law and to ensure that the spirit behind
it is observed. This power is part of the system of checks
and balances or system of restraints in our government.
The DBM's exercise of such authority is not in itself an
arrogation inasmuch as it is pursuant to the paramount
law of the land, the Salary Standardization Law and the
Administrative Code. x x x x
The courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.
To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting
the nation's coffers, the Secretary of the DBM, as the
President's alter ego, knows from where he speaks
inasmuch as he has the front seat view of the adverse
effects of an unwarranted upgrading or creation of
positions in the CHR in particular and in the entire
government in general.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of the
Cabinet – Singularity of Office – EO 284
Facts: Petitioners in the two separate petitions assail the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284. They argue
that the subject E.O. is unconstitutional because it, in
effect, allows Cabinet members, their undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions
in violation of Sec. 13, Art. VII of the Constitution which,
according to the petitioners provides an absolute
prohibition against these public officers from holding
other offices or positions. They argue that the public
respondents incorrectly applied the exception provided
in Sec. 7 par (2), Art. IX-B of the Constitution with Sec.
13, VII thereof.
This is because, according to the petitioners, the public
respondents interpret these two provisions to mean that
that Cabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries)
and assistant secretaries may hold other public office,
including membership in the boards of government
corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the
Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice
who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII;
or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary
functions of their respective positions. In sum, the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being
challenged by petitioners on the principal submission
that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other
than those provided in the Constitution. That the only
exception provided by Sec. 13, Art. VII is limited to (1)
The Vice-President may be appointed
as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),
Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an
ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), PArticle VIII and nothing else.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the
prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil
Service Commission applies to officers and employees of
the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do
not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article
VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants. On the other hand, the public respondents
posited that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference
to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive
officials mentioned therein are concerned.
Issue: Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their
deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad
exceptions made for appointive officials in general under
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B
Held: No. The Court in resolving the issue traced the
historical background these two provision and concluded
that the framers of the Constitution intended to provide
stricter prohibition against holding other office or
employment with regards to the President, Vice-
President, cabinet members and their subalterns than
the other civil servants in general. They declared that
Sec. 7, par. (2) of Art. IX-B of the Constitution as
providing the general rule while Sec. 13, Art. VII lays
down the exception and not the other way naround. The
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution"
as contained in Sec. 13, Art. VII must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances
cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice- President
being appointed as a member of the Cabinet
under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as
President in those instances provided under Section 7,
pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice
being exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. To this extent, the
court clearly sided with the petitioners herein. The
prohibition under Section 13, Article VII however, is
not to be interpreted as covering positions held without
additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as
provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-
officio means "from office; by virtue
of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
Case Digest: Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto
Guingona, PCSO and PGMC
Transcendental importance to the public
FACTS:
The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system
for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and
diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before
March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested
in operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya
Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International
Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its
services and resources to PCSO. Considering the
citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya
Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to
40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign
stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent
to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of
an online lottery system due to ethical and moral
concerns, however the project pushed through.
ISSUES:
Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal
standing); and
Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light
of Sec. 1 of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.
RULING:
The petitioners have locus standi due to the
transcendental importance to the public that the case
demands. The ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral
well-being of the people. The legal standing then of the
petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of
its sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the
procedural barrier.
Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42,
prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture
with any person, association, company, or entity,
whether domestic or foreign.” The language of the
section is clear that with respect to its franchise or
privilege “to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races,
lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO cannot
exercise it “in collaboration, association or joint venture”
with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning
and import of the phrase. By the exception explicitly
made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another
by way of the methods mentioned, nor can it transfer,
assign or lease such franchise.
TOLENTINO V. COMELEC
Doctrine of proper submission
(Note that this case was decided in 1971, and the
Constitutional Convention herein referred to was for the
purpose of amending the 19352 Constitution.)
FACTS: Congress approved the creation of a
Constitutional Convention of 1971 by virtue of two
resolutions. Congress approved such resolutions in its
capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the
purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments
to
the Constitution.
The Convention approved Organic Resolution
No. 1 which seeks to amend the Constitutional provision
thereby lowering the voting age to 18 y/o. Its Section 3
also provides that “This partial amendment, which refers
only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage
shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will
be
proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on other portions of the amended Section or
on other portions of the entire Constitution.” Later,
President D. Macapagal called upon Comelec to help the
convention implement the said resolution.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the validity of the resolution is subject to
judicial review? YES. Convention and the Court
are still ubject to the Constitution and the rule
of law.
W/N the proposed amendment in question may
be presented to the people for ratification
separately from each and all of the other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the
Convention? NO. The 1935 Constitution
expressly said “an election” thereby saying
that there should one be one election for all
the amendments intended.
Is it within the powers of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a
plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed
amendment reducing to eighteen years the age
for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution proposed in the
Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the
manner and form provided for in said resolution
and the subsequent implementing acts and
resolution of the Convention? NO, because
2 Art. XV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provides
that:
Section 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a
vote of
three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House
of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments
to this Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution
when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which
the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
there was no sufficient time given to the
people to study the matter.
HELD: Said resolution is null and void.
The Courts has jurisdiction not because the Court
is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is
subject to the control of the Court, but simply because
both the Convention and the Court are subject to the
Constitution and the rule of law.
The Convention came into being by a call of a
joint session of Congress pursuant to Section I of
Article XV of the (1935) Constitution. As to matters not
related to its internal operation and the performance
of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the
Constitution, the Convention and its officers and
members are all subject to all the provisions of the
existing Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its
latter task of proposing amendments to the Constitution,
it
is subject to the provisions of Section I of Article XV.
This
must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of
the Constitution took care that the process of amending
the same should not be undertaken with the same ease
and facility in changing an ordinary legislation.
Constitution
making is the most valued power, second to none, of the
people in a constitutional democracy such as the one
our
founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and which
we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. A
constitution worthy of the people for which it is intended
must not be prepared in haste without adequate
deliberation and study. Generally, the framers of the
latter
see to it that their handiwork is not lightly treated and
as
easily mutilated or changed, not only for reasons purely
personal but more importantly, because written
constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last
for
some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they
can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the
people,
hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and
hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political
moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original
constitutions carry with them limitations and conditions,
more or less stringent, made so by the people
themselves,
in regard to the process of their amendment. And when
such limitations or conditions are so incorporated in
the original constitution, it does not lie in the
delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that
they may ignore and disregard such conditions
because they are as powerful and omnipotent as their
original counterparts. (Note that in this case, the Concon
scheduled the plebiscite to be held with the local
elections in 1971. The resolution was adopted
sometime in October of the same year. So in short,
they only have a month left before the plebiscite.- )
The Court holds that it is the condition and
limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the
same Convention must be submitted to the people in a
single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that
the
amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite
is only the first amendment the Convention propose We
hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of
submitting the same for ratification of the people on
November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of
Article
XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention
and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null
and
void.
No one knows what changes in the fundamental
principles of the constitution the Convention will be
minded
to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any
means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of
any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not
later on the Convention may decide to provide for
varying
types of voters for each level of the political units it may
divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other
words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the
verge
of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones,
in
almost every part and aspect of the existing social and
political order enshrined in the present Constitution.
How
can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently
determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age
upon the different institutions which the Convention
may
establish and of which presently he is not given any
idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a
plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the
voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment
per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious
whole. In the context of the present state of things,
where
the Convention has hardly started considering the merits
of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the
existing Constitution, to present to the people any single
proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this
requirement. We are of the opinion that the present
Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of
Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the
people are in the dark as to frame of reference they
can base their judgment on.
Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary 50 SCRA 30
Ratification / Political vs. Justiciable Question
Ponente: Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
The Facts:
The Plebiscite Case
A Convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines was approved on August
24, 1970 and began to perform its functions on June 1,
1971. On September 21, 1972, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines
under Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional
Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines. The next day,President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting
to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and
appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the
plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution on January 15, 1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case
against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of
the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said
“respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further
orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that
said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law
because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of
guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription
of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered
by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for
the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively
in Congress “ and “there is no proper submission to the
people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15,
1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and
assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform
the people of the contents thereof.”
On December 23, the President announced the
postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution and temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for
purposes of free and open debate on the proposed
Constitution.”
The Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being,
from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the
date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite
would be held were known or announced officially.
 effect that independently of the validity of the
“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in ratification, a new Constitution once accepted
Case G.R. No. 
 L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” acquiesced in by the people must be accorded
recognition by the Court.”
praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible,
preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”
On the fourth question, 6 justices voted to DISMISS the
The Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents
petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the
in said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent
strength of their view that “The effectivity of the said
motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday
Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and
noon, January 16, 1973 and set the motion for hearing
ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which
“on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.”
considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond
the competence of this Court, are relevant and
While the case was being heard, the President issued
unavoidable.
Proclamation No. 1102.

“ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO

On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of
PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE
1973 is in force:
1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes
municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities.
of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,
The said Citizens Assemblies were established to
Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes
broaden the base of citizen participation in the
of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and
democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for
Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby
the citizenry to express their views on important national
dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is
issues.
no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution
being considered in force and effect.
The Ratification Case
Dissenting Opinion:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R.
No. L-36142, as a “Filipino citizen, and a qualified and
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “As to
registered voter” and as “a class suit, for himself, and in
whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly
behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated against
ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in
the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National
the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning
Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said
and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens’
respondents “and their subordinates or agents from
Assemblies, especially in the manner the votes therein
implementing any of the provisions of the propose
were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the
Constitution not found in the present Constitution”
requirements thereof.
referring to that of 1935. Javellana alleged that the
President ordered “the immediate implementation of the
However, the fact that there was voting and that the
New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, and that the latter
majority of the votes were for considering as approved
are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in
the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual
implementing the said proposed Constitution. He
form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, the
construed that the President is without authority to
people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes
create the Citizens Assemblies; to approve the proposed
in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of
Constitution; proclaim the ratification; and that the
them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its
election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not
political aspect, which is what counts most, after all,
a free election, hence null and void.
said Article has been substantially complied with, and,
in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally
The Issue:
ratified.”
Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a
SANIDAD V. COMELEC
justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable,
Judicial Supremacy vs. Constitutional Supremacy
question?
Political vs. Justiciable Question
Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with
Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766,
substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the
entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?
FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was
Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution
enacted into law. The Commission on Elections, by
acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the
virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the
people? (acquiesced – “permission” given by silence or
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and
passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet
other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution
or by not making objections.)
No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the
Are petitioners entitled to relief?
said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner
Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper
columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND
Decision and Ratio:
COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of
Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality
The court was severely divided on the issues raised in
of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which
the petition but when the crucial question of whether the
provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists,
petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court
commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite
(Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite
and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion,
day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer
together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee,
or personality shall use his column or radio or television
voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding
time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues It is
the 1973 Constitution.
alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and
unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
The Court held that the issue is political and “beyond
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
the ambit of judicial inquiry.”
enshrined in the Constitution.
Court held that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in
Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is
accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935
unconstitutional
Constitution, which provides only one way for
ratification, i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held in
Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
accordance with law and participated in only by qualified
that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to
and duly registered voters. However, it is conceded that
supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of
the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the
franchises, permits or other grants issued for the
operation of transportation or other public utilities,
media of communication or information to the end that
equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among
candidates are ensured Neither Article IX-C of the
Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646
can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also
been granted the right to supervise and regulate the
exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right
to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression
during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no
candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19
of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's
freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his
choice of the forum where he may express his view. No
reason was advanced by respondent to justify such
abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is
tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of
expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are
matters of public concern and importance. The people's
right to be informed and to be able to freely and
intelligently make a decision would be better served by
access to an unabridged discussion of the issues,
including the forum. The people affected by the issues
presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened
by restrictions on the forum where the right to
expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and
Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression
but they do not guarantee full dissemination of
information to the public concerned because they are
limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times
PBA v. Comelec
1986 Snap Presidential Election
Facts:
1. Eleven (11) petitions were filed for prohibition against
the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special
national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections)
for the offices of President and Vice President. It was
contended that BP 883 in conflict with the constitution
in that it allows the President to continue holding office
after the calling of the special election.
2. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter
of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual
vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the
Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a
special election for President and Vice President earlier
than the regular elections for such positions in 1987.
The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably
vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when
the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed
and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten
(10) days after his proclamation.”
3. The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict
compliance with the cited constitutional provision that
the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office
and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers
have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the
purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They
have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office,
so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE: W/N BP 883 is unconstitutional, and should the
Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of
the elections
The petitions were dismissed and the prayer for the
issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from
holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as
there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP
883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the
Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned
the issue into a political question (from the purely
justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of
the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the
President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the
people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled
election, since there is no issue more political than the
election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the
people decide through their ballot, either to give the
incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new
president.
LAWYER’S LEAGUE VS. AQUINO, ET AL. G.R. No.
73748, May 22, 1986 People Power Revolt
Ponente: GLORIA C. PARAS
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the “new
government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate
Decision:
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted
to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated
below.
On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the
petitions and manifested that they would pursue the
question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is
functus oficio.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people of the Philippines are the judge.
And the people have made the judgment; they have
accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy
of the present government. All the eleven members of
this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ G.R. No. 76180
October 24, 1986
PER CURIAM:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no
respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first
paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously
stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election
is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-
President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision “is not clear” as to
whom it refers, he then asks the Court “to declare and
answer the question of the construction and definiteness
as to who, among the present incumbent President
Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and
the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-
President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the
said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers
to, . …
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction
and for lack for cause of action.
Prescinding from petitioner’s lack of personality to sue or
to bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677),
it is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction
over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly,
the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the
incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon
C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought
to court during the period of their incumbency and
tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action.
Petitioner’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the
aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a
matter of public record and common public knowledge
that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to
incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-
President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons,
and provides for the extension of their term to noon of
June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of
elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited
section provides for the holding on the second Monday of
May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President
and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In
previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be
questioned with the claim that it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were
dismissed outright by this court which held that:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions
state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines
are the judge. And the people have made the judgment;
they have accepted the government of President Corazon
C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country so that it is not merely a de facto government
but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
tlie present government. All the eleven members of this
Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
(Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748
[Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs.
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972
[People’s Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc.
vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990
[Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et
al.])
Santiago vs COMELEC G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
People thru Initiative
Ponente: Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.
Facts:
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift
Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative”
The COMELEC then, upon its approval
set the time and dates for signature gathering all over
the country,
caused the necessary publication of the said petition in
papers of general circulation, and
instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners
and volunteers in establishing signing stations.
On 18 Dec 1996, Miriam Santiago et al filed a special
civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.
Also, Raul Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to
dismiss the Delfin petition, the petition having been
untenable due to the foregoing. Santiago argues among
others that the People’s Initiative is limited to
amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof.
The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in
power (particularly the President) constitutes revision
and is therefore beyond the power of people’s initiative.
The respondents argued that the petition filed by Roco is
pending under the COMELEC hence the Supreme Court
cannot take cognizance of it.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to call for
People’s Initiative to amend the constitution specifically
to lift term limits of elected officials.
Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance
of the case
Decision:
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING
THE DELFIN PETITION.
The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative.
Ratio:
Under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC’s
power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation
is authorized and which satisfies the “completeness” and
the “sufficient standard” tests.
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Puno does not share the view that R.A. No. 5735
and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective
and cannot implement the people’s initiative to amend
the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with
respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and
should be dismissed.
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that “. . .
R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution.” It ought to be so for
this intent is crystal clear from the history of the law
which was a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 3 and
Senate Bill No. 17. 4 Senate Bill No. 17 was entitled “An
Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum
and the Exception Therefrom, Whereby People in Local
Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact
Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject any
Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative
Body.” Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include
people’s initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No.
21505 5 expressly included people’s initiative to amend
the Constitution.
SALONGA vs PAÑO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Symbolic function principles
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally
protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due
process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has
been established to warrant the filing of an information
for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to
prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the
iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute
him, a member of the democratic opposition in the
Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which
occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of
August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns
Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated
petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General
sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation”
in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included
petitioner as a co-accused), stating that “the preliminary
investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at
2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12, 1980″ and that
petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the
charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which
to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up
to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981,
and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not
received any copies of the charges against him nor any
copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an
amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas,
dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39
other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended
by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981,
the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the
charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to
establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December
1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon
City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano)
issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information
for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as
amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The
resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and
4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition
for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no
prima facie case has been established by the prosecution
to justify the filing of an information against him. He
states that to sanction his further prosecution despite
the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that
no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an
actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court
still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this
case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment had been
arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for
concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on
January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz
granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio
Apostol to drop the subversion case against the
petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of
Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and
decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga
as one of the accused in the information filed under the
questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the
prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the
draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and
signatures and to place it once again in the Court’s
crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant
the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this
decision has been rendered moot and academic by the
action of the prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to
the case’s moot and academic nature, it has on several
occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases
where mootness was clearly apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines,
or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench
and bar on the extent of protection given by
constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled
that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not
preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language
clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the
part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command
of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be
required.”
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the
Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be
created through an executive order was mooted by
Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center’s new charter
pursuant to the President’s legislative powers under
martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and
development of Filipino culture for national Identity.
(Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59
SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and
academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its
symbolic function from promulgating one of the most
voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
Tanada vs Angara
Justiciable Question; Theory of Auto-Limitation;
Declaration of Principles and State Policies
TANADA VS ANGARA
Justiciable Question; Theory of Auto-Limitation;
Declaration of Principles and State Policies
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
Wigberto E. Tanada et al, in representation of various
taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations,
petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.
Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together
with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s to
nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the
growth of our National Economy and against to the
“Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign
markets, especially its major trading partners, through
the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new
opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty
associated with exporting and more investment in the
country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in
the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators,
a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the
provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement
is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines
because it meant that Congress could not pass
legislation that would be good for national interest and
general welfare if such legislation would not conform to
the WTO Agreement.
Issues:
Whether or not the petition present a justiciable
controversy.
Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included
in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or
undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19,
Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative
power by Congress.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable
Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’
implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
Discussions:
1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy controlled by
Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of
foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the
international community.” The WTO itself has some
built-in advantages to protect weak and developing
economies, which comprise the vast majority of its
members. Unlike in the UN where major states have
permanent seats and veto powers in the Security
Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of
sovereign equality, with each member’s vote equal in
weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can
protect their common interests more effectively through
the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with
developed countries. Within the WTO, developing
countries can form powerful blocs to push their
economic agenda more decisively than outside the
Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical
alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus,
the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement
recognize the need of developing countries like the
Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic
development.”
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine
of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of our own laws. A
state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1,
Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With
regard to Infringement of a design patent, WTO members
shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own
internal systems and processes.
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of
legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly
gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making
it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of
its sovereign duty and power.
Rulings:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on
the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or
any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty
to pass judgment on matters of this nature.”
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor
of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the
same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that
are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not
intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut
out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country,
it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict
the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state power
in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived
from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of
mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also
commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise
absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties
Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be
waived without violating the Constitution, based on the
rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation
and amity with all nations.”
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not
contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with
due process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from
its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the
WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-aware of
what it was concurring in as shown by the members’
deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter
of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators
of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was
concurring in.
*Sanlakas v. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004.
(The President as the Commander-in-Chief; Calling out
power)
Facts:
-In the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some 300 junior
officers and enlisted men of the AFP stormed into the
Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee
hours of July 27, 2003. The soldiers demanded, among
other things, the resignation of the President, the
Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the PNP.
-In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President
issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, both declaring "a state of rebellion"
and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion.
-By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood
occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the
soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President,
however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a
state of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003,
through Proclamation No. 435.
-In the interim, several petitions were filed before this
Court challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4.
-Contentions of petitioners: (1) because of the cessation
of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient
factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a
state of rebellion for an indefinite period; (2) the
declaration of a state of rebellion is a “superfluity,” and
is actually an exercise of emergency powers; (3) the
declaration of a state of rebellion opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests
for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or not the calling out power the Constitution
requires the President to make a declaration of a state of
rebellion.
Ruling:
No.
Section 18, Article VII provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon
the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension
for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
The above provision grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of “graduated
powers.” From the most to the least benign, these are:
the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the
Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions,
namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public
safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as
we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora, these conditions are not required in the exercise
of the calling out power. The only criterion is that,
“whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call
the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.”
In calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of
rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives
notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the
armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.
Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects
upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the
entire nation. But this Court's mandate is to probe only
into the legal consequences of the declaration. This
Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal
significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is
deemed not written.
The mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot
diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. x x
x x In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the
authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant. x x x x A person may be
subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of
rebellion whether or not the President has declared a
state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid
warrantless arrest are present. x x x x
The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in
calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the
President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to
the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section
23 (2), Article VI.
*David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006.
(The President as the Commander-in-Chief; Calling out
power)
Facts:
-On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which
states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent
or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and
as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution
do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”
-On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5
implementing PP 1017, thus:
“NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
by virtue of the powers vested in me under the
Constitution as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of
the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017
dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief
of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP
and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.”
-During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police
arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and
newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
-At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25,
2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in
Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by
reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the
Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon
City were stationed inside the editorial and business
offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the
Manila Police District were stationed outside the
building.
- Section 17, Article XII reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public
interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
-Also on February 25, 2006, the police arrested
Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the
Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan.
-Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of
the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his
wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country
Club in Dasmariñas, Cavite.
-Petitioners filed this petition in view of these events.
-On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the
declaration of a state of national emergency, Arroyo lifted
PP 1017.
-Contentions of petitioners: (1) it is a subterfuge to avoid
the constitutional requirements for the imposition of
martial law; (2) the CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily
Tribune offices is a clear case of “censorship” or “prior
restraint;” (3) President Arroyo gravely abused her
discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear
and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless
violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so;”
(4) PP 1017 is unconstitutional for being violative of the
freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such
as freedom of the press and the right to access to
information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed
under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not PP 1017 and GO5 are
unconstitutional; (Related: Can this Court adjudge as
unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of
these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal
implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?)
(2) Whether or not the President can validly take over
any privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest during national emergency;
(3) Whether or not the Supreme Court can review the
factual bases of PP 1017 and GO5;
(4) Whether or not President Arroyo can enforce
obedience to all decrees and laws through the military;
(5) Whether or not President Arroyo can issue decrees
pursuant to PP 1017.
Ruling:
(1) No. They are valid.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the
President may call the armed forces “to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” x x x x
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon
the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless
violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary
police action. But every act that goes beyond the
President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or
ultra vires. x x x x
(As to the abuse of the same:)
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare
statutes invalid although they may be abused and
misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in
the manner of application. The validity of a statute or
ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose
and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from
its effects in a particular case.
PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s
calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the
AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which
prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there
is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or
impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the
citizens’ constitutional rights.
[NOTE:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into
three important provisions, thus:
First provision: (Calling-out Power)
“by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18,
Article VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: (“Take Care” Power)
“and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: (Power to Take Over)
“as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.”
(2) No.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect
of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just
another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed
upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the
“the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers
to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a
law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
While the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no
power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
(3) Yes.
However, judicial inquiry can go no further than to
satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is
correct, but that the President did not act arbitrarily.
Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but
arbitrariness.
It is incumbent upon the petitioner/s to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis and
that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion,
then the Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise
of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally
bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor
General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum
shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming
part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo
D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from
the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of
the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between
the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing
to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President
was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
(4) No.
Arroyo cannot call the military to enforce or implement
certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing
family and property relations, laws on obligations and
contracts and the like. She can only order the military,
under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to
suppress lawless violence.
(5) No.
PP 1017 states in part: “to enforce obedience to all the
laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction.”
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section
1, Article VI categorically states that, “the legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a
state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees.
[NOTE:
The warrantless arrests and searches were all declared
illegal and unconstitutional.
SENATE VS. ERMITA - April 20, 2006
Facts: The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department and AFP
officials for them to appear as resource speakers in a
public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon
Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery
and Equipment Group (North Rail Project). The public
hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the
alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the North Rail Project.
Subsequently, the President issued E.O. 464.
Section 1 provides: Appearance by Heads of
Departments
Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section
22 of the Constitution and to implement the
Constitutional
provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal
branches of the government, all heads of departments of
the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress.
Section 3 further provides: Appearance of Other
Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials
enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior
consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress to ensure the observance of the
principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule
on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public
officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Then, 3 petitions were filed questioning the
constitutionality of EO 464 which allowed executive
department heads to invoke executive privilege.
Issue: W/N EO 464 is constitutional.
Held: CONSTITUTIONAL FOR SECTION 1 AND 2(a).
The power of inquiry of Congress is expressly recognized
in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. An
exemption to such Congressional power falls under the
rubric of executive privilege, which is also a
constitutional
concept. Executive privilege, however, is recognized only
in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. The validity of a claim thereof depends on the
ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
made. Executive officials are NOT exempt from the duty
to
disclose information by the mere fact of being executive
officials.
Validity of Section 1
The requirement then to secure presidential consent
under
Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22,
Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary
on
their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to
appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to
respect the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by
the Executive Secretary.
Validity of Section 2(a)
Section 2(a) merely provides guidelines, binding only on
the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is
covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be
conclusive on the other branches of government. It may
thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by
the
President regarding the nature and scope of executive
privilege.
Unconstitutionality of Section 2(b) and 3
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress.
Whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify
his failure to be present, such invocation must be
construed as a declaration to Congress that the
President,
or a head of office authorized by the President, has
determined that the requested information is privileged,
and that the President has not reversed such
determination. There is an implied claim of privilege,
which
implied claim is not accompanied by any specific
allegation of the basis thereof.
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why
the executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the
President, or an authorized head of office, has
determined
that it is so, and that the President has not overturned
that
determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the
dark on how the requested information could be
classified
as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that,
on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege
only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make
Congress doubly blind to the question of why the
executive branch is not providing it with the information
that it has requested.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O.
464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is
not asserted. It is merely implied. It does not provide for
precise and certain reasons for the claim, which deprives
the Congress to determine whether the withholding of
information is justified under the circumstances of each
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information
from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must
be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow
the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to
do
so and/or proffering its reasons therefore. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated. That is impermissible.
Resort to any means then by which officials of
the executive branch could refuse to divulge information
cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have
merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire
into
the operations of government, but we shall have given up
something of much greater value – our right as a
people
to take part in government.
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006
Calibrated pre emptive response
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they
are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that
their right as organizations and individuals were violated
when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005
was violently dispersed by policemen implementing
Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a
signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a
permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless
of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger.
It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the
time and place of a public assembly form part of the
message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it
is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
actions in support of the government. The words “lawful
cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the
exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance”
shows that the law applies to assemblies against the
government because they are being tolerated. As a
content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict
scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were
ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During
the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the
interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew
the portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No.
880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of
September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and
the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5,
6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the
Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect
on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably
assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine
Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.
The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress
of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys
dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For
this rights represent the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights
would be meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while
sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it
shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society. The power to regulate the exercise
of such and other constitutional rights is termed the
sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of
the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies
but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily
shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that
would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause”
does not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would
not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither the
words “opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing” in of
grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so
its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is
for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is
independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the
ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the rights even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and
respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take
all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with
Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable
freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of
the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this
Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no
prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to
peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or
plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet
complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore,
Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it
would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum
tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are
ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY
OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, The
petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
SUSTAINED
H. HARRY L. ROQUE v. COMELEC, GR No. 188456,
2009-09-10
Facts:
Harry L. Roque...s uing as taxpayers and concerned
citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelec's award of
the
2010 Elections Automation Project (automation project)
to the joint venture of Total Information Management
Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International
Corporation (Smartmatic)... and to permanently prohibit
the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing... and/or
implementing the corresponding contract-award.
Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436
authorizing the adoption of an automated election
system (AES)... in the May 11, 1998 national and local
elections and onwards
On January 23, 2007, the amendatory RA 9369... ssed
authorizing anew the Comelec to use an AES
In 2008 Comelec managed to automate the regional polls
in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM),... hailed as successful automated ARMM 2008
elections paved the way for Comelec,... to prepare for a
nationwide computerized run for the 2010 national/local
polls
Comelec and Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as provider,
executed a contract... for the lease of goods and
services... petitioners interposed the instant recourse
which, for all intents and purposes, impugns the validity
and seeks to nullify the
Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation
contract adverted to... petitioners would have the
Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation
contract nullified since, in violation of the Constitution,
it constitutes a wholesale abdication of the poll body's
constitutional mandate for election law enforcement.
the mechanism of the PCOS machines would infringe the
constitutional right of the people to the secrecy of the
ballot which, according to the petitioners, is provided in
Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution.
Issues:
(1) the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) of Smartmatic and
TIM; and (2) the PCOS machines to be used...
constitutionality and statutory flaw of the automation
contract itself.
Ruling:
contention is not well taken.
The first function of the Comelec under the
Constitution... and the Omnibus Election Code for that
matter--relates to the enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relating to the conduct of
elections to public office to ensure a free,... orderly and
honest electoral exercise.
By acceding to Art. 3.3 of the automation contract...
upervision and control of the system to be used for the...
automated elections. To a more specific point, the loss of
control, as may be deduced from the ensuing exchanges,
arose from the fact that Comelec would not be holding
possession of what in IT jargon are the public and
private keys pair.
The Court is not convinced.
SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the
greater track record in automated elections, shall be in
charge of the technical aspects of the counting and
canvassing software and hardware
The proviso designating Smartmatic as the joint venture
partner in charge of the technical aspect of the counting
and canvassing wares does not to us translate, without
more, to ceding control of the electoral process to
Smartmatic.
Art. 6.7 of the automation contract, providing:... the
entire processes of voting, counting, transmission,
consolidation and canvassing of votes shall be conducted
by COMELEC's personnel and officials,... With the view
we take of the automation contract, the role of
Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to supply the
goods necessary for the automation project, such as but
not limited to the PCOS machines, PCs, electronic
transmission devices and related equipment, both
hardware... and software, and the technical services
pertaining to their operation.
As lessees of the goods and the back-up equipment, the
corporation and its operators would provide assistance
with respect to the machines to be used by the Comelec
which, at the end of the day, will be... conducting the
election thru its personnel and whoever it deputizes.
Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would
infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot
because... the voter would be confronted with a "three
feet" long ballot
Surely,... the Comelec can put up such infrastructure as
to insure that the voter can write his preference in
relative privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral
arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the
ballot into the machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve
the secrecy... of his ballot, will always devise a way to do
so. By the same token, one with least regard for secrecy
will likewise have a way to make his vote known.

The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with

a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government.
In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of
fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of
laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not...
be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be
justified in the case of an organization of lesser
responsibility.[103] It should be afforded ample elbow
room and enough wherewithal in devising means and
initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great
objective for... which it was created--to promote free,
orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it
should be for, too often, Comelec has to make decisions
under difficult conditions to address unforeseen events
to preserve the integrity of the election and in the
process the voice of... the people

This independent constitutional commission,... it is true,

possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a
considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.