Bonifacio Bros., Inc. V.

Mora (1967)

G.R. No. L-20853 May 29, 1967

Lessons Applicable: stipulation pour autrui (Insurance)

FACTS:

 Enrique Mora, owner of Oldsmobile sedan model 1956, mortgaged it to H.S. Reyes, Inc., with
the condition that they would be the beneficiary of its insurance
 June 23, 1959: The sedan was insured with State Bonding & Insurance Co., Inc
 During the period of effectivity, the sedan met an accident and it was appraised by Bayne
Adjustment Co. and repaired it with Bonifacio Bros. and the parts were supplied by Ayala Auto
Parts Co. This was all done without the knowledge of H.S. Reyes. Enrique was billed P2,102.73
through Bayne. The insurance company drew a check deducting P100 for franchise and
entrusted it to Bayne payable to Enrique or H.S. Reyes.
 Still unpaid, the sedan was delivered to Enrique without the Knowledge of H.S. Reyes
 Bonifacio Bros and Ayala Auto filed in the MTC on the theory that the insurance proceeds should
be paid directly to them
 CFI affirmed MTC: H.S. Reyes, Inc. as having a better right

ISSUE: W/N there is privity between Bonifacio Bro and Ayala Auto against the insurance company

HELD: NO. Judgment affirmed

 GR: contracts take effect only between the parties thereto

 EX: some specific instances provided by law where the contract contains some stipulation in
favor of a third person - stipulation pour autrui
 provision in favor of a third person not a party to the contract
 third person is allowed to avail himself of a benefit granted to him by the terms of the contract,
provided that the contracting parties have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon such
person
 stipulation pour autrui must be clearly expressed - none here
 "loss payable" clause of the insurance policy stipulates that "Loss, if any, is payable to H.S.
Reyes, Inc." indicating that it was only the H.S. Reyes, Inc. which they intended to benefit.
 stipulation merely establishes the procedure that the insured has to follow in order to be
entitled to indemnity for repair
 a policy of insurance is a distinct and independent contract between the insured and insurer,
and third persons have no right either in a court of equity, or in a court of law, to the proceeds
of it, unless there be some contract of trust, expressed or implied between the insured and third
person
 "loss" in insurance law embraces injury or damage
 The injury or damage sustained by the insured in consequence of the happening of one or more
of the accidents or misfortune against which the insurer, in consideration of the premium, has
undertaken to indemnify the insured
Insular v Ebrado

G.R. No. L-44059 October 28, 1977

Facts:

Cristor Ebrado was issued by The Life Assurance Co., Ltd., a policy for P5,882.00 with a rider for
Accidental Death. He designated Carponia T. Ebrado as the revocable beneficiary in his policy. He
referred to her as his wife.

Cristor was killed when he was hit by a failing branch of a tree. Insular Life was made liable to pay the
coverage in the total amount of P11,745.73, representing the face value of the policy in the amount of
P5,882.00 plus the additional benefits for accidental death.

Carponia T. Ebrado filed with the insurer a claim for the proceeds as the designated beneficiary therein,
although she admited that she and the insured were merely living as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.

Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado also filed her claim as the widow of the deceased insured. She asserts that she
is the one entitled to the insurance proceeds.

Insular commenced an action for Interpleader before the trial court as to who should be given the
proceeds. The court declared Carponia as disqualified.

Issue: WON a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married
man can claim the proceeds in case of death of the latter?

Held: No. Petition

Ratio:

Section 50 of the Insurance Act which provides that "the insurance shall be applied exclusively to the
proper interest of the person in whose name it is made"

The word "interest" highly suggests that the provision refers only to the "insured" and not to the
beneficiary, since a contract of insurance is personal in character. Otherwise, the prohibitory laws
against illicit relationships especially on property and descent will be rendered nugatory, as the same
could easily be circumvented by modes of insurance.

When not otherwise specifically provided for by the Insurance Law, the contract of life insurance is
governed by the general rules of the civil law regulating contracts. And under Article 2012 of the same
Code, any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named
beneficiary of a fife insurance policy by the person who cannot make a donation to him. Common-law
spouses are barred from receiving donations from each other.
Article 739 provides that void donations are those made between persons who were guilty of adultery
or concubinage at the time of donation.

There is every reason to hold that the bar in donations between legitimate spouses and those between
illegitimate ones should be enforced in life insurance policies since the same are based on similar
consideration. So long as marriage remains the threshold of family laws, reason and morality dictate
that the impediments imposed upon married couple should likewise be imposed upon extra-marital
relationship.

A conviction for adultery or concubinage isn’t required exacted before the disabilities mentioned in
Article 739 may effectuate. The article says that in the case referred to in No. 1, the action for
declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilty of the donee
may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

The underscored clause neatly conveys that no criminal conviction for the offense is a condition
precedent. The law plainly states that the guilt of the party may be proved “in the same acting for
declaration of nullity of donation.” And, it would be sufficient if evidence preponderates.

The insured was married to Pascuala Ebrado with whom she has six legitimate children. He was also
living in with his common-law wife with whom he has two children.
Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS - Retirement Insurance Benefits

37 SCRA 315

Facts:

> Jose Consuegra was employed as a shop foreman of the Office of the District Engineer in Surigao Del
Norte.

> When he was still alive, he contracted two marriages:

o First – Rosario Diaz; 2 children = Jose Consuegra Jr. and Pedro but both predeceased him

o 2nd – Basilia Berdin; 7 children. (this was contracted in GF while the first marriage subsisted)

> Being a GSIS member when he died, the proceeds of his life insurance were paid by the GSIS to Berdin
and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy.

> Since he was in the gov’t service for 22.5028 years, he was entitled to retirement insurance benefits,
for which no beneficiary was designated.

> Both families filed their claims with the GSIS, which ruled that the legal heirs were Diaz who is entitled
to one-half or 8/16 of the retirement benefits and Berdin and her children were entitled to the
remaining half, each to receive an equal share of 1/16.

> Berdin went to CFI on appeal. CFI affirmed GSIS decision.

Issue:

To whom should the retirement insurance benefits be paid?

Held:

Both families are entitled to half of the retirement benefits.

The beneficiary named in the life insurance does NOT automatically become the beneficiary in the
retirement insurance. When Consuegra, during the early part of 1943, or before 1943, designated his
beneficiaries in his life insurance, he could NOT have intended those beneficiaries of his life insurance as
also the beneficiaries of his retirement insurance because the provisions on retirement insurance under
the GSIS came about only when CA 186 was amended by RA 660 on June 18, 1951.

Sec. 11(b) clearly indicates that there is need for the employee to file an application for retirement
insurance benefits when he becomes a GSIS member and to state his beneficiary. The life insurance and
the retirement insurance are two separate and distinct systems of benefits paid out from 2 separate and
distinct funds.

In case of failure to name a beneficiary in an insurance policy, the proceeds will accrue to the estate of
the insured. And when there exists two marriages, each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate.
Asian Terminals vs Malayan Insurance

GR 171406 / April 4, 2011

Facts:

Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV “Jinlian” 60,000 plastic bags of soda
ash dense. The shipment was insured with Malayan Insurance.

Upon arrival of the vessel, the stevedores of Asian Terminals unloaded the bags from the vessel and
brought them to the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping pending
clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to consignee. After all the bags were unloaded, a
total of 2,881 bags were in bad condition.

Malayan Insurance, as insurer, paid the value of the lost cargoes to the consignee.

Malayan Insurance, as subrogee of the consignee, filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against
Asian Terminals.

RTC found Asian Terminals liable for the damage sustained by the shipment. The proximate cause was
the negligence of Asian Terminals’ stevedores who handled the unloading of the cargoes from the
vessel. This was caused by their usage of the steel hooks in retrieving and picking-up the bags bythe
stevedores, despite the admonitions of the Marine Cargo Surveyors.

RTC orders Asian Terminals to pay P643K to Malayan Insurance. CA agrees with the decision of the RTC

Asian Terminals argues claims that the amount of damages should not be more than P5,000, pursuant to
its Management Contract for cargo handling services with the Philippine Ports Authority(PPA). Petitioner
contends that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the said contract since it is an official act of an
executive department subject to judicial cognizance.

Issue:

Whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the PPA
in determining petitioner’s liability.

Held:

Judicial notice does not apply

Section 1, Rule 129

Judicial notice when mandatory – a court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence,
of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols
of nationality, the laws of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.

The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters
which the court can take judicial notice of.It cannot be considered an official act of the executive
department.

The PPA is a GOCC in charge of administering the ports in the country.

the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with
petitioner.