Fire and Explosion of A Mobile Explosive Manufacturing Unit

Fire and Explosion of a Mobile Explosive Manufacturing Unit
Javier L. Amigo, Ramón G. Eguren, MAXAM

&
José A. Sanchidrián, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid
Abstract
On December 2013 a MEMU exploded at a blasting site in Norway, after burning for more than two
hours. This paper describes the analyses made to determine the actual yield of the explosion, the
lessons learned from the event and the actions taken as a consequence. The conclusions of the
analysis were the following:
- The yield of the explosion was 650-1450 kg TNT. In terms of AN and ANE they correspond to
1300 – 3700 kg AN, or 950 – 2450 kg ANE or ANE/AN blend. These quantities are 8 to 31 % of
the explosive precursors in the truck. The burning of the truck and its load for two and a half
hours had consumed more than two thirds (perhaps up to 90 %) of the explosive precursor
material.
- The action taken by the MEMU operator, evacuating the area once it became clear that the fire
could not be controlled, proved to be very right. This behavior must be stressed and be included
into the best practices.
- The fire started in the electric system of the truck chassis for reasons that have not been possible
to find out.
- The most important safety contribution to avoid these types of events is to minimize the risk of
fires. Additional fire detectors, fire extinguishing systems and controls that contribute to reduce
the fire risks have been implemented on the new MEMUS.
Copyright © 2016 International Society of Explosives Engineers

2016G - Fire and Explosion of a Mobile Explosive Manufacturing Unit 1 of 25
Introduction
On 17th December 2013, a Mobile Explosive Manufacturing Unit (MEMU) was charging a blast
near the town of Drevja, Norway. At approximately 13:00, after about one hour of normal explosive
production and pumping, the electric power supply shut down and a few seconds later the truck
engine stopped. The operator went to the truck cab and discovered a large amount of black smoke
coming from the fuse box located on the lower right side of the dashboard. Despite the efforts of the
operator the fire could not be put out so he called the fire brigade (at 13:11) and decided to quit and
evacuate the area approximately 500 m. In addition, all residents in the range of 500 meters were
identified and evacuated.
At 15:24, nearly two and a half hours after the fire started, an explosion occurred.
When the MEMU was left, it had the following approximate product load: 4670 kg of ammonium
nitrate porous prill (AN); 7380 kg of emulsion matrix (ANE); 720 liters of water; 84-96 kg of 25%
sodium nitrite aqueous solution; 84-96 kg of 60% acetic acid aqueous solution and 427 liters of
diesel oil. There were also about 260 liters of diesel oil in the chassis tank and 390 liters of hydraulic
oil.
This work describes the analyses made to determine the actual yield of the explosion and to depict a
possible course of events that led to it. It also reports the lessons learned from the event and the
actions taken as a consequence.
The following data furnished by the investigation were used to calculate the explosion yield:
- Air blast effects on structures, from the report of damage observed in the nearby constructions and
their distances to the explosion source.
- Maximum distance of fragments.
- Seismograph record. A seismograph was attached to one of the structures affected by the blast.
From the particle velocity recording, two analyses were done:
o The time of arrival of the air blast was obtained and from it the explosion yield estimated.
o A finite-elements dynamic modeling of the structure response to the air blast loading was
performed, and the explosion yield was estimated as that for which the calculated peak
particle velocity was equal to the measured value.
- Crater dimensions.
- Far field air blast, from an estimation of the pressure level of the blast wave in a video footage
recorded at some 2800 m.
The site
The explosion took place in the excavation works for a new layout, close to the existing one, of road
254, part of the project of improvements of the highway connecting Sandnessjøen with Mo i Rana, in
the area of Ømmervassveien, located between the town of Drevja and the Ømmervatnet Lake, in the
municipality of Vefsn, province of Nordland. The site was on the northern hill of an open, shallow
valley running roughly East-West between two hills, Blåfjellet to the North and Hellfjellet to the
South. To the East, a few hundred meters from the explosion site, the valley opens to the
Ømmervatnet Lake. Figure 1 shows an aerial view (Google Earth) of the zone. The explosion
affected two house groups: Nordbu towards the South West of the explosion site and Vinstad
towards the South East.

The surroundings of the explosion site is forest, though the western area had been cleared by the
construction works. This resulted in an open path from the explosion to the Nordbu group, while
there was a tree barrier between the explosion and the Vinstad group. The topography also favored
the propagation of the airblast towards the West since it took place on the East bank of the Kalddalen
creek, a small stream running down the Blåfjellet towards the South, emptying South of Nordbu in
the Osen River 100 m before it discharges into the Ømmervatnet Lake. Nordbu is situated on the
West bank of the Kalddalen. The downhill slope from the explosion site towards Nordbu was about
15-20 %.
Air blast
The characteristics of the pressure pulse of the blast wave from an explosion in air depends primarily
on the amount and type of explosive and the distance from the explosion. Shape and means of
initiation may also influence the effective explosive output. Other circumstance such as topography
(that may shelter a structure from the wave, or may channel and reinforce it), trees or other structures
encountered by the wave on its path, also have an influence on the wave propagation and pressure
attenuation.
When an element of a structure is struck by the shock wave, the actual pressure acting is not the
incident but the reflected pressure on it, which depends on the value of the incident pressure and the
orientation of the surface with respect to the travel direction of the blast wave.
Although blast damage tables are typically built by pressure, it is the impulse of the blast, that takes
into consideration the duration of the pressure pulse, that accounts primarily for the damage on a
structure. The value of the impulse depends not only, like the peak overpressure does, on the scaled
distance (ratio of the distance to the cube root of the explosive mass) but also on the explosive charge
mass itself: while the incident pressure is completely determined for a given scaled distance, the
impulse is higher for a larger charge even at equal scaled distance. Finally, the strength of the
structures may vary greatly with its actual constructive characteristics, so that the patterns of
structural damage from given blast overpressures in the literature may only be considered as general
indications.

N
Drevja
Blåfjellet
Hellfjellet
Nordbu
Vinstad
Ømmervatnet
Figure 1. View of the area where the explosion took place (the star indicates the explosion site). A 1
km distance is shown on road 254 indicatively; scale varies with the perspective.
Table 1. Incident pressures and explosion yield from damage observed to on-site machinery and
buildings.
Damage Group*
Distance Pressure Yield
(m) (kPa) (kg)
Min Max Min Max
Rock drill, crawler type, visible damage; windows BS 16.5 55 69 54 77
Water tank truck, overturned and crashed BS 36.4 48 62 465 700
Tree, snapped BS 36.9 35 35 269 269
Excavator, windows broken, little visible damage BS 38.5 16 21 65 114
Crawler crusher, jaw crusher, little visible damage, some covers BS 53.9 16 21 179 313
Excavator, windows broken, little visible damage BS 81.0 16 21 609 1068
Building, magazine, unknown, 1 broken window SE 168.3 2.0 3.5 52 170
Workshop building, 8 broken windows SE 181.0 2.0 3.5 64 211
House, 1 floor, basement, 4 windows broken SE 193.7 2.0 3.5 79 259
Garage building, with second floor, <100 cm panels displacement SE 206.3 3.5 6.9 306 1480
House, lot of broken windows, some structural damage SW 209.4 3.5 6.9 320 1548
Garage building, 3 windows broken SE 215.7 2.0 3.5 109 357
House, 1 floor, 1 broken window (door) SE 229.7 2.0 3.5 131 431
Shed, wall damage SW 237.0 3.5 6.9 465 2246
Barn, windows broken, roof plates damaged SW 237.4 3.5 6.9 467 2257
Barn, some walls pushed in, parts of the wall displaced SW 241.9 3.5 6.9 494 2388
Barn, some windows pushed in, 60 % SW 281.8 3.5 6.9 781 3774
Old saw mill, 1 broken window SE 296.5 2.0 3.5 282 928
House, 2 floors, 10 broken windows SE 307.6 2.0 3.5 315 1036
*BS: blast site (machinery), SW: group of houses on the South West of the explosion (Nordbu), SE: group of houses on
the South East of the explosion (Vinstad).
The above circumstances encompass some uncertainty in the estimation of (i) the incident
overpressure in a given location from the effect observed on a structure, and (ii) the calculation of the
charge originating it. Our approach has been to assign minimum and maximum reasonable values of
peak incident overpressure to each damage effect observed (DoD 1997, Glasstone 1962, Beveridge
1998, Brasie & Simpson 1968, Clancey 1972, Mannan 2005, Scilly & High 1986):
- Few windows shattered: 2 kPa

- Most windows shattered, some window frames damaged: 3.5 kPa.
- Most window frames damaged, some wall panels blown in: 6.9 kPa.
- Damage to machinery: 16-21 kPa for machines with little damage, 48-55 kPa for severe damage
and 48-62 kPa for the overturned and crashed tank truck.
The pressures obtained are compiled in Table 1. The location of the point of interest is indicated
under the heading “Group”. From the pressure values, the scaled distances are calculated using the
Swisdak polynomials (1994, a re-analysis of the Kingery-Bulmash formulae, 1984) for a TNT
surface explosion. The TNT mass (the explosion yield) is calculated from the scaled distance and the
distance itself. As expected, the dispersion is high and the estimations from the SE group are
somewhat lower than those for the SW one, due to the lesser effects on the former that may be
attributed to the sheltering effect of the trees. Those effects would have been undoubtedly stronger
should the wave path have been clear, encompassing higher pressures. It should be noted that the
valley effect may account for some 15 % increase (Kaplan 1978) of the air blast overpressure on the
SW group but this is well within the uncertainty of the estimations.
The medians of the lower and upper yield estimations are 282 and 700 kg respectively, with 95 %
confidence intervals [109, 465] and [269, 1480] respectively. If all values are lumped, then the
median is 317.5 kg with a 95 % confidence interval [264, 479.5] kg. The median has been preferred
as central estimator over the mean because it is not affected by outliers.
Fragments
355 fragments were collected. The total mass of fragments recovered, on the basis of the information
made available, is 2882.6 kg, nearly one third of the approximately 9000 kg of non-combustible
material in the truck, which may be considered a significant sample of the fragments population. The
fragment count and mass breakdowns are given in Table 2 for the various types of fragments;
interestingly, some fragments recovered consisted of melt aluminum, re-solidified (referred to as
Aluminum cakes). Figure 2 shows the distribution of fragment masses in cumulative form. The
location map is shown in Figure 3.
The distribution of the distances of the fragments is shown in Figure 4 as probability density of
number of fragments and in Figure 5 as probability density of masses. Figures 6 and 7 show the
cumulative functions. Half of the fragments were found at distance less than about 150 m from the
explosion; the farther travelling missiles were the steel ones, the closer were the non-metallic
materials (e.g. rubber). When the distribution of distances is plotted by mass, the occurrence of some
large fragments is determinant in the shape of the curves, particularly the big 925 kg engine block at
205 m that marks the median distance of mass.
Table 2. Fragment count and mass.

Number Mass, mean Mass, median Mass, total
kg kg kg
Steel 233 11.85 1.56 2760.42
Aluminum, fragments 87 1.03 0.30 89.96
Other 7 3.52 0.86 24.63
Aluminum, cakes 28 0.27 0.20 7.63
All 355 8.12 0.88 2882.64

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3 All fragments

Steel
Aluminum fragments
0.2
Other
Aluminum cake
0.1
-1 0 1 2 3
10 10 10 10 10
Mass (kg)
Figure 2. Distribution of fragment mass (fraction of fragments with mass less than the abscissa).
An estimation of the explosive yield has been done based on the maximum fragment range, to which
it is assigned a scaled distance corresponding to a peak incident overpressure ranging from 1.4 kPa
(Scilly & High 1986, for explosion yields of the order of 1000 kg TNT) to 2 kPa (Clancey 1972);
scaled distances are 58 to 44 m/kg1/3 respectively. The maximum distance of fragments has been
measured at 502 m and the distribution fit for all fragments gives a maximum distance (i.e. the
distance to which the probability density reaches zero, or the cumulative distribution function
reaches unity, see e.g. Figures 4 to 7) somewhat greater. The “maximum fragment range” of “safe
distance” should be understood as a distance at which the probability of fragments is low e.g. 0.05
(in fact, Clancey defines the safe distance as that with a probability 0.95 of no serious damage).
Extreme values are always difficult to estimate from distributions fitted to data since cumulative
distributions very often tend to 1 (and density functions to zero) in an asymptotical form, so that
small differences in the coverage mean large differences in the variable. If an e.g. 95 % probability
distance is sought, different estimations may be obtained depending if the fragment count or
fragment mass distributions are used (Figures 6 and 7). Given this uncertainty, and given that the
sample of fragments is ample, the maximum distance can effectively be considered a high percentile
(0.95 or higher, see Figures 6 and 7) of the fragment distances distribution. For the scaled distance
range given above (58 to 44 m/kg1/3), the explosion yield results in 648 to 1483 kg TNT.

7319900
7319800
7319700
7319600
7319500 50
NORTHING
100
7319400
200
7319300 300
400
7319200
500 m
Steel
7319100 Aluminum fragment
Other
Aluminum cake
Ground zero
7319000
425200 425300 425400 425500 425600 425700 425800 425900 426000
EASTING
Figure 3. Map of fragments.

0.014
All fragments
Steel
0.012 Aluminum fragment
Other
Aluminum cake
0.01
0.008
0.006
0.004
0.002
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600
Distance (m)
Figure 4. Probability density functions of fragment distances, by fragment count.

0.03
All fragments
Steel
Aluminum fragment
0.025
Other
Aluminum cake
0.02
0.015
0.01
0.005
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600
Distance (m)
Figure 5. Probability density functions of fragment distances, by mass.
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
All fragments
0.2
Steel
Aluminum fragments
0.1 Other
Aluminum cakes
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600
Distance (m)
Figure 6. Cumulative distribution functions of fragment distances, by fragment count.

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
All fragments
0.2
Steel
Aluminum fragments
0.1 Other
Aluminum cakes
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600
Distance (m)
Figure 7. Cumulative distribution functions of fragments, by mass.

Seismograph record
A seismograph had been attached to the foundation of a farmhouse in the Nordbu group at a distance
of 233 m. Figure 8 shows the record. It has two distinct wave forms: the first one is the seismic wave
transmitted to the foundation and the second, stronger one, is the response of the structure to the air
blast.
Two ways of determining the explosion yield have been followed here:
Time of arrival
The time of arrival calculation is sketched in Figure 8. The onset of the seismic record marks the
time of arrival of the seismic wave; if the time of travel of the seismic wave is determined, then the
time of the explosion can be obtained. From that instant, the time of arrival of the air blast is marked
by the onset of the structural response record (the second phase of the seismograph, with much
higher particle velocity than the seismic wave).
The time of arrival of the seismic wave depends on the transmission characteristics of the ground
between the explosion site and the farm.
The rock in which the seismic wave travels from the explosion site to the seismograph is initially
about 119 m mica gneiss/schists (where blasting was being carried out) (Figure 9, Berggrunn) and
about 114 m in loose material (gravel, sand, clay, landslide material, marsh, obviously associated
with fluvial or glacial erosion in the East-West valley between the Blåfjellet and the Hellfjellet hills).
A wave velocity between 4200 to 6100 m/s has been considered for the bedrock (Palmstrom 1995,
Kern et al. 2009). For the fill material, a range 1250 to 1850 m/s may be assumed for water-saturated
sand and gravel, and up to 2700 m/s for consolidated clay (Lucius et al. 2007).
It could also happen, if the thickness of the sediments is not too large, that the first arrival to the
seismograph is a p-wave travelling in the underlying high-velocity bedrock, and transmitted to the
structure through a short path of low-velocity sediments, as depicted in Figure 10. Taking into
account the slope of the bedrock and of the sediments (see altitudes in Figure 10), the latter’s
thickness at the farm position should be at least some 10 m; on the upper end, a maximum thickness
of 40 m has been guessed.

Figure 8. Time of arrival of the air blast.
Figure 9. Geological characteristics of the explosion area.

EXPLOSION
+ 112 m
+ 85 m
FARM Surface path
+ 74 m
Sediments
10-40 m Bedrock
Deep path
114 m 119 m
Figure 10. Geological cut of the explosion area with seismic wave paths.
Table 3. Air blast time of arrival calculations; the duration of the seismic pulse is 0.540 s (see Figure
8).
Bedrock velocity Sediments velocity Seismic wave travel time Time of arrival of the air blast Explosion yield
m/s m/s s s kg TNT
Surface path
4200 1250 0.121 0.660 35
4200 1850 0.091 0.631 172
4200 2700 0.071 0.611 521
6100 1250 0.112 0.651 63
6100 1850 0.082 0.622 310
6100 2700 0.062 0.602 752
Deep path, sediments thickness: 10 m
4200 1250 0.065 0.6044 690
4200 1850 0.062 0.6018 765
4200 2700 0.060 0.6001 815
6100 1250 0.047 0.5867 1315
6100 1850 0.044 0.5841 1440
6100 2700 0.043 0.5824 1520
Deep path, sediments thickness: 40 m
4200 1250 0.091 0.6305 174
4200 1850 0.080 0.6201 339
4200 2700 0.074 0.6133 475
6100 1250 0.072 0.6122 498
6100 1850 0.062 0.6018 765
6100 2700 0.055 0.5950 985

0.68
0.66
0.64
Time of arrival (s)
0.62
0.60
0.58
0.56
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Yield (kg TNT)
Figure 11. Time-of-arrival/yield function.
A better knowledge of the wave velocity would reduce the uncertainty of the present calculation; in
the absence of such experimental data, the time of arrival of the air blast has a wide range of
variation that trails into the calculation of the yield.
From the time of arrival, the yield is back-calculated using the time-of-arrival function 𝑡𝑎 /𝑊 1/3 =
𝑓(𝑅/𝑊 1/3 ), where ta= time, W yield and R distance, taken from Swisdak (1994), or directly in the
appropriate UFC’s chart (UFC-3-340-02 2008), with R=233 m. The resulting time-of-arrival/yield
function is plotted in Figure 11; the results are summarized in Table 3. The low yield values obtained
with sediments’ wave velocity of 1250 m/s are probably just an indirect evidence that the sediments
are more competent than that low velocity, and they can probably be discarded. The median of the
yield estimations in Table 3 is 721 kg with a 95 % confidence interval [475, 875] kg.
Structural model
A finite-elements dynamic modeling of the response of the farm structure to the airblast loading was
performed, and the explosion yield was estimated as that for which the calculated peak particle
velocity was equal to the measured value. The modeling was performed using the Finite Element
code LS-DYNA (LSTC 2014). A model of the farm was built from the raw plans and the
photographs available. The module where the seismograph was attached and the warehouse next to it
(which confers dynamic rigidity to the structure) were included in the model, forming an L-shaped
structure (Figure 12). This was considered enough structure to influence the total response at the
point of interest. Figures 13 through 16 show the computational model.
Many constructive data and material properties had to be guessed to reasonable values. However,
besides the peak particle velocity, every effort was made to match also the damping and frequency
characteristics of the structure’s response wave form so that, even if some of the constructive details
are unknown, the model’s global stiffness and energy-dissipating behavior are similar to the real
structure ones so that the results can be considered reasonably robust. Details of the modeling are
reported in Sanchidrián et al. 2014a,b.
LS-DYNA applies the pressure-time load function on the faces of the elements selected (outer wall
and roof) as calculated for a surface burst according to UFC-3-340-02 (2008), for each element
considering its position with respect to the explosion point (distance and angle). The explosion yield
(as TNT mass) and position are input to the code.
Seismograph
Figure 12. Pig farm. Layout plan.

Figure 13. Numerical model of the pig farm. General aspect of the finite element mesh.
Figure 14. Numerical model of the pig farm. Wall precast panels modeled through shell elements;
color difference indicates the possibility of using different sections. Roof-supporting trusses elements
are also shown.
Figure 15. Numerical model of the pig farm. Sidewalls modeled with shell elements (red); the soil
beneath the structure modeled with solid elements (blue).
Figure 16. Numerical model of the pig farm. Mesh for the sidewalls (red), foundation beam (green)
and floor slab (pink) using shell elements; soil (yellow) meshed using solid elements.
1000 kg
0.06
1300 kg
1400 kg
1500 kg
0.04
2000 kg
Measured
Particle velocity, vertical (m/s)
0.02
-0.02
-0.04
-0.06
-0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7

Time (s)
Figure 17. Seismograph record and calculated velocity histories.
The seismograph record was not available to the authors in digital form but only as a paper printout
(though it has been digitized by hand for convenience), so the peak particle velocity has been
approximately read on the paper plot to be 54.5±0.5 mm/s. The model structure was subjected to air
blast loading of varying yields until the peak vertical velocity at the node which corresponds to the
position of the seismograph matched the measured one. Fine tuning was done afterwards on the
structure and soil properties in order to achieve a frequency response similar to the measured one;
without digital record, no numerical frequency analysis could be done so the dominant frequency
was approximated as the pseudo-frequency obtained from the period of the peak wavelet, which is
about 20.8 Hz if only the first half period is used, or 18.9 Hz if the whole period is used.
A peak vertical velocity of 54.8 mm/s is obtained for a yield of 1400 kg TNT with principal
frequency 17.3-18.6 Hz, slightly lower than the 19-21 Hz measured, probably due to some
discrepancies of the model with respect to the actual structure. Every effort has been made to
reproduce also the attenuation pattern of the measured record; the modeled result has finally a
slightly slower damping, which again could be attributed to minor differences from the model and
the real structure. Figure 17 shows a plot of the experimental record together with the outputs for the
yields 1000, 1300, 1400, 1500 and 2000 kg TNT, with the time scales offset so that the peak times
coincide in all of them. The frequency response around the peak wavelet is very consistent at all
yields except 1000 kg. Table 4 gives some relevant results of the modeling. Given the uncertainty of
the mechanical parameters used, a yield range of 1350-1450 kg TNT is retained.
Crater
The on-site investigation concluded that “no crater” had been formed. Figure 18 gives crater
dimensions as a function of the explosion yield for charges sitting on the ground, using Holsapple
(2003, 2007) model. The crater dimensions for the yields in the range of 1000 kg TNT are noticeable
(about 1 m deep and some meter diameter) which, even in a slope, drill and blast scenario, should
have been hardly overlooked in the scene investigation. The fact that there was no report of crater
can be explained if the explosion took place in material still in a tank: the stand-off distance from the
ground would have limited the cratering effect to values much smaller than what Figure 18 (that
applies to charges sitting on the ground) suggests.
Table 4. Blast loading and vibration parameters in the seismograph position.

Yield Maximum pressure Arrival time of the blast Peak vertical velocity Principal
applied at wall wave at the selected point frequency
(kg TNT) (kPa) (s) (mm/s) (Hz)
1000 9.9 0.593 47.5 15.0
1300 11.1 0.585 51.9 17.5 – 18.7
1400 11.5 0.583 54.8 17.3 – 18.6
1500 11.8 0.581 55.9 17.6 – 18.6
2000 13.3 0.572 62.8 17.6 – 18.9
4.5
Vol (m3)
4 Diam (m)
Depth (m)
3.5
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Yield (kg TNT)
Figure 18. Crater dimensions calculated with Holsapple’s model (Holsapple 2003, 2007).
Far field air blast – video recording
Watchers were looking at the truck in flames and video recording it when the explosion happened;
the video can be seen in this site: http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=d9c_1387360040. From the video
footage, the time from the explosion to the air blast arrival at the watching position is some 8.5 s.
The air blast travels initially at a much higher speed than sound, but at scaled distances of about 40
m/kg1/3 it has already decayed to a sonic wave. Using the sonic speed of 331 m/s (appropriate for a
0 C temperature), a distance of 2800 m is derived. The noise, from what can be seen and heard in
the video, could be quoted as annoying, but nothing that might e.g. break windows; probably it was
something similar to a clap of thunder from a nearby lightning. Noise level tables quote a strong
thunder clap as 120 dB, 130 dB as a painful noise (such as jackhammers) and 140 dB as typical from
firecrackers or gunshots, that may cause momentarily hearing loss, ear buzzing etc., close to an
airplane sonic boom and near eardrum rupture. The person that is recording gets obviously startled
and jerks up when the airblast arrives, but no report of pain or ear damage can be concluded from his
reaction so we may assume a pressure level of about 130 dB and definitely lower than 140 dB, that
corresponds to a pressure range of 63 to 200 Pa. Decibel noise scales are RMS values; for a
triangular-like pressure pulse the peak pressure is √3 times the RMS value so that peak
overpressures at the watchers position can be estimated to have been in the range 110 to 350 Pa. The
scaled distance for those incident pressures, in calm air, is 420 to 160 m/kg1/3 and, since the distance
was 2800 m, the yield results 300 – 5700 kg TNT. This range is very wide and it is based on rough
guesses so this evidence was not conclusive.
TNT equivalence
The pressure/distance/mass functions employed in air blast calculations generally originate in the
TM 5-1300 (1990) and, more recently, the UFC 3-340-02 (2008) manuals, or equivalent material
(e.g. Kingery & Bulmash 1984, Swisdak 1994) that put together in a functional form a wealth of
knowledge on explosions gathered over many years. The amount of explosive is always expressed as
mass of TNT. All publications and reports of any kind follow this line so that TNT is the reference
explosive for these purposes.
The effect of an explosion depends on the particular characteristics of the explosive material
involved: energy delivered, detonation pressure and velocity, shape of the charge, confinement,
initiation mode and strength, direction of the detonation if the charge is not perfectly spherical or
hemispherical, or the initiation is not centered, etc. The data, however, apply to bare (hemispherical
in our case) TNT charges. In order to use these data in different explosives and situations, a TNT
equivalent figure is given to charges other than TNT hemispherical ones. The TNT equivalent of a
certain explosive is the mass of TNT that would give equal effect that the unit mass of that explosive.
If the effects observed are stronger than with TNT (e.g. higher peak overpressure, higher impulse,...)
then the TNT equivalent of the material is greater than 1, and less than 1 if the effects are weaker.
TNT equivalence is no trivial subject. It can only be determined experimentally by measuring the
desired parameter on which the TNT equivalence is sought. If peak pressure equivalence of a certain
explosive is desired, charges of variable mass must be fired and pressure measured until the mass
that yields the same peak overpressure that 1 kg of TNT is determined. The inverse of that value is
the TNT equivalent of that explosive. If it is the impulse equivalent that is required, the same
procedure must be followed, matching in this case the impulse of a 1 kg TNT charge. TNT
equivalents may vary for a given explosive with the shape of the charge and also the distance, so that
sometimes near-field (high pressure) and far-field (low pressure) equivalents are given.
If no experimental information is available, and there is no possibility of doing tests, then a gross
estimate of the TNT equivalence may be calculated, for open air explosions, as the ratio of the heats
of explosion of the explosive in question to that of TNT. This assumes that the main influence in the
explosive/air interaction is the energy delivered which is true only to some extent. Equivalents have
also been derived from the ballistic mortar values but they are, like the heat of explosion, gross
estimations with little practical value since they do not address the actual detonation of a sufficient
amount of material nor do they assess the interaction of explosive with air.
The two materials that may have contributed to the explosion were porous prilled ammonium nitrate
(technical grade) and emulsion matrix (an ammonium/sodium nitrate formulation
AN/SN/Water/Oil+ Emulsifier 70/9/14/7 %, that we will refer to with the generic term ANE).
Ammonium nitrate
The following values of TNT equivalents could be considered:
- Olevskii (1978) gives a TNT equivalent of 0.39 based on experimental heats of explosion of TNT
and ammonium nitrate.
- NFPA (1982) gives a TNT equivalent of 0.5.
- FMA (1989, in Mannan 2005) Regulation 7 of CIMAH, by the Fertilizer Manufacturers
Association (the FMA Ammonium Nitrate Guide, 1989). Based on the explosion of a stack of 300
t of ammonium nitrate, it obtains a TNT equivalent of 0.55 and a maximum explosion efficiency
(a concept that describes the amount of material that suffered detonation) of 25%. For the case of
prilled, technical grade AN, the efficiency is, if anything, close to 1 (Government of Australia
2004).
- French government (MATE 2002). A TNT equivalent of 0.3 is assigned for fertilizer AN; that
equivalent is further corrected, for the purpose of safety distances calculation, with a fraction of
substance undergoing detonation, equal to 0.1 if the facility is state-of-the-art built, with a
minimum risk of fire or contamination of the product, or some (unspecified) higher value
otherwise. That fraction seems to be more of a risk analysis coefficient than a physical reaction
fraction (as the efficiency concept appears to be).
- Dechy & Mouilleau (2004). From the investigation of the Toulouse plant explosion in 2001, the
overall equivalence of Ammonium Nitrate to TNT was rated 0.05-0.10. The material in that
incident was contaminated and off-spec prill so these values seem unlikely to apply to high grade,
technical AN. Low figures have also been applied to fertilizer grade AN by Kordek et al. (2003)
and Kordek (2005).
- Mannan (2005). The Lees’ loss prevention handbooks quotes overall TNT equivalents of 0.13 and
0.33 for bagged and bulk product, respectively.
- Nygaard (2007). Experimental determination from air blast pressure measurements:
o At scaled distance Z= 2.5 m/kg1/3: Equivalence=0.60.
o At scaled distance Z= 10.1 m/kg1/3: Equivalence=0.39.
These values were obtained with 4000 kg AN at 40 and 160 m with a strong initiation source
(plastic explosive + ANFO booster).
- Queensland Government (2008). A TNT-equivalence of 0.32 is prescribed for the purpose of
calculating safety distances for AN explosive grade. This value is also given by Sherpa
Consulting (2009) and Dyno Nobel (2006); it probably comes from the Fedoroff & Sheffield
(1969) values of 1449 kJ/kg and 4522 kJ/kg for heats of explosion of AN and TNT respectively.
When stored with explosives, a TNT equivalence of 0.5 is established.
- W-DETCOM heat of explosion ratio. Calculations with this thermodynamic code (Sanchidrián &
López 2006) give 5070 and 1585 kJ/kg as heats of explosion for TNT and AN respectively, which
means an equivalent of 0.31.
Experimental ANFO pressure equivalents range from 0.37 to 0.64, and impulse equivalents 0.25 to
0.46 (Formby & Wharton 1996, for a 0.9 g/cm3 ANFO, 83 % ballistic mortar strength value, 4000-
5000 m/s detonation velocity). Tests in large scale, i.e. more than 100-200 kg, have yielded pressure
TNT equivalents up to 0.82, though with strong variability depending on the shape and the size
(Petes et al. 1983).
The sole experimental and scientifically documented values for AN are Nygaard’s ones. The 0.60
figure seems an all-high value considering the ANFO (whose energy more than doubles AN’s)
equivalents. Though some effects in the present report are observed close to the source, most of the
scaled distances involved are in the long range of the Nygaard test, so the TNT equivalent in our case
will likely be closer to the 0.39 figure.
A range 0.39 – 0.50 for the TNT equivalent of technical grade, porous prilled AN has been assumed.
Emulsion matrix
The following TNT equivalents for ANEs have been given:
- Sosnin et al. (1998) report experimental data with 180 mm diameter cylinders, 10 kg of ANE
67/14/12/5 % AN/SN/water/oil, not much different that the ANE involved in the explosion
addressed in this report, at density 1.40-1.41 g/cm3, initiated with a 0.5 kg RDX/TNT 60/40
booster. TNT equivalents were 0.59 and 0.47 for pressure and impulse respectively. After gassing,
the pressure/impulse equivalents were 0.84/0.75 (density 1.32 g/cm3), and 0.92/0.69 (density
1.245 g/cm3).
- Qiao et al. (1998) give a pressure TNT equivalent for a sensitized emulsion of 0.708.
- Sherpa Consulting (2009) quotes a TNT equivalent for ANE (composition unspecific, probably
ammonium nitrate only) of 0.68, based on thermodynamic calculations of heat of explosion.
- Simoens et al. (2011). Experimental data referring to an AN/water/oil 80/10/6 % sensitized
emulsion give TNT equivalents 1 (pressure) and 0.7 (impulse). Density is not specified; charges
1.6 and 4.5 kg of 6 and 12 cm diameter; values quite consistent with the Sosnin et al. (1998) ones
for the sensitized product.
- Fan et al. (2011) give a pressure TNT equivalent for a sensitized emulsion of 0.609.
- Thermodynamic calculations with W-DETCOM (Sanchidrián & López 2006) code give a heat of
explosion for the AN/SN emulsion used in the MMU of 3072 kJ/kg, which yields a TNT
equivalent of 0.61.
The Sosnin et al. (1998) data are certainly the most detailed ones for matrix emulsions so the 0.59
pressure equivalence must be retained. Lower values seem to be unlikely from the references studied
while somewhat higher values could perhaps be allowed. We shall use a range 0.59-0.68 as TNT
pressure equivalent of ANE matrix.
Emulsion matrix/AN mixture

In principle, a mixture of ANE and AN should be similar to a fuel-sensitized AN (i.e. close to an
ANFO) if the amount of AN prills is dominant, or closer to the ANE if the amount AN is small. In
either case, an equivalence similar to ANE’s range is probably reasonable.
With the above TNT equivalent ranges, the equivalent TNT weights in the explosion site, when the
fire started, were as given in Table 5.
Discussion
Estimates from the different calculation methods of the amount of explosive precursor material that
exploded are summarized in Table 6 (the crater and video estimations have not been used). The
possible explosion yield may be estimated from the median of the different calculation methods
(lumping upper and lower estimations) as 761.5 kg TNT; a 95 % coverage interval of the median is
372 to 1450 kg.
Table 5. TNT equivalent mass originally in the explosion site, when the truck was abandoned.
TNT equivalent mass (kg)
Mass (kg) TNT equivalent Minimum Maximum
AN 4670 0.39 – 0.50 1821 2335
ANE 7380 0.59 – 0.68 4354 5018
Total 12050 6175 7353
Table 6. Summary of yield results from the various calculation methods.

TNT (kg)
Effect Min Max
Air blast structural damage (lower pressures) 109 465
Air blast structural damage (upper pressures) 269 1480
Fragments 648 1483
Seismograph record, time of arrival 475 875
Seismograph record, structural response 1350 1450
TNT equivalents for AN (ammonium nitrate) and ANE (ammonium nitrate emulsion) have been
compiled from numerous references, ranging from 0.39 to 0.50 for AN, and 0.59 to 0.68 for ANE;
the latter range is considered also appropriate for an explosion of a mixture of AN and ANE. The 372
– 1450 kg TNT range correspond then to:
- Ammonium nitrate: 744 – 3718 kg.

- Ammonium nitrate emulsion or ANE/AN blend: 547 – 2458 kg.
These figures represent between 5 and 31 % of explosive precursor material in the truck when it was
abandoned.
The yield estimation from the structural calculation of the shed where the seismograph was located is
worth of special consideration, since it is based on an objective, measured value, other than arguable
damage (qualitative) considerations. The shape of the calculated response wave, in attenuation and
frequency, is quite close to the measured one. Hence, the numerical modeling should be looked with
confidence. To the above statement, it should be added that the fragments distance has been
estimated from a very significant sample of the total fragments (nearly one third of the total non-
combustible material), recovered in a systematic and professional search made on a wide area. This
means that the maximum fragment distance can be effectively considered a high percentile of the
distribution of fragment distances, and the yield estimation from it an acceptable one.
Following this, it can be stated that the most likely yield of the explosion was in the range 650-1450
kg TNT; many of the results of the time-of-arrival calculations also lie in this interval. In terms of
AN and ANE they correspond to:
- Ammonium nitrate: 1300 – 3700 kg.

- Ammonium nitrate emulsion or ANE/AN blend: 950 – 2450 kg.
These quantities represent between 8 and 31 % of the explosive precursors AN+ANE originally in
the truck when it caught fire in the truck. The unit had been burning for two and a half hours before
the explosion happened; this lapse is about the longest observed on fires in trucks carrying explosives
and precursors (see cases reported in Annex), or in the large-scale burn tests (von Rosen &
Contestabile 2004). It is highly likely that a large fraction of the explosive precursors, ANE and AN
(more than two thirds, perhaps even more than 90 %) had been burning prior to the explosion.
It appears that pressure buildup in the ANE and AN tanks was initially prevented from the opening
of the safety valves and, afterwards, by openings in the metal wall of the tanks (Aluminum-made)
due to local melting, since temperatures were certainly above the 660 °C melting point of Aluminum,
in some locations and for some time, according to temperature data in explosive material fires (von
Rosen & Contestabile 2004, Karlström et al. 2007). This probable wall failure under high
temperature may have helped the release of pressure. It is also possible that the fluid material (both
the emulsion and the melt ammonium nitrate) leaked from the tanks and, not being anymore in a
bulky, massive form but in a thin layer spilled on the ground, merely burned, helping to maintain the
fire.
The AN bin was next to the cabin, where the fire started, so it is reasonable that the ammonium
nitrate heated up first and began decomposing; the eventual opening of the safety valve or the local
failure of the tank wall may have led to a significant leakage of the product. AN decomposition,
initially endothermic, may have continued under the support of the external fire heat, readily
transferred to the interior of the tanks through the uninsulated Aluminum walls. Secondary,
exothermic, reactions occurring in the gas phase at higher temperatures may have taken place, further
accelerating the decomposition; contamination of spilled AN with diesel and hydraulic oil may have
occurred, contributing to the exothermic decomposition. The process continued more or less steadily,
as heat released and gases formed were readily lost to the ambient, without any temperature and
pressure buildup. Diesel and hydraulic oil, rubber from tires and hoses, paint, plastic and textiles,
were the abundant inventory of combustible material, totaling about 2000 kg, to which most of the
ANE and AN spilled out from their tanks, was added. Melt aluminum from the tanks may have also
contributed the bonfire.
At some point, some AN or ANE may have accumulated (e.g., trapped in a shaft, nook or slot, either
inside or outside the tanks), in a situation in which the release of gas was hampered by e.g. a
confined location or even the self-confinement effect under sufficient mass of product. At that point,
pressure would have built up and the decomposition accelerated, finally transitioning to a higher
order reaction, most probably a full detonation. Other causes may have triggered the detonation, e.g.
missiles from tanks rupture, violent tire burst, springs released, a sudden blaze from combustible
accumulation in some location, etc. The video recording shows some material being ejected from the
explosion in a fountain-like, or fireworks-like, fashion. It is possible that such material was, together
with incandescent fragments, partly unburnt fluid ANE and AN being scattered by the explosion,
along with remnants of other liquids (diesel and hydraulic oil, nitrite and acetic acid solutions, water
spilled from its tank, and even melt Aluminum).
A large fraction the ANE and AN had been consumed during the long time to the explosion. There
are innumerable reports of this behavior of ammonium nitrate (some recent events are reported in
Annex) when thermally decomposing in large quantities so it is likely that it was the AN that actually
detonated. The long time to explosion of the present case, compared with other similar incidents, is
probably connected with the Aluminum tanks failure that reduced the confinement, and the cold
ambient temperature that allowed the heat of combustion to be removed faster, and slowed the
decomposition kinetics, thereby keeping the fire in a steady combustion mode.
The behavior of the tanks, their walls melting, so preventing a pressure buildup and allowing the
material inside to leak and decompose without a run-up event, must have been a determining factor
in the process. This behavior of the ANE in Aluminum tanks under fire has been described in the
Kuosanen tests report (Karlström et al. 2007). Interestingly, nearly 30 pieces, weighing almost 8 kg,
of melt and solidified Aluminum, have been found, undoubtedly from the walls of the tanks, which
had melted in the bonfire and were scattered in liquid form by the explosion. However, the use of
aluminum tanks were not sufficient ultimately to prevent the explosion.
Conclusions. Lessons learned
The yield of the explosion was likely in the range 650-1450 kg TNT. In terms of actual products in
the truck they probably correspond to 1300-3700 kg AN, or 950-2450 kg ANE or ANE/AN blend.
These quantities are 8 to 31 % of the explosive precursors in the truck. The burning of the truck and
its load for two and a half hours had consumed more than two thirds (perhaps up to 90 %) of the
explosive precursor material.
The numerous pieces of melt and re-solidified Aluminum found, scattered away by the explosion,
prove that the tanks walls melted and broke open under the fire. The failure of the tanks walls
allowed an unconfined decomposition of a large fraction of the explosive precursor load in them,
together with the spillage on the ground of some of the load, leaving it in an unconfined form and,
being in a relatively thin layer compared to its critical diameter, insensitive to heat or shock, thereby
able to steadily decompose. This was the reason why only a limited fraction of explosive precursor
material remained (probably still in the tanks) when the explosion happened.
The fact that there was no report of crater speaks in favor of the explosion coming from material still
in a tank: the stand-off distance from the ground would have limited the cratering effect which, for
the amount of explosive estimated, if sitting on the ground, should have been large enough to be
clearly noticeable in the site investigation. The material spilled on the ground and decomposing
would likely not have taken part in the explosion, since it was not confined and in a thin layer; on the
contrary, its decomposition was probably quenched by the explosion, and the fluid material was
splashed up from it.
The ultimate cause of the explosion stays, to our knowledge, unknown. Though hardly more than a
speculation, photographs taken shortly prior to the burst seem to show an intensification of the
flames towards the rear of the truck, where the product diesel tank was located. Perhaps this tank
(also Aluminum-made) failed at that time and the fuel poured out and burned in the bonfire, the
sudden heat release eventually disrupting the thermal balance of the – up to that time – steady
AN/ANE decomposition process, making the temperature rise in its vicinity and accelerating the
decomposition of nearby material that was in a confined and massive form, that transitioned to a
deflagration or a detonation. Similar situations in the literature suggest that a detonation in
ammonium nitrate as a result of varying amounts and types of contaminants is possible. In addition,
ammonium nitrate possesses the ability of “self-gassing” during decomposition (DSB 2015).
The photographs taken immediately after the explosion showed what appears to be a rainfall of
incandescent drops; the video recording also showed some kind of firework-like projections
following the explosion. They could be attributed, together with glowing metal fragments, to
decomposing ANE or melt AN which, as explained above, did not take part in the explosion but were
splashed up from it. Also melt Aluminum was amongst the spilled fluid material that was launched
out by the explosion.
The fire started in the electric system of the truck chassis for reasons that have not been possible to
find out. The official report by the Norwegian authorities (DSB 2015) gave as cause of the fire some
unspecified damage in the electrical installation from a previous crash with an elk group.
Findings of vital parts substantiated that the explosion was not initiated in the pump and neither in
the vertical or the horizontal augers. Despite the incident, the project committee assessed the risk
related to MEMUs to be acceptable (DSB 2015).
The action taken by the MEMU operator, according to the work instructions, evacuating the area
once it became clear that the fire could not be controlled, proved to be very right. This behavior must
be stressed and be included into the best practices. The most important safety contribution to avoid
these types of events is to minimize the risk of fires. Additional fire detectors, fire extinguishing
systems and controls that contribute to reduce the fire risks have been implemented on the new
MEMUS:
- Tire pressure and temperature monitoring in the truck dashboard.

- Recording and remote connection via CanBus of pressure and temperature of the chassis engine
coolant, water, engine oil and gear oil.
- Automatic fire extinguishing system for the motor compartment and manual system for the tires.
The system comprises a 95/5 % mixture of water/foam so that it acts against the three fire
promoters: heat, oxygen and fuel. The automatic one has a detection system (a plastic hose) that,
breaks when heated and frees a valve open in the bottle with the extinguishing agent.
- Unit position tracking.
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- Few windows shattered: 2 kPa

Table 2. Fragment count and mass.

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0.3 All fragments

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Figure 3. Map of fragments.

Figure 4. Probability density functions of fragment distances, by fragment count.

Copyright © 2016 International Society of Explosives Engineers

Figure 5. Probability density functions of fragment distances, by mass.

Figure 6. Cumulative distribution functions of fragment distances, by fragment count.

Figure 7. Cumulative distribution functions of fragments, by mass.

Copyright © 2016 International Society of Explosives Engineers

Figure 9. Geological characteristics of the explosion area.

Copyright © 2016 International Society of Explosives Engineers

Figure 12. Pig farm. Layout plan.

-0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7

Table 4. Blast loading and vibration parameters in the seismograph position.

Emulsion matrix/AN mixture

Table 6. Summary of yield results from the various calculation methods.

- Ammonium nitrate: 744 – 3718 kg.

- Ammonium nitrate: 1300 – 3700 kg.

- Tire pressure and temperature monitoring in the truck dashboard.

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Copyright © 2016 International Society of Explosives Engineers

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