BAQUILOD, MA.

CARMEL MIGUEL
Article XIII. Section 17. Budget.

CHR EMPLOYEES v. CHR, 496 SCRA 226

FACTS:
This is a petition for review filed by petitioner challenging the CA decision which sustained the
validity of the upgrading and reclassification of certain personnel position in the CHR despite the
disapproval thereof by DBM.
The 1998 GA provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying
Fiscal Autonomy. It imposes on the aforementioned offices to formulate and implement organization
structures of their respective offices, to fix and determine salaries, allowances and other benefits of their
personnel. They are then authorized to use savings in their respective appropriations for the improvement,
salaries, and maintenance of their offices.
The CHR promulgated a resolution which upgraded and reclassified scheme among selected
positions in the Commission. The resolution proposed creation of additional positions. Another resolution
was passed that provided for the upgrade and raising of salary grades of the following positions in the
Commission. To support this scheme, the CHR authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount
generated from savings under Personnel Services. A third resolution was passed by CHR, which
"collapsed" the vacant positions in the body to provide an additional source of funding for said staffing
modification.
DBM Secretary Diokno denied the request of CHR on the third resolution as "it effectively
involved the elevation of field units from divisions to services". In the absence of a specific provision of
law which may be used as a legal basis to elevate the level of divisions to a bureau or regional office, and
the services to office, the DBM continues to deny the upgrading of the proposed positions. The CSC-NCR
office, through a memorandum, recommended to CSC- Central Office that the subject appointments be
rejected owing to the DBM's disapproval of the reclassification. The officers of petitioner CHREA, in
representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC- Central Office, to affirm the
recommendation. It stood ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority
mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of
positions.
However, on appeal by CHR, the CA decided in favor of the reclassification scheme

ISSUES:
1. W/N the CHR can validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla
positions in the Commission without the prior approval of DBM?

HELD: NO

The disputation of CA that CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is
flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans
qualification. This power to "administer" is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the
Court of Appeals. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or
superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to
administer the government of the state. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is
encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. The DBM must first be sought prior to
implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. Thus, it is within the
power of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla
positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.

Palpably, the Court of Appeals' Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs
to the species of constitutional commissions. But, Article IX of the Constitution states in no uncertain terms
that only the CSC, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as
Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Along the same vein, the
Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on Distribution of Powers of
Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, which are granted independence and fiscal
autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other
bodies including the CHR. From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear
that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence
excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to
what is implied.

Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In
essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by
law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to
the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time. We note with interest that the special
provision under the 1998 GAA, while cited under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention
CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement organizational
structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying
fiscal autonomy. In contrast, the Special Provision Applicable to the Judiciary under Article XXVIII of the
General Appropriations Act of 1998 specifically mentions that such special provision applies to the
judiciary and had categorically authorized the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to formulate and
implement the organizational structure of the Judiciary

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the
genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the
DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow
to the Salary Standardization Law. Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency
with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM.

The Salary Standardization Law has gained impetus in addressing one of the basic causes of
discontent of many civil servants. For this purpose, Congress has delegated to the DBM the power to
administer the Salary Standardization Law and to ensure that the spirit behind it is observed. This power is
part of the system of checks and balances or system of restraints in our government. The DBM's exercise of
such authority is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is pursuant to the paramount law of the land, the
Salary Standardization Law and the Administrative Code. To be sure, considering his expertise on matters
affecting the nation's coffers, the Secretary of the DBM, as the President's alter ego, knows from where he
speaks inasmuch as he has the front seat view of the adverse effects of an unwarranted upgrading or
creation of positions in the CHR in particular and in the entire government in general.