Republic of the Philippines created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
SUPREME COURT ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
Manila
EN BANC
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1 submitted
its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest
recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the
proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 5262 of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the
Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming
nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon
as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate
Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order
the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving
recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial
and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in
favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded
before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted,3 and all parties
were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda.4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant
developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this
jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a
strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled
"An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the
same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this
Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is
hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the
purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the same purpose shall be included in
the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the
constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual
data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions,
sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the
Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and
presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is
thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court
may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the
Philippine Bar?
 (2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at
this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the
meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the
concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5
of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification
of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose
names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or
Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an
entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore,
signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession based on the recognition
of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an
instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration
fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their
own organized action and participation, the promotion of the
objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals
of integrity, learning, professional competence, public service
and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and
brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence,
law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations
of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish
information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in
substantive and adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it
possible for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule
of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical
judges and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the
disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy
judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself
except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and
self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its
integrity, impartiality and independence;
 (5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and
prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any
monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or
position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and
deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices
and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country
so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are
difficult to obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal
education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the
standards of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum
fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal
research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal
rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal
advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer;
and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-
wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the
multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the
Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13
of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law."
Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor
restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest
or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar
would be constitutional — hinges on the effects of Bar integration on
the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and
freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made
by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has
been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their
constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the
practice of law.
— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a
privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a
lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and
takes part in one of the most important functions of the State,
the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public
interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be
regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
— These public responsibilities can best be discharged
through collective action; but there can be no collective action
without an organized body; no organized body can operate
effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and
just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of
such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the
most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar
through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual
dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the
corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a member of
the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only
the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue
therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group
activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of
elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to
the end of improving the quality of the legal service available
to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as
an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal
profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of
legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent
power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the
authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members
does not mean that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for
regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court
has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to push through an
Integrated Bar program without means to defray the
concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar
is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional
burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the
Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a
member that might result from his required payment of annual
dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on
any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views
be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote
measures to which said member is opposed, would not nullify
or adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to
practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is
 difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional
for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very
purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the
material of a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax would
be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have
never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute
taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by
his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private
judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and
the compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising
because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a
new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new
system which they hitherto have not had and through which,
by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities
in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in
the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid
exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply
equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar
integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in
exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not
unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain
the integration of the Bar at this time — requires a careful overview of
the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and
disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the
United States, Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1)
improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater
influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful
participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated
Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership
campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more
cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by
the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the
courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences
are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the
Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of
integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar
associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result;
effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an
impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by
opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty
years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the
United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has
been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other
hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the
public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The
official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show
that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the
matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090
lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their
individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar
integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157
(or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80)
local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have
submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified
endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single
local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed
position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast
their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted
by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof,
662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are
non-committal.5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide
demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious
study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and
effectively.
3 Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar
Fajardo and Vicente L. Arcega, the Camarines Norte
Lawyers League, Atty. Fructuoso S. Villarin, the
Camarines Sur Bar Association and the Manila Bar
Association.
4 The Petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar
Association submitted memoranda in favor of Bar
integration, while the Manila Bar Association submitted
a memoranda opposing Bar integration.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by 5 All figures are as of January 8, 1973.
Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the
attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando,

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5,

1970 "for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of
the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction," the
Commission is composed of Supreme Court Associate
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro (Chairman), Senator Jose J.
Roy, retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Conrado
V. Sanchez, Supreme Court Associate Justice (then
Court of Appeals Presiding Justice) Salvador V.
Esguerra, U. P. Law Center Director Crisolito Pascual,
Ex-Senator Tecla San Andres Ziga, and San Beda Law
Dean and Constitutional Convention Delegate Feliciano
Jover Ledesma (Members).

2 Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of

Jose W. Diokno, Roman Ozaeta, Jose P. Carag,
Eugenio Villanueva, Jr. and Leo A. Panuncialman), the
petition represented the unanimous consensus of 53
Bar Associations (from all over the Philippines) reached
in convention at the Far Eastern University Auditorium
in Manila on June 23, 1962.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of
Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile
Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public
interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the
"Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing
admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the
Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully,
he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127,
sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying
difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the
varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were
graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates
who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent
in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to
1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of
having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No.
972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few
percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress
for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which,
among others, reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President
requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that
request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted
written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the
President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it
approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions
of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their
unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to
become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which
incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the
Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August
nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one
per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations;
seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty
per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe
the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any
exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as
one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-
five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have
 passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades 1953 2,555 968 284
shall be included in computing the passing general average
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168
that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take. Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent
examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be
benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed
each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain
petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others
a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their
whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still
highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for
their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing
admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or (3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of
has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually
to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125
declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented
they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, similar motions, which are still pending because they could be
properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been
detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider
to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the their grades
effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by
section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows: Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on
the practice of the legal profession and the administration of justice,
and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the
1946 (August) 206 121 18 court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on
1946 (November) 477 228 43 the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
1947 749 340 0 constitutional.
1948 899 409 11
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant
1949 1,218 532 164 assistance of the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally
1950 1,316 893 26 an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be
gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente
1951 2,068 879 196 J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor
1952 2,738 1,033 426 of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the
Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando,
Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de
Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it,
aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton,
and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has
greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have
exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the
matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a
long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation
of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to
place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or
partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to
admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of
reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of
the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable
Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing
grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the
years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to
overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and
the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law
soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to
1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604
candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they
suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy
of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because
it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate
preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by
this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest
demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become
more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital
requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly
and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the
protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve
officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate
themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social
danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of
legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant
materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were
made available to the public during those years and private
enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and
annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously.
Books and magazines published abroad have entered without
restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and
enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A
new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946,
which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes.
Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be
enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of
view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would
have been easier had an identical case of similar background been
picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been
directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty
ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have
preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous
judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of those
defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a
similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity cite,
among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon
(State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37),
aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote
of the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law
respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other
countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared
them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully
the case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law
— that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New
York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying
the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the
provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia
College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the
Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of
New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public
trust. All votes for either of them for any elective office except
that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the
people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of
appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of
twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability,
shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this
State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional
precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of
appointing them had previously rested with the judges, and
this was the principal appointing power which they possessed.
The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in
which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions
which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice
before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was
aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision"
expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section
of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the
object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of
confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any
portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme
Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word
`admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the
admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means
to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily
implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of
determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite
qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the
validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to
indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the school
of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws
was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required
of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however
quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or
accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the
Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of
the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent.
Columbia College being an institution of established
reputation, and having a law department under the charge of
able professors, the students in which department were not
only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee
of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before
being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination,
together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully
equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study
was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning
and ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of
substituting the examination by the law committee of the
college for that of the court. It could have had no other object,
and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions.
We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to
dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate
an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as
 to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a
diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act
admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the
applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as
a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself
in order to determine the present condition of the law on the
subject. (p.89)
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction
over the question of admission, that has simply prescribed
what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that
question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper
with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the following
distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of
Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to
the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has
not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission
of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any
lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the
Philippines are entirely different on the matter of admission of the
practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the
judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six
centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to
repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding
the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition
that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the
attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously
established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or
present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect,
a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more
undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions
on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked
or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been
derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had
been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441,
in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon
be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the
text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without
parallel in the history of the English speaking people so far as
we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to
prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has
been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function.
This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law,
and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative
power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a
Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the
prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are
legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its
constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such
qualifications. (p. 444)
 But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications
which in its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate
legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other
and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or
exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments
are distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the
government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of
sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to embarrass the other in the
discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme
and thought of the people setting upon the form of government
under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p.
445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the
plane upon which the administration of justice is maintained.
Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a
portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department
of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was
supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or
interference by any other department of government, the
courts cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the
powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial
department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate
relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of
justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree
upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring
scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring
the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe
supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking
countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than
six centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the
courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since
the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining
who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was
said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New
Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts
and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to
determine who should be admitted to practice law is a
constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate
that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of
the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the
judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power
belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a
sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent,
and coordinate branch of the government. They took this
institution along with the power traditionally exercise to
determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is
no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an
intent that this traditional power of the judicial department
should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps
the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to
make the three great departments of government separate
and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature
might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing
inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent
with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent
of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not
be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions.
While the legislature may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its
general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest.
When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications
required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may
be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a
minimum standard and limit the class from which the court
must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court
cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary
by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions.
There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their
 bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the
prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of
appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may
exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh
unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of
law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New
Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to
practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the
court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How.
9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366;
Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs.
Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs.
Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20
Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been
perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so
generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney
to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this
on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any
one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that
the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely
judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the
qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in
answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725,
said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to
interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of
sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character.
This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the
honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is
highly important, also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for
doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People
ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487,
489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege
burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for
something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of
the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is
due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial
department of government would be hampered in the
performance of its duties. That has been the history of
attorneys under the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost
without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to
that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking
judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made
open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its
records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial
department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its
powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an
inherent power of such a department of government ultimately
to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to
practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect
itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral character.
Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been
well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts,
that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is
qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and
counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed."
(p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to
secure license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of
state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366,
the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be
unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office
as follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as such by
its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal
learning and fair private character. It has always been the
general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an
 examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to
which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding
their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the
possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of
counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their
private and professional character is fair. The order of
admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess
the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and
are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein.
From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are
responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their
office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the
court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex
parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise
of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power,
and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by
the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the
application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81.
"Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only
officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost
exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their
appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and
the latter, in performing his duty, may very justly considered as
engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions."
(pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception
conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function,
and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the
exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. — Re
Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial
function, and is an inherent power of the court. — A.C.
Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to
bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the
functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the
government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the
judicial departments is that it is the province of the legislature
to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action,
while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with
reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist
at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction
is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by
legislative action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded
by either of the other departments of the government. — 16
C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the
courts by requiring of them construction of the law according to
its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling
aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials,
ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular
steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. —
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations
of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice
of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a
judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the
aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although
this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on
the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its
functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal,
alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning
the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13,
article VIII of the Constitution provides:
 Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and
shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The
existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject
to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress
and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to
the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had
Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the
matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power
granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at
law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The
power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor
permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the
exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not
say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate
directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the
practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement
the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need
for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power
does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend,
disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the
legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate
and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the
concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and
should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other,
giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of
each department requires. These powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation
being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the
existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands
which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues,
culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of
appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it
may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility
for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of
the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as
the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to
it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the
exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which,
exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but
rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a
Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of
the administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion.
Guariña took examination and failed by a few points to obtain the
general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had
been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the
practice of law without a previous examination. The Government
appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the
applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without
taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds
the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as
follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered
One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and
orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the
United States and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to
the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have
held, under the authority of the United States, the position of
justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First
Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land
Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of
Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney
General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city
attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial
fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the
courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon
motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to
the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion
this appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed
examination. The report of the examining board, dated March
23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per
cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he
was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance
of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this
affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the
required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when
he presented his former application for admission to the bar,
we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of
these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his
failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now
"possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and
ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited
statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the
bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion
before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof
that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of
the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the
object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in
enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and
in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that
the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the
original Act which specifically provides for the admission of
certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to
give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the
candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of
the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13
to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by
the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress
would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that
under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word
"may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or
limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that
extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and
authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to
the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of
Guariña, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to
the bar under the provisions of this statute have been
considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the
qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had
reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively
appears that the applicant was not and never had been
practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the
date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further
affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required
qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to
the bar.
 In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that
occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of
provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of
the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We
conclude therefore that this application for license to practice
in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the
examination he fell only four points short of the necessary
grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of
the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office
of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably
gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the
duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent
and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain
him in the Government service by appointing him to the office
of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the
above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case
the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided
he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special
examination which will be given him by a committee of the
court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his
right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the
ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In
re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed
by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has
been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class
legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is
arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of
the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license
for the practice of law to those students who began studying before
November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a
diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a
law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had
studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the
aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was
unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court
said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of
this state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the
applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899,
under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to
amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in
relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28,
1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it
appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the
section of the following: "And every application for a license
who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard
to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant
commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law
school or college, shall be granted a license under this act
notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In
re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch
of which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant
a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every
diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized
under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law
studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the
student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and
showing that the student began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of
good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that
any student who has studied law for two years in a law office,
or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid
law school," and whose course of study began prior to
November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory
examination by the examining board in the branches now
required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission
exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed,
confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons
named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for
their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is
clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and
invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the
administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of
evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive
of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law,
it could only be done by a general law, persons or classes of
persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a
privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an
officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear
for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and
creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and
arrest on civil process while attending court. The law
conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No
doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that
purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing
classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the
end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a
reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to
the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People,
147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E.
454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill
acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for classification
(Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place
where such physician has resided and practiced his profession
cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination,
making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor,
65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to
say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of
the law, and plainly, any classification must have some
reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such
practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who
began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class
is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting
diplomas issued by any law school of this state before
December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for
the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a
law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted
upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules
of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be
no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both
classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as
between the two different conditions and limits of time are
fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a
diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its
managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be
anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons
to practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4,
1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not.
Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify
themselves to practice in two years as well as those who
began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need
spend only two years in study, while those who commenced
the next day must spend three years, although they would
complete two years before the time limit. The one who
commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be
admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and
without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other
the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is
utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any
natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought,
and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of
bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-
648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441,
where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the
practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being
a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted
that the legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and
definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and
license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not
be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must
be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike
and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the
Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue
chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626,
said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United
States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he
may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed
upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right
may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing
feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all
open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as
sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great
learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it
is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them — that is,
the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great value
to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them,
any more than their real or personal property can be thus
taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that
all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall
enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the
practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the
possession on the part of the application of his proper
qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have
been challenged, and courts have seriously considered
whether the exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law
rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement
upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C.
643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs.
Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom,
122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon
him the right to practice law and to constitute him an officer of
this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is
not material that he had once established his right to practice
law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and
other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no
matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the
great body of the public an individual upon whom it would
confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424)
commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law
without examination, all who had served in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the World War and received
a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled
therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress
approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act,
1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent
thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act
was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated
the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In
re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227
N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is
explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities
that a classification to be valid must rest upon material
differences between the person included in it and those
excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial
distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the
constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and
real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial
ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class
of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to
which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such
a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the
members of the class and the situation and circumstances of
all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause
for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in
their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it
operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial
reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not
generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50
per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per
cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952,
71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and
73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding
that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent,
which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of
the nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this
classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the
classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years
before, with the general average indicated, were not included because
the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those
years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953,
1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said
years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has
no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one
concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal
consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on
account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in
such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ?
Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal
permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the
general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72
per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948,
70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who
obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as
equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of
circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in
the passing averages during those years were all that could be
objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been
done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not
obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law
clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has
been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court
did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who
failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law.
Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is
being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of
the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and
1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with
the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose,
manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to
amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or
judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is
doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years
according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power
exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which
continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And
this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to
Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This
power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of
examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is
that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are
not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it
may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already
different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system
that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of
this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In
this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed
in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text
of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This
is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which
vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable
from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they
are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or
Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the
Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic
Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any
force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed
in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are
certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found
by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the
Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to become members
of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to
reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment
on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this
Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having
examined their respective examination papers, and although it is
admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time
for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and
alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated
the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power
to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar.
Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be,
intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should
tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall
consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to
the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent
prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on
who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of
candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of
general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of
law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is
arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the
law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable
from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1
referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1,
insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue
in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of
the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by
our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of
two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have
announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight
members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and
resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of
the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to
the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law
are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1
which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the
law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to
be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the
Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates
who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied,
and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a
general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed,
whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this
decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on
the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of
SUPREME COURT a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born
Manila citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
SECOND DIVISION However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991 practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what

vs. constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION office.
ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents. Black defines "practice of law" as:

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf. The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
petitioner. appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
PARAS, J.: conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of
this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an
aspect of our national existence. attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree,
N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
when he:
the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law ... for valuable consideration engages in the business of
for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied) advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity
as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
 controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association
v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of
an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.]
179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation
briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the
practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and
public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he
is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR
23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show
that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
 MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the
provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding
members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We
have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on
the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever
this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the
Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is
set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed
in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the
answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that
this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among
others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission
on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many
ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many
lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons:
Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as
commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged
in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers
are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of
the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In
most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of
law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice
of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d
623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once
the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon
role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without
litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both
the public image and the self perception of the legal profession.
(Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind
reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late
Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney
is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of
the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal
work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also
know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time
doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided
where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig
engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and
other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services
outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax
practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-
giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client
before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer
is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this
work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the
lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of
client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of
employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation
work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically,
so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both
by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of
these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below
quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure
from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other
professional groups, in particular those members participating in
various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding
the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today
requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of
the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating
rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such
improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-
making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the
inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed,
the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the
appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast
decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional
structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment
thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in
predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of
corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal
education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those
trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early
introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with
either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making
now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar
types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems
would require the services of an astute attorney because of the
complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary
step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously
referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time"
lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could
not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the
number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with
the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms.
Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems
in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who
handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or
jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws
research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including
the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities
which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other
than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as determining policy and
becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being
isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually
fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short,
a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more
closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged
by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one
of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the
international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working
in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an
area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the
overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm
of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce
Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a
good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the
arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law
teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation
Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3)
types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances
which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles,
with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting
managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the
counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning
that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with
global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within
the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has
gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in
the organization and operations of governance through participation
on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as
barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental
policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New
collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms
of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons
to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial
structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term
and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be
related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as
the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment
coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within
the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate
lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged.
Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective
managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been
found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both
planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the
role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable
users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming
techniques now make the system dynamics principles more
accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law
department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk
involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models
can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of
negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and
effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in
these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture
may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal
function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They
differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned
with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts
are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences
attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay
competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and
theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships
needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The
general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most
vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships
with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with
public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or
by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate
law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor
to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate
activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand
all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very
least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if
only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or
makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have
more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect
of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure?
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon
C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18,
1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office
as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying
that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having
passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has
been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled
the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his
stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work
of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with
the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment
bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986,
has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the
field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-
Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as
the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and
engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately
the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial
body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited
by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system
for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis
supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty.
Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team,
and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies
that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of
the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of
the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it
lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus,
the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five
(5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events
of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L.
Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory
Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August
26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than
purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of
contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation.
Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan
agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and
signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p.
321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction
is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual
remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the
contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities
of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party
when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the
ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of
whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where
they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet
genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p.
265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of
law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
— that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil
Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case,
and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has
no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the
Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of
a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested,
subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of
its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond,
etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales,
Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to
the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and
the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to
say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional
intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz
states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of
law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident
from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase
by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers
almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in
advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In
that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr.
Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of
persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an
elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks
one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing,
how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And
even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon
a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by
the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom
the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in
the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee,
it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit
that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the
procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for
help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the
procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan,
C.J.) Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
 RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. —
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United
States of America. — Citizens of the United States of America who,
before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine
Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and
regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts
before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after
taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to
continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of may
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose
of evasion. So help me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. —
Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled
attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States
or in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the
highest court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who
can show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least
five years in any of said courts, that such practice began before July
4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may,
in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination.
Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All
applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two
preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination,
satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years,
and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of
Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate
from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such
facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has
satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or
university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial
law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law,
political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence,
taxation and legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he
has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the
study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an
authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for
admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course,
the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts
or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of
concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and
economics.
Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for
admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence
required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the
beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4
of this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and
certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3
and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their
admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not
been revoked, and certificates as to their professional standing.
Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits as to
their age, residence, and citizenship.
Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for
admission shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme Court in
newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten
(10) days before the beginning of the examination.
Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise
provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to
examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social
Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law
(Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers);
International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil
Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in
writing. — Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers,
books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the
same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish,
shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the
questions personally without help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his
penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his answers
without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such
examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only
noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are
necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or commission of
other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the
examination papers. No oral examination shall be given.
Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to
the bar of the Philippines shall take place annually in the City of
Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the
chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be
distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law
(morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day:
Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile
Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial
Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).
Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be
conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be appointed by the
Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the
Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be
designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of
the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one
year. The names of the members of this committee shall be published
in each volume of the official reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to
influence any member of the committee, and during examination the
candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give
or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions,
or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the
examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and
further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may
be taken in the discretion of the court.
Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be
deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have
obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without
falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average,
the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative
weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per
cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political
and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial
Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. —
Not later than February 15th after the examination, or as soon
thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on
the result of such examination. The examination papers and notes of
the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be examined
by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the report.
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates
who have failed the bar examinations for three times shall be
disqualified from taking another examination unless they show the
satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular
fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review
course in a recognized law school.

The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the

candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that the candidates
have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the
same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by
them in the particular subject.

Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An

applicant who has passed the required examination, or has been
otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and
subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.

Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall thereupon admit

the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the
Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon
its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the
clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.

Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall
kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be
signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate.
Bar Matter No. 1153 A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of
Laws degree or its equivalent in a foreign law school must present
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En proof of having completed a separate bachelor's degree course.
Banc dated March 9, 2010
The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is hereby
"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing directed to CIRCULARIZE this resolution among all law schools in the
Reforms in the Bar Examinations Through Amendments to Rule 138 country."
of the Rules of Court). - The Court Resolved to APPROVE the
proposed amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to wit:
SEC. 5.Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All applicants
for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding
sections shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily
show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed
courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in
a law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine
Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where
the degree has been granted.
No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this
jurisdiction shall be admitted to the bar examination unless he or she
has satisfactorily completed the following course in a law school or
university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial
law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law,
political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence,
taxation and legal ethics.
A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be
admitted to the bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme
Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to
the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b)
recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority;
and (c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of
Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized by the
Philippine Government.
SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar examination
shall present a certificate issued by the proper government agency
that, before commencing the study of law, he or she had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or
college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year
high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-
TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino
along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September
1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of
severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted
as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-
accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as
a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the
fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an
application for probation with the lower court. The application for
probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of
probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's
initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition
for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he
disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation
status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this
Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the
Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's
oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow
him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the
practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated
his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We
note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10)
months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him
probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed
three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to
the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to
be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a
high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The
essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and
which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition
precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in
North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites,
satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such
a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It
is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must
have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily
would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in
negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite
often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve
not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is
eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is
 sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate
effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his
care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is
a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid
the administration of justice. . . .
xxx
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926
(1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater
temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the
multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession.
For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission
to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly
apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is
required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral
standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no
further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest
degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a
candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil
must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has
pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far
more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are
instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his
license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every
citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is
a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all
will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants
by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only
those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only
those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a
fair private and professional character is one of them; to refuse
admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offense: an examination into character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that
they may not only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but
be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to
clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They
are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and
officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the
due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible
consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the
first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall
not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of
justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral
character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public
and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the
possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A.
[N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to
the practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral
character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if
anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than
legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the
applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character
the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will
become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling — a
curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or
a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in
respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such
inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the
moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding
for his admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment
proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission
to the California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good
moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts
which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be
sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a
disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence
which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty,
integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission
upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts
declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who
would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent
than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that
entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate
moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of
law and in our legal system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities
certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral
character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led
to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated
serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral
duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by
seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and
confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be
beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty
and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a
finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral
character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has
expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of
whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be
demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take
the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of
application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of
office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination
and consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as
complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed
upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of
the community who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge
Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up
for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must,
in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different
person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the
ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by
appropriate written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the
father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of
this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if
any, of Raul Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ.,
concur. Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
 EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]
EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE
SILVA, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in
Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus
Sergio Natividad, Accused. During the proceedings, respondent Atty.
Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant
Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her
account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the civil
aspect of the case against her client. Complainant refused to accept
the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon
its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer,
she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus,
respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the
check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining
witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and
the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned
unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason: Account Closed. On June
19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she
pay the face value of the check.[1] However, his demand was ignored
by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against her for
Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-
1036. On September 22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the
necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva.[2]
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent for deceit and
violation of the Lawyers Oath.[3]
In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given
address at Carmelo Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo
City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten (10)
days from notice.[4] However, it was returned unserved with the notation
Moved.[5] The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the
latest address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.[6]
On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to
comment on the administrative complaint filed against her was served
at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with the
notation: Refused. Thus, the case was referred to the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[7]
In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner
Florimond C. Rous found respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct
and violation of the Lawyers Oath. Thus, he recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to
accept her personal check by way of settlement for the civil liability of
her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have
sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived
complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in
exchange for a check which she drew against a closed account.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in
issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a violation
of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized.[8] Such an
act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such
malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to PROCESSES.
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with
lawful orders directed at her with not even an explanation for doing so
The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a
be a person of good moral character. Since this qualification is a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all
condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society,
maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.[14] We can not tolerate any
practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable
the lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to profession.
continue in the practice of law.[9]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY.
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
shall warrant her suspension or disbarment,[10] because it is important a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof.Let copies of
that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the
standards of morality.[11] Any wrongdoing which indicates moral Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non- information and guidance.
professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be
SO ORDERED.
disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct
is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
beyond reproach and above suspicion.[12] Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave.
accept the notices served on her betrays a deplorably willful character
or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession.[13] Her
conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it
also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her
psyche which renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue
in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very
core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the
administration of justice because obedience to the dictates of the law
and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would respondent
even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains
to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost
command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could not be any
clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE

CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
 EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE
HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND
FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs,
one of which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a
supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed
with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition[1] to disqualify
Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and
to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of
the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in
his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3)
pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687
for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which
occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory
words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and
other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the
title Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been
received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002,
Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the
criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge
Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case
would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over
them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling
considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident
and involving the same parties as closed and terminated. Moreover,
Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not
involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of
his communications really contained the word Attorney as they were,
according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the
OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this
wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed
against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are
ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent
jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law
professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were
already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the
Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar
Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by
an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this
case. What matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes
dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is,
as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but
one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal
and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him
makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar.[5]
As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to
say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the
explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a
member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as
attorney whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of
law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as Atty. Haron S.
Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the
Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation
attorney may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.[6]
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed
to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event
that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that
Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further
orders from the Court.[7]
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the
OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This
renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking
the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and
academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to
impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Sharia
Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is
not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals
who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess
good moral character.[8] The requirement of good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law.[9]
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take
the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she
has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule
or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or
indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any
offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending
case or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration required by the
form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases.
His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine
whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the
applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the
applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed
with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the
existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness
even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient
to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending
criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good
moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed
upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well
that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v.
Alauya,[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the
use of the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are not
likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an
executive clerk of court of the 4thJudicial Sharia District in Marawi City,
used the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with the
rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Courtdeclared that: Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one
who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney
is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the
study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.[12]

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such
as Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering justice
demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein,
from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be
competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of
honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish
the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the
constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his
marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations and made
conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the
respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law
and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the
imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member
of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S.
Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further
orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Insofar as the Petitionseeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the
Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO
L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband,
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral
conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under
scandalous circumstances.[1]
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively
charged four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. in
Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent,
at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six
months suspension without pay,[2] while in Administrative Matter Nos.
1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated,[3] this Court on
January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service of respondent.[4]
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline, it appears that complainant and respondent were married on
October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in
Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were
eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated
his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos City), where
his last three children were born and where he practiced his profession
until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30,
1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge,
respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea, in
Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena gave birth to
their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an
administrative complaint against respondent for immorality. After
investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six
months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent.[5]
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with
Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other
administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an officer of the
court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated
and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation
from the service.[6]
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his
ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on
September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Pea
Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his
children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to
Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children. And
on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a
ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A.
Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondents
marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the
dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of
America upon her retirement from the government service in
1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted
of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their fathers acts,
including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having
previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976,
complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment under
the compulsion of the material impulse to shield and protect her children
from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant
secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana
Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the
matter was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the
Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken
off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that,
notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the
Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with
Elena.[7]
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of
contradicting the charges against him, respondent displayed
arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as when
he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months
without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena
(Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered separated in later
administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for
marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute triple jeopardy. If thats the law
so be it.[8]
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the
Commissioners recommendation, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-titled case, herein made part
of the Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L.
Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the
roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the Board of Governors of
IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing Resolution,
herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the Rules of Court.* We are in
agreement that respondents actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a
condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must
also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity.[9] There is perhaps no profession after
that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more
imperative than that of law.[10] The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.*
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up
to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by
upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standards of legal
proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public
opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose
conduct both public and private fails this scrutiny would have to be
disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a
member of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates this professional
infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he
knew a judges actuations ought to be free from any appearance of
impropriety.[11] For a judge is the visible representation of the law, more
importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of
strength that fortifies their will to obey the law.[12] Indeed, a judge should
avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations, lest it be
a demoralizing example to others.[13] Surely, respondent could not have
forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral
imperatives.[14]
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical
conduct,[15] an attorney-at-law is also invested with public trust. Judges
and lawyers serve in the administration of justice. Admittedly, as
officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of
the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high
degree or moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community
where he resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency in
an orderly society.
 A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[16]Exacted from him, as a
member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a
shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of
decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously
described as moral character. To achieve such end, every lawyer
needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his
profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but
also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer
for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.[17]
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously affects
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court of
and member of the bar.[18] For disbarment proceedings are intended to
afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before
disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general public that those who
are tasked with the duty of administering justice are competent,
honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the
clients may repose full confidence.
Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the
privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the
matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct
abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a
mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists,
as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their
children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency,
the law and the lawyers oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long
period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondents character,
his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright
defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal
profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of
justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary
action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is
hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his
name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, and Quisumbing,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, no part due to personal relationships.
Purisima, J., no part.

In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint for

disbarment was filed against a member of the bar by his wife. She was
able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their son; and that he
had adulterous relations with a married but separated
woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented
by his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another
case,[20] a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. The Court
held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of a bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous
sanctions imposed upon by this Court, respondent continued his illicit
liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded wife.The report of the
Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found
respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier
attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges against him. The IBP
 Republic of the Philippines 4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our
Supreme Court children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me
ManilA that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller
talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my
EN BANC husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But
when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, A.C. No. 6593 sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at
Complainant, the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita, Manila together
Present: with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty.
PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia
CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, Garrido, respectively x x x
- versus - VELASCO, JR., NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, 5. xxxx
BRION, PERALTA,
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO,6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was
*
ROMANA P. VALENCIA, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating
Respondents. PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. among others that the said child is their daughter and that
Promulgated: Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana
______________ Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on
1978.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION 7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home
PER CURIAM: and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit[1] and a residence x x x
supplemental affidavit[2] for disbarment against the respondents Atty.
Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. 8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still
Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee failing to give us our needed financial support to the
on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint- prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of
affidavit states: financial constraints.
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue xxxx
of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church,
Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against
Cortes x x x his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P.
Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded
six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, feelings and sleepless nights; x x x
Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and
Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;
In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas
3. xxxx charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that
Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to
Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He
claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted
ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and
understood his bad boy image before she married him in 1962. As he
and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems,
Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to
whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal
problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty.
Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children
with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated
in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino,
who finished a special secondary course.[4] Atty. Garrido alleged that
Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her
profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted
before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third
marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26,
1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he
became a lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that she was
the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not
the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was
void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty.
Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew
of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they
(Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent
about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this
silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build
a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea
was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent
when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also
alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following
motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of
Proceedings[6] in view of the criminal complaint for concubinage
Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity[7] (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to
Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion
for lack of merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] the
complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the
marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute
nullity. Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the
respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints
against them.The respondents also alleged that they had not committed
any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a
widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his
admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also
denied this motion.[9]
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the
complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted
to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her
six (6) children.[10] The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise
denied this motion.[11]
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and
Recommendation for the respondents disbarment.[12] The Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of
Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with
modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30,
2004. This resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct
which lacks the degree of morality required as members
of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is
hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the
case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No.
XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present
petition for review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did not
commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He
also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP
rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on
humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is already in
the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and
irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty.
Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on
Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a
modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing
the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old
Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways
by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage.
Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever
been filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of
the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its
recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the
verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the
complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.[13] We have so
ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling.[14] First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it
involves service to the public.[15] The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice
law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for
the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that
the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in
the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own;[16] effectively, his or
her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between
the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material
in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for
admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be
a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not
important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty.
Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre
v. Castillo,[17] the possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar
and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar
does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint,
into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the
respondent before he became a lawyer.[18] Admission to the practice
only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar.[19]
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution
recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of
the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit
applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this
constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
which expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among
others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that
he is required to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and
the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern,
Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of
discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have
stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these
proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal
only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now
available for the Courts examination and consideration, and their merits
are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that
Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the
evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and,
impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the community.[20] Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the communitys sense of decency.[21] We make these distinctions
as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.[22]
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering
lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple
marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered
into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever
them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct undermined
the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this society looks
up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values
essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the
strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than
disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the
complainant while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We
held that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good
moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the
respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v.
Palma,[25] where the respondent secretly contracted a second marriage
with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the
respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of
marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also
declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence
and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross
immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only
corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue
his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic
relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this
Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage
and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a
bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia.[26] This
was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a
prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with
Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage. This
was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the
commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty.
Valencia while his two marriages were in place and without taking into
consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the
two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second
marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage
with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married
Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced
Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry,
considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not valid.
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido
married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord
legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido
simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women
who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life
with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to
Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-
Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of
mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to
escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage
declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the
legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of
his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a
lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar.[27] As a lawyer, he violated
his lawyers oath,[28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court,[29] and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[30] all
of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying
Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this
second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was
subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to
nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands
that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands
that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the
expectation and that he would set a good example in promoting
obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law
and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives,
he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression
that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and
abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also
used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up
to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by
upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[31] Lawyers are bound to maintain not only
a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[32] Lawyers are at all times subject to
the watchful public eye and community approbation.[33] Needless to
state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny
have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly
penalized.[34]
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan
that Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable under the
circumstances for gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not
yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married
shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good
moral character is required as a condition precedent to
admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction
whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers
professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the
claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab
initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility
x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent
was subsequently declared null and void the fact
remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks
that degree of morality required of them as members of
the Bar.[35]
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that
corresponds to objective reality.[36] To have good moral character, a
person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not
enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally
entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held
by the public in the place where she is known.[37] The requirement of
good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect
the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect
prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.[38] Each purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to
becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was
a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he
already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was
under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered
into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the
subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido
with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These
circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked
good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person
possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought
by another with respect to the latters family problems, would not
aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the
person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the other persons
feelings and affection from his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with
Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away
from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would
have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was a
married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages
subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from
the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido,
driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his
relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this,
because of Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido
even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with
her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the
prism of law.
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that
Atty. Garridos second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she
felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict
legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity
of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the
honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married
in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired
before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage,
we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage,
contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with
family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty.
Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a
subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in
Hongkong[39] leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry
in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy
by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.
In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards
opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of
her husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her
husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his
second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia
did not mind at all sharing her husband with another woman. This, to
us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral
values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find
Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as
to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all
appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family.
Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree;
as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and
engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of
his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias
conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of
shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she professed to be
the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house
prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her
husband with the woman of his second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the
dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her
duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality.[40] In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as officers
of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed
to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and
after she became a member of the legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court,
membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances
concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required
of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E.
Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents,
we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great
caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an
officer of the Court.[42]
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that
the present case is one of them. The records show the parties pattern
of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental
and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the
responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as
officers of the court.
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for
gross immorality, violation of the Lawyers Oath; and
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law
for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records
of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of
the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel
E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
compassion and his act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after Associate Justice Associate Justice
their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his
demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other Associate Justice CASTRO
circumstances are commendable traits of character. Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of
Associate Justice
time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the Associate Justice
administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker (on wellness leave)
victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit. Associate Justice Associate Justice
(on leave)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to: JOSE P. PEREZ JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7481 April 24, 2012
LORENZO D. BRENNISEN, Complainant,
vs. ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by
complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen against respondent Atty. Ramon
U. Contawi for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of his lawyer's
oath.
The Facts
Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San
Dionisio, Parañaque City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 211762 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal.
Being a resident of the United States of America (USA), he entrusted
the administration of the subject property to respondent, together with
the corresponding owner's duplicate title.
Unbeknownst to complainant, however, respondent, through a
spurious Special Power of Attorney (SPA)3 dated February 22, 1989,
mortgaged and subsequently sold the subject property to one Roberto
Ho ("Ho"), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale4 dated November
15, 2001. As a result, TCT No. 21176 was cancelled and replaced by
TCT No. 1508145 issued in favor of Ho.
Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent for having violated his oath as a lawyer,
causing him damage and prejudice.
In his counter-affidavit,6 respondent denied any formal lawyer-client
relationship between him and the complainant, claiming to have
merely extended his services for free. He also denied receiving
money from the complainant for the purpose of paying the real estate
taxes on the property. Further, he averred that it was his former office
assistants, a certain Boy Roque ("Roque") and one Danilo Diaz
("Diaz"), who offered the subject property to Ho as collateral for a
loan. Nevertheless, respondent admitted to having confirmed the
spurious SPA in his favor already annotated at the back of TCT No.
21176 upon the prodding of Roque and Diaz, and because he was
also in need of money at that time. Hence, he signed the real estate
mortgage and received his proportionate share of ₱130,000.00 from
the proceeds of the loan, which he asserted to have fully settled.
Finally, respondent denied signing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of Ho and insisted that it was a forgery. Nonetheless, he sought
complainant's forgiveness and promised to repay the value of the
subject property.
In the Resolution7 dated July 16, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The Action and Recommendation of the IBP
During the mandatory conference held on October 21, 2008, the
parties stipulated on the following matters:
1. That complainant is the owner of a property covered by TCT No.
21176 (45228) of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque;
2. Respondent was in possession of the Owner's Duplicate Certificate
of the property of the complainant;
3. The property of the complainant was mortgaged to a certain
Roberto Ho;
4. The title to the property of complainant was cancelled in year 2000
and a new one, TCT No. 150814 was issued in favor of Mr. Roberto
Ho;
5. The Special Power of Attorney dated 24 February 1989 in favor of
Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is spurious and was not signed by
complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen;
6. That respondent received Php100,000.00 of the mortgage loan
secured by the mortgagee on the aforementioned property of
complainant;
7. That respondent did not inform the complainant about the
unauthorized mortgage and sale of his property;
8. That respondent has a loan obligation to Mr. Roberto Ho;
9. That respondent has not yet filed any case against the person
whom he claims to have falsified his signature;
10. That respondent did not notify the complainant that the owner's
copy of TCT No. 21176 was stolen and was taken out from his office.8
In its Report9 dated July 10, 2009, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Eduardo V. De Mesa,
found that respondent had undeniably mortgaged and sold the
property of his client without the latter's knowledge or consent,
facilitated by the use of a falsified SPA. Hence, in addition to his
possible criminal liability for falsification, the IBP-CBD deduced that
respondent violated various provisions of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility and accordingly recommended that he be disbarred
and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the report of Commissioner De Mesa through Resolution No. XIX-
2011-24810 as follows:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex 'A' and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and finding Respondent guilty of falsification; making or using
falsified documents; and for benefiting from the proceed[s] of his
dishonest acts, Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is hereby DISBARRED."
The Issue
The sole issue before the Court is whether respondent violated his
lawyer's oath when he mortgaged and sold complainant's property,
which was entrusted to him, without the latter's consent.
The Court's Ruling
After a punctilious examination of the records, the Court concurs with
the findings and recommendation of Commissioner De Mesa and the
IBP Board of Governors that respondent acted with deceit when,
through the use of a falsified document, he effected the unauthorized
mortgage and sale of his client's property for his personal benefit.
Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's property without
his knowledge or consent, and partook of the proceeds of the sale for
his own benefit. His contention that he merely accommodated the
request of his then financially-incapacitated office assistants to
confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully
aware that complainant's signature reflected thereon was forged. As
aptly opined by Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent transactions
involving the subject property were effected using the owner's
duplicate title, which was in respondent's safekeeping and custody
during complainant's absence.
Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of
Governors correctly recommended his disbarment for violations of the
pertinent provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Canon 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client which may come into his possession.
Canon 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from client.
Canon 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand.
Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. admission to practice xxx" (emphasis supplied)

In Sabayle v. Tandayag,11 the Court disbarred one of the respondent
lawyers and ordered his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys on
the grounds of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. The
respondent lawyer knowingly participated in a false and simulated
transaction not only by notarizing a spurious Deed of Sale, but also –
and even worse – sharing in the profits of the specious transaction by
acquiring half of the property subject of the Deed of Sale.
12
In Flores v. Chua, the Court disbarred the respondent lawyer for
having deliberately made false representations that the vendor
appeared personally before him when he notarized a forged deed of
sale. He was found guilty of grave misconduct.
The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required.15 Having carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the
Court therefore finds that the standard of substantial evidence has
been more than satisfied.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, having
clearly violated his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional
Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct,
is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.

In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness and Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar
plain inability to discharge the bounden duties of a member of the Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
legal profession. He failed to prove himself worthy of the privilege to country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision
practice law and to live up to the exacting standards demanded of the be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.
members of the bar. It bears to stress that "[t]he practice of law is a
privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal SO ORDERED.
proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability."13 RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal lawyer- ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
client relationship between him and complainant will not serve to Associate Justice Associate Justice
mitigate his liability. There is no distinction as to whether the TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE ARTURO D. BRION
transgression is committed in a lawyer's private or professional CASTRO Associate Justice
capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at Associate Justice
one time and a mere citizen at another.14 1âwphi1 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the penalty of MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
disbarment proper in this case, as recommended by Commissioner Associate Justice Associate Justice
De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors. Section 27, Rule 38 of the MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Rules of Court provides: Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA MARIA LOURDES P. A.
"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; Associate Justice SERENO
grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or Associate Justice
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, xxx Associate Justice Associate Justice