[Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series] Gian Luca Gardini, Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida (Eds.) - Foreign Policy Responses to the Rise of Brazil_ Balancing Power in Emerging States (2

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Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
Foreign Policy Responses to
the Rise of Brazil
Balancing Power in Emerging States
Edited by
Gian Luca Gardini

Professor of International Relations, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg (FAU), Germany
Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida

Senior Researcher, Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento (CEBRAP), Brazil
Editorial selection and content © Gian Luca Gardini and Maria Hermínia
Tavares de Almeida 2016
Individual chapters © Respective authors 2016
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2016 978-1-137-51668-8
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Gardini, Gian Luca, editor, author. | Almeida, Maria
Hermínia Tavares de, editor, author.
Title: Foreign policy responses to the rise of Brazil : balancing power in
emerging states / Gian Luca Gardini, Professor of International Relations,
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg (FAU), Germany, Maria Hermínia
Tavares de Almeida, Senior Researcher, Centro Brasileiro
de Anglise e Planejamento.
Description: New York, NY : Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. |
Series: Palgrave studies in international relations series | Includes index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015035455 |
Subjects: LCSH: Brazil—Foreign relations—South America. | South
America—Foreign relations—Brazil. | Brazil—Foreign
relations—1985– | South America—Foreign relations—1948–
Classification: LCC F2232.2.B6 F67 2016 | DDC 327.8108—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015035455
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Contents
List of Figures and Tables vii
Acknowledgements ix
Notes on Contributors xi
Introduction 1
Gian Luca Gardini and Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida
1 Brazil: The State of the Art of Its Rise and Power Projection 12
Gian Luca Gardini
2 Within the Region, Beyond the Region: The Role of Brazil

According to the Mass Public 29
3 Brazil’s Rise and Its Soft Power Strategy in South America 46

Miriam Gomes Saraiva
4 Argentina and the Rise of Brazil: Perceptions and Strategic

Options 62
Roberto Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian
5 Brazil: Chile’s Mythical Ally 77

Joaquín Fermandois
6 Brazil as a Global Stakeholder: A View from Uruguay 90

Carlos Luján
7 Paraguay and the Rise of Brazil: Continuity, Resistance,

and Compliance 114
Peter W. Lambert
8 Bolivia–Brazil: Internal Dynamics, Sovereignty Drive, and

Integrationist Ideology 129
Ana Carolina T. Delgado and Clayton M. Cunha Filho
9 The Peruvian Response to the Rise of Brazil: Developing a

Strategic Relationship 145
Ronald Bruce St John
v
vi Contents
10 Venezuela and the Rise of Brazil: Convergence and

Divergence in the Chávez Era 160
José Briceño-Ruiz
11 Colombia’s Contestation Strategies Facing the Emergence

of Brazil as a Regional Power 177
Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas
12 Containing and Engaging: Mexico’s Response to the Rise

of Brazil 195
Ana Covarrubias
13 Latin American Regionalism Faces the Rise of Brazil 214

Andrés Malamud
Concluding Remarks 227

Index 236
Figures and Tables
Figures
2.1 Self-identification 33
2.2 Regional priorities 35
2.3 The role of Brazil in South America 39
2.4 Regional integration (IIP) 41
2.5 Regional integration (UUP) 42
8.1 Bolivian exports, 2000–2014 (in US$ million) 136
Tables
2.1 Opinion-makers in the press – main topics 34

2.2 Relations to selected countries 37
2.3 Brazil’s behaviour in the region 39
6.1 Uruguayans’ opinions on Uruguay’s main friend (%) 92
6.2 Uruguayans’ opinions on the least friendly country (%) 92
6.3 Uruguayans’ opinions regarding the South American
country they would choose to live in if they had to leave
Uruguay (%) 93
6.4 MPs’ opinions on the past and future Uruguayan
relations with Argentina and Brazil 97
6.5 MPs’ support for the strengthening of Uruguayan
bilateral relations with Argentina or Brazil 99
6.6 MPs’ degree of agreement with a Uruguayan strategic
alliance with Brazil 101
6.7 MPs’ degree of agreement with Brazil’s leadership and
the region’s prioritization 102
6.8 MPs’ support for the possible signing of bilateral free
trade agreements (FTA) with different countries or blocs 104
6.9 MPs’ support for Uruguay joining the Pacific Alliance 105
6.10 MPs’ support for the signing of a new treaty with the
US or China 106
6.11 MPs’ opinions on the most reliable country to preserve
international peacekeeping 107
vii
viii List of Figures and Tables
6.12 MPs’ opinions on the most unreliable country to

preserve international peacekeeping 109
8.1 Bolivian exports, total and Brazil 137
8.2 Bolivian foreign trade index, by sector (2006 = 100) 138
C.1 Strategies towards Brazil 233
Acknowledgements
This book would have not been possible without the help, support,
and advice of a number of persons. We are grateful to our editors at
Palgrave Macmillan, Eleanor Davey-Corrigan and Hannah Kaspar, for
having faith in this project, for their encouragement, and for their excel-
lent editorial work. Our colleagues at Bath, São Paulo, and Nuremberg
constantly supported us: thank you! The same goes for our students,
whose interest in Latin American international relations and Brazil’s for-
eign policy prompted us to produce a book that might answer some
of their intelligent and challenging questions about the real impact on
Latin America of Brazil’s rise and how Latin American countries have
adapted to, and coped with, this new scenario. We must also thank
the many scholars who generously shared their thoughts with us dur-
ing the development of this volume, not least the contributors to this
volume, whom we would also like to thank for their enthusiasm, as
well as their patience with our requests for amendments and changes.
We are particularly grateful to all colleagues who gave us their intellec-
tual input and comments when the book project was first presented at
the FLACSO-ISA joint conference in Buenos Aires in July 2014. We are
also indebted to the University of Bath, which generously sponsored
the initial phase of this project through the International Partnership
& Mobility Scheme. This gave Prof. Gardini the opportunity to spend
a very fruitful research period as a visiting professor at the Institute
of International Relations (IRI, University of São Paulo), then directed
by Prof. Tavares de Almeida. Our conversations and exchanges of ideas
on that occasion truly originated most of the content and concepts
of this book. We are also extremely grateful to the Bulletin of Latin
American Research and Wiley Publishers for allowing us to republish,
in a different format, four of the chapters of this volume,1 which had
previously appeared in the special issue 35:1 of that journal under the
guest-editorship of Gian Luca Gardini.
Gian Luca Gardini would specifically like to thank the University
of Bath, the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, the European Union,
and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council of the
UK for sponsoring his research in the last three years, thus making
the development of this book project possible. He would also like to
dedicate this book to all those new and old friends who supported
him in his first, exciting but challenging, year in Germany, and to his
ix
x Acknowledgements
parents. Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida would like to thank the

colleagues, students, and staff of the Institute of International Relations
at the University of São Paulo, for providing the best academic envi-
ronment a researcher could dream of. She is equally grateful to the
Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo – FAPESP (State
of São Paulo Research Foundation) for sponsoring the research project
‘Brazil, the Americas and the World’, of which Chapter 2 is a partial
result. She is also indebted to the Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa-CNPq
(National Research Council) for the Research Productivity Scholarship
A-I (2011–2015) that allowed her time and means to work on this book.

Nuremberg and São Paulo
Note
1. Chapters 1, 4, 7, and 12.
Contributors
José Briceño-Ruiz is an associate professor at the Faculty of Social and

Economic Sciences, University of the Andes, Mérida, Venezuela. He
holds a PhD in political science from the University of Aix-en-Provence,
France. He is a visiting professor at the University of São Paulo, Brazil.
His areas of expertise include Latin American regionalism, comparative
regionalism, international political economy, and foreign policy. His
most recent book is The Resilience of Regionalism in Latin American and
the Caribbean. Autonomy and Development (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
Ana Covarrubias Velasco is Professor of International Relations and

the Director of the Center of International Studies at El Colegio de
México, Mexico City, Mexico. She obtained her BA in international
relations from El Colegio de México and an MPhil/DPhil from the
University of Oxford, UK. She teaches Latin American international rela-
tions, Mexican foreign policy, and theory of international relations. Her
research focuses on Mexican foreign policy, principally towards Latin
America, and human rights.
Clayton M. Cunha Filho holds a PhD in political science from Rio

de Janeiro State University’s Social and Political Studies Institute (IESP-
UERJ) and is an assistant researcher at the South American Political
Observatory (OPSA/IESP-UERJ) responsible for Bolivian politics since
May 2008. He has published extensively on Bolivian politics in many
different journals and is a post-doctoral fellow at Brasília University’s
Institute of Foreign Relations and Compared International Politics
(Irel/UnB).
Ana Carolina Delgado holds a PhD in international relations from

Pontificia Catolica University (PUC), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. She is Lec-
turer in Politics at the International Relations Institute of PUC-Rio,
where she has also been adjunct coordinator of the Undergraduate
Program. For the past three years, she has taught five different under-
graduate courses, including Actors of Emerging Global Civil Society,
International Relations of Latin America, and State, Politics & Devel-
opment in Latin America. She has also worked as a research assistant
xi
xii Notes on Contributors
at BRICS Policy Center (BPC) and Assistant Coordinator of the South

American Political Observatory (OPSA/IESP-UERJ).
Joaquín Fermandois is Professor of Contemporary History at the

Catholic University of Chile, Santiago, Chile. He holds a PhD from
the University of Seville, and in 1989 he was awarded a prestigious
Guggenheim Fellowship. He has been a visiting scholar at Georgetown
University, Hamburg University, and the Free University of Berlin. He
is a regular columnist of the Chilean daily El Mercurio. He is the author
of Mundo y fin de mundo. Chile en la política mundial 1900–2004 and La
revolución inconclusa. La izquierda Chilena y el gobierno de la Unidad Popular
(2013).
Gian Luca Gardini is Professor of International Relations and Chair

of International Business and Society Relations with focus on Latin
America at Friedrich Alexander University in Nuremberg, Germany.
Among his books are Latin America in the 21st Century (2012), Latin
American Foreign Policies between Ideology and Pragmatism (edited with
P. W. Lambert, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), and The Origins of MERCOSUR
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). His main research interests cover the inter-
national relations of Latin America, regional integration, and foreign
policy
analysis.
Miriam Gomes Saraiva is Professor of International Relations at the

University of the State of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. She holds a PhD in
political science from the Complutense University, Madrid, and she was
a visiting fellow at the European University Institute (2002–2003). Her
publications and research lie in the field of regional integration and
foreign policy. In 2013, she was appointed the first Rio Branco Visit-
ing Chair in International Relations at the University of Oxford, where
she carried out research on ‘Strategies and Partnerships for Brazil in a
Changing Global Order: The Place of the European Union’.
Peter W. Lambert is Professor of Latin American Studies at the Univer-

sity of Bath, UK, where he is also Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Learning and
Teaching. His research focuses on Paraguayan history and contemporary
politics, as well as broader issues of foreign policy, democratization, and
national identity. Among his key publications are The Paraguay Reader
(2012, co-edited with A. Nickson) and Latin American Foreign Policies:
Between Ideology and Pragmatism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011, co-edited
Notes on Contributors xiii
with G. L. Gardini). He was the president of the Society for Latin

American Studies (2007–2009).
Carlos Luján is Professor of Decision-making, Negotiation and Method-

ology at the Universidad de la República, Montevideo, Uruguay. He
holds a PhD in human sciences (option political science) from the
Universidad Católica del Uruguay and a master’s degree in international
relations from FLACSO Buenos Aires, Argentina. In the period 2010–
2014, he was head of the Diplomatic Academy and chief of the Strategic
Analysis Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Uruguay. He has
been a consultant to international organizations such as UNDP, ECLAC,
IADB, and the World Bank.
Andrés Malamud is a research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences

of the University of Lisbon, Portugal. He holds a PhD in political science
from European University Institute. He has been a visiting researcher
at the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg and at the University of
Maryland, College Park, and a visiting professor at several universities in
Argentina, Brazil, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain. His areas of interest
include comparative regional integration, government institutions and
parties, EU Studies, and Latin American politics. His publications have
appeared in journals such as European Political Science, Latin American
Research Review, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Latin American
Politics and Society, and Journal of European Integration.
Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas is Director of the International Relations

Department and Professor of International Relations in the Faculty of
Political Sciences and International Relations in the Pontificia Javeriana
University of Bogotá, Colombia. He is the editor of the political jour-
nal Papel Político and a consultant for the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation
in Colombia. He holds a PhD in law from the University of Leipzig in
Germany.
Roberto Russell holds a PhD in international relations from the School

of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), The Johns Hopkins University,
in Washington. He is full professor and director of the Master and PhD
programs in International Studies at the University Torcuato di Tella,
Buenos Aires, Argentina, and president of the Vidanta Foundation. He
was formerly academic director of the Argentine Institute of the Foreign
Service (ISEN). He was awarded the 2006 Konex Humanities Award in
xiv Notes on Contributors
Political Science. His latest book is Argentina 1910–2010. Balance de un

siglo (2010).
Ronald Bruce St John, independent analyst, US, holds an MA and

a PhD from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, Univer-
sity of Denver, CO, USA. He has acted as a consultant for a variety of
Fortune 500 companies, US government agencies, and global media out-
lets. Working as an independent scholar, he has published 23 books
and monographs, contributed to 24 others, and written more than
350 articles and reviews. Focused on Andean America, the Middle East
and North Africa, and Southeast Asia, recent books include Toledo’s
Peru: Vision and Reality (2010) and Revolution, Reform and Regionalism in
Southeast Asia (2008).
Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida is a senior researcher at Centro

Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento (CEBRAP), Brazil. She retired as
Professor of Political Science and International Relations from the Uni-
versity of São Paulo, Brazil. She holds a PhD in political science from
the University of São Paulo and conducted post-doctoral studies at the
University of California at Berkeley. Her main areas of research are pub-
lic policy, public opinion, and foreign policy. She was president of the
Latin American Studies Association (LASA, 2010–2012). She is a mem-
ber of the World Bank Chief Economist’s Council of Eminent Persons.
In 2006, she was awarded the prize of the National Order of Scientific
Merit by the Brazilian presidency.
Juan Gabriel Tokatlian holds an MA and a PhD in international

relations from The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies, USA. He is the director of the Department of Political
Science and International Studies at Universidad Di Tella, Buenos Aires,
Argentina. He has published various books, essays, and op-ed articles on
the foreign policies of Argentina and Colombia, on US–Latin American
relations, on contemporary global politics, and on drug trafficking,
organized crime, and violence in the Americas.
Introduction
Background and rationale of the book
Brazil has risen. Its international position has never been as central to
world affairs, or its global presence as strongly felt, as in the last ten
years. Its recently acquired status and recognition as a global player
and influential actor are unlikely to recede. The might of its econ-
omy, by now the seventh largest in the world in GDP terms (World
Bank, 2014), and its international activism have attracted considerable
attention from academic, political, and economic analysts (Sweig, 2010;
The Economist, 2010; Burges, 2013). However, the limitations of Brazil’s
capacity and will to turn its potential power into actual leverage inter-
nationally have been identified too. Some have stressed the reluctance
of Brazil’s regional partners to follow Brasilia’s policy preferences and
agenda (Schirm, 2010; Malamud, 2011). Others have simply omitted
Brazil from the list of those likely to shape the world in the 21st cen-
tury (Kagan, 2008; Russell Mead, 2015). Still others have cast doubt on
Brazil’s immediate ability to drive change and promote values globally
(Castañeda, 2010). In fact the association of Brazil with concepts such as
power or leadership seems to be a contested and complex one, leading
some to conclude that Brazil is perhaps a sui generis middle power (Hirst
and Soares de Lima, 2006).
Relatively little attention has been paid to how other countries have
perceived and responded to the rise of Brazil. The focus of academic
attention has only recently turned from the so-called rising or emerging
powers to the responses that other international actors, mainly neigh-
bouring states, have offered to these perceived shifts. This new focus is
only at the embryonic stage. A first comprehensive attempt, perhaps
not surprisingly, was conducted with reference to the rise of China
1
2 Introduction
and the behaviour of its neighbours. It was argued that the reaction
of other Asian states tended to accommodate, rather than balance,
Beijing’s prominent role (Kang, 2007). With reference to Latin America
and Brazil, theoretical and empirical analysis has just started (Flemes and
Wehner, 2013; Flemes and Lobell, 2015; Gardini, 2016), but promises to
be a fruitful field of investigation. This edited book is an attempt to
broaden the existing discussion to a larger range of case studies and to
contribute to the current debate in both empirical and theoretical terms.
Empirically, we intend to study the impact of the emergence of Brazil
upon a number of Latin American countries and how these perceive
and face the rise of Brazil as a regional and international power. The
purpose is to unpack the essence and the projection of Brazil’s power as
felt in the region, and to assess the place that Brazil has in the perception
and, most of all, the foreign policy of other Latin American countries.
In other words:
• What has been the real impact of the rise of Brazil on the rest of Latin
America?
• How have other Latin American countries responded to it?
Theoretically, from an international relations (IR) theory perspective,

the balance of power theory suggests that hegemony and great powers
more broadly prompt reactions of either bandwagoning or balancing.
This set of theories was developed essentially during the Cold War
(Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1985). Is it still valid and applicable to the rise of
emerging powers in the 21st century? Or have today’s rising powers pro-
voked novel reactions in response to their ascendance? If one considers
that the emerging powers of our day, such as China, India, Brazil, or
South Africa, pose a number of theoretical challenges to traditional def-
initions of what an internationally powerful actor is (see Chapter 1 in
this volume), it also makes sense to investigate whether or not reac-
tions to new types of powers constitute new species of conduct, and to
what extent these are significantly different from traditional alignment
or balancing.
The IR literature has recently tried to identify new forms of responses
to emerging powers. New labels and more nuanced concepts are
emerging. ‘Soft balancing’ or ‘soft-hedging’, for instance, defines a
multiple-component strategy situated between the two ends of the
balancing–bandwagoning spectrum, based on a set of varied counter-
ing options designed to offset risks in the international system (Paul,
2005; Cheng-Chwee and Kong Chian, 2008). The emphasis lies upon
Gian Luca Gardini and Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida 3
the relinquishment of hard power solutions in favour of a pool of more

flexible and less conflictive postures. More specifically, ‘institutional bal-
ancing’ identifies a situation in which the rise of new dominant actors
and competing regional orders prompts an intensification of institution-
alized mechanisms and norms of cooperation in different policy areas
such as security or the economy (He, 2015). This does not seem to be
too different from traditional alliance theory, though, the main distinc-
tion being the emphasis on institutionalized frameworks of cooperation
to counter hegemonic pretensions not only in security, but also in other
areas.
Another interesting approach stresses instead the diversification of
issues, options, and strategies available to those facing the emergence of
powerful neighbours. International affairs and containment are played
on different tables at the same time. Therefore, it is possible to dis-
tinguish between primary and secondary objectives and/or challenges.
Responses can be differentiated accordingly. A distinction can be made,
for instance, between resisting primary threats and accommodating sec-
ondary threats, and these can be dealt with using different instruments
and different degrees of firmness (Lobell et al., 2015). What clearly
emerges is that there is a whole range of foreign policy options between
traditional bandwagoning and hard balancing. Most states will use a
variety and a combination of these conducts in what is defined as a
‘strategic contestation’ of the emerging hegemon’s order and agenda.
This seems to be precisely the case in Latin America (Flemes and Wehner,
2015).
Using Brazil and Latin America as case studies, this volume aims
to contribute to conceptualizing the type of response (balancing,
bandwagoning, or new/alternative typologies) that emerging powers
generate among their neighbours. In particular, building on the dis-
tinction between old and new types of powers (Narlikar, 2010), this
book focuses on responses to the emergence of new powers. These are
states that ‘through a mix of a very large and expanding resource base
(indicators of which include market size, economic growth rates, popu-
lation, and defense spending) and diplomatic skills, have acquired the
de facto status of veto players’ (Narlikar, 2010:7). Conversely, the old
or established powers are those that enjoy ‘both material capabilities
and legitimacy, and who position themselves as the interpreters and
executors of the international society as a whole’ (Narlikar, 2010:7). The
approach taken in the book is innovative in so far as it places emphasis
on those countries affected by the rise of a newly powerful neighbour
rather than on the emerging country itself. This may provide interesting
4 Introduction
insight, not only for Latin or South America but also for other areas of
the world. With specific reference to Brazil and Latin America, we ask:
• Has the rise of Brazil prompted a clear coping strategy in Latin

American countries?
• Can this response be understood as balancing, bandwagoning, or
some new typology?
The common thread of the book
In dealing with each individual country’s response to the rise of

Brazil, and besides any particular issue that each contributor may con-
sider of special importance, all the chapters also take into account
some common questions that give analytical coherence to the project.
In particular, the following seven questions/issues inform the whole
volume and are developed in each individual chapter and throughout
the book:
1. What has been the impact of the rise of Brazil upon the country case
study? Is it possible to detect a substantial change in the quality
and quantity/intensity of the relations between Brazil and the tar-
get country in the last ten years? Is there any evidence in terms
of trade, investment, cooperation agreements, political alignment,
or disputes in regional and international affairs and organizations?
This is meant to give the reader a clear idea of whether or not any
substantial change in Brazil’s relations with other Latin American
countries has occurred over the last ten to 15 years, that is to
say, since the acknowledgement of its emerging power status and
the corresponding political narrative and academic and practical
investigation.
2. What is the place/role of Brazil in the perception of the country
under investigation? By perception here, we refer to the percep-
tion of those political and economic elites who are able to affect
state/government policies. It is important to identify, with some
degree of precision, what is the dominant perception about the
nature of the relations between the country examined and Brazil.
There is, of course, a whole range of possibilities:
a. Are they just neighbours that interact occasionally?

b. Are they allied to reach specific goals?
c. Are they partners committed to long-lasting common goals?
d. Is Brazil seen as a leader that the country is prepared to follow in

one or more regional and international endeavours?
e. Are the countries competitors, even if they can occasionally ally?
f. Are they enemies? Or is there any serious concern for potential
conflict (not necessarily armed)?
g. Is Brazil seen as a political broker? Or is it seen as a useful
third partner, or even a buffer that can cushion other conflictive
relations?
3. Almost as a natural consequence of point 2, What is the place of

Brazil in the foreign relations of the subject country? To fully assess the
perceptions and reactions of each individual country to the rise of
Brazil, it is important to discuss the place occupied by Brazil in the
foreign relations of these countries, especially compared with other
significant countries.
4. What is the role of extra-regional actors (namely, the US and increas-
ingly China) in determining the relations between Brazil and the subject
country? Latin American countries’ relations with Brazil exist in a
geopolitical space where the US is/has been a hegemonic power
and where China is becoming more present and important every
day. Understanding how and how much these crucial issues impact
bilateral relations and perceptions about the role of Brazil is a key
question addressed by all authors.
5. What does the Brazilian (claim to) leadership – if and where acknowl-
edged – rest on? Legitimacy? Authority? Incentives? Brazilian politi-
cians, foreign policy authorities, and scholars emphasize Brazil’s
commitment to abdicate hard power and build its influence on
soft power resources. How is this self-image perceived by the other
countries? In the absence of capacity and willingness to coerce, in
what kind of authority and in what type of legitimacy is Brazilian
leadership grounded, if and where it is acknowledged?
6. What is the weight of domestic factors and dynamics in shaping the
relations between the subject country and Brazil? Is domestic poli-
tics important to mould foreign policy? If so, how does domestic
politics interplay with and influence countries’ perceptions of and
responses to the rise of Brazil in the region and worldwide?
7. How is it possible to define the subject country’s response to the rise of
Brazil? Bandwagoning? Balancing? Other? Each chapter tries to out-
line in theoretical terms whether the subject country has devised
any conscious and consistent strategy to deal with the rise of Brazil,
or whether the reaction is on a case-by-case basis. Each author may
6 Introduction
choose to characterize it with one noun or adjective or eye-catching

slogan and define the type of reaction/response of the country to
the rise of Brazil. The concluding chapter of this volume will try
to make sense of the different responses and identify patterns and
commonalities as well as key differences and discrepancies.
The distinctiveness of the book
The book aims to fill a gap in the existing research and literature. Lit-
tle has been written in a comprehensive way and format about Latin
American responses to the rise of Brazil. In fact, there is currently
no directly competing book on the specific subject, time frame, and
perspective. We are confident that the book will make an important
contribution to the academic fields of IR, foreign policy analysis, Latin
American studies, and the emerging sub-field of rising power studies.
The literature on the foreign policies of specific Latin American coun-
tries, and on emerging powers, is relatively abundant. Yet, there is no
book specifically covering the reaction of neighbouring countries to the
rise of Brazil. The debate on this specific topic has just started. Only
a special issue of International Politics (Flemes and Lobell, 2015) and
of the Bulletin of Latin American Research (Gardini, 2016) have so far
dealt with a comprehensive theoretical and empirical approach to the
topic. Indeed, many of the contributors to these two special issues are
pioneers in the field, and some of them have been recruited for this
book project too, mainly with new pieces to shed a fresh light on the
subject.
We are confident that a major strength of the book is the quality
and variety of its contributors, whom we would like to thank for their
commitment and their academic contribution in terms of both their
chapters and their input into theoretical debates. All the authors have
proven expertise in Latin American politics and an unquestionable pas-
sion for and extensive knowledge of the continent. They also reflect
a variety of scholarly backgrounds and cultural approaches to Latin
America, IR, and foreign policy, and come from different areas of the
world, prioritizing Latin America, but including also the US, Britain, and
continental Europe. This variety within a truly international team con-
tributes to the richness of the volume in terms of pluralism, perspective,
and analysis. At the same time, it preserves a primarily Latin American
view on Latin American issues. There is also a balanced mix of promis-
ing young scholars and more established academics and analysts, which
we hope makes for a refreshing and fruitful approach to the subject.
This book is the result of a long-term, carefully developed project,

which originated from a generous International Partnership & Mobil-
ity Scheme grant from the University of Bath. These resources allowed
Professor Gardini to spend a research period as visiting scholar at the
University of São Paulo in 2013, at the Institute of International Rela-
tions, then directed by Professor Tavares de Almeida. The two co-editors
had a chance to work side by side and develop the theoretical bulk of
this project. Since then, ideas and concepts have been discussed with
many scholars worldwide, and have been presented at the Joint ISA-
FLACSO (International Studies Association-Facultad Latinoamericana de
Ciencias Sociales) Conference in Buenos Aires in July 2014. Feedback has
been encouraging, stimulated debate, and prompted further discussion
and adjustments to the conceptual framework and the contents. This
book thus reflects the efforts, contributions, and enthusiasm of a wide
group of scholars and students from all around the world over the past
two years.
The IR of Latin America, understood as inter-Latin American relations,
deserve study and attention in their own right (Gardini and Lambert,
2011:5). We have stressed this in many of our works and presentations
worldwide. This book is precisely about the IR of Latin America as a
central topic, here taken seriously as such, not only as a sub-area or a by-
product of US foreign policy, the rise of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India,
China) in world affairs, or comparative regionalism. Indeed, there exists
a solid body of literature to justify the search for a distinctive foreign
policy approach to a region’s IR (Manners and Whitman, 2000). Latin
America offers a range of good reasons to support the case.
Six such reasons stand out. First, in the last ten to 15 years Latin
America has been experimenting in both political and economic terms –
including foreign policy – with the spread of the ‘pink tide’. This is
a wave of left-leaning and supposedly progressive administrations that
have tried, in different degrees, to reject the excesses of capitalism and
US influence in the continent. Instead, they claim to pursue more bal-
anced foreign relations and more equitable policies at home. While
peculiar to Latin America, this trend expresses globally felt aspirations
and concerns.
Second, Latin America embodies a mix of unity and diversity in its
member countries. This is, in a way, a unique combination, but in
another, it is representative of the variety of positions and interests exist-
ing in continents such as Africa and Asia too. This tension is particularly
evident in foreign relations, and was best perceived by the definition of
Latin America as the ‘Extreme Occident’, where Western heritage and
8 Introduction
local legacy blend and intersect (Rouquié, 1998). Variety refers not only
to the wide range of ideological and policy solutions currently available
but also to the different attitudes and policies resulting from differ-
ing perceptions of identity and belonging, especially with reference to
Western values and models.
Third, the form and pervasiveness of US influence in the region
are unique to the Americas, and yet, with the possible exception of
Colombia and Mexico, Latin America is a region where the impact
of 9/11 and the so-called War on Terror has been less strongly felt
(Crandall, 2008:247). This also contributes to a context that is entirely
peculiar to Latin America and is best appreciated in the domain of
inter-Latin American and inter-American relations. Besides this, the
interactions between new (Brazil) and old (the US) powers, as well as
the positioning and reactions of the other continental actors, can be
dissected in the same geographic space, which, in one way or another,
all those involved consider as their own.
Fourth, Latin American regionalism, in its hemispheric and sub-
continental dimensions, is arguably the most sophisticated and endur-
ing outside Europe. Regionalism is a foreign policy choice as much as
a foreign policy tool. This can be used to support or contest emerging
powers’ order and agenda. This is particularly evident in the variety of
projects and schemes available. These do not only reflect Latin American
aversion to sovereignty sharing, but, most of all, signal the divergence
of interests and ideologies underpinning regional visions and projects
(Gardini, 2010). This also confirms that regionalism in Latin America
is more often a government policy than a state policy (Gomez-Mera,
2014).
Fifth, the absence of major international conflicts in the region since
1936 characterizes South America as an unrivalled ‘zone of peace’ in the
developing world (Kacowicz, 1998:68). This does not mean that violence
or its beyond-the-border effects are limited, as the War on Drugs testifies.
Rather, it reinforces the point that the use and consequences of violence
in the continent are quite peculiar to this region, thus further validating
the argument for a specific approach to the IR of Latin America.
Sixth, with a touch of optimism, Latin America is a region steadily
gaining a higher profile in international affairs. This is by virtue of its
globally ascending powers, such as Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Mexico,
and also the overall growing standing of most of its countries interna-
tionally, whether in the political, economic, social, or ideational realm.
The increasing international weight of Latin America is also due to its
natural resources and their attractiveness to China, its newly gained
political stability and relative autonomy from extra-regional powers, its
economic and industrial growth, and, last but not least, the booming
of its multinational corporations (Van Agtmael quoted in De Benedetti
and Rampini, 2008:14).
The idea that Latin America is somehow different from the rest of
the world is prevalent both within and outside the region. For all
these reasons, we believe that a book on Latin America informed by
IR and foreign policy analysis concepts and concerns may equally con-
tribute to area studies debates and to globally relevant discussions. The
combination of both elements has the potential to make a distinctive
contribution to knowledge in a number of disciplines in the political
and social sciences.
Finally, the book is organized in 13 chapters, in addition to this
introduction, which illustrates the conceptual framework and the dis-
tinctiveness of the book, and a conclusion. Chapters 1–3 present a
Brazilian perspective on the subject as an indispensable starting point
to set the stage for the following individual country studies. Chapter 1
deals with theoretical debates about the international status of Brazil in
the existing literature. Chapter 2 discusses Brazil’s self-perception and
own role conception. Chapter 3 analyses Brazil’s strategy and objec-
tives towards Latin America. Chapters 4–12 then dissect a number of
case studies, namely, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru,
Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico. The aim is to assess how large and
small countries, allies and rivals, close and distant neighbours in Latin
America have perceived the rise of Brazil, and how they have been
reacting to it. Chapter 13 analyses the impact of Brazil’s rise upon
regionalism and strategies of regional integration in Latin America,
a central component of inter-Latin American relations. The conclud-
ing remarks reflect on possible patterns and peculiarities that resulted
from the case study analyses throughout the book. The conclusion
not only wraps up the main empirical findings but, most of all, dis-
cusses the key theoretical implications for foreign policy responses to
the rise of Brazil and, more broadly, for balancing power in emerging
states.
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1
Brazil: The State of the Art of Its
Rise and Power Projection
Gian Luca Gardini
Introduction
The concept of power and the ways to compare it – and necessarily to

measure it somehow – is central to international relations (IR) as prac-
tice and as an academic discipline (Mearsheimer, 2012). This has been
largely inescapable in both historical and conceptual terms and across
intellectual paradigms and traditions (Bially Mattern, 2004). The logical
consequence is that the international status of a country, or any other
actor, has also had to be somehow linked to and assessed against the
idea(s) of power. Because the nature and attributes of power are con-
tested, the assessment and definition of a country’s international status
also become quite problematic. The current debate on rising powers and
their role in global affairs illustrates the point. Brazil in particular seems
to epitomize the dissonance between the existing IR literature on power
status, on the one hand, and the complexities and peculiarities of the
reality of emerging players, on the other.
Brazil wields significant traits of power that are considerable against
any international comparison, regardless of the preferred definition of
power. Its area and population make it a big country in geographic
terms. Its economy is now the seventh largest in the world (World Bank,
2015). It is the major regional player in a fast-growing region. Its military
capabilities and spending are significant beyond regional parameters.
Since the 2003 Goldman and Sachs report on future leading economies,
Brazil has been steadily on the map of both economic and academic ana-
lysts, as well as policy-makers, as an internationally influential power
(Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003; Sweig, 2010; The Economist, 2010).
In a parallel move, the country itself has perceived its growing weight in
regional and global affairs, and since the Cardoso administration it has
12
Gian Luca Gardini 13
started a narrative and a policy of more assertive international presence

that was displayed in full under President Lula da Silva.
The international status of Brazil has been dissected and amply dis-
cussed, but no consensus on the South American country’s reach and
rank has been reached. The academic literature has focused in particu-
lar on three aspects: the definition and ranking of Brazil’s power status,
whether medium, great, or something else (Soares de Lima and Hirst,
2006; Burges, 2013); the reach of Brazilian power and influence, whether
regional or global (Bethell, 2010; Caballero Santos, 2010); and Brazil’s
leadership credentials (Schirm, 2010; Malamud, 2011). In each case, a
sense of dissatisfaction and frustration has prevailed. Brazil either falls
short of or exceeds the criteria and definitions of almost all labels and
concepts. Brazil has proved to be a challenge not only for observers and
their findings but also for their methodological tools and mental cate-
gories. It seems that Brazil does not fit the labels but configures itself as
a unique case.
This chapter reviews the literature on international power status and
assesses the position of Brazil against the most used definitions and cri-
teria. It also tries to reverse the approach most commonly used in the
literature by asking: Is it Brazil that does not fit the labels, or is it that
the labels do not fit Brazil, and therefore are not suitable to grasp and
explain reality? In the latter case, which is the position adopted here,
one may also wonder what is the value of a theory or a concept or
a mental category that does not capture reality any longer. Should it
be stretched and forced upon empirical evidence until it fits? Should it
be updated? Or should it be replaced by new mental and methodolog-
ical categories and approaches suitable to a changed or fast-changing
reality? Using the case of Brazil, this chapter suggests that times may
be ripe for a revision of major concepts and categories employed in IR.
Open-mindedness and a little creativity may be needed to go beyond the
established concepts of power status, such as great or medium power, or
even leadership, if one wants to capture Brazil’s international status, and
arguably that of other rising powers. These labels were created to capture
a world very different from the world of today. They fit the reality and
power configurations of 19th-century Europe and capture many of the
features of the Cold War. Today, different considerations, scenarios, and
values may need to be taken into account.
In the first section, the concepts of rising/emerging power and great
power are dissected. The question is when an emerging power has risen
enough to be considered a great power, and whether or not Brazil is one.
The second section discusses labels such as medium and regional power,
14 Brazil: Its Rise and Power Projection
as well as leadership. The case of Brazil shows how these labels only
partly grasp the complex picture of emerging powers. Finally, a num-
ber of alternative definitions of and approaches to power status will be
analysed to show how the need for innovative thinking is being clearly
perceived in the literature. Brazil and other emerging or new powers
pose conceptual challenges to the analytical categories used in IR. The
discipline ought to be ready to take them on to capture the world of the
21st century.
From rising to great power: A chimera for Brazil?
Brazil is certainly in the category of rising or emerging powers. This is

nothing really new, as the argument about the ascendance of Brazil dates
back at least to the 1940s, when the Vienna-born intellectual Stefan
Zweig coined the expression of Brazil as the land of the future (Zweig,
1941). The argument was then regularly resumed, as happened in the
1970s and 1990s before the current phase (Hurrell, 2010). But being in
the list of emerging powers does not really solve the practicalities of
what this means in terms of international status and prerogatives. What
is an emerging power, and what attributes define it? The emergence or
rise is from what to what? And finally, and more specifically, one won-
ders when in fact the rise culminates in the status of an internationally
accepted great power, provided that it is possible to circumscribe and
identify such a category.
The definition of an emerging power, like all definitions linked to
the concept of power, is problematic. This is due more to the power
component than to its qualification. As a basic notion, emerging pow-
ers ‘dominate their neighbours in terms of power over resources, that
is, population, territory, military capacity and gross domestic product.
In addition, they articulate a wish to change the distribution of power
in the international system and to assume leadership roles in global gov-
ernance’ (Schirm, 2010:198). As a corollary, emerging powers lie either
outside, or on the margins of, the mostly liberal ‘Greater West’ (Hurrell,
2006:3). On a more practical plane, rising powers wield enough capa-
bilities and influence to act as veto powers on (certain) global issues,
but lack agenda-setting power (Narlikar, 2013:561). These arguments
provide a good general picture but fall short of empirical and policy
determinacy. How much can rising powers veto? In how many areas?
The spectrum of emergence can be quite ample, so when has a ris-
ing power emerged enough to attain the status of an accepted great
power?
Great power status first requires a degree of recognition as well as

self-perception and self-image. Brazil perceives itself as a ‘big country’
in world affairs (Lima and Hirst, 2006:21). However nothing com-
parable to the US ‘manifest destiny’ is detectable in Brazil’s political
thought or external action. The idea of Brazilian ‘greatness’ remains
‘largely politically harmless’ (Narlikar, 2010:123), and the realization
of this perception in terms of foreign policy grand strategy and actual
achievements remains elusive at best. In fact, Brazilian diplomats have
always been quite wary of using the word ‘leadership’, and even more
so of enacting it in diplomatic practice. And yet, today ‘Brazil regards
itself, and is internationally regarded, as not only an emerging or ris-
ing regional power [... ] but also as an emerging or rising global power’
(Bethell, 2010:1). So the question remains: at what stage does this emer-
gence result in great power status? Taking it as a given that the notion
is contested and controversial, is it at least possible to go through a list
of characteristics seemingly defining and certifying great power status?
A number of issues have consistently been included in such a list.
First, power status is connected to material capabilities. In this depart-
ment, Brazil ranks very high globally. Its territorial area and population
are the fifth largest in the world. The World Bank predicts that the
Brazilian economy will become the fifth largest on the planet by 2016
(Gilbert, 2011). The country is largely self-sufficient in terms of natu-
ral resources, and may soon become an oil-exporting state. Yet, there is
a consensus in the literature that Brazil does not have sufficient hard
power capabilities to be considered a great power. There may be two
explanations for this. First, power, of any kind, is context dependent.
That is, power is segmented and situational (Baldwin, 1989; Guzzini,
2005). Therefore, one may ask over what actors and in which ways
Brazil exercises influence. Also, different countries have different moti-
vations and values in their search for power, so power can be pursued
and used for different purposes (Hurrell, 2010:130). Brazil has so far
been largely perceived as a peaceful power, abstaining from the unilat-
eral and assertive postures that have mostly characterized the foreign
policy behaviour of the more established powers. The second explana-
tion is linked to traditional understandings of power and attempts to
measure it.
Historically, military power has been a key factor in assessing a coun-
try’s great power status. In the case of Brazil, there seems to be no
consensus on the extent of its military capabilities and how these can
be used for international leverage. In 2006, the Brazilian military budget
was relatively smaller than those of neighbouring Venezuela, Colombia,
and Chile (Lima and Hirst, 2006:38). By 2011, the Brazilian defence
budget was the highest in Latin America, but the country showed no
appetite to become a military power (Malamud, 2011:5). In comparative
terms internationally, Brazil’s military spending is now double that of
Colombia, the second-highest military spender in South America, but it
remains at about two thirds of India’s and around one fourth of China’s
(Narlikar, 2010:108). The modernization of the armed forces, as well as
the recent program to replace and strengthen the submarine fleet, may
signal a shift in Brazil’s own self-perception and role. ‘Brazil’s motiva-
tion seems to reside in the projection of its hemispheric and global
role, that is, in the search for adequacy with the country’s status of
emerging global and multidimensional actor’ (Duarte Villa and Viana,
2010:98).
The debate about Brazil’s material, and especially military, capabilities
reflects the ambiguity informing the overall debate on Brazil’s power sta-
tus. In other words, while Brazil may display some signs of great power
status and shows some ambition for it, it seems to fall short somewhere.
An increase in military spending and modernization is required for
Brazil’s full entry on the international scene (Bertonha, 2010). Although
military power has not been thought of as a crucial component of
Brazil’s efforts to acquire more international influence (and Brazil has
lacked significant military capabilities so far), this seems to be changing
fast, signalling a possible shift in military policy as well as in self-image
and goals. However, where the country falls short is in comparative
terms. According to the Correlates of War project, since 1945 Brazil has
risen in its composite index of national capabilities but remains well
below the US, China, or even declining Russia, and has not grown more
than Mexico in percentage terms (Correlates of War, 2008).
The second factor generally associated with great power status is
significant immaterial capabilities, mainly in the form of soft power
and the ability for agenda setting, structuring situations, and defining
canons of legitimacy and acceptability (Nye, 1990). Consensus exists on
the essentially soft nature of Brazil’s power, and examples of its display
abound. The Brazilian economic and social success at home in the first
decade of the 21st century is being turned into a strategy of interna-
tional cooperation and influence. Brazil’s aid policy is an instrument of
international projection to attain domestic goals, but, contrary to tra-
ditional North–South cooperation, it purports to allow more space and
autonomy for recipient countries and seeks the institutional strength-
ening of allies as a condition for transfer of financial resources and
know-how. On the back of Brazil’s domestic policy achievements, and
their perceived success, Brazilian cooperation is becoming a model

under construction for emerging powers (Ayllon, 2010).
Other examples of Brazil’s soft power are equally illustrative.
Brazil’s weight in international trade in merchandise is rather limited.
It accounts for about 1.30% of world trade, against about 11% for
China or 2.50% and over 3% for Italy and the Netherlands, respectively
(WTO, 2014). And still Brasilia’s diplomatic ‘activism and assertiveness
have worked to convince many that Brazil has to be part of any sta-
ble global trade regime for reasons of political legitimacy as much as
narrow economic logic’ (Hurrell, 2008: 57). On a different stage, accord-
ing to former foreign minister Celso Amorim, ‘the Brazilian decision
to recognize the Palestinian state triggered a series of similar acts by
other Latin American countries’ and contributed to some European
countries reviewing their position (Amorim, 2011:55). Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, Brazil managed to develop, and to have largely accepted by
its neighbours, the geostrategic concept of South America in contrast or
in addition to the more traditional Latin America. This led to the cre-
ation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) under Brazil’s
aegis and leadership. While perhaps not decisive at the global level yet,
Brazil’s power of attraction and ability to define mental categories and
international wants is significant beyond its regional context.
Yet there also exist doubts about Brazil’s true ability to gather follow-
ers to support its agenda and national interests, at both the regional
and the international level (Malamud, 2011). Examples abound. Recent
Brazilian ventures to increase international status and credibility
resulted, in fact, in net losses. The attempt to present Brazil as a reliable
broker of nuclear agreements internationally failed in the case of the
Iran–Turkey–Brazil compromise on Tehran’s uranium enrichment. The
deal brokered by Brazil was rejected by the international community.
By a similar token, the Brazilian concept of ‘responsibility while pro-
tecting’ was meant to give shape to a third moderate position between
international ‘interventionists’ and ‘non-interventionists’. Devised to
accompany the doctrine of the responsibility to protect in international
interventions and to define the Brazilian stance facing the Syrian cri-
sis, the concept proved itself to be an ambiguous and ill-defined label,
allowing Brazil not to take clear sides and to maintain an ambiguous
stance in the face of moral as well as policy issues of key importance
internationally.
Moreover, Brazilian soft power is trapped in a double contradiction.
On the one hand, Brazil claims its global prominent status on the basis
of its ability to talk to rich and poor, to North and South, to act as
a mediator and establish bridges. But this results in an inescapable

ambiguity about both identity and policy between a great power and
a smaller developing nation (Lima and Hirst, 2006:25). Can a country
be one and the other at the same time? The extent to which this position
can be maintained in the long term is debatable. On the other hand, an
inherent contradiction – and complexity – to Brazil’s international pres-
ence exists. ‘A simple view of Brazil as honest broker on global affairs
overlooks the self-interested streak that lies at the core of Brazilian for-
eign policy and drives its attitudes’ to global regimes and governance
(Burges, 2013: 577). Self-interest is a universal motive in world politics,
and Brazil does not seem to escape this logic. And why should it?
The third element that has traditionally defined great powers is that
they possess general or universal interests. Their interests are as wide as
the entire international system. One may wonder to what extent Brazil’s
international presence and interests are truly global. As usual, Brazil dis-
plays traits of global interests and presence, but also shows limitations.
In terms of self-perception, former foreign minister Celso Lafer observed
that Brazil’s interests go beyond specific issues and outcomes and that
the country has, alongside the other big countries, a major stake in how
global affairs are managed (Lafer in Hakim, 2002:157). Along similar
lines, another former foreign minister, Celso Amorim, noted how other
countries now perceive Brazil as a global player and how Brazil’s most
remarkable foreign policy achievement in recent years has been its more
prominent stance in the international arena (Amorim, 2011:50).
This has been accompanied by a major expansion of diplomatic pres-
ence. Still, the real weight and extent of this presence is debatable.
Brazil now has 228 representations worldwide (155 in 2003), as many
as Germany and more than India or South Africa. However, this result
has been largely reached with the multi-country accreditation system
(one ambassador accredited to several countries). In comparative terms,
the Brazilian diplomatic network is still far behind those of the US, the
UK, France, or even China and Russia (Gomes and Valente, 2013:82).
An additional argument can be made that in an era of globalization and
interdependence, all states may, in a sense, have global interests in that
all states are affected by global issues. What perhaps distinguishes great
powers from would-be great powers is the increased responsibility for
maintaining international order and managing global issues that comes
with great power status. However, Brazil’s record in this department has
been mixed, especially regarding its capacity to stand up internationally
for the protection of the values it supposedly cherishes and abides by
(Castañeda, 2010).
Brazil’s tangible presence in and contribution to international affairs

and transactions also needs to be scrutinized. The Real Instituto Elcano
in Madrid has elaborated an index of global presence – and I stress
presence, not necessarily power – to measure the global positioning
of 54 countries in the fields of the economy, defence, migration and
tourism, science and culture, and development assistance (Olivié and
Molina, 2011). With all the limitations that these indexes always have,
the Elcano index is a composite picture that takes into account many
factors and indicators, provides at least a credible sense of a country’s
global presence in comparison to many significant others, and is based
on very solid methodological and statistical foundations. Results are sur-
prising. Overall, Brazil occupies the 25th position in the world, preceded
by countries such as Ireland, Turkey, Malaysia, Austria, Mexico, Sweden,
South Korea, and Belgium. Brazil is not in the top ten in any of the five
fields considered.
In the economic field, where Brazil can boost the world’s seventh
largest gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank, 2015), results are
not very clear-cut either. The Elcano economic index includes eval-
uations of trade in goods and services, energy, and investments, not
only GDP. Brazil ranks 23rd, surpassed by unlikely competitors such
as Sweden, Norway, and Belgium (Olivié and Molina, 2011). Yet, this
result is hardly surprising if one looks, for instance, at Brazil’s contribu-
tion to global economic governance. An attentive analysis of tangible
financial contributions to the maintenance and management of the
global organizations that, for better or worse, underpin the current
architecture of global economic and financial governance reveals a
quite different picture from that portrayed by Brazilian rhetoric. Brazil’s
contribution to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is about half of
Belgium’s (WTO, 2011), and its contribution to the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) is roughly the same as Belgium’s and about a half of
Italy’s (IMF, 2015). With these facts, it is at least legitimate to cast doubts
on the ability of the great power label to capture Brazil’s international
status.
A final and decisive element for great power status is the subjec-
tive element of recognition by others. This includes recognition by the
established powers, which accept a new member into the club, as well
as by the smaller states, which accept the reasons for and legitimacy
of the newly acquired role of the would-be power. Again, Brazil is on
the edge. In certain areas and situations, Brazil has been welcome to
join the club of the most influential powers (WTO, G20), but both
established and small powers have been often reluctant to grant Brazil
full legitimacy and status as a great power. Brazil’s main foreign policy
aspiration and driver is to achieve international recognition (Lima and
Hirst, 2006:21). However, the question remains: recognition as what,
exactly? In the absence of consensus and in the presence of several
caveats, Brazil cannot be considered a great power, at least following
the traditional understanding of the concept. Overall, the impression
remains that Brazil is now punching above its weight in global affairs
(Bethell, 2010). The way ahead is to investigate whether or not other
power-related labels fit Brazil.
Middle power, regional power, and a peculiar leader?
The most frequently applied labels to capture the international status of

Brazil are probably ‘middle power’ and ‘regional power’. These, too, do
not escape the controversy surrounding the concept of power, and add
their own complexities. In a classic definition, a middle power is ‘a state
whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively, but may be
able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an interna-
tional institution’ (Keohane, 1969:295). This certainly captures Brazil’s
regional prominence (small group) and preference for regional and mul-
tilateral institutions. In a constructivist addition, middle powers have
been defined not as an analytical category characterized by an objective
set of attributes or circumstances but, rather, as a constructed identity
or even ideology (Hurrell et al., 2000). This well serves Brazil’s own
ambivalent identity and insertion strategy between great power and
small nation. However, Brazil has shown the ambition and behaviour
to go beyond middle ranking.
In an attempt to make the concept suitable to capture the intrica-
cies of the current rise of new powers, it has been suggested that there
are substantial constitutive and behavioural differences between tradi-
tional middle powers and emerging ones (Jordaan, 2003). In constitutive
terms, the former would be wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social demo-
cratic, and not regionally influential. The latter are semi-peripheral,
materially inegalitarian, recently democratized, and with a strong
regional influence and self-association. In behavioural terms, traditional
middle powers display weak regional orientation, differentiate their
identity from the powerful states in their region, and are relatively
open to concessions for global reforms. Emerging middle powers, on
the contrary, show strong regional orientation, pursue reformist rather
than radical change globally, and differentiate themselves from the
weaker states in their region (Jordaan, 2003). While Sweden and Canada
embody the more traditional middle powers, South Africa and Brazil
would epitomize the emerging ones.
As usual, Brazil presents conceptual and policy ambiguities. According
to Burges, Brazil is an emerging middle power (2008:66), while following
Malamud it would be, in fact, closer to the category of the traditional
middle powers (2011:20). This different understanding is the result of
Brazil’s ambiguous policies and leadership attitudes as much as it is the
product of elusive definitions. The perfect example comes from a further
attempt to clarify the concept of emerging middle powers by placing
emphasis on the field of security (Schoeman, 2000). Accordingly, an
emerging middle power should play a stabilizing role in its region, show
willingness and capacity to act as a regional peacemaker, and attract the
support of regional neighbours as well as of major extra-regional pow-
ers. Following this definition, Brazil could both be (stabilizing role) and
not be (willingness to act as peacemaker) an emerging middle power,
with either argument having credibility, as the debates on Brazil in Latin
America and US–Brazil relations demonstrate (Arnson and Sotero, 2010).
Also, such a definition may well apply to regional powers. Is this another
category entirely? After all, many of the candidates for middle power
status are also candidates for regional power status.
Regional powers are states with interests focused ‘on a limited region
where they can act on their own accord’ (Wight, 1978:63). Brazil once
again both exceeds and falls short of these criteria. While its interests
are now global, or certainly extend beyond the region, its ability to
have things its way in South America is disputed. In a more refined
definition, regional powers are those whose influence may be large in
their regions but who have less impact at the global level (Buzan and
Waever, 2003). And the definitional problem with Brazil remains basi-
cally the same. A more accurate definition is that a regional power is able
to stand up to any coalition of other states in the region, is influential
in regional affairs, and may also be a great power globally (Neumann,
1992). While Brazil meets the second and third criteria, it may not be
able to stand against any coalition of Latin American states, as votes
for top appointments in international organizations have demonstrated
(Malamud, 2011).
The status of regional power, even when sufficiently qualified, does
not solve key foreign policy questions. Is regional power status indis-
pensable or useful to attain recognition of great power status? It is often
taken for granted that regional prominence is an asset globally, but
sometimes the regional setting might be a liability too (Hurrell, 2006).
Regional conflict and instability, and regional resistance to the global
pretensions of a fellow regional country, may all represent an obstacle

to international recognition. Also, while there seems to be a consensus
on the fact that regional pre-eminence is essential for Brazil to compete
for global status (Lima and Hirst, 2006; Malamud, 2011; Burges, 2013),
history teaches us otherwise. Major powers such as the US and Britain
were successful globally precisely because they avoided being engulfed
in regional competition and commitments (Hurrell, 2010:142). This dis-
cussion well reflects Brazil’s divided identity and strategy between being
a regional power and a developing country, on the one hand, and a
global player and a great power, on the other. This is epitomized in the
debate about Brazilian leadership, the final and perhaps most decisive
caveat of Brazil’s regional power status.
‘Regional leaders need regional followers’ (Nolte, 2010:894). The
resistance to Brazil’s regional pretensions and agenda has been well doc-
umented (Hurrell, 2008; Malamud, 2011; Spektor, 2011). The ensuing
debate on Brazil’s leadership teaches two lessons. First, it is one thing
to meet abstract definitions and criteria; it is quite another to be able to
command authority and followership with regional neighbours. Second,
the kind of leadership that Brazil can, or is willing to, assume is pecu-
liar at best. Brazil has displayed a certain ambivalence in its regional
leading role, with a noticeable aversion to bearing the costs, political
and economic, associated with it. At the regional level, the reading
of Brazil’s role has swung from ‘a leader without followers’ (Malamud,
2011) to a ‘consensual hegemon’ (Burges, 2008). This indicates that lead-
ership does not require domination and can be exercised by way of soft
power. But it also indicates that Brazil may not possess the resources and
willingness to use either incentives or coercion to command regional
followership. If this is the case, ultimately, being a regional power would
not help much with managing regional governance and advancing one’s
national agenda.
Towards new definitions of international status
Traditional categories based on classic notions of power have demon-

strated their limitations in capturing the international status of coun-
tries, especially of those rising states whose behaviour is substantially
different from the assertive and dominant posture of established great
powers. These limitations consist principally in their indeterminacy and
elusiveness, but also in their inability to significantly guide or under-
stand policy and diplomacy. The fact that notions such as ‘great power’
were coined in the 1800s in a mainly European context cast doubts on
their ability to capture our times and today’s dynamics of international

power and interaction among influential nations. Values have changed;
canons of legitimacy and appropriateness have too. Military power and
the ability to wage war successfully have traditionally been a defin-
ing feature of great powers. Today, militaristic and aggressive behaviour
would likely be detrimental to acceptance of newcomers into the club
of influential nations, yet military assets may help. Economic relations
are now a preponderant component of IR, and new areas of global con-
cern are emerging, such as the environment, the fight against poverty
and inequality, and technology and cyber-science. Traditional labels of
power status do not seem to be able to capture these changes.
Great, emerging, middle, and regional power labels all suffer from
some limitations. To begin with, the standards and perceptions of what
they are or require are fluid and change with time. Also, if one accepts
that with greater power comes greater responsibility (Bull, 1977; Wight,
1978), then rising powers should be able and willing to contribute sub-
stantially to international order and governance. But this has hardly
been the case (Castañeda, 2010). The idea of emerging global powers
is not entirely convincing either. The rise would emphasize a change
in the relative position of emerging countries, but it has been observed
that perhaps it is more correct to talk of changes in the periphery or
semi-periphery of the system, with emphasis on the structural position
of rising countries (Soares de Lima, 2014). Regarding the concepts of
both middle and regional power, their rigorous theorization has essen-
tially led to a dead end (Hurrell et al., 2000). It is no surprise that the
academic literature has been in search of alternative paths.
An interesting attempt has been conducted to distinguish between old
and new powers (Narlikar, 2010). The old or established powers are those
that enjoy both material capabilities and legitimacy, and that position
themselves as the interpreters and executors of the international society
as a whole (Narlikar, 2010:7). These are the US, the EU, Britain, France,
and, to a lesser degree, Germany and Japan. In contrast, new powers are
states that ‘through a mix of a very large and expanding resource base
(indicators of which include market size, economic growth rates, popu-
lation, and defence spending) and diplomatic skills, have acquired the
de facto status of veto players’ (Narlikar, 2010:7). These are China, India,
and Brazil. The effort at rigor is laudable, but one may wonder what the
real and substantial difference is between this conceptualization and the
traditional distinction between great and emerging powers. Definitional
problems remain. What can be vetoed by new powers? In what areas?
To what extent? How differently from great powers?
A more daring attempt proposes the concept of ‘adhocracy’ or ad hoc

powers (Etzioni, 2012). The idea is that with the scaling back of the
US international role, no other power will step in to maintain inter-
national order. Instead, the gap will be filled to an extent by ad hoc
coalitions and agreements, in which the various participants will impose
strict limits to their roles and responsibilities. This is the result of a
decreasing domestic appetite, among both politicians and populations,
for the costs implied in leading international roles. Brazil is an excellent
candidate to fit this definition. It has taken ad hoc commitments and
a subject-limited leading role in global issues such as negotiations on
trade and development at the WTO or in the negotiations on climate
change. The situational nature of power is nothing new, dating back
to the sociological approaches of the 1970s, but this application to the
international scenario has conceptual and policy relevance.
In the same vein, but with more attention to a specific issue of grow-
ing global concern, is the idea of green power (Never, 2013). Green
power combines into one concept sustainability, innovation, and power.
It is more than economic dominance in green technology or endow-
ment with natural resources. Green power aims to capture what kind of
power enables state and non-state actors to manage and shape green
change, arguably a crucial area of international activity in the near
future. The Brazilian ‘environmental profile is a strong condition of
its status as an emerging power’ (Barros-Platiau, 2010:74). Somehow,
among new powers, green powers have at least a structural veto power
in a global climate deal. Countries such as China, Brazil, and Indonesia
are catching up with the leading countries in the fields of clean tech-
nology and renewable energy. Moreover, with breakthroughs in tropical
agriculture, seeds, and soil treatment, Brazil is on its way to becoming
the new food superpower (Omestad, 2008). With environmental con-
cerns slowly moving from low to high politics, ‘green power is likely
to become a relevant factor for the general distribution of power in the
international system’ (Never, 2013:24).
Finally, in a world more and more dominated by economic and finan-
cial concerns and activities, the business literature has focused on the
concept of management. Rather than a typology of power, or a leader,
Brazil’s international status and aspirations can be configured as a man-
ager of global affairs. Management is related to running complexities,
controlling things and making them reliable (Kotter, 1990). In contrast,
leadership focuses on change and inspiration. Now, in spite of a num-
ber of suggestions that Brazil intends to act as a force for change in the
international system (Cooper, 2010:65; Desai, 2013), there seems to be
a vast consensus on the status quo nature of Brazil’s external projection.

Globally, Brazil is no revisionist power, but is aiming at a joining-the-
club strategy (Malamud, 2011:20). Regionally, its role would be that of
a ‘coordinator’ and an ‘organizer’ (Burges, 2006:29). The challenge to
Brazilian foreign policy is how to improve the country’s relative posi-
tion without fundamentally damaging the system (Burges, 2013:578).
Patient diplomacy and consensus building are indispensable assets to
manage international governance. Brazil has shown both, and presents
itself as a credible and desirable international manager. This is probably
the best definition of Brazil’s current international status.
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2
Within the Region, Beyond the
Region: The Role of Brazil
According to the Mass Public
If we are to assess the role that countries play in the world system, it is
as important to consider their construed international identity as it is to
take into account their material resources and capabilities. Dominant
perceptions of world affairs, shared values and beliefs, and represen-
tations about its own interests frame and shape a country’s decisions
and actions (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Wendt, 1999).1 Widespread
beliefs and perceptions, which go beyond the circle of decision-makers
and powerful stakeholders, are particularly important in democratic
polities, helping to provide stability and predictability to foreign policies
across time and different administrations.
In this chapter, we use survey data on the perceptions of the Brazilian
mass public to explore, at the level of ideas and beliefs, the ambiguities
of Brazil’s relations to its regional surroundings. Several authors (Hurrell,
2008; Malamud, 2011) have previously pointed towards this, and it cer-
tainly mirrors Brazil’s complex and elusive identity as an aspiring global
power.
In what follows, we will first further discuss such ambiguities and
later show how they translate into public opinion perceptions and
representations.
This chapter presents partial results from the research project Brazil, the Americas
and the World, funded by FAPESP (Thematic Research Project 2013/00495-4). I am
grateful to Matheus Rogatis for his dedication and efficient research assistance in
organizing the data and in producing graphs and tables, and to Camila Schipper,
Meilian Higa, and Dan Novachi for their assistance in collecting and organizing
the information of articles published in the press. My colleagues Janina Onuki
and Feliciano Sá Guimarães, at the Institute of International Relations, University
of São Paulo, read a draft version and provided suggestions for its improvement.
29
30 Role of Brazil According to the Mass Public
We begin from two assumptions: one empirically grounded and the

other purely theoretical. First, based on rich evidence presented by
Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), Page and Shapiro (1988), Holsti (1992),
Jentleson (1992), Popkin (1994), and Wittkopf (1996), we assume that
there exists such a thing as a public opinion on foreign policy and
international affairs and that it is quite rational, consistent, and rela-
tively stable, even among ill-informed persons. Second, we assume that
widespread and shared perceptions and beliefs concerning foreign affairs
emerge and solidify by means of a twofold complex process. Govern-
mental officials, high-level bureaucrats, public intellectuals, the media,2
and other opinion-makers are the sources of those representations and
exert influence upon the public’s perceptions. They provide cognitive
shortcuts that allow uninformed people to form their opinions (Popkin,
1993; Baum and Potter, 2008:46). On the other hand, governmental
officials are sensitive to the ways through which the public perceives,
reinterprets, and reacts to those ideas. This is especially true under
democratic regimes, where public opinion polls are a current tool for
governments as much as a source of public information.
Brazil and the region
Different authors (Bethell, 2009; Burges, 2009; Flemes, 2010; Malamud,

2011; Fonseca, 2012; Schenoni, 2015) have underlined Brazil’s com-
plex and ambiguous relations towards its region, whether in terms of
perceptions or actual foreign policy guidelines. Basically, there are four
types of ambiguities.
The first ambiguity relates to the perceived political borders of the
region, at different moments. Across time, there have been three imag-
ined borders, circumscribing what Brazilian foreign policy-makers con-
sidered the meaningful region: Americas, Latin America, and South
America. First, pan-Americanism, implying a region stretching from
North to South America – and therefore including the US – has guided
Brazilian foreign policy at different times throughout its history. Belong-
ing to the Americas, by contrast with Europe, has been a powerful
flagship guiding the Brazilian transition from a monarchy to a repub-
lic in the late 19th century. It continued to be an important idea during
the first decades of the republican period, and had a revival in the sec-
ond half of the 1950s, when President Juscelino Kubischek (1955–1960)
launched the Pan American Operation.3
Second, the awareness of being a part of a geopolitical entity
called Latin America, although it had existed previously, increased
Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida 31
and solidified during the Cold War. A number of prominent Brazilian

intellectuals associated with the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) – such as Celso Furtado, Helio
Jaguaribe, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso – envisaged Brazil as part
of Latin America, a region where countries, beyond their cultural and
historical differences, shared the same (subordinate) place in the inter-
national economic system and could, therefore, attempt to establish
some kind of political coordination to act together in the interna-
tional arena. The perception of being part of Latin America did have
some influence on the country’s foreign behaviour during that period,
for instance when it took part in the creation of the Latin American
Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960, and when it participated in
the Contadora Group in the 1970s and 1980s, in the Latin American
Integration Association (LAIA) in 1980, and in the Rio Group in 1986.
Finally, since Brazil has physical borders with 10 out of 12 South
American countries, this region has always been an important space
where Brazilian foreign policy has necessarily evolved. Nevertheless,
South America has only recently become the region towards which
the Brazilian ‘Latin American’ policies and politics were in fact fully
deployed, after the establishment of Mercado Común del Sur (Com-
mon Market of the South – MERCOSUR) in 1991 and UNASUR in 2008.
Bethell (2009:314) argues that when Brazil hesitantly decides to play the
regional leader role, the region is South America and not Latin America.
The second ambiguity relates to the question of the extent to which
Brazil wants to exert leadership in the region, and which resources and
tools it is willing to employ in order to attain recognition and allegiance.
Bethell (2009) believes that under President Lula da Silva’s administra-
tion, maybe for the first time, Brazil thought of itself as a regional leader,
the region being South America. Nevertheless, it is far from clear how
this leadership aspiration would translate into actual behaviour.
During the Cardoso administration (1995–2002), strategies towards
the region seemed to have two goals, both grounded in a deep-seated
cooperation with Argentina within the MERCOSUR framework. The first
was assuring stability and peaceful coexistence among South American
countries, thus creating an adequate environment for consolidating
the emerging democratic regimes. The second was increasing political
bargaining power, especially in trade global forums, by means of a signif-
icant regional market. Under the Cardoso administration, foreign policy
towards South America sought to create the steady regional foundations
for the Brazilian aspirations to actively plug into the dynamic process of
globalization.4 Nevertheless, critics of Cardoso’s foreign strategies have
emphasized that the project presented the country’s credentials as an

emerging market rather than as an emerging power (de Lima and Hirst,
2003).
The third ambiguity touches upon the role Brazil should play regard-
ing the region’s relations with the world. As Fonseca (2012) and others
have pointed out, Brazil’s strategies regarding the region have oscillated
among three possibilities: being a mediator between the Latin/South
American countries and the US, being a spokesperson on behalf of those
countries in their relations with great powers and international insti-
tutions, or merely acting as one among many other countries in the
region.
The fourth ambiguity relates to how Brazilian foreign policy actu-
ally ranked and accommodated its South American foreign policy and
its aspirations of being recognized as a meaningful global player. Dur-
ing the Lula da Silva administration (2003–2010), the importance given
to South–South alignments emphasized both South America and those
coalitions established inside the Global South, of which policies towards
Africa, the G20 initiative at WTO, the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa)
treaty, and, last but not least, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China)
initiative are conspicuous examples.
Nevertheless, at times, rhetoric and actual behaviour sharply diverged.
For instance, while the South American partnership ranked high in the
official discourse during Lula da Silva’s administration, coordination
has been often poor, and, at least once, Brazil has competed with its
neighbours for a high position in international organizations.5 On the
other hand, Argentina, Brazil’s most important partner in the region, has
always felt uncomfortable with the Brazilian pursuit of a permanent seat
at the UN Security Council, an important goal of Brazilian foreign policy
from 2003 to 2010. By playing within and beyond the region, Brazil cre-
ated tensions and frictions that were not always easy to resolve. In the
following sections, we will show how they translate into public opinion
perceptions and representations.
Our data come from a national survey conducted in 2014, with
1,841 respondents, as part of the collaborative international project Las
Americas y el Mundo.6 By using two screening questions, we divided
the public into two groups. Those who answered that they were inter-
ested in international issues and could correctly identify the United
Nations acronym were labelled Informed and Interested Public (IIP),
and amounted to 464 individuals (23.2% of the sample). Conversely,
those who claimed to have no interest in international issues and did
not know what ‘UN’ meant were labelled Uninformed and Uninterested
Public (UUP). They represented 74.8% of the sample, amounting to
1,377 people. We will see that, while there are significant differences
in the opinions and distribution of preferences between the two groups,
especially in the percentage of respondents who did not answer or did
not know how to answer, both groups’ responses show important levels
of coherence and convergence.
Regional identification and the region’s importance to

Brazil
Brazilians, whether more or less interested and informed on interna-

tional issues, barely identify themselves as citizens of a region. They see
themselves mainly as Brazilians and, to a very small degree, citizens of
the world. Figure 2.1 shows this indisputable reality.
Only 3% of the IIP and 1.5% of the UUP think of themselves as South
Americans or MERCOSUR citizens, and fewer Brazilians in both groups
feel they are Latin Americans than those who claim to be citizens of the
world. Within the country, some kind of regional self-identification is
more likely to be found among opinion-makers than among the pub-
lic. Data from the 2010 survey of leaders showed that 26% considered
themselves to be Latin Americans, 18.5% to be South Americans, and
only 1.5% to be MERCOSUR citizens (Almeida et al., 2012).7
During 2014, Brazilian foreign policy towards the region was an
important topic addressed by public opinion-makers who are active in
the domestic public debate over the country’s international behaviour.
Table 2.1 shows the frequency of different topics dealt with in editorial
Brazilian 72.0
81.9
World Citizen 18.3

11.8
Latin American 6.7

2.8
South American 1.7

.8
Mercosur Citizen 1.3

.7
DK/DA .0
2.0
0 20 40 60 80 100
IIP UUP
Figure 2.1 Self-identification

Source: Brazil, the Americas and the World Survey, 2014.
34
Table 2.1 Opinion-makers in the press – main topics
Topics Number %
South America/Latin America 112 22.6

Brazil–Venezuela relations 33 6.7
MERCOSUR 29 5.8
Brazil–Argentina relations 15 3.0
Brazil–Cuba relations 14 2.8
Brazil and Latin America 8 1.6
Brazil–Bolivia relations 3 0.6
Brazil–Chile relations 2 0.4
Regionalism 2 0.4
Brazil–US–Cuba relations 2 0.4
OAS and inter-American cooperation 1 0.2
Brazil–Colombia relations 1 0.2
Brazil–Mexico relations 1 0.2
UN peacekeeping mission to Haiti 1 0.2
Brazilian foreign policy (broad issues) 65 13.1
International trade 61 12.3
Brazil–US relations 45 9.1
Brazilian trade policies 42 8.5
BRICS 19 3.8
Environment/climate change 18 3.6
Brazil’s international role 15 3.0
Brazil–China relations 14 2.8
Presidential diplomacy 13 2.6
Brazilian presidential address to UN Assembly 13 2.6
Brazil and the crisis in Ukraine 12 2.4
Brazil–Israel relations 12 2.4
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 9 1.8
Foreign policy and presidential elections 8 1.6
MERCOSUR–European Union Agreement 7 1.2
Brazil–Middle East relations 4 0.8
Brazil–Africa relations 3 0.6
Brazil in the G20 2 0.4
Internet governance 2 0.4
Brazilian extradition policy 2 0.4
Brazil–Japan relations 2 0.4
Brazil–Russia relations 2 0.4
Diplomatic relations with other countries 2 0.4
Other∗ 12 2.4
Total 496 100.0
Source: Opinion Makers and the Press database, Project Brazil, the Americas and the World,
CEBRAP (Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento).
Notes: ∗ Only one article published: Brazil at the United Nations; human rights; drugs; Ebola;
International Tourism in Brazil; international rules and domestic change; WTO; Brazil–
Germany relations; Brazil–Angola relations; Brazil–Congo relations; Brazil–Portugal relations;
and national security.
OAS: Organization of American States.
pages and signed articles by journalists and specialists in Brazilian for-

eign policy, published in the four most important Brazilian newspapers.
Mostly critical of the government’s foreign behaviour, they were part of
a lively debate on Brazil’s international priorities and strategies.
More than one fifth of the articles addressed Brazilian relations
and initiatives regarding the region, predominantly South America.
MERCOSUR and relations to Venezuela, Argentina, and Cuba have been
the main topics.8
The attention given by opinion-makers to regional issues goes with
the perceived importance attributed to Latin America by the mass public
in comparison to other regions of the globe,9 as shown in Figure 2.2.
Preferences are actually divergent. Most of the IIP believe that Brazil
should pay attention, first of all, to Latin America and then to Africa,
while Europe and North America are given much less importance. Latin
America and Africa change positions when the answer comes from the
UUP. Nevertheless, the number of UUP who could not or would not
respond is roughly equal to the preference for both regions.
On the other hand, even the IIP seem to have scanty information
about Latin American or even South American countries. The propor-
tion of those who know the names of presidents from neighbouring
countries is very slim. When presented with a list of names, 80.5% could
not recognize Mexico’s president; 64.5% did not know that José Mujica
was Uruguay’s president; 50% could not identify Venezuela’s president
Latin America 21.3

14.5
Africa 20.3
25.7
Europe 15.1
12.4
North America 12.9
8.7
Middle East 12.5
7.5
Asia 9.7
6.0
DK/DA 7.3
24.0
Oceania .9
1.3
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
IIP UUP
Figure 2.2 Regional priorities

Source: Brazil, the Americas and the World survey, 2014.
Nicolas Maduro, and 44.6% did not know the Cuban Raul Castro. These
proportions were significantly lower for Argentina’s Cristina Kirchner
(27%) and Bolivia’s Evo Morales (29.5%) (Brazil, the Americas and the
World Survey, 2014).
The Brazilian public do not see the country’s relations to its neigh-
bours – and to other significant foreign partners – in terms of rivalry or
menace. After a century of peaceful coexistence and varying degrees of
political and diplomatic proximity, both segments of the public consider
South American countries as either friends or partners – more often part-
ners for the informed public, and more often friends for those who have
a distant relation to international affairs. The exception is Argentina,
seen as a rival by around a quarter of the people in both groups of the
mass public. It is possible that recent skirmishes around tariffs and inter-
national trade within MERCOSUR, traditional rivalry in football, and
increased contact through tourism, in both directions, account for the
way Brazilians perceive our closest neighbor.10 In any case, opinions are
split, showing some degree of ambiguity regarding all countries in the
region with which Brazil otherwise has lasting and peaceful relations.
Table 2.2 shows the full picture.
The reluctant leader
Forty-seven percent of the IIP and 27% of the UUP consider that Brazil is
the most influential country in the region. Moreover, when asked which
country they rely on to be the region’s leader, 70% of the IIP and 59% of
the UUP mention Brazil (Brazil, the Americas and the World Survey, 2014).
Nevertheless, data from Figure 2.3 show that both segments of the
public are sharply divided when asked the straightforward question of
what the country’s role in South America should be. A slender majority
of both IIP and UUP would rather have Brazil cooperating with other
countries than making efforts to lead them.
When confronted with the different tasks the country should perform
in the region, leading the neighbours in international forums receives
approximately the same support from both groups of the public, as
shown in Table 2.3, while tackling international threats, such as drug
trafficking, elicits much greater approval. This is consistent with the
answers given to a question concerning the most important goals for
Brazil’s foreign policy: tackling drug trafficking and organized crime
ranks first in a list of 13 possible goals, with a 30% preference rate among
the IIP and 33.3% among the UUP11 (Brazil, the Americas and the World
Survey, 2014).
37
Table 2.2 Relations to selected countries

Tell me how you would describe the Brazil relations to the following
countries? (%)
IIP UUP
Argentina
Friendship 36.9 31.7
Partnership 34.1 23.0
Competition 23.7 26.7
Threat 3.2 8.4
DK/DA 2.2 10.2
European Union
Competition 4.7 8.6
Threat 4.7 9.9
DK/DA 6.5 20.3
Chile
Competition 4.7 7.6
Threat 3.0 6.9
DK/DA 6.7 20.4
China
Competition 8.6 8.2
Threat 9.1 13.1
DK/DA 5.4 17.4
Colombia
Threat 16.6 13.8
DK/DA 8.4 23.7
Cuba
Competition 7.5 9.1
Threat 13.4 12.7
DK/DA 7.3 22.6
Bolivia
Table 2.2 (Continued)
IIP UUP
Threat 13.8 13.0

DK/DA 8.2 21.9
US
Competition 9.5 6.7
Threat 12.5 10.8
DK/DA 2.8 11.7
India
Competition 3.4 5.6
Threat 3.2 6.1
DK/DA 14.2 25.8
Japan
Competition 4.1 5.7
Threat 3.0 7.0
DK/DA 8.2 18.1
Peru
Competition 5.0 7.9
Threat .6 5.9
DK/DA 10.3 25.7
Venezuela
Competition 7.1 9.6
Threat 9.5 7.7
DK/DA 9.1 25.2
The importance and forms of regional integration
Until 1985, regional integration did not rank high in Brazil’s foreign
policy priorities. The country had shown an ambiguous attitude towards
previous proposals in this direction (Bueno et al., 2015). The same holds
true today for Brazilian public opinion.
39
Brazil should cooperate with other South 47.8

American countries 38.3
Brazil should struggle to be the leader in 40.9

the region 31.7
Brazil should keep itself away from the 8.0

South American efforts 20.2
3.2
DK/DA 9.8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
IIP UUP
Figure 2.3 The role of Brazil in South America

Table 2.3 Brazil’s behaviour in the region

Due to its territorial, demographic and economic size, Brazil is the most impor-
tant South American country. Taking this into account you agree or disagree that
Brazil should: (%)
IIP UUP
Assist the less developed countries

Completely Agree 36.2 41.5
Partially Agree 40.3 31.8
Neither Agree nor Disagree 2.8 3.5
Partially Disagree 10.6 8.6
Completely Disagree 9.5 8.5
DK/DA 0.6 6.1
Combat the international threats

DK/DA 1.1 5.8
Lead the region in the international

forums
DK/DA 2.2 13.4
IIP UUP
Do not intervene in region’s problems

DK/DA 2.4 10.7
Source: Brazil, the Americas and the World Survey, 2014
The Brazilian public do not see regional integration as an important

foreign policy goal. Only 2.6% of the IIP and 1% of the UUP believe
that promoting regional integration is Brazil’s most important goal in
the international arena (Brazil, the Americas and the World Survey, 2014),
despite the fact that 41% of the IIP and 18% of the UUP have a positive
or very positive opinion about MERCOSUR, by far the most appreciated
and best-known regional mechanism (Brazil, the Americas and the World
Survey, 2014).
When asked about different forms of integration, a clear majority in
both groups of the public agree with the existence of joint military
operations and joint embassies. While the IIP also agree with develop-
ing a common foreign policy, the UUP are divided on this issue. Both
groups are doubtful regarding the possibility of having some kind of
joint political deliberation mechanism, by means of a regional parlia-
ment, and of creating a common currency, while being clearly hostile
towards increasing people’s freedom of movement across the region12
(Figures 2.4 and 2.5).
Brief conclusions
In 2014, initiatives towards Latin America were an important topic in

the opinion-makers’ public debate regarding Brazilian foreign policy.
In fact, this was the single most important topic. In the same vein,
slightly more than one fifth of the public who were interested in and
informed about international issues thought that the region should
be the focus of Brazil’s attention, well above North America, Europe,
and Asia.
Joint military operation 75.6 4.1 17.9 2.4
Joint embassies 60.1 7.3 28.4 4.1
Common foreign policy 59.7 8.4 25.6 6.3
South American congress 50.9 9.5 34.5 5.2
Common currency 41.8 7.8 47.8 2.6
Free movement of people 22.6 4.7 70.0 2.6
0 20 40 60 80 100
Agree Neither agree nor

disagree
Disagree DK/DA
Figure 2.4 Regional integration (IIP)

Nevertheless, the majority of Brazilians do not consider themselves to

be Latin or South Americans, and show ambivalence in their feelings
towards Brazil’s regional neighbours. Although they do not see them as
enemies or threats, Brazilians oscillate between considering them either
as friends or, in a more realistic vein, as mere partners.
The reluctance of Brazil’s foreign policy to try to play an actual
regional leadership role is mirrored by public opinion, which would
rather see the country cooperating with than leading South American
nations. Moreover, the major Brazilian initiative in the region, sup-
ported by the public, is tightly connected with the domestic urgency
of fighting drug trafficking.
Finally, the public – whether interested and informed or otherwise –
do not rate the accomplishment of regional integration highly, but,
rather, support a very superficial and conventional idea of integration,
in terms of military and diplomatic coordination.
In brief, the public echo the ambiguities shown by educated opinion-
makers and foreign policy-makers. Overcoming them will depend more
on the determination of policy-makers than on pressure from public
opinion.
Joint military operation 64.2 5.9 17.6 12.3
Joint embassies 51.1 8.4 19.6 20.6
Common foreign policy 48.6 8.6 21.4 21.5
Common currency 40.7 7.8 34.1 17.4
South American congress 38.1 9.8 29.2 22.9
Free movement of people 27.8 6.2 53.7 12.3
0 20 40 60 80 100
Agree Neither agree

nor disagree
Disagree DK/DA
Figure 2.5 Regional integration (UUP)

Notes
1. As Weber argued a long time ago: ‘Not ideas, but material and ideal interests,
directly govern the conduct of men. Yet, very frequently the “world images”
that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks
along which action has been pushed by the dynamics of interest’ (Gerth and
Mills, 2009:280).
2. In agreement with Baum and Potter (2008), we believe that the media play a
crucial and independent role in shaping beliefs and perceptions of the mass
public on foreign policy and international issues.
3. The Pan American Operation was a Brazilian diplomatic initiative launched
in 1958, just after President Richard Nixon visited Venezuela among vio-
lent protests. The initiative sought to bring together all countries of the
Americas for an agenda of economic development and moderate reform to
tackle poverty, both seen as the only efficient way of fighting communism
and promoting democracy. US investments were thought to be important
and welcome to propel economic development. Although the US considered
it to be a positive initiative, their diplomatic priorities would soon change
after the Cuban Revolution, in 1959. Nevertheless, the Pan American Oper-
ation resulted in the foundation of the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB) and the Latin American Free Trade Area (ALAC), both in 1960. (For
more on the subject, see Lessa, 2008.)
4. Speaking during the commemorations of the tenth anniversary of the
Asuncion Treaty, which created MERCOSUR (1991), the minister of foreign
affairs, Celso Lafer (2001), observed:
‘The founding of the integrationist project for Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay,

and Uruguay substantiates the need to overcome the prevailing logic
in the economic and political spheres, namely, the autarchic pretense
marked by the import substitution model and the geopolitical ratio-
nale of conforming to “influence spheres” in the perspective of a power
balance in the relations between States. [. . .]
In the case of Mercosur, this movement associates itself to the peculiar

dynamics of a new international system established by the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the end of the East/West conflict. The occurrence of
this new paradigm is reflected in the dilution of conception conflicts,
understood here by their axiological heterogeneity of different views on
the promotion of development and wellbeing, for conflicts of interest, as
reflected in the analysis of the potential use by the productive forces of a
country within a given market situation.’
5. This was the case with the elections for WTO director-general in 2004,
running against a Uruguayan candidate and the French Pascal Lamy.
6. For more information on the project and access to the database, go to
http://www.lasamericasyelmundo.cide.edu.
7. As we were writing this chapter, the 2014–2015 survey with leaders was still
ongoing.
8. The emphasis on Brazil–Cuba relations happened because of a highly con-
troversial domestic federal program ‘More doctors’, which brought foreign
professionals to work in the Brazilian public health care system. The major-
ity of them were Cubans (circa 11,000 doctors). Before that, Cuba did not
rank particularly high among foreign policy topics in the public debate.
9. Contrary to the mass public, opinion makers were not only critical of
the actual government policies towards Argentina, Venezuela, Cuba, and
MERCOSUR, but also regretted the ‘excessive’ attention assigned to South–
South policies over North–South relations.
10. Argentina is among Brazil’s top ten trade partners, and the first in terms of
tourism flow. In 2012 and 2013, Argentinian tourists in Brazil ranked first,
amounting to around 30% of total foreign tourists and 58–59% of those
coming from Latin America (Ministry of Tourism, 2015). Argentina is also
the most frequent destination for Brazilian tourists abroad. Brazilian lore has
plenty of jokes about Argentinians, displaying a mixture of admiration and
jaundice towards our neighbours.
11. This is all too natural, since Brazil is an important market for illegal drugs,
and the organized crime revolving around the drug business is thought to be
related to the exceptionally high levels of violence in the country.
12. This is consistent with Meseguer and Maldonado (2012), who, by using data
from the Americas and the World project, have found ambiguous attitudes
towards immigrants among Mexican and Brazilian leaders.
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3
Brazil’s Rise and Its Soft Power
Strategy in South America
Miriam Gomes Saraiva
Since 2003, in a shifting international scenario of increasing fragmen-

tation and following the decline of the liberal world order seen in the
1990s, Brazil has taken assertive action to expand its participation in
multilateral forums and debates on global political matters as part of a
diplomatic strategy that envisages a reformulation of existing interna-
tional institutions. Brazil’s regional context has also proved beneficial to
its rise. Since 11 September 2001, the US has neglected its foreign policy
towards Latin America to make way for its War on Terror. The lack of any
structured US behaviour in South America persisted even when Barack
Obama took office. Meanwhile, in the same year, Argentina (Brazil’s his-
torical rival for hegemony in the Southern Cone) found itself weakened
by the regional political and economic crisis. The rise of new govern-
ments keen to reformulate the international political setting from the
beginning of the century further reduced the alignment of these coun-
tries with the US. It was the conjunction of all these factors that paved
the way for Brazil to take an increasingly autonomous approach in the
region.
This is the backdrop for the discussions that have arisen about the rise
of Brazil based on a soft power strategy. In fact, the strategy Joseph Nye
(2004) defines as ‘soft power’1 is nothing new in Brazil’s international
dealings. Since the early 1900s, it has used this kind of strategy – with
different labels – in conjunction with two core beliefs which, combined
with different interests, have marked Brazilian foreign policy: the need
to build and ensure Brazil’s autonomy in its foreign policy choices and
development strategy, and the desire to raise its global political profile.
When President Lula came to power in 2003, this strategy was clearly
oriented towards building Brazil’s leadership in the region, seeking a
46
Miriam Gomes Saraiva 47
bandwagoning response from its neighbouring partners, who would

support Brazil’s proposals in the global scenario.2
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the South American aspect of
Brazil’s rise in international politics, with a focus on the construction
of its leadership in the region using a soft power strategy and seeking
bandwagoning behaviour, in an asymmetrical context. It gives a brief
historical overview of how the Brazilian soft power strategy took shape
in the 20th century, followed by the construction of its leadership base
in South America. Brazil’s increasing prominence in the region under
President Lula and the limitations of its policy for the region under
Dilma Rousseff are then analysed. The concluding section looks at the
continuity of Brazil’s soft power strategy for the region.
The background of Brazil’s soft power strategy
In the early 20th century, Brazilian Foreign Minister Baron of Rio

Branco, whose ideas had a major impact on the country’s foreign policy,
identified a realistic international scenario according to which coun-
tries should defend their sovereignty and expand their relative power
through material and symbolic power resources. Rio Branco argued that
although material power resources are more recognizable, symbolic ones
are a good way for countries of limited means to attain greater interna-
tional presence (Silva, 1995). This can be achieved at a regional level
by fostering special relations with a rising global power (at the time,
the US). The consolidation of foreign policy principles, which would
guide the country’s behaviour, could help boost its global standing and
open up new potential for international action through a mixture of
convincing and persuasion. This idea gave rise to a general approach
in Brazilian foreign policy, which, bar a few short-lived exceptions, has
been the backdrop for its soft power initiatives – the defence of legal
equality between states and the sovereignty of nations, respect for inter-
national law, the defence of peaceful resolution for controversies, and
non-intervention.
Throughout the 20th century, other tactics were incorporated, such
as harnessing foreign policy to attract inputs for Brazilian industrial
development, defending the self-determination of peoples (or states),
and building an image of a unique nation whose size and other social
and economic features make it a suitable bridge between poorer coun-
tries and Western powers (Pinheiro, 2004; Merke, 2008). This third
symbolic power resource has recently gained priority in Brazil’s inter-
national policy strategies. From 1945, Brazil started to consolidate the
48 Brazil’s Rise and Soft Power Strategy
alignment of its foreign policy for the region with the US within the
framework of Pan-Americanism. However, from 1960, any hopes of
building a special relationship with the US to regionally bolster its sym-
bolic power gave way to a rise in universalism. This made it possible
for Brazil to forge and/or strengthen its ties with countries outside the
European/Inter-American system and functioned as an instrument for
its international projection. With a greater diversity of partners, Brazil
boosted its bargaining power with the US and other global powers
(Pinheiro, 2004).
Although the basic principles behind Brazil’s use of soft power have
remained intact over the years, its foreign policy has not been uniform
since the early 20th century. Even with universalism as the new bench-
mark for its foreign actions, different strategies have been adopted in
an attempt to raise Brazil’s international profile according to different
international contexts and the inclinations of ruling political groups
(Saraiva and Valença, 2011). Meanwhile, the aim of attaining greater
regional projection has taken a back seat. Since the 1980s, and espe-
cially since the 1990s, with the new international context, Brazil has
managed to balance the global and regional dimensions in its strategy
to enhance its global standing using soft power (Saraiva, 2014). This has
been so marked since 2003 that it has attracted the attention of policy-
makers from neighbouring countries and influenced the trajectory of
Latin American regionalism.
Building a soft power base in South America
In the 1990s, two new, interrelated elements were incorporated into

Brazil’s foreign policy. One was the idea of prioritizing South America
rather than Latin America as a regional platform. The formation of the
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and Mexico’s membership
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – Mexico having
been a key partner in historical initiatives prioritizing South America
and something of a rival in terms of influence in the region – opened
new prospects for the Brazilian government. In 1994, the Itamar Franco
government (1993–1994) formulated a project for a South American free
trade area. The project ultimately failed, but it sowed the seeds for new
reflections on the region.
During the Fernando Henrique Cardoso years (1995–2002), Brazil’s
regional strategy gained new momentum and became more clearly
integrated with its global projection strategy. The government started
to see other South American countries as partners, and realized that
Brazil would have to strengthen its position in multilateral institutions

in order to reap the benefits of its growing development. Taking the
Western values disseminated by international institutions as a given,
Brazilian diplomats began to review the country’s behaviour towards
the region, which had thus far been guided by the idea of non-
intervention, and sought to build its leadership in the area through a
combination of MERCOSUR-based integration, regional security guar-
anteed through democratic stability, and the development of regional
infrastructure.
Cardoso was keen to build what Burges (2009) has called consensual
hegemony, based on an articulation with different countries. However,
the structuring of regional governance was not an easy task, because of
the differences between Brazil’s and Argentina’s views on South America
and what the role of the US should be in the region.
The year 2000 was a milestone for Brazil’s growth in the region.
In 1999, MERCOSUR was shaken to the core when the Brazilian currency
devalued. There were serious knock-on effects in the Argentine econ-
omy, prompting an immediate backlash by the Menem government,
which introduced customs duties against Brazilian goods. Trade, which
until then had been the cornerstone of MERCOSUR, ran into choppy
waters, and the accusations and mistrust that ensued have never been
overcome. Meanwhile, talks on the formation of the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) were also running out of steam, and the US started
pursuing bilateral agreements. The Cardoso government was very keen
to boost trade with other countries in the region (buyers of Brazilian
manufactured goods), but this was hampered by the state of the region’s
infrastructure. Progress in the regionalization process – a prerequisite for
Brazilian leadership – was severely curtailed.
Cardoso then called a meeting of all the presidents of South America
in the Brazilian capital, where he revived the idea of a South America
that had been envisaged a few years earlier. The main topics on the
agenda concerned economic integration and infrastructure, as well as
the importance of defending democratic regimes. The Initiative for
the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA)
was created with the idea of investing funds from the Inter-American
Development Bank and from regional funds. However, in practice,
as it co-opted and persuaded the other countries to adopt unprece-
dented positions, the Brazilian government sought to build a consensus
around democratic stability and infrastructure expansion, and to lay
the groundwork for the creation of a South American community of
nations. Foreign minister and academic Celso Lafer reflected Cardoso’s
position at the time when he said: ‘South America is our diplomatic

circumstance’ (Lafer, 2001).
Brazil’s rise with Lula
The election of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003–2010) changed the face of
Brazil’s foreign policy. The faith entrusted in international regimes dur-
ing the Cardoso government was replaced by proactive efforts to change
them through persuasive tactics designed to favour countries from the
South and/or Brazil’s own interests. The idea of enlisting other Southern
nations, both poorer and emerging, in an effort to balance the power of
traditional Western nations, was the springboard for Brazil’s new inter-
national approach. While coalitions with emerging partners were seen
as a means to leverage its global actions, there were also efforts to estab-
lish an individual international leadership, with the notion of Brazil as a
global player founded strongly on ideas of autonomy and universalism
(Vigevani et al., 2008). As it engaged in building a new political order,
Brazil gave precedence to anti-hegemonic, multipolar positions (Gratius,
2011).
As well as raising its international profile, acquiring leadership in
South America became another priority for Brazil. From the Brazilian
perspective, these dual objectives were complementary and could be
pursued simultaneously. Policy-makers saw closer ties with neighbour-
ing countries as a means of boosting Brazilian development and build-
ing a bloc with a stronger international voice (Gratius and Saraiva,
2013). Facing international issues, the Brazilian government sought to
consolidate followers through bandwagoning. Against this backdrop,
Brazil perceived regional integration not only as a goal in itself but
also as an instrument for autonomy and soft balancing the US (Hurrell,
2006).
This approach to South America received widespread political sup-
port from a variety of groups within the government and its supporting
coalition during the Lula years. The strategy tied in with the objectives
of developmentalists, autonomists from the diplomatic corps3 (Saraiva,
2013), nationalist geopoliticians,4 (Costa, 2003), and a pro-integration
epistemic community that included political players from the Workers’
Party and academics who supported regional integration5 (Yee, 2011).
The Brazil that Lula inherited was marked by political stability
and economic growth, exacerbating the asymmetry between it and
its neighbours. In terms of its economic policy, the government first
maintained the features of liberalism and then gradually started to
introduce elements of developmentalism such as building infrastruc-

ture. Economic growth went hand-in-hand with social inclusion, and
Brazil could ‘speak with greater confidence and authority’ (Hurrell,
2010:60). In this context, and in a bid to respond to domestic cir-
cumstances and this new regional balance (or imbalance), the Lula
government’s foreign policy prioritized building a South American order
under Brazilian leadership, with Brazil as the main agenda-setting driver
and taking key responsibility for the integration and regionalization
process.
The government consolidated its soft power initiatives with a com-
bination of bilateral deals and reinforced multilateralism. It prioritized
the coordination of regional leadership with boosts to Brazilian eco-
nomic development and geared its actions towards finding consensus
between different parties and determining how to respond to the dif-
ferent issues affecting the region, rather than prioritizing traditional
economic integration structures. The success of Brazil’s socioeconomic
model during the Lula administration prompted its adoption in other
countries, following Brazil’s example and with its technical assistance.
The Brazilian government’s strategy was twofold: it targeted
MERCOSUR and South America. Brasilia made initiatives within
MERCOSUR as an inner circle. In formal economic terms, the bloc is
an incomplete customs union of an intergovernmental nature, but in
practice it is an asymmetric integration process strongly marked by bilat-
eralism. This feature of the bloc has enabled Brazil to maintain relations
of a different nature with each of the member states.
The initial idea of making a bloc to encourage integration, espe-
cially trade integration, was modified. In the economic sphere, the
Brazilian government sought to maintain a balance within MERCOSUR
that favoured infrastructure development projects and industrial expan-
sion. There was a good degree of integration and cooperation within
the bloc, especially between Brazil and Argentina, as evidenced by the
interaction between their respective ministries in the fields of education,
culture, energy, and agriculture. With the formation of the MERCOSUR
parliament, new prospects for more comprehensive integration took
shape.
Brazil gradually took on the costs of making the bloc more cohesive
by creating and implementing the MERCOSUR Structural Convergence
Fund (FOCEM), with 70% of the funds being contributed by Brazil.6
The bloc also expanded its borders as agreements were signed for
Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia to be associate members, while Venezuela
applied for full membership.
The bloc was an important mechanism for Brazil to manage its rela-
tionships with its Southern Cone neighbours, especially Argentina. But
the construction of autonomous Brazilian leadership in the region and
the growing asymmetry between the two countries, both economically
and in terms of their regional influence, frustrated any expectations
Argentina might have had of sharing leadership (Gratius and Saraiva,
2013:222). Brazil’s increasing international presence yielded new oppor-
tunities for its diplomats to operate in different multilateral forums
without the presence of Argentina and did not bring any benefits for
MERCOSUR.
South America was the other geographical sphere of action for Brazil.
The consolidation of the South American Community of Nations in
2004 and its transition to the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR) in 2008 was where Brazil focused most of its diplomatic
efforts. UNASUR was unlike the other regional initiatives, which fol-
lowed classic patterns of integration, and became an important instru-
ment for structuring regional governance.7 The organization incorpo-
rated new topics such as political dialogue, energy integration, and
financial mechanisms and asymmetries. It adopted a post-liberal model
of regionalism, with the political dimension gaining priority and the
countries keeping their autonomy to decide on their respective develop-
ment strategies, since the benefits of integration and cooperation were
asymmetrical. Based on this type of regionalism, strictly commercial
integration ceased to play a major role8 (Motta Veiga and Rios, 2007).
However, Brazil’s actions in this area were not free from tension. Its
position was challenged by social demands and the developmentalist-
oriented economic strategies of some of its neighbours, which called
for it to shoulder the full economic burden of regional cooperation.
Meanwhile, Brazil’s plans to build a regional power structure and give a
regional response to international challenges were met with mistrust by
its neighbours. These saw Brasilia’s plans to gain greater international
stature as more self-serving than actually benefiting the region. This
put a premium on the cost of Brazil’s regional leadership (Malamud,
2009). It was only at the end of Lula’s first term of office, with Brazil’s
acceptance of the Bolivian government’s nationalization of Petrobras’
natural gas reserves, that the Brazilian government’s willingness to
take on some of the costs of South American regionalism, to the
detriment of its short-term interests, became clearer. With this, tradi-
tional resistance to shouldering the costs of collective regional assets,
dubbed a ‘highly cost-averse leadership style’ by Burges (2005), was
overcome.
Institutionally speaking, although UNASUR has a strictly intergovern-

mental nature, which has guaranteed Brazil a degree of autonomy from
its partners in the organization as well as in its plans to project itself as
a global player, it also has a complex institutional design: 12 sectoral
sub-committees enable closer cooperation in different areas between
government agencies from different South American countries. As it
is not formally committed to any specific regional integration model,
economically speaking, and does not fit any of the traditional free-
trade-oriented economic integration formats, it can embrace different
sub-regional initiatives, such as MERCOSUR, the Andean Community,
the ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), and the
newly formed Pacific Alliance.
With such a flexible format, UNASUR gradually aligned the behaviour
of the region’s countries on different sectoral issues. It proved important
in responding to crises in the continent, whether of a domestic politi-
cal nature (such as in Bolivia) or over borders (e.g. Colombia/Ecuador
and Colombia/Venezuela). It also became the main channel of multilat-
eral action through which Brazilian diplomats acted in order to build
common positions with Brazil’s neighbours so as to ensure regional
stability.
The development of regional infrastructure was also incentivized.
Its administrative entity, IIRSA, was incorporated in 2010 by the
COSIPLAN (South American Infrastructure and Planning Council).
Regional investments in infrastructure financed by the Brazilian Devel-
opment Bank (BNDES) and executed by Brazilian companies grew dur-
ing the period, leveraged by IIRSA/COSIPLAN. In this case, the Brazilian
government adopted a traditional instrument of hard power – regional
investments in infrastructure dependent on the hiring of Brazilian com-
panies.9 By the end of Lula’s second term, a good portion of the funds
invested in infrastructure in the region were coming from the BNDES
(Couto and Padula, 2012). These initiatives reinforced the Brazilian
development model and were largely oriented towards projects either in
Brazil or not necessarily linked to infrastructure development (Sorgine,
2014).
In the field of defence, the diplomatic crisis triggered by the
Colombian air strikes on Ecuadorian territory prompted the Brazilian
government to suggest the creation of the South American Defence
Council (Dabène, 2012). Meanwhile, the Lula government’s 2008
national defence strategy was geared towards the development of the
national arms industry, and the prospect of building weapons facto-
ries in the region weighed significantly on the Brazilian government’s
decision. The council was thus created in 2009 with the aim of artic-
ulating both the region’s defence policies and the manufacture and
exchange of weapons, while also placing Brazil at the centre of the
regional security agenda.
Parallel to UNASUR, the diplomatic corps under Lula introduced a
complex cooperation structure between the region’s countries, giving
priority to technical and financial cooperation. Technical cooperation
started to be introduced in sectors such as education, agriculture, science
and technology, and health, boosting coordination with other coun-
tries in the region in non-commercial areas and the continent’s overall
regionalization (Hirst et al., 2010).
The Lula administration made clear diplomatic efforts with UNASUR,
pushing the Rio Group into a secondary position. However, towards the
end of Lula’s second term, Brazil joined forces with Venezuela to propose
the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(CLACS) in an effort to counterbalance US power. The idea was to pave
the way for a wider Brazilian presence throughout Latin America in the
future, but this did not actually come about until 2011.
The legacy of the Lula government, inherited by a government of the
same party, was a country on its way to becoming a global power and
with the foundations set for regional leadership. The division of the
Brazilian soft power strategy between MERCOSUR and UNASUR did not
lead to problems of overlap or questions of loyalty. From Brazil’s point of
view, both cooperation and integration initiatives contributed towards
strengthening regional governance under Brazilian leadership.
A reversion of Brazil’s rising presence and soft power

strategy?
Since she was elected president, Dilma Rousseff has sought to maintain
her predecessor’s foreign policy – a revisionary approach to international
institutions, an active stance in multilateral forums as a representative
of Southern countries, and an orientation towards South America. The
autonomist group remains strong, holding key posts in the Foreign
Ministry, and the developmentalist tendencies have been reinforced.
However, the weight of the Foreign Ministry in foreign policy-making
has been reduced and presidential diplomacy has dwindled (Celestino,
2014). The political will demonstrated by President Lula to articulate
visions favourable to the construction of regional leadership has not
been continued. With Rousseff as president, the political dimension of
Brazil’s actions in South America has declined, and the initiatives are
more pragmatic and have a lower political profile.
In the realm of MERCOSUR, little progress has been achieved. Eco-
nomic integration is being hampered by trade disagreements. Barriers
against Brazilian exports have not been lifted, and nationalization mea-
sures taken in Argentina are warding off Brazilian investments. The
Rousseff government seems less inclined to make concessions to its
main partner, and bickering in the economic field is unlikely to be
resolved in the short term. Venezuela’s membership has also embroiled
the trade dimension, since Caracas has proved unwilling to adapt to
the requirements of the common external tariff. Little progress has
been made in the consolidation of the MERCOSUR parliament, and
the adoption of its constitutive treaty has been postponed (Malamud
and Dri, 2013). The crisis involving Paraguay and Venezuela has ham-
pered progress in this sense. Internal differences aside, MERCOSUR has
continued to aspire to expansion. Since Venezuela joined, Bolivia has
also applied for entry as a full member without giving up its member-
ship of the Andean Community. Ecuador, too, started negotiations to
join MERCOSUR in 2013. Guiana and Suriname have signed association
agreements, laying the groundwork for the formation of a free trade area
covering the entire sub-continent.
In the political field, the increasing alignment of Brazil’s and
Argentina’s positions has gone a long way towards making up for their
economic differences. The Brazilian government is still keen to main-
tain close cooperation with Argentina to curb the resurgence of any
kind of rivalry that might damage Brazil’s soft power strategy in the
region. Early on in the Rousseff government, the then three MERCOSUR
partners, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, acted together in response to
the political crisis in Paraguay, resulting in the temporary suspension of
Paraguay from the bloc, as well as – surprisingly – accepting Venezuela
as a full member. However, when Venezuela itself experienced political
upheavals, MERCOSUR did not react, and it was UNASUR that made
moves to resolve the issue.
UNASUR remains Brazil’s primary point of reference when respond-
ing to crisis situations. When Venezuela entered a period of political
turmoil, there was a consensus regarding a weak initiative by UNASUR
that had not yielded results. Brazil’s tradition of non-intervention
makes it more difficult to build leadership in an area where there
are differences regarding the best form of government. The fact that
leaders from the Workers’ Party have continued to hold sway in the
government’s response to crisis situations in the region, and the pres-

ident’s lack of interest in putting any effort into building a more
substantial consensus, have hampered Brazil’s capacity to fulfil its role
as leader.
The Brazilian initiatives in the South American Defence Council and
in others of the organization’s committees are effectively on hold.
Brazil’s actions are more connected with developmentalism, prioritizing
bilateral ties with neighbours through technical and financial coop-
eration. However, the South American share in Brazil’s total foreign
investments has recently declined too, falling from 14.3% in the first
half of 2012 to 5.7% in the same period in 2013 (Folha de Sao Paulo,
2013). The Brazilian economy is going through a testing time, and
any calls to have the country cover the costs of regional coopera-
tion are not seen in a good light by the government. The prospect of
building economies of scale is not on the agenda of the Brazilian pri-
vate sector. However, even soft power must be backed up by concrete
resources.
To make matters worse, while Brazil counts on support from its
UNASUR partners for its global aspirations, it is unwilling to accept
any kind of restriction on its autonomy of action, whether regionally
or globally, thus raising the cost of its leadership to levels the new
government seems unwilling to meet. The positions of the region’s
countries on multilateral forums have generally not coincided in prac-
tice with Brazil’s, with the notable exception of the 2013 election of the
Brazilian candidate Roberto Azevedo as director general of the World
Trade Organization.
CLACS was formalized in 2010, but did not receive any attention from
Brazilian diplomatic circles. The responses to the impeachment of the
Paraguayan president in 2012 and the political upheavals in Venezuela
were coordinated by UNASUR, with CLACS playing no significant role.
As well as CLACS’ difficulty in accommodating the differences between
Latin American countries, there is overlap between it and UNASUR, and
Brazil’s primary loyalty is to South America.
Nevertheless, regionalization is still underway. The coordination
between South American countries begun during the Cardoso years and
Brazil’s ties with its neighbours through technical and financial coop-
eration are established facts and have penetrated different spheres of
government, resulting in Brazil’s actions in the region having a long-
term nature. In practice, the Lula administration’s strategy of building
regional leadership has been replaced by tactics geared towards the
expansion of developmentalism and risk containment.
Particularities of Brazil’s behaviour and prospects for its

continued soft power in the region
Brazil’s soft power strategy in South America has been different from
that of other players keen to build or maintain a degree of leadership in
the region.
Venezuela is the country that has played the most decisive role in
shaping a new regional structure, defending positions different from
Brazil’s. ALBA has emerged as an alternative to the US-backed FTAA.
It is primarily political in nature and proposes to form a common
identity between countries with similar (i.e. anti-liberal) political ideals
and economic development strategies. As Venezuela is also a Caribbean
nation, its sphere of influence ranges beyond South America to include
Central America and the Caribbean. Venezuela has thus far acted as
ALBA’s paymaster, using a mixture of soft power resources (political
influence) and hard power mechanisms (subsidized oil and other kinds
of economic aid). Venezuela’s entry into MERCOSUR and its idea of
creating a more substantial community of South American nations
were attempts to reshape regional governance not through consen-
sual actions, but through closer ties between countries with left-wing
governments. Being ad hoc initiatives, these moves did not effectively
foster regionalization in South America and have only had limited
success with a few allies. Brazil’s position has always been to include
Venezuela under its soft power influence and bring it under South
America’s and UNASUR’s wing (Burges, 2010). More recently, with the
death of Hugo Chávez and the election of Nicolás Maduro, ALBA has
been sidelined.
The US, for its part, has a history of hegemony in its dealings with
Latin America, but has always had less of an impact on South America
than on Central America and the Caribbean. In the inter-American sys-
tem led by the Organization of American States, the US has combined
soft and hard power tactics in a context of prioritized bilateral dealings,
to the detriment of regional entities. The absence of a regional policy
for the whole inter-American system, reinforced by the formal end of
negotiations on the FTAA in 2005, demonstrates the limits of US influ-
ence in South America. Despite the efforts after the Miami Summit of
1994 to form liberal-oriented regional governance, the initiative was
short-lived and in practice did not further the regionalization of the
Americas as a whole. Brazil’s position in this context has been to offset
US hegemony wherever possible, and to operate autonomously in South
American matters.
China, in turn, is forging ever closer ties with specific countries in

the region (Rubiolo, 2013). These are mostly of an economic nature
and should therefore be classified as manifestations of hard power.
It has a select group of political partners, but does cooperate with Brazil
through its membership of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)
group. Dialogue between China and CLACS countries only formally
began in 2015. The trade dependency of South American countries on
China has grown quickly and bilaterally, and there has been no coor-
dinated regional response. Persuasion and consensus are not part of
China’s approach in the region, and it does not favour regionalization.
Meanwhile, Brazil’s strategy is sustained by two key elements. First,
its quest for leadership has contributed to the formation of consen-
sus in a region where political differences persist, although it has
not been followed by the other countries in international issues. Sec-
ond, Brazil’s efforts to build a form of regional governance able to
accommodate differences have resulted in improvements in processes
of regional cooperation and have strongly encouraged the deepening of
regionalization.
Since the meeting held in Brasilia in 2000, Brazil has clearly opted
for partnering with its South American neighbours. Despite being an
important trade partner, Mexico is structurally bound to the US through
NAFTA. In addition, Brazil’s soft power resources are limited, and Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean are much closer to the US’ sphere
of influence. Their differences aside, the last three Brazilian presi-
dents have all seen South America as an arena in which Brazil has
the potential to soft balance the US and expand through trade and
investments in infrastructure. In Brazil’s vision, these countries have
geographical proximity and could share a regional governance struc-
ture capable of encouraging new standards of consensual behaviour by
bandwagoning Brazil’s positions in international issues, thus improving
Brazil’s chances of attaining greater global projection despite the evident
limitations.
During the Lula administration, Brazil’s soft power initiatives were
driven by both domestic and foreign factors. However, the combina-
tion of a favourable international scenario, economic stability in Brazil,
and the rise to power of a government like the one headed by President
Lula, which invested heavily in diplomatic efforts both regionally and
internationally, may now be consigned to history. Since Dilma Rousseff
took office, the Brazilian economy has floundered and the country’s
foreign policy has shifted away from regional interests towards a more
pragmatic and short-term perspective.
Yet, two key elements still indicate a degree of continuity. First, as

far back as Rio Branco’s symbolic power resources, Brazil’s foreign pol-
icy has been marked by the expectation that it will attain international
standing through soft power mechanisms. This has become a hallmark
of the country’s identity abroad since it was formulated in the early 20th
century, and, although it may be adapted to specific circumstances, it is
unlikely to change substantially. Second, Brazil’s soft power in South
America has quite different features from the actions of other players.
Despite the tendency for neighbouring countries to react against follow-
ing Brazil in the global scenario, it has contributed to regionalization in
the continent and to the development of a regional governance struc-
ture that includes all countries and different governmental actors. It may
vary in intensity and focus in response to economic circumstances or
the domestic political climate, but it will be maintained as an inherent
feature of Brazil’s foreign identity and behaviour towards neighbouring
countries.
Notes
1. Nye’s (2004) soft power strategy is about influencing the behaviour of others
through the ability to attract and persuade rather than to coerce or pay.
2. Here, leadership is understood as a country’s capacity to influence the political
trajectory of a specific region, creating consensus through mechanisms of soft
power, or, as Schirm (2010:200) defines it, ‘the ability to make others follow
goals and positions which these others did not previously share and/or to
make others support an increase in status and power of the emerging power’.
3. The autonomists form a school of thought within the Brazilian Foreign
Ministry that defends Brazil’s taking a more active, autonomous stance in
international politics and assertive leadership in South America. See Saraiva
(2013).
4. Ideologues with a geopolitical viewpoint who defend regional integration
around Brazilian leadership and interests, who had an influence on foreign
policy for the region, or who took part in government agencies. For example,
see Costa (2003).
5. According to Haas’s definition of the capacity of the epistemic community to
exert political influence, their members do so by ‘diffusing ideas and influenc-
ing positions adopted by [. . .] governments, bureaucrats and decision makers’,
as well as by exerting ‘direct policymaking influence by acquiring bureaucratic
positions’ (Yee, 2011:44, mentioning Peter Haas’s ideas).
6. FOCEM was created with an initial fund of US$100 million a year for invest-
ing into infrastructure projects inside the bloc (with 80% being assigned to
Paraguay and Uruguay). The funds have progressively increased. See http://
www.mercosur.int/focem/.
7. According to Nolte (2011), regional governance refers to a set of regional
organizations and principles and rules designed to regulate the behaviours
of states, as well as the process of creating such organizations and principles,

which contribute to resolving problems in a region and foster greater benefits
in intra-regional relationships.
8. Motta Veiga and Rios (2007) define the model of regionalism established
in the region in the 2000s as post-liberal regionalism, which differs from
commercial integration in that it highlights political aspects, regional asym-
metries, physical integration, and greater political coordination between the
region’s countries, it being understood that Brazil would gradually take on the
costs of the integration process.
9. The 1988 Brazilian constitution does not allow BNDES loans to be made to
foreign governments or companies.
References
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4
Argentina and the Rise of Brazil:
Perceptions and Strategic Options
Roberto Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian
Introduction
Brazil’s rise in the world in the last two decades has attracted enor-
mous interest in Argentina, not only due to its impact and meaning
for Argentina’s international relations but also because it was coinciden-
tal with an opposite process: the long-running Argentine decline, which
found its most clear and painful expression in the 2001–2002 domes-
tic crisis. This dual process is essential to understand and evaluate how
Argentine political and economic elites have perceived the rise of Brazil
and, more specifically, the role it played in Argentine foreign policy.
Against this background, this chapter focuses on the two following
issues: (a) Argentine elites’ perception of Brazil’s international rise from
the 2001/2002 crisis to the present; and (b) the strategic options put
into practice by Argentina during this period as a response to Brazil’s
ascent as an emerging power. We conceptualize these strategic options,
which, in our view, constitute a new typology, since the corresponding
behaviours cannot be inscribed within the conventional logic of balanc-
ing or bandwagoning. Finally, we make some brief comments on what
could be seen as a new stage in bilateral relations characterized by the
end of the Kirchner cycle and the emergence of new questions about the
magnitude of Brazil’s rise, which have generated new perceptions about
the nature of this process and its implications for Argentina’s foreign
policy.
We divide the period under discussion into three stages that cor-
respond, broadly speaking, to the governments of Eduardo Duhalde,
Néstor Kirchner, and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, in both her first
62
Roberto Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian 63
and, particularly, her second term, until the present. These adminis-
trations successively implemented three strategic options: regionalism,
light balancing, and soft hedging.
The post-crisis and Néstor Kirchner’s government
Duhalde’s government
During Eduardo Duhalde’s transition government (2002–2003), perce-
ptions were strongly influenced by three domestic elements – the crisis
itself, the predominantly negative evaluation of Menem’s legacy, and
the urgency to find ways to overcome the difficult situation of the
country – and by the attitudes adopted by the outside world towards
Argentina. At that time, Washington (the White House and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), New York (Wall Street and the private
banks), and several European capitals were criticizing Buenos Aires for
its poor economic management, while Brasília was asking for more
understanding. The Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration stated
from the very beginning that the IMF could not be insensitive to the
Argentine crisis and that Brazil would continue politically trusting its
main partner in the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR). This
position helped to shape an image of Brazil as a faithful companion.
Later, when Lula was already installed in the Planalto, the vision of
Brazil as an alternative model to the neoliberal policies implemented
throughout the 1990s and as Argentina’s strongest ‘external card’ for
its reinsertion into the world began to gain strength. The new Brazilian
administration’s will to reinvigorate MERCOSUR and the bilateral rela-
tion gave the Argentine government important room for manoeuvre
within its limited number of international choices. At the end of
Duhalde’s term, an ongoing trend that had been developing since the
late 1990s was accentuated: the growth of a positive image of Brazil.
A study by the Argentine Council for International Relations on foreign
policy and public opinion, published in 2002, showed that most opin-
ion leaders (57%) and public opinion generally (44%) shared the view
that ‘Brazil will be the Latin American country with the highest role at
the level of international relations.’ At the same time, 77% of the general
public and 90% of opinion leaders thought that Argentina’s member-
ship in MERCOSUR was important. Indeed, when it came to indicating
the counterpart with which Argentina should achieve ‘military integra-
tion’, the survey showed that MERCOSUR was clearly in the first place
(48% of the general public and 55% of opinion leaders), followed by the
US (15 and 29%, respectively) (Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones
64 Argentina and the Rise of Brazil
Internacionales, 2002:7–12). In the wake of the crisis, being weak, alone,

and self-absorbed, Argentina acknowledged its Latin American origin
and looked at the partnership with Brazil as the best way to improve its
collective self-esteem and return to a world that had largely turned its
back to the country.
Within this context, Duhalde’s administration strategically chose
regionalism – in the sense Fawcett (2004) gives to the word – explicitly
assuming that Argentina was the ‘junior partner’. According to Fawcett,
this implies that several countries ‘cooperate and coordinate their strate-
gies in a specific region [. . .] with the aim of achieving and promoting
common objectives in one or more fields’. Argentina’s domestic sit-
uation, its need to avoid a further decline of its relative position in
Latin America, and Brazil’s well-known reluctance to support robust
regional institutions seem to have inclined Duhalde to a soft variant
of regionalism, ‘promoting a sense of regional awareness or commu-
nity (soft regionalism)’, and not to the creation of ‘pan- or subregional
groups formalized by interstate arrangements and organizations (hard
regionalism)’ (Fawcett, 2004:433).
Néstor Kirchner’s government

After Néstor Kirchner’s coming to power, some of his predecessor’s for-
eign policy perspectives were altered. The duality characteristic of the
15-month term of Duhalde as head of state came to an end; at that time,
for example, the president had given maximum priority to relations
with Brazil, while his foreign affairs minister, Carlos Ruckauff, sought
to reinstall the US, as in the 1990s, at the core of Argentina’s foreign
policy. Kirchner took direct and personal charge of foreign policy and
assigned to it a more precise orientation. In his long and remarkable
inaugural address on 25 May 2003 (Kirchner, 25 May 2003a), he only
named the US once, to say that he ‘wished to keep a serious, broad
and mature relation’ with Washington. Even more noticeable was his
lack of any explicit reference to Brazil, only mentioning it when speak-
ing in general terms about the relevance Latin America would have in
his foreign policy: ‘Our foreign policy priority will be the building of a
political, stable, prosperous and united Latin America. [. . .] [To that end]
MERCOSUR and the Latin American integration must be part of a true
regional political project’ (Kirchner, 25 May 2003b).
Kirchner’s main reference to his country’s neighbour was made several
months later, in the speech given on 16 October 2003, when Luiz Inacio
Lula made his first visit to Argentina as head of state. In a concise and
precise way, Kirchner pointed out his will to develop a ‘deep bilateral
relationship’ with Brazil, though at the same time he emphasized his

expectation for it to be ‘crystal clear and honest’. Briefly speaking, his
desire for a closer relation between Argentina and Brazil also included
the demand for it to be more sincere and effective. Thus, Kirchner was
expressing a double lack of confidence in Brazil: on the one hand, that
of the generation of the 1970s, which mostly perceived it as a sort of a
proxy ‘sub-empire’ subordinate to Washington; on the other hand, that
of an important number of members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
who questioned the ‘hegemonic’ temptation that would be guiding
Brazil on regional matters.
In spite of the signing of two documents relevant to bilateral rela-
tions – the ‘Buenos Aires Consensus’ (2003) and the ‘Copacabana
Declaration’ (2004) – during his first two years in power, Kirchner had
an oscillating view on Brazil, not only because of his own temperament
but also as a result of an objective element: the fluctuating behaviour of
Brazil towards Argentina. Two emblematic examples combined to give
rise to the view then prevailing at the ‘Casa Rosada’: on the one hand,
the complex negotiations of the debt in default, and the relations with
multilateral credit institutions; on the other hand, the evolution of com-
mercial and financial ties with countries in the area. As to the former,
Mexico and Chile gave clearer support than Brazil to Argentina; as to the
latter, the Argentine government established closer ties more easily with
Caracas than with Brasilia. To this must be added the bilateral strate-
gies then followed by Argentina and Brazil vis-à-vis China. Hu Jintao’s
important visit to both countries in 2004 showed their inability and
unwillingness to share a common agenda with regard to Beijing. A sort
of ‘peripheral unilateralism’ prevailed in both countries, each individ-
ually acting without consulting the other party, with the sole aim of
pursuing its national interests, sometimes to the detriment of its peer.
Thus, in private and public spheres alike, subjective and objective
elements nurtured a bipolar view of Brazil, while Argentina was leav-
ing behind the 2001/02 crisis because of the rapid successes – mainly
in the economic field – of a governmental project that was presented
as ‘nationalist’ and ‘popular’ and aimed at regaining the country’s lost
self-esteem. Though Brazil had a key role in this project, its condition
and intentions raised renewed doubts and suspicions. Its status as an
emerging power worried nationalist and leftist groups, who feared the
negative consequences for Argentina that could arise from the unequal
distribution of power between the two countries, while the fact that it
was governed by Lula gave the Argentine right new reasons to refloat
the perception of Brazil as an ‘incorrigible’ country. There was also a
reappearance of a distinctive assessment of Latin America and South

America, accompanied by presentiments about the eventual Brazilian
hegemony in this latter area. In the face of Brazilian intentions to
make South America a region with unique geopolitical characteristics,
Néstor Kirchner adopted a preventive and defensive attitude, reluctantly
backed Brazil, and expected to be able to execute a Latin American
policy of his own. An eloquent example of this was his decision not
to attend the establishment of the South American Community of
Nations in 2004 (before it was transformed into the Union of South
American Nations, UNASUR) because he perceived it as an instrument
for projecting and guaranteeing Brazil’s own power.
This approach to Brazil coincided with MERCOSUR’s stagnation: the
recurrent promises of its ‘political’ relaunching could not hide the fact
that, in economic terms, the bloc showed evident signs of becom-
ing exhausted. Even though both countries had similar views on the
domestic model of economic development, this coincidence, paradox-
ically, did not help them to bring some fresh air into their integration
process. Kirchner’s and Lula’s convergence on the need to recover an
‘industrialist’ view of integration, as opposed to the ‘commercialist’ view
of the 1990s, seemed to imply that both countries were intending to
endow their links with a new strategic perspective. However, the agenda
of ‘productive integration’ and Brasilia’s acceptance of the importance
of reindustrializing Argentina were interpreted in Buenos Aires as the
possibility of setting, at least temporarily, protective policies against
Brazilian exports threatening Argentina’s industry, and ignoring some
of MERCOSUR’s trading rules.
In sum, ambiguous perceptions coexisted with fluctuating relations.
This scenario was propitious for the resurgence of several anti-Brazil
perceptions. The pro-Brazil euphoria of Duhalde’s time (in which Brazil
was perceived as a key strategic ally) was replaced by new doubts, and
even criticisms. From the right and the left, an ambivalent anti-Brazilian
feeling was revealed, either explicitly or implicitly, and even if it did not
have the aggressiveness of the past, it demonstrated the difficulty of
establishing a culture of friendship between the two countries (Wendt,
1999). Critical perceptions came from various sectors, both within and
outside the state.
Closer relations with other would-be regional leaders and/or foreign
and economic policy models, such as Mexico, Chile, or Venezuela, were
advocated. Brazil was often placed in the irritating or unfavourable
corner of several triangles of which Argentina was part. The right
and centre-right made an unusual reference to Mexico: elements in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in businesses, in think-tanks, and in

the media recommended responding to Brazil’s growing power and
influence in ‘South America’ with a more ‘Latin American’ policy in
which the role of Mexico would be significant (Calle and Merke, 2007;
Cisneros, 2007; Morales Solá, 2007; Muchnik, 2007; Pérez de Eulate,
2007). The reference to a kind of ‘Mexican card’ had its origin in three
different but not necessarily exclusive lines of thought. For some, men-
tioning Mexico was a way of not speaking directly about the US, since
after the 2001/02 crisis and the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq,
the image of Washington in public opinion was largely negative; in
fact, one of the greatest critics of US policies in these two conflicts
was Argentina (Chicago Council of Global Affairs, 2007). For others, the
Mexican economic model and its de facto integration into the US mar-
ket was a path to be imitated. Finally, some people saw Mexico as a
political peer that could be useful to deal jointly with key diplomatic
issues (i.e. the reform of the United Nations Security Council). Since
the levels of mutual knowledge and economic, technological, and mil-
itary ties between Argentina and Mexico were quite low, the appeal to
the latter was less the result of a pro-Mexican conviction and more a
way to signal the existence of other friendly and productive regional
alternatives to Brazil.
The goal of establishing good relations with Mexico as a way to
restrain Brazil’s power was a typical right and centre-right banner that
found strong support in certain sectors of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs that were opposed to the idea of a South American region under
the leadership of Brazil. The ‘Mexican card’ also attracted some fol-
lowers among members of Kirchner’s government who did not come
from that political venue, so much that it was also mentioned in sev-
eral statements made by the president himself. For instance, in the
above-mentioned speech in honour of Lula, Kirchner said:
We do not have to keep enclosed within MERCOSUR but must

strongly advance [. . .] towards the integration with the Andean Pact
countries, towards a thorough Latin American integration, and also
in our relationship with Mexico, by way of a very strong process of
commercial, political and institutional integration that would enable
us to build a solid, ample and plural bloc.
(Kirchner, 16 October 2003b)
Later on, near the end of his term, Kirchner promoted a Strategic Part-
nership Agreement between Argentina and Mexico that was signed in
Mexico City on 30 July 2007. Besides the commercial and economic

interests pursued in the agreement, the Argentine government saw the
partnership with Mexico as a way of acknowledging this country’s
‘belonging’ to Latin America and bringing it closer to South America,
more specifically to MERCOSUR. Its aim was both to bring into ques-
tion the idea, widespread in the whole region at the time, that Mexico
had turned its back on Latin America after the signing of NAFTA, and to
enlarge Argentina’s political and economic room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis
Brazil (La Nación, 2007a, 2007b).
On the other hand, the view that Chile could well be a partner in
order to reach a greater balance in South America as well as a model
to follow also recovered strength, spreading into an even wider range
among Argentine elites, which included the right, the centre-right, and
part of the centre-left. The image of Chile contrasted with that of
Brazil: the former was seen as an essentially ‘predictable’ and ‘prudent’
country, while the latter was increasingly shown to be the opposite.
In this case, too, there were nuances: for some, a closer link with Chile
would compensate for Brazil’s influence in the Southern Cone – the
Santiago–Buenos Aires axis would limit Brazilian aspirations to regional
leadership; for others, the ‘Chilean way’ was most suitable for putting
a reasonable distance between Argentina and a stagnated MERCOSUR
while opening a more flexible and open relationship with the outside
world (La Nación, 2011). Chile, which had signed multiple free trade
agreements, was identified as a model to imitate by economic and polit-
ical sectors that criticized the Argentine position as a ‘follower’ of Brazil,
a country reluctant to formally commit to such agreements. Common
interests with Chile in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields
were also sought by members of the administration, especially within
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mainly during Jorge Taiana’s term of
office) and the Ministry of Defence (for instance, during Nilda Garré’s
and Arturo Puricelli’s terms).
On their part, the left perceived Venezuela as a compensating factor
and, in some aspects, a model to be taken into account. In a relatively
homogeneous way, a wide range of progressive forces, both inside and
outside the government, considered Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela as an
alternative regional pole which might be useful to balance Brazilian
attempted ‘hegemony’. It is worth mentioning that the notion that
Brazil’s power should be restrained was not new to a large part of the
Argentine left. In the late 1960s and the 1970s, many voices in Argentina
warned about the dangers stemming from the advance of ‘Brazilian sub-
imperialism’ in the Río de la Plata Basin and the potential role of Brazil
as ‘Washington’s policeman in South America’. This interpretation led

the third Peronist government, when it returned to power in 1973, to
try to compensate for Brazil’s influence by promoting a rapprochement
to the Andean Pact countries, especially to Peru and Venezuela. Follow-
ing the same logic, the left, closely linked to Kirchner’s government,
saw in Chavism an opportunity to join forces in order to gain more free-
dom of choice in the relation with Brazil. Some even proclaimed that
Chávez’s Venezuela was the ‘faithful companion’, the same definition
that had been applied to Brazil during the brief period of Duhalde. The
Bolivarian Revolution, presumably having so many aspects in common
with the first and second Peronist governments, was regarded as a nat-
ural bridge between Venezuela and Argentina in the face of what these
sectors considered Lula’s ‘mild’ reformism. Furthermore, some leftists
groups identified with Kirchnerism thought that an alliance between
Caracas and Buenos Aires was doubly necessary, both to reinforce the
weakened Argentine state and to hold back the Brazilian state’s excessive
ambitions for regional influence. This logic implied that MERCOSUR –
and, by the same token, the Argentine ability to negotiate – needed
the thorough participation of Venezuela in the mechanics of integra-
tion (Tokatlian, 10 September, 2004). In addition, closeness to Venezuela
was also a matter of geopolitical concern: the search for equilibrium
between Latin America and South America. The Alianza Bolivariana
para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA) led by Chávez was distinc-
tively Latin American in that it included member countries from Central
America, the Caribbean, and the Andean region. Argentina did not plan
to join ALBA, but its ideal – the Patria Grande Latinoamericana – was
perceived as another means to counter the South American hegemonic
temptation of Brazil.
In essence, all these views included an anti-Brazilian bias to some
extent. As happened with many other public debates that took place in
Argentina, these were recycled perceptions, residues of readings made
in other periods, in either the recent or the distant past. Kirchner him-
self, with his ambiguities, his statements and policies, and his style of
leadership, did not help to build a more positive view of the role Brazil
could play for Argentina. In a domestic context characterized by a re-
established political legitimacy and a strong economic recovery, he had
at his disposal more bargaining power and international alternatives
than the Argentina of the early 2000s. Heir to the 1970s perspective
that combined admiration and precaution with regard to Brazil, and
bearer of a foundational project aimed at producing a major change
in Argentina (an ‘Argentinazo’) (Kirchner and Di Tella, 2003:250), he
resorted to the strategic option we call ‘light balancing’. Though dif-

ferent from the three typical kinds of balancing – internal, external
(Waltz, 1979), and soft (Pape, 2005) – it includes elements from all of
them. The first type implies the strengthening of the country’s economic
growth while increasing defence expenditures; the second is based on
the development of international alliances in order to counteract the
influence and power of one country; the third employs economic, diplo-
matic, and institutional means to limit the power and undermine or
thwart the unilateral moves of any powerful actor. Since the advent of
democracy, and even more after the 2001–2002 crisis, Argentina had
not increased its defence budget, the purchase of military equipment,
or the number of military personnel in foreign missions – three charac-
teristic features of a hard balancing option. Nor had it tried to establish
a new system of external alliances, to the point that Argentina contin-
ued to remain outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Lastly, Argentina did not intend to implement an obstructionist strat-
egy to the rise of Brazil as an emerging power. But Néstor Kirchner’s
administration did strive to strengthen the domestic economy (a basic
component of internal balancing), to curb Brazil’s growing influence in
South America by establishing closer ties with other countries in the
region (a key element of external balancing), and to continue involving
it in several international arrangements that were vital for the country,
such as non-proliferation regimes (a typical action of soft balancing).
In sum, the Argentine ‘light balancing’ was an economic and defensive
move; it never had as its goal a return to the past period of competi-
tion and rivalry. The intention, as the weaker part in the relation, was
to preserve and expand its own space of national autonomy.
Brazil’s greater relevance
Since 2007, when Cristina Fernández de Kirchner took office, there

has been an interesting change in the direction of a more complex
perception of Brazil. This country came to be seen as an ‘inevitable’
neighbour – mainly from a negative and pessimistic view – or as an
‘indispensable’ partner in a common project – in this case, from a pos-
itive and hopeful perspective (La Nación, 2010). In effect, the idea that
Brazil was crucial and central to Argentina’s foreign policy was accepted
either with resignation and displeasure or with enthusiasm and confi-
dence in a common future, either as an opportunity or as a challenge.
This dual perception was widespread in both public and private cir-
cles, though with different rationales. Furthermore, it was relatively
independent from the evolution of MERCOSUR, which still had the

rhetorical support of the government and was viewed favourably by the
general public (Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales,
2006). Another study, published by this same source in May 2010,
showed that 62% of the population thought that MERCOSUR was the
economic bloc with which Argentina should have the closest ties, while
the European Union was chosen by 14% and the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) by only 7% (Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones
Internacionales, 2010).
For large segments of the political opposition and of the private sector,
Brazil’s increasingly central position was a consequence of its success;
this phenomenon was contrasted with the fact that Argentina’s place
as neighbouring country was less significant, giving rise to a desire for
emulation and sentiments of pain, envy, and even nostalgia for a better
national past. The country that was once ‘inferior’ in human resources
can now explain its recent achievements by the superiority of its leaders
and its institutional and political improvements. In Argentina’s domes-
tic politics, Brazil’s progress was also a point of reference among those
who opposed Kirchnerism. Lula’s and Dilma’s Brazil was perceived as a
‘predictable’, ‘institutionalized’, ‘serious’, and ‘effective’ country, while
the Kirchners’ Argentina was the opposite. This kind of perception was
common in the anti-government media with a clear ideological orien-
tation. At La Nación, for instance, both countries’ images seem to be
reflected in inverted mirrors: Brazil was a leader, while Argentina was
isolated; Brazil improved, Argentina declined; Brazil received interna-
tional recognition, Argentina was irrelevant to the world; Brazil invested
domestically and in the region, Argentina sold an important part of its
assets and denationalized. Brazil’s increasing involvement in Argentine
commercial and productive activities had also contributed to the image
of the former as a model, while renewing perceptions already present in
the 1960s and 1970s on the dangers of an excessive dependence on the
neighbouring country. For instance, the ability and sense of opportunity
of Brazilian entrepreneurs to ‘take advantage’ of the Argentine crisis and
weaknesses by buying several important firms was noted. It was empha-
sized that this process was based on the close and long-established links
between the state and the private sector in Brazil, a situation that was
again contrasted with the oscillating relations between government and
firms in Argentina (La Nación, 2007a, 2007d, 2009, 2012).
Finally, the Argentine academic world has mainly shown a posi-
tive view of Brazil and a hopeful picture of bilateral relations. These
perceptions are present in journals such as the Revista de la SAAP
(published by the Argentine Society of Political Analysis), Relaciones

Internacionales; Archivos del Presente, Agenda Internacional, Politikós, and
PostData, among others (see, for example, De la Balze, 2010; Malamud,
2013; Simonoff, 2013). Simultaneously, this dominant positive view
among scholars is often contrasted with a predominant critical view of
Argentine domestic and foreign policy (Cisneros, 2010).
During Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s first term and the initial part
of her second government, some trends that were already present at
the beginning of the new century were reinforced. The boom of Asian
countries and the high international prices of commodities helped to
reorient and diversify Argentina’s participation in international trade.
At the same time, the quest for new regional equilibrium gave the
foreign policy of Buenos Aires towards South America a higher pro-
file. For example, in order to compensate for close relationships with
Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, there was a gradual improvement of
ties with Colombia and Peru and a strengthening of those with Chile.
There were recurrent tensions between Argentina and Brazil in the com-
mercial and economic spheres (mainly because of trade barriers set by
Argentina) and frequent rapprochements in the political field (in the
face of domestic crises or border conflicts between Latin American coun-
tries, or joint participation in United Nations peace operations such as
the MINUSTAH). Argentina’s protectionism produced tense situations
with Brasilia, but the common perspective of a stable and peaceful South
America prompted the adoption of common, active positions regionally.
It is, then, possible to talk about the deployment of a sort of ‘soft
hedging’ strategy towards Brazil, that is, the typical non-confrontational
option of secondary regional powers in a peripheral area. According to
Kuik Cheng-Chwee and Lee Kong Chian, hedging is a
purposeful act in which a state seeks to insure its long term interests
by placing its policy bets on multiple countering options that are
designed to offset risks embedded in the international system. [. . .] it
is conceived as a multiple-component strategy situated between the
two ends of the balancing-bandwagoning spectrum.
(Cheng-Chwee and Kong Chian, 2008:5)
In the ‘soft’ version we are describing, it is a mixed strategic option,

emphasizing interconnection and collaboration with the other party,
while maintaining some areas in which dissent and differentiation
are possible, with the aim of increasing and improving some power
attributes. The implementation of this strategic option towards Brazil is
seen most clearly in Latin America. Though the foreign policy of Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner during her second term as regards the region had
its own limitations and contradictions, it has been quite close to the so-
called ‘concentric circles’ or ‘multivectorism’ diplomacy (Vlassov, 2008;
Bhadrakumar, 2009; Strakes, 2013; Landsberg, 2014). It focused on the
Southern Cone in the nearest neighbourhood, on South America at the
sub-regional level, and in Latin America as a whole in its widest expres-
sion. MERCOSUR, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR),
and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)
were, in each of these three circles, the main sites for action, and Brazil
had a fundamental but different role in each. In the first, the attempt
was made to commit it to a closer integration (with the idea of strength-
ening the partnership); in the second, the intention was to encourage
and benefit from an organization that Brazil had created but with which,
over time, it had become less concerned (a locus for concert diplomacy
and for its own utilization); and in the third, the CLACS helped to
keep open bridges with the region as a whole, enhancing the Latin
American identity (a place for broad and regional cooperation and,
simultaneously, compensating for the asymmetry with Brazil).
Closing remarks
The general perception of Brazil in Argentina has been changing sig-

nificantly in the last two decades. Once the very long stage of rivalry
was overcome and after Argentina’s return to democracy, a more pos-
itive image of the neighbouring country gradually emerged, and with
it a feeling more akin to friendship. Public opinion and opinion lead-
ers, entrepreneurs and workers, politicians and officials, rightist sectors
and leftist movements, the media and scholars, scientists and young
people: all of them seem to agree on the central role of Brazil for
Argentina’s present and future (Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones
Internacionales, 2010).
However, this convergent perception on the part of so many heteroge-
neous actors is only true up to a point. The content and meaning of the
bilateral relation are a matter of intense discussion, as is Argentina’s role
as a minor partner. The debate centres largely on fundamental objectives
that were not fulfilled, such as the consolidation of a strategic partner-
ship and a thorough integration through MERCOSUR. To this is added
a conspicuous concern in some circles on the evident rift between the
two countries on military matters in favour of Brazil. The debate is also
driven by the big external opportunities emerging for Argentina, both
from its links with many Latin American and some Western countries as
well as from its relations with several emerging and re-emerging nations
of the broad South. At the same time, the new political, economic, and
social problems confronting Brazil in recent times raised questions and
doubts about its condition as a model to be admired and emulated, and
about the sustainability and speed of its rise. This fact coincides with
broad acknowledgment of the new opportunities for economic growth
open to Argentina. These refer to the extraordinary oil and shale gas
reserves found in Vaca Muerta (in the Patagonian province of Neuquén),
its important reserves of lithium, its considerable capacity for the pro-
duction of biofuels, the recovering nuclear industry, and the progress
being made in sectors such as satellite and aerospace craft building,
among others.
In this context, Brazil continues to be seen by Argentine elites as a
central partner, but neither exclusive nor exceptional, and even as less
important than other foreign actors in some areas with great produc-
tive potential in the future. China is not the only alternative to Brazil
as a complementary country. In the last five years, for instance, rela-
tions with Russia have intensified so much that for the first time in
the diplomatic history of both countries (which began in 1885), two
Russian presidents visited Argentina – Medvedev in 2010 and Putin in
2014 – thus broadening the range of bilateral agreements in the trade
and energy areas.
The sum of these factors influences perceptions of Brazil, as a model
and a partner, in what seems to be the beginning of a new phase of
bilateral relations. The idea that integration with Brazil is an inevitable
fate remains, but it is also acknowledged that this integration should
be reformulated. After more than a decade of progressive governments
in both countries, the level and reach of their similar preferences and
convergent interests are not greater than those of their opposite prefer-
ences and divergent interests. Furthermore, both sides are increasingly
tired of repeatedly announced and always failed processes of ‘recovery’
in bilateral relations, of ‘regeneration’ of MERCOSUR, or of ‘strength-
ening’ UNASUR. As things are, there is no place on the Argentine side
for the resurgence of initiatives or policies in favour of ‘balancing’ or
‘bandwagoning’. As we have noted in this chapter, from the 2001–2002
crisis to the present, Argentina has made diverse and ad hoc responses
to cope with the rise of Brazil. There is no indication that a future
government will not follow the same rationale while responding and
adapting to future circumstances. It is to be expected, then, that more
active variants of regionalism, light balancing, and soft hedging will be
observed in Buenos Aires’ foreign policy as regards Brasilia in the short

and medium term, within a scenario in which difficulties in building a
common strategic project are visible and profound.
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5
Brazil: Chile’s Mythical Ally
Joaquín Fermandois
Introduction
Brazil has always occupied an important place in Chile’s foreign affairs.

This was particularly evident in the second half of the 19th century,
a period that left a deep impression in the Chilean state culture and
the nation’s memory. Thereafter a recurrent joke was to characterize
the Chile–Brazil bilateral relation as ‘an unlimited friendship’ (‘amistad
sin límites’; in Spanish, ‘límite’ has the double meaning of ‘limit’ and
‘border’), referring both to an unquestioned friendship and to the fact
that the two countries do not share borders. The expression was pre-
sumably coined by the Brazilian diplomat Baron do Rio Branco (Stuven
and Pamplona, 2009), and throughout the 20th century Chilean diplo-
mats, policy-makers, and public opinion held on to the assumption that
ultimately Brazil was Chile’s friend (Fermandois, 2005; Soto et al., 2012).
In spite of some differences in the first decade of the 21st century,
the bilateral relation remained solid and cordial, with no major fric-
tion. Frequent interpretations suggest that under the governments of
Sebastián Piñera (2010–2014) and the second term of Michelle Bachelet
(since March 2014), bilateral relations have somehow cooled off, mainly
due to Chile’s participation in the Pacific Alliance (PA), arguably per-
ceived in Brazil as a lack of commitment to the region on the part of
Chile. On the contrary, this chapter argues that most recently there has
been a further rapprochement between Chile and Brazil. This does not
equate by any means to bandwagoning. Instead, Chile pursues a diver-
sified and independent foreign policy, of which closeness to Brazil is a
cornerstone.
The chapter unfolds as follows. First, it provides an overview of the
prevailing perceptions of Brazil in Chilean society and challenges some
77
78 Brazil: Chile’s Mythical Ally
commonplaces about Chile’s role and presence in Latin and South

American regional affairs. Second, it assesses the period of the 1990s up
to the arrival of Lula da Silva to power in Brazil. Third, it concentrates
on the first decade of the 21st century and the consequences for Chile of
the regional and global ascendance of Brazil under Lula. Fourth, it anal-
yses bilateral relations during the Piñera years and the second Bachelet
administration. Finally, it draws some conclusions about the historical
and current place of Brazil in Chile’s foreign policy.
Brazil for Chilean society: Distant but attractive
Chileans have always viewed Brazil with spontaneous fondness. The

idea of a pleasant, tropical giant results in a strong, positive prejudice.
There are language barriers to knowledge of the country. The Chilean
public knows Brazil mostly through its music, its football players, its
soap operas, and, more recently, through tourism. In recent times, with
the emergence of a new middle class in both Chile and Brazil, visiting
each other’s country ceased to be an experience reserved only for an
elite. The beaches of Southern Brazil have been visited by thousands
of Chileans in recent years. Conversely, Chile has received an increas-
ing number of Brazilian tourists, and occasionally job-seekers. Latin
American immigrants are a new phenomenon in Chile. It was not only
the rise of Brazil which permitted this, but also the less publicized rise
of Chile.
Chileans have a good impression of Brazil. According to a recent Pew
poll, Chileans are the people who most appreciate Brazil, with 74% of
those asked having a favourable opinion of the country. The average per-
centage of favourable opinions in all the other countries where the poll
was conducted was 54% (La Tercera, 15 June 2014). A 2008 study on pub-
lic opinion showed similar results (Instituto de Estudios Internacionales,
2008). Another important poll, conducted in 2013 and 2014, showed
that for the Chilean public the most admired countries are the US,
Germany, and Brazil (Universidad Católica, 2013, 2014). Experts offer
different explanations for this view, including political, economic, and
cultural aspects. What is remarkable is that this quite favourable opin-
ion has remained constant for many years among the Chilean people,
and Brazil’s rise has not significantly affected this perception.
There is a widespread feel that Chile does not genuinely favour
regional integration (Gamboa, 2011). The fact is, however, that in the
last 25 years Chile became more economically interrelated with the
region than it ever was in the 20th century. Chile continues to depend
Joaquín Fermandois 79
heavily on world markets, like many Latin American countries. This is

why ‘open regionalism’ is more than just a slogan (Gamboa, 2011). But
trade with the region has amounted to a good fifth of Chilean foreign
trade. In a twist of fate, since the 1990s, Chile has become an exporter of
capital. The main receivers were Peru and Argentina. The latter has been
less attractive in the last 15 years, but will never lose its special status for
Chile.
From Chile’s point of view, there has been a practical integration in
the region. Brazil became the biggest destination for Chilean exports in
Latin America, and Chile is the second biggest consumer of Brazilian
products in the region (El Mercurio, 2 February 2012). In 2011, trade
between the two countries amounted to almost US$11 billion (Banco
Central de Chile, 2011). By 2014, Chilean businesses had invested up
to US$25 billion in Brazil (Dirección General de Relaciones Económicas
Internacionales, 2015). However, Brazilian investment in Chile has not
been so significant (López and Muñoz, 2008). Brazilian firms have a lot
of other places to go. Distance, a small market, high energy prices, and
a restrictive labour code may constitute a barrier (El Mercurio, 18 July
2013). The chairman of Chile’s most powerful business association,
Hermann von Mühlenbrock, maintained that Chile’s Pacific strategy
and its membership of the PA were not in opposition to Brazil (El
Mercurio, 5 December 2013). The Chilean business community does not
think that the PA is a problem for the maintenance of good relations
with Brazil. An interesting question for both Chile and Brazil regarding
the PA is not so much about the potential competition with the Com-
mon Market of the South (MERCOSUR) as about the salient role that
Mexico plays in the new alliance.
Limited convergence in the 1990s up to the Lula

administration
The momentous years of the early 1990s on the world stage, with the
triumph of democracy and the open economy, were replicated in the
Southern Cone. As Fernando Collor de Melo began his ill-fated pres-
idency in Brazil, he pursued economic liberalization and democratic
consolidation. At the same time, the return of Chile to democracy in
1990 did not alter the country’s preference for the open economy and
free trade established in the Pinochet years. However, differences existed
too. When George H. W. Bush launched the Enterprise for the Americas
initiative, to conclude a free trade agreement ‘from Alaska to Tierra del
Fuego’, Chile was enthusiastic; Brazil much less so. Brasilia viewed the
issue with suspicion and insisted that the only negotiation possible was
one between the whole of Latin America and the US. Thus, Brazil’s
weight would be a decisive factor. Brasilia discreetly showed its discon-
tent at the eagerness of the Chileans to negotiate a free trade agreement
with the US (Garrido and Álamos, 1992).
In Chile, in the second half of the 1980s, different social and politi-
cal forces reached a consensus that embraced the Western model as the
paradigm to follow. This model included a market economy and open-
ness to the world. Chile became the most vocal advocate for free trade in
Latin America. This position did not directly oppose Brazilian economic
policy, and Brasilia did not consider it necessary to confront the Chilean
strategy. However, Brasilia acted to make sure that the Free Trade Area
of the Americas (the FTAA) that followed Bush’s embryonic proposal did
not succeed. The Brazilian position, with an explicit reference to Chile,
was stated by Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Lafer while visiting the
Chilean President Lagos in 2001 (El Mercurio, 25 February 2001). Protec-
tion of its industrial sector was still a priority for Brazil’s policy, while as
early as the 1970s Chile had already sacrificed a much smaller industrial
sector in favour of a trade vocation. In any event, the US did not show
any rush to conclude the FTAA, as the White House could not overcome
the opposition or indifference of Congress to the initiative. The Chilean
and Brazilian approaches to international trade policy differed in some
important matters, but during the 1990s no significant friction arose in
the relations between the two countries.
At the same time, Chile stressed that one of its main goals was ori-
entation to and integration with Latin America, ‘our neighborhood in
the universal city’, as President Eduardo Frei said (El Mercurio, 18 May
1994). Referring to the upcoming association with MERCOSUR, Frei
affirmed that the importance was not in customs or tariffs integra-
tion, but in physical connection, investment, and services (La Época,
5 August 1995). He was alluding to the fact that Chile was joining
MERCOSUR only as an associate member, meaning that Chile would
join on the political front, but would keep its own trade and tariff
policies.
This compromise agreement was satisfactory to all parties as the result
of two factors. First, in Latin America, democracy and the market econ-
omy (although with some important nuances) were the motto of the
day. From Mexico to Argentina, including Collor de Mello’s Brazil, coun-
tries of the region introduced drastic reforms in this direction. The
Chilean case, warmly applauded by many and bitterly criticized by
others, was not so rare, and after all, Chilean international economic
policy did not depart dramatically from the mainstream. Second, when
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a former advocate of dependency theory,
came to power, he quickly accepted globalization and the market econ-
omy. Cardoso built a majority consensus for liberalizing reforms, and in
the official discourse he praised the validity of the Chilean model: ‘Chile
is an example for Latin American societies. Chile shows with vigor that
democracy and economic freedom can bring the transformations that
Latin American societies have long needed’ (El Mercurio, 3 March 1995).
These words well reflect the Zeitgeist.
On the South American scene, Cardoso became an alter ego of Chile’s
President Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006). Even though Lagos’s tenure had
to face troubles with the first tremors of the ‘Chilean model’ after
the ‘Asian crisis’ of 1997–1998, which halted Chile’s vigorous pace of
economic growth, there was still a sense that Chile was on the right
path, that it still could be considered a model. Lagos sustained a for-
eign policy which was relatively convergent with that of Cardoso, or, at
least, Brazil did not consider it detrimental to its own soft-style leader-
ship. Both presidents supported the policy of ‘open regionalism’ – a way
to retain a Chilean-style strategy of openness to world markets while
trying to interact fully with Latin American partners (Van Klaveren,
1997).
This is among the reasons why Chile was able to sign a free trade
agreement with the US and another with the European Union in
2003 without much displeasure in Brazil. Nevertheless, Brasilia was not
entirely happy about these developments. Brazil did not see them as a
direct threat but, rather, as a potential threat to MERCOSUR, and halted
the negotiations for incorporating Chile into the economic mechanism
of MERCOSUR (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, 2006).
Chile had also sought an association with Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-
eration (APEC) since 1994, as a tool of economic integration with other
open economies, with the explicit approval of Washington. The weight
of the Chilean trade with Asia demanded such a step.
At the end of the 20th century, Chile and Brazil had quite good rela-
tions, although with some differences. Two political factors combined
in favour of a further rapprochement between Santiago and Brasilia.
The first was opposition to the war in Iraq on the international front.
Chile, as a UN Security Council non-permanent member, opposed the
American war in Iraq in 2003. Brazil adopted a similar line in this area.
The second factor has to do with evolutions in the Latin American polit-
ical scenario. Both Chile and Brazil saw with suspicion and distrust the
surge of the so-called neo-populism, a phenomenon that spread across
Latin America at the beginning of the new millennium, often favouring

strongly ideological postures over pragmatic positions.
Brazil as a BRICS country and a new era in Latin American

politics
The rise of Brazil did not begin in the year 2000; it has been a long-
term process. However, after the ‘unipolar moment’ (Krauthammer,
1990) of the 1990s, a significant growth of the so-called periphery took
place. After decades of growth in China, the recovery of Russia under
Putin, and the emergence of India, Brazil came next as the new wonder
on the global stage. This new context had an impact on Chile–Brazil
relations too.
Chile assumed that Brazil was a trustworthy regional power, but
Brasilia did not always and invariably feel the same way towards
Santiago. Not to confront Brazil has been almost a dogma in Chilean
foreign policy. Even Allende in the 1970s tried to coexist with the mil-
itantly anti-Marxist Brazilian military regime. Only in very recent years
have there been misgivings in Brazil towards Chile, or, at least, they
have become more public. This has partly to do with the emergence of
‘neo-populism’ in Latin America (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012)
and the different responses of Brazil and Chile. Most of all, the changing
role of Brazil in the region and globally had an impact on relations with
Santiago. Either because of the US retreat as leader or hegemonic centre,
or because of the growth of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China),
Brazil followed a path in world politics that apparently left the Latin
American region behind (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006).
In the regional theatre, Brazilian leadership somewhat paled in front
of the aggressive positioning of Chávez’s Venezuela. The Venezuelan
leader set the more visible agenda in the region, even if this referred
mainly to a colourful rhetoric with direct consequences mostly for the
Venezuelan people only. Brazil continued to influence regional poli-
tics in the discreet way it had always done, but, at the same time, it
developed a new sort of Weltpolitik. In this respect, the arrival of Lula
da Silva to the presidency was a defining moment. At the outset of his
government, the relations between Chile and Brazil did not show any
alteration, even though the close friendship that characterized the time
of Cardoso and Lagos could not be reproduced. The same was later true
of the relations between Lula and Michelle Bachelet.
Overall, the long-standing Chilean diplomatic closeness to Brazil
continued. Chile has consistently supported the Brazilian quest for a
permanent seat at the UN Security Council; Brazil has often supported

Chilean positions and candidatures internationally. In 2005, Brazil sup-
ported the Chilean politician José Miguel Insulza’s successful bid to
become secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS).
Especially in the second half of the first decade of the 2000s, ‘Chile
and Brazil are friends, but they do not see each other too frequently’,
wittily remarked former Brazilian diplomat Jose Botafogo (El Mercurio,
30 November 2006). The former Brazilian foreign minister of that time,
Celso Amorin, maintained that Chile and Brazil were relatively closer
officially in their common attempt to exert moderation on the South
American scene (El Mercurio, 25 March 2006). This referred to the
containment of the more radical and neo-populist regimes, although
Brasilia and Santiago adopted different tactics. Brazil preferred not to
confront these regimes directly, while Chile adopted a more critical
stance. As former under-secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Chile and
ambassador to Brazil between 2012 and 2014, Fernando Schmidt, noted,
in public policies and domestic politics, Brazil’s strategy was closer to
Chile’s than to that of Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra
América (ALBA) (El Mercurio, 25 March 2006).
Brazil’s new status in world politics did not prevent it from caring
for its position in the region (Fermandois, 2005). In its Latin American
policy, Brazil supported the creation of the Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR), where its own influence would be still more visi-
ble. Later on, Brazil accepted the creation in 2011 of the Community of
Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which includes Mexico,
Central America, and the Caribbean, in spite of some rivalry with
Mexico over influence in the region. Chile, for its part, joined both
organizations, as they did not imply any change to its global trading
policy or any specific economic commitment. On the political plane,
CELAC reinforced the traditional Chilean preference for Latin rather
than South American integration, while at the same time Santiago found
in UNASUR an interesting forum for discussion of security, education,
health, and infrastructure development.
The Piñera years and the new Bachelet: Limited change and
real change
After 20 years of centre-left governments, in 2010 the centre-right can-

didate, Sebastián Piñera, won the presidential election in Chile. Many
observers saw this as a sea change. It was, but not in the sense envisaged.
It is better to see a continuity from 1990 through the Piñera years. The
government was successful in the reconstruction of the areas ravaged by

the 2010 earthquake and tsunami, the creation of jobs, and managing an
unabated economic growth. To be sure, the good results were not very
impressive if seen in the long run, from the 1980s on. Nevertheless, on
the international scene, Chile was regarded as an exemplary economy.
In domestic politics, good management did not entail having a politi-
cal strategy, which the Piñera administration sorely lacked. In 2011, a
wave of protests erupted, mainly from students, trying to demonstrate
the inequality in income distribution and the lack of success in educa-
tion compared with economic growth, a reality that resulted from the
last 25 years, not only from the Piñera years.
The political crisis of the government precipitated a disastrous defeat
for the centre-right in the 2013 presidential and congressional elections.
Michelle Bachelet was again elected president, this time supported by
a more left-leaning coalition, which envisaged deep changes, perhaps
touching the ‘Chilean model’ of global free trader. Foreign policy was
no issue in the campaign or in the whole political crisis. But some
politicians of the winning coalition criticized the economic interna-
tional orientation of the country, specifically pointing to the weakened
relations with Brazil and MERCOSUR.
Chile’s troubles in foreign policy are mostly linked to its relations with
the neighbouring countries. This is difficult to grasp for many foreign
observers and scholars. Chile is perhaps the Latin American country that
has had most trouble with its neighbours in a continent where interna-
tional wars have not played the same outstanding role as in European
history. Chile is an exception because of an almost total war in the 19th
century with Peru and Bolivia, but this conflagration was not the only
one in the region; for Chile, in this sense, the past has a mightier weight.
In international affairs, the past often returns, one of the reasons why
Brazil has played a role as a sort of last refuge – a mythical ally. The
1990s witnessed a rather peaceful situation regarding the neighbours.
But problems resurged in the 2000s, and have required close attention
from the Chilean political and foreign policy establishments up to the
present. Cooperation with Argentina was not as easy as it appeared in
the 1990s. Peru brought a case against Chile before the International
Court of Justice at The Hague regarding maritime delimitation between
the two countries, a case on which the tribunal pronounced its verdict in
January 2014, with mixed results. Bolivia has recently presented a case
before the same court in order to force Chile to negotiate with Bolivia
the cession of territory on the Pacific coast (Bolivia became a land-
locked country after its defeat in the war against Chile between 1879
and 1883). All these historical questions have soured Chilean relations
in the region. This has occurred despite Chile participating actively in
all regional forums and being economically more interrelated with the
region than ever before.
The Piñera government, despite the maritime controversy, enthusias-
tically adopted Peru’s idea – already halfheartedly accepted by Bachelet –
of establishing the PA (Alianza del Pacífico in Spanish) with the aim
of economic integration and with some political content. Mexico and
Colombia joined the initiative, as they have a similar approach to
international trade. The whole initiative had an unmistakable smell of
competition with MERCOSUR. Commentators remarked that Mexico
would like to compete with Brazil for leadership in the region, even
though the North American country does not have much experience in
this regard, at least not in comparison with Brazil’s former standing in
South America. The Piñera administration was perhaps over-enthusiastic
about this trend, but in a way the PA was very convenient for the
country, helping Chile to improve its relations with Peru. The poten-
tial rivalry between the PA, with a Pacific strategy, and MERCOSUR,
rather more inland- and Atlantic-oriented, became more a political than
an economic issue, and has potential consequences for Chile’s foreign
relations, especially with Brazil.
During her first term, Dilma Roussef did not pay a state visit to Chile,
which was seen as a political gesture of displeasure, although it is more
probable that it was a question of her administration’s relative lack of
interest in foreign issues. As the PA received more attention from the
media, the stress on the supposed competition with MERCOSUR also
grew. Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota said in an interview
with a Chilean newspaper that the PA and MERCOSUR were different
‘scenarios of insertion’. ‘For us, it is Chile’s commitment to UNASUR
that is fundamental’ (Patriota interviewed in Avetikian, 2014). This
is consistent with the views expressed by the then defence minister
in Brasilia, Celso Amorim: ‘Chile has all its openness to the Pacific,
which is very important, has privileged relations with [South] Korea
and other countries. But the more Chile feels itself as South American,
the more it will help us in the [regional] integration’ (El Mercurio,
31 March 2012). In 2013, Dilma Roussef, in many ways a counter-
part to Michelle Bachelet, visited Peru, but did not visit Chile. The
Peruvian president, Ollanta Humala, is a former nationalist close to
the Chávez vein, but later, under the influence of Lula’s PT (Partido
dos Trablhadores), he has taken a more moderate course. So there was
a direct link between Brazil and Peru despite the PA, even as Humala
pursued the program with no less enthusiasm than Piñera (Avetikian,

2013).
The subject arose in Chilean politics, where politicians of the centre-
left coalition accused the Piñera administration of ignoring regional
relations, especially considering the Peruvian case before the Inter-
national Court. Luis Maira, a Chilean socialist politician and former
ambassador, stated:
Chile had two historical allies in Latin America: Brazil and Ecuador.
Today they are not with us. Brazil keeps a big distance. Lula has
recently published in the newspaper El País that with the return of
Bachelet he hopes that Chile would regain its active presence in Latin
America. Ecuador did not stay with us in any point of the Peruvian
demand.
(El Mercurio, 1 February 2014)
As an appendix, the centre-left, now called the New Majority,

expressed its dislike for the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), a pet
project of the Obama administration, which Piñera had enthusiastically
endorsed.
This was expressed in part because of some ideological views shared
with the MERCOSUR countries; in part it was an articulation of oppo-
sition to the Piñera administration, which faltered in political appeal
despite reasonable performance in managing government tasks. But,
once elected for the second time, Bachelet, though maintaining the
tenet of changing the orientation of the country with constant refer-
ence to Brazil, became more careful and somewhat more nuanced in her
objectives. The new foreign minister, Heraldo Muñoz, an academic and
diplomat with a vast experience on the international scene, stressed that
the orientation towards the PA would continue, but limiting its politi-
cal content in order not to build a rival bloc to MERCOSUR. It would
remain a means for economic integration and for ‘facilitating the pro-
jection to the Asia-Pacific region as the future’s challenge’. Furthermore,
relations with MERCOSUR would not consist of ‘fusion’, but of dialogue
(La Tercera, 31 May 2014). As a further confirmation of this inclusive atti-
tude, the Chilean government invited the foreign minister of Argentina
and Brazil to a meeting of businessmen and entrepreneurs of APEC,
because ‘it is not in the interest of Chile that the region should be
divided between Pacific and Atlantic’ (La Segunda, 6 May 2014).
Once re-elected for her second, non-consecutive term, President
Bachelet put forward several messages signalling the new orientation.
Attending the inauguration of the football World Cup in Brazil in
2014, she spoke of ‘refuelling’ bilateral relations, ‘reactivating’ dialogue

mechanisms and defining a strategic alliance with Brazil (El Mercurio,
13 June 2014). Foreign Minister Muñoz, referring to the idea of redefin-
ing Chile’s commitment to the PA as non-exclusive of close relations
with the rest of Latin America, MERCOSUR, and Brazil, went as far as
suggesting that the PA could be for Chile even a tool ‘for cooperation
with the Atlantic, with MERCOSUR’ (El Mercurio, 13 June 2014). This
view was reinforced by the idea of ‘pragmatism’ in being closer to Brazil,
as announced by the new ambassador in Brasilia, Jaime Gazmuri. He
asserted that the ‘political relation with Brazil is based on common inter-
ests and common views on many regional issues and on multilateral
ones too’ (El Mercurio, 12 June 2014).
However, some observed that this reorientation and the recent rap-
prochement between Chile and Brazil could be read as a Brazilian
attempt to weaken the PA project to reassert its own centrality in
South America. The Chilean ambassador to Mexico was quite explicit
in this regard, saying that ‘we would be blind if we were closed to the
fact that Brazil is a power’ (El Mercurio, 30 May 2014). In Chile, the
high-level debate on domestic reforms has hidden the international
agenda, even as the partisans of the PA fear the direction taken by
the new government (El Mercurio, 2 June 2014). For Chile, trade and
investment relations with MERCOSUR as a whole have been difficult.
The PA addresses the problem of practical integration, is a bid for the
improvement of relations with Peru, and may result in a trade bloc
potentially more successful than MERCOSUR itself, which is precisely
what Brazil fears. Yet, Mexico has not historically shown an interest in
South America, and the relation between the PA members is still fragile,
depending also on the political will to sustain long-term policies, which
is not precisely a Latin American virtue. In the meantime, the narrow
victory of Rousseff in the 2014 elections may help reinforce somewhat
the Chilean choice of rapprochement to both Brazil and MERCOSUR:
the losing candidate, Neves, was quite critical of MERCOSUR, and many
voices in Brazil praised the PA (El Mercurio, 22 September 2014). Should
those voices prevail, they may inadvertently push Chile to distance itself
from South America in favour of an even stronger projection towards the
Pacific Rim.
Conclusion
Chile’s relations with Brazil have been scarcely affected by the rise of the
latter, because they have always been central to Santiago’s foreign policy,
even if this is not matched by Brazil’s interest in Chile. Chile has always
considered itself an ally of Brazil and has never taken a course that col-
lides with Brasilia’s strategic preferences. Brazil can be a sort of arbiter or
broker in some conditions (as when ‘pardoning’ Chile for advancing the
PA), and a supporter of last resort in the case of difficulties on the South
American scene. But for Chilean diplomacy the ties with Brazil are as
important as the relations with other key partners, be they other neigh-
bouring countries, the US, or increasingly the emerging Asian countries.
There is no straightforward bandwagoning.
With the (relatively) waning presence of the US and the concomi-
tant emergence of China – a vital market for both the Chilean and the
Brazilian economy – Chile’s leaning towards Brazil is likely to increase
rather than diminish. But Santiago will try to simultaneously develop
more links with the world’s main economies and international orga-
nizations as an insurance policy, and consistently with its traditional
vocation as a global trader. Still, the place of Brazil in the Chilean percep-
tion has deep historical roots, and a solid basis in more recent experience
too. Brazil plays a moderating role in the region; it also plays a grow-
ing role in trade and investment for the Chilean economy, the real
novelty in the relation. The recent decided rapprochement is more a
government-oriented policy than one originating from Chilean struc-
tural domestic factors, even though the Chilean business community
is more enthusiastic than ever, and the favourable orientation towards
Brazil is deep-seated in the credo of the majority of the political class.
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6
Brazil as a Global Stakeholder:
A View from Uruguay
Carlos Luján
Introduction
In 2011, the president of Uruguay, José Mujica, declared that ‘Uruguay

should seize the opportunity of Brazil’s growth letting it lead the way’
(El Observador, 4 January 2006:6). The statement is a perfect reflection
of Uruguay’s policy towards Brazil in the last ten years. This chapter
focuses on the relations between Uruguay and Brazil during both Frente
Amplio’s administrations: Tabaré Vázquez’s presidency from 2005 to
2009; and José Mujica’s from 2010 to 2014. Priority is given to the
last, as it epitomizes key and lasting trends and debates. There are few
academic studies about this subject (Ferro and Fernández Luzuriaga,
2004; Ferro, Fernández Luzuriaga and Hernández, 2006; Bizzozero, 2009,
2011, 2012; Caetano and Luján, 2013; Clemente and Hernández, 2013)
so this chapter is an original contribution in terms of both content
and argument. Furthermore, this chapter offers an additional method-
ological novelty by using a very comprehensive survey (López Burian,
2015) conducted across the Uruguayan political spectrum in order to
dissect and assess key issues in Uruguay’s foreign policy, and more specif-
ically its bilateral relations with Brazil. This chapter maintains that
the ascendance of Brazil to global stakeholder status in the 21st cen-
tury together with the centrality of the regional integration processes –
highly valued by successive Uruguayan leftist governments for strategic
development – explains the efforts towards a strong bilateral alliance
made by Montevideo in the last ten years.
The analysis of Uruguay’s foreign policy is centred in the perceptions,
beliefs, and positions taken by main Uruguayan politicians (members
of the executive and members of parliament from both the majority
90
Carlos Luján 91
coalition and the opposition parties). The opinions of current legislators

are differentiated according to the political party they belong to. This
analysis reveals, on the one hand, the consensus within the Frente
Amplio (left alliance in the government since 2005) regarding the high
relevance of Brazil as a regional and global stakeholder. On the other
hand, that agreement is not always present among politicians of the so-
called ‘historical parties’ or ‘traditional parties’ (Partido Colorado and
Partido Nacional) or within the Partido Independiente.
From the methodological point of view, in addition to the limited
secondary material available, the study is based on two main sources.
The first is a survey conducted among 125 legislators, that is, 96%
of coverage within the Uruguayan parliament (97% of senators and
95% of deputies) in 20131 (López Burian, 2015). Tables 4–12 in the
appendix use data from this survey. The second is media information
from all major national daily and weekly newspapers published dur-
ing the Mujica administration (2010–2014); for the sake of clarity, the
references are in the core text but not reported in the bibliography, in
order to avoid confusion, as several issues were used. More specifically,
the next section, on Uruguayan public opinion about Brazil and the
region, is based on the results of a telephone survey conducted by the
consulting company CIFRA with 1,013 Uruguayans older than 18 years
between 13 and 23 March 2014 and published in the weekly Busqueda
in May 2014 (Busqueda, 2014). Tables 1–3 in the appendix are based on
data from this source.
Public opinion about the region and Brazil’s positioning
According to available public opinion data, more than two out of

five Uruguayans consider Brazil to be Uruguay’s main friend in the
region (Table 6.1). This relative majority becomes absolute among left-
wing citizens and surpasses two fifths of respondents among citizens
of all political parties. Argentina comes in a distant second place, with
15% of respondents. Venezuela appears in third position, with strong
support among left-wing Uruguayans. Finally, almost one out of ten
Uruguayans, mainly among centre and right-wing citizens, does not
consider any of the countries in the region as a friend.
When Uruguayans were asked about the country in the region they
consider the ‘least friendly’ to Uruguay, three out of five mentioned
Argentina, with figures decreasing a little among left-wing citizens.
It should be noted that there are almost no other countries considered
‘least friendly’ (Table 6.2).
92 Brazil as Global Stakeholder: A View from Uruguay
Table 6.1 Uruguayans’ opinions on Uruguay’s main friend (%)
Left Centre Right All interviewees
Brazil 45 43 42 42
Argentina 18 13 16 15
Venezuela 12 8 5 8
Chile 4 3 4 3
Paraguay 3 3 4 3
None 5 10 10 9
No answer 13 20 19 20
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Public opinion poll, Consultora CIFRA, April 2014.
Table 6.2 Uruguayans’ opinions on the least friendly country (%)
Left Centre Right All interviewees
Venezuela 2 2 3 2
Brazil 2 2 3 2
Colombia 4 2 – 2
Others 7 5 6 6
None 7 3 4 5
No answer 22 18 20 22
Total 100 100 100 100
Table 6.3 shows Uruguayans’ opinions regarding the South American

country they would choose to live in if they had to leave Uruguay.
Almost two out of five Uruguayans chose Brazil; this proportion is
reduced to one third among the least educated, and it is over two fifths
among those who have university or tertiary studies. The second coun-
try in the list is Chile (chosen by a sixth of respondents, and especially
popular among the most educated), and the third country is Argentina,
the traditional destination of Uruguayan migrants (currently selected
only by one out of eight Uruguayans, regardless of their educational
level). One fifth of respondents stated that they would not like to live in
any South American country; this rejection reaches its peak among the
least educated.
Results from the three tables show that Brazil is the country best posi-
tioned among Uruguayans, regardless of their ideology or educational
Carlos Luján 93
Table 6.3 Uruguayans’ opinions regarding the South American country they
would choose to live in if they had to leave Uruguay (%)
Primary Secondary Tertiary All interviewees

education education education
Brazil 32 41 41 38
Chile 6 19 29 17
Others 3 4 4 4
None 30 17 19 19
No answer 17 8 10 10
Total 100 100 100 100
level; it is considered the ‘most popular friend’ in the region, it is not

perceived as the ‘least friendly’ country, and it is the region’s favourite
destination to live in. Overall, this means that the perception of Brazil
of the Uruguayan public is quite positive and indicates a favourable
predisposition towards Brazil’s role and position in the region.
Governmental strategy towards Brazil and positioning of the

opposition
The Uruguayan rapprochement strategy with Brazil is well summarized

in the statement by the Uruguayan president José Mujica (2010–2015)
in the opening line of this chapter. This ‘trip’ through the international
system together with Brazil generates the first question: has the swing-
ing movement between Argentina and Brazil finished, and is Uruguay
currently prioritizing Brazil, recognized as a definite regional leader and
emergent global stakeholder?
Since the beginning of Mujica’s administration, several governmental
stakeholders have shown a clear pro-Brazil position:
Great importance has been given to UNASUR. In fact, one of the top-
ics for discussion with President Lula was UNASUR and the Brazilian
leadership. A leadership we naturally recognize and that we propose
as a political ambition. This is to say that we want Brazil to have that
leadership. In our opinion, its willingness to lead has not been as
clear in the region as it has been shown at a global level.
(Danilo Astori, vice-president, Frente Amplio,
Brecha, 9 April 2010:8)
The relationship with Brazil, beyond specific problems, is irreplace-

able and considered a priority: there is a strong interconnection that
cannot be ignored.
(Minister of Foreign Affairs Luis Almagro, Frente Amplio,
La Diaria, 8 March 2010:5)
For President Jose Mujica, rapprochement with Brazil is an opportunity

for the opening of markets for Uruguay:
Brazil would be about to start an important negotiation, a commer-

cial agreement with the European Economic Community. We want
to know about it and we want to participate. Indeed, what we need
is a greater market opening at a global level, but we do not want to
leave behind what we already have since it would be a major tactical
mistake.
(President Jose Mujica, El País,
7 April 2012:A7)
The opposition has criticized Uruguay’s approach to Brazil, as some

spokespersons have stated:
The worst thing that can happen to a country is to get aligned. Riding
on Brazil’s back means not having control over the path to follow and
risking crashing against a tree.
(Senator Jorge Abreu, Partido Nacional, Últimas
Noticias, 7 May 2010:6)
Brazil should be a reference point but that does not mean that we
have to agree on everything. I believe we are heading towards a ‘cis-
platinized’ [that is, prone to Brazilian interests and positions] foreign
policy.
(Senator Ope Pasquet, Partido Colorado, Últimas
This huge bet on Brazil leaves us at risk. It was a mistake we made in

the years before the crisis. We should try to be competitive in the rest
of the world.
(MP Iván Posada, Partido Independiente, Últimas
The repositioning in relation to the region, and in particular to Brazil,

has been seen by some opposition stakeholders as an undesirable
Carlos Luján 95
rupture of the state’s foreign policy followed by successive democratic

governments prior to the Frente Amplio’s victory in 2005. Therefore,
the Frente Amplio is accused of ‘ideologizing’ this public policy ‘arena’:
It was difficult to make it worse. In short time, the foreign policy was
destroyed, starting from a wrong conception that is the ideological
affinity with the region.
(Senator Pedro Bordaberry, Partido Colorado, Últimas
Noticias, 14 November 2011:5)
Regarding international relations, former President Sanguinetti, as well

as Pablo Mieres (leader of the Partido Independiente), has shown greater
interest in the US and countries on the Pacific.
Our way should be with the United States, China, Chile, Colombia,
Peru and Brazil. They are the big markets we have to approach.
(Julio Maria Sanguinetti, Partido Colorado, El
Observador, 24 May 2012:12)
We have to go out to the world. It is not necessary to leave the
MERCOSUR. We have to join the Pacific Alliance as a full member
and open all doors. Uruguay needs to have an aggressive policy to
join the global world. Relations with Argentina could not be worse,
with Brazil they are just fine, we cannot end up on Brazil’s back as
suggested by Mujica.
(Pablo Mieres, Partido Independiente, Brecha,
25 April 2014:6)
Within the opposition parties, most positions are favourable towards

the US and the PA. Conversely, in the governing party, there are several
positions regarding this issue. On the one hand, some groups are in
favour of full incorporation into the PA, without being aligned with the
US – which is a similar position to the one assumed by Chilean President
Michelle Bachelet. On the other hand, this pro-PA position contradicts
the presidency pro-secretary, the president’s right hand, who stated at
the Christian Business Leaders Association Seminar the new relationship
with Brazil:
We are on the Atlantic Ocean. How are we going to generate advan-

tages for Uruguay in the future if it is not within our geo-political
reality? The idea is to go with Brazil to show that integration is pos-
sible while discussing the possibility of Mercosur having a strategic
vision. We have to take part in the history of the Atlantic, with

Europe, although it is going through very difficult times, and also
with the Atlantic coast in Africa which has rapidly grown over the
last decade.
(Diego Cánepa, Búsqueda, 24 May 2012:9)
In sum: all Uruguayan political actors agree on the strategic importance

of the relationship with Brazil. However, centre and right leaders view
the US as a model, while leaders on the left have adopted two dif-
ferent positions: some of them are favourable to the strengthening of
the region and to Brazilian leadership within it; others look forward to
a deeper equilibrium in the relationships Uruguay develops with the
region and the rest of the world (the US included).
The MPs’ opinions on Brazil
Over the last decade, there has been a major change in the quality and
intensity of relations between Brazil and Uruguay. On the one hand,
in the political dimension, the interaction between ‘presidential cen-
tres’ has increased, bonds between both foreign ministries have become
stronger, and military cooperation has grown bilaterally and also at
a regional level (within the South American Defence Council of the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)). In addition, both coun-
tries have agreed to defend democracy at UNASUR and the Organization
of American States (OAS). On the other hand, regarding the economic-
commercial dimension, since the beginning of the 21st century, Brazil
has been the main destination of Uruguay’s goods exports in 11 of
the 13 years considered. Furthermore, Brazil’s investments in Uruguay
have grown, while trade flows and Brazilian tourism to Uruguay have
increased too, in contrast with Argentina’s, which has decreased over
the last five years.
Regarding culture, Uruguayan MPs’ opinions showed that they have
changed their position to a positive view regarding Brazil’s role in the
region and in the world. As well as economic data, this chapter presents
the view of the Uruguayan parliamentarian elite regarding the evolution
of relations between Uruguay and Brazil, considering that the assess-
ment of the Frente Amplio administration’s performance on foreign
affairs is a judgment on whether there has been a change in Uruguayan
foreign policy compared with past years and, at the same time, the
extent to which this policy is a state policy. Data show that two out of
three legislators consider the relationship between Uruguay and Brazil to
Carlos Luján 97
Table 6.4 MPs’ opinions on the past and future Uruguayan relations with
Argentina and Brazil
Argentina Brazil
Ten years ago In ten years Ten years ago In ten years
No. % No. % No. % No. %
All parties
Better 38 30.4 72 57.6 79 63.2 77 61.6
The same 20 16.0 23 18.4 41 32.8 28 22.4
Worse 64 51.2 3 2.4 3 2.4
No answer 3 2.4 27 21.6 2 1.6 20 16.0
Total 125 100 125 100 125 100 125 100
Frente Amplio
Better 34 51.5 40 60.6 62 93.9 43 65.2
The same 12 18.2 13 19.7 4 6.1 13 19.7
Worse 19 28.8
No answer 1 1.5 13 19.7 10 15.2
Total 66 100 66 100 66 100 66 100
Partido Nacional
Better 3 8.3 20 55.6 12 33.3 19 52.8
The same 5 13.9 6 16.7 20 55.6 11 30.6
Worse 27 75 1 2.8 3 8.3
No answer 1 2.8 9 25.0 1 2.8 6 16.7
Total 36 100 36 100 36 100 36 100
Partido Colorado
Better 1 4.8 11 52.4 5 23.8 13 61.9
The same 3 14.3 4 19.0 15 71.4 4 19.0
Worse 16 76.2 2 9.5
No answer 1 4.8 4 19 1 4.8 4 19.0
Total 21 100 21 100 21 100 21 100
Partido Independiente
Better 1 50.0 2 100
The same 2 100
Worse 2 100
No answer 1 50.0
Total 2 100 2 100 2 100 2 100
Source: Survey of MPs conducted in the second semester of 2013.
be better now than ten years ago, and the absolute majority consider the
relationship with Argentina to have worsened in this period (Table 6.4).
For the future, there is an optimistic view regarding relations with
both countries in ten years’ time: around three out of five legislators
foresee an improvement in relations with Brazil, and nearly three out
of five legislators believe that the relationship with Argentina will

improve. It can be said that the parliamentary elite expect relations
with Argentina to return to their normal status, and at the same time,
to maintain or increase the progress made with Brazil in these last two
decades.
The analysis shows significant differences among members of dif-
ferent parties. Most of the governing party members, nine out of ten
MPs, are convinced that relations with Brazil have improved in the last
decade. Regarding the evolution of the relationship with Argentina, they
seem to be divided into two categories. Within the opposition party,
legislators from the Partido Blanco and Colorado tend to believe that
the relationship with Argentina has clearly worsened compared with
the situation ten years ago. More than half of the Partido Blanco MPs
and seven out of ten of the Colorado Party maintained that the rela-
tionship with Brazil is just as it used to be at that time. Besides, a little
over half of legislators from traditional parties foresee a better relation-
ship with Argentina and Brazil within a decade. Both legislators from
Partido Independiente have a critical vision of past relations with both
countries, are slightly optimistic regarding the future of relations with
Argentina, and are more positive regarding Uruguayan relations with
Brazil.
The strengthening of bilateral relations and the strategic

alliance with Brazil
Uruguayan political and economic elites consider Brazil’s leadership

to be an opportunity and not a threat. In the case of leftist politi-
cal elites, which are currently governing, Brazil’s regional leadership
(particularly in South America) is key to the strengthening of the inte-
gration process, through which Brazil can be projected as a global
actor. However, in the case of politicians from traditional parties, and a
considerable percentage of Uruguayan businessmen, the importance of
Brazil transcends the region, since it implies a ‘bridge’ with developed
countries.
This position regarding Brazil should be analysed in comparison with
positions regarding Argentina, Uruguay’s other neighbour. Uruguayan
legislators show significant differences regarding the strengthening of
bilateral relations with Argentina and Brazil; the opinion is overwhelm-
ingly favourable in the case of Brazil (85.6%), while in the case of
Argentina, just over half of parliamentarians from all parties are in
Carlos Luján 99
Table 6.5 MPs’ support for the strengthening of Uruguayan bilateral relations
with Argentina or Brazil
Argentina Brazil
No. % No. %
All parties
Yes 73 58.4 107 85.6
No 49 39.2 14 11.2
No answer 3 2.4 4 3.2
Total 125 100 125 100
Frente Amplio
Yes 39 59.1 56 84.8
No 26 39.4 9 13.6
No answer 1 1.5 1 1.5
Total 66 100 66 100
Partido Nacional
Yes 26 72.2 32 88.9
No 9 25.0 3 8.3
No answer 1 2.8 1 2.8
Total 36 100 36 100
Partido Colorado
Yes 8 38.1 18 85.7
No 13 61.9 2 9.5
No answer 1 4.8
Total 21 100 21 100
Yes 1 50.0
No 1 50.0
No answer 1 50.0 1 50.0
Total 2 100 2 100
favour (58.4%). Moreover, there are no differences among parties with

reference to Brazil, but there are differences with reference to Argentina
(Table 6.5).
Brazil and Uruguay have currently developed a stable alliance by
establishing a Brazil–Uruguay High Level Group (GAN) for the creation
of a joint development strategy. This group was set up according to the
2012 Joint Presidential Communication, which created a new paradigm
in bilateral relations. On 16 May 2014, foreign affairs ministers from
Uruguay and Brazil, Luis Almagro and Luis Alberto Figuereido, respec-
tively, met at the GAN II Plenary Meeting. The ministers approved the
Plan of Action for Sustainable Development and the update of the list
of those areas considered by the presidents as priorities for bilateral
integration improvement: science, technology and innovation, commu-
nication and information, integration of transport infrastructure, and
free movement of goods, services, and persons.
Regarding the strategic alliance, there is a high degree of agreement
among MPs, around nine out of ten. Almost all legislators from Frente
Amplio and the Partido Independiente support it, and the degree of
agreement is also quite high within the opposition, where six out of
seven legislators from Partido Colorado and two out of three legislators
from Partido Blanco approve of it (Table 6.6).
Uruguay sees Brazil as a leader to be followed in different international
undertakings. These can be in the security area, at regional or interna-
tional level, for example, Haiti in Latin America or Congo in Africa,
countries where Uruguay and Brazil have troops as part of the United
Nations contingents. Also, Uruguay can follow negotiations with the
European Union if MERCOSUR enters into a multiple speeds dynamic,
or even with other key global stakeholders, such as the US or China. It is
more difficult to think of a common positioning of Uruguay and Brazil
in cases such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Brazil and Uruguay tend to have very few areas of competition, and
this strengthens their strategic alliance. However, the lack of Brazilian
support for Uruguay in its conflict with Argentina for the paper mills on
the Uruguay River was very disappointing. Brazil remained neutral. Dif-
ficulties in the Argentinean–Brazilian relationship and the weakening of
the so-called ‘strategic patience’ of Brazil in relation to Argentina soften
Uruguayan dissatisfaction, but, at the same time, show the very relative
importance of Uruguay to Brazil.
According to a survey among legislators, seven out of ten Uruguayan
MPs agree with Brazil’s leadership and the region’s prioritization,
and just one out of five MPs expresses disagreement with such a
statement (Table 6.7). On this point, differences among parties are
noticeable: almost all legislators from Frente Amplio agree in princi-
ple with Brazil’s leadership (92.4%), but only a third from the Partido
Nacional, and half of the Partido Nacional MPs explicitly express
their disagreement. Among legislators from Partido Colorado, three out
of five MPs are in favour of Brazil’s leadership, and just one quar-
ter oppose it. Within the Partido Independiente, opinions are evenly
divided.
Carlos Luján 101
Table 6.6 MPs’ degree of agreement with a Uruguayan strategic alliance with
Brazil
No. %
All parties
Agreement 109 87.2
Neither agreement nor disagreement 7 5.6
Disagree 6 4.8
No answer 3 2.4
Total 125 100
Frente Amplio
Agreement 65 98.5
Disagreement
No answer
Total 66 100
Partido Nacional
Agreement 24 66.7
Disagreement 4 11.1
No answer 2 5.6
Total 36 100
Partido Colorado
Agreement 18 85.7
Neither agreement nor disagreement
Disagreement 2 9.5
No answer 1 4.8
Total 21 100
Agreement 2 100
Disagreement
No answer
Total 2 100
Support to other economic and geostrategic links
This section analyses MPs’ opinions on possible free trade agreements

(FTAs) and the desirability of Uruguay becoming a full member of the
PA or signing defence treaties with the US, the EU, or China.
The US is constantly present in Uruguay’s foreign relations. This
relationship impacts on the relationship between Uruguay and Brazil,
Table 6.7 MPs’ degree of agreement with Brazil’s leadership and the region’s
prioritization
No. %
All parties
Agreement 87 69.6
Disagreement 26 20.8
No answer 4 3.2
Total 125 100
Frente Amplio
Agreement 61 92.4
Disagreement 2 3.0
No answer 1 1.5
Total 66 100
Partido Nacional
Agreement 12 33.3
Disagreement 18 50.0
No answer 2 5.6
Total 36 100
Partido Colorado
Agreement 13 61.9
Disagreement 5 23.8
No answer 1 4.8
Total 21 100
Agreement 1 50.0
Disagreement 1 50.0
No answer
Total 2 100
as well as the bilateral Brazil–US relationship. From the economic and

trade perspective, the signing of an FTA with the US has recurrently been
on the Uruguayan international agenda (Porzecanski, 2010). Regard-
ing political and strategic plans, President Vázquez (2005–2010) even
asked President George W. Bush for support at the peak of the con-
flict with Argentina for the blocking of the international San Martín
Carlos Luján 103
bridge, operated by the Argentines, and the controversy over the build-
ing of paper processing plants on the Uruguayan shore of the Uruguay
River.
In the case of China, impact on Uruguay–Brazil bilateral relations
is the product of Chinese–Brazilian relations and not of Uruguayan–
Chinese relations (even though China is Uruguay’s main sales destina-
tion, with figures close to those with Brazil). It is important to highlight
the difference between the added value of products sold by Uruguay
within the region and the primary products sold outside the region in
general, and to China in particular. This is a pattern Uruguay shares with
Brazil. Political relations between Uruguay and China are very good but
low-profile, and thus have not conditioned, at least until now, strategic
relations between Uruguay and Brazil.
Apart from the support for regional integration processes, and indi-
rectly for Brazil’s leadership in the region, it is important to consider
support for the possible signing of bilateral FTAs with different coun-
tries or blocs. In practice, Table 6.8 shows the rejection of these bilateral
agreements by the absolute majority of Uruguayan MPs. About 55% of
the legislators reject the FTA with the US and China, and more than half
of them are opposed to a bilateral agreement with the European Union.
There are, however, clear differences across the political spectrum: while
nine out of ten Frente Amplio MPs oppose the signing of a FTA with the
US, the EU, or China, a similar proportion of Partido Nacional MPs sup-
port these options. Representatives of the Partido Colorado, too, would
support those agreements: four out of five support an FTA with the
European Union, three quarters with the US, and a little more than
seven out of ten with China; the Partido Independiente representatives
unanimously support the signing of these three FTAs.
One issue that tinges Brazil’s predominance among Uruguay’s for-
eign policy options is support for Uruguay joining the PA. The absolute
majority of legislators support the idea of Uruguay joining the PA,
although 36.8% of MPs oppose the idea (Table 6.9). There are important
differences between parties: among Frente Amplio’s legislators, only a
third support the idea and the absolute majority oppose it, while there
is strong support by legislators from traditional parties: four fifths of
Partido Nacional legislators and three quarters of Partido Colorado’s;
Partido Independiente’s legislators are divided between support and
indecision.
There has been a defence treaty between Uruguay and the US since
1952. In 2013, after the proposal of a new treaty by the American Min-
ister of Defense León Panetta, the said treaty was re-examined. The
Table 6.8 MPs’ support for the possible signing of bilateral free trade agreements
(FTA) with different countries or blocs
FTA US European Union China
No. % No. % No. %
All parties
Yes 56 44.8 61 48.8 55 44.0
No 69 55.2 64 51.2 69 55.2
No answer 1 0.8
Total 125 100 125 100 125 100
Frente Amplio
Yes 5 7.6 9 13.6 7 10.6
No 61 92.4 57 86.4 59 89.4
No answer
Total 66 100 66 100 66 100
Partido Nacional
Yes 33 91.7 33 91.7 31 86.1
No 3 8.3 3 8.3 5 13.9
No answer
Total 36 100 36 100 36 100
Partido Colorado
Yes 16 76.2 17 81.0 15 71.4
No 5 23.8 4 19.0 5 23.8
No answer 1 4.8
Total 21 100 21 100 21 100
Yes 2 100 2 100 2 100
No
No answer
Total 2 100 2 100 2 100
support for the signing of a new treaty with the US or China as a global
power shows, in contrast, how regional defence and strategic relations
with Brazil are perceived: Table 6.10 shows strong rejection of both these
possibilities, in both cases above 80%. It is worth noting, however, that
rejection of a defence treaty with the US is not as strong within the
Partido Colorado (57.1% rejection). Summing up, government legisla-
tors’ opposition to an FTA or defence treaties with main world powers
shows the government’s will to promote regional relations in general
and with Brazil in particular.
Carlos Luján 105
Table 6.9 MPs’ support for Uruguay joining the Pacific Alliance
No. %
All parties
Yes 69 55.2
No 46 36.8
No answer 10 8.0
Total 125 100
Frente Amplio
Yes 23 34.8
No 38 57.6
No answer 5 7.6
Total 66 100
Partido Nacional
Yes 29 80.6
No 6 16.7
No answer 1 2.8
Total 36 100
Partido Colorado
Yes 16 76.2
No 2 9.5
No answer 3 14.3
Total 21 100
Yes 1 50.0
No
No answer 1 50.0
Total 2 100
Analysis of the degree of confidence in Brazil to keep world

peace compared with other global actors
At the global level, and in comparison with the major interna-

tional players, Brazil’s military and economic power internationally is
quite limited. In the region, however, and specifically compared with
Uruguay, asymmetries in favour of Brazil are evident. This does not
mean that Uruguay feels threatened by the Brazilian military power, but
it recognizes its importance within the context of a South American
defence system. Especially in the case of having to exploit oil platforms
on its maritime front, military cooperation with Brazil would be only
Table 6.10 MPs’ support for the signing of a new treaty with the US or China
Defence Treaty US China
No. % No. %
All parties
Yes 19 15.2 15 12.0
No 104 83.2 109 87.2
No answer 2 1.6 1 0.8
Total 125 100 125 100
Frente Amplio
Yes 6 9.1 8 12.1
No 60 90.9 58 87.9
Total 66 100 66 100
Partido Nacional
Yes 5 13.9 4 11.1
No 31 86.1 32 88.9
Total 36 100 36 100
Partido Colorado
Yes 8 38.1 3 14.3
No 12 57.1 17 81.0
No answer 1 4.8 1 4.8
Total 21 100 21 100
Yes
No 1 50.0 2 100
No answer 1 50.0
Total 2 100 2 100
Source: MP survey conducted in the second semester of 2013.
natural, taking into account Brazil’s experience in the Pre-sal offshore

fields.
Regarding ‘soft’ power (Nye, 2011), for cultural and linguistic reasons,
Uruguay has been historically distant from Brazil and closer to Argentina
and other Spanish-speaking countries in the continent or Latin-rooted
countries in Europe (Spain and France being the two most important).
Some facts do, however, show a potential turn towards Brazil: on the
one hand, there is a growing interrelation with the Brazilian univer-
sity system, especially with universities on the Atlantic coast (Rio, Sao
Paulo, Porto Alegre); on the other hand, the adoption of the European
digital TV standard has been questioned and the possibility of adopt-
ing the Japanese-Brazilian one has been considered. Not considering the
adoption of the US standard – as was considered by Argentina – is a clear
Carlos Luján 107
indicator of Uruguay’s attempt to avoid the American communicational

and cultural bombardment, or at least to rebalance the sources of cul-
tural productions in Uruguayan households with regional content in
general and Brazilian in particular, in the hope that part of this contents
will be co-produced between Brazilian and Uruguayan TV networks.
Regarding international peacekeeping, Brazil is the most reliable
country, according to Uruguayan MPs: it is the first option for three out
of ten MPs, being chosen by half of them among their first three options,
as shown in Table 6.11. The US comes second to Brazil, with half the
preferences, either as the first or among the three first options. Germany
Table 6.11 MPs’ opinions on the most reliable country to preserve international
peacekeeping
First mention In first three mentions
No. % No. %
All parties
Brazil 38 30.4 59 47.2
US 20 16.0 30 24.0
Germany 14 11.2 31 24.8
China 10 8 36 28.8
France 6 4.8 17 13.6
Great Britain 3 2.4 19 15.2
South Africa 3 2.4 13 10.4
India 1 0.8 16 12.8
Russia 0 0.0 5 4.0
None 25 20
No answer 5 4.0
Total 125 100
Frente Amplio
Brazil 34 51.5 47 71.2
US 2 3.0 4 6.1
Germany 1 1.5 8 12.1
China 10 15.2 24 36.4
France 4 6.1 10 15.2
India 1 1.5 15 22.7
Russia 1 1.5
None 13 19.7
Total 66 100
Partido Nacional
Brazil 2 5.6 4 11.1
US 11 30.6 16 44.4
Germany 10 27.8 17 47.2
China 9 25.0
No. % No. %
All parties
France 2 5.6
India 1 2.8
Russia 1 2.8
None 7 19.4
No answer 4 11.1
Total 36 100
Partido Colorado
Brazil 2 9.5 4 19.0
US 6 28.6 9 42.9
Germany 3 14.3 7 33.3
China 2 9.5
France 2 9.5 5 23.8
India 1 4.8
None 4 19.0
No answer 1 4.8
Total 21 100
US 1 50.0 1 50.0
China 1 50.0
Russia 1 50.0
None 1 50.0
Total 2 100
is considered the third most reliable country, chosen by one out of nine
legislators as the first option, and by one out of four when considering
the three first options. China is among the first options, in an even bet-
ter position than Germany when the first three options are considered.
All other countries, including Great Britain, France, India, and South
Africa, lag far behind. There are clear differences when sorting results by
political parties. The absolute majority of the Frente Amplio members
chose Brazil as the most reliable country, followed by China and India.
Members of the Partido Nacional and Partido Colorado, however, chose
the US and Germany.
Carlos Luján 109
Table 6.12 shows different opinions on countries considered unreli-

able for world peacekeeping: the US is in the first place, included by
42.4% as the first option and by more than 50% when Uruguayan MPS
considered the first three options. The US is followed by Russia, included
Table 6.12 MPs’ opinions on the most unreliable country to preserve interna-
tional peacekeeping
No. % No. %
All parties
US 53 42.4 66 52.8
Russia 19 15.2 46 36.8
China 13 10.4 34 27.2
Great Britain 4 3.2 40 32
France 2 1.6 15 12
Germany 2 1.6 12 9.6
Brazil 1 0.8 1 0.8
Others 4 3.2 10 8.0
None 8 6.4 8 6.4
No answer 19 15.2 19 15.2
Total 125 100
Frente Amplio
US 42 63.6 51 77.3
Russia 5 7.6 19 28.8
China 4 6.1 13 19.7
France 2 3.0 13 19.7
Germany 2 3.0 12 18.2
Brazil
Others 1 1.5 4 6.0
None 3 4.5 3 4.5
No answer 5 7.6 5 7.6
Total 66 100
Partido Nacional
US 6 16.7 7 19.4
Russia 9 25.0 16 44.4
China 5 13.9 11 30.6
France
Germany 2 5.6
Brazil
Others 2 5.6 4 11.1
None 2 5.6 2 5.6
No answer 10 27.8 10 27.8
Total 36 100
No. % No. %
Partido Colorado
US 5 23.8 8 38.1
Russia 5 23.8 11 52.4
China 4 19.0 10 47.6
Great Britain 1 4.8
France
Germany
Brazil 1 4.8 1 4.8
Others
None 3 14.3 3 14.3
No answer 3 14.3 3 14.3
Total 21 100
None 1 50,0
No answer 1 50,0
Total 2 100
as the first option by 15.2%, and by more than a third in the three first
options. China is in the third place, chosen by one out of ten MPs and by
a fourth of them among the first three places. Great Britain shows a very
low percentage as the first option (3.2%), but it reaches an accumulated
32% in the first three options chosen by the legislators interviewed; as
a result, it is considered less reliable than China. France and Germany
complete the list with around 10% of accumulated options. It should be
noted that only one legislator mentioned Brazil as an unreliable country
to keep world peace.
As usual, differences among parties are quite significant. For Frente
Amplio’s legislators, the US was the country most frequently named,
both in the first place and in the first three; Great Britain was chosen
by more than half of the left-wing legislators in the first three places,
followed by Russia with 28.8%, and China, France, and Germany were
mentioned in the first three places by less than a fifth of the legisla-
tors. Among Partido Nacional’s legislators, the most unreliable country
is Russia, either in the first place or among the first three. Russia is fol-
lowed by the US and China, the US being in first place when considering
the first option and China when considering the accumulated result of
Carlos Luján 111
three options. Russia is also the least reliable country for the Partido
Colorado, followed by the US and China, or China and the US, depend-
ing on the order in which they are sorted, by first mention or by the
accumulated result of the first three options.
Conclusions
In the last ten years, Uruguay has actively reinforced its bilateral
relations with Brazil. This positioning could have consequences in
two different dimensions: the historical swinging between Brazil and
Argentina, and its impact on MERCOSUR’s external agenda.
Regarding the first dimension, although there has been deep resent-
ment in Uruguay towards Argentinean postures in the last few years,
it is important to consider whether Argentina’s foreign policy towards
Uruguay is structurally hostile because of opposing national interests
or whether a positive agenda between the countries could contribute to
overcoming current confrontation. In this sense, a change in Argentina’s
regional policies, as the result of a change in government, may revitalize
bilateral relations. In contrast, it is clear that Uruguay’s current strategic
alliance with Brazil is not based on Uruguay’s difficult relations with
Argentina in the last decade but is the result of structural factors and
long-term interests that have consolidated in recent years, as well as
because of the rising role of Brazil in regional and global scenarios.
Regarding the second dimension, and taking into account that the
different countries in the MERCOSUR might adopt different paces in
their relationship with the European Union (a faster pace for Brazil
and Uruguay, maybe Paraguay, and slower, almost static in the cases of
Argentina and Venezuela) and the US, a question arises: is it possible for
Uruguay to go along with Brazil in this process? Regarding the European
Union, the answer is affirmative, and, in fact, there is apparently agree-
ment in process based on different paces. However, an agreement with
the US in the medium term is uncertain, since this would represent a
clash between the Uruguayan left’s pro-Brazilian spirit and its historical
anti-imperialism; additionally, the support by Uruguayan conservative
and liberal sectors for a major agreement with the US, without Brazilian
intervention, has to be taken into consideration.
Domestic factors have always had a strong influence on Uruguay’s for-
eign policy (Ferro et al., 2006). There are currently two political projects,
promoted by two blocs of similar size in Uruguay (‘promoting coalitions’
according to Sabatier and Weible, 2007), confronting each other. Their
differences are expressed not only in terms of internal policies but also in
foreign policy choices. These differences, however, do not concern the

substance of a close strategic alliance with Brazil but, rather, the prefer-
ences of each bloc for the type of foreign policy and the role of Brazil
itself. The traditional parties (Partido Colorado and Partido Nacional)
prefer a Brazilian policy of openness to the world, close to developed
countries, and distant from the region. Left-wing parties, instead, pre-
fer a Brazil leading the regional integration process, pro-South America,
focusing on South–South relations and on other emerging powers,
acting as a counterweight for the US and its allies (Luján, 2011), com-
petitors in a multipolar world – or even a non-polar world, as suggested
by Ian Bremmer (2012). Overall, Uruguayan politicians, parliamentary
elites, and public opinion agree on the increasing importance of Brazil to
Uruguay. Strengthening relations with Brazil seems to be an undisputed
‘state’ rather than ‘government’ policy, regardless of who is in charge of
foreign policy.
Uruguay’s closeness to Brazilian positions, regionally and globally,
seems to be unshakable. But this is not a case of mere ideological
alignment or opportunistic bandwagoning. It is, rather, a deliberate,
autonomous, openly debated, and carefully pondered choice of strate-
gic alliance due to long-term and structural considerations. Uruguay is
not short of other potential options, but it considers that Brazil offers
today, and will likely continue to do so in the foreseeable future, its
most rewarding regional and international partnership.
Note
1. We would like to thank Mag. Camilo López for allowing access to the sur-
vey database conducted within the context of his doctoral thesis in Political
Science.
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7
Paraguay and the Rise of Brazil:
Continuity, Resistance, and
Compliance
Peter W. Lambert
Paraguayan history, culture, and national identity have to a significant

extent been defined by the country’s geopolitical proximity to Brazil.
This is not simply due to the vast size of Brazil in terms of size of pop-
ulation, economy, and land mass, but also to the perceptions, fears,
and realities of Brazilian intervention. From constant threat of invasion
in colonial and early post-independence periods, through the catas-
trophe of the Triple Alliance War (1864–1870) and its aftermath, to
the re-establishment of Brazilian influence from the 1960s, Paraguay’s
economic and political development has been closely tied to its rela-
tions with Brazil. In this sense, the so-called rise of Brazil on the global
platform in the new millennium has not fundamentally changed the
relationship, but, instead, has put pre-existing tensions into sharper
focus.
Paraguay, Brazil’s small, underdeveloped, and landlocked neighbour,
provides a revealing, if consistently (or conveniently) overlooked, case
study. Although it has acted as perhaps Brazil’s most loyal regional
ally over the past 50 years, the case of Paraguay is striking, due both
to the highly contentious nature of relations and also to the scarcity
of academic analysis. In terms of Brazilian studies, Paraguay is over-
looked at best, invisible at worst. By examining relations with Brazil
from a Paraguayan rather than Brazilian or bilateral perspective, this
chapter seeks to make an important contribution to the growing liter-
ature on Brazilian foreign policy and regional relations. The emerging
analysis raises questions about the widely accepted and carefully con-
structed image of Brazil as a benign neighbour and regional partner,
114
Peter W. Lambert 115
with a foreign policy based on respect for autonomy, solidarity, and

non-intervention (Saraiva, 2011).
Although the focus of the paper is on Paraguay’s response to the
rise of Brazil in the past 15 years, it starts from the premise that
Paraguayan–Brazilian relations cannot be viewed in historical isolation.
It therefore begins with a brief overview of relations up to the new
millennium, in order to contextualize Paraguayan responses to Brazil’s
growing regional leadership and international profile, and focuses par-
ticularly on the resurgence of Brazilian influence during the dictator-
ship of Alfredo Stroessner and the subsequent transition to democracy
(1989–2000). It then analyses three key issues in the new millennium
that exemplify the highly asymmetrical relationship between the two
states: MERCOSUR and economic dependency; the Itaipú hydroelec-
tric project; and the issue of the brasiguayos,1 colonization, and Brazil’s
so-called ‘moving borders’. Finally, it will offer a brief analysis of the rela-
tionship in the current administration of Horacio Cartes (2013–present),
which encapsulates many of the traditional relations between Brazil and
Paraguay.
This chapter will argue that as the key regional power, Brazil has his-
torically used its significant influence over Paraguayan domestic issues
and policy in order to promote and protect its own interests. The
response of Paraguay, as a small state and with a highly inconsistent
and limited foreign policy, has been to generally bargain and band-
wagon, within the parameters of vast asymmetries of power, but also
to generally comply and occasionally resist, alternatives that are more
widely associated with relations of dependency and hegemony (Dos
Santos, 1968). Such asymmetries raise questions about issues of ‘consen-
sual hegemony’ or the capacity to engage subordinate states so that they
adopt the goals of the leading state (Burgess, 2008), and of dependency,
in which a country is ‘conditioned by the development and expan-
sion of another country, to which the former is subject’ (Dos Santos,
1968:26).
Historical context
Following independence from Spain in 1811, Paraguayan domestic and

foreign policy was to a great extent shaped by the threat of invasion and
absorption by its powerful neighbours, Brazil and Argentina. Indeed, the
priority of Paraguay’s post-independence governments was to consoli-
date economic and political independence. This priority contributed to
both its successful pursuit of an independent state-led developmental
116 Paraguay and the Rise of Brazil
model and the dominance of authoritarian, nationalist regimes under

Rodríguez de Francia (1811–1840), Carlos Antonio López (1840–1862),
and Francisco Solano López (1862–1870) (Pincus, 1968).
Paraguayan autonomous development was brought to a halt by the
Triple Alliance War (1864–1870), the most brutal conflict in modern
Latin American history, in which Paraguay battled for six years against
the combined forces of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The war resulted
in the death of over 60% of the Paraguayan population, including over
90% of adult males (Whigham and Potthast, 1999). Paraguay not only
suffered the destruction of its nascent industrialization and independent
state-led development model, but also lost 25% of the national territory
to Brazil and Argentina. The scale of devastation, along with the imposi-
tion of crippling reparations, meant that Paraguay would never regain its
former power. Paraguay was subsequently occupied by Brazilian forces
until 1876, with Brazil dominating domestic politics until 1904.
Following a period of close relations with Argentina, Brazilian influ-
ence began to re-emerge in the 1940s and was consolidated under the
dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner (1954–1989). Within a series
of mechanisms of control, foreign policy played a key role in strength-
ening the regime, primarily through strong relations with the US and
its major regional ally, Brazil (Masi, 1991:3). Presenting Paraguay as a
bastion of anti-communism, Stroessner offered unswerving and uncon-
ditional support for US and Brazilian interests in the context of the Cold
War (Yore, 1992). In return, the US and Brazil provided diplomatic and
economic support in the form of economic aid, technical assistance,
loans, grants, foreign investment, trade concessions, and military aid.
Such support from the US, and particularly from Brazil after 1976, when
the US began to distance itself from the regime, was absolutely key to
the survival and longevity of the dictatorship.
From the early 1960s, Stroessner increasingly saw the advantages to
his regime of a close alliance with Brazil, the consolidation of which
proceeded swiftly. In 1964, Stroessner oversaw the construction of the
highway from Asunción to Puerto Presidente Stroessner (now Ciudad
del Este) on the Brazilian border, and in 1965, the construction of the
Friendship Bridge across the Paraná River. In 1967, he repealed the
Agrarian Statute, which had formerly prohibited the sale to foreigners
of land lying within 150 km of the national frontier, and in 1973, he
signed the Treaty of Itaipú. The signing of the Treaty of Alliance and
Cooperation (1975) further consolidated security and economic cooper-
ation and led to an unprecedented level of political cooperation between
the two countries (Riquelme, 2004). As Stroessner sought agreements
to strengthen his regime rather than to further the national interest,

Paraguay’s economic development and political system became increas-
ingly dependent on the support of its powerful neighbour, creating
the framework for a rapid movement towards economic and political
dependency (Laíno, 1997:7).
The signing of the Itaipú Treaty (1973) sparked a construction-led
economic boom in Paraguay, while overall, Paraguay’s exports to Brazil
increased from less than 1% of total exports in 1965 to 25% by 1981,
with imports following a similar pattern (Rodríguez Silvero, 1987).
The subsequent boom in contraband and triangular trade2 was tacitly
approved by both sides.
The fall of the dictatorship in 1989 led to a transition process initiated
and controlled by the same Colorado Party that had been a bastion of
the dictatorship, and characterized by a high level of structural con-
tinuity (Lambert, 2000). Throughout the 1990s, the Colorado Party
maintained itself in power through its electoral machinery and clien-
telistic networks, despite a prolonged period of economic stagnation
and recession, as well as a series of political crises, including attempted
military coups in 1996, 1999, and 2000. In terms of foreign policy, the
focus on constant domestic crises led to a process of stagnation and
neglect of key issues in which Paraguay was ‘dragged’ by foreign inter-
ests into key areas of regional political and economic cooperation, such
as MERCOSUR (Mora, 2003). In the context of this vacuum, the US and
Brazil were able to exert significant influence, both in domestic policy
(most notably in their role in preventing the breakdown of democracy
under threat of military coups) and in foreign policy.3 With eight foreign
ministers (under three different presidents), Paraguay’s foreign policy in
the 1990s was ineffective, reactive, and ‘characterised by neglect, drift
and drag’ (Lambert, 2011:90).
MERCOSUR
The signing of the MERCOSUR Treaty in 1991 was perhaps the most
significant event of the transition in terms of foreign policy. Yet,
Paraguayan membership was pushed forward and negotiated by Brazil
and Uruguay, with Paraguay unable to formulate a clear strategy or set
of demands for entry that would defend its own economic interests
(Rachid and Ramírez, 2008). MERCOSUR was seen as a political and eco-
nomic necessity, the lesser of two evils, with the potential advantages of
greater trade, investment, and international presence outweighing the
threats to certain sectors, most notably triangular trade (Lambert, 2004).
The drift of the 1990s with regard to foreign policy was halted to
some extent with the election of Nicanor Duarte Frutos (2003–2008).
Although a member of the same Colorado Party, in power since 1947,
he emphasized the professionalization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
as a way of creating a more assertive stance in foreign policy (Lambert,
2011). Despite growing public frustration with MERCOSUR on a series
of issues (weak enforcement of rules, perceived discrimination against
Paraguay, and structural asymmetries), Duarte oversaw progress in terms
of approval of the MERCOSUR Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM)
in 2005 and several agreements with Brazil over infrastructure fund-
ing and promises to reconsider royalties paid for electricity from Itaipú.
Such progress was limited; by mid-2006, Duarte’s attention had become
focused on domestic issues of re-election and constitutional change,
with foreign policy once again relegated to a peripheral concern.
Despite the many criticisms of MERCOSUR within Paraguay, there
is little doubt that Paraguay has benefited from its role within the
regional organization. Foreign direct investment (FDI) may not have
increased as much as in other MERCOSUR countries and may initially
have been in non-productive sectors, but it has undergone significant
growth, both in the 1990s and, later, from 2007 to the present (Ruíz
Díaz, 2012). Membership of MERCOSUR has also led to a growth in
exports (mainly in primary goods and, more recently, manufacturing)
and offered greater access to both regional and extra-regional markets,
most notably the European Union. It has also given Paraguay access
to new trade partners, such as China, currently the main origin of
Paraguayan imports. However, over the past 20 years Paraguay’s econ-
omy has become significantly more dependent on Brazil. In 2012, the
Brazilian market represented 81% of Paraguayan exports and 68% of
Paraguay’s imports from MERCOSUR (CADEP, 2013), making Brazil by
far Paraguay’s most important trade partner. Furthermore, the overall
growth in FDI has been fuelled by a boom in investment from Brazil,
which has increased by over 50% in the past five years. Indeed, Brazilian
investment is now second only to the US and dominates agricultural
production, meat processing, transport, manufacturing, fuel, and bank-
ing (Nickson, 2013). As a result, Paraguay’s economic performance is
now intimately connected with – and dependent on – that of Brazil
(Ruíz Díaz, 2012).
The highly controversial impeachment of Fernando Lugo (2008–
2012) in June 2012 brought issues of balance of power in MERCOSUR
into sharp focus. Lugo was impeached by the Paraguayan Congress, on
the basis of failure in performance of his duties, in a process that was
widely criticized both nationally and internationally on the grounds

of both constitutionality and procedure (Lambert, 2012, Setrini 2012).
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) countries, from Chile
to Venezuela, concurred in their condemnation of what was widely
seen as a ‘constitutional coup’ and, led by Brazil, swiftly approved the
suspension of Paraguay from both UNASUR and MERCOSUR. How-
ever, the decision of MERCOSUR partners to use the suspension in
order to approve membership of Venezuela, previously blocked by the
Paraguayan senate, was seen in Paraguay as evidence of Brazil taking a
hegemonic position and using its power to override both the regulations
of MERCOSUR and Paraguayan interests, reflecting that Paraguay had
‘no commercial, cultural, diplomatic or political weight within the bloc’
(Rodríguez, 2006). There followed an upsurge of nationalist sentiment
in Paraguay, with politicians, journalists, and observers condemning
MERCOSUR as an instrument of Brazilian imperialism and Brazil as a
hegemonic power, complete with references to the Triple Alliance of
1865. Paraguay was eventually permitted to re-enter MERCOSUR on
the election of President Horacio Cartes in 2013, but for Paraguayans,
events clearly reflected the imbalance of political power relations within
MERCOSUR, and above all with Brazil.
Itaipú
The 1973 Treaty of Itaipú led to the construction of the largest hydro-
electric plant in the world, with an installed capacity of 14,000 MWh
from its 20 turbines. While ostensibly a triumph of binational cooper-
ation, the treaty represented a clear example of asymmetries of power.
The treaty, signed in secret by two military dictatorships and in force
until 2023, was agreed on terms that were highly unfavourable to
Paraguay and that ‘responded exclusively to the interests of Brazil
and a small group of politicians and businessmen favoured by the
Stroessner regime’ (Masi, 2008:4). Indeed, the overwhelming perception
in Paraguay was that ‘the construction of the Itaipú Dam represented
a clear concession by the Paraguayan government to the demands of
Brazil’ (Herken, 1975:54).
The costs of construction were shared equally, with Brazil acting as
guarantor for the initial loans, which would be paid back through the
Paraguayan share of electricity generated. Although entitled to 50% of
the energy production, Paraguay uses far less than 20% of its share.
However, under the treaty, Paraguay must sell the remaining energy to
Electrobras, the Brazilian state electricity corporation, at a price set well
below international rates and fixed until 2023. Sales to third party coun-
tries are prohibited, but Paraguay receives ‘royalties’ of US$120 million
per year in compensation for the low sale price. Electrobras then resells
the energy in Brazil at a huge profit (Nickson, 2008). To further com-
plicate matters, during the financial crisis in Brazil in 1985, Paraguay
agreed to Brazil’s request to temporarily sell energy at below the cost
price, thus provoking a subsequent rise in the Paraguayan debt to Itaipú,
known as the ‘spurious debt’ and estimated to be around US$19 billion.
The terms, which are hugely beneficial to Brazil, are widely perceived as
scandalously unfair towards Paraguay, which effectively subsidizes just
under 20% of Brazil’s total energy supply (Canese, 2006).
Despite almost constant pressure for reform from within Paraguay,
successive Colorado administrations in Paraguay did little to force Brazil
to negotiate, leading to a widespread belief in Paraguay that ‘succes-
sive Brazilian governments adroitly paid off the Paraguayan political
and economic elite in order to maintain this lucrative deal’ (Nickson,
2008). Indeed, it was not until the electoral campaign of Fernando Lugo
in 2007 and his subsequent election in 2008 (which temporarily ended
Colorado hegemony) that Itaipú became a key issue between the two
countries. Lugo presented the case as an issue of national sovereignty
and control over natural resources, capturing public discontent with the
status quo and rapidly leading to a national consensus on the need to
prioritize renegotiation of the treaty.
Although Brazil initially refused to consider renegotiation, the threat
by Lugo to appeal to the International Court of Justice at The Hague,
and the possible reputational damage to Brazil’s international image,
led to the opening of negotiations. In a historic agreement, in July 2009,
Brazil committed itself to the implementation of original clauses of the
treaty, including parity in management, an audit of the ‘spurious debt’
(already declared illegal by the comptroller general of Paraguay), and the
completion of outstanding works on the Paraguayan side (including the
key issues of a sectional substation and transmission line to Asunción).
Significantly, Brazil agreed to increase annual royalties from US$120 mil-
lion to US$360 million. However, Brazil did not accede to Paraguayan
demands to cancel the ‘spurious debt’, meet Paraguayan demands for far
higher compensation, or, crucially, allow Paraguay to sell to third party
countries before 2023.
The agreement was approved by the Paraguayan senate in 2009 and
the Brazilian senate in 2011, and both the substation and transmission
lines were completed by 2013. However, other issues regarding trans-
parency of management and an audit of accounts and debt made no
further progress. Furthermore, there has been no progress on the ‘spu-

rious debt’, despite a study in 2013 by the respected economist Jeffrey
Sachs, which confirmed that Paraguay had long paid off its debt obliga-
tions to the Itaipú Binational (Rivarola, 2013). The 2009 agreement was
certainly historic, but Brazil ensured that concessions did not funda-
mentally affect the asymmetries of power built into the treaty on which
much of Brazil’s industrial and economic growth is dependent.
Brasiguayos and Brazilian migration
The issue of Brazilian migration represents a further illustration of

asymmetries of power, and perhaps the clearest example of Paraguayan
compliance with Brazilian economic and political needs. In the 1960s,
the expansion of mechanized agricultural production in Brazil and the
resulting crisis of landlessness led to a growth of migration to Paraguay’s
Eastern Border Region (EBR), which offered high-quality, cheap land and
low taxation. This was actively encouraged by the Stroessner regime,
which sought to comply with Brazilian political needs within the
context of an increasingly close relationship.
President Stroessner offered minimal taxation on land, income, and
exports, and investment in infrastructure and communications, and
also abolished the law restricting foreign purchase of land within a
150 km strip from the border with Brazil (Nickson, 1981). For its part,
Brazil offered credit and investment to encourage migration to Paraguay.
By 1980, there were 300,000 brasiguayo colonists, who formed approx-
imately 10% of the total Paraguayan population, while in some border
areas, immigrants represented more than 70% of the local popula-
tion (Kohlhepp, 1984:12), creating Brazilian enclaves, responsive to and
dependent on the Brazilian market and economic interests and resistant
to any process of integration (Riquelme, 2004).
This was exacerbated by the rise in world soybean prices from 1973,
which led to the growth of financial investment and a rapid commer-
cial and industrial expansion by large Brazilian agricultural companies
operating highly mechanized forms of production. Indeed, by 1977,
half of all foreign investment in Paraguay was concentrated in the EBR,
principally from Brazil (Nickson, 1981:123). As a result, agricultural pro-
duction in the region was increasingly integrated into the Brazilian
market and largely divorced and isolated from the Paraguayan economy
(Kohlhepp, 1984).
The results of such rapid migration produced not only huge defor-
estation, but also the displacement of Paraguayan peasants and the
increased concentration of land (Kohlhepp, 1984). It also led to

unprecedented levels of smuggling to Brazil, with Brazilian registered
imports five times greater than Paraguayan registered exports to Brazil in
the period from 1965 to 1975 (Nickson, 1981:128). For some Paraguayan
observers, the scale and nature of migration not only led to a process of
‘denationalization’ (the loss of Paraguayan economic, cultural, social,
and political influence in the region) but was also evidence of the doc-
trine of ‘moving borders’, advanced by the Brazilian armed forces, and
associated with military geopolitician Golbery de Couto e Silva (Herken,
1975; Laíno, 1977).4
By the new millennium, Brazilian large landowners and agricultural
businesses had expanded landholdings well into the Eastern Region of
the country as well as into the Chaco. They were also responsible for
the bulk of Paraguay’s booming soya production; it is estimated that
85–90% is currently produced by brasiguayos, and soya constitutes 46%
of Paraguayan agricultural exports (Ortíz, 2011). However, despite the
huge profits derived from the boom in agricultural production, pro-
ducers pay no direct export taxes, while total taxation paid amounts
to less than 3%. As a result, soya production, for example, contributes
only 2% of total tax revenue, even though Paraguay is now the fourth
largest global exporter (Nickson, 2013). Efforts to reform the tax system,
especially under the administrations of Duarte Frutos and Lugo, met
with significant and successful opposition from Paraguay’s richest eco-
nomic group, represented by the brasiguayo-dominated Soya Producers’
Association (Zibechi, 2008).
Brasiguayos have also successfully opposed any efforts to implement
land reform in a country with the most regressive distribution of land in
South America. Increasing land concentration and other consequences
of mechanized agricultural production have led to a rise in landlessness
and clashes over land. Underlying the growing numbers of land occupa-
tions led by Paraguay’s increasingly militant peasant organizations is a
sense of frustration with the efforts of brasiguayos to block land reform,
and especially to prevent investigation into tierras malhabidas – lands
distributed by Stroessner to allies of the regime under the guise of land
reform, much of which was sold on to brasiguayos (Nickson, 2013).
The response to the question of land has been indicative of the power
of brasiguayos, which now represent one of Paraguay’s most powerful
economic lobby groups. Vehement opposition to government initiatives
on tax and land reform have led to road blocks by tractors on major
highways, the use of paramilitary groups to protect lands and evict
illegal occupants, and the successful lobbying of members of Congress
in both Paraguay and Brazil, where they have successfully portrayed

themselves as victims of Paraguayan peasant organization. In response,
Brazil has not hesitated in intervening to protect brasiguayo interests in
Paraguay.
Such intervention, while controversial, has generally been diplomatic.
However, in 2008, two major military exercises close to the Paraguayan
border (Fronteira Sul 1 and 2) were seen by Paraguay as a veiled threat
regarding plans for both renegotiation of the Itaipú Treaty and land
reform by the newly elected President Fernando Lugo, who had come
to power precisely on a platform of defence of national sovereignty, the
recovery of strategic resources, and land reform. Although President Lula
was quick to reassure Lugo following criticism in the Organization of
American States, the perception in Paraguay was that Brazil would not
tolerate policies that would adversely affect the interests of brasiguayo
landowners, Brazilian companies, or Brazil itself (Torres González, 2008).
The issue is not one of colonization, but, rather, one of economic
power and domination by a powerful group which is widely seen as ‘an
enclave of Brazilian capital’ (Chávez, 2014), acting ‘above the law due to
significant support from Brazilian capital, politicians and Itamaraty. This
has led to the increasing perception among Paraguayans that brasiguayos
wield significant and at times inappropriate political influence, which
undermines Paraguayan national sovereignty (González Vera, ABC 8
April, 2004).
The return to compliance
The election of Horacio Cartes, the Colorado Party presidential can-

didate, in 2013 returned Paraguay to a more traditional relationship
with Brazil. Following an electoral campaign in which he had repeat-
edly emphasized the importance of closer cooperation with Brazil,
once in office he clearly prioritized relations with Brazil. Since then,
a strong pro-Brazilian stance has been a major feature of his presi-
dency. Within six months of taking office, Paraguay had returned to
MERCOSUR with no conditions attached, and he had organized two
large Brazilian trade delegations to promote investment in Paraguay,
especially in the areas of public works, energy, and construction. He also
downplayed Paraguayan efforts to press Brazil for implementation of the
2009 agreements on Itaipú, galvanized senate approval for Venezuelan
entry into MERCOSUR following years of Colorado opposition, and
adopted a hard-line policy on land invasions of Brazilian and brasiguayo
properties.
Moreover, he also signed agreements to develop infrastructure

projects favouring Brazilian investment, including the construction of
a second bridge over the Río Paraná, the encouragement of invest-
ment from Brazilian maquila companies, the dredging of the Paraná
and Paraguay Rivers to facilitate the Hidrovía project,5 and a further
bridge between Puerto Murtinho and Puerto de Camelo Peralta to
link Brazil with the Chaco, as well as security agreements to fight the
(Brazilian-controlled) narcotics trade in Ciudad del Este and Pedro Juan
Caballero. Most controversially, in February 2014, having described his
foreign policy as ‘everything with Brazil and nothing against Brazil’,
Cartes urged a large Brazilian trade delegation that they should ‘use
and abuse Paraguay’ and take advantage of a generous tax regime,
favourable export rates to the EU, low energy costs, and weak unioniza-
tion and labour costs (ABC Color, 2014). His extraordinary comments
were widely seen as evidence that Cartes seeks to re-establish Brazil’s
position in Paraguayan foreign policy and, more importantly, sees
compliance with Brazil as a political priority for the survival of his
administration.
Further evidence of compliance with Brazilian wishes and the power
of Brazilian interests over the Cartes administration came in October
2013, when the president was faced with a bill, previously approved
by Congress, to establish a 10% tax on the export of soya (ABC Color,
16 April 2014). Even though the bill was widely supported and long
overdue, and would have brought taxation on soya in line with that
on other productive sectors, Cartes, under pressure from the brasiguayo-
dominated Soya Producers’ Association, used executive powers of decree
to veto the bill. He then ensured that the veto was upheld by Congress
in April 2014.
Cartes’ economic and political power is allegedly partly derived
from contraband, money laundering, and narcotics (Nickson, 2013),
and he is widely seen as what José Mujica, the former Uruguayan
president, described as ‘narcocoloradismo’ (ABC Color, 2012). What is
striking is not only Brazil’s silence since his election on his dubi-
ous business dealings, but also his comparatively recent adoption of
such a strong pro-Brazilian stance since his electoral campaign. What-
ever the reasons for this coming together, his uncritical support and,
indeed, promotion of Brazilian interests signal a return to the signifi-
cant leverage that Brazil enjoyed over the Paraguayan executive under
previous Colorado administrations, and, of course, under President
Stroessner.
Conclusion
The three case studies analysed in this chapter lead to a number of

conclusions with a common theme. MERCOSUR is widely seen as a
Brazilian-dominated regional organization, which has produced some
benefits for sectors of the Paraguayan economy while increasing eco-
nomic dependency on Brazil. The suspension of Paraguay and the
inclusion of Venezuela in 2012 simply confirmed widespread views of
asymmetries in economic and political power which militate against
Paraguay. This is also reflected in the issue of the Itaipú Treaty, which,
despite the 2009 agreement, is still seen as unresolved, scandalously
unfair, and a clear reflection of asymmetries of power that allow
Brazil to put subsidization of its industrial growth above Paraguayan
development. Finally, the issue of brasiguayos further reflects such
asymmetries of power, with brasiguayo agro-industrial groups hold-
ing extraordinary political and economic power, in great part due to
support from Brazil. All three cases reflect a Paraguayan lack of lever-
age, a political dependency on Brazil, and the economic and political
asymmetries of power relations, which undermine Paraguayan national
sovereignty.
From a Paraguayan perspective, the rise of Brazil in the new millen-
nium is only the latest stage in a long period of close but asymmetrical
relations. It could be argued that progress on the Itaipú Treaty was fun-
damentally due to the combination of a strong and assertive presidency
in Paraguay combined with a fundamentally different approach to for-
eign policy under Lula. This may be the case, but the results of the
agreements on the treaty did not threaten the basis of the relation-
ship. Brazil simply had to offer relatively minor concessions and wait for
a return to normality. The administration of Horacio Cartes has returned
Paraguay to a dependent relationship, in which the previous approach
of greater Paraguayan assertiveness has once again been replaced by
compliance. This would suggest that any gains made under the presiden-
cies of Lugo and Lula signalled not a fundamental change in Paraguay’s
relationship with Brazil but a brief interruption in a remarkably con-
sistent relationship between the Colorado Party and Itamaraty over
the past 50 years. This relationship, in turn, reflects vast asymmetries
of power and that key strategic areas are characterized by Paraguayan
compliance with Brazilian interests.
However, Paraguay’s relationship with Brazil cannot be seen solely
within the parameters of the past 15 years, or from three case studies.
From a Paraguayan perspective, relations with Brazil have been shaped

by two key issues. First, the Triple Alliance War and the subsequent
Brazilian occupation left deep-rooted resentment and a widespread
sense of injustice. Brazil has not sought to address this by recogniz-
ing its role in the decimation of the Paraguayan population. Second,
Brazil’s vital support for the highly corrupt dictatorship of Alfredo
Stroessner not only enabled the regime to remain in power until the
end of the 1980s, but also established a pattern of relations that have
deepened Paraguayan economic and political dependency, exacerbated
asymmetries of power, and heightened Paraguayan dependency.
This is not simply a question of Paraguayans constantly returning
to the past. Rather, unaddressed historical grievances, current contro-
versies, and at times aggressive Brazilian policy towards Paraguay over
the past 50 years feed into Paraguayan nationalism and undermine
the development of relations based on equality and cooperation. They
also raise questions regarding Brazil’s international image and widely
accepted claims that, in the words of Minister of Foreign Relations Celso
Amorim, ‘Brazil has always based its agenda on non-intervention in
other states’ domestic affairs’ (Saraiva, 2011:62).
Notes
1. The term brasiguayo is used to refer to the Brazilians who migrated to the EBR
of Paraguay from the 1960s onwards, and their descendants. Although the
latter may have been born in Paraguay, they generally retain close cultural,
economic, and political links with Brazil rather than Paraguay.
2. Triangular trade refers to the re-export of imported goods from extra-regional
markets (Asia and the US) to Brazil and Argentina. From the 1970s, it repre-
sented an increasingly important part of the Paraguayan economy, especially
in electronic goods, but also in contraband cigarettes and drugs. Despite
efforts from MERCOSUR partners to regulate the triangular trade through
common tariffs, by 2000, export sales in triangular trade were still estimated
to be three times those of regular exports (Masi, 2008).
3. In 1996, General Lino Oviedo attempted a coup against President Wasmosy,
which failed in great part to the diplomatic intervention of Brazil and the
US. Having been released from prison by his ally President Raúl Cubas Grau,
Oviedo launched a further attempt at a coup in 1999, which was defeated by
popular defence of democracy in the marzo paraguayo.
4. The concept of moving borders formed part of the Brazilian national security
doctrine. It maintained that a demographic, cultural, and economic expan-
sion over its borders into weaker states would create a protective cordon,
especially around unstable or strategically important borders. This expansion
could be defended militarily if necessary. See Cortez, C. (1993).
5. First developed in 1997, the Hidrovía is a controversial plan by Brazil, Paraguay,
Bolivia, Uruguay, and Argentina to develop a 2,000 km industrial shipping
channel along the rivers Paraguay and Paraná, from Mato Grosso to the La
Plata Basin.
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8
Bolivia–Brazil: Internal Dynamics,
Sovereignty Drive, and
Integrationist Ideology
Ana Carolina T. Delgado and Clayton M. Cunha Filho
After about two decades of adherence to the so-called ‘Washington

Consensus’ (Williamson, 1990), Bolivian politics has experienced a
decade of change with the arrival to the presidency of Evo Morales in
2006, the first indigenous president in two centuries of independence
from Spain. Consistently with the ‘decolonial’ and anti-imperialistic
rhetoric adopted by the new government, one of the first measures
of Morales’ administration was the nationalization of the hydrocar-
bon sector. Some analysts first perceived this event as the beginning
of a tense relation between Bolivia and its main commercial partner,
Brazil, expressing a pattern that would be followed by other coun-
tries in the region towards the emerging local power. Other experts
stressed that such behaviour would coexist with moments of bilateral
cooperation, the strengthening of political and commercial ties, and
regional integration. In this chapter, we argue that Bolivian foreign pol-
icy towards its neighbour is largely conditioned by the domestic realm
and reflects the complexities of its national political setting as well as
its drive for sovereignty and for expressing its distinctiveness to the
world.
Despite being located at the geographic heartland of South America
and sharing 3,423 km of borders with Brazil – the South American giant’s
largest shared border in the continent – Bolivia’s chronic poverty and
political instability have always made it a minor concern for Brazilian
foreign strategies. Until very recently, Bolivia has only intermittently
come to the surface of Brazil’s international agenda, mainly as a peren-
nial source of drug trafficking and smuggling-related concerns. Also, the
129
130 Bolivia and Brazil
country’s chronic poverty and position as one of the largest producers

of coca leaf led Bolivia to seek, in its first two decades of democratic
life after the end of its last dictatorship in 1982, a special relationship
with the US, whereby full cooperation with the War on Drugs and
commitment to market structural reforms would be rewarded with pref-
erential market access and considerable donations that were crucial to
the country’s feeble budgets.
The situation of relative neglect towards Brazil started to change with
the signing of the La Paz Treaty in 1996, which opened the way for the
construction of the Bolivia–Brazil Gas Pipeline (Gasbol), the first phase
of which was concluded in 1999 and secured an important market for
the country’s main export product. Gas exports to Brazil rose gradually
to become Bolivia’s largest revenue source, but the country remained
very much in the political and ideological orbit of the US. This lasted
until the internal political landscape started to change in the 2000s,
paving the way for Evo Morales’ rise to the presidency and a substantial
change in Bolivia’s foreign policy.
Some of the policies implemented by Morales, such as nationaliza-
tion of hydrocarbons or the search for diversification of international
partners, could be thought of as generating balancing effects. Others,
such as the enthusiastic adherence to new and old Brazil-led regional
integration mechanisms such as the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(CELAC), and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), could be
seen as bandwagoning. However, we will contend that these traditional
concepts do not really explain Bolivian foreign policy under Morales,
which may be better understood as a pragmatic search for economic
opportunities combined with a strong ideological commitment to South
and Latin American integration.
In the first part of the chapter, we will discuss the nature of Bolivian
foreign policy during the neoliberal years and the internal disarrays that
led to the ascension of Evo Morales. We will also investigate the sig-
nificant change of direction brought about by Morales. In the second
section, we will focus on Bolivia–Brazil bilateral relations and how they
came to be affected by internal change in Bolivia. In the third and final
section, we will assess the impact of internal affairs upon the country’s
foreign relations and how the latter reflect a drive for sovereignty, as
defined by Inayatullah and Blayney (1995). This vision challenges tra-
ditional bandwagoning or balancing approaches to foreign policy and
calls for a distinctive approach to the Bolivian case.
Ana Carolina T. Delgado and Clayton M. Cunha Filho 131
Under a neoliberal sign: Bolivian foreign policy and the

prospects for change
The end of the Cold War presented many challenges to the interna-
tional system and its components, as well as to theorists and politicians.
Unlike a world marked by a sense of balancing, represented by the
competition between the two superpowers, this new period was one of
adjustment first and US leadership later. Some, such as John Ikenberry
(2002), emphasized the benign character of this shift, which was evi-
dent – in his analysis – in the existence and spread of liberal values and
their institutional apparatus all over the system. In Latin America, the
post-Cold War decade was marked by the end of dictatorships and efforts
to rebuild democratic institutions and to overcome severe economic
crises.
Like most countries in the region, Bolivian administrations in the
1980s and 1990s implemented structural reforms to achieve develop-
ment and economic stability. On the one hand, liberalization, priva-
tization, and deregulation, along with the insulation of the executive
and its technocracy, would promote pragmatic responses to problems
in the domestic realm. On the other hand, these measures reflected
interconnectedness with the international sphere, since they were con-
ditions for acceding to loans from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank, and similar international organizations. They
played, therefore, a relevant role in the diffusion of a liberal project and
the settlement of a unipolar world (Krauthammer, 1990).
In the case of Bolivia, President Victor Paz Estenssoro inaugurated his
fourth non-consecutive term in 1985 with the adoption of macroeco-
nomic adjustments expected to lead to stabilization and growth through
market liberalization, tributary reform, and the independence of the
monetary policy (Dunkerley, 1990). The next administration, headed
by Jaime Paz Zamora (1989–1993), created a series of norms in order
to deepen the liberalization process, such as the new Mining Code and
Hydrocarbons Law and the Privatization Law, fostering the participa-
tion of foreign investments. Later, these reforms were expanded during
President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s first presidency (1993–1997),
when the executive proposed the so-called capitalization (capitalización)
of public companies, including the state-owned hydrocarbon company
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB). Capitalización consisted
of a series of measures combining privatization – through the creation of
joint ventures under private firm control – with the restructuring of the
pension system (Weyland, 2005). While the majority control of the com-
panies’ stocks was handed over to foreign investors, the government’s
remaining share was given in administration to private pension funds
responsible for the retirement of elderly Bolivians.1
Considering the country’s geographic position and its neighbours’
need for gas, capitalization was expected to convert Bolivia into the
region’s energy centre. It was in this context that Bolivia signed the La
Paz Treaty with Brazil, allowing the construction of the Gasbol pipeline,
which would be a crucial component of bilateral relations and of the
Bolivian economy, at the heart of tensions and cooperation between
the two countries. The initiative reflected the deepening and expan-
sion of Bolivia’s relations in South America as part of several integration
agreements, such as the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) and
MERCOSUR, which Bolivia joined as an associate state in 1996. Thus,
the implementation of liberal reforms played a double role for Bolivia:
it promoted both a sense of domestic stability and the country’s open-
ing to the regional scene. In the case of hydrocarbons, these reforms
were expected to raise Bolivia’s profile in South America and, as such,
transform the country’s geopolitical position.
In that unipolar moment (Krauthammer, 1990), Bolivia’s goal of a
better position in the region entailed the development of a closer rela-
tionship with the world superpower. As many Latin American countries
strengthened their ties with the US well beyond economic agreements,
so did the Andean country. On the one hand, the search for a ‘special
relationship’ with the US was felt in its deep commitment to struc-
tural reforms. On the other hand, those measures in the economic
and political fields were related to issues apparently disconnected from
one another, as shown by the creation of the Andean Trade Preference
Act (ATPA). Launched by the US in 1991, the initiative was directed at
Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, and made the reduction of tariffs
to these countries’ products in the US conditional on their commitment
to fighting drug traffic.
As one of the greatest producers of coca leaves in the region, Bolivia
created institutional norms and adopted a series of eradication poli-
cies supported by bilateral cooperation in the fight against coca crops
and the production of cocaine. Thus, in 1988, the Bolivian govern-
ment enacted Law 1008, which criminalized coca production in most
parts of the national territory, except for an area of 12,000 hectares,
classified in the document as the ‘traditional zone’, where produc-
tion was destined for licit consumption (for medical purposes and
rituals). In addition, the norm created different bodies to fight illicit
trafficking, one of them being the Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el
Narcotráfico (FELCN), which received financial and technical assistance

from the US.
During the 1990s, the executive promoted Plan Dignidad, extensively
supported by the US government as well. Although its prime focus was
on voluntary eradication and the development of alternative crops as
substitutes for coca, the government’s policy progressively gave rise to
forced eradication, especially in the Chapare tropical region, classified
in the law as an ‘exceeding zone’ where coca production was destined
for illicit trade as well. The plan resulted in a considerable reduction in
the area of coca crops (from 38,000 to 13,700 hectares) in four years,
and the dismantling of buildings destined for drug production (Delgado
and Gusmão, 2007). But none of these measures guaranteed either a
long-lasting reduction of drug trafficking or the achievement of pro-
gressive ideals of development in the long term. On the contrary, by
the turn of the century, Bolivia was one of the poorest countries in
the Americas, which called into question the credibility and efficacy of
neoliberal policies inside the country.
The positive results of Plan Dignidad were perceived as less than its
negative effects, both economically and politically. First, the narcotics
trade was, and remained, an important part of the Bolivian economy
(Kohl and Farthing, 2006). Second, forced eradication was achieved
through violent conflicts with coca farmers, mainly in the Chapare
region, often resulting in the violation of human rights (Cabieses, 2004;
Gamarra, 2005). Also, many of the coca farmers living in the tropical
region were former miners who had lost their jobs in the 1980s due
to reforms that restructured and privatized the bulk of the state-owned
Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Comibol). The process culminated in the
closure of most of the mines controlled by Comibol and the intensifi-
cation of migration from the Andean highlands to agricultural frontier
regions such as the Chapare. This situation would later fuel social protest
and support for Morales’s political project.
During the 2000s, Bolivians witnessed a worsening of the economic
situation and a deep crisis of representativeness of the political system
(Domingo, 2001), followed by the intensification of social mobilization.
In 2002, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada began his second term, presenting
economic stabilization and development as his major goals for the coun-
try, 62.4% of whose population were under the poverty line (CEPAL,
2006). With this aim, the executive promoted unpopular measures, such
as the taxation of salaries and the exportation of gas to the US. The
former caused deterioration in the living conditions of many Bolivians
and exacerbated the widespread popular perception of international
interference in the country, since the government was following IMF
guidelines. Popular discontent was also triggered by the fact that the
country’s most relevant commodity – gas – was to be exported through
a port located in Bolivia’s number one rival in South America: Chile.
Lozada’s decision provoked a new wave of social mobilization and vio-
lence all over the country. During the so-called ‘Gas War’, the executive
resorted to the armed forces to contain the protest, causing several
deaths and ultimately being forced to resign (Santalla, 2012).
For the next two years, Bolivia would be governed by two caretaker
presidents until 2005’s anticipated polls and the subsequent inaugura-
tion of Evo Morales in 2006. An indigenous Aymara and the leading
authority of Chapare’s Federations of Coca Farmers, Morales built his
political career on the farmers’ resistance to coca eradication poli-
cies. In the 1990s, coca farmers and left-wing politicians created the
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, and over the years, coca farmers
and the MAS incorporated into their activism themes of national rel-
evance that were already being pursued by other social groups, such
as resistance to privatization, the defence of natural resources, and the
nationalization of gas. As a result, the new political party achieved
national resonance, with its members reproducing a critical discourse
towards neoliberalism, imperialism, and the US (Stefanoni and Do Alto,
2006; Cunha Filho, 2011).
Following the deterioration of governability in Bolivia and the deca-
dence of political and economic institutions, Morales’s landslide elec-
tion by an unprecedented 53.72% of votes was symptomatic, as it mir-
rored Bolivia’s desire for change. The main topics in the electoral cam-
paign cut across the domestic realm and the establishment of a different
direction in foreign policy. Both were related to a discourse emphasizing
the country’s decolonization; sovereignty, as independence from inter-
national financial institutions and the US; the allocation of central stage
to the indigenous question; and the creation of a new social pact that
reflected these issues.
It is in the context of this logic that the nationalization of gas in
2006 should be understood. It was the first of a series of measures to
recover national control over sectors that were previously privatized.
Although there has been much discussion about the actual extent of
nationalization (Kaup, 2010), this certainly represented a watershed in
Bolivia’s domestic as well as international relations, since it questioned
the neoliberal ideology. From a Bolivian perspective, this meant calling
into question the internationally dominating principles that governed
both interactions between states and internal arrangements.
Accordingly, relations with the US have changed drastically. As well
as the nationalizations and the higher priority given to non-US-led
regional integration mechanisms, which in themselves reflect a rup-

ture in Bolivia’s position towards an international liberal project led by
the then superpower, Morales’ administration put forward a new drugs
policy (Farthing and Kohl, 2010). It not only revised Law 1008, signifi-
cantly increasing the area allowed for coca crops (from 12,000 to 20,000
hectares) and radically differentiating the coca leaf from cocaine, but
also reflected the introduction of new claims into the national sphere:
the resistance of coca farmers and the framing of the coca leaf as a sym-
bol of Bolivian identity, related to historical indigenous practices. The
new executive attempted at the United Nations to decriminalize coca
leaf internationally. Nevertheless, the government did not abandon the
eradication of excessive coca crops. On the contrary, following Morales’s
first years in power, the country progressively reduced them (UNODC
and Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2012; UNODC, 2014).
Despite these results, relations with the US did not improve. The coun-
try’s refusal to extradite former President Sanchez de Lozada (accused of
responsibility for the deaths during the Gas War); accusations of US con-
spiracy against his government, publicly expressed by Morales; and the
expulsion of Ambassador Philip Goldberg and of the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s office, both in 2008, increased tensions in the bilat-
eral relation. President George W. Bush refused to maintain preferential
treatment for Bolivian products regardless of the Andean country’s
achievements in drug repression. The decision was severely criticized by
Bolivia’s government as a political vendetta, since the US constituted an
important market for Bolivian exports. Later, Morales decided to exclude
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) activities
from Bolivia in 2013, reflecting once again a stark change of direction
in Bolivian foreign policy as compared with the ‘special status’ with the
US pursued through the neoliberal years. This overall reorientation of
Bolivian foreign policy also considerably impacted the bilateral relation
with Brazil, to which we shall turn in the next section.
Bilateral relations with Brazil and the impact of change
The signing of the La Paz Treaty between Bolivia and Brazil in 1996 came
at the apex of neoliberal hegemony in both countries and was, indeed, a
direct consequence of the structural reforms then championed by multi-
lateral agencies in the region. Under Sánchez de Lozada’s capitalización,
the Bolivian state-owned oil company YPFB was divided into several
different branches, and the treaty, which enabled the construction of
the Gasbol pipeline, was seen as crucial to attract foreign investment
to the sector, as it would guarantee a secure market for the country’s
natural gas. On the other side of the border, and equally encouraged
by the multilateral agencies, the treaty and the pipeline were seen as
an opportunity to include gas-powered thermal plants in the Brazilian
energy matrix (Fuser, 2014).
After the signing of the treaty, and especially after the inauguration
of the Gasbol in 1999, Petrobrás – which was granted by the treaty very
special and profitable conditions on the San Alberto and San Antonio
giant gas fields – became the largest company in Bolivia, accounting for
60.8% of its gas production in 2005 (Miranda, 2008:185). Brazil quickly
rose to become the country’s biggest export market, more than doubling
its share, and peaking at almost 44% of Bolivian exports in 2008. The
importance of gas for these results can be easily grasped by the fact that
Brazil never reached a 4% share of non-traditional exports (everything
but minerals and hydrocarbons) in the period, despite peaking at more
than 55% of traditional exports in 2005, even though non-traditional
Bolivian exports had risen at a considerably higher rate than traditional
ones since 2006 (see Figure 8.1 and Tables 8.1 and 8.2).
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Brazil Others
Figure 8.1 Bolivian exports, 2000–2014 (in US$ million)

Source: Own elaboration with data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), Bolivia.
Table 8.1 Bolivian exports, total and Brazil
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Total (US$ million) 1,246.28 1,226.21 1,319.85 1,589.84 2,194.57 2,867.43 4,088.33 4,821.83 6,932.93 5,399.58 6,966.05 9,145.76 11,814.58 12,207.56 12,856.06
Traditional 603.67 643.55 693.26 874.58 1,308.09 1,988.94 3,121.76 3,684.89 5,490.11 3,982.60 5,415.69 7,597.24 9,654.37 9,748.88 10,570.03
Non-traditional+ 642.61 582.65 626.60 715.26 886.48 878.49 966.57 1,136.94 1,442.82 1,416.98 1,550.36 1,548.52 2,160.20 2,458.68 2,286.03
Total Brazil (US$ 158.67 288.00 331.99 491.15 713.76 1,113.97 1,560.77 1,748.24 3,023.13 1,667.47 2,407.39 3,030.09 3,665.31 4,030.58 3,818.38
million)
Traditional Brazil 151.42 280.11 324.08 482.39 700.85 1,099.58 1,540.33 1,717.30 2,968.16 1,633.28 2,359.01 2,990.27 3,604.36 3,961.16 3,779.38
Non-traditional 7.25 7.88 7.91 8.76 12.91 14.39 20.43 30.94 54.97 34.19 48.38 39.82 60.95 69.42 39.00
Brazil+
All Exports to 12.73% 23.49% 25.15% 30.89% 32.52% 38.85% 38.18% 36.26% 43.61% 30.88% 34.56% 33.13% 31.02% 33.02% 29.70%
Brazil /Total
Traditional 25.08% 43.53% 46.75% 55.16% 53.58% 55.28% 49.34% 46.60% 54.06% 41.01% 43.56% 39.36% 37.33% 40.63% 35.76%
Exports to
Brazil/Total
Non-traditional 1.13% 1.35% 1.26% 1.22% 1.46% 1.64% 2.11% 2.72% 3.81% 2.41% 3.12% 2.57% 2.82% 2.82% 1.71%
Exports to
Brazil/Total+
Note: + See footnote 8.

Source: Own elaboration with data from INE, Bolivia. There was no available data prior to 2000.
137
Table 8.2 Bolivian foreign trade index, by sector (2006 = 100)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012(p) 2013(p)
Exports 100 115.95 145.45 99.81 134.62 168.39 212.53 228.35

Minerals 100 111.43 122.91 138.46 180.81 264.88 262.8 175.84
Hydrocarbons 100 116.19 151.08 78.14 110.73 132.67 170.02 181.67
Other Products 100 114.99 127.86 159.94 130.14 165.89 216.91 329.65
Imports 100 111.85 133.63 132.59 158.29 202.87 214.14 207.88
Consumer Goods 100 113.61 150.9 179.91 196.88 235.51 290.16 364.77
Raw Materials 100 107.88 125.79 119.56 145.56 183.88 188.92 173.68
Capital Goods 100 108.64 153.54 158.04 168.16 239.59 245.57 372.55
Others 100 109.23 112.76 122.69 118.27 126.07 88.8 99.63
Note: (p) = preliminary data

Source: Own elaboration with data from INE, Bolivia.
When the internal scenario started to change in Bolivia and gas

became an ever more politicized issue in the country, with its national-
ization a core issue on Morales’s successful electoral platform in 2005,
it all promised a complicated relationship. The nationalization pro-
cess, which started in May 2006, was actually much more of a ‘hostile
take-over’ than a nationalization tout court (Kaup, 2010). The decision
included the renegotiation of contracts based on a new distribution
of tributes and royalties and the restructuring of YPFB, which was to
be responsible for controlling production, refinement, distribution, and
transportation – with private companies acting as service providers and
minority partners of the state company. In the overall framework of
Bolivia–Brazil relations, the end product of the nationalization process
turned out to be, or at least was officially presented as, an almost friendly
renegotiation process in which Brazil refrained from exercising its full
power in defence of Petrobrás’s interests. However, the truth is that rene-
gotiation and accommodation were very conflictive, and both sides had
to exert considerable pragmatism and accept less than optimal results as
compared with their preferred positions.
As Igor Fuser (2014) shows, the supposed ‘generosity’ of Brazilian for-
eign policy towards its smaller neighbours is much more of a myth used
by the opposition to attack such policy as detrimental to national inter-
ests, or by the Brazilian government to defend itself as being guided by
higher-order values. During the caretaker government of Carlos Mesa
(2003–2005) – a period in which Lula da Silva was already president on
the other side of the border – Brazil exerted considerable pressure over
the Bolivian government in defence of Petrobrás’s commercial interests
and tried to steer Morales onto a more favourable path as best it could.
Only with the nationalization process already underway did Brazil

change to a more understanding and flexible policy towards Bolivia.
Yet, there were still several moments of tension, and only at the end
of 2012 did Petrobrás announce new major investments in gas prospec-
tion, which had been frozen after the nationalization (Fuser, 2014:252).
On the Bolivian side, the Morales government, too, sought to avoid
a confrontational stance and refrained from adopting some more rad-
ical initiatives. For example, when the cabinet’s first hydrocarbons
minister, Andrés Solis Rada, decreed the expropriation of Petrobrás-
owned refineries in September 2006, this decision was then reversed in
favour of a negotiated purchase agreement after strong protests from the
Brazilian side.
Even though relations with Petrobrás only fully normalized in 2012,
it is true that after the ‘refineries’ crisis, the bilateral relation improved
significantly in all other relevant issues. The official Bolivian discourse
characterized Brazil as a sort of bigger brother that could help the
country’s aims and even cushion it from external threats. The Andean
country thus enthusiastically joined the new Brazil-led regional integra-
tion mechanisms, such as UNASUR in 2008 and CELAC in 2012, and
applied for full membership of MERCOSUR in the same year. UNASUR,
in particular, also played an important moderating role in the acute
political confrontation between government and opposition in Bolivia
in 2008 (Cunha Filho, 2008).
Latin American integration is among the core declared aims of the
current Bolivian foreign policy. The country also joined the Venezuela-
led Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) in 2006, while at the
same time refusing to leave the Andean Community (CAN) during its
deepest crisis since its creation in 1969 (Araujo, 2014). Bolivia also
tried to revive the URUPABOL treaties with Uruguay and Paraguay.
Among the new regional integration mechanisms in Latin America, only
the Pacific Alliance is strongly opposed by Bolivia, since its underpin-
ning neoliberal philosophy is at odds with the ideology of the current
Bolivian government. At the same time, the country has also sought to
diversify its commercial and diplomatic relations with other countries,
such as South Korea, China, Russia, and Iran, in order to maximize its
development agenda. These new and old cooperation agreements with
neighbours and extra-regional actors have been used to attract invest-
ment to the country’s infrastructural projects, such as the construction
of roads and railways, the modernization of the hydrocarbon and min-
eral sector, and the launch of a telecommunications satellite, operating
in 2013.
The Brazilian policy of internationalizing its companies through loans

from its own national development bank (BNDES) for projects over-
seas came in handy, and promoted the participation of several Brazilian
contractors in Bolivia. However, the Morales administration has never
granted any official priority to Brazilian firms. If more beneficial agree-
ments were available from other sources, the La Paz government did
not hesitate to go for them. Contracts with several foreign firms
(Brazilian and otherwise) have been rescinded when Bolivian authorities
considered them to fall short of the agreed conditions.
During Lula da Silva’s two terms in office, the personal relationship
between the Brazilian president and Morales helped to foster bilat-
eral relations. The two leaders shared a common background as trade
unionists, professed a left-of-the-centre ideology, and made a strong
commitment to regional integration. After Dilma Rousseff took office
in 2011, the bilateral relation faced something of a cool-down. With
the new Brazilian president, Latin American integration seemed to lose
some of the priority it had previously enjoyed, and Bolivia became a
much lower concern. This is also reflected in the fact that, contrary to
Lula da Silva, Rousseff spent her whole first term without ever visiting
Bolivia. Even on the occasion of official summits such as the G77+China
in 2014, or UNASUR’s emergency meeting in 2013 following the denial
of fly-over permission to the Bolivian president’s airplane by some
European countries on a trip back from Russia, President Rousseff did
not travel to Bolivia.2
These episodes, however, did not have a major impact on bilateral
relations. The full normalization of Petrobrás’ economic activities in
Bolivia, with new major investments, came in 2012, when Rousseff
was already president. In 2014, the two countries signed an agree-
ment in which Brazil agreed to pay US$434 million compensation for
the export of rich components of Bolivian gas without due payment
prior to the 2006 nationalization. In Rousseff’s second term, the two
countries signed an energy integration agreement in 2015, whereby the
export of Bolivian electricity to Brazil and the construction of binational
hydroelectric power plants on the border will be studied.
The two countries did have a potentially serious diplomatic conflict
in May 2012, though, when Bolivian opposition senator Roger Pinto –
facing corruption accusations – sought refuge in the Brazilian Embassy
in La Paz and was granted political asylum, in spite of the fact that his
safe conduct to leave the country had been denied. Bolivian authori-
ties strongly criticized the asylum concession, and the tension increased
after an Embassy employee smuggled the senator out of the country and
into Brazil in August 2013. Brazil avoided diplomatic escalation, and

instead responded by condemning the employee’s action and removing
Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota. This significantly helped overcome
the crisis.
A pragmatic sovereignty-driven foreign policy
The characteristics stressed above may sometimes make Bolivian for-

eign policy towards Brazil appear somehow paradoxical. On the one
hand, it includes policies that could be considered as a balancing strat-
egy towards its neighbour, as in the case of gas, the firm stance towards
Senator Pinto, and the diversification of partnerships abroad. On the
other hand, and with the same determination, the Morales administra-
tion pursues policies that could be considered as bandwagoning, such
as the enthusiastic adherence to Brazil-led regional integration initia-
tives. The paradox, however, is only apparent. Bolivian foreign policy
under Morales takes its main thrust from the ongoing internal political
reorganization (Cunha Filho and Delgado, 2010) and responds to the
aims of sovereignty inscribed in the country’s National Development
Plan (Ministério de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2007; Cunha Filho and
Santaella Gonçalves, 2010). In this framework, the executive has not
refrained from adopting any sort of foreign policy positions consistent
with domestic reorganization and the quest for effective sovereignty,
even when these aims might occasionally put the country at odds with
international partners.
The centrality attributed to sovereignty in Bolivian official speeches
and documents reflects one of the main goals of the so-called ‘weak
states’ in the international realm, which, as Inayatullah and Blaney
(1995) argue, goes along with economic demands such as redistribu-
tion of wealth and equality. The explanation for this lies in the idea that
politics in the international realm does not work in isolation from capi-
talism; quite the contrary. Not surprisingly, ‘weak states’, mostly located
in the Global South, are characterized by some sort of economic inca-
pacity, and therefore by difficulty in achieving real sovereignty, since
they are constantly dependant on stronger states. In that sense, author-
ity over the domestic political community and autonomy in relation
to the international sphere require the material resources to sustain
a more independent national project. The projects promoted by the
new administration in La Paz follow this logic and see the sovereignty–
development nexus as crucial to the country’s effective decolonization
and independence.
Stressing Bolivia’s particularity in and to the world is an integral

part of this vision. The National Development Plan stands as a water-
shed in relation to previous documents, inasmuch as it systematizes
the government’s goals and state project, uniting sovereignty, economic
strength, and Bolivia’s exceptionality in the same discourse (Cunha
Filho and Santaella Gonçalves, 2010). Bolivia’s uniqueness is to be
found in the absorption of the Aymara expression Suma Qamaña, trans-
lated as ‘Living Well’ and frequently reproduced by the government
in national propaganda and international meetings. In the domestic
sphere, this serves as some sort of recognition of indigenous peoples
(in fairness, especially Aymara) and the maintenance of their support;
in the international sphere, the same emphasis works as a way to
project Bolivia’s self-image, constructed on its indigenous character as
the source of a positive difference in relation to other states (Delgado,
2014).
Certainly, the Bolivian government under Morales shows a remark-
able degree of pragmatism (Mayorga, 2007, 2011) that allows it to find
some common middle ground over conflicts with international part-
ners. In the case of Brazil and the other Latin American neighbours, the
government’s sincere programmatic commitment to regional integra-
tion seems to help attain such a compromise. But this behaviour should
not be read in terms of simple, and perhaps simplistic, balancing or
bandwagoning. The current Bolivian foreign policy responds mainly to
internal political imperatives. Its goal is to assert national sovereignty
and link it to both development and the projection of its self-image
internationally. All other considerations seem to be contingent on and
subservient to the attainment of this aim.
Notes
1. For a more detailed analysis of the neoliberal reforms in Bolivia, see Barja Daza
(1999), Dunkerley (1990), Kohl and Farthing (2006), and Grindle (2003).
2. Allegedly at the request of the US, due to the suspicion that Morales could be
carrying American whistleblower Edward Snowden.
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9
The Peruvian Response to the Rise
of Brazil: Developing a Strategic
Relationship
Ronald Bruce St John
The Republic of Peru has enjoyed commercial and diplomatic relations

with the Federative Republic of Brazil since the independence era; how-
ever, those relations were limited in scope, design, and purpose until
the turn of the last century. With the rise of Brazil as an increasingly
influential regional and international power, Peru saw an opportunity to
expand and deepen its relationship with Brazil in the wider context of
Peruvian policy in the Amazon region and participation in the Initiative
for Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America. As a result,
bilateral relations between Peru and Brazil in areas like immigration,
investment, trade, and security have expanded considerably over the
last decade and look set to continue to grow in the future. The Peruvian
response to the rise of Brazil was both deep-rooted and opportunistic, as
a long-term Peruvian interest in a wider relationship with Brazil led to
the conclusion of a strategic alliance as early as 2003.
Boundaries and trade
In common with most of its neighbours, Peru’s boundaries at inde-

pendence in 1824 were in dispute, and would remain so for much of
the next century. In the Amazon Basin, the legal basis of the territorial
claims of Peru and Brazil centred on the applicability of treaties nego-
tiated by Spain and Portugal in the 18th century (St John, 2012:181).
In an effort to resolve conflicting interpretations of these early agree-
ments, Peru and Brazil, in an 1841 treaty, accepted the principle of uti
possidetis, a doctrine generally understood to say that each new state was
145
146 Peruvian Response to the Rise of Brazil
entitled to the territory formerly under the jurisdiction of the colonial

administrative areas from which it was formed (Checa Drouet, 1936);
however, the agreement was never ratified. After Peru and the US con-
cluded a commercial treaty in 1851, a pact that Brazil viewed as a threat
to its interests, Peru and Brazil agreed in the 1851 Herrera-Da Ponte
Ribeyro convention that navigation on the Amazon River belonged
exclusively to the states owning its banks. In 1902, Peru began to chal-
lenge Brazil’s long-time occupation of most of the disputed territory,
systematically establishing outposts in the contested region. When war
threatened, Peru and Brazil concluded a pair of agreements in 1904 that
restored the peace, albeit largely on Brazilian terms (Moore, 1904:4–6,
18–21; Wagner de Reyna, 1964:I, 62–70, 133). Eager to resolve all of
Peru’s boundary disputes, Peruvian President Augusto B. Leguía (1908–
1912, 1919–1930) later opened negotiations with Brazil that led in
1909 to a Treaty of Limits, Commerce, and Navigation on the Amazon
River, conceding to Brazil the bulk of the disputed territory (St John,
1999:50–51, 76–78, 145–146).
Throughout most of the 20th century, bilateral relations between Peru
and Brazil were cordial in nature but limited in scope. Peru and Brazil
concluded only 35 international agreements prior to 1950, and 23 of
those were signed in the first half of the 20th century. As official contacts
increased in the second half of the 20th century, the number of bilateral
agreements concluded over the next 40 years totalled an additional 99
(Bákula, 2002:I, 718). Given the relative scarcity of bilateral agreements,
Brazilian involvement in a number of South American disputes, often
in cooperation with the US, had the greatest impact on Peruvian foreign
policy in this period (Novak and Namihas, 2012:60–65). When the 1887
Spanish arbitration of the Ecuador–Peru boundary dispute led to a pro-
jected award in 1910 that largely accepted Peru’s juridical thesis, violent
protests broke out in Ecuador and Peru. War appeared imminent, but a
tripartite mediation by Argentina, Brazil, and the US eventually restored
the peace. In late 1924, Brazil presented friendly but formal observations
to Peru that the Treaty of Frontiers and Free Inland Navigation that Peru
had concluded with Colombia in March 1922 dealt in part with terri-
tory Brazil claimed against Peru and had never settled in its dispute with
Colombia. After Peruvian filibusters in 1932 occupied Leticia, the only
village of any importance in the territory ceded by Peru to Colombia in
the 1922 treaty, talks opened in Rio de Janeiro in October 1933 under
the mediatory auspices of Afranio de Melo Franco, a former foreign min-
ister of Brazil. These talks led to a May 1934 settlement in which Peru
expressed regret for the occupation of Leticia, and Peru and Colombia
Ronald Bruce St John 147
agreed to renew diplomatic relations (Ulloa Sotomayor, 1941:79–96; St

John, 1999:167–171).
In 1941, Argentina, Brazil, and the US, later joined by Chile, medi-
ated an interim settlement to the long-standing boundary dispute
between Peru and Ecuador. Under the terms of the 1942 Rio Pro-
tocol, the four mediators guaranteed the protocol and its execution,
ensuring a continuing role for them until the Peru–Ecuador dispute
was resolved in the 1998 Brasilia Accords. In the interim, Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela con-
cluded a multilateral Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation in 1978 that
attempted to balance the demands of economic growth with environ-
mental conservation in the Amazon region. Calling for joint studies
aimed at improving telecommunication links throughout the Amazon,
the treaty proved a precursor to the Initiative for Integration of Regional
Infrastructure in South America (Iniciativa para la Integración de la
Infraestructura Regional Suramérica, IIRSA) (Costa, 1988:53–96; Bákula,
2002:I, 724–728, 734–747).
By the mid-1980s, economic regionalism was a priority in Latin
America, as reflected in the establishment in 1986 of the Program
of Cooperation between Brazil and Argentina and in efforts in Peru
and elsewhere to revitalize the Andean Pact. The Common Market of
the South (Mercado Común del Sur, MERCOSUR) was established in
1991, and the creation of a South American Community of Nations
(Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones, CSN) aimed at combining the
Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones, CAN)
and MERCOSUR began in 2000. By this time, most Latin American states
viewed sub-regional cooperation pacts as steps towards greater hemi-
spheric integration; however, Brazil was an exception, as it continued to
view sub-regional and regional initiatives largely in the context of trade
and security issues. As the process of regionalism unfolded, Brazil took a
greater interest in South American affairs in general and its ties with Peru
in particular. President Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) made a state visit
to Brasilia in 1996, and President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–
2003) visited Lima in 1999 (Soares de Lima, 1996:141–142; Gomes
Saraiva, 2011:59–63).
Strategic relationship
At the outset of the administration of Peruvian President Alejandro

Toledo (2001–2006), diplomatic relations between Peru and Brazil were
correct but not warm, in part due to a contentious meeting between
Toledo and Brazilian President Cardoso during the 2000 presidential

campaign in Peru. According to an eyewitness, Toledo entered the meet-
ing thinking that Cardoso supported Peruvian President Fujimori’s bid
for re-election; consequently, the manner in which Toledo conducted
himself during the meeting left a poor impression with Cardoso. Brazil
later supported the work of an Organization of American States (OAS)
observer mission sent to Peru to monitor the election; nevertheless, per-
sonal relations between Toledo and Cardoso remained strained in the
aftermath of Toledo’s electoral victory. José Eduardo Ponce Vivanco, the
Peruvian ambassador to Brazil in 1999–2000, returned to Peru prior to
Toledo’s inauguration, and President Toledo delayed naming a replace-
ment envoy for a year, in what Brazilians viewed as a diplomatic slight to
President Cardoso. In contrast, President Toledo worked hard to develop
a strong personal relationship with Cardoso’s successor, President Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2011) (Ponce Vivanco, 2008; Toledo, 2008).
A strategic relationship with Brazil was under consideration at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru as early as the second Fujimori admin-
istration (1990–1995, 1995–2000), and several factors led to its consum-
mation under Toledo (Novak and Namihas, 2012:108–116, 123–127).
For decades, Brazil and Peru had tended to articulate different for-
eign policy goals and look in opposite directions, with Brazil generally
focused on Africa and the US and Peru more concerned with boundary
questions and Andean affairs. In the 1990s, the focus of Brazil turned
increasingly to South America, in a transition begun under President
Cardoso and accelerated under President Lula. In his first eight months
in office, for example, President Lula met every South American head
of state, almost doubled the number of diplomats posted to embassies
throughout the region, and increased financing for regional trade and
infrastructure. At the same time, Peruvian involvement in Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), together with its growing participation
in Asian markets, made improved access to the Pacific attractive to
Brazil, which has the most advanced industrial sector in Latin America.
For Peru, the conclusion of a strategic alliance with Brazil marked a reori-
entation of its foreign policy from CAN towards MERCOSUR (Deustua,
2002:113–121; García Sayán, 2008; de Zela, 2012:30).
Once Presidents Toledo and Lula had laid the groundwork for a strate-
gic alliance in an April 2003 meeting in Brasilia, they met again in
Lima in August 2003, concluding a pact with an ambitious set of objec-
tives. First, they agreed to promote increased economic and political
cooperation and development within the framework of IIRSA. Sec-
ond, they agreed to promote bilateral trade and investment within
the context of the Economic Complementation Agreement (Acuerdo

de Complementación Económica, ACE 58) that Peru and MERCOSUR
were negotiating, with a key objective being the achievement of bal-
anced commercial growth between Peru and Brazil. Third, they agreed to
negotiate an agreement that would give Peru access to two surveillance
systems – the Amazon Surveillance System (Sistema de Vigilancia de la
Amazonía, SIVAM) and the related Amazon Protection System (Sistema
de Protección de la Amazonía, SIPAM) – that Brazil had developed for use
in the Amazon Basin. Fourth, they agreed to support the South American
Community of Nations, created at the Third Summit of South American
Presidents in 2004, as part of an effort to create within South America a
zone of peace, security, free trade, cooperation, development, and polit-
ical dialogue. Other goals included support for democracy and the
rule of law, the promotion of human rights as an essential element of
socioeconomic development, and the creation of improved conditions
for mutual friendship, understanding, commerce, and transit (St John,
2010:147–148; Novak and Namihas, 2012:126–133). Peruvian Foreign
Minister Allan Wagner, a professional diplomat not given to hyper-
bole, shortly thereafter characterized the Peru–Brazil alliance as the most
important event in Peruvian foreign policy in the last 30 years (Wagner,
2003; Gestión 26 August 2003).
The IIRSA initiative involves multiple governments and some
US$37 billion in potential investment in a series of large-scale, high-risk,
and debt-heavy projects. Requiring significant investment in transporta-
tion, energy, and telecommunications, the initiative, when completed,
will consist of multiple axes or hubs of economic integration, crisscross-
ing the South American continent. Peru is located in the eye of the
storm, as three of these axes cross Peru, linking the Brazilian Amazon
with the Pacific coast. Opened in 2011, IIRSA Sur runs from the Brazilian
port of Santos to the Peruvian ports of Ilo, Matarani, and San Juan
de Marcona, and was the first axis in the IIRSA system to link the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. IIRSA Norte will join the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans by way of the Amazon River and its tributaries in Colombia,
Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru. When completed, it will increase commerce
within northern Peru and between northern Peru and the Brazilian
ports of Manaus, Belen, and Macapá. Finally, IIRSA Centro links the
Brazilian Amazon through the river port of Pucallpa to the port of Callao
(Cornejo, 2012:25–43; Burges, 2012–2013:133–148).
Two weeks after the conclusion of the strategic understanding with
Brazil, Foreign Minister Wagner, in an article in a weekly Peruvian
magazine, provided additional perspective on the significance of the
agreement to Peru (Caretas, 11 September 2003). After stressing the

importance of full participation in the IIRSA initiative and the three
road corridors outlined above, he discussed other aspects of the pact.
Regarding the free trade agreement with MERCOSUR, which at the time
comprised Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay with Bolivia and
Chile as associate members, he noted that the agreement gave Peru
access to a market of 220 million people. It also put Peru in a lead-
ership role in promoting cooperation between CAN and MERCOSUR,
because the deal opened the way for future accords between MERCOSUR
and other Andean states. In addition, he stressed the importance of the
clause in the agreement that gave Peru access to the information gen-
erated by the two surveillance systems developed by Brazil. Utilizing
a mixture of fixed and mobile ground radar, meteorological stations,
and airborne surveillance, SIVAM and SIPAM provide real-time informa-
tion on illegal activities in the Amazon Basin, including drug trafficking,
illegal logging, and other forms of illicit deforestation, together with
meteorological data (Rodríguez, 2008). Peru and Brazil later concluded
an agreement formalizing Peruvian participation in both SIVAM and
SIPAM (Santa Gadea Duarte, 2012:131–154).
Some aspects of the strategic alliance with Brazil, especially the
many road construction projects, were not without their critics. Oppo-
sition politicians complained that President Toledo had rushed the
approval process through a Byzantine bureaucracy, bypassing channels
that would have more thoroughly assessed the economic benefits of
public spending and likely raised concerns about the economic and
environmental viability of the roads. The government claimed that the
projects would generate large numbers of new jobs, but critics noted that
most of them would be short-term construction jobs. Environmentalists
warned that the new highways would mean more secondary roads, addi-
tional cattle ranches, and increased logging in environmentally rich and
sensitive areas of the Amazon Basin. Finally, observers inside and outside
Peru worried that road construction would bring with it vices like prosti-
tution, drugs, and contraband, feeding off the Wild West atmosphere in
Amazonian Peru (Financial Times, 18 July 2005; St John, 2010:149–150).
In response, President Toledo argued that IIRSA Sur alone was more
important to Peruvian development than the Camisea Gas Project. In so
doing, he forecast that it would add 2% annually to the GDP of Peru and
transform every village it contacted (Toledo, 2006). For the remaining
two years of the Toledo administration, implementation of the strategic
alliance with Brazil remained centre stage, but Peru also engaged Brazil
on other diplomatic fronts. The free trade agreement between Peru and
MERCOSUR was executed in December 2005, and ratifications of a Peru–

Brazil extradition treaty were exchanged in late May 2006 (Maúrtua de
Romaña, 2006; St John, 2010:150–151).
Expanding ties (2006–2011)
In the course of the 2006 presidential campaign, former president

Alan García (1985–1990) reinvented himself, gaining favour with vot-
ers when he targeted his message at younger Peruvians with no memory
of his disastrous first administration (St John, 2006). He promised to
continue macroeconomic stability, promote worker rights, and levy a
windfall profits tax on mining companies. Pushing an austerity program
that included a reduction in public sector salaries, he offered condi-
tional support for a free trade agreement with the US and pledged to
maintain open relations with the International Monetary Fund (Perú,
Presidencia de la República, 2006). Signalling the direction of Peruvian
foreign policy in his second term, President García, in a back-handed
complement to the Toledo administration, told Miami Herald journalist
Andres Oppenheimer in June 2006 that ‘Peru’s foreign policy has not
been the most misguided part of Toledo’s government. So we must con-
tinue [current policies] in issues such as opening up the world market
and drawing investments in a framework of democracy’ (Miami Herald,
11 June 2011).
As is often the case with newly elected officials, García, the presi-
dent, was not always the same as García, the candidate. Once in office,
President García pursued a foreign policy that blended the old with
the new, but often mirrored the policies of the Toledo administration.
In an early August 2006 interview with Caretas, José Antonio García
Belaúnde, the newly appointed foreign minister, was mildly critical of
the foreign policy of the Toledo administration, yet outlined a set of
goals little changed from those of President Toledo (Caretas August 3,
2006). Consequently, the foreign policy of the second García admin-
istration stood in marked contrast to that of his first government, in
that it largely continued the pragmatism-over-ideology model pursued
by Presidents Fujimori and Toledo (St John, 2011:119–137). Ambassador
García Belaúnde continued as the foreign minister of Peru throughout
the entire second administration of President García, and in a January
2014 interview, he argued that the foreign policy of the second García
administration was ‘less ideological, less biased, and more reasoned’
than that of the Toledo administration ‘but not necessarily different’
(García Belaúnde, 2014).
Eager to advance the strategic alliance with Brazil, President-elect

García sought out President Lula in June 2006 and stressed to him
that the emphasis of his second administration would be on a wider
South American union, with Brazil being the key to that goal (Perú21, 9
June 2006). Five months later, President García made an official visit to
Brazil, meeting with President Lula and issuing a 9 November 2006 joint
communication, ‘Ampliando los horizontes de una Alianza Estratégica’,
in which the two heads of state pledged to advance bilateral coopera-
tion and integration at all levels, including defence, education, energy,
investment, trade, and tourism. The joint communication made special
mention of an agreement to begin so-called 2+2 meetings between the
ministers of defence and foreign policy of Peru and Brazil and to acceler-
ate the integration of Peru into the SIVAM and SIPAM security systems.
It also stressed the importance of the ongoing process of physical inte-
gration, especially the completion of IIRSA Sur and IIRSA Centro (Novak
and Namihas, 2012:156–160). When the momentum that marked the
early years of the strategic initiative appeared to slow, President Lula
made an official visit to Peru in mid-May 2008 in what one informed
Peruvian observer, Alejandro Deustua, rightly described as an attempt
to relaunch a bilateral initiative that was not receiving the attention
that its strategic importance merited. At the end of the meeting, the
joint communication issued by Presidents García and Lula emphasized
the need for increased focus on high-priority areas, including cross-
border development, electrical interconnectivity, energy cooperation
and development, and increased investment. In the course of the meet-
ing, the two heads of state also signed ten new cooperation agreements
in related institutional areas, including agriculture, health, housing, and
labour (Deustua, 2008).
President García made another state visit to Brazil in February 2008,
and during this visit, García and Lula signed 12 additional accords,
including agreements on technical cooperation, health, education, bio-
technology, energy-mining, and Amazonian security. In July 2008,
Brazil, Colombia, and Peru also concluded a memorandum of under-
standing aimed at combating narco-trafficking in the Amazon, a reflec-
tion of their growing concern with immigration and border-related
security issues (Perú21, 20 July 2008). President García returned to Brazil
in September 2008 at the head of a large delegation of government min-
isters and private businessmen in a visit aimed at promoting investment,
trade, and tourism. In April 2009, Presidents García and Lula met in
the Brazilian border state of Acre, where they signed the ‘Compromiso
de Río Branco’, a ten-point document that emphasized the need for
greater commercial and economic integration in the borderland, includ-

ing a reduction in technical obstacles to trade. The agreement also
expressed the mutual interest of both states in wider energy cooperation.
By September 2009, President García, not known for understatement,
was proclaiming Peru–Brazil relations to be at the ‘highest and most
creative point in history’ (Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times, 8 Septem-
ber 2009). Thereafter, Presidents García and Lula continued to meet
on a regular basis, including a December 2009 meeting in Lima and a
June 2010 meeting in Manaus, where agreements covering scientific and
technical cooperation, border integration, water resource management,
and energy integration were signed (MercoPress, 18 June 2010; de Zela,
2012:32–36).
The most controversial agreement concluded by the García and Lula
administrations was the June 2010 energy agreement calling for con-
struction of a series of hydroelectric dams in the borderland. Part of
a broader Brazilian strategy to construct hydropower plants in neigh-
bouring countries to help supply Brazil’s surging demand for electricity,
the 50-year agreement committed Peru to generating up to 7,200 MW
of power for domestic consumption and export to Brazil, most of
which was expected to come from hydropower in the Peruvian Amazon
(Reuters, 2 December 2011). In February 2012, the Central Ashaninka
of the Ene River (CARE), an indigenous group, filed a lawsuit at the
Superior Court of Justice in Lima, seeking an injunction against the
agreement on the grounds that it threatened the fundamental rights
of indigenous peoples. With the Peruvian Amazon one of the world’s
biodiversity hotspots, the lawsuit called for the conduct of environmen-
tal and social impact evaluations, together with technical assessments
of Peru’s energy needs and the options to meet those needs (Inter Press
Service News Agency, 5 March 2012).
Continuity and change (2011–2015)
In the course of the 2011 presidential election in Peru, the Workers’

Party of Brazil, the political party of President Dilma Vana Rousseff and
former president Lula, threw its weight behind the candidacy of the
Peruvian nationalist and former army officer Ollanta Humala. Acting
as political advisors, Brazilian political strategists, including the cam-
paign manager for the Brazilian Workers’ Party and mastermind behind
Lula’s presidential victory in 2002, helped to transform Humala from
a far-left politician into one more socially moderate and thus attrac-
tive to a broader base of political support. In so doing, Brazil presented
the region with a new paradigm, an increasingly influential regional

and international power willing to intervene in the domestic politics
of a neighbouring state when Brazilian economic and political inter-
ests were at stake. In the course of the campaign, Humala praised the
‘Brazilian experience’ for ‘delivering success and results by respecting
freedom of the press, the adequate management of the macro-economy,
and monetary stability’ (Aramayo and Pereira, 2011). Brazilian interven-
tion proved just enough to get Humala elected. In a June 2011 run-off
election between Humala and Keiko Sofia Fujimori Higuchi, daughter of
former president Fujimori, Humala received just over 51% of the vote
(Associated Press, 12 July 2011). This was the first time Brazil had exerted
its influence and leverage in a presidential election in another coun-
try, and whether the experience becomes the exception or the rule, it
was clearly successful in this case, as President Humala has proved to
be a good friend of Brazil. An article in The Economist magazine pub-
lished almost three years after the 2011 run-off election rightly described
Humala as a ‘pro-Brazilian social democrat’ (The Economist, 12 April
2014).
President-elect Humala’s first stop in a week-long tour of South
America was Brazil, where he met with both President Rousseff and
former president Lula and reaffirmed Peru’s commitment to the Peru–
Brazil strategic relationship (Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times, 8 June
2011). Over the next two years, the Humala administration worked
to strengthen its strategic alliance with Brazil, building on old initia-
tives and introducing new ones (Roncagliolo, 2014). In September 2011,
for example, the head of the Brazil–Peru Chamber of Commerce and
Integration (Camera Binacional de Comercio e Integración Perú Brasil,
CAPEBRAS) in Lima, Miguel Vega Alvear, noted that Brazil and Peru had
had more presidential meetings in the last ten years than in the previ-
ous 180, and this accelerated pace of high-level interaction continued
throughout the first four years of the Humala administration (Financial
Times, 20 September 2011).
In December 2011, the Peruvian ambassador to Brazil announced the
creation of a joint commission to combat drug trafficking in the Amazon
region, and in December 2012, Peru and Brazil created a binational
working group to study the financial and legal aspects of defence tech-
nology transfer (Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times, 29 December 2011;
Andina, 18 December 2012). Throughout this period, Peru also tar-
geted increased exports to Brazil, together with deeper integration with
the Pacific Alliance (Alianza del Pacífico, AP), to offset slower trade
with developing markets (Reuters, 21 May 2013). In June 2013, former
president Lula travelled to Lima to participate in a forum marking the

tenth anniversary of the Peru–Brazil strategic alliance. After highlighting
the advances that had been made over the previous decade, President
Humala noted that much work remained to be done to enhance bilateral
trade and borderland development, advance the development of science
and technology, and combat drug trafficking, as well as in the related
areas of energy, fluvial, commercial, and cultural integration (Andina, 5
June 2013).
In November 2013, President Rousseff made a state visit to Peru,
highlighting the momentum the Humala administration had sustained
in the decade-long strategic alliance (Roncagliolo, 2014). In a tweet
before her arrival, the Brazilian head of state noted that more than
70 Brazilian companies were now operating in Peru, where they had
invested some US$6.0 billion, and she later added that Peru ranked
third in terms of Brazilian investments in South American states (Agence
France-Presse, 11 November 2013). To mark the end of the first decade of
their strategic alliance, which President Rousseff said ‘has reached a new
threshold’, Humala and Rousseff signed three new agreements beneficial
to Peruvians and Brazilians in the borderland. The first two agreements
made it easier for them to live and work in border areas, and the third
provided for greater cooperation between the National Water Authority
of Peru and the National Water Agency of Brazil in their management
of the water quality in common rivers. Presidents Humala and Rousseff
also agreed to create working groups to study building a railway link-
ing their two states and to boost internet connectivity (El Comercio, 11
November 2013; El Peruano, 12 November 2013).
Conclusions
With Brazil on the rise as a regional and international power, the Peru–
Brazil strategic alliance concluded in 2003 has proved advantageous to
Peru from a number of different perspectives. Economic development
has become a priority in many of the borderlands of Peru, areas tra-
ditionally underdeveloped, isolated, and disadvantaged. Bilateral trade
and investment have also increased. Peruvian exports to Brazil nearly
tripled in 2006–2012, and by the end of 2013, bilateral trade had reached
US$3.9 billion. Unfortunately, the bulk of the trade is in the form of
Brazilian imports to Peru, creating a growing trade imbalance and bely-
ing the call in the 2003 agreement for ‘balanced commercial growth’.
At the end of 2013, Brazilian investments in Peru totalled approxi-
mately US$6 billion, with the mining sector most attractive to Brazilian
investors, followed by manufacturing, services, and construction. The

Brazil–Peru Chamber of Commerce and Integration recently estimated
that Brazilian investment in Peru could reach US$34 billion over the
next 20 years. Access to the SIVAM–SIPAM security systems developed
by Brazil has enabled Peru to address more effectively long-standing nar-
cotics, immigration, and smuggling issues. Progress also has been made
in areas like health care, science and technology transfer, and cultural
integration.
The diplomatic and political benefits of the strategic alliance are less
clear. Politically, Peru and Brazil are compatible, in that both are working
democracies; however, their traditional approaches to and expectations
from regional integration differ. Like most Latin American states, Peru
has tended to view regional economic integration as a potential first
step towards greater political unity. Brazil is the regional exception in
this regard, as it has tended to view regional integration more in terms
of economic gain, with the end game being increased trade and invest-
ment as opposed to regional political unity. In a similar vein, many Latin
American states do not view Brazil as a natural leader in the region,
because its foreign policy agenda is often focused on different areas, like
Africa and the Middle East, and different subjects, like nuclear enrich-
ment and UN Security Council reform. In the case of the US, Brazil has
often pursued agendas separate and distinct from those of its neighbours
in the region. Almost every Peruvian president in recent times, including
Toledo, García, and Humala, has acknowledged the importance of hav-
ing a positive relationship with the US; however, Brazil has often taken a
more independent approach. President Rousseff’s decision in September
2013 to postpone an official visit to Washington to protest US spying
activities that she denounced as a ‘violation of human rights and civil
liberties’ is a case in point (Byman and Wittes, 2014). China is a different
matter, with both Brazil and Peru welcoming increased investment and
trade with Beijing. Over the last decade, China has become the principal
export market for Brazil and Peru, and regarding imports, it is also now
the leading supplier to both states. As a result, China has impacted more
than the US on the current Brazil–Peru relationship, with Peru in effect
becoming the door to better access to Asia-Pacific markets for Brazilian
trade.
At the same time, it is important to recognize the asymmetrical nature
of the Peru–Brazil relationship. Due to its size, power, and location,
Brazil looms large on the Peruvian horizon, but the view from the
opposite direction is very different. In Brazil, Peru is viewed as a middle-
range power with limited resources, capacities, and influence. Brazil
can have a significant impact on the domestic and foreign policies of

Peru, but Peru has a limited ability to impact on policy-makers or pol-
icy in Brazil. In part because of this asymmetrical relationship, more
and more Peruvians over the last decade have expressed concern that
Brazil could come to dominate Peru. Overt Brazilian involvement in
the 2011 Peruvian presidential election and Brazilian interest in con-
structing hydropower projects in Peru and a rail link to the Pacific
Ocean through Peru have heightened Peruvian concerns that Brazilian
demands could trump Peruvian priorities, with Peru becoming a satellite
to its eastern neighbour. Consequently, it is highly likely that domes-
tic Peruvian politics will have an increasingly strong impact on future
relations with Brazil.
Finally, when it comes to defining the Peruvian reaction to the rise
of Brazil, opportunism, as opposed to more traditional approaches like
balancing or bandwagoning, is the word that best defines the Peruvian
response. Peruvian businessmen, diplomats, and politicians have long
considered the possibility of forming a closer relationship with Brazil,
and events at the turn of the century, notably increased Brazilian inter-
est and involvement in Latin American affairs and the IIRSA initiative,
offered the perfect opportunity to consummate a strategic alliance. Over
the last decade, successive Peruvian governments have worked to nur-
ture and expand this strategic relationship, creating mutually beneficial
synergies; nevertheless, it remains an unequal alliance whose future
limits are unclear.
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10
Venezuela and the Rise of Brazil:
Convergence and Divergence in the
Chávez Era
José Briceño-Ruiz
Introduction
Brazil and Venezuela were ‘indifferent neighbours’ for decades.

Nonetheless, the bilateral relations entered into a new historical period
after a meeting held in Caracas, in March 1994, between Presidents
Rafael Caldera and Itamar Franco. Fernando Henrique Cardoso contin-
ued Franco’s initiatives and was committed to deepening relations with
Venezuela. The rise to power of Hugo Chávez in 1999 did not bring this
process to a halt. Conversely, when Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva arrived to
power in 2003, the so-called Lula–Chávez axis relaunched the bilateral
agenda, the pinnacle of which was the signing of a bilateral strate-
gic partnership in 2005. Despite the fact that the bilateral relation has
lost momentum during Dilma Rousseff’s and Nicolas Maduro’s govern-
ments, Venezuela and Brazil are currently closer neighbours than they
were 20 years ago.
This new age of bilateral relations has to a large extent coincided with
the rising of Brazil as a global actor, a factor that has shaped the way
in which Venezuelan political and economic elites have perceived the
rapprochement with this country, especially in the Lula–Chávez era. The
polarization that has characterized the Venezuelan political system since
1999 has also defined the perceptions of the domestic actors on relations
with Brazil.
This chapter analyses the relations between Venezuela and Brazil
in a period which has coincided with the rising of Brazil as a global
power and Venezuela’s increasing presence in international affairs under
Hugo Chávez. The chapter is organized as follows. The rapprochement
160
José Briceño-Ruiz 161
between Brazil and Venezuela from the 1990s to today is analysed in the
first section. The second section evaluates differences between the inter-
national strategy of the two countries and the extent to which these
differences impede a deepening of bilateral relations. The third section
discusses the reactions of Venezuelan domestic actors to the growing
relations with Brazil and the extent to which these are actually linked
with the rise of Brazil as a global power. The final section examines the
strategy fostered by the Venezuelan government to deal with the rise of
Brazil.
Brazilian–Venezuelan relations from the 1990s to the

present
The years previous to the summit between Caldera and Franco had
been marked by tensions caused by the invasions of garimpeiros1 on
the Venezuelan southern border. These were often associated with a dis-
course of an alleged ‘Brazilian expansionism’ in South America. Caldera
was able to rebuild the bilateral relation by furthering an agenda beyond
the garimpeiros issue and by diluting the narrative of a Brazilian expan-
sionism. The summit between Caldera and Franco was a turning point,
and the Protocol of Guzmania, the final document of that meeting, is
considered the stepping stone of the new era in the relations between
Brazil and Venezuela. The bilateral relation was consolidated in the years
following that summit. Three periods in the bilateral relationship can
be observed since the meeting between Caldera and Franco (Barros and
Sanná-Pinto, 2012).
A period of reconnaissance began with the Protocol of Guzmania,
in which possible areas of initial cooperation were outlined, such
as energy and infrastructure. In particular, the collaboration between
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) and Petrobras and the definition
of projects to improve infrastructure and connect northern Brazil and
southern Venezuela were proposed (Barros and Pinto-Sanna, 2012:109).
In the second period, a consolidation of the bilateral relation took
place with the decision of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to pro-
vide gasoline to Venezuela during the general strike that took place in
this country between December 2002 and January 2003. These events
coincided with the change of strategy of the Brazilian National Bank
of Economic and Social Development (BNDES), which was allowed
to finance infrastructure projects carried out by Brazilian firms in
Venezuela. Another feature of this period was the growth of bilateral
trade.
162 Venezuela and the Rise of Brazil
The rise of Lula da Silva to power in 2003 led to a deepening of the

bilateral relation. First, the ideological empathy between the Labour
Party and the ‘Venezuelan revolution’ created expectations of closer
cooperation. Second, after victory in the recall referendum in Venezuela
in August 2004, Chávez decided to restructure the foreign policy strategy
in order to increase the Venezuelan presence in Latin American affairs.
In particular, Chávez aimed at blocking the US proposal of establish-
ing a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) as well as weakening the
open regionalism model that had been hegemonic since the early 1990s.
Brazil and Lula were perceived as allies in such tasks. Last but not least,
the two presidents got along very well, which helped the consolida-
tion of what was perceived as a new political axis in Latin America: the
Chávez–Lula axis (Naim, 2008, 2009).
A strategic alliance was signed in Caracas in February 2005 with the
aim of giving new direction to the bilateral relation. The agenda that
had been fostered since the Caldera–Franco meeting was complemented
with new goals that echoed the political discourse promoted by both
leaders. Thus, aims such as the fight against poverty and the promo-
tion of the Patria Grande were part of the strategic alliance. There was
some convergence between Chávez’s and Lula’s ideas on certain for-
eign policy issues, such as the rejection of FTAA, the promotion of
South American economic and political regionalism, and the criticism of
some international institutions. Two additional projects are important
to highlight, even if they were not explicitly included in the strategic
alliance: a joint venture between Petrobras and PDVSA to build a refin-
ery in Pernambuco, which would be called José Inácio Abreu e Lima,
and the Gran Gasoducto del Sur (the Great South American Pipeline),
proposed by Chávez and initially supported by Lula.
The third period of the bilateral relationship began in 2007, when dif-
ficulties in the development of the Abreu Lima refinery and the Great
South American Pipeline arose (Barros and Sanna-Pinto, 2012:109–110).
In this period, Brazil and Venezuela were also actively involved in the
transformation of the Community of South American Nations into
the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the creation of
the Community of Latin America and the Caribbean States (CELAC),
projects that both countries supported, although their approach to these
initiatives was not exactly similar, as will be explained later in this
chapter.
We can add a fourth period to Barros and Sanna-Pinto’s original his-
torical classification. This period began with the rise to power of Dilma
Rousseff in 2011 and is influenced by the death of Hugo Chávez in
2013. Bilateral relations have remained strong during this period, espe-
cially in the domains of trade and investment, one result of which is
the transformation of Brazil into one of Venezuela’s major trading part-
ners. However, dynamism has been lost in the political sphere. This
has occurred because Dilma has reduced the personal stamp that Lula
tried to place on Brazilian foreign policy, but also because of different
approaches to several issues of the international agenda. The illness and
subsequent death of Hugo Chávez also played a role in the reduced
dynamism of bilateral relations. Once elected, Nicolas Maduro visited
Brazil in May 2013 and confirmed the Venezuelan interest in maintain-
ing and strengthening the strategic alliance. While the existence of a
Lula– Chávez axis was discussed for several years (Naim, 2009), there
seems to be consensus that there is no Rousseff–Maduro axis, and some
scholars have even argued that a ‘discreet distancing’ between Brazil and
Venezuela is taking place (Romero, 2013).
The limits of the bilateral relationship: The differences

despite the friendship
Despite the empathy between Lula and Chávez and the commitment
to greater cooperation in the political sphere, as projected in the strate-
gic alliance signed in 2005, political reality revealed differences between
Brazil and Venezuela that limit the bilateral relation. The crux of the
matter is that the two countries have different worldviews. Despite
coincidences in the understanding of some aspects of the international
political and economic order (especially in the era of Lula–Dilma in
Brazil), substantive differences also exist. As a result, diverse foreign
policy strategies and approaches to international economic integration
have been proposed by Venezuela and Brazil.
Brazil and Venezuela have different approaches to the international
system. The Venezuelan government subscribes to an anti-systemic view
of the world political order, in line with what Fred Halliday (2002)
and Laurent Rucker (2004) have described as revolutionary states. The
governments of this kind of state aim at extending to international
affairs the radical changes that have been implemented at domestic
level. In this sense, ‘Chavism’ has developed a radical criticism of
globalization, which is perceived as a process that has deepened the
asymmetries of power in the international system, favouring the devel-
oped countries. The criticism is particularly incisive regarding the US,
a country perceived as the main enemy of the ‘Bolivarian revolution’.
Thus, differences with the US emerged in the initial period of the Chávez
government (between 1999 and his victory in the recall referendum),

particularly due to the criticism of the existing world order, which
Chávez often described as unipolar.
In fact, one of the objectives of Venezuelan foreign policy in that
period was the promotion of a multipolar order by building different
poles of power to confront US unipolarism; one of those poles would be
South America. After 2004, but markedly after 2006, the Venezuela gov-
ernment started to describe the US as an ‘empire’, and anti-imperialism
became at that time a complement of the objective of promoting a
multipolar world. This ‘anti-US’ and ‘anti-imperialist’ rhetoric became a
crucial element in the Chávez government’s international strategy, the
paramount moment of which was achieved in 2006, during the par-
ticipation of the Venezuelan president at the annual sessions of the
General Assembly of the United Nations. Chávez described President
George W. Bush as ‘the devil’ and ‘world tyrant’ wanting to impose
a ‘model of exploitation and pillage’ and the US hegemony (Chávez,
2006 [2013]:18–19). Venezuela became the most uncooperative country
in the region after Cuba vis-à-vis the US and a strident critic of almost
every US foreign policy initiative (Corrales and Penfold, 2011).
Brazil has also developed an international strategy that has favoured
anti-hegemonic positions and the promotion of multipolarism. How-
ever, Lula and Dilma have expressed their criticism of the international
order in quite a different way from Chávez and Maduro. Brazil has
not adopted an anti-imperialist or anti-Western discourse, and has not
proposed a radical rupture with the established powers. The Brazilian
aim is not to create ‘another world’ but to take advantage of the cur-
rent decision-making processes in order to generate new international
majorities, respecting the existing rules of the game (Kourliandsky,
2010:80). Therefore, Brazil has promoted its insertion into the global-
ization process ‘as a condition of competitiveness in the geopolitics of
the post-cold-war era’ (de Lima, 2010:9). This has not meant an uncon-
ditional Brazilian alignment with the positions of the US and Western
powers, or the neglect of the traditional autonomist bias in foreign pol-
icy. What has taken place is a review of the Third World orientation of
the Brazilian foreign policy to give priority to the reform of prevailing
norms and international regimes and make them more favourable to
developing countries (de Lima, 2010:9).
Certainly, Brazilian strategy aims, as in the case of Venezuela, at the
construction of regional poles of power as a mechanism to promote a
global balance (de Lima, 2010: 9). However, this quest for multipolarity
has not meant a confrontation with the US, a country with which Brazil
has a pragmatic relationship. The US–Brazilian bilateral agenda has had

controversial issues (such as the now defunct FTAA project or differ-
ences in the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO)) but
also points of agreement (such as the common interest in developing
ethanol). While the multipolar model of Venezuela purports to be devel-
oped by mechanisms such the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of
America (ALBA) and is based on an anti-systemic approach to world
politics, Brazilian multipolarism is expressed more in initiatives such
as IBSA, the forum gathering together the so-called democracies of the
South: India, Brazil, and South Africa.
Since the early 2000s, Brazil has sought to become a relevant player in
world affairs (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006:21). For this reason, a strat-
egy of confrontation with the central actors of the international system,
even at the rhetorical level, is not in the agenda of the Brazilian foreign
policy decision-makers. The relationship with the US is a particularly
important issue for Brazil. Despite their differences, both countries ‘look
for primarily prudent coexistence, possible collaboration and minimum
collision’ (de Lima and Hirst, 2006:33). This approach is certainly quite
different from that proposed by Venezuela.
These different views about the international system, globalization,
and relations with the US set limits to a common agenda between
Brazil and Venezuela. In reality, the overall strategy of the Lula–Dilma
and Chávez –Maduro governments has followed different paths, despite
their points of agreement. This has been described by Moisés Naím
in the following terms: ‘While the countries of Hugo axis build their
anti-Yankee alliance and try to implement what the Venezuelan presi-
dent calls 21st-century socialism, the Brazilian government is success-
fully developing a very different geopolitical project: ensuring Brazil’s
presence at the table when the world’s most important decisions are
negotiated’ (Naim, 2009).
Other specialists have made a distinction similar to that proposed
by Naim. For Andrés Serbin, the ideology-laden Venezuelan strategy is
based upon a highly geostrategic and military approach to international
affairs. In consequence, the Venezuelan government has developed a
proactive diplomacy and used oil resources as a mechanism to forge
regional alliances such as Petrocaribe and ALBA, or bilateral strategic
alliances, which gave Chávez leadership in Latin American politics.
At the same time, Venezuela has developed a strong activism on the
global stage by promoting close relations with China, Russia, and Iran,
and by using the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) as a forum to increase its influence in international affairs
(Serbin, 2009:233). Gonzalez Urrutia (2011:135) describes the Brazilian

strategy as multidimensional and reformist, aiming at avoiding con-
frontation by fostering a balanced diplomacy based upon ‘planning,
discretion and efficiency’.
These differences caused a silent and subtle competition between
Chávez and Lula. Between 2006 and 2010, Chávez played a crucial
role in South American politics, proposing the Great South American
Pipeline and the Bank of the South and encouraging the transformation
of the South American regional project (which was initially called the
South American Community of Nations (SACN)) into UNASUR. Chávez
also announced a plan to produce nuclear energy in Venezuela, and pro-
posed the creation of a South Atlantic Organization similar to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Some of these initiatives were not
particularly popular with the Brazilian government, but they were never
rejected. Instead, the Lula government chose a ‘strategy of diversion and
co-option’ (Burges, 2010:57–58).
Most of these proposals were either not implemented or implemented
in quite a different way from what Chávez expected. The Bank of the
South Foundational Act was approved in December 2007, but the Bank
has not initiated its activities. If, eventually, the Bank starts working, it
seems that it would not be the regional alternative to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) foreseen by Chávez. The Bank would be a
source to finance plans for the development of infrastructure in South
America, but the problem is that this task is currently being carried
out by the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF, known in English as
the Development Bank of Latin America) and, to some extent, by the
Brazilian BNDES, which has been allowed to finance projects in the
region. The Great South American Pipeline project was not really viable,
either environmentally or financially, and it was abandoned in 2007.
When Chávez announced his interest in developing nuclear energy,
Brazil proposed that Venezuela (which was in the process of entering
as a full member into MERCOSUR) should subscribe to the existing
nuclear agreement between Argentina and Brazil (Burges, 2010:58). The
project of ‘a South American NATO’ was replaced by the Brazilian project
of the South American Defense and Security Council (SADC). Finally,
SACN was transformed into UNASUR, accepting some of the proposals
of Chávez and his partners (Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa
in Ecuador). Ultimately, the development of regional infrastructure and
the creation of the SADC were incorporated into UNASUR’s agenda,
essentially under Brazil’s aegis and lead.
Proposals such as the creation of a Bank of the South as an alternative

to the IMF, the WB, and the IDB implied a challenge to those interna-
tional regimes of which Brazil has been a member since their creation.
A South American NATO would have involved the establishment of a
military alliance that certainly would not have been welcomed by the
US or Great Britain. Due to the diplomatic tensions between Caracas
and Washington, Chávez’s proposal of a possible nuclear development
in his country could potentially have generated tensions in the region.
In short, all the proposals Chávez presented fit perfectly the behaviour
of a revolutionary state that challenged the rules and institutions of the
international system. Brazil could hardly have supported such initia-
tives, because they worked against its aim to achieve recognition as a
relevant player in world affairs. As Chávez’s initiatives involved not a
reform, but the replacement of current regimes, they were the opposite
of the Brazilian strategy, the aim of which is the reform of those interna-
tional regimes in a way that recognizes the interests of the Global South.
Thus, despite the increasing trade interdependence, growing Brazilian
investments in Venezuela, ideological proximity between Lula and
Chávez, and personal empathy between them, the structural features
that have shaped Brazil’s international strategy and foreign policy were
obstacles that impeded the materialization of some objectives estab-
lished in the strategic alliance established in 2005. The coordination
between Venezuela and Brazil in international institutions, for exam-
ple, seems to be a difficult goal to achieve because of the different
approaches to various issues on the current international political and
economic agenda. These different visions have set limits to cooperation
and integration between the two countries.
Venezuelan domestic actors and the rise of Brazil
The rise of Brazil has revived in Venezuela the ‘ghost’ of Brazilian impe-
rialism. A short review of opinions of scholars, journalists, and leaders
linked to the Venezuelan political opposition validates this assertion.
In particular, some spokespersons of the political opposition have crit-
icized what they describe as the ‘ideological bias’ of the relation with
Brazil, rejecting some aspects of the official narrative about the rap-
prochement with this country. A crucial argument in this criticism is
a revival of the fears of a Brazilian hegemony and sub-imperialism in
South America.
Thus, the Venezuelan scholar Demetrio Boesner describes Brazil as
a country with two facets. In one, Brazil is focused on solidarity and
liberation and promotes a fair and equitable international order, but in

another facet it is powerful and hegemonic. Brazil would be ‘a pow-
erful nation rapidly rising, conquering spheres of influence and with
natural ambitions to be part of the concert of world powers’ (Boesner,
2011:2). By the same token, Teodoro Petkoff, a former political leader
and current editor of the Venezuelan newspaper TalCual, argues that on
some occasions Lula was just the operator ‘of the quasi-imperial interests
of his powerful country’ (Petkoff, 2 November 2010). This argument is
also presented by Rafael Poleo, editor of the newspaper El Nuevo País,
who stated in 2009 that ‘Lula acts in accordance to the interests of
nascent Brazilian imperialism, announced since the beginning of the
XX century by specialists and strategists’ (Poleo, 2009). Finally, Carlos
Raúl Hernandez, a political analyst linked to the Venezuelan opposi-
tion, published an article in the newspaper El Universal in the days after
the beginning of the World Cup that was reminiscent of the 1970s
and 1980s rhetoric on Brazilian sub-imperialism and expansionism.
Hernández asserts that ‘the Brazilian representatives – and, at less formal
spheres, the single citizens of that country, behave in an arrogant way,
convinced that they have the manifest destiny to dominate the south
of the continent and to be part of the great powers’ (Hernández, 2014).
This rejection of Brazil and its increasing presence in Venezuela and
South America, as well as its ambitions to become a global power, is
influenced by the political polarization in Venezuela. This factor became
particularly significant after Lula’s rise to power in 2003. One main crit-
icism relates to a purported ‘ideologization’ of the bilateral relation.
Nonetheless, the major condemnation of the Brazilian governments is
because of their alleged complicity with Chávez and his successor. The
main argument is that Brazilian governments in the Lula and Dilma
era have not taken action vis-à-vis the weakening of democratic insti-
tutions in Venezuela. Conversely, it is argued that Brazil has endorsed
Chávez’s initiatives, such the South American Pipeline, the Bank of the
South, and entry as a full member into MERCOSUR, giving legitimacy
to Chávez’s international actions. Similarly, some political leaders have
criticized the Brazilian position in the crises created by the coup d’etat
in Honduras in 2009 and in Paraguay in 2012, claiming that it fuelled
Venezuelan rhetoric. Diego Arria, an important leader of the Venezuelan
opposition, described Brazil as ‘cynical and abettor’ (Arria, 2009). Carlos
Rául Hernández describes the point of view of important sectors of the
Venezuelan opposition on this issue:
All sorts of abuses were committed with impunity, thanks to that

protection [the Brazilian complicity]. Brazil allowed a Venezuelan
invasion of Paraguay, almost an invasion of Honduras, and allowed

that its Embassy desecrated the sovereignty of that small country.
[The Venezuelan government] not only counted on the Brazilian
silence but on its active complicity, through the enabler of all that:
Marco Aurelio Garcia. The weight of Brazil in the region made nuga-
tory the Democratic Charter of the OAS, except to disrupt the lives of
small countries that defended their democracy against the Bolivarian
siege.
(Hernández, 2014)
Finally, it is argued that the Brazilian governments have shown no inter-

est in hearing the voices and demands of the Venezuelan opposition.
To maintain the good dividends that Brazilian companies were getting
in Venezuela, Lula and Dilma did not defend democracy in that country.
Hernández asserts that ‘it is not unfair to say that the big neighbor south
of the border has substantive responsibility for many of the misfortunes
that destroy Venezuela today’ (Hernández, 2014).
It may be shocking for external political analysts to see the way in
which the increasing Brazilian presence in Venezuela and South America
is perceived and examined by academics, pundits, and political leaders
in that country. The political polarization has not allowed distinc-
tion between different nuances of some aspects of the Brazilian and
Venezuelan foreign policies. Papers published by Naim (2008, 2009),
González Urrutia (2011), and to a lesser extent Romero (2010) have per-
ceived and analysed those nuances and have attempted to understand
the Brazilian policy beyond the domestic polarization by placing it in
the framework of the international strategy Brazil is fostering in order
to become a global actor.
Overall, domestic political polarization has impeded an appropriate
analysis of the rise of Brazil as a global power and the strategy Venezuela
has adopted to deal with it. This is quite obvious in the opposition sec-
tor, but it is also true for the followers of the ‘Chavist project’, who
adopt an idealistic and largely uncritical approach when addressing the
issue. Serious academic discussion is at best quite weak, and at worst
non-existent.
The Venezuelan government and the rise of Brazil
The analysis in this chapter provides some insights that could help
explain the transformation of Brazilian–Venezuelan relations and the
way in which the rise of Brazil is influencing the bilateral rapport. It is
quite clear that Venezuela has contested the Brazilian leadership in the
region. Chávez stated in December 2008: ‘Brazil is an outstanding leader,

and there is no doubt about it. But this is not about having one single
leader in the region but a number of leaders’ (El Universal, 18 Decem-
ber 2008). This statement involves the recognition of Brazil’s status as a
regional emerging power in South America but, at the same time, reflects
a rejection of any attempt at unilateralism by the Brazilian government.
Venezuela, to some extent, advocates for itself the status of secondary
power, a country that has been described as a ‘reluctant follower’ of
Brazil (Flemes and Wojczewski, 2011:10).
The Venezuelan reluctance derives from particular conceptions of
the international system and the understanding of relations with the
US. The diversity of narratives on these issues could create scenarios
of competition that both Caracas and Brasilia would gladly avoid, but
reality and diplomatic practice clearly reveal them. Thus, Caracas has
used the resources available to offer material incentives to neutralize
the Brazilian agenda in controversial issues, while in others, where the
Venezuelan and Brazilian narratives converge, cooperation has contin-
ued. For example, Chávez rejected the creation of a South America Free
Trade Area (SAFTA) as one of the pillars of the new regionalism, as
proposed by Itamar Franco and maintained by Cardoso. This rejection
was in accordance with the approach against free trade and neoliberal
globalization defended by Chávez. In contrast, Venezuela agreed with
Brazil on the need for an institutional common framework to deal with
defence and security issues and, in consequence, supported the Brazilian
initiative to create the SADC. The construction of UNASUR, in par-
ticular the process that followed the 2007 South American Summit in
Margarita, evidences the identification of a minimum common denom-
inator between the Brazilian original project (which included goals such
as SAFTA and IIRSA, both rejected by Venezuela and its allies), Lula’s
interest in the creation of the SADC, and the Venezuelan demands for
the inclusion of social, environmental, and political dimensions in the
process.
Reality and empirical data disprove the alleged Venezuelan subor-
dination to ‘Brazilian sub-imperialism’. Venezuela has not adopted
a bandwagoning strategy vis-à-vis the rise of Brazil. Traditional or
hard balancing is excluded as a policy option, not only because the
hegemonic power in the American continent is the US, but also because
Brazil is not perceived as a threat with territorial ambitions at the
expense of other countries of the region. Instead, some analysts have
suggested that Venezuela has adopted a ‘soft-balancing’ strategy. This
concept was developed by T. V. Paul (2005) to explain the strategy
followed by the second-tier major powers (such as China, Germany,

India, and Russia) to deal with the increasing US unilateralism in
a global context. For the second-tier major powers, it is difficult to
carry on ‘hard-balancing’ strategies such as military or economic build-
up. Instead, they would promote actions aiming to frustrate the foreign
policy objectives of the presumably more powerful nation (Corrales,
2009:98). Soft balancing ‘is a variation of traditional balancing behavior:
whereas hard balancing involves efforts to reconfigure the international
system (e.g., ending the predominance of a great power), soft balanc-
ing seeks less ambitious goals centered mostly on raising the costs of
action for the more powerful state. Precisely because the goals are less
ambitious, it can become a particularly appealing foreign policy tool for
second-tier nations, more so if they know that chances of retaliation are
low’ (Corrales, 2009:98).
While there is certain consensus among scholars that Chávez designed
and implemented a ‘soft-balancing’ strategy vis-à-vis the US (Corrales,
2009; Corrales and Penfold, 2011; Williams, 2011; Serbin and Serbin
Pont, 2014), the application of the concept to Venezuela–Brazil relations
is more problematic.
Venezuela has systematically eschewed cooperation with the US.
An example was the end of collaboration with the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) in the fight against drug trafficking. By the same
token, Venezuela established alliances with traditional US competitors
such as Cuba, China, Russia, and Iran. Venezuela also made counterpro-
posals to neutralize US initiatives, such as the parallel anti-Summit of
the Americas in Mar the Plata in 2005 and the creation of ALBA, both of
which contributed to the failure of the FTAA project. Last but not least,
Venezuela under Chávez implemented programs of international coop-
eration, particularly on social issues. All these initiatives are examples of
a soft-balancing strategy (Corrales, 2009).
However, the use of the idea of soft balancing in the case of relations
with Brazil is problematic. According to Paul, soft-balancing behaviour
occurs under certain conditions. First, the hegemon’s power position
and military behaviour is of growing concern, but does not pose a real
challenge to the sovereignty of second-tier powers. Second, the domi-
nant state is a major source of public goods in the economic and security
area that cannot be replaced. Finally, the dominant state cannot easily
retaliate, either ‘because the balancing efforts of others are not overt or
because they do not directly challenge its power position with military
means’ (Paul, 2005:59). Some of these conditions do not apply to the
Brazilian case.
A crucial factor is important to explain the Venezuelan strategy regard-

ing the rise of Brazil: the Brazilian reluctance to play a proper leading
role in South America. There is a consensus that Brazil is an emerg-
ing or rising power, but doubts exist about its commitment to actual
leadership in the region (Schirm, 2010; Malamud, 2011). One of the fun-
damental criticisms of Brazil is its reluctance to pay the cost of regional
pre-eminence. This is the issue that the Chávez government used to
counterbalance the rise of Brazil: Venezuela has been ready to pay –
and has paid – the costs of its increasing presence in South American
political and economic affairs. Benefiting from the favourable interna-
tional economic context of high oil prices, Chávez furthered a strategy
based on two pillars: the use of the material incentives provided by
‘petro-diplomacy’ and the creation of an alternative sub-regional bloc
to foster the narrative defended by Venezuelan government and shared
to an extent by its allies.
‘Petro-diplomacy’ is twofold: on the one hand, the Venezuelan gov-
ernment sells oil to some countries on special conditions, and, on the
other hand, Venezuela invests and finances projects in infrastructure,
education, and health. Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and even Paraguay
have reaped the benefits of such initiatives. Corrales (2009:97) describes
this strategy as ‘social power diplomacy’, a mechanism that is a spec-
tacularly effective foreign policy tool for world leaders ‘to earn allies,
even admirers abroad’ (Corrales, 2009:97–98). If, as was the case with
Venezuela, social power diplomacy is committed to promoting social
programs or development aid, the prestige of the benefactor increases.
According to Corrales, Venezuela has spent around US$17 billion in
social investments abroad between 1999 and mid-20072 (Corrales,
2009:99). While Brazil is often described as a doubtful regional leader,
Venezuela is perceived, at least by some, as a benevolent benefactor.
The consequence of this strategy is that those countries that received
Venezuelan assistance have become close allies of Caracas in the con-
struction of regional regimes. By aligning with Venezuelan positions,
those countries have been successful in modifying Brazilian proposals.
An example is the transformation of SACN into UNASUR. This was orig-
inally a Brazilian proposal with a minimalist agenda centred on free
trade, infrastructure, energy cooperation, and promotion of peace and
democracy. From 2004 onwards, Chávez began to criticize the SACN
project as being neoliberal, trade-based, and non-representative of the
interests of the South America people. In the 2007 South American
Summit in Margarita Island, the transformation of the SACN into
UNASUR was announced. The negotiations that followed evidenced the
Venezuelan leading role in the process, in close alliance with Bolivia and
Ecuador and with the support of Argentina and Uruguay. The result was
the transformation of Brazil’s minimalist project of SACN into the max-
imalist project of UNASUR, in which free trade disappeared and new
dimensions such as social and human development, eradication of illit-
eracy, universal access to quality education, protection of biodiversity,
water resources, and ecosystems, and universal access to social security
and health services were added. These goals were not foreseen in the
original Brazilian project (Briceño-Ruiz, 2010).
The second element of the strategy is represented by ALBA. Although
the regional group was originally created to confront the US-led
FTAA project, it evolved over time and became a mechanism by which
the member countries coordinate some aspects of their international
behaviour, in particular the relations with the US, defence and human
rights, or energy cooperation. Certainly, ALBA does not confront Brazil,
but, as a bloc, promotes different narratives from Brazil. This increases
Venezuelan bargaining power in regional forums such as UNASUR,
where Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela form an ‘ALBA axis’, or in
CELAC, where ALBA constitutes a cohesive group. The approach to
issues such as relations with the US or the construction of interna-
tional regimes proposed by ALBA differs in substantial aspects from
those furthered by Brazil.
Conclusions
Venezuela and Brazil are no longer indifferent neighbours. In the last

two decades, the economic and political relations between the two
countries have undergone substantial changes. The bilateral relation-
ship has grown, and has had even outstanding moments in the Lula–
Chávez era. In the economic sphere, for example, the growth of the
bilateral relationship is remarkable, to the point that in a relatively
short period, Brazil has become one of the major trading partners of
Venezuela.
However, the political dimension is different. Brazil and Venezuela,
even in the Chávez–Lula era, have different perceptions about the inter-
national system, different narratives about how that system should
work, and different foreign policy initiatives. These differences have set
limits to bilateral relations. Both governments have had to find mech-
anisms to deal with those differences, thereby avoiding an impasse
that would threaten the progress achieved in their relations. This has
occurred in a complex domestic political scenario in Venezuela, where
the opposition has criticized the government’s approach to Brazil. The

main criticism is that the approach to bilateral relations is ideologically
committed to supporting the Chavist project. Similarly, these sectors
have revived the ‘spectre’ of Brazilian imperialism.
This chapter has argued that the reality of the bilateral relation and
the way in which the rise of Brazil is addressed in Caracas is more com-
plex. Despite the strategic alliance, there is no total harmony. There is
no bandwagoning, but a sort of pragmatic acquiescence. Brazil has con-
trolled the Venezuelan hyper-activism in the region in the Chávez era by
promoting strategies of diversion and co-option. Venezuela uses social
power diplomacy and alternative regionalism as mechanisms to deal
with the rise of Brazil. The result of this pragmatism is the achievement
of a minimum common denominator that has allowed the bilateral
relation to make progress but, at the same time, has prevented it from
becoming deeper.
Notes
1. Garimpeiros were Brazilian gold miners who migrated to northern Brazil to
prospect for minerals. Their activities were particularly developed in the
Brazilian states located in the border areas with Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam,
and even the French Department of Guyane. The garimpeiros’ illegal activities
in Venezuelan territories, particularly in lands considered a sanctuary of the
indigenous Yanomami people, caused various diplomatic conflicts between
Brazil and Venezuela in the early 1990s.
2. ‘Venezuela’s spending abroad between 2004 and 2007 encompassed a diverse
portfolio of projects including oil subsidies to Cuba; the acquisition of
Argentine commercial papers to exempt Argentina from having to pay the
International Monetary Fund (IMF); cash donations to Bolivia; medical equip-
ment donations to Nicaragua; heating oil subsidies to more than 1 million U.S.
consumers; $20 million to Haiti for investments in education, health care’
(Corrales, 2009: 99).
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11
Colombia’s Contestation Strategies
Facing the Emergence of Brazil as a
Regional Power
Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas
Introduction
In the last ten years, conditions in the Latin American region have
been operating in Colombia’s favour, providing the country with
increased self-confidence to boost its regional and, to a lesser extent,
extra-regional impact. Furthermore, Colombia has looked to involve
itself in projects, or competitive strategies, that attempt to distance
it from Brazil’s leadership both through its own development and by
maintaining its privileged relations – although now less imbalanced –
with the US. It has also looked to use coalitions of interest, like the
Pacific Alliance1 (PA) and CIVETS2 (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam,
Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa), to connect actors with different
geopolitical identities. Finally, Colombia has continued its participa-
tion in traditional international institutions like the Organization of
American States (OAS), the World Bank (WB), and the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), without abandoning its participation in
‘alternative’ institutions like the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(CELAC).
The main argument of this chapter is that Colombia and Brazil have
dramatically increased their trade and cooperation dynamics in many
areas, in particular during the government of Colombia’s current pres-
ident, Juan Manuel Santos (2010–2014). However, Colombia has also
developed competition strategies to face the challenge posed by the
emergence of Brazilian regional leadership. To address this problem, first
177
178 Colombia’s Strategies Facing Brazil
we will highlight the most relevant aspects of bilateral relations in the

period 2002–2014, and then we will identify Colombia’s contestation
strategies facing Brazil’s regional leadership.
Colombia–Brazil relations: 2002–2014
During both of Álvaro Uribe’s presidential terms (2002–2010), Colombia

aligned itself closely with the US, which has become its most important
political and trade partner. For this reason, the fight against guerrillas –
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National
Liberation Army (ELN) – and illicit drugs became, within the frame-
work of Plan Colombia, part of the global war on terror. As a result, the
close link between Colombia and the US, and their strategy to combat
the guerrilla groups, caused conflict with Venezuela and Ecuador and
a breakdown in relations with both countries (Pastrana, 2011b:75–78).
Furthermore, Colombia gradually distanced itself from political dialogue
scenarios and regional integration in South America; in this same con-
text, there was a distancing from Brazil during the presidency of Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2011).
Uribe always distrusted the political path and leftist ideological beliefs
shared by Lula and Chávez. This understanding led Uribe to assume that
Brazil had a certain partiality in Colombian–Venezuelan crises. In the
same way, it was hoped that Brazil would cooperate more fully with
Colombia in terms of security. Instead, Brasilia disappointed Bogota
with its neutrality, which can be described as a ‘tightrope walker’
position during the aforementioned crises. Furthermore, discrepancies
between Lula and Uribe increased following the signing of a Colombia–
US agreement for the use of three air bases, two land bases, and two
naval bases by US troops and contractors in 2009 (Carvajal, 2011:281;
Londoño, 2011:235). As a result, Brazil was particularly restless, coincid-
ing with criticisms by Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia of espionage and
US intervention (Carvajal, 2011:290–291).
Additionally, there was a ‘distancing’ between the administrations
of Lula and Uribe concerning regional integration. The political back-
ground of this ‘distancing’ suggested a mutually prudent, but nonethe-
less steady, distrust. Lula privileged Brazilian leadership interests in the
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and the Doha Round,
with the intention of improving the capacity of national negotiations
and those of the bloc. However, Uribe considered this leadership to
be disruptive regarding the US, a factor that could potentially distance
Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas 179
Colombia from its largest trade partner. Furthermore, when UNASUR

was created in 2008 to boost regional integration, Uribe called the
organization politically weak, as it did not offer a concrete platform for
trade integration (Pastrana, 2011b:84–87). He also considered it a plat-
form to promote the political and ideological interests of those countries
critical of the US and Plan Colombia, such as Brazil and Venezuela
(Varas, 2008:2).
However, Uribe’s government sought a permanent expansion of trade
ties with Brazil, due not only to the attractiveness of Brazil’s market,
but also to an appreciation of Brazil’s role as the economic engine
of, and potential bridge to, MERCOSUR. Uribe attempted this rap-
prochement by the Andean Community (CAN)3 –MERCOSUR route,
and also by bilateral routes. Despite this intention, political differ-
ences regarding trade liberalization hampered its realization, just as
happened with discrepancies in the World Trade Organization (WTO)
between the US and Brazil. Colombia prioritized a free trade agreement
(FTA) with the US, tending to passively support the dominant US posi-
tion on global trade in Doha (El Tiempo, 2011), while Brazil sought
the help of other emerging economies, creating supportive coalitions
in order to achieve more balanced rules through IBSA (India, Brazil,
and South Africa) and negotiating pressure with the G20 (Pastrana,
2011b:85).
Slight tensions and practical discrepancies were characteristic of
Colombian–Brazilian relations in the Uribe–Lula era. Both adminis-
trations agreed upon the rejection of terrorism and combating drug
trafficking, but essential differences emerged in the way in which
they addressed these threats. A first difference concerns the under-
standing of the extent of the regional impact of the Colombian
internal conflict, with Brazil downplaying it and Colombia highlight-
ing it. A second difference was in their perceptions with respect
to US involvement in South American security matters, with Brazil
trying to minimize it and Colombia fully accepting it. Since 2003,
Brazil has consistently tried to distance itself from a direct com-
mitment against the FARC or from a Plan Colombia extended into
the Amazon, but without losing a pragmatic bilateral view that led
to increased police and military cooperation, monitoring the border,
and sharing information (Ramirez, 2004:155; Duarte and Trindade,
2010:108–109).
In contrast to his predecessor, Santos has created a shift in Colombian
foreign policy. His strategic objective points to a thematic and
geographic diversification, characterized from the start by its pragma-

tism and multilateralism (Pastrana, 2011c). Latin America has once
again begun providing a geographical, cultural, and historical scenario
for the development of Colombia’s international relations, more out
of conviction than obligation (Pastrana, 2011a:72). In this context,
Santos relaunched Colombian–Brazilian relations with Lula in 2010 and
strengthened mutual cooperation with the Rousseff government. Com-
mon interests with Brazil became more relevant after the recovery of
diplomatic channels between Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela fol-
lowing the 2008 diplomatic crisis, as well as a greater commitment of
Colombia to UNASUR.
On his first official visit as head of state (2010), Santos signed
eight important agreements with Lula in Brazil. The most noteworthy
are: development and social exchange on the border between Leticia
and Tabatinga; police cooperation; academic and scientific research
(Colciencias-Capes); the building of infrastructure; employment and
environmental protection in the border regions; technical coopera-
tion for the production and use of biofuels; and demarcation of the
shared border of the Amazon River. Two years later, Defence Minis-
ters Pinzón (Colombia) and Amorim (Brazil) signed 17 items regarding
security and defence cooperation (Semana, 2012a), including: training
of personnel and development of military technology; joint exercises;
the Summit of Defence Industries; the development of unmanned
aerial vehicles, armoured vehicles, and cyber-defence mobile equip-
ment; strengthening the Amazonian radar system SIVAM; the trilateral
security agreement between Colombia, Peru, and Brazil; training of
Colombia by Brazil on peacekeeping missions; and the ‘KC-390’ pro-
gramme for the joint construction of a multipurpose aircraft. In 2012,
Colombia began to sell river patrol boats to Brazil, and in 2014 both
sides agreed to the joint production of an Amazon surveillance vessel
(Portafolio, 2013).
Additionally, trade exchange also increased, though it remains rela-
tively low. Colombian exports to Brazil reported an historic high of
US$1,590,629,000 in 2013, and imports amounted to US$2,584,693,000
(LAIA, 2013). This leaves Colombia with an important deficit.
In November 2014, the US was the primary purchaser of Colombian
exports, making up 25.3% of the total, and Brazil was the ninth, with
just 2.9% (LAIA, 2014a). By September 2014, the US was the primary
seller to Colombia, making up 29% of total imports, while Brazil was
the fourth, representing only 4% (LAIA, 2014b).
Colombian Exports
18,00,000
16,00,000
14,00,000
12,00,000
10,00,000
8,00,000
6,00,000
4,00,000
2,00,000
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
To Brazil
Colombian Imports
30,00,000
25,00,000
20,00,000
15,00,000
10,00,000
5,00,000
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
From Brazil
In terms of investment, Colombia experienced an increase in foreign

direct investment (FDI) from its neighbour, rising by 60.4% between
2011 and 2012. However, this shrank significantly, by 29%, from 2012 to
2013 (Proexport, 2014). In 2014, this trend was accentuated, so much so
that Brazil was excluded from the top ten investors in Colombia, as the
FDI from Spain (+190%), Peru (+124%), and Canada (+64%) all gained
ground (Procolombia, 2015a:7). By September 2014, the FDI from
Brazil represented only 0.2% of the total, and had contracted by 90%
compared with the same month in 2013 (Procolombia, 2015b:1).
In short, during the Santos period, Colombia has been diversifying its
foreign policy in geographic and thematic terms, and in this context has
boosted its bilateral relations with Brazil. However, relations between
Colombia and the US are increasingly relevant considering economic
and security matters, despite Colombia having reduced its extreme
alignment to the superpower. Hence, Colombia’s driving role in the
creation of the PA – together with Chile, Mexico, and Peru – has
been particularly noticeable, with the hope of a possible expanded
‘trans-pacific’ market, with strong US influence, through the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP).
The PA responds to the model of ‘open regionalism’ or ‘new
regionalism’, which broadly follows the guidelines of the 1990s
Washington Consensus (opening, deregulation, austerity), in opposition
to protectionist or closed regionalism, which characterized ‘nationalist-
developmentalist’ projects and schemes such as the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFTA) between 1960 and 1980 (Heine, 2012:212).
In addition, the PA differs from post-hegemonic integration initiatives,
such as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), UNASUR,
and CELAC, which exclude the US and Canada, reject neoliberal
practices, and conceive the idea of ‘region-ness’ through a clear re-
politicization of the region (Riggirozzi, 2010:3–4; Pastrana, 2013:457;
Prieto and Betancourt, 2014:94–98). Lastly, Colombia considers the
PA an instrument to disassociate itself geographically from MERCOSUR
and from Brazil as the main actor in South American regionalization
processes (Prieto and Betancourt, 2014:105). The PA is, then, a tool
that allows Colombia and the other members to partially refute Brazil’s
regional policies. It also helps reduce some of the disadvantages of
competing one on one against the regional power for access to the
market – essentially in the primary sector – and for US investments,
in order ‘to strengthen its negotiating capacity in regional scenarios
and maintain trust and closeness with the US’ (Pastrana and Vera
2012:214).
Colombia’s strategies facing the regional leadership of

Brazil
Colombia is expanding its regional activism as a secondary power.

This has prompted more opportunities for a diversified cooperation
with Brazil and, at the same time, a more proactive Colombian role
in bilateral and sub-regional projects that do not necessarily coincide
with Brazil’s preferences. This seems to be the result of structural change
as well as policy orientation. In the last seven or eight years, there
has been a gradual but significant decentralization of South American

gross domestic product (GDP) as well as military spending, with the
Colombian percentage in both indicators increasing more than the aver-
age. This improvement of Colombia’s economic and military position
seems to support its ‘self-confidence’ in acting less asymmetrically with
Brazil and even in challenging some of Brasilia’s projects, albeit with
non-hostile strategies.
Recent Colombian policies in the region may configure a case of
soft balancing, which is a strategic option for secondary regional pow-
ers, such as Colombia, in regions with low levels of conflict, such as
South America, and in which rivalry with the regional power, in this
instance Brazil, is replaced with competition (Flemes, 2012:20). Soft
balancing comprises a set of discursive and institutional instruments
in order to counterbalance the regional power (Flemes and Wehner,
2015:164). In this way, weaker states seek to improve the existing dis-
tribution of power and partially slow down the foreign policy objectives
of the most powerful actor in the region (Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005, in
Flemes, 2012:20). Non-aggressive strategies are deployed: regional coali-
tion building, the use of international institutions to influence the
regional power’s foreign policy, and the signing of bilateral or multilat-
eral agreements that bind the regional power to its neighbours’ interests
(Flemes, 2012:20).
Military spending and capacity provide a good example of recent
dynamics. Although matching Brazilian military spending (60% of the
regional total) seems unachievable, Colombia accounts for around 20%
of the regional total. While Colombian military spending has remained
quite stable in the last few years, from a national point of view it
has increased substantially, given the parallel reduction in the amount
of military-police aid from the US, from US$434,174,860 in 2010 to
US$227,879,635 in 2014 (Center for International Policy, 2014). Brazil
and Colombia display the two highest annual military expenditures in
South America, and they have ambitious plans to modernize their arms
industries. Despite Brazil’s defence minister’s insistence on Brazil’s com-
mitment to international peace and ‘cooperation as the best form of
deterrence’ (Amorim, 2013), military spending is one of several pieces
of evidence that demystify Brazil’s projection of itself solely from a posi-
tion of soft power and civilian power. Brazil’s plans to annually match the
military spending of the other BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa) partners, pushing it from 1.5% annually to 2% or more of
its GDP, provide a further indication (Costa and Medeiros, 2012:59). The
2008 National Defence Strategy, with its three foundations – peaceful
use of atomic energy, developing nuclear-powered submarines, and
aerospace and cyber defence – supplies a final hint. These considerations

help to explain Colombia’s recent posture bilaterally and regionally.
Another factor that may help to explain why, despite being peace-
ful neighbours with increasing opportunities for cooperation, Colombia
and Brazil seek to strengthen blocs that nowadays are more competitive
than complementary – PA versus MERCOSUR – is Brazilian preferences
in trade partners. In 2014, the ALADI (2013) system reported that
Brazil’s three principal consumers were China (18.6%), the US (11.8%),
and Argentina (6.4%), with other South American countries remaining
below the sixth position. In the same year, its principal sellers were
China (16.2%), the US (15.2%) Germany (6.1%), and Argentina (6.0%),
with only one other South American country, Chile, appearing in 13th
position. That is to say, Brazil projects the idea that intra-regional trade
is not a priority. Although UNASUR is an attractive ‘alternative’ integra-
tion proposal for Brazil and more moderate ideologically than ALBA, for
PA members it does not offer concrete trade integration (Varas, 2008:2).
Brazil sought to reverse this perception with the creation of the South
American Council of Economics and Finance (CSEF) of UNASUR in
2010, in order to ‘overcome asymmetries through concrete and effec-
tive mechanisms of complementary economics’ (UNASUR, 2010), but
these have not been implemented.
Despite its internal constraints, Colombia is very interested and active
in maximizing its participation in many areas of regional political,
trade, and cooperation dialogues. This means actively participating in
UNASUR and CELAC but disassociating itself as much as possible from
Brazil. This has been pursued through coalitions such as the PA and
CIVETS, while emphasizing the role of ‘traditional’ organizations like
the OAS, WB, IMF, and IDB – for some, a reflection of hemispheric or
global US hegemony.
Following these general remarks, Colombia’s specific contestation
strategies to compete partially or directly with the regional projection
of Brazil (Flemes, 2012:20) include seven issues or areas:
1. Colombia is adopting a North Atlantic identity, while Brazil is con-

structing a South Atlantic one. For Colombia, this is in terms of
the defence doctrine, looking to strengthen military and intelligence
cooperation with the US in more symmetric conditions, through
the exchange of ‘best practices’ with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and despite decreasing financial and tech-
nical contributions from Plan Colombia. The intention is to take
advantage of the North Atlantic ‘shop window’ for the promotion
of its experience in de-mining and counter-narcotics operations,

affirming before NATO that military and police from more than 45
countries have benefited from their knowledge (Ministry of Defence,
2013:4). (pp. 123–125)
Regarding Brazil’s stance, the UN Security Council has insisted that since
the reform of 2010, NATO has acted beyond its natural borders and with
little international control, with reference to the violation of limits of
the mandate to enter Libya and regarding a possible intervention in
Syria (Telesur, 2013). Facing Colombia’s strategy, Brazil’s defence min-
ister, Celso Amorim, said that his country respects the sovereignty of
others but is concerned that a member of the South American Defense
Council (SDC) of UNASUR is looking to an extra-regional military
defence alliance (El Universo, 2013). This Colombian strategy can be seen
as a form of distancing itself from a regional South American identity
in defence terms and as a channel to show itself as a state that sup-
ports the promotion of democracy internationally – unlike Brazil, which
regards it as interference in the domestic affairs of other countries and
interventionism.
2. Colombia is distancing itself from the Bank of the South project of

UNASUR, and/or a South American currency. Instead, it is seeking
a competitive national currency pegged to the dollar. Furthermore,
Colombia is reactivating its interest in the IDB – currently under the
direction of the Colombian Luis Alberto Moreno – and is pursuing
a policy open to the reception of foreign currency, thus stimulating
an increasing flow of dollars. In turn, the PA projects itself as a free
trade zone, and is intended to facilitate currency flows that enable a
leverage effect for the US currency vis-à-vis local currencies and the
economies most tied to the dollar in the region. This is the opposite
of Brazil’s intention to reduce the regional exchange dependence on
US monetary policy through trade in national currencies. Colombia’s
vision also opposes the wish of other neighbouring countries to
adopt a South American currency, perhaps based on the common
exchange unit, the Sucre, already being trialled by the ALBA coun-
tries. In addition to the Bank of the South and the possibility of
extending or replacing the Sucre for a broader South American cur-
rency, regional monetary enthusiasts outside Colombia are already
promoting the constitution of a ‘Southern Monetary Fund’. In the
view of the proponents, this would make reserves of financial help
available at a lower interest rate than the IMF’s, and would act as a
possible stabilizing mechanism for a future common South American

currency (El Nacional, 2013).
Some countries, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay,

and Venezuela, have become financial backers of the Bank of the
South. They anticipate that the new bank may become a promoter
of autonomous regionalism and an alternative to the main interna-
tional financial institutions like the WB, IMF, and IDB (UNASUR, 2013).
Colombia, on the contrary, has not shown any interest in contribut-
ing (El Espectador, 2007). Colombia’s strong commitment to the IDB,
WB, and IMF is based on its role as a ‘good client’ of these financial
organizations, and it is convinced of the principles of monetary and
fiscal discipline. Additionally, these institutions have supported and pro-
vided technical assistance to Colombia in priority projects such as the
FTA with the US.
3. The decline of the Andean Community (CAN) and Colombia’s grow-

ing distance from MERCOSUR have contributed to the establishment
of the PA and to Colombia’s increasing orientation towards the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The implications are sig-
nificant for both Brazil and Colombia. For Brazil, Venezuela became
a MERCOSUR member in 2006, while Ecuador (Revista CN, 2013)
and Bolivia (El País, 2014) have announced their intention to join
MERCOSUR. On the contrary, the breaking down of the Andean
organization is driving Colombia in three different directions: to
the west (Asia Pacific), to the north-east (the European Union), and
to the north (NAFTA) (Prieto and Betancourt, 2014:103–104). This
complicates Brazil’s strategic goal of avoiding the presence of any
extra-regional power from outside South America in the region.
Moreover, the PA has provided an opportunity for Mexico, a middle
power and a potential would-be leader in Latin America, to par-
ticipate in a number of economic and even security issues in the
region.
Colombia’s soft-balancing instruments also include ‘tempting’ Uruguay

and Paraguay, both full members of MERCOSUR, towards the PA. The
two countries currently have the status of observer states, with the pos-
sibility of future membership, but this would be incompatible with
MERCOSUR rules and would be a direct challenge to Brazil. Brasilia
has appeared uncomfortable that Colombian President Juan Manuel
Santos calls the PA the new ‘engine of development and prosper-

ity in Latin America’, indirectly alluding to the trade stagnation of
MERCOSUR. However, the combined diplomacy of Colombia and its
three PA partners has recently managed to overcome Brazilian indif-
ference, or even aversion, towards the PA and the vision it proposes
(Pastrana et al., 2014:188–191). Accordingly, the lobbying of other
MERCOSUR members, amid competing models of regionalism, is begin-
ning to bear fruit, and initial meetings between delegates of PA and
MERCOSUR members took place in November 2014. The first was of
a purely intergovernmental and informative nature, regarding the aims
and progress of the PA. However, the second also involved the private
sector, academics, and other civil society actors to discuss ways in which
the proposals of the PA, MERCOSUR, and the Association of Caribbean
States could eventually converge.
Additionally, Colombia intends the PA to become a ‘bridge’ between
Latin America and Asia, in trade, investment, and, to a certain point,
political terms, given that China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and
New Zealand (soon to be joined by Singapore, which recently submitted
its application) have also become observers (RPP, 2014). This intention
directly competes with Brazil, and more generally with MERCOSUR as
an institution.
4. In the energy sector, the alliance between the Colombian oil com-
pany Ecopetrol and the Mexican oil company Pemex encourages
the exploration, exploitation, and distribution of hydrocarbons,
with potential extension to other interested countries in the region
(Ecopetrol, 2013), thus competing directly with the projects and
activities of the Brazilian oil company Petrobras. Mexican Presi-
dent Peña Nieto’s energy reforms aim to invigorate Mexican energy
internationalization. This will have direct consequences for the
PA’s oil exports, particularly considering their ‘targets’: recently
industrialized countries in Asia that are major oil consumers. The
rivalry between the ‘Ecopetrol model’ and the ‘Petrobras model’
has increased to such an extent that statistics indicate – according
to Forbes – that Petrobras suffered a resounding fall from 12th to
120th among the biggest companies in the world in 2013, while
another report showed a dramatic rise of Ecopetrol in aspects such
as capitalization (Rapoza, 2014).
5. Colombia has a clear preference to address regional political and
security issues within the OAS, while Brazil seems to prioritize new
bodies that can boost its leadership credentials and aspirations.
Brazil has never formally proposed UNASUR as a replacement for

the OAS. Yet the former has, in fact, played a key role in solving
recent regional crises in South America, such as the trilateral crisis
between Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela (2009–2010), the cri-
sis in Bolivia over regional autonomy in 2009, and the revolt of
a sector of the Ecuadorian police against Rafael Correa in 2010.
Thereby, the true objective of Brazil has been to consolidate UNASUR
according to its geopolitical interests. In contrast, the inter-American
organizations have always had priority for Colombia (Pastrana and
Vera, 2012:198–199). This, in large part, has a geopolitical and cul-
tural explanation: when Colombian elites and governments speak
of ‘the region’, generally they mean ‘Latin America’. However, when
the highest representatives of Brazil speak of ‘the region’, most of
the time they refer to ‘South America’. This, at least, seems to be a
position that Colombia shares with many other Spanish-speaking
countries in the neighbourhood. Nonetheless, also at the discur-
sive and ideational level, Colombia pursues a subtle strategy of
contestation vis-à-vis Brazil.
6. As for reform of the United Nations Security Council, Colombia
maintains its position alongside the so-called ‘Uniting for Con-
sensus’ countries, which collectively reject Brazil’s aspiration to a
permanent seat. In 2005, Colombia helped introduce draft reso-
lution A/59/L.68, co-sponsored by Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica,
Italy, Malta, Mexico, Spain, and others. This aims to broaden the
base of non-permanent members from ten to twenty, but not to
change the permanent structure (Sepúlveda and Riquelme, 2010:30).
That is to say, Colombia indirectly – and through collective diplo-
macy – blocked a ‘seat in the name of Latin America’ for Brazil.
From this perspective, Colombia does not aspire to interfere with
the status quo of the five nuclear powers, or with the veto power
as originally designed by the US. Nor is Colombia looking to
follow the current tendency in the international system towards
the redistribution of economic and political power from tradi-
tional powers to emerging ones (Sepúlveda and Riquelme, 2010:30).
Also in this respect, Colombian and Brazilian positions are quite
different.
7. Lastly, Santos’s government has tried to position itself as a ‘bridge
country’ in different regional and global scenarios. It has acted
as a mediator or broker among countries and organizations with
different political and ideological points of view – for example,
NAFTA and MERCOSUR, or NAFTA and UNASUR (Pastrana and Vera,

2012:209–210). This is a strategy that allows secondary regional
powers, whose geographic location and geostrategic interests allow
them to belong to several different regionalization projects, to get
closer to various actors at the same time, above all to powerful
states – meaning, for Colombia, the US and Brazil. This consolidates
international networks – trade or otherwise – in which secondary
regional powers can partially influence the agenda-setting pro-
cess and actively participate in decision-making (Flemes, 2012:20;
Nolte, 2012:47). This was particularly evident in Colombia’s role
in the 2012 Summit of the Americas, in which it attempted,
and failed, to reintegrate Cuba into the OAS and to mitigate
the frictions between those that unconditionally supported Cuba
(Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil) and Cuba’s crit-
ics (the US and Canada). The attempt to set a regional agenda
in a ‘trialogue’ between the US, Colombia, and Brazil (Semana,
2012b) eventually failed because of the significant differences
in interests between Washington and Brasilia regarding regional
issues.
In sum, these seven strategies seek to strengthen the position of the

Colombian state in the region and facing Brazil. This is pursued with-
out breaking the ‘special’ ties that Colombia has with the US, and at the
same time without leaving behind bilateral and multilateral cooperation
with Brazil in Latin America. This willingness to trade and cooperate
with the regional power, which has, in fact, recently intensified, does
not necessarily imply that Colombia always shares Brazilian interests
and values. While Colombia tries to compensate for its limitations in
the face of Brazil through strategic external alliances, at the same time
it also tries to increase its participation in Brazilian and South American
cooperation projects (Pastrana and Vera, 2013:636–637). This entails
that while Colombia may move closer to Brazil in the short term, it will
not accept a ‘Brazilian umbrella’ or hegemonic power in commercial,
financial, and military affairs in South America. Nor will it accept the
replacement of the hemispheric regimes that have historically been built
by the US (and supported by Colombia itself) by new schemes under the
aegis of Brasilia. Ultimately, Colombia now accepts that it must adapt
more effectively to changing realities. The need to reduce inequality and
not only fight organized crime, the need to discuss the assumptions of
the hard approach against illegal drugs promoted by Washington for
more than two decades, and the recognition that Latin America aspires
to the end of the economic blockade against Cuba, among other objec-
tives, are all issues on the Colombian agenda. Bogota pursues them in
a variety of ways meant to diversify its international partners, to main-
tain ties with traditional allies, and to abide by its neglecting regional
commitments.
Conclusions
Colombia’s conduct vis-à-vis Brazil in the 21st century comprises several

instruments and strategies:
• cooperation without alignment

• contestation or institutional counterweight via alliances such as the
PA or attachment to traditional organizations such as the IDB, WB,
and IMF
• multiple bonds in order to bring closer antagonistic or competitive
players from diverse geopolitical areas
• acceptance of ‘parallel regional leadership’, accompanying the US but
without hard balancing Brazil
This has allowed Colombia to participate in UNASUR, the OAS, and the
PA at the same time, and to benefit from Brazilian and US incentives,
acting as a ‘problem-solving’ country and a mediator, maintaining less
asymmetric relations with Washington and disassociating itself from the
leadership of the regional power or that of any other Latin American
contender. Overall, Colombia’s contestation strategy vis-à-vis the rise of
Brazil can be understood as a complex, far-reaching, and well-executed
case of soft balancing.
Notes
1. A regional organization legally constituted in 2012 that is comprised of
Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Mexico.
2. This acronym was invented by Robert Ward from The Economist Intelligence
Unit in 2010 in order to describe new, rapidly growing economies; however, it
seemed to become a real term in forums at the end of 2012, with the ‘Primer
Diálogo de Cooperación Sur – Sur CIVETS+’ [First Dialogues of South-South
Cooperation CIVETS+] in Cartagena and the videoconferences about the
’Exchange of Experiences on Informatión and Communication Technologies’,
promoted by Colombia in 2012–2013. See http://www.cancilleria.gov.co/. The
term ’emerging economy’ was coined by Antoine W. Van Agtmail, previously
of the World Bank, and has been applied to both Brazil and Colombia.
3. An integration organization that, following Venezuela’s exit, has retained the

following as full members: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
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12
Containing and Engaging: Mexico’s
Response to the Rise of Brazil
Ana Covarrubias
Historically, relations between Mexico and Brazil have been character-

ized as distant, sometimes difficult, and occasionally good.1 In the words
of historian Guillermo Palacios, relations between the two countries
have been a ‘chain of conflicts and reconciliation’.2 As the 21st cen-
tury began, Brazil and Mexico appeared as the two great powers in Latin
America willing to become influential players in international politics,
thus fostering a general perception of rivalry and competition in the
media, academic articles, and official language, especially in Mexico.3
The governments of Fernando Enrique Cardoso and, more importantly,
Luis Inàcio ‘Lula’ da Silva in Brazil, and Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón
in Mexico, effectively implemented policies to increase the participa-
tion of their countries in international politics. As Peter Hakim clearly
expressed it, in their own – contrasting – ways, Mexico and Brazil
intended to ‘go global’; the former based on an open economy and free
trade, the latter on a rather protectionist economy.4
Brazil’s projection was more visible and enduring than that of Mexico.
In the world’s view, Brazil was ‘rising’: by 2001, Brazil was recognized as
an emergent economy that, together with Russia, India, and China, con-
stituted the BRIC group; later, Brazil participated in IBSA (India, Brazil,
South Africa), and the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH);
created the South American Nations Union (later UNASUR) and the
I wish to thank all the diplomats and high governmental officials who agreed to
discuss the subject of this chapter with me, either in interviews or by answering
questionnaires. I assume, however, all responsibility for mistakes and misinter-
pretations in this work. I also want to thank Érika Uribe, José Luis Rodríguez
Aquino, and Marlene Montes de Oca for their invaluable help in finding press
and academic articles and official documents, and in translating some sources.
195
196 Mexico’s Response to the Rise of Brazil
Latin American and Caribbean Community (CALC); and promoted

other regional and international initiatives. The first Partido Acción
Nacional (PAN) government in Mexico, in turn, proposed a ‘new’ and
‘active’ foreign policy that would strengthen relations with the US, on
the one hand, and increase Mexico’s participation in multilateral orga-
nizations, on the other. According to Foreign Secretary Jorge Castañeda,
Mexico had all that was necessary to contribute to shaping the new
world order.5 Fox’s panista successor, Calderón, also argued that Mexico’s
‘intermediate position’ in the international system made it an ‘active
and influential interlocutor at the regional and global levels’.6 The
terrorist attacks of September 2001, together with domestic difficul-
ties and policies, such as the war against drugs, significantly frustrated
Mexico’s intentions to become an influential global player, a situation
that contrasted with Brazil’s – Lula’s – active foreign policy.
There is no doubt that the rise of Brazil influenced Mexican
perceptions of the country, bilateral relations, and Mexican foreign pol-
icy. With all proportions being guarded, Brazil’s rise may be understood
in a logic resembling that of the balance of power: a country becom-
ing more powerful, changing power relations in the region, and posing
a certain kind of threat to its neighbours. The case of Mexico is, of
course, unusual, Mexico not being one of Brazil’s immediate neighbours.
Still, Brazil’s protagonist role seems to have threatened Mexico in cer-
tain ways, or this was the perception of Mexican governments. Mexico
was not willing to be excluded from actively participating in the region,
or to accept Brazil’s emergence in world politics or Brazil’s image as a
leader, leaving Mexico as a secondary power. This is what Mexican gov-
ernments reacted to, and the way they did it was by soft balancing Brazil
and approaching it in different ways. Although ‘soft balance’ may refer
to a security/military dimension, it is still a useful concept, since it also
means neutralizing a ‘rising or potentially threatening power’ by non-
military means such as ‘cooperative exercises, collaboration in regional
or international institutions’, or by engaging the targeted power and
developing institutional links with it.7 ‘Binding diplomacy’, or strate-
gies to restrain the stronger state through international agreements,
complements soft balance.8
This chapter will analyse Mexico’s reaction to Brazil’s rise by soft bal-
ancing and binding diplomacy. The UN Security Council reform was a
very divisive issue between Mexico and Brazil. Mexico’s strategy was to
support the Uniting for Consensus Group and to try to approach Brazil.
Other ways in which the Mexican government intended to engage Brazil
were through Mercosur and the Community of Latin American and
Ana Covarrubias 197
Caribbean States (CELAC). Bilaterally speaking, Mexican governments

supported the creation of a Binational Commission and promoted a
free trade agreement (FTA) with Brazil, with the purpose of engaging
Brazil through institutionalization and cooperation. This is how Mexico
intended to contain Brazil and to be recognized as its equal.
A note of caution on methodology: this work has tried to reconstruct
Brazilian–Mexican relations relying mostly on Mexican sources. There
are few academic writings that examine the last 15 years of the bilateral
relationship, so this chapter uses press reports and official documents,
and includes information from interviews with Mexican diplomats
(some of whom asked to remain anonymous) and high governmental
officials. Thus, Mexican policy is interpreted through Mexican lenses.
The multilateral arena: Disagreement and accommodation
UN reform, especially concerning the enlargement of the Security Coun-

cil, became a very divisive issue in Mexico–Brazil relations. Both coun-
tries had historically supported divergent positions: Mexico rejecting the
veto system, and Brazil searching for a seat on the Council. Ever since
the discussions about the enlargement of the Security Council began,
Mexico, in the Uniting for Consensus Group (Argentina, Italy, South
Korea, and Pakistan), endorsed an increase of non-permanent members,
while Brazil hoped to obtain a permanent seat, as did Japan, Germany,
and India, the G4. The first part of this section will examine the Secu-
rity Council debate between Mexico and Brazil, and will demonstrate
how Mexico could not accept Brazil as a ‘greater’ power. This position
will be even clearer at the regional level, where Brazil implemented
an active foreign policy in South America, excluding Mexico. Mexico’s
response was to approach Brazil and strengthen its own position in Latin
America.
The UN Security council reform: Status matters
In 2004, a high-level committee submitted to the UN secretary general a

formal proposal for the establishment of new permanent members, thus
strengthening Brazil’s position in its search for a seat on the Council.9
This was the beginning of two very difficult years in Mexican–Brazilian
relations.
Publicly, the Mexican and Brazilian presidents tried to minimize their
divergent positions: during Lula’s visit to Mexico in September 2003,
both presidents decided to ‘iron their differences’.10 Lula declared that
he would not listen to ‘media intrigues’ about an alleged fight (between

Brazil and Mexico) for a seat on the Security Council.11 Interestingly,
in an interview given to the Folha de São Paulo before his visit to Brazil
in 2004, Fox not only avoided recognizing the discrepancies between
Mexico and Brazil, but also declared that Mexico did not rule out sup-
porting Brazil for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Fox added
that the participation of one country did not exclude the other.12
Mexican diplomats tell a different story. A former member of the
Mexican delegation at the United Nations, Mexican diplomat A, men-
tions that 2004 and 2005 were the most difficult years regarding the
Security Council reform. Conflicting views, however, have to be under-
stood from a historical perspective: Mexico has historically opposed
the veto system in the Security Council, and Brazil has historically
searched for a permanent seat on it. In her view, two historical trajec-
tories openly clashed.13 Former Mexican representative to the United
Nations, Enrique Berruga, explains Mexico’s proposal: consecutive re-
election of non-permanent members. Brazil, he adds, advocated regional
representation, and this was unacceptable to Mexico. Berruga recognizes
that Brazil was a regional power at the time, but there was no certainty
that it would continue to be so in the future, so there was no reason to
make it a permanent member.14 Mexican diplomat A agrees that the idea
of regional representation was the problem: the Mexican government
could not accept that anyone would unilaterally take on the status of
Latin American representative. If representation was to be the criterion,
a regional process should take place before deciding who would play
such a role. Mexico would not be happy if Brazil – or any other country –
became a permanent member.15 These two sources affirm that Mexico’s
representative to the UN, Berruga, tried to approach the Brazilian rep-
resentative to talk their positions over, but Brazil did not respond and
avoided any dialogue.16
Former foreign secretary, Luis Ernesto Derbez, states that his per-
sonal relationship with Brazil’s foreign minister, Celso Amorim, had
been very difficult, antagonistic even, since the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) meeting in Cancún in 2003.17 This situation must not
be ignored when analysing Mexico’s position. According to Derbez, as
the discussion about the Security Council became tougher, he proposed
to Amorim the creation of a Latin American seat: Brazil would be the
‘spokesperson’ but all decisions would be taken by the Latin American
countries. In other words, Brazil would always be the region’s represen-
tative but would not take any decision unilaterally. This was the only
way in which Mexico could accept Brazil having a seat on the Security
Ana Covarrubias 199
Council; otherwise Mexico would not allow it. Derbez was very clear in
his mind that Mexico must oppose Brazil’s gaining a permanent seat,
and that it should do anything to avoid it.18 Derbez justifies his position
in terms of Mexico–US relations: given the importance of the Security
Council to the US, it became a useful place where Mexico could nego-
tiate multilateral issues that might be linked to bilateral affairs. If Brazil
were the only Latin American member in the Council with influence
on multilateral affairs, Mexico would lose the capacity to negotiate with
the US.19
Views about the importance of Brazil in the debate about the Secu-
rity Council vary: Víctor Arraiga (former director for South America and
coordinator of advisors of the under-secretary for Latin America and
the Caribbean, Ministry of Foreign Relations) affirms that Mexico can-
not easily accept Brazil’s desire for global leadership, especially when
Mexican interests or principles are affected;20 Cassio Luiselli, former
ambassador to Uruguay and the Latin American Integration Association
(ALADI), has a more qualified view, maintaining that it is a ‘background
noise’ in the bilateral relationship;21 and former ambassador to Brazil,
Jorge Eduardo Navarrete, argues that Mexico and Brazil can very well live
with their differences concerning the Security Council reform. Mexico’s
opposition to more permanent members in the Council does not affect
the possibility of Brazil becoming one of them; it is the five permanent
members who decide about more permanent seats, not Brazil or Mexico.
Disagreement between Mexico and Brazil refers to trade, finance, and
economics, and the Security Council reform is not to blame for it.22
Despite these different interpretations, and the fact that the Mexican
government argued that it was defending a general position, the tone
of the discussion at the time indicates that Mexico clearly disliked the
idea of Brazil becoming a permanent member at the Security Council
and thus a recognized global player.
Regional initiatives: Contested accommodation
Perhaps the most visible divide between Mexico and Brazil in regional
terms was Mexico’s decision to negotiate the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s.23 Although MERCOSUR had
been in force since 1991, Brazil and other Latin American countries
reacted to NAFTA by declaring that Mexico was opting for the North
at the expense of the South. This perception grew stronger as Mexico
became a full member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) and abandoned the G-77 in 1994. The idea
of Mexico turning its back on Latin America may be a subject for discus-
sion, but the truth is that by the beginning of the 1990s, NAFTA and
MERCOSUR reflected a new regional order, and this suggested that
the two big Latin American countries had opted for different strategies
according to their geopolitical and ideological positions.
Significantly, Fox’s government decided to apply to become an asso-
ciate member of MERCOSUR in 2004, ‘to be closer to our trade partners
in the south’ and to form a great Latin American bloc.24 Ambassador
Navarrete maintains that Mexico’s desire to become an associate mem-
ber was a symbolic gesture to demonstrate that Mexico was not turning
its back on Latin America, and underlines that MERCOSUR’s founding
treaty did not foresee what Mexico was asking for.25 Derbez agrees that
Mexico could not join MERCOSUR because it was a customs union,
and it would have implied matching tariffs, something that NAFTA did
not allow. Nevertheless, Mexico wanted to give the message that it
was interested in MERCOSUR, and wanted the same treatment given
to Chile and – then – Venezuela. Approaching MERCOSUR was part
of Mexico’s Latin American strategy, and the message the government
wanted to send was that Mexico ‘was not angry’. Mexico’s participation
in MERCOSUR would also prevent any attacks on its foreign policy.26
In this sense, it must be remembered that Fox’s relations with some Latin
American countries (Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Argentina)
were very tense because of Mexico’s views on the promotion of democ-
racy and human rights, on the one hand, and on regional integration,
on the other.27 Regarding the latter, Brazil was also an important actor:
Mexico supported the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA),
whereas Brazil was one of its main opponents. Economic policy and the
place of the US in regional integration also divided Mexico and Brazil.28
It is evident that the rationale behind the Mexican government’s deci-
sion to apply for the status of observer in MERCOSUR was political, not
economic. Therefore, the official explanation seems to be accurate: it
was a strategy to demonstrate willingness to approach Latin America.
In so doing, the government would be responding to domestic and
foreign criticism that Mexico was neglecting Latin America. It is also
significant that Mexico decided to ‘be in Brazil’s space’, knowing that
Brazil would not enter ‘Mexico’s space’: NAFTA.
Lula gave South America a prominent place in his foreign policy.29
Although authors such as Andrés Malamud and Andrew Hurrell ques-
tion the rise and success of Brazil as a regional leader,30 the fact is that
Brazil launched a series of regional initiatives that gave the impres-
sion of its determination to consolidate South America as its sphere of
Ana Covarrubias 201
influence. Two such initiatives were the South American Community

(2004), later UNASUR (2008), and CALC (2008).
There seems to be consensus that the Mexican government resented
the creation of UNASUR. According to Luiselli, UNASUR was a blow to
Mexico;31 Arriaga and former ambassador to Brazil, Andrés Valencia,
agree that it was a mechanism that formally excluded Mexico from
South America’s dynamics.32 Valencia considers that UNASUR was the
only case that actually led the Mexican government to perceive Brazil’s
rise as a threat.33 There is no consensus, however, as to whether CELAC
was a reaction to UNASUR: Luiselli considers that CELAC was a ‘band
aid’ for Mexico, whereas Arriaga affirms that it was a compromise
between Brazil and Mexico.34
Mexican diplomat B traces the origins of CELAC to the XX Rio
Group Meeting in Santo Domingo in March 2008, when Presidents
Calderón and Leonel Fernández (Lula did not attend) brought about
reconciliation between Ecuador and Colombia. Calderón realized that
Latin Americans could resolve their own disputes, and proposed a Latin
American organization. The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked
on the project and presented a proposal for an organization for polit-
ical coordination and dialogue to Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
Peru, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. In May 2009, however,
Brazil organized a summit to create an organization for development
and integration: CALC. Brazil, therefore, took away the Mexican ini-
tiative. The Mexican government insisted that the new organization
should merge CALC and the Rio Group, but Brazil resisted, defend-
ing CALC and marginalizing the Rio Group.35 Mexico offered to host
the second CALC in December 2009, but decided to delay the meet-
ing until February, when its period as pro tempore secretary of the
Rio Group ended. The result was the Unity Summit that took place in
Cancún, Mexico, in February 2010, when the creation of CELAC was
announced. The Unity Summit revealed Mexico’s capacity to convene
the region’s heads of state, and it reinforced its place in the region. More-
over, CELAC was a victory for Mexican diplomacy, since CALC did not
survive.
In the cases of both MERCOSUR and CELAC, Mexico’s strategy was
one of soft balancing and binding diplomacy: Mexican governments
tried to approach Brazil and engage it in collaborative behaviour. CELAC
is not really an institution; rather, it is an agreement that enabled the
Mexican government to restrain Brazil. Mexico wanted to contain Brazil
by eliminating CALC and, at the same time, to work together towards a
final regional organization. CELAC, therefore, fulfilled one of Mexico’s
most desired objectives: to be recognized as Brazil’s equal. Mexico and

Brazil were both regional players.
Trying to engage Brazil
One of President Calderón’s foreign policy objectives as he assumed

power in 2006 was to improve relations with Latin American coun-
tries, and to increase the country’s presence in the region.36 Brazil
continued to be active in international politics, and had become a
benchmark to evaluate Mexico’s domestic and international perfor-
mance. The Mexican government opted for a rapprochement strategy to
formalize cooperation and political dialogue. To do so, Mexico proposed
the creation of a Binational Commission to facilitate communication
and bilateral links. The official discourse of both countries was one of
good disposition and openness, but relations were strained once again
when the Brazilian government announced its intention to renounce
the Economic Complementation Agreement (ECA) 55 on free trade in
the automobile sector. Binding diplomacy was only partly successful.
Change in the Mexican government: A new beginning?
Change in the Mexican government appeared as a good opportunity

to improve relations with Brazil. To do so, Ambassador Valencia sug-
gested the creation of a Binational Commission to oversee all issues in
the bilateral relationship.37 The first Binational Commission took place
in Brasilia in March 2007, and was headed by the ministers of foreign
relations, Patricia Espinosa and Celso Amorim. According to Minister
Amorim, it was a promising occasion to deepen the bilateral relation-
ship, and there was ‘no reason to talk about competition for leadership’,
since the margins for cooperation in regional matters were wide.38 The
commission would encourage the bilateral relationship in all areas, and
would promote dialogue on various topics of common interest in the
regional and international agendas. In the final declaration, both coun-
tries recognized their ‘important role’ in regional and world affairs, as
well as convergences in matters of international politics.39
The Joint Communiqué referred to a very delicate issue in the bilateral
relationship: the visa requirement. In 2005, the Mexican government
revoked a bilateral agreement for visa exemption, and started request-
ing visas for Brazilian nationals, as a consequence of the increasing
number of Brazilians travelling to Mexico to cross the northern bor-
der into the US illegally. The Brazilian government acted in reciprocity,
Ana Covarrubias 203
and requested visas for Mexican nationals. The visa requirement thus
became a very problematic question in relations between Mexico and
Brazil; the communiqué indicated that the Mexican government had
the disposition to facilitate visas but not to eliminate them.40
President Lula visited Mexico two months after the binational com-
mission; his main interest was to give an economic content to the new
relationship by signing a trade agreement and collaborating closely in
the energy sector.41 Lula urged Mexico and Brazil to occupy a place
as dynamic poles, since ‘[T]he international community increasingly
sees our countries as fundamental interlocutors in a global scenario of
complexity and uncertainty. We are called to take responsibilities to cre-
ate new consensus on essential topics of the international agenda.’42
Lula recognized that Mexico and Brazil had a different approach to the
UN reform, but underlined their agreements in the G20 to eliminate
subsidies in trade, and acknowledged Mexico’s participation in recon-
structing Haiti, where Brazil was heading the stabilization mission.43
The second meeting of the Binational Commission took place in July
2009. The Joint Communiqué once again underlined the mutual recog-
nition of the important role that Mexico and Brazil played in the region
and the world, and their commonalities in topics of international pol-
itics. In a very similar tone to that of the first Binational Commission,
and dealing with practically the same issues, the document reviewed the
bilateral relationship in its different aspects.44
In August 2009, President Calderón visited Brazil and promoted an
FTA between the two countries.45 This was no easy task, since some
sectors in both Mexico and Brazil opposed the agreement. The energy
sector was once again an important matter for discussion, the Brazilian
side being more interested in an association in the field.
Good intentions, the Binational Commission, CELAC, and an opti-
mistic official language, however, did not solve the visa requirement
problem, and the strongest opportunity to improve relations, trade, and
economics would soon fade away, as the next section will examine. The
strategy of engaging Brazil and giving the bilateral relationship a more
institutional or formal content was not completely successful.
ECA 55 and the Economic Integration Strategic Agreement

(EISA): The end of the new relationship
Historically, trade between Mexico and Brazil has not been significant
to either country. Geographical distance, Mexico’s traditional concen-
tration on the US market and Brazil’s preference to trade with Europe,
MERCOSUR, China, and India, plus little complementarity between the

two economies, explain why trade has not been important in bilateral
relations.46 In the period under study, however, trade became an issue,
especially after the conclusion of the ECA 53 and 55, and the discussions
of a possible EISA.47
ECA 55 was promoted by the automobile industry, which had a
strong interest in sectorial integration within Latin America.48 The pur-
pose of the agreement was the implementation of free trade, and the
integration and productive complementation in the automobile sector
among Mexico and the MERCOSUR countries (basically Argentina and
Brazil).49 The export of Mexican vehicles to Brazil increased from 31.5%
in 2006 to 38.5% in 2009. In five years, the value of exports to Brazil
multiplied by 26, from US$35 million in 2004 to US$938 million in
2009; its maximum value was reached in 2008, with US$1,518 million.50
The vehicles that Mexico exports to Brazil are of medium and large
size, with more aggregated value; those exported by Brazil to Mexico
are compact, fabricated mostly by European subsidiary companies.51
As mentioned above, Calderón proposed an FTA during his visit to
Brazil. In February 2010, Lula and Calderón announced that discussions
to evaluate the viability of an EISA would begin.52 The rounds of nego-
tiations, however, were cancelled on two occasions. The first, in early
2011, was because different economic sectors in Mexico expressed their
positions on the agreement indicating lack of consensus: the chemi-
cal, electronic, perfume, cosmetics, automobile, auto-parts, and services
sectors were interested in the agreement, whereas sectors such as agri-
culture and the shoe industry openly rejected it.53 The second round
of negotiations was cancelled in early 2012, when Brazil announced its
intention to renounce ECA 55, claiming a growing deficit in its trade
balance of vehicles and auto-parts with Mexico. Both governments ini-
tiated a series of meetings to find an acceptable solution, and in March
2012 they signed an Additional Protocol to the Bilateral Appendix that
establishes, among other things, annual importation quotas for light
vehicles.54
The Mexican government strongly reacted to Brazil’s announcement:
the economics secretary declared that talks about a FTA would take
place only when trust returned to markets and businessmen in both
countries,55 and Secretary Espinosa reiterated Mexico’s strong posi-
tion against protectionism, and asserted that restrictive commercial
measures undermined competitiveness and hindered investment.56 Pres-
ident Calderón, in turn, expressed that an FTA was vital for Mexico, but
certain sectors in Brazil opposed it.57
Ana Covarrubias 205
In brief, as Luiselli clearly states, ‘ECA 55 killed the FTA.’58 According

to Arriaga, the Mexican government had the political will to conclude it
despite resistance from certain economic sectors. Mexican diplomat C,
in turn, questions Brazil’s deficit argument: for the first eight years since
2003 the deficit was on the Mexican side.59 She argues that Brazil did
not approach Mexico to negotiate or consult beforehand, and commu-
nicated its decision almost casually. Mexico immediately tried to build
bridges, and the Protocol was signed.60 One of the results of Brazil’s
actions was to generate distrust in Mexican businessmen towards Brazil
as a trade partner or investment destination.61 In this case, respect for
formal agreements was not total, but rapprochement to avoid a com-
plete rupture was possible. Perhaps on the grounds of irreconcilable
positions, Mexico and Brazil were capable of maintaining a minimum
of commitment.
It is significant that Brazil and Mexico so clearly expressed their inten-
tion to improve bilateral relations during Calderón’s presidential term.
The context was more favourable: the debate about the UN Security
Council had lost prominence, relations between the two foreign minis-
ters were cordial, and Mexico’s government was determined to improve
its presence in the region. The Mexican government wanted to commit
Brazil more firmly, and it managed to do so by gaining Brazil’s recogni-
tion that both countries stood on an equal footing; official statements
on both sides were careful to place them at the same level in terms of
regional and global importance. There is no doubt that Brazil’s decision
to renounce ECA 55 was very damaging to the bilateral relationship,
and it probably put an end to rapprochement, initiating a new period of
distance.
The Brazilian threat
Did Brazil really threaten Mexico over the last decade? What kind of
threat did Brazil pose to Mexican governments? There seems to be lit-
tle doubt that Mexico resented Brazil’s rise, especially under Lula. The
Security Council reform and the creation of CELAC are good examples:
believing Mexico to be comparable to Brazil, and resenting its exclusion
from South American politics, the Mexican governments intended to
contain Brazil by approaching it and trying to gain a commitment. They
tried to engage Brazil in negotiations and mechanisms to make regional
initiatives and the bilateral relationship work better. Mexico was search-
ing for recognition as an equal and influential actor; foreign policy was,
therefore, the area where Mexico felt Brazil’s rise most deeply.
Mexican efforts had mixed results: they attracted Brazil’s attention,

and managed to position Mexico as an equally important country in the
region. However, Brazil’s presence was more visible, and it proved to be
more entrepreneurial than Mexico, which most of the time only reacted
to Brazil’s initiatives (except in the case of CELAC). Significantly, both
countries now face serious domestic challenges that negatively influence
their foreign policies; domestically vulnerable, they no longer have the
capacities necessary for an ambitious and positive projection abroad. Are
rivalry and competition likely to define their relations again?
Notes
1. G. Palacios (2005) ’Brasil y México: su relaciones 1822–1992’ in A. Ortiz,
L. N. Mena, O. Amorim Neto, and R. Fernández de Castro (eds), Brasil y
México: encuentros y desencuentros (Mexico: Instituto Matías Romero-SRE), and
G. Palacios (2001) Intimidades, conflictos y reconciliaciones. México y Brasil,
1822–1993 (Mexico: SRE-Dirección General del Acervo Histórico).
2. ‘Brasil y México’, 108.
3. Some examples are: L. Rubio (2012) ‘¿México vs. Brazil?’ Terra Noticias,
11 March, http://noticias.terra.com.mx/mexico/luis-rubio-mexico-vs-brasil,
29864029e1206310VgnVCM4000009bf154d0RCRD.html, date accessed 2
December 2013; J. Castañeda (2012) ‘La rivalidad México-Brasil’, El
País, 2 March, http://elpais.com/elpais/2012/02/28/opinion/1330453013_
778328.html, date accessed 2 December 2013; M. Ojeda Gómez (2009)
‘México y Brasil: caminos opuestos’, Milenio, 17 November, http://eurolat.
blogspot.mx/2009/11/opinion-mexico-y-brasil-caminos.html, date accessed
2 December 2013; J. Authers (2011) ‘Mexico v. Brazil contest not decided yet’,
The Financial Times, 23 June, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/international-business/latin-american-business/mexico-v-brazil-
contest-not-decided-yet/article584240/, date accessed 2 December 2013;
M. C. Rosas (2008) ‘México y Brasil: ¿Buenos enemigos o amigos mortales?’
Mosaico I(1), 87–105.
4. P. Hakim (2002) ‘Two Ways to Go Global’, Foreign Affairs, LXXXI(1), 148–162.
See also M. R. Soares de Lima (2008) ‘Brazil Rising. The Country’s New Sta-
tus Means Reconciling Divergent Interests with the North, the South, and
Its Neighbors’, IP Journal, http://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/article/20388/print,
date accessed 1 May 2014; M. R. Soares de Lima and M. Hirst (2006) ‘Brazil as
an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibili-
ties’, International Affairs LXXXII(1), 21–40; A. Covarrubias (2010) Cambio de
siglo: la política exterior de la apertura económica y política. México y el mundo.
Historia de sus relaciones exteriores (ed. Blanca Torres) (Mexico: El Colegio de
México); A. Covarrubias (2013) ‘La política exterior de Calderón: objetivos y
acciones’, Foro Internacional LIII(3–4), 455–462; E. Ruiz Sandoval (2008) ‘La
política exterior de México durante el sexenio de Vicente Fox: mucho ruido
y pocas nueces’, Foro Internacional ILVIII(1–2), 66–80; R. Velázquez Flores and
R. Domínguez (2013) ‘Balance de política exterior de México en el sexenio
Ana Covarrubias 207
de Felipe Calderón bajo los tres niveles de análisis: límites y alcances’, Foro
Internacional LIII(3–4), 483–516.
5. J. Castañeda (2001) ‘Los ejes de la política exterior de México’, Nexos
XXIII(288), 67.
6. F. Calderón (2007) ‘Discurso del presidente Felipe Calderón Hinojosa durante
la presentación del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007–2012’, http://www.
energia.gob.mx/portal/Default.aspx?id=1392, date accessed 1 June 2007;
Covarrubias, ‘La política exterior de Calderón’, 457–458.
7. T. V. Paul (2004) ‘Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power
Theory and their Contemporary Relevance’, in T. V. Paul, J. Wirtz, and
M. Fortmann (eds), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), 1–27.
8. D. Flemesand L. Wehner (2012) ‘Drivers of Strategic Contestation in South
America’, GIGA Working Papers 207, 5.
9. M. R. Soares de Lima and M. Hirst, ‘Brazil as an Intermediate State’, 29;
A. Malamud (2011) ‘A Leader without Followers? The Growing Divergence
Latin American Politics and Society LIII(3), 9.
10. ‘Liman asperezas Fox y Lula da Silva’, Proceso, 26 September 2003, http://
www.proceso.com.mx/?P= 256367, date accessed 31 March 2014.
11. ‘Liman asperezas Fox y Lula da Silva’.
12. Maisonnave, ‘Fox cree que México dará aliento al Mercosur’, Folha de São
Paulo, 6 July 2004, p. A9, Acervo Folha, http://acervo.folha.com.br/fsp/2004/
07/06/2/, date accessed 10 April 2014.
13. Interview. Mexico City, 7 April 2014.
16. Interviews. Mexico City, 7 and 25 April 2014.
17. Interview. Estado de México, 7 May 2014.
19. Interview. Estado de México, 7 May 2014. According to Berruga and Mexican
diplomat B, if Brazil obtains a permanent seat on the Council, Mexico will
remain in the ‘second League’ forever. Interview. Mexico City, 25 April 2014;
telephone conversation, 3 June 2014.
20. Víctor Arriaga. Interview. Mexico City, 5 April 2014.
23. Many in Brazil argued that by signing NAFTA, the Mexican government was
violating the Treaty of Montevideo (the rules of the Latin American Inte-
gration Association, ALADI). The Mexican government did not agree with
Brazil’s interpretation of articles 5, 44, and 48 of ALADI, and offered to nego-
tiate FTAs with whomever was interested. Brazil was not. A. Ortiz, l. N. Mena,
and R. Sennes, ‘Brasil y México en la economía política internacional’, in
A. Ortiz and L. N. Mena, Amorim Neto, and Fernández de Castro (eds), Brasil
y México, 230.
24. F. Maisonnave (2004) ‘Fox cree que México le dará aliento al Mercosur’, Folha
de São Paulo.
27. Covarrubias, Cambio de siglo; Ruiz, ‘La política exterior de México’, Velázquez
and Domínguez, ‘Balance de la política exterior de México’, G. Guajardo Soto
(2008) ‘Viejos puentes y nuevos acervos. La relación de México con América
Latina y el Caribe durante el sexenio de Vicente Fox’, Foro Internacional
ILVIII(1–2), 268–296.
28. D. Flemes (2010) ‘Brazil: Strategic Options in the Changing World Order’, in
D. Flemes (ed.), Regional Leadership in the Global System. Ideas, Interests and
Strategies of Regional Powers (Surrey: Ashgate), 102; A. Fishlow (2011) Start-
ing Over. Brazil since 1985 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press),
158–164.
29. Celso Amorim (2003) ‘Discurso proferido pelo Embaixador Celso Amorim
por ocasião da transmissão do Cargo de Ministro de Estado das Relações
Exteriores’, Brasília, 1 January 2003, http://mundorama.net/2003/01/01/
discurso-proferido-pelo-embaixador-celso-amorim-por-ocasiao-da-transmiss
ao-do-cargo-de-ministro-de-estado-das-relacoes-exteriores-brasilia-brasil-0101
2003, quoted by Malamud, ‘A Leader without Followers?’ 7.
30. Malamud, ‘A Leader without Followers?’ 1–24; Andrew Hurrell (2009)
‘Brasil y la tormenta que se avecina’, Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica IX(2),
43–54.
31. Interview. Mexico City, 3 April 2014. To Luiselli Fernández and Rodríguez
Minor, Brazil seemed to have formulated a ‘tropical Monroe Doctrine’:
‘South America for the Brazilians’. C. Luiselli Fernández and R. Rodríguez
Minor (2006) ‘México y América Latina: al encuentro de la comunidad per-
dida’, in J. E. Navarrete (ed.), La reconstrucción de la política exterior de México:
principios, ámbitos, acciones (Mexico: UNAM-Centro de Investigaciones
Interdisciplinarias en Ciencias y Humanidades), 286–290.
32. Interviews. Mexico City, 5 April and 8 May 2014.
33. Interview. Mexico City, 8 May 2014.
34. Interviews. Mexico City, 3 and 5 April 2014.
35. Mexican diplomat B. Telephone conversation, 3 June 2014.
36. G. González and R. Velázquez (2013) ‘La política exterior de México hacia
América Latina en el sexenio de Felipe Calderón (2006–2012): entre la pru-
dencia política y el pragmatismo económico’, Foro Internacional LIII(3–4),
572–618; Covarrubias (2013) ‘La política exterior de Calderón’.
37. ‘Segundo Receso Comisión Permanente, LIX Legislatura, Miércoles 21 de
junio de 2006, Diario 8. Ratificación de nombramientos diplomáticos’, http:
//www.senado.gob.mx/index.php?ver=sp&mn=3&sm=2&lg=59&ano=3&
id=18061, date accessed 8 May 2014.
38. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Assessoria de Imprensa do Gabinete,
‘Entrevista concedida pelo Ministro das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador
Celso Amorim, ao Jornal “Reforma”, do México – Cidade do México,
28 March 2007’, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-
artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/ministro-estado-relacoes-exterior
es/632745565601-entrevista-concedida-pelo-ministro-das-relacoes/, date acc-
essed 3 April 2014.
39. ‘Establecen México y Brasil una Comisión Binacional con el propósito de
intensificar sus relaciones’, 29 March 2007, Mexico, SRE, http://www.sre.
gob.mx/csocial_viejo/contenido/comunicados/2007/mar/cp_084.html, date
Ana Covarrubias 209
40. Arriaga. Interview. Mexico City, 5 April 2014, and Comunicado de prensa
conjunto, ‘Establecen México y Brasil una Comisión Nacional con el
propósito de intensificar sus relaciones’, Brasilia, Brazil, 28 March 2007, http:
//consulmex.sre.gob.mx/saopaulo/index.php/noticias/239-comision-binacio
nal?tmpl=component&print=1&page=, date accessed 7 April 2014. Mexico
and Brazil announced the elimination of the visa requirement in March
2013 as a result of the agreements reached by Presidents Dilma Rousseff and
Enrique Peña Nieto.
41. Andrés Valencia. Interview. Mexico City, 8 May 2014.
42. Luis Inàcio Da Silva (2007) ‘Brasil-México: una asociación necesaria’, El
Universal, 5 August, http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/153072.html,
date accessed 23 April 2014.
43. Da Silva, ‘Brasil-México’.
44. ‘Comunicado conjunto de la visita de Estado a Brasil del Presidente de
México, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa’, 17 August 2009, Comunicado CGCS-132,
http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2009/08/comunicado-conjunto-de-la-
visita-de-estado-a-brasil-del-presidente-de-mexico-felipe-calderon-hinojosa,
45. S. J. Jiménez, ‘Calderón llega a Brasil en busca de un TLC’, El Universal,
16 August 2009, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/170671.html, date
accessed 23 April 2014; E. Camacho (2011) ‘México y Brasil, el impacto de un
acuerdo comercial’, El Universal, Cartera, 7 February, http://www.eluniversal.
com.mx/finanzas/84491.html, date accessed 25 April 2012.
46. M. E. Morales, P. Mejía, R. Gutiérrez, M. A. Díaz, and R. Vergara (2012)
‘Interacciones económico-financieras Brasil-México: ¿cuál es su grado de
integración?’ Perfiles Latinoamericanos 39, 119–120.
47. Morales et al., ‘Interacciones económico-financieras’, 117.
48. Luis Ernesto Derbez. Interview. Estado de México, 7 May 2014.
49. Morales et al., ‘Interacciones económico-financieras’, 124, footnote.
52. O. Brito (2010) ‘Brasil y México pactan acuerdo estratégico’, El Economista,
24 February, http://eleconomista.com.mx/industrias/2010/02/23/mexico-
brasil-avanzan-complementacion-economica, date accessed 25 April 2012.
53. E. Camacho (2011) ‘México y Brasil, el impacto de un acuerdo comercial’.
54. L. González, L. Flores, and P. Suárez (2012) ‘México aceptaría recortar envío
de autos a Brasil’, El Economista, 13 March, http://eleconomista.com.mx/
industrias/2012/03/13/brasil-espera-cerrar-acuerdo-mexico, date accessed
25 April 2012.
55. L. González (2012) ‘El TLC con Brasil está enterrado: Ferrari’, El
Economista, March 18, http://eleconomista.com.mx/industrias/2012/03/16/
brasil-perdio-confianza-tlc-ferrari, date accessed 25 April 2012.
56. ‘«Congelan» TLC con Brasil’ (2012) El Informador, 17 March, http://www.
informador.com.mx/economia /2012/364071/6/congelan-tlc-con-brasil.htm,
date accessed 25 April 2012.
57. J. Ramps and J. Vales (2012) ‘Calderón fustiga a Brasil por su proteccionismo’,
El Universal, 14 April, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/internacional/77411.
html, date accessed 25 April 2012.
58. Interview. Mexico City. 3 April 2014.

59. Interview. Mexico City. 5 April 2014; Mexican diplomat C. Questionnaire
received 15 April 2014. The Economist also reported that the agreement had
favoured Brazil for the first decade, but that in 2011 Mexico’s exports grew
by 40% to US$2 billion, while Brazil’s exports reached only US$372 million.
‘Brazil, Mexico and Trade. Two Ways to Make a Car’, 10 March 2012.
60. Mexican diplomat C. Questionnaire, received 15 April 2014.
61. Mexican diplomat C. Questionnaire, received 15 April 2014.
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13
Latin American Regionalism Faces
the Rise of Brazil
Andrés Malamud
In the last two decades, Brazil has emerged as a global actor. Its rise
is embodied in such acronyms as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
South Africa), IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), and BASIC (Brazil, South
Africa, India, China), which include emerging states from several world
regions. Brazil’s emergence has been an unintended outcome of its for-
eign policy, not because the government did not seek international
recognition but because it planned to reach it through regional blocs
rather than transregional alliances. There are two reasons for this unpre-
dicted result: first, Brazil has been widening the gap with its neighbours;
second, the organizations it has created as regional means to global ends
have not delivered as expected.
This chapter analyses Brazil’s regional strategies and the region’s
reactions along three dimensions: power struggle (politics), interest
coordination (policy), and community building (polity). It shows that
most South American neighbours have followed Brazil’s lead only in
exchange for material compensation, which has been limited and spo-
radic, and have either dragged their feet (as in the Common Market of
the South (MERCOSUR)) or created alternative organizations (such as
the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) or the Pacific Alliance)
rather than bandwagoning (as in the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR)) when there was little on offer.
Politics: How Brazil accommodated concertación regional1
Until 1979, Brazil saw Argentina as a major security threat, and the pos-
sibility of a military confrontation with it shaped the mission of the
I thank Gian Luca Gardini and Miriam Prys for comments.
214
Andrés Malamud 215
Brazilian armed forces. This perception began to change when both

countries, under symmetric military rule, signed an agreement on the
shared Paraná River basin (Resende-Santos, 2002). The following demo-
cratic regimes deepened this cooperation path by signing several agree-
ments covering issues from nuclear to trade. In 1991, MERCOSUR was
established, and the historic rivalry between Argentina and Brazil turned
into fully-fledged regional cooperation. As the Southern Cone ceased to
represent a threat, the Amazonian region began to be identified as the
main security concern for Brazil.
In the current Brazilian view, South America is not just a geographical
region (different from Latin America as a whole) but also an autonomous
political-economic area, given that US influence recedes as distance
from Washington increases. Brazil’s elites consider this sub-region to be
within the country’s natural sphere of influence (CEBRI-CINDES, 2007;
Souza, 2009), although this perception has slightly changed in recent
years, as the region is increasingly regarded as a burden rather than an
asset (Malamud, 2011).
Historically, there have been two major institutional mechanisms to
resolve interstate security disputes in the region, both of which include
non-Latin American countries. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (TIAR), signed in the city of Rio in 1947, commits signatories
to mutual defence in the case of an outside attack. The Organization
of American States (OAS), the sponsoring institution of the TIAR, was
created in 1948 to promote cooperation in the Western hemisphere.
While both the Rio Treaty and the OAS are in effect at the present
time, their relevance in high-stakes politics in the region is arguable. The
refusal of the US to uphold the TIAR during the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands
war, siding instead with its historic European ally, the UK, was an eye-
opener for some Latin American elites. Henceforth, the membership
of the US in the OAS (and its location in Washington, DC) has left
many Latin American administrations unconvinced of the neutrality of
the organization in resolving regional disputes. This scepticism inten-
sified in the 2000s with the election of centre-left governments across
South America. A few years later, the Lula administration decided to fill
the void.
UNASUR, established in May 2008, can be seen as the skeleton of an
autonomous South American governance structure, with defence and
security issues grouped under the supervision of its South American
Defense Council (SDC). The SDC project was launched by then Brazilian
president Lula da Silva and his minister of defence, Nelson Jobim, dur-
ing a state visit to Argentina in February 2008. The proposal gained
216 Latin American Regionalism and the Rise of Brazil
impetus after the Colombian attack on a Revolutionary Armed Forces

of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla camp in Ecuador in March the same year.
Minister Jobim visited several South American countries to garner sup-
port, and the SDC was finally established in December 2008 (Weiffen
et al., 2013). Its founding treaty subordinates this body to the prin-
ciples and objectives established by the UN charter, the OAS charter,
and UNASUR’s own decisions. Its main goals are to consolidate South
America as a zone of peace, to create a common identity on defence
matters, and to strengthen regional defence cooperation. Ideological
rhetoric notwithstanding, this does not entail a common defence policy,
still less a military alliance. UNASUR was also part of Brazil’s strategy to
use regional integration as a springboard for increasing its global influ-
ence. However, the Brazilian notion of the region has gradually changed
from asset to burden in the last decade, as potential synergies lose
steam and negative externalities increase. Currently, the major threat
is the escalation of neighbours’ domestic conflicts, which could result
in the intervention of external actors – that is, the US. Thus, by institu-
tionalizing security relations, Brazil intends to forestall ad hoc regional
responses to crisis and extra-regional interventions (Spektor, 2010).
Both MERCOSUR and UNASUR include democratic clauses through
which member governments may intervene if a member state reverts
back to authoritarianism. Intervention mechanisms range from partial
and total suspension from the organization to the imposition of diplo-
matic sanctions. Procedurally, the two organizations allow high-level
consultations and direct presidential diplomacy among members. This
became evident in 2012, when the then president of Paraguay, Fernando
Lugo, was removed from office in a contentious move by the national
congress. MERCOSUR and UNASUR served as forums within which Pres-
ident Dilma Rousseff could debate with her counterparts on how to
proceed with the Paraguayan crisis. Finally, the decision was made to
invoke the democratic clauses, resulting in the temporary suspension of
Paraguay from the two organizations. As Stuenkel (2013) remarks, this
approach ‘is less likely to stir up anti-Brazilian sentiment at home or
abroad. Only when preventive measures fail do Brazilian policy makers
contemplate more invasive interventions.’ Indeed, in 2009, an attempt
to reinstate ousted Honduran president Manuel Zelaya had ended in
failure without bringing Brazil significant gains in reputation.
South American organizations are virtually costless, as their headquar-
ters are funded by the respective host countries, each member state
pays for its own travel expenses, and common budgets are non-existent
(as in UNASUR) or negligible (as in MERCOSUR). However useful these
Andrés Malamud 217
organizations might be to Brazil’s power ambitions, they are fully inter-

governmental. They lack supranational procedures because national
sovereignty remains the utmost principle and organizing rule. Regional
integration thus remains superficial rather than deep, and it would be
more accurate to call it regional cooperation. Intergovernmental insti-
tutions offer a different set of incentives and resources for member
states seeking to influence neighbours’ policies, among which presiden-
tial diplomacy stands out. Informal involvement, or shuttle diplomacy,
has also been used by successive Brazilian governments, whether in the
frame of regional organizations or through bilateral or multilateral oper-
ations. Brazil does not intend to share or pool sovereignty, and neither
do its neighbours.
Brasilia’s preference for non-coercive means, based on its soft power
structure and non-interventionist traditions, has biased the country’s
role in regional security governance. It no longer supports US co-
responsibility in South America, but it is not ready to assume the
previous role of the US if hard power is required. On the contrary, it
sustains the legitimacy of its regional role by contrasting it with historic
US interventionism. Burden sharing is thus asserted to be more ‘demo-
cratic’ and respectful of national sovereignty, though it becomes difficult
to disguise the fact that the burden Brazil is prepared to share is less than
what its neighbours deem necessary. Brazil can afford to be a reluctant
regional power because its rise, ‘with all its tensions and dilemmas, does
not take place in an international [regional] system but in an interna-
tional [regional] society’ (Merke, 2013:16), where concertación is accepted
as the prevailing diplomatic practice. A midway institution between
diplomacy and great power management, concertación is defined as a
loose form of regional organization ‘based on consensus-seeking and
peaceful settlement of disputes’ (Merke, 2013:13). Somehow counter-
intuitively, Brazil’s growth in national capabilities has been paralleled by
most other South American countries. The lonely decline of Argentina
sometimes obscures the fact that Brazil’s stand in the region has not
changed as much as it has on the global scenario (Darnton, 2015), and
neither have the mechanisms that manage interstate relations.
Policy-making: Brazil and the transformation of regional

cooperation2
In the two decades following the creation of MERCOSUR, established

in 1991, Brazil came increasingly to be seen as a regional leader and
an intermediate power (Lima and Hirst, 2006). Its government initially
designed a sequential foreign policy that conceived region building as a

means to attain global recognition. However, recurring regional setbacks
and unexpected global achievements led to policy reformulation, and
actions at both regional and global levels have gained autonomy from
each other. A dual foreign policy ensued, as Brazil begun to act as a
stabilizing peer in Latin America but as an assertive power on the global
stage (Malamud, 2011; Malamud and Rodriguez, 2014).
Some emerging states tie the economies of their neighbouring coun-
tries together; they have become geoeconomic nodes of their respective
regions. At first glance, it seems that Brazil is a case of this phenomenon.
First, Brazil is the most important trading partner of Argentina, Bolivia,
and Paraguay, and close to most important for Uruguay. The Andean
countries and Venezuela are becoming more and more attractive to
investment by Brazil’s largest enterprises. Second, Brazil possesses a geo-
graphically central position in the Initiative for the Integration of the
Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA). The vision that guides
IIRSA is that highways and waterways will connect the Atlantic to the
Pacific, crossing the Amazon Basin and the Andes. Pipelines for oil and
natural gas will link the growing Brazilian market to Argentina, Bolivia,
Uruguay, and Venezuela, and national electricity grids will connect with
each other. Third, the state-owned National Development Bank (BNDES)
massively supports the regional expansion of Brazilian energy and con-
struction firms through loans conceded to neighbouring governments.
In short, regional economic integration has been defined as a strategic
goal for the Brazilian government.
Yet, a closer look at Brazil’s economic role in South America leads
to more nuanced conclusions. Large distances and physical barriers
hinder close economic ties between Brazil and its non-Southern Cone
neighbours. Transregional transport infrastructure is deeply inadequate.
IIRSA has remained a vision so far. What is more, the South American
countries mostly export primary sector products to the cores of the
global economy. Intra-regional trade is not essential to them. For Brazil,
regional markets are of minor relevance in comparison with overseas
markets. Political obstacles to regional economic cooperation further
reduce Brazil’s geoeconomic nodality.
The South American ministers responsible for transport, energy, and
telecommunication agreed, at a meeting in Montevideo in 2000, to
coordinate their policies and to foster physical integration in these sec-
tors. They identified 12 development axes for this purpose. In order
to put the decisions taken at Montevideo into practice, IIRSA was
founded in the same year. This is a loose intergovernmental initiative, a
Andrés Malamud 219
technical forum for cooperation on regional infrastructure, and concen-

trates on coordinating investment in projects that physically interlink
the South American countries. If all projects envisaged were carried
out, South America would be integrated closely by railway and road
corridors, waterways, and electricity transmission lines (IADB, 2008).
Brazil would assume a nodal role in the resulting infrastructure net-
work. However, its powerful national development bank has financed
only two out of several hundred IIRSA projects, opting instead for lend-
ing money bilaterally to neighbouring governments on the condition
that they contract Brazilian firms (Hochstetler, 2014). BNDES’s lend-
ing reflects less a new model of developmentalism or regionalism than
an updating of the old strategy to take advantage of a market-oriented
economy (Hochstetler and Montero, 2013) and the available clients in
the neighbourhood.
Comparing visions and reality in the energy sector confirms that even
physical integration – and thus Brazil’s geoeconomic nodality – is to
large extent rhetoric. Two years after the Gasoducto del Sur, a giant net-
work of gas pipelines that would have stretched across the continent,
had first been promoted by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, the
president of Petrobras downplayed it by declaring that it would take
25–30 years for a project of this dimension to become operational (La
Nación, 2007). As Brazil was reluctant, the scheme eventually died.
The coastal location of the agglomerations of most South American
countries favours the import of liquefied natural gas instead of building
costly transregional pipelines. Thermal and hydroelectric resources are
compatible, as countries rich in natural gas could increase their genera-
tion of electricity whenever droughts limit the output of hydropower
stations if they were sufficiently interlinked, only they are not. This
discrepancy between Brazil’s potential as a geoeconomic node and its
reality is reinforced by low levels of economic complementarity between
Brazil and its neighbours. As Burges (2005:440) showed, the commodity-
export structure of most South American countries does not generate
sufficient incentives for deeper integration.
Arguably, UNASUR has achieved some advances in the area of public
health, due not so much to intra-regional harmonization as to extra-
regional coordination – health diplomacy. Riggirozzi (2014) argues that
[t]he leadership of Brazil in the region is undoubtedly critical for

these developments as it has been instrumental in promoting an
international presence of UNASUR, yet policy positions for inter-
national discussions concerning the impact of intellectual property
rights [. . .] or the monopolist position of pharmaceutical companies

[. . .] have been particularly driven by Ecuador and Argentina.
UNASUR is apparently conducting a unified sub-regional diplomacy

at the World Health Organization and its regional branch, the Pan-
American Health Organization. Indeed, UNASUR is seeking recognition
to act through regional, rather than national, delegates at the World
Health Assembly, just as the EU negotiates as a bloc in several interna-
tional organizations. However, as Riggirozzi shows, it is not Brazil but its
more radical neighbours who have led the way.
Polity-making: Brazil’s avoidant behaviour on regional

integration3
Brazil’s conception of its surroundings went through several redef-

initions over time. At the beginning of the 20th century, pan-
Americanism – a euphemism for a multilateral alliance that included
the US – was the chosen instrument to counterbalance threats from both
Europe and Argentina. This balancing strategy guided the actions of the
Baron of Rio Branco, who led the Foreign Ministry under four presi-
dents between 1902 and 1912. Later on, the ‘pan’ was dropped in favour
of ‘Latin’. In 1960, Brazil embraced the developmentalist beliefs of the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
and became a founding member of the Latin American Free Trade Asso-
ciation (LAFTA). However, for the general population and elites alike,
Latin America was seen as the region that surrounded Brazil rather than
its ‘home region’.
In the 1990s, a revival of integration occurred. It was different from
the earlier wave in that the so-called ‘new regionalism’ was conceived
of as open: it pursued not import substitution but export promotion,
thus aiming not to close the region in a defensive way but to improve
national competitiveness in an increasingly free trade environment. The
fears of a world divided into several ‘fortresses’ receded, and the new
regionalism began to be thought of as a feature of the wider globaliza-
tion process. However, it developed heterogeneously. One of its features
was ‘the very wide variation in the level of institutionalization, with
many regional groupings consciously avoiding the institutional and
bureaucratic structures of traditional international organizations and
of the regionalist model represented by the EC’ (Fawcett and Hurrell,
1995:3). The main upshot of this decade, and poster child of Brazilian
foreign policy, was MERCOSUR.
Andrés Malamud 221
MERCOSUR was initially a realistic project that sought gradually to

overcome the ‘integration fiction syndrome’ and the rhetoric that had
hitherto predominated in Latin America (Campbell, 1999). As inter-
dependence increased and economic growth lubricated the process, a
pragmatic approach prevailed. After the completion of the schedule of
automatic tariff reduction, however, a succession of economic crises
between 1997 and 2001 ignited intra-regional conflicts, and national
leaders opted to up the rhetorical ante. Deepening, enlargement, and
institutional buildup became obsessive topics as trade controversies mul-
tiplied and barriers were erected and taken down time and again. The
gap between those who defended the bloc for identity reasons and those
who did so for instrumental reasons became wider. Whereas the former
talked about establishing supranational institutions, a single currency,
and a common external policy, the latter advocated the liberalization of
services and government procurement, a more effective internalization
of regional rules, and the improvement of macroeconomic coordination
without necessarily going supranational (Malamud, 2015). Although
there were areas of agreement between the two camps, such as the need
to invest in physical integration, disagreements outweighed the points
of consensus. Ideology has gradually overtaken interests as the main fuel
of integration, and lip-service has skyrocketed while concrete advances
have faded.
As of 2000, a further wave has been identified: post-liberal or post-
hegemonic regionalism, which has allegedly changed the focus from
economics to logistics or politics (Sanahuja, 2009; Riggirozzi and Tussie,
2012). Physical integration, political identities, and security issues are
quoted as the rationale for the new undertakings, as in the case of
UNASUR. Almost two centuries after holding two Bolívar-led pan-
American conferences, in 1819 and 1826, Latin American visions of
integration seem to have gone full circle – back to a shared iden-
tity as the main driver. Identity politics, however, is likely to lead
to fragmentation rather than integration, which is driven instead ‘by
the convergence of interests’ (Malamud and Schmitter, 2011:147). The
most recent reaction to the ideological radicalization of Latin American
regionalism, and to Brazil’s prioritization of South America, has come
from the Pacific Arc, as Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico have signed
a treaty that – once again – puts the economy first.
As an outcome of the consecutive waves, a patchy picture has emerged
of ‘many coexisting and competing projects with fuzzy boundaries’
(Tussie, 2009:170), which neither form ‘concentric circles of regionalist
forums’ (Phillips and Prieto, 2011:120) nor show a minimum common
denominator or a convergence of political or policy positions (Gardini,

2010:26; Malamud and Gardini, 2012). In the Western hemisphere,
regionalism is always sub-regional, and there is no common core or
political centre, which is tantamount to saying that Brazil is neither a
regional node nor a regional leader.
The reason for Brazil’s losing regional nodality is ‘centrifugal
multipolarity’, understood as a global dynamics by which the exis-
tence of extra-regional poles pulls regions apart (Malamud and Viola,
2015). However, this is the result of structural dynamics as much
as agency choice, as secondary powers adapt their strategies to the
changing system. As new poles emerge, secondary states change their
cost–benefit calculations. They are no longer confined to their regional
hegemon, and can pick alternative leaders from a menu of global pow-
ers. Multipolarity thus broadens the autonomy of both small states and
middle powers, as has been shown to be the case with Brazil (Rodriguez,
2012). Yet, as Brazil loosened itself from Washington’s grip, so did other
South American states from Brasilia’s (Malamud, 2011:10–5). In spite
of the region’s structural unipolarity (Schenoni, 2014), in some policy
areas South American countries may opt – indeed, some have opted –
to align with overseas powers instead of with the regional hegemon.
Garzón (2015:3–4) identifies ‘a major (slow but steady) “decoupling”
of the economic function of regionalism from its social-, politico-, and
security dimensions’, which explains why South America is still an
arena of diplomatic manoeuvring but no longer a ground for economic
integration.
Conclusion
Brazil has run short of the necessary capacities and consistent strategy
to shape the region as it desires. Its government has oscillated between
investing in region building and pursuing global strategies, depending
on the policy area and short-term domestic preferences. Multilateralism
has been historically the preferred option, with minilateralism lately
becoming a close second – and regionalism standing as one subset
thereof (Malamud and Viola, 2015). Brazil’s neighbours have taken note
and reacted accordingly. Their reaction, rather cautious and halfhearted,
has contributed to the underperformance of regional organizations.
Brazil’s reluctance to a fully-fledged commitment to its region is not
new. Building on Hurrell’s earlier findings, Spektor (2010:192) under-
lined this ambivalence by stating that the Brazilian elites ‘are wed-
ded to traditional understandings of national autonomy and do not
Andrés Malamud 223
consider pooling regional sovereignties into supranational bodies. They

are equally reluctant to pay the costs of regional prominence, prefer-
ring to deal with smaller neighbors on an individual, ad hoc basis.’ The
neighbours’ reluctance to invest in deeper integration stems from prior
apprehension but feeds on Brazil’s ambivalence.
Brazil’s definition of its home region is a moving target. It is ‘South
America’ when the country aspires to secure a manageable area beyond
the US economic and security perimeter; but it turns to ‘Latin America’
when bidding for a position at an international organization. This strat-
egy has placed Brazil in several fields, and obliges it to articulate diverse,
sometimes even opposing, discourses. This situation qualifies the coun-
try as a cusp state, that is, one that lies on the edge of and in an
ambivalent relationship with regions that are seen to function as an
international relations sub-system (Herzog and Robbins, 2014). The par-
ticularity of Brazil is that it straddles one fuzzy region and (not other
regions but) the global stage.
The fuzziness of the region stems not from any objective nebulos-
ity regarding land contiguity but from Brazil’s deliberate decision to
redraw boundaries according to its interests. The other source of inter-
national identity is global rather than regional, as Brazil sees itself as a
global actor with a universalist vision. As the region became increasingly
burdensome, Brazilian foreign policy adapted in order not to let the
neighbours drain resources that the country needed for national devel-
opment and global projection. Accordingly, the neighbours have never
nurtured many expectations regarding Brazilian leadership – although
they may still require it when it is missing and resent it when it is
present.
Although regionalism has not delivered, politics – rather than eco-
nomics – keeps it at the top of the Latin American agenda. ‘Regionalism
in Latin America can best be understood as serving a set of political
objectives, but . . . it can no longer be seen as playing a significant role in
driving processes of structural political-economic change in the region’
(Phillips and Prieto, 2011:120). Latin American states continue to estab-
lish regional organizations because their leaders know that sovereignty
is not relinquished through ink and paper. Regionalism has become a
foreign policy resource used to achieve other ends, such as international
visibility, regional stability, and regime legitimacy, as well as to please
domestic and foreign audiences and mobilize support for the incumbent
administrations.
Given such a diversity of national goals, Latin American regionalism
lacks a core country and a political centre. Brazil is a lukewarm would-be
leader that has not been willing to pay the price for leadership, has
limited projection beyond South America, and divides its credentials
between several regional projects. Mexico has lost ground in South
America due to its approximation to the US, and was thus purposively
excluded from the UNASUR venture. Bolivarian Venezuela has had divi-
sive proposals and restricted appeal, and its claim to leadership was
already over when Hugo Chávez passed away. The absence of a regional
leader should come as little surprise, though. As (Prys, 2010:479) argues,
an ‘achievement-expectations gap’ can be observed in almost all cases
of potential regional hegemons’. Indeed, these powers ‘do not seem to
provide public goods, such as order and stability, nor do they always
have an extraordinary impact on the behavior of other states in their
region’. In spite of its much-celebrated rise, Brazil has strictly adhered to
Prys’s script.
Latin American regionalism remains mostly a question of foreign
policy, without having acquired a dynamics of its own. Regional orga-
nizations are cumulative layers of changing national strategies. In this
scenario, Brazil’s may be the most coherent or influential – but it is still
one among many. Its neighbours have followed its lead only when duly
compensated; otherwise, they have resorted to foot-dragging – a safer
and less costly strategy than balancing – or have looked for alternative
paymasters. Lest we forget, no matter how much Brazil has risen in the
last decade, China has risen more – and the US has never fully retired
from the region. Latin American countries have a rich menu from which
to pick a leader or paymaster should they want one, and Brazil is hardly
anybody’s first choice.
Notes
1. This section draws on Malamud and Alcañiz (2014).
2. This section draws on Scholvin and Malamud (2014).
3. This section draws on Malamud (2013).
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Concluding Remarks
Brazil has risen. Its economy is the seventh largest in the world in
terms of gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank, 2015). Its mili-
tary spending is the highest in Latin America, although Brazil does not
have nuclear capability. Brazil’s international activism in the last ten
years has been remarkable, with the direct launch of, or active participa-
tion in, integration initiatives regionally (Integration of the Regional
Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR), Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States (CELAC)) and with an acknowledged growing role internationally
(World Trade Organization (WTO), climate change negotiations, leading
the UN mission in Haiti). However, the rising trajectory of Brazil, at the
time of publishing, seems to have come to a halt.
Brazil’s international projection and self-confidence are faltering. The
country is experiencing the worst recession in 25 years (Lima and
Galvao, 2015) with significant repercussions on its external projection.
For instance, a diminished presence, both at state level and in invest-
ment and economic terms, is observable in Africa, a key area of Brazil’s
international pretentions under Lula. Corruption scandals affect the
highest spheres of the state organization (Petrobras) and government
(the treasurer of the ruling party arrested and several deputies and sen-
ators investigated for kickbacks). Still, the idea of Brazil as the regional
heavyweight in Latin America, and a major actor internationally, stands.
Brazil’s regional and international prominence is unlikely to fade away.
It is not – or not only – about Brazil’s rise per se, but about struc-
tural changes at the global level, with a wider rise of what was once
the periphery of the system. The impact Brazil has, and will continue
to have, in regional and global affairs remains very significant and
definitely deserves attention, including the responses that it prompts
in neighbouring countries.
227
228 Concluding Remarks
Brazil shares borders with ten countries, all of them less endowed in
terms of territory, population, and diversity of natural resources. This is
not necessarily an unusual situation among emerging countries – see,
for instance, China – but what is noteworthy is the fact that Brazil is
the only emerging country to have had, for more than a century, peace-
ful and steady relations with all nations on its borders. Because of its
size, international identity (Lafer, 2000), and diplomatic postures, Brazil
has played a stabilizing role in South America, which ensured peace-
ful – although not always friendly – relations among countries that,
through time, have experienced high levels of political turmoil and
internal violence of all sorts.
Nevertheless, as the authors of this book have shown in different
ways, Brazil is far from being a regional hegemon or even a regional
leader. In the first place, the country does not seem to see itself or
to coherently behave as a leader. An unwavering option to prioritize
regional activism is a relatively recent trait of Brazilian foreign pol-
icy. For a long time, Brazilian elites and foreign policy-makers – not
free of naïve parochialism – have perceived the region, at best, as a
platform from where the country could launch itself towards higher
positions in the international scene. Universalism and multilateralism
were very early representations and actual orientations of Brazil’s exter-
nal behaviour, while ambiguity has characterized the perceptions of its
aims concerning regional agency.
This analysis of Brazil’s own role, perception, and strategies is still
highly valid today, as the first three chapters have demonstrated.
Gardini has argued that traditional international relations (IR) labels to
define power status do not fully capture the case of Brazil’s rise and that
new concepts, such as ‘international manager’ rather than ‘international
power’ or ‘leader’, may be necessary. Tavares de Almeida has shown
that both Brazilian policy-makers and the general public are lukewarm
towards a leading regional role for Brazil, and understand regional inte-
gration essentially in terms of enhanced coordination. This is reflected,
Gomes Saraiva argues in Chapter 3, in Brazil’s preference for soft power
strategies and accommodation over imposition, coercion, or even costly
political or economic inducement.
As a matter of fact, it is difficult to see what could be the actual basis
for Brazil’s regional leadership in the absence of clear strategies, firm
resolve, and, last but not least, harder power resources and the will to
use them. Consequently, the rise of Brazil on the international scene is
not a consequence of its leading regional role, nor does it contribute
decisively to enhancing or changing its regional status. Asked to write
about reactions to what has been perceived as Brazil’s increasing regional

and global visibility and activism, our authors have produced studies
suggesting that regional and bilateral dynamics do not seem to be fun-
damentally affected by Brazil’s possible new global roles. This reflects
the actual nature of Brazil’s regional status, and consequently of its
relations with neighbouring countries, which largely depend on factors
other than Brazil’s global status per se.
As a corollary, Latin American or, for that matter, South American
countries do not recognize, accept, or seek for Brazilian leadership,
either in the past or at the present time. This stand is quite clear when
one observes their behaviour in multilateral forums, where leadership
is absent, coordination is rare, and every man for himself is the rule.
If this is true, how should one tackle and conceptualize those rela-
tions, and especially the countries’ responses to the international rise
of Brazil?
At the empirical level, the chapters in this book indicate that relations
between Brazil and countries in the region vary from country to country
and across time. These relations are fashioned by different factors: rela-
tions with the US and, increasingly, with China and the Pacific Rim; past
experience; the types and importance of today’s bilateral exchanges; and
domestic political, economic, and ideological considerations.
Relations among Latin/South American countries cannot be fully
understood if, at the same time, one does not consider the role of extra-
regional actors, namely, the US, in the past as much as today. This is
especially the case when one searches for explanations for the distant
and intermittent relations between Brazil and Colombia, or Mexico,
as Pastrana and Covarrubias, respectively, have shown. But, as Russell
and Tokatlian have highlighted, ‘playing the Mexican card’, which is,
in a way, getting closer to the US, has been favoured by sectors of the
Argentinian elites as a strategy for restraining Brazil’s power. If it is true
that the end of the Cold War and US ‘benign neglect’ towards South
America have provided more space for Brazilian regional initiatives, it
is also true that geographical proximity and political and economic
closeness to the US enhance the possibilities of countervailing Brazil’s
influence. More recently, China has become an increasingly important
trade partner and investor in Latin America, thus offering countries
in the region additional opportunities to offset hegemonic pretentions
or undesired leadership. China has the potential not only to be an
important player in the region in its own right, but also to change the
conditions under which relations between Brazil and its neighbours will
evolve.
Different countries relate differently to Brazil, and history matters for

laying the ground over which present interactions are deployed. Pre-
vious experiences, reprocessed, contribute to framing the perceptions
of today’s relations. Lambert shows that the huge territorial and eco-
nomic losses imposed on Paraguay, in consequence of the Triple Alliance
War (1864–1870), are a central element of a narrative about exploitative
bilateral relations. Representations about the 19th-century war frame
the recent disputes about prices of energy generated by the binational
Itaipu plant or about the expansion of soybean farms across borders.
In a similar vein, the change of the long-standing rivalry between
Argentina and Brazil into consciously sought cooperation, with minor
frictions in MERCOSUR, shows that the impact of previous experiences
on present bilateral relations depends on the ways leaders and polit-
ical elites fit them into their political rhetoric and publicly accepted
narratives. On the other hand, absence of closer political ties and sig-
nificant conflicts and exchanges in the past helps to build more open
and sympathetic attitudes towards Brazil, as described by Fermandois,
Pastrana, Cunha Filho and Delgado, and St John when writing about
Chile, Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.
Also, the more complex and diversified the bilateral agendas, the
stronger and denser relations with Brazil become, while the num-
ber of possible contentious issues increases in tandem. Trade and
trade agreements, direct investments, expansion of agriculture frontiers,
infrastructure and energy integration, management of shared environ-
mental resources, drug and other illicit trafficking across borders, and
democratic crises are part and parcel of a rich shared agenda, multiply-
ing the chances of divergence as much as the need for coordination
among the nations in the region. Brazil is undoubtedly a central actor
in all the different arenas where these issues evolve, but is not a recog-
nized leader, capable of bringing the regional partners together under its
guidance.
One issue that invariably emerges from a majority of chapters is
the interconnection between the domestic politics and the attitudes
regarding Brazil in neighbouring countries. The chapters on Uruguay
and, to a lesser extent, on Argentina and Venezuela show that atti-
tudes regarding Brazil vary across different groups of the political elites,
and also that relations with Brazil may, in certain circumstances, be
mobilized in domestic political disputes. As IR theories have long since
established, there is no such thing as states as unified actors; their inter-
national behaviour is deeply influenced by domestic political cleavages
and institutions (Allison, 1971; Smith, 1980; Allison and Zelikow, 1999).
It might be expected that attitudes regarding Brazil’s new inter-

national status would be influenced by the political orientations of
parties, and coalitions in government, in different countries. Neverthe-
less, as our authors have shown, political affinities and differences do
not translate directly into international cooperation or contestation.
In totally different ideological and domestic contexts, Chile under
Piñera, Bachelet, and the other Concertación governments, on the one
hand, and Venezuela under Chavez and Bolivia under Morales, on the
other, have experienced diplomatic and economic rapprochement with
Brazil, while at the same time pursuing independent foreign policy
strategies and alternative visions of regional integration and cooper-
ation, and have occasionally experienced tensions with Brasilia too.
A similar case could be made for Colombia, where, under a different
ideological underpinning from Brazil, the country has pursued both
contestation and cooperation, acting autonomously and following its
own way to development and international positioning.
Also, Brazil’s growing international recognition occurred when left-
wing forces, of various flavours, attained or remained in control of
national governments in a significant number of Latin American coun-
tries, as well as in Brazil itself. The consequences of political affinities
between national governing parties have been important in facilitating
some regional initiatives – for instance, the launching of MERCOSUR
and its relaunching between 2003 and 2006 – or bilateral negotiations –
for instance, over Itaipu energy prices, between Brazil and Paraguay, or
over gas and oil, between Brazil and Bolivia. However, ideological affini-
ties did not necessarily seem to play a very significant role in accommo-
dating diverging interests and views among Latin American countries,
with MERCOSUR members being a perfect case in point. As Malamud
noted in his chapter on the impact of Brazil’s rise on regionalism, this
also applies to UNASUR, where broad ideological affinity did not result
in any strategic alliance or coordinated defence policy.
Finally, it is important to highlight some theoretical implications of
the studies presented in this book. If Brazil is not a hegemonic power,
a great power, or even a recognized regional leader, but continues to
be a weighty regional player with considerable global influence and
projection (arguably more than any other country in the region), how
can we conceptualize the different strategies of Latin American coun-
tries towards it? In other words, how can we account in analytical
terms for situations where relations among countries occur under a
sharp asymmetry of power resources and display, but in the absence of
hegemony and clear ability or will to lead or, at least, act as a paymaster?
The concepts of balancing and bandwagoning, developed to explain

relations among traditional Western great powers – or between these and
nations under their direct influence – fall short of adequately capturing
and assessing Latin American responses to the rise of Brazil. Still, they
provide a sort of continuum on which intermediate, more moderate,
complex, and up-to-date strategies can be located. Our authors describe
an array of them, summarized in Table C.1.
The variety of strategies, nuances in postures, and subtleties of diplo-
matic action are impressive. Russel and Tokatlian suggest that, in recent
times, Argentina has deployed three different strategies to cope with
Brazil’s increasing international importance: soft regionalism, light bal-
ancing, and soft hedging. In the case of Chile, Fermandois points to
a long-lasting friendship characterized by Chilean collision avoidance,
cooperation without alignment, and institutional counterweighting.
The case of Uruguay, Luján suggests, is somewhat peculiar, in that
Montevideo pursues a strategic alliance bordering on bandwagoning
with Brazil, but this is the result of careful design rather than lack
of options. Similarly, Paraguay, both historically and under the cur-
rent administration of Horacio Cartes, has been prone to accommo-
date and comply with Brazilian interests, with Lugo’s resistance only
as an interlude, Peter Lambert argued. Bolivia has recently adopted
ambivalent positions vis-à-vis Brazil, alternating alignment and overt
confrontation; Cunha Filho and Delgado maintain that this is due
to Bolivia’s own domestic priorities and the sovereignty–development
nexus. Peru concluded a strategic alliance with Brazil, but Bruce St
John suggests that this is essentially the result of political and eco-
nomic opportunism. Venezuela has shown pragmatic acquiescence
towards Brazil’s rise, and Caracas’ contestation strategy – Briceño-Ruiz
argued – was essentially due to Brazil’s reluctance to provide regional
leadership, thus leaving room for Chavez’s manoeuvring and social
power rhetoric and diplomacy. Colombia, in turn, has implemented
an articulated strategy of soft balancing based, according to Pastrana,
on multiple bonds, institutional counterweights, and an international
identity essentially constructed around extra-regional allegiances and
interests. Mexico, as noted by Covarrubias, has engaged and contained
Brazil with a variety of initiatives meant to regain terrain in the region
and to be considered an equal to Brazil. Finally, also at the level of
regional integration and cooperation, Malamud concludes that Brazil
has prompted such a varied set of reactions that these have ultimately
impeded Brasilia’s role as a node or centre of integration in Latin/South
America.
Table C.1 Strategies towards Brazil
Country Strategies
Argentina • Soft regionalism

• Light balancing
• Soft hedging
Chile • Collision avoidance

• Cooperation without alignment
• Multiple bonds and institutional
counterweighting
Uruguay • Asymmetric alliance

• Close strategic alliance
Paraguay • Dependency
• Resistance aiming at extracting
benefits
• Compliance/subservience
Bolivia • Shifting balancing

• Shifting bandwagoning
• Asymmetric
sovereignty-development alliance
Peru • Strategic alliance

• Opportunism
• Asymmetric alliance
Venezuela • Problematic soft balancing

• Pragmatic acquiescence
• Social power diplomacy
Colombia • Soft balancing

• Cooperation without alignment
• Multiple bonds and institutional
counterweighting
Mexico • Containing and engaging

• Approaching
• Soft balancing
Overall, Latin American responses to the rise of Brazil are quite var-
ied, but if a pattern could be identified, this would be a multiple
contestation strategy. A majority of countries employ different tactics
and instruments, such as multiple bonds, institutional counterweight,
cooperation without alignment, and even ‘soft blackmailing’, in order

to pursue their own agenda, maximizing possible gains obtainable
from Brazil and its ascending status and at the same time limit-
ing net or relative losses deriving from Brazil’s excessive power or
assertiveness. Overt confrontation in economic terms, much less mil-
itary terms, is not an option. The existing IR conceptualization that
best seems to capture this complex picture is soft balancing (Paul,
2005): a set of discursive and institutional instruments to counterbal-
ance the regional power. However, José Briceño-Ruiz, in his chapter
on Venezuela, noted that the application of this concept to the case
of Brazil may be problematic. Perhaps, then, the best term to capture
a pattern in the Latin American response to the rise of Brazil is that
coined by Ana Covarrubias for the case of Mexico: ‘approach, engage
and contain’.
Issues and questions of broader interest and relevance to IR and inter-
national affairs can be drawn from this collection of case studies and the-
oretical considerations focusing on Latin America and Brazil. Asymmet-
ric alliances could be broadly understood as a form of bandwagoning,
since they imply adhesion of weaker states to a stronger one. Conversely,
the ways of resisting and restraining regional predominance can be
broadly understood in terms of balancing in various forms and degrees.
These are multifarious, as they reflect a complex and fluid distribution
of power and material and immaterial resources. The real point, though,
goes well beyond the assessment of Latin American strategies to face the
rise of Brazil.
The key question, as suggested by Gardini in Chapter 1, is a further
theoretical elaboration of the nature and limits of emerging countries’
actual powers in the global sphere as well as in their regional the-
atres. Do these emerging powers actually command, drive, and influence
regional agendas, policies, and interstate dynamics? To what extent do
emerging powers differ from the more established ones? Are these dif-
ferences visible in their foreign policy conduct? If so, then, is it this
difference in essence and form that prompts different (new?) responses
from neighbours as compared with more traditional cases? Avenues for
further research seem to be promising in both theoretical and empiri-
cal terms. We invite other researchers to follow up on these suggestions.
Such efforts would exceed the scope of this book; the more confined
and humble objective here was to assess foreign policy responses to the
rise of Brazil and to draw some considerations on balancing power, if it
occurs at all, in emerging states. We trust that the readers will find the
mission accomplished.
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Index
Afghanistan, 67 Caldera, Rafael, 160, 161, 162

Africa, 7, 32, 35, 96, 100, 108, 148, Calderón, Felipe, 195, 196, 201, 202,
156, 227 203, 204, 205
ALBA, 53, 57, 69, 83, 139, 165, 171, CAN, 53, 55, 67, 69, 132, 139, 147,
173, 182, 184 179, 186
Amazon, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 152, Canada, 20, 181, 182, 188, 189
153, 154, 179, 180, 215, 218 Cardoso, Fernando H., 12, 31, 48, 49,
Amorim, Celso, 17, 18, 85, 126, 180, 50, 56, 63, 81, 82, 147, 148, 160,
185, 198, 202 161, 170, 195
Andean Community, see CAN Cartes, Horacio, 115, 119, 123, 124,
APEC, 81, 86, 148 125, 232
Argentina, 9, 31, 32, 35, 36, 46, 49, Castro, Raul, 36
51, 52, 55, 62–76, 79, 80, 84, 86, CELAC, 54, 56, 58, 73, 83, 130, 139,
91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 162, 173, 177, 182, 197, 201, 203,
102, 106, 111, 115, 116, 146, 147, 205, 206, 227
150, 166, 173, 184, 186, 188, 189, Chávez, Hugo, 57, 68, 69, 82, 85, 160,
197, 200, 201, 204, 214, 215, 217, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168,
218, 220, 229, 230 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 178, 219,
Asia, 2, 7, 40, 72, 81, 86, 88, 148, 156, 224, 231, 232
186, 187 Chile, 9, 16, 65, 66, 68, 72, 77–89, 92,
Azevedo, Roberto, 56 95, 119, 134, 147, 150, 182, 184,
200, 201, 221, 230, 231, 232
China, 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24,
Bachelet, Michelle, 77, 78, 82, 83–7, 32, 58, 65, 74, 82, 88, 95, 100,
95, 231 101, 103, 104, 108, 110, 111, 118,
balancing, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 62, 63, 70, 72, 139, 140, 156, 165, 171, 183, 184,
74, 130, 131, 141, 142, 157, 170, 187, 195, 204, 214, 224, 228, 229
171, 183, 186, 190, 196, 201, 220, civilian power, 183
224, 232, 234 CLACS, see CELAC
bandwagoning, 2, 3, 4, 5, 47, 50, 58, Cold War, 2, 13, 31, 116, 131, 164, 229
62, 72, 74, 77, 88, 112, 130, 141, Collor de Mello, 79, 80
142, 157, 170, 174, 214, 232, Colombia, 8, 9, 15, 16, 51, 53, 72, 85,
233 95, 132, 146, 147, 149, 152,
BNDES, 53, 140, 161, 166, 218, 219 177–95, 201, 216, 221, 229, 230,
Bolivarianism, 69, 163, 169, 224 231, 232
Bolivia, 9, 36, 52, 53, 55, 72, 84, contestation, 3, 177, 178, 184, 188,
129–44, 147, 150, 166, 172, 173, 190, 231, 232, 233
178, 186, 188, 189, 200, 218, 230, Correa, Rafael, 166, 188
231, 232 Costa Rica, 188
BRIC, 7, 32, 58, 82, 183, 195, 214 Cuba, 35, 164, 171, 189, 190, 200
Britain, see UK
Bush, George H., 79, 80 Derbez, Luis Ernesto, 198, 199, 200
Bush, George W., 102, 135, 164 Doha Round, 165, 178, 179
236
Index 237
Dominican Republic, 201 IBSA, 32, 165, 179, 195

Duarte Frutos, N., 118, 122 IDB, 49, 166, 167, 177, 184, 185, 186,
Duhalde, Eduardo, 62, 63–4, 66, 69 190
IIRSA, 49, 53, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152,
Ecuador, 51, 53, 55, 72, 86, 132, 146, 157, 170, 218, 219, 227
147, 149, 166, 172, 173, 178, 180, IMF, 19, 63, 131, 133, 151, 166, 167,
186, 188, 189, 201, 216, 220 184, 185, 190
ELN, 178 India, 2, 7, 16, 18, 23, 32, 58, 82, 108,
environment, 23, 24, 147, 150, 153, 165, 171, 179, 183, 195, 197, 204,
166, 170, 180 214
Espinosa, Patricia, 202, 204 Iran, 17, 139, 165, 171
EU, 23, 71, 81, 94, 100, 101, 103, 111, Iraq, 67, 81
118, 124, 186, 220 Italy, 17, 19, 188, 197
Europe, 6, 8, 13, 17, 22, 30, 35, 40, 48,
63, 84, 96, 106, 140, 203, 204, Jamaica, 201
215, 220 Japan, 23, 106, 187, 197
FARC, 178, 179, 216 Kirchner, Cristina, 36, 62, 70, 72, 73
Figuereido, Luis A., 100 Kirchner, Néstor, 62, 63, 64–70
FOCEM, 51, 118 Kubischek, Juscelino, 30
Fox, Vicente, 195, 196, 198, 200
France, 18, 23, 106, 108, 110 Lafer, Celso, 18, 49, 80
Franco, Itamar, 48, 160, 161, 162, LAFTA, 31, 182, 220
170 Lagos, Ricardo, 80, 81, 82
Frei, Eduardo, 80 leadership, 1, 5, 13, 14, 15, 17, 21,
FTAA, 49, 57, 71, 80, 162, 165, 171, 22, 24, 31, 41, 46, 47, 49, 50,
173, 200 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 67,
Fujimori, Alberto, 147, 148, 151, 68, 69, 81, 82, 85, 93, 96, 98,
154 100, 103, 115, 131, 150, 165,
Fujimori, Keiko, 154 169, 172, 177, 178, 182, 187,
190, 199, 202, 219, 223, 224,
G20, 19, 32, 179, 203 228, 229, 232
Garcia, Alan, 151, 152, 153 light balancing, 63, 70, 74, 232
Garcia, Marco Aurelio, 169 Lugo, Fernando, 118, 120, 122, 123,
Germany, 18, 23, 78, 107, 108, 110, 125, 216, 232
171, 184, 197 Lula da Silva, 13, 31, 32, 46, 47, 50,
Global South, 32, 141, 167 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, 63, 64, 65,
great power(s), 2, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 66, 67, 69, 71, 78, 79, 82, 85, 86,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 32, 168, 171, 93, 123, 125, 138, 140, 148, 152,
195, 217, 231, 232 153, 154, 155, 160, 162, 163, 164,
Guyana, 55, 147 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 173,
178, 179, 180, 195, 197, 200, 201,
Haiti, 100, 195, 203, 227 203, 204, 215, 227
hard balancing, 3, 70, 170, 171, 190
hard power, 3, 5, 15, 53, 57, 58, 217 Maduro, Nicolás, 36, 57, 160, 163,
Honduras, 168, 169 164, 165
Hu Jintao, 65 Medvedev, Dmitry, 74
Humala Ollanta, 85, 153–5, 155 Menem, Carlos, 49, 63
238 Index
MERCOSUR, 31, 33, 35, 36, 40, 48, 49, Petrobras, 52, 136, 138, 139, 140, 161,
51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 63, 64, 66, 162, 187, 219, 227
67, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 79, 80, 81, Piñera, Sebastián, 77, 78, 83–7, 231
84, 85, 86, 87, 95, 100, 111, 115, pink tide, 7
117–19, 123, 125, 130, 132, 139, Pinochet, Augusto, 79
147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 166, 168, Plan Colombia, 178, 179, 184
178, 179, 182, 184, 186, 187, 189, Plan Dignidad, 133
196, 199, 200, 201, 204, 214, 215, Portugal, 145
216, 217, 220, 221, 230, 231 Putin, Vladimir, 74, 82
Mesa, Carlos, 138
Mexico, 8, 9, 16, 19, 35, 48, 58, 65, 66, regional power(s), 8, 13, 15, 20, 21,
67, 68, 79, 80, 83, 85, 87, 182, 22, 23, 52, 72, 82, 115, 177, 182,
186, 188, 195–213, 221, 224, 229, 183, 186, 189, 190, 198, 217, 234
232, 234 Rio Branco, 47, 59, 77, 152, 220
Middle East, 156 Rio Group, 31, 54, 201
middle power(s), 1, 20, 21, 186, 222 Rousseff, Dilma, 47, 54, 55, 58, 71, 85,
MINUSTAH, 72, 195 140, 153, 154, 155, 160, 162, 163,
Morales, Evo, 36, 129, 130, 133, 134, 164, 165, 168, 169, 180, 216
135, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 166, Russia, 7, 16, 18, 32, 58, 74, 82, 109,
231 110, 111, 139, 140, 165, 171, 183,
Moreno, Luis Alberto, 185 195, 214
Mujica, José, 35, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95,
124 SADC, 53, 56, 96, 166, 170, 185, 215
SAFTA, 48, 170
NAFTA, 48, 58, 68, 186, 189, 199, 200 Sanchez de Lozada, G., 131, 133, 134,
NATO, 70, 166, 167, 184, 185 135
Nicaragua, 200 Santos, Juan Manuel, 177, 179, 180,
182, 187, 188
soft balancing, 2, 50, 70, 170, 171,
OAS, 83, 96, 148, 169, 177, 184, 187, 183, 186, 190, 196, 201, 232, 234
188, 189, 190, 215, 216, 219 soft hedging, 2, 63, 72, 74, 232
Obama, Barack, 46, 86 soft power, 5, 16, 17, 22, 46, 47, 48,
OECD, 199 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 106,
OPEC, 165 183, 217, 228
South Africa, 2, 18, 21, 32, 108, 165,
Pacific Alliance, 53, 77, 79, 85, 86, 87, 177, 179, 183, 195, 214
88, 95, 101, 103, 139, 154, 177, South Korea, 19, 85, 139, 187, 197
182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 190, 214 sovereignty, 8, 47, 120, 123, 125, 129,
Paraguay, 9, 55, 56, 111, 114–28, 139, 130, 134, 141–2, 169, 171, 185,
150, 168, 169, 172, 186, 216, 218, 217, 223, 232
230, 231, 232 Spain, 106, 115, 129, 145, 181, 188
Patriota, Antonio, 85, 141 Stroessner, Alfredo, 115, 116, 119,
Paz Estenssoro, V., 131 121, 122, 124, 126
Paz Zamora, Jaime, 131 Suriname, 55, 147
PDVSA, 161, 162 Syria, 17, 185
Peña Nieto, Enrique, 187
Peru, 9, 51, 69, 72, 79, 84, 85, 86, 87, TIAR, 216
95, 132, 145–59, 180, 181, 182, Toledo, Alejandro, 147, 148, 150, 151,
201, 221, 230, 232 156
Index 239
TPP, 86, 182 112, 116, 117, 118, 130, 131, 132,
Triple Alliance War, 114, 116, 119, 133, 134, 135, 146, 147, 148, 156,
126, 230 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 170, 171,
Turkey, 17, 19, 177 173, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183,
184, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 196,
UK, 6, 18, 22, 23, 108, 110, 167, 215 199, 200, 202, 203, 215, 216, 217,
UNASUR, 17, 31, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 220, 223, 224, 229
57, 66, 73, 74, 83, 85, 93, 96, 119,
130, 139, 140, 162, 166, 170, 172, Vázquez, Tabaré, 90, 102
173, 177, 179, 180, 182, 184, 185, Venezuela, 9, 15, 35, 51, 53, 54, 55,
186, 188, 189, 190, 195, 201, 214, 56, 57, 66, 68, 69, 72, 82, 91, 111,
215, 216, 219, 220, 221, 224, 227, 119, 123, 125, 139, 147, 160–76,
231 178, 179, 180, 186, 188, 189, 200,
United Nations, 32, 67, 72, 100, 135, 218, 219, 224, 230, 231, 232, 234
164, 188, 198
Uniting for consensus, 188, 196, 197 Washington Consensus, 129, 182
Uribe, Alvaro, 178, 179 World Bank, 15, 131, 166, 167, 177,
Uruguay, 9, 35, 55, 90–113, 116, 117, 184, 186, 190
124, 139, 150, 172, 173, 186, 199, World Cup, 86, 168
218, 230, 232 WTO, 19, 24, 32, 100, 165, 179, 198,
US, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 227
24, 30, 32, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 54,
57, 58, 63, 64, 67, 78, 80, 81, 82, YPBF, 131, 135, 138
88, 95, 96, 100, 101, 102, 103,
104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, Zelaya, Manuel, 216

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Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series

Mathias Albert, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Alexander Wendt (editors)

Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series

Gian Luca Gardini

Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida

List of Figures and Tables vii

2 Within the Region, Beyond the Region: The Role of Brazil

3 Brazil’s Rise and Its Soft Power Strategy in South America 46

4 Argentina and the Rise of Brazil: Perceptions and Strategic

5 Brazil: Chile’s Mythical Ally 77

6 Brazil as a Global Stakeholder: A View from Uruguay 90

7 Paraguay and the Rise of Brazil: Continuity, Resistance,

8 Bolivia–Brazil: Internal Dynamics, Sovereignty Drive, and

9 The Peruvian Response to the Rise of Brazil: Developing a

10 Venezuela and the Rise of Brazil: Convergence and

11 Colombia’s Contestation Strategies Facing the Emergence

12 Containing and Engaging: Mexico’s Response to the Rise

13 Latin American Regionalism Faces the Rise of Brazil 214

Concluding Remarks 227

2.1 Opinion-makers in the press – main topics 34

6.12 MPs’ opinions on the most unreliable country to

parents. Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida would like to thank the

Gian Luca Gardini and Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida

José Briceño-Ruiz is an associate professor at the Faculty of Social and

Ana Covarrubias Velasco is Professor of International Relations and

Clayton M. Cunha Filho holds a PhD in political science from Rio

Ana Carolina Delgado holds a PhD in international relations from

at BRICS Policy Center (BPC) and Assistant Coordinator of the South

Joaquín Fermandois is Professor of Contemporary History at the

Gian Luca Gardini is Professor of International Relations and Chair

Miriam Gomes Saraiva is Professor of International Relations at the

Peter W. Lambert is Professor of Latin American Studies at the Univer-

with G. L. Gardini). He was the president of the Society for Latin

Carlos Luján is Professor of Decision-making, Negotiation and Method-

Andrés Malamud is a research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences

Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas is Director of the International Relations

Roberto Russell holds a PhD in international relations from the School

Political Science. His latest book is Argentina 1910–2010. Balance de un

Ronald Bruce St John, independent analyst, US, holds an MA and

Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida is a senior researcher at Centro

Juan Gabriel Tokatlian holds an MA and a PhD in international

Background and rationale of the book

Theoretically, from an international relations (IR) theory perspective,

the relinquishment of hard power solutions in favour of a pool of more

• Has the rise of Brazil prompted a clear coping strategy in Latin

The common thread of the book

In dealing with each individual country’s response to the rise of

a. Are they just neighbours that interact occasionally?

d. Is Brazil seen as a leader that the country is prepared to follow in

3. Almost as a natural consequence of point 2, What is the place of

choose to characterize it with one noun or adjective or eye-catching

The distinctiveness of the book

This book is the result of a long-term, carefully developed project,

The concept of power and the ways to compare it – and necessarily to

started a narrative and a policy of more assertive international presence

From rising to great power: A chimera for Brazil?

Brazil is certainly in the category of rising or emerging powers. This is

Great power status first requires a degree of recognition as well as

their perceived success, Brazilian cooperation is becoming a model

a mediator and establish bridges. But this results in an inescapable

Brazil’s tangible presence in and contribution to international affairs

Middle power, regional power, and a peculiar leader?

The most frequently applied labels to capture the international status of

pretensions of a fellow regional country, may all represent an obstacle