Republic of the Philippines (U.S.A.

), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding

SUPREME COURT Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
Manila
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
THIRD DIVISION surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the
United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California,
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18
years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,
1992.
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed
as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New
vs. Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage,
and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties,
DECISION both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that
the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4,

1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds
1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence
prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married
Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. to Merry Lee.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her
10of the petition. On February 28,
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal
1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to
dismiss.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin,
with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry
Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on
12 thereto. She submitted documentary
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America March 5, 1994 her opposition
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercise

the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E.
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce Santos from hearing the case.
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the
Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the
virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue
laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14 was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was
deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their resolution of said motion.
motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code. reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which
it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to
Judge Paul T. Arcangel. remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between
the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their marriage.
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity
of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement
his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995,
respectively. Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters
of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for
duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to
the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the
was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly
divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta.
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also
Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v.
ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38"residence" is
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence
Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person
can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28 have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was
aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of
4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states: the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article
26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal
October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of letters of administration.
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a The petition lacks merit.
person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that
although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the
the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It settlement of his estate:
found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly
dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2,
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted
with respondent. Thus –
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than
of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence
or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and
also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time
of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes
of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of
actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it
is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile
in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time
of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the
aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the
Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period
August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from
1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang
address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while
his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration
was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and
the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then
seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26,
par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing
us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that
the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged
that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should
be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce
and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired
by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status
or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown
to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the
guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that
she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further,
she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations.
It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still marriedto private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the
Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said
case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the
adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy
on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a
Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in
the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were
still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has
long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed
marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
law." 59In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
case in relation to Article 26. 61 other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien
spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background this case.
and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
were discussed, to wit: Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the
divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
Brief Historical Background However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if
the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Court, 68 the Court stated:
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect
on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent,
in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, justice.
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles
26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid,
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly is obeyed.
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied) apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
x x x x sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Legislative Intent Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio- xxxx
Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
spouse. continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in
every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added) allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records
a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid
precedent.1awphi1.net down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree
is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must
be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country as follows:
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
authenticated by the seal of his office. 71 contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage presumed to be equal.
Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California
which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with x x x x
the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved
the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. essential. x x x

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent
in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to
file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were
acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status
However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x. reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial
Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24,
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not proceedings.
merely indirect or contingent. 75
SO ORDERED.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the
laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the
co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce

and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the
Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by
expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as
husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of
property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
Republic of the Philippines Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should
SUPREME COURT have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to
Manila their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no
factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s
SECOND DIVISION estate.

G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013 In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of
Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The
lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
QUIAZON, Petitioners,
Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of
vs.
the RTC decision reads:
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
DECISION
administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore,
be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
PEREZ, J.: this Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28
Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV
rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held
88589,1the decretal portion of which states: that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the
assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
in toto.2 reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of
The Facts Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate The Issues
of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s
common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals
petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented
by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In
her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when
her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the
legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity
of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having
been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same
petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth
₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to
preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value,
Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia,
together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of
the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to
Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas
City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT
ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND
THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED
TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE
QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of
the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file
Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed from voidable marriages, to wit:
by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied). lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is a void marriage.24
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken
domicile is the significant factor.13Even where the statute uses word place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription,
the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, marriage.25
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."15In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may
of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical
impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father.
presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil
The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same
the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding
meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place
case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action
of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo
and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot extinguish such cause of action.
be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the
settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to
evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the
marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp
previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently
on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas,
established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the
Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in
Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San
death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at
Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a
the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on
competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the National
the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had
Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not
been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice
from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent
of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago,
with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of
thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in
properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on
the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote.
the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo
Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been
went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts
dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the
of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather
therefore, void ab initio.27
than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings
arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention
held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21 that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
Administration.
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of
Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no
the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the intestate, administration shall be granted:
ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In
 (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person
as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects
for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it

may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for
Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for

letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names
and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the

estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration

are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be

benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase
"next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such
that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. 28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited

by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party.
With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove
her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in
the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt
to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of
Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir,
who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s
estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as
an interested party within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008
Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines entitling the distributees the right to receive and enter into possession
SUPREME COURT those parts of the estate individually awarded to them.
Manila
On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for
SECOND DIVISION initial hearing and directing Eduardo to cause its publication.

G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011 On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting
the allegations in the petition, and conceding to the appointment of
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, Eduardo as special administrator.
vs.
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged
DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents. that the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin
with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became the
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their
residence was built with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and
the expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria
G.R. No. 177192
and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant) was built with
the exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, the appointment of Eduardo as administrator on the following grounds:
vs. (1) he is not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed
DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents. that the best interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as
special or regular administrator.
DECISION
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as
NACHURA, J.: regular administrator of Joaquin’s estate. Consequently, it issued him
letters of administration.
Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of
petitioners Sebastian G. Agtarap (Sebastian)1 and Eduardo G. Agtarap On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in intervention,
(Eduardo),2 assailing the Decision dated November 21, 20063 and the alleging that Mercedes is survived not only by her daughter Cecile, but
Resolution dated March 27, 20074 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. also by him as her husband. He also averred that there is a need to
CV No. 73916. appoint a special administrator to the estate, but claimed that Eduardo is
not the person best qualified for the task.
The antecedent facts and proceedings—
After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit
On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), their respective proposed projects8 of partition, the RTC, on October 23,
Branch 114, Pasay City, a verified petition for the judicial settlement of 2000, issued an Order of Partition, with the following disposition—
the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin). It was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 94-4055. In the light of the filing by the heirs of their respective proposed projects
of partition and the payment of inheritance taxes due the estate as early
The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 in as 1965, and there being no claim in Court against the estate of the
Pasay City without any known debts or obligations. During his lifetime, deceased, the estate of JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now consequently – ripe –
Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia),5 and for distribution among the heirs minus the surviving spouse Caridad
second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Garcia who died on August 25, 1999.
Joaquin and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died without issue),
Milagros, and Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria,6 Joseph, Considering that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during the
and Teresa7). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926. They also had existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT
three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was married to
daughter Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence
with improvements in Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title other than their negative allegations, the greater part of the estate is
(TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, perforce accounted by the second marriage and the compulsory heirs
had been leasing and improving the said realties and had been thereunder.
appropriating for himself ₱26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true and just accounting
Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him of his administration from his date of assumption up to the year ending
as special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate assets December 31, 1996 per Financial and Accounting Report dated June 2,
and their civil fruits, pending the appointment of a regular administrator. 1997 which was approved by the Court. The accounting report included
In addition, he prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming and declaring the income earned and received for the period and the expenses incurred
the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be entitled to in the administration, sustenance and allowance of the widow. In
participate in the estate; (b) apportioning and allocating unto the named accordance with said Financial and Accounting Report which was duly
heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with law; and (c) approved by this Court in its Resolution dated July 28, 1998 – the
deceased JOAQUIN AGTARAP left real properties consisting of the
following:
I LAND: The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the amount of
₱1,181,548.30 and who died in 1996 will go to Teresa Agtarap and Joseph
Two lots and two buildings with one garage quarter located at #3030 Agtarap, Walter de Santos and half brothers Eduardo and Sebastian
Agtarap St., Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 38254 Agtarap in equal proportions.
and 38255 and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, Metro
Manila, described as follows: TERESA AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66

JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66

TCT LOT ZONAL
AREA/SQ.M. AMOUNT
NO. NO. VALUE WALTER DE SANTOS - ₱236,291.66
38254 745- 1,335 sq. m. ₱5,000.00 ₱6,675,000.00 SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66
B-1
EDUARDO AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66
38255 745- 1,331 sq. m. ₱5,000.00 ₱6,655,000.00
B-2
Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as follows:
TOTAL------------------------------------------------ ₱13,330,000.00
------------- COMPULSORY HEIRS:

II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS: 1) GLORIA – (deceased) – represented by Walter de Santos –

- ₱295,364.57
BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) ---------------------
₱350,000.00
--------- 2) JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57

BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) -------------------- 320,000.00 3) TERESA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57

---------
4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57
Building Improvements ------------------------- 97,500.00
-------------
Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit ₱295,364.57.
Restaurant ----------------------------------------- 80,000.00
------------- Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs of the first
TOTAL ----------------------------------------------- ₱847,500.00 marriage stand to receive the total amount of:
----------
HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:
TOTAL NET WORTH ------------------------------ ₱14,177,500.00
-----------
1avvphi1
1) JOSEPH AGTARAP ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros
WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the late JOAQUIN AGTARAP - Agtarap
with a total value of ₱14,177,500.00, together with whatever interest
from bank deposits and all other incomes or increments thereof accruing
₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
after the Accounting Report of December 31, 1996, after deducting
therefrom the compensation of the administrator and other expenses
allowed by the Court, are hereby ordered distributed as follows: ₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

2) TERESA AGTARAP ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros

TOTAL ESTATE – ₱14,177,500.00 - Agtarap

CARIDAD AGTARAP – ½ of the estate as her conjugal share – ₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
₱7,088,750.00, the other half of ₱7,088,750.00 – to be divided among the
compulsory heirs as follows:
₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

3) WALTER DE ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros

1) JOSE (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30
SANTOS - Agtarap
2) MILAGROS (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30
₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
3) MERCEDES (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30

4) SEBASTIAN - ₱1,181,548.30 ₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

5) EDUARDO - ₱1,181,548.30
HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:
6) CARIDAD - ₱1,181,548.30

a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999

 ₱7,088,750.00 - as conjugal share WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated August 27, 2001 is AFFIRMED
₱1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir and pursuant thereto, the subject properties (Lot No. 745-B-1 [TCT No.
38254] and Lot No. 745-B-2 [TCT No. 38255]) and the estate of the late
Joaquin Agtarap are hereby partitioned as follows:
Total of ₱8,270,208.30

b) SEBASTIAN ₱1,181,458.38 – as compulsory The two (2) properties, together with their improvements, embraced by
AGTARAP - heir TCT No. 38254 and TCT No. 38255, respectively, are first to be distributed
among the following:
₱ 236,291.66 – share from
Milagros
Lucia Mendietta - ½ of the property. But since she is deceased, her share
c) EDUARDO ₱1,181,458.38 – as compulsory shall be inherited by Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros and Jose in equal shares.
AGTARAP - heir
Joaquin Agtarap - ½ of the property and ¼ of the other half of the property
₱ 236,291.66 – share from which pertains to Lucia Mendietta’s share.
Milagros

d) MERCEDES - as represented by Abelardo Dagoro as Jesus Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since he is already
the deceased (and died without issue), his inheritance shall, in turn, be
surviving spouse of a compulsory heir acquired by Joaquin Agtarap.

₱1,181,458.38
Milagros Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since she died in
1996 without issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria
REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP: (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter
Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of
1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP Milagros’ brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by
Mercedes (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
daughter Cecile), Sebastian Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
2) EDUARDO AGTARAP
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Agtarap)
Jose Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since he died in 1967, his
inheritance shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria
In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter
inherit: Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa in equal shares.

SEBASTIAN ₱4,135,104.10 – share from Then, Joaquin Agtarap’s estate, comprising three-fourths (3/4) of the
– ₱1,181,458.30 Caridad Garcia subject properties and its improvements, shall be distributed as follows:
₱ 236,291.66 - as compulsory heir
- share from Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1999, her share
₱5,522,854.06 Milagros shall be inherited by her children namely Mercedes Agtarap (represented
by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecilia), Sebastian
EDUARDO – ₱4,135,104.10 – share from
Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap in their own right, dividing the inheritance
₱1,181,458.30 Caridad Garcia
in equal shares.
₱ 236,291.66 – as compulsory
heir
₱5,522,854.06 – share from Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1996 without
Milagros issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria (represented by
her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph
Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of Milagros’ brother Jose
SO ORDERED.9 Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by Mercedes (represented by her
husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile), Sebastian and
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
respective motions for reconsideration.
Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance
On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution10 denying the motions shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria (represented by
for reconsideration of Eduardo and Sebastian, and granting that of Joseph her husband Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph
and Teresa. It also declared that the real estate properties belonged to Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap in equal shares.
the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the
modification of the October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1984, her
correct sharing of the heirs. However, before the RTC could issue a new inheritance shall be acquired by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA. daughter Cecile in equal shares.

On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
portion of which reads—
Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. failure of Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos to oppose his motion to
exclude them as heirs had the effect of admitting the allegations therein.
SO ORDERED.11 He points out that his motion was denied by the RTC without a hearing.

Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian maintains that the
reconsideration. certificates of title of real estate properties subject of the controversy are
in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, and as such
are conclusive proof of their ownership thereof, and thus, they are not
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both motions.
subject to collateral attack, but should be threshed out in a separate
Hence, these petitions ascribing to the appellate court the following
proceeding for that purpose. He likewise argues that estoppel applies
errors:
against the children of the first marriage, since none of them registered
any objection to the issuance of the TCTs in the name of Caridad and
G.R. No. 177192 Joaquin only. He avers that the estate must have already been settled in
light of the payment of the estate and inheritance tax by Milagros, Joseph,
1. – The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the and Teresa, resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in Milagros’ name
aforementioned important facts12 which alter its Decision; and of TCT No. 8026 in the names of Milagros and Jose. He also alleges
that res judicata is applicable as the court order directing the deletion of
2. – The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the necessity the name of Lucia, and replacing it with the name of Caridad, in the TCTs
of hearing the issue of legitimacy of respondents as heirs; had long become final and executory.

3. – The Court of Appeals erred in allowing violation of the law In his own petition, with respect to his first assignment of error, Eduardo
and in not applying the doctrines of collateral attack, estoppel, alleges that the CA erroneously settled, together with the settlement of
and res judicata.13 the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria,
and Milagros, in contravention of the principle of settling only one estate
in one proceeding. He particularly questions the distribution of the estate
G.R. No. 177099 of Milagros in the intestate proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding
was conducted in another court for the probate of the will of Milagros,
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) DID NOT ACQUIRE bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from
JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE OF MILAGROS G. AGTARAP AND ERRED Joaquin’s estate. He states that this violated the rule on precedence of
IN DISTRIBUTING HER INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF JOAQUIN testate over intestate proceedings.
AGTARAP NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF HER LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE OF Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo contends that the CA
TESTATE PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. gravely erred when it affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this
case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that
II. the certificates of title were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap
casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia. According to him, the RTC,
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) ERRED IN acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, was not vested with
DISMISSING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM FOR LACK OF MERIT AND IN the power and authority to determine questions of ownership, which
AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.
LOWER COURT HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY TCT
NO. 38254 AND TCT (NO.) 38255 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE The Court’s Ruling
CITY OF PASAY BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN
AGTARAP MARRIED TO LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA NOTWITHSTANDING As to Sebastian’s and Eduardo’s common issue on the ownership of the
THEIR REGISTRATION UNDER THEIR EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AS subject real properties, we hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had
REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP, CASADO CON jurisdiction to resolve the same.
CARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE PROBATE
COURT HAS NO POWER TO DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE WHICH SHOULD The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
BE RESOLVED IN AN APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION FOR A TORRENS probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with
TITLE UNDER THE LAW IS ENDOWED WITH INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE MANNER INDICATED IN THE LAW ITSELF. 14 persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for
this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
As regards his first and second assignments of error, Sebastian contends jurisdiction.16 As held in several cases,17 a probate court or one in charge
that Joseph and Teresa failed to establish by competent evidence that of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or
they are the legitimate heirs of their father Jose, and thus of their determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which
grandfather Joaquin. He draws attention to the certificate of title (TCT No. are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
8026) they submitted, stating that the wife of their father Jose is inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased
Presentacion Garcia, while they claim that their mother is Priscilla. He and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties
avers that the marriage contracts proffered by Joseph and Teresa do not is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory
qualify as the best evidence of Jose’s marriage with Priscilla, inasmuch as of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
they were not authenticated and formally offered in evidence. Sebastian dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
also asseverates that he actually questioned the legitimacy of Joseph and administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
Teresa as heirs of Joaquin in his motion to exclude them as heirs, and in
his reply to their opposition to the said motion. He further claims that the
action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.23
determination of the conflicting claims of title.
Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la Costa,
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the phrase con Lucia
expediency and convenience. Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and replaced by en segundas nuptias
con Caridad Garcia, referring to the second marriage of Joaquin to
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a Caridad. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the Caridad’s name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon her demise, already left, as
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal share in TCT No. 32184. Lucia’s share
determination of ownership in a separate action.18 Second, if the in the property covered by the said TCT was carried over to the properties
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of covered by the certificates of title derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of Nos. 38254 and 38255. And as found by both the RTC and the CA, Lucia
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not was survived by her compulsory heirs – Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership.19 Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the community
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse. 20 thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. Thus, the RTC
considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of had jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are conjugal as it
third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. had to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the
More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties decedent. In fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement
are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should be
the estate of Joaquin.1auuphi1 consolidated with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucia’s
spouse.24 Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the estate of Lucia,
with respect to the properties covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition for
subject of this case, to her compulsory heirs.
judicial settlement of Joaquin’s estate, he alleged that the subject
properties were owned by Joaquin and Caridad since the TCTs state that
the lots were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the
Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to RTC and the CA, the claim of Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254
contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a first marriage with Lucia. and 38255 conclusively show that the owners of the properties covered
Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were able to therein were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registration in the name
present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 were of Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves scant
derived from a mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in the consideration. This cannot be said to be a collateral attack on the said
name of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a certificate of title is not necessarily
casado con Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Lucia Garcia Mendietta conclusive of a holder’s true ownership of property.25 A certificate of title
(FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first married to under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as
Emilia Muscat, and the second married to Lucia Garcia an instrument for the deprivation of ownership.26 Thus, the fact that the
Mendietta).21 When TCT No. 5239 was divided between Francisco Barnes properties were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to
and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the properties were acquired
married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was issued for a parcel of land, during the spouses’ coverture.27The phrase "married to Caridad Garcia"
identified as Lot No. 745 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as the
No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1368, consisting of 8,872 square registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the realties are
meters. This same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577 (32184)22 issued on their conjugal properties.28
April 23, 1937, also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia
Garcia Mendietta. Neither can Sebastian’s claim that Joaquin’s estate could have already
been settled in 1965 after the payment of the inheritance tax be upheld.
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on April 24, 1924, Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the estate of a
and subsequently, on February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is deceased person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court—
worthy to note that TCT No. 5577 (32184) contained an annotation, which
reads— SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. -- When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to
Ap-4966 – NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de titulo, tal the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
como aparece, tanchando las palabras "con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a" y accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the
poniendo en su lugar, entre lineas y en tinta encarnada, las palabras "en executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and
segundas nupcias con Caridad Garcia", en complimiento de un orden de after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
fecha 28 de abril de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto de la Costa, juez del persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts,
Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente cadastal No. 23, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 1368; copia de cual orden has sido presentada respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
con el No. 4966 del Libro Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo T-No. having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the
32184. court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by Milagros
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City.34 While there has been no
or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned
showing that the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her share
for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.from Joaquin’s estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been probated and
approved, prudence dictates that this Court refrain from distributing
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the Milagros’ share in Joaquin’s estate.
payment of the debts of the estate, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. The records It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January 15, 2010, per
of these cases do not show that these were complied with in 1965. his Certificate of Death.35 He is survived by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap
(Teresita) and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
Teresa, suffice it to say that both the RTC and the CA found them to be
the legitimate children of Jose. The RTC found that Sebastian did not Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November 21, 2006
present clear and convincing evidence to support his averments in his Decision and the March 27, 2007 Resolution of the CA should be affirmed
motion to exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative with modifications such that the share of Milagros shall not yet be
allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and Teresa being the distributed until after the final determination of the probate of her
children of Jose was never questioned by Sebastian and Eduardo, and the purported will, and that Sebastian shall be represented by his compulsory
latter two even admitted this in their petitions, as well as in the stipulation heirs.
of facts in the August 21, 1995 hearing. 29 Furthermore, the CA affirmed
this finding of fact in its November 21, 2006 Decision.30 WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is DENIED for lack of merit,
while the petition in G.R. No. 177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that
Also, Sebastian’s insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos the Decision dated November 21, 2006 and the Resolution dated March
are not heirs to the estate of Joaquin cannot be sustained. Per its October 27, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the following
23, 2000 Order of Partition, the RTC found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos MODIFICATIONS: that the share awarded in favor of Milagros Agtarap
died on May 4, 1995, and was later substituted in the proceedings below shall not be distributed until the final determination of the probate of her
by her husband Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with Walter de will, and that petitioner Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of his demise on
Santos, Georgina Samantha de Santos. The RTC likewise noted that, on January 15, 2010, shall be represented by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap and
September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.
intervene, alleging that he is the surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap
and the father of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in intervention. These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114,
The RTC later granted the motion, thereby admitting his answer on Pasay City, for further proceedings in the settlement of the estate of
October 18, 1995.31 The CA also noted that, during the hearing of the Joaquin Agtarap. No pronouncement as to costs.
motion to intervene on October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo did not
interpose any objection when the intervention was submitted to the RTC
SO ORDERED.
for resolution.32

Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no compelling
reason to hold that both courts erred in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter
de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully participated in the estate of
Joaquin. It was incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent evidence
to refute his and Eduardo’s admissions that Joseph and Teresa were heirs
of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object to the
participation of Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately,
Sebastian failed to do so. Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo
Dagoro had the right to participate in the estate in representation of the
Joaquin’s compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes, respectively.33

This Court also differs from Eduardo’s asseveration that the CA erred in
settling, together with Joaquin’s estate, the respective estates of Lucia,
Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria. A perusal of the November 21, 2006 CA
Decision would readily show that the disposition of the properties related
only to the settlement of the estate of Joaquin. Pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as cited above, the RTC was specifically
granted jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin, as
well as their respective shares after the payment of the obligations of the
estate, as enumerated in the said provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus,
Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria in the distribution of the shares was merely a
necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquin’s estate, they being
his legal heirs.

However, we agree with Eduardo’s position that the CA erred in

distributing Joaquin’s estate pertinent to the share allotted in favor of
Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a separate proceeding was
Republic of the Philippines From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the
SUPREME COURT Veterans memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide
Manila case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital, he
continued to be under observation and treatment.
SECOND SPECIAL DIVISION
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental
G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012 aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest
even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965
when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic)
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,
treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the
vs.
remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was

RESOLUTION
effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in.
This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article
PEREZ, J.: 85 of the Civil Code which provides:

The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes
imbroglio over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera. 1 We now find a need
to replace the decision.
xxxx

Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming
Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053
to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
dated 16 June 2010, directing the issuance of joint letters of
administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads: There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew
about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff
continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of
patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
indication of schizophernia (sic).4
shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico
Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan and Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with
is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court. The
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their
as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was subsequently
subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent reduced to thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3 Isabel’s testimony in court that her grandparents’ visits caused her and
her siblings stress and anxiety.5
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death,
Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4
June 1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay
(Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial
including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of
including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, administration over Cristina’s estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case
Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as
the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed
administrator of the decedent’s estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared
conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference
from infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate
in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been
grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with
alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the
their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s
enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention
parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her
the other children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the
paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases,
death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties,
including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I.
and thus, is better situated to protect the integrity of the decedent’s
Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was
grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
wife, charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared
as null and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel
Cojuangco on the finding that:
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in
administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and
to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter
as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void. Isabel, we considered that:
However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that
Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina,
opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil
and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as
Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in
their grandchild;
the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.

2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate

Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer
of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal
the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration
partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-
Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition,
alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than 3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still
respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, commingled with those of her husband, Federico, because her
Cristina. share in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined and
unliquidated; and
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to
share in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir,
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered
one degree from Federico, and not simply in representation of
a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s
his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
intestate estate:

In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the
Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status as a
Opposition-in-Intervention is GRANTED.
legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.

Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby

Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the
appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo
Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of
administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code
a bond in the amount of ₱ 200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated
adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete to become a co-administrator thereof.
inventory;
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio
and charge on the same, or dividends thereon; III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the estate
to justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9
time when required by the court, and November 2001 emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the
order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4)
(4) To perform all orders of the Court. there is no basis for joint administration as there are no "opposing parties
or factions to be represented."
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration
be issued in his favor.6 To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between
Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedent’s estate. We did not choose. Considering merely his
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the
demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should
RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and
likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as
appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:
a co-administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice
and therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of
decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any,
are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby
appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no
Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (₱ 200,000.00) Pesos. 7 incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set
aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
and willing to serve; represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where
the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to
16
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the
17
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the estate; and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that desires to have another competent person associated with him in the
office. 18
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be of special co-administrators during the pendency of the appeal for the
granted to such other person as the court may select. probate of the decedent’s will. Pending the probate thereof, we
recognized Matias’ special interest in the decedent’s estate as universal
heir and executrix designated in the instrument who should not be
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference,
excluded in the administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and
in the appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which
equity demands that the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
heirs of the decedent, consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and
creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be represented in the
jurisprudence.8
management of the decedent’s estate.19

The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator

over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest
in the estate.9 This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78
takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the
rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and
economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the
person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must
demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein
greater than any other candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in
the administration of a decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving
spouse’s interest in the conjugal partnership or community property
forming part of the decedent’s estate.11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more,
interest in administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from her
share in the conjugal partnership or absolute community property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the
appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception.
We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which
specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both theVentura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the
surviving spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can
refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that "x x x
when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, x x
x."
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than
one administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested
therein.13 We recognized that the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a decedent or the determination of a person’s suitability for the In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, we maintained that the order of
office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment.14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in
Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment
of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented;15 (2) where
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that
"inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties
and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of
any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the
will would be unfair to her proprietary interests."20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v.
Ventura21 where we allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators. However, we
drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the
nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura
is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been
defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedent’s property (citations omitted). It is generally
said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more
preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among
members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or
preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is
to be preferred.’" (citations omitted)
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court,
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio
nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to preference over
the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6
of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana
Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as
nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in
the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both
interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)
23
preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the
legitimate child’s appointment as special administrator, and eventually as
regular administrator, of the decedent’s estate as against the surviving
spouse who the lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v.
Garcia24 as good law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment
as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and
to those immediately interested in the estate. Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent proprietary interests and
moral circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily related
In Valarao v. Pascual, we see another story with a running theme of to the demand for representation being repeatedly urged by
25
26
heirs squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to respondents. (Emphasis supplied)
set aside the probate court’s refusal to appoint as special co-
administrator Diaz, even if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory
of the decedent and represented one of the factions of heirs, because the character of the rule on the order of preference for the issuance of letters
evidence weighed by the probate court pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in of administration:
his previous duty as co-administrator of the estatein the early part of his
administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases of Matias, Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of
Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, thus: preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it categorically
seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It
Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously
assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do not establish an set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and
absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint special co- sufficient reason therefor.27
administrators who would represent the respective interests of
squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the
authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also two or legal contemplation of a "next of kin," thus:
more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the
probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of
among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion.
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute
factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such
which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this Court that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an
ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of the heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters
applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate
will, which we considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A
during the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this
court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than one consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and
special administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the passed upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco
lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the selection Angeles.29
of another special administrator.
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of,
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of and benefits to, the estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-
Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any
latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will," for this Court cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-
to compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is also manifest administrators may be sanctioned by law.
from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests
among the heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s
of a second special administrator as this fact was taken into account only
demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of
to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the objections
preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio III’s
to the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of kinship."
demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of
the attendant facts and circumstances, directed co-administration
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the thereof. We are led to a review of such position by the foregoing survey
decedent as special co-administrator because it was "our considered of cases.
opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal
properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the
deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the
estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-
probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests." The
administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor
special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an
adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference
estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we held
set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of
that the widow would have more interest than any other next of kin in
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
the proper administration of the entire estate since she possesses not
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be
only the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
appointed as administrator.31 Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the
decedent but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good
estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted
or bad administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more
nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of
critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals
the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely
we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as
to the sound discretion of the Court32 and depends on the facts and the
regular administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we
attendant circumstances of the case.33
counseled the probate court that "there must be a very strong case to
justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration."
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in
this case even as we reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater assuming and performing the functions of administrator of Cristina’s
interest in the estate of Cristina. estate:

These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of 1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as
preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings before the RTC, had
compel that a choice be made of one over the other. vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption of that office,
arguing that "the decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001 is
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity not among the judgments authorized by the Rules of Court
between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, which may be immediately implemented or executed;"
traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were
alive, which can be characterized as adverse interest of some 2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to
kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately Isabel’s vociferous objections to Emilio III’s attempts to act as
interested in the estate; administrator while the RTC decision was under appeal to the
Court of Appeals;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and
Emilio III working harmoniously as co-administrators may result 3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent
in prejudice to the decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying in the nature thereof, and one of the first steps in the lengthy
settlement thereof; and process of settlement of a decedent’s estate, such that it cannot
constitute a complete and total listing of the decedent’s
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management properties; and
of Cristina’s estate, has not looked after the estate’s welfare
and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof. 4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges
where Isabel, as private complainant, has been unwilling to
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s appear and testify, leading the Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co- Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the
administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out prosecutor of a possible motu propio dismissal of the cases.
to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points
out that after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the
estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate blamed delay in the filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature
and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement
by the following: of a decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel’s
accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a inventory, which properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he
complete inventory, omitted in the partial inventories34 he filed claims to be knowledgeable about.
therewith properties of the estate35 including several parcels of
land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as
vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section administrator rooted in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and
1,36paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. complete inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed
partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against occasions of Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs,
Federico’s settlement of the decedent’s estate which herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.
adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly
belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially), and As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and
which contained a declaration that the decedent did not leave executes an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the
any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to decedent’s estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any.
succeed to her estate.37 This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission
and inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to
respond to the following imputations of Isabel that: those immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.

1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002; In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent
Isabel have a deep aversion for each other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it
2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of
becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-
the decedent;
administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III,
the testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio
3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their grandparents
different individuals or persons; several properties to Federico Suntay further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel.
himself; and More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate to
appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest
4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of of some kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel,
falsified documents;38 immediately interested in the said estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not
preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come
here point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his after the inheritance is liquidated.
interests in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals,39 we
mapped out as among the allowable participation of "any interested Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the
persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" in either testate or foregoing admonition:
intestate proceedings:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a
xxxx controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, ordinary cases.
embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of
evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;" No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees,
5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned
the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.45
persons interested;"
Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the Comment46 of Emilio III questioning the Special Second Division which
persons interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that "the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and
void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its
7. Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" Decision on 16 June 2010 on the petition filed by him:
43

to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of
the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.44 7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio,
acting separately from the Second Division of the Supreme Court in
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions of the Supreme Court:
found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit: one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special Second
Division acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme
Court in Manila.47
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. – If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, is not a different division created by the Supreme Court.
or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16
court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. June 2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the different composition, with the advent of Justice Nachura’s retirement on
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no provides:
remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to
any suitable person. Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of
decisions or signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. – Motions for
restraint: we uphold that the question of who are the heirs of the reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution and
decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be
curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better acted upon by the ponente and the other Members of the Division who
qualified to administer the estate of the decedent. participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution.

Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision: If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is
disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through
refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members of
presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed
considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the resolution and who concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court
long deceased couple has yet to be settled. who participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good
law: If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the
decision or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the
Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on
The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although
the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced
the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased.
through raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the
other Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for the
retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall
replace the designated Justice as replacement Member of the Special
Division.

Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle

from among the other Members of the Court to constitute a Special
Division of five (5) Members.

If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the
Decision or signed Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the
case shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion shall be
acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other Members of
the Division to which he or she belongs.

If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of

the motion for reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted
upon by the ponente on record with the participation of the other
Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the time said
pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis
supplied)

As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change

in venue for the Supreme Court's summer session held last April.48

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters
of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
shall solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment
of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the estate
of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortaez, acting in
[G.R. No. 146006. February 23, 2004] his personal capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and 1,011[5] Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance share in the estate,
Corporate Secretary, respectively, of Philippines Internationl sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner
Life Insurance Company, and FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE FLAG, represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. After
GROUP, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of the
CITY BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA, Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose Ortaez failed to repurchase the
BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY same.
SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA It appears that several years before (but already during the
ENDERES claiming to be Special Administratrix, and other pendency of the intestate proceedings at the Regional Trial Court of
persons/ public officers acting for and in their Quezon City, Branch 85), Juliana Ortaez and her two children, Special
behalf, respondents. Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez, entered into a memorandum of
DECISION agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the
CORONA, J.: estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, partitioning the estate (including the
Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. This was the basis of the
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court number of shares separately sold by Juliana Ortaez on April 15, 1989
seeking to reverse and set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortaez on October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in
First Division, dated July 26, 2000, in CA G.R. 59736, which dismissed the favor of herein petitioner FLAG.
petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao
(in their capacities as president and secretary, respectively, of Philippine On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina
International Life Insurance Company) and Filipino Loan Assistance OrtaezEnderes and her siblings (hereafter referred to as private
Group. respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for appointment of special
administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was opposed by
The antecedent facts follow. Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.

Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine International Life On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of
Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the time of the companys private respondents Enderes et al. and appointed private respondent
incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
capital stock.
On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortaez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana urgent motion to declare void ab initio the memorandum of agreement
Salgado Ortaez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to declare
Ortaez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedents estate.
respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, These motions were opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.
Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortaez).[2]
On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortaez filed before the Court of First motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch (now Regional Trial Court of Quezon stock, which move was again opposed by Special Administrator Jose
City) a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortaez.
Ortaez, docketed as SP Proc. Q-30884 (which petition to date remains
pending at Branch 85 thereof). On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion for (1)
the approval of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock and
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings filed (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes as special administratrix of
an opposition to the petition for letters of administration and, in a the Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer
subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a any shares of stock for her to administer.
special administrator.
On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Pao, then presiding judge of of Special Administrator Jose Ortaez for the approval of the deeds of sale
Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose Ortaez joint special administrators for the reason that:
of their fathers estate. Hearings continued for the appointment of a
regular administrator (up to now no regular administrator has been Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in substance that a sale of a
appointed). property of the estate without an Order of the probate court is void and
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and passes no title to the purchaser. Since the sales in question were
Jose Ortaez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which entered into by Juliana S. Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez in their personal
included, among other properties, 2,029[3] shares of stock in Philippine capacity without prior approval of the Court, the same is not binding
International Life Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife), upon the Estate.
representing 50.725% of the companys outstanding capital stock.
WHEREFORE, the OMNIBUS MOTION for the approval of the sale of
On April 15, 1989, the decedents wife, Juliana S. Ortaez, claiming Philinterlife shares of stock and release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes as
that she owned 1,014[4] Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share Special Administratrix is hereby denied.[6]
in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of herein
petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its
On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued another order
president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortaez failed to
granting the motion of Special Administratrix Enderes for the annulment
repurchase the shares of stock within the stipulated period, thus
of the March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement or extrajudicial
ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name.
partition of estate. The court reasoned that:
In consonance with the Order of this Court dated August 11, 1997 1. Confirming the nullity of the sale of the 2,029
DENYING the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stocks and Philinterlife shares in the name of the Estate of
release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes as Special Administratrix, the Dr. Juvencio Ortaez to Filipino Loan Assistance
Urgent Motion to Declare Void Ab Initio Memorandum of Agreement Group (FLAG);
dated December 19, 1995. . . is hereby impliedly partially resolved
insofar as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of 2. Commanding the President and the Corporate
stock are concerned, in particular, No. 5, 9(c), 10(b) and 11(d)(ii) of the Secretary of Philinterlife to reinstate in the
Memorandum of Agreement. stock and transfer book of Philinterlife the
2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock in the name
of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez as the
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares the Memorandum of owner thereof without prejudice to other
Agreement dated March 4, 1982 executed by Juliana S. Ortaez, Rafael S. claims for violation of pre-emptive rights
Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez as partially void ab initio insofar as the pertaining to the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares;
transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of stocks are
concerned.[7] 3. Directing the President and the Corporate Secretary of
Philinterlife to issue stock certificates of
Aggrieved by the above-stated orders of the intestate court, Jose Philinterlife for 2,029 shares in the name of the
Ortaez filed, on December 22, 1997, a petition for certiorari in the Court Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez as the owner
of Appeals. The appellate court denied his petition, however, ruling that thereof without prejudice to other claims for
there was no legal justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition violations of pre-emptive rights pertaining to
of the estate by Jose Ortaez, his brother Rafael Ortaez and mother Juliana the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares and,
Ortaez during the pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortaez,
4. Confirming that only the Special Administratrix, Ma.
without the requisite approval of the intestate court, when it was clear
Divina Ortaez-Enderes, has the power to
that there were other heirs to the estate who stood to be prejudiced
exercise all the rights appurtenant to the said
thereby. Consequently, the sale made by Jose Ortaez and his mother
shares, including the right to vote and to
Juliana Ortaez to FLAG of the shares of stock they invalidly appropriated
receive dividends.
for themselves, without approval of the intestate court, was void.[8]
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other person or
Special Administrator Jose Ortaez filed a motion for reconsideration
persons claiming to represent it or otherwise,
of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. He elevated the case
to acknowledge and allow the said Special
to the Supreme Court via petition for review under Rule 45 which the
Administratrix to exercise all the aforesaid
Supreme Court dismissed on October 5, 1998, on a technicality. His
rights on the said shares and to refrain from
motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on January 13, 1999.
resorting to any action which may tend directly
On February 23, 1999, the resolution of the Supreme Court dismissing the
or indirectly to impede, obstruct or bar the free
petition of Special Administrator Jose Ortaez became final and was
exercise thereof under pain of contempt.
subsequently recorded in the book of entries of judgments.
6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any responsible
Meanwhile, herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, with the
officer/s of Philinterlife, or any other person or
rest of the FLAG-controlled board of directors, increased the authorized
persons claiming to represent it or otherwise,
capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 50.725%
are hereby directed to comply with this order
controlling interest of the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, in the insurance
[9]
within three (3) days from receipt hereof under
company. This became the subject of a separate action at the Securities
pain of contempt.
and Exchange Commission filed by private respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes against petitioner Jose Lee and other members of 7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja
the FLAG-controlled board of Philinterlife on November 7, 1994. are hereby directed to implement the writ of
Thereafter, various cases were filed by Jose Lee as president of execution with dispatch to forestall any and/or
Philinterlife and Juliana Ortaez and her sons against private respondent- further damage to the Estate.
Special Administratrix Enderes in the SEC and civil courts.[10]Somehow, all
these cases were connected to the core dispute on the legality of the sale SO ORDERED.[12]
of decedent Dr. Ortaezs Philinterlife shares of stock to petitioner FLAG,
represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose Lee who later became
the president of Philinterlife after the controversial sale. In the several occasions that the sheriff went to the office of
petitioners to execute the writ of execution, he was barred by the security
On May 2, 2000, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes guard upon petitioners instructions. Thus, private respondent-Special
and her siblings filed a motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate Administratrix Enderes filed a motion to cite herein petitioners Jose Lee
court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997 because the orders of the and Alma Aggabao (president and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife)
intestate court nullifying the sale (upheld by the Court of Appeals and the in contempt.[13]
Supreme Court) had long became final. Respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes served a copy of the motion to petitioners Jose Petitioners Lee and Aggabao subsequently filed before the Court of
Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary, respectively, of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736.
Philinterlife,[11] but petitioners ignored the same. Petitioners alleged that the intestate court gravely abused its discretion
in (1) declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of
On July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for stock was null and void; (2) ordering the execution of its order declaring
execution, the dispositive portion of which read: such nullity and (3) depriving the petitioners of their right to due process.

On July 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition

WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of execution issue as outright:
follows:
We are constrained to DISMISS OUTRIGHT the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the light of the following
considerations:
1. The assailed Order dated August 11, 1997 of the
respondent judge had long become final and
executory;
2. The certification on non-forum shopping is signed by
only one (1) of the three (3) petitioners in
violation of the Rules; and
3. Except for the assailed orders and writ of execution,
deed of sale with right to repurchase, deed of
sale of shares of stocks and omnibus motion,
the petition is not accompanied by such
pleadings, documents and other material
portions of the record as would support the
allegations therein in violation of the second
paragraph, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee and
Aggabao of the above decision was denied by the Court of Appeals on
October 30, 2000:
This resolves the urgent motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners of our resolution of July 26, 2000 dismissing outrightly the
above-entitled petition for the reason, among others, that the assailed
Order dated August 11, 1997 of the respondent Judge had long become
final and executory.
Dura lex, sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the urgent motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED,
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[15]
On December 4, 2000, petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme
Court through a petition for review under Rule 45 but on December 13,
2000, we denied the petition because there was no showing that the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 59736 committed any reversible error
to warrant the exercise by the Supreme Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction.[16]
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee
and Aggabao, the Supreme Court granted the motion and reinstated their
petition on September 5, 2001. The parties were then required to submit
their respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes, on
July 19, 2000, filed a motion to direct the branch clerk of court in lieu of
herein petitioners Lee and Aggabao to reinstate the name of Dr. Ortaez in
the stock and transfer book of Philinterlife and issue the corresponding
stock certificate pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
which provides that the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of
the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court and
the act when so done shall have the effect as if done by the party.
Petitioners Lee and Aggabao opposed the motion on the ground that the
intestate court should refrain from acting on the motion because the
issues raised therein were directly related to the issues raised by them in
their petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 59736. On October 30, 2000, the intestate court granted the
motion, ruling that there was no prohibition for the intestate court to
execute its orders inasmuch as the appellate court did not issue any TRO
or writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 3, 2000, petitioners Lee and Aggabao filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62461,
questioning this time the October 30, 2000 order of the intestate court
directing the branch clerk of court to issue the stock certificates. They also
questioned in the Court of Appeals the order of the intestate court
nullifying the sale made in their favor by Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez.
On November 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied their petition and
upheld the power of the intestate court to execute its order. Petitioners
Lee and Aggabao then filed motion for reconsideration which at present
is still pending resolution by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president and secretary,
respectively, of Philinterlife) and FLAG now raise the following errors for
our consideration:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR:
A. IN FAILING TO RECONSIDER ITS PREVIOUS
RESOLUTION DENYING THE PETITION DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE APPELLATE COURTS MISTAKE IN
APPREHENDING THE FACTS HAD BECOME PATENT
AND EVIDENT FROM THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND THE COMMENT OF
RESPONDENT ENDERES WHICH HAD ADMITTED
THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONERS IN
THE PETITION AS WELL AS IN THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION. MOREOVER, THE
RESOLUTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT DENYING
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS
CONTAINED IN ONLY ONE PAGE WITHOUT EVEN
TOUCHING ON THE SUBSTANTIVE MERITS OF THE
EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION OF FACTS AND
SUPPORTING LAW IN THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IN VIOLATION OF THE RULE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS;
B. IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE VOID ORDERS OF THE
INTESTATE COURT ON THE ERRONEOUS GROUND
THAT THE ORDERS WERE FINAL AND EXECUTORY
WITH REGARD TO PETITIONERS EVEN AS THE
LATTER WERE NEVER NOTIFIED OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OR ORDER CANCELING ITS
OWNERSHIP;
C. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INTESTATE COURT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION (1)
WHEN IT ISSUED THE OMNIBUS ORDER
NULLIFYING THE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER
FLAG OVER SHARES OF STOCK WHICH WERE
ALLEGED TO BE PART OF THE ESTATE AND (2)
WHEN IT ISSUED A VOID WRIT OF EXECUTION
AGAINST PETITIONER FLAG AS PRESENT OWNER
TO IMPLEMENT MERELY PROVISIONAL ORDERS,
THEREBY VIOLATING FLAGS CONSTITUTIONAL
 RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY Petitioners asseverations relative to said [memorandum] agreement
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS; were scuttled during the hearing before this Court thus:

D. IN FAILING TO DECLARE NULL AND VOID THE JUSTICE AQUINO:

ORDERS OF THE INTESTATE COURT WHICH
NULLIFIED THE SALE OF SHARES OF STOCK
BETWEEN THE LEGITIMATE HEIR JOSE S. ORTAEZ
AND PETITIONER FLAG BECAUSE OF SETTLED LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE, I.E., THAT AN HEIR HAS THE
RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF THE DECEDENTS PROPERTY
EVEN IF THE SAME IS UNDER ADMINISTRATION
PURSUANT TO CIVIL CODE PROVISION THAT
POSSESSION OF HEREDITARY PROPERTY IS
TRANSMITTED TO THE HEIR THE MOMENT OF
DEATH OF THE DECEDENT (ACEDEBO VS.
ABESAMIS, 217 SCRA 194);
E. IN DISREGARDING THE FINAL DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 128525 DATED
DECEMBER 17, 1999 INVOLVING SUBSTANTIALLY
THE SAME PARTIES, TO WIT, PETITIONERS JOSE C.
LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO WERE RESPONDENTS IN
THAT CASE WHILE RESPONDENT MA. DIVINA
ENDERES WAS THE PETITIONER THEREIN. THAT
DECISION, WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED LAW OF
THE CASE, RULED THAT PETITIONERS CANNOT BE
ENJOINED BY RESPONDENT ENDERES FROM
EXERCISING THEIR POWER AS DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS OF PHILINTERLIFE AND THAT THE
INTESTATE COURT IN CHARGE OF THE INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS CANNOT ADJUDICATE TITLE TO
PROPERTIES CLAIMED TO BE PART OF THE ESTATE
AND WHICH ARE EQUALLY CLAIMED BY
PETITIONER FLAG.[17]
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing Philinterlife
and FLAG, assail before us not only the validity of the writ of execution
issued by the intestate court dated July 7, 2000 but also the validity of the
August 11, 1997 order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of the
2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez,
in their personal capacities and without court approval, in favor of
petitioner FLAG.
Counsel for petitioner, when the Memorandum
of Agreement was executed, did the children of Juliana
Salgado know already that there was a claim for share
in the inheritance of the children of Novicio?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Your Honor please, at that time, Your Honor, it
is already known to them.
JUSTICE AQUINO:
What can be your legal justification for
extrajudicial settlement of a property subject of
intestate proceedings when there is an adverse claim of
another set of heirs, alleged heirs? What would be the
legal justification for extra-judicially settling a property
under administration without the approval of the
intestate court?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Well, Your Honor please, in that extra-judicial
settlement there is an approval of the honorable court
as to the propertys partition x x x. There were as
mentioned by the respondents counsel, Your Honor.
ATTY. BUYCO:
No
JUSTICE AQUINO:
The point is, there can be no adjudication of a
property under intestate proceedings without the
approval of the court. That is basic unless you can
present justification on that. In fact, there are two
steps: first, you ask leave and then execute the
document and then ask for approval of the document
executed. Now, is there any legal justification to
exclude this particular transaction from those steps?
ATTY. CALIMAG:

We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of nullity of the None, Your Honor.
sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock in their favor because this was ATTY BUYCO:
already settled a long time ago by the Court of Appeals in its decision
dated June 23, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was effectively With that admission that there is no legal
upheld by us in our resolution dated October 9, 1998 in G.R. No. 135177 justification, Your Honor, we rest the case for the
dismissing the petition for review on a technicality and thereafter denying private respondent. How can the lower court be
the motion for reconsideration on January 13, 1999 on the ground that accused of abusing its discretion? (pages 33-35, TSN of
there was no compelling reason to reconsider said denial.[18] Our decision January 29, 1998).
became final on February 23, 1999 and was accordingly entered in the
book of entry of judgments. For all intents and purposes therefore, the Thus, We find merit in the following postulation by private respondent:
nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana
Ortaez and Jose Ortaez in favor of petitioner FLAG is already a closed case.
What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the
To reopen said issue would set a bad precedent, opening the door wide
decedent without securing court approval have appropriated as their
open for dissatisfied parties to relitigate unfavorable decisions no end.
own personal property the properties of [the] Estate, to the exclusion
This is completely inimical to the orderly and efficient administration of
and the extreme prejudice of the other claimant/heirs. In other words,
justice.
these heirs, without court approval, have distributed the asset of the
The said decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342 estate among themselves and proceeded to dispose the same to third
affirming the nullity of the sale made by Jose Ortaez and his mother parties even in the absence of an order of distribution by the Estate
Juliana Ortaez of the Philinterlife shares of stock read: Court. As admitted by petitioners counsel, there was absolutely no legal
justification for this action by the heirs. There being no legal Administratrix Fausta Carreon Herrera on November 14, 1974. Private
justification, petitioner has no basis for demanding that public respondent was appointed as administratrix of the estate on March 3,
respondent [the intestate court] approve the sale of the Philinterlife 1976 in lieu of Fausta Carreon Herrera. On November 1, 1978, the
shares of the Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortaez in favor of the Filipino questioned deed of sale of the fishponds was executed between
Loan Assistance Group. petitioner and private respondent without notice and approval of the
probate court. Even after the sale, administratrix Aurora Carreon still
It is an undisputed fact that the parties to the Memorandum of included the three fishponds as among the real properties of the estate
Agreement dated March 4, 1982 (see Annex 7 of the Comment). . . are in her inventory submitted on August 13, 1981. In fact, as stated by the
not the only heirs claiming an interest in the estate left by Dr. Juvencio Court of Appeals, petitioner, at the time of the sale of the fishponds in
P. Ortaez. The records of this case. . . clearly show that as early as March question, knew that the same were part of the estate under
3, 1981 an Opposition to the Application for Issuance of Letters of administration.
Administration was filed by the acknowledged natural children of Dr.
Juvencio P. Ortaez with Ligaya Novicio. . . This claim by the xxxxxxxxx
acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez is admittedly
known to the parties to the Memorandum of Agreement before they The subject properties therefore are under the jurisdiction of the
executed the same. This much was admitted by petitioners counsel probate court which according to our settled jurisprudence has the
during the oral argument. xxx authority to approve any disposition regarding properties under
administration. . . More emphatic is the declaration We made in Estate
Given the foregoing facts, and the applicable jurisprudence, public of Olave vs. Reyes (123 SCRA 767) where We stated that when the
respondent can never be faulted for not approving. . . the subsequent estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
sale by the petitioner [Jose Ortaez] and his mother [Juliana Ortaez] of intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any
the Philinterlife shares belonging to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez. transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
(pages 3-4 of Private Respondents Memorandum; pages 243-244 of the
Rollo) Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (149 SCRA
174), We held that the sale of an immovable property belonging to the
Amidst the foregoing, We found no grave abuse of discretion amounting estate of a decedent, in a special proceedings, needs court approval. . .
to excess or want of jurisdiction committed by respondent judge.[19] This pronouncement finds support in the previous case of Dolores Vda.
De Gil vs. Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797) wherein We emphasized that it
From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortaez, and her is within the jurisdiction of a probate court to approve the sale of
three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortaez, invalidly properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final
entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the adjudication. x x x
intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there
were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of It being settled that property under administration needs the approval
the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate of the probate court before it can be disposed of, any unauthorized
properties by Juliana Ortaez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. As early as
Ortaez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano (42 Phil 347), We laid down the
third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void. rule that a sale by an administrator of property of the deceased, which is
not authorized by the probate court is null and void and title does not
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property pass to the purchaser.
under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that
possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir
without interruption from the moment of death of the There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and
decedent.[20] However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the void the disposition of the property under administration, made by
estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the private respondent, the same having been effected without authority
probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize
shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is
their shares.[21] This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided said court that can declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings
share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case, had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioners contention
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 that the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would
and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This render meaningless the power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs.
they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (emphasis ours)
the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the
other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case. Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of
estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate, adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition
without court approval. It is well-settled that court approval is necessary of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no
for the validity of any disposition of the decedents estate. In the early case need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
of Godoy vs. Orellano,[22] we laid down the rule that the sale of the
property of the estate by an administrator without the order of the The question now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its
probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. And in the case order nullifying the invalid sale?
of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals,[23] we ruled that:
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power
to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of
[I]t must be emphasized that the questioned properties (fishpond) were estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or
included in the inventory of properties of the estate submitted by then fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other
words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate proceedings was made without the prior approval of the court. The
courts power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent dispositive portion of our decision read:
the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.

Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate court nullifying the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed Order
sale was affirmed by the appellate courts (the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. dated February 18, 1981 of the respondent Judge approving the
SP No. 46342 dated June 23, 1998 and subsequently by the Supreme questioned Amicable Settlement is declared NULL and VOID and hereby
Court in G.R. No. 135177 dated October 9, 1998). The finality of the SET ASIDE. Consequently, the sale in favor of Sotero Dioniosio III and by
decision of the Supreme Court was entered in the book of entry of the latter to William Go is likewise declared NULL and VOID. The
judgments on February 23, 1999. Considering the finality of the order of Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the latter is hereby ordered
the intestate court nullifying the sale, as affirmed by the appellate courts, cancelled.
it was correct for private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes to
thereafter move for a writ of execution and for the intestate court to It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlifes authorized
grant it. capital stock, approved on the vote of petitioners non-existent
shareholdings and obviously calculated to make it difficult for Dr. Ortaezs
Petitioners Jose Lee, Alma Aggabao and FLAG, however, contend estate to reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife, was likewise
that the probate court could not issue a writ of execution with regard to void ab initio.
its order nullifying the sale because said order was merely provisional:
Petitioners next argue that they were denied due process.
The only authority given by law is for respondent judge to determine We do not think so.
provisionally whether said shares are included or excluded in the
inventory In ordering the execution of the orders, respondent judge The facts show that petitioners, for reasons known only to them,
acted in excess of his jurisdiction and grossly violated settled law and did not appeal the decision of the intestate court nullifying the sale of
jurisprudence, i.e., that the determination by a probate or intestate shares of stock in their favor. Only the vendor, Jose Ortaez, appealed the
court of whether a property is included or excluded in the inventory of case. A careful review of the records shows that petitioners had actual
the estate being provisional in nature, cannot be the subject of knowledge of the estate settlement proceedings and that they knew
execution.[24] (emphasis ours) private respondent Enderes was questioning therein the sale to them of
the Philinterlife shares of stock.
Petitioners argument is misplaced. There is no question, based on It must be noted that private respondent-Special Administratrix
the facts of this case, that the Philinterlife shares of stock were part of the Enderes filed before the intestate court (RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85)
estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez from the very start as in fact these shares a Motion to Declare Void Ab Initio Deeds of Sale of Philinterlife Shares of
were included in the inventory of the properties of the estate submitted Stock on March 22, 1996. But as early as 1994, petitioners already knew
by Rafael Ortaez after he and his brother, Jose Ortaez, were appointed of the pending settlement proceedings and that the shares they bought
special administrators by the intestate court.[25] were under the administration by the intestate court because private
The controversy here actually started when, during the pendency respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her mother Ligaya Novicio
of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortaez, his wife Juliana Ortaez sold had filed a case against them at the Securities and Exchange Commission
the 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock in favor petitioner FLAG without the on November 7, 1994, docketed as SEC No. 11-94-4909, for annulment of
approval of the intestate court. Her son Jose Ortaez later sold the transfer of shares of stock, annulment of sale of corporate properties,
remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares also in favor of FLAG without the annulment of subscriptions on increased capital stocks, accounting,
approval of the intestate court. inspection of corporate books and records and damages with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.[27] In
We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or exclusion of said case, Enderes and her mother questioned the sale of the aforesaid
properties in the inventory of the estate because there is no question shares of stock to petitioners. The SEC hearing officer in fact, in his
that, from the very start, the Philinterlife shares of stock were owned by resolution dated March 24, 1995, deferred to the jurisdiction of the
the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortaez. Rather, we are concerned here with intestate court to rule on the validity of the sale of shares of stock sold to
the effect of the sale made by the decedents heirs, Juliana Ortaez and petitioners by Jose Ortaez and Juliana Ortaez:
Jose Ortaez, without the required approval of the intestate court.This
being so, the contention of petitioners that the determination of the Petitioners also averred that. . . the Philinterlife shares of Dr. Juvencio
intestate court was merely provisional and should have been threshed Ortaez who died, in 1980, are part of his estate which is presently the
out in a separate proceeding is incorrect. subject matter of an intestate proceeding of the RTC of Quezon City,
The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao next contend that the Branch 85. Although, private respondents [Jose Lee et al.] presented the
writ of execution should not be executed against them because they were documents of partition whereby the foregoing share of stocks were
not notified, nor they were aware, of the proceedings nullifying the sale allegedly partitioned and conveyed to Jose S. Ortaez who allegedly
of the shares of stock. assigned the same to the other private respondents, approval of the
Court was not presented. Thus, the assignments to the private
We are not persuaded. The title of the purchaser like herein respondents [Jose Lee et al.] of the subject shares of stocks are void.
petitioner FLAG can be struck down by the intestate court after a clear
showing of the nullity of the alienation. This is the logical consequence of xxxxxxxxx
our ruling in Godoy and in several subsequent cases.[26] The sale of any
property of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir without
With respect to the alleged extrajudicial partition of the shares of stock
order of the probate or intestate court is void and passes no title to the
owned by the late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, we rule that the matter properly
purchaser. Thus, in Juan Lao et al. vs. Hon. Melencio Geneto, G.R. No.
belongs to the jurisdiction of the regular court where the intestate
56451, June 19, 1985, we ordered the probate court to cancel the transfer
proceedings are currently pending.[28]
certificate of title issued to the vendees at the instance of the
administrator after finding that the sale of real property under probate
 With this resolution of the SEC hearing officer dated as early as Petitioners next contend that we are bound by our ruling in G.R. No.
March 24, 1995 recognizing the jurisdiction of the intestate court to 128525 entitled Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes vs. Court of Appeals, dated
determine the validity of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Dr. December 17, 1999, where we allegedly ruled that the intestate court
Ortaez and the subsequent sale by the heirs of the decedent of the may not pass upon the title to a certain property for the purpose of
Philinterlife shares of stock to petitioners, how can petitioners claim thatdetermining whether the same should or should not be included in the
they were not aware of the intestate proceedings? inventory but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to final
decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be
Futhermore, when the resolution of the SEC hearing officer reached constituted by the parties.
the Supreme Court in 1996 (docketed as G.R. 128525), herein petitioners
who were respondents therein filed their answer which contained We are not unaware of our decision in G.R. No. 128525. The issue
statements showing that they knew of the pending intestate proceedings: therein was whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
resolution of the SEC that Enderes et al. were not entitled to the issuance
[T]he subject matter of the complaint is not within the jurisdiction of the of the writ of preliminary injunction. We ruled that the Court of Appeals
SEC but with the Regional Trial Court; Ligaya Novicio and children was correct in affirming the resolution of the SEC denying the issuance of
represented themselves to be the common law wife and illegitimate the writ of preliminary injunction because injunction is not designed to
children of the late Ortaez; that on March 4, 1982, the surviving spouse protect contingent rights. Said case did not rule on the issue of the
Juliana Ortaez, on her behalf and for her minor son Antonio, executed a validity of the sale of shares of stock belonging to the decedents estate
Memorandum of Agreement with her other sons Rafael and Jose, both without court approval nor of the validity of the writ of execution issued
surnamed Ortaez, dividing the estate of the deceased composed of his by the intestate court. G.R. No. 128525 clearly involved a different issue
one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal properties; that in the said and it does not therefore apply to the present case.
Memorandum of Agreement, Jose S. Ortaez acquired as his share of the Petitioners and all parties claiming rights under them are hereby
estate the 1,329 shares of stock in Philinterlife; that on March 4, 1982, warned not to further delay the execution of the Orders of the intestate
Juliana and Rafael assigned their respective shares of stock in court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997.
Philinterlife to Jose; that contrary to the contentions of petitioners,
private respondents Jose Lee, Carlos Lee, Benjamin Lee and Alma WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
Aggabao became stockholders of Philinterlife on March 23, 1983 when Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 59736 dated July 26, 2000, dismissing
Jose S. Ortaez, the principal stockholder at that time, executed a deed of petitioners petition for certiorari and affirming the July 6, 2000 order of
sale of his shares of stock to private respondents; and that the right of the trial court which ordered the execution of its (trial courts) August 11
petitioners to question the Memorandum of Agreement and the and 29, 1997 orders, is hereby AFFIRMED.
acquisition of shares of stock of private respondent is barred by
prescription.[29] SO ORDERED.

Also, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes offered

additional proof of actual knowledge of the settlement proceedings by
petitioners which petitioners never denied: (1) that petitioners were
represented by Atty. Ricardo Calimag previously hired by the mother of
private respondent Enderes to initiate cases against petitioners Jose Lee
and Alma Aggaboa for the nullification of the sale of the shares of stock
but said counsel made a conflicting turn-around and appeared instead as
counsel of petitioners, and (2) that the deeds of sale executed between
petitioners and the heirs of the decedent (vendors Juliana Ortaez and Jose
Ortaez) were acknowledged before Atty. Ramon Carpio who, during the
pendency of the settlement proceedings, filed a motion for the approval
of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stock to the Knights of Columbus
Fraternal Association, Inc. (which motion was, however, later
abandoned).[30] All this sufficiently proves that petitioners, through their
counsels, knew of the pending settlement proceedings.

Finally, petitioners filed several criminal cases such as libel (Criminal

Case No. 97-7179-81), grave coercion (Criminal Case No. 84624) and
robbery (Criminal Case No. Q-96-67919) against private respondents
mother Ligaya Novicio who was a director of Philinterlife,[31] all of which
criminal cases were related to the questionable sale to petitioners of the
Philinterlife shares of stock.

Considering these circumstances, we cannot accept petitioners

claim of denial of due process. The essence of due process is the
reasonable opportunity to be heard. Where the opportunity to be heard
has been accorded, there is no denial of due process.[32] In this case,
petitioners knew of the pending instestate proceedings for the
settlement of Dr. Juvencio Ortaezs estate but for reasons they alone
knew, they never intervened. When the court declared the nullity of the
sale, they did not bother to appeal. And when they were notified of the
motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate court, they ignored
the same. Clearly, petitioners alone should bear the blame.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996]
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division),
MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE
ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH
156, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside
the decision dated November 10, 1994and the resolution dated January
5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045.
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a
holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his
three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator
bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and
named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the
cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and
private respondents in accordance with the decedents will. For
unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any
action for the probate of his fathers holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it was private
respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of
Hilario Ruizs will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
Ruiz.3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the
will was executed under undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate - the
house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the
testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline4 - was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit
with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling
P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property.
In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount
of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting
P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate.5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay
the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate
court approved the release of P7,722.006
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate
of the will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted
the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary
to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz as
executor, filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds. It prayed for the
release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of
Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a
Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion for Issuance of
Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will. Montes prayed for the release of
the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline and for the distribution of the testators properties, specifically
the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance
with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioners motion
for release of funds but granted respondent Montes motion in view of
petitioners lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent
payments to the decedents three granddaughters. It further ordered the
delivery of the titleds to and possession of the properties bequeathed to
the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a
bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed
his opposition to respondent Montes motion for release of rent payments
which opposition the court failed to consider. Petitioner likewise
reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested
that he was withdrawing his motion for release of funds in view of the
fact that the lease contract over Valle Verde property had been renewed
for another year.7
Despite petitioners manifestation, the probate court, on December
22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only such
amount as may be necessary to cover the espenses of administration and
allowanceas for support of the testators three granddaughters subject to
collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court,
however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes
and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date
of firast publication of the notice to creditors.8 The Court stated thus:
xxx xxx xxx
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the parties,
the court resolves to allow Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to take
possession of the rental payments deposited with the Clerk of Court,
Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such amount as may be necessary to
cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support of
Maria Cathryn Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeli, which are
subject to collation and deductible from the share in the inheritance of
said heirs and insofar as they exceed the fruits or rents pertaining to
them.
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar Ruiz-
Montes and the above-named heirs, the same is hereby reconsidered
and held in abeyance until the lapse of six (6) months from the date of
first publication of Notice to Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to
submit an accounting of the expenses necessary for administration
including provisions for the support Of Maria Cathryn Veronique Ruiz,
Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the amount
required can be withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to
creditors with reasonable dispatch.9
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge, the appellate
court dismissed the petition and sustained the probate courts order in a
decision dated November 10, 199410 and a resolution
dated January 5, 1995.11
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING THE ORDER OF
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, DATED
DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS
EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL
THE REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE; (2) GRANT
SUPPORT, DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE,
TO CERTAIN PERSONS NOT ENTITLED THERETO; AND (3) PREMATURELY
PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE PURSUANT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC
VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED, AND DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
UNPAID DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after
admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estates debts and
obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of
the estate for the support of the testators grandchildren; (2) to order the
release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all
properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
 On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of
the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such
allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the
minor or incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive
allowances for support during the settlement of estate proceedings. He
contends that the testators three granddaughters do not qualify for an
allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors
but of legal age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the
provision expressly states children of the deceased which excludes the
latters grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83
should not be limited to the minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
substantive law in force at the time of the testators death, provides that
during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceaseds
legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or
gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of
the estate.14 The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to
support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of
majority.15
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional
support from the funds of the decedents estate. The law clearly limits the
allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to the deceaseds
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. 16 It was error,
therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate courts order
granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the
titles of the bequeathed properties to private respondents six months
after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. An order releasing
titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of
the estate which is allowed only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Nothwithstanding a
pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a
decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may
deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be
affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or
legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of
these Rules.17
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of
the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate,
and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to
the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and
recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or
any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time
as the court directs.18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges,
expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court
conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles
to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private
respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of
notice to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz
allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those
obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet
paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such
provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their
respective shares in the inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was
issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the
release of the titles six months after admitting the will to probate. The
probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic
validity21and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of
the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised
even after the will has been authenticated.23
The intrinsic validity of Hilarios holographic will was controverted
by petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes Opposition
to his motion for release of funds24 and his motion for reconsideration of
the August 26, 1993 order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner assailed
the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his
fathers will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his
legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there
is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their
distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear
and decide the same as in ordinary cases.26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order
deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real and personal
properties of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator to the
possession and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration,27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court
explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts,
and to administer estate not willed. - An executor or administrator shall
have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as
the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses for administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with
the clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the probate court
certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the properties
of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner
moved again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he
previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to
submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration
before releasing any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had
deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income from the
Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after
renewal of the lease.29 Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the
properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not
been fully settled and partitioned.30 As executor, he is a mere trustee of
his fathers estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and
he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest
order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his
parents properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an
inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the
deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which
are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety
and justness.32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming the order dated December 22,
1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259
are affirmed with the modification that those portions of the order
granting an allowance to the testators grandchildren and ordering the
release of the titles to the private respondents upon notice to creditors
are annulled and set aside.
Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the
proceedings below.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ
ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming
the dismissal2 of the petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Efraim M. Santibañez entered into a loan agreement 3 in the amount of
₱128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase
price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In
view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in
favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st
thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement,4 this time in the amount of ₱123,156.00. It was intended to
pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600
Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund,
executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC.
Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty
Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to
will.6 Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial
before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings court:
No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed
as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.7 During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his
sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement 8 dated July
22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund
and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities9 was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others,
assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter
failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988,
the petitioner filed a Complaint11 for sum of money against the heirs of
Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued
against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he
was in the United States and there was no information on his address or
the date of his return to the Philippines.12 Accordingly, the complaint was
narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her
Answer13 and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she
was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by
her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it
was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the
joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 63.14 Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a
decision was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for
lack of merit.15
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been
filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late
Efraim Santibañez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was
an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that
the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and
Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the
decedent. However, the said agreement was void, considering that it had
not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid
partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court further
declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and
liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence
S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedent’s
account. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null
and void, the trial court held that the petitioner’s cause of action against
respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE
PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE
NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE
WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-
LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.16
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased
had passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and
Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as
Exhibit "A" estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot
deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been
signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary
to present the same before the probate court for approval; the property
partitioned in the agreement was not one of those enumerated in the
holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the
heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary
civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the
estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the
money claim of the petitioner should have been presented before the
probate court.17
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held
that the petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as
provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further
held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no
valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated.
According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered
the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms when the deceased
referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and
participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount appellate courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S.
to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.18
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held liable
CA:
I.
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were
transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there
was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement
where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and
assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S.
Ariola signed the joint agreement without any condition, she is now
estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner
also points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include
nor mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was
beyond the ambit of the said will. The active participation and resistance
of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the
petitioner’s claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim
presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs
who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of
the tractors under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said
heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing
the vinculum jurisor the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibañez
and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the
Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed
by the late Efraim Santibañez, together with his heirs, Edmund and
respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs
are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express
provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory
jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the
petitioner to file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the
petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their
respective personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT

AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT. In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains
that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased
Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate
II. court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint
agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of which
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID the petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ UNTIL which might delay payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted to
AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED. require them to execute the said agreement.1a\^/phi1.net

III. According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in
declaring that the agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund,
HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
ESTATE PROCEEDING. prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not
waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that
the claim should be filed with the probate court. Thus, the petitioner
IV.
could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.

RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE

Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any
WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ ON THE
continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any document presented
STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN
as evidence to show that she had caused herself to be bound by the
FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
obligation of her late father.

V.
The petition is bereft of merit.

THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF

The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the
₱128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF ₱123,000.00
partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or
CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS
not the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid;
BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE
and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation
DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK. 19
of the deceased.1awphi1.nét
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor
properties to be administered.20 The said court is primarily concerned of First Countryside Credit Corp."29 The assumption of liability was
with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. 21 conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall
take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were
the heirs until after the will has been probated: to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were
each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs
in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and
the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the
by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no decedent.l^vvphi1.net The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late
other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the
the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules
prescribes for the validity of a will.22 of Court, which provides:

This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred;
same properties embraced in the will.23 In the present case, the deceased, exceptions. — All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
Efraim Santibañez, left a holographic will24 which contained, inter alia, the contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
provision which reads as follows: contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and
executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action
Florence, my children.
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set
forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all- presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and
encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final
which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so
and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as
three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the
tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement 25 executed by administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be
Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is approved at their present value.
invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a
pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate
covering the said tractors.
court is mandatory.30 As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
Herrera:31
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired
jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3)
… This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the
tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate court’s
deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against
approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court
it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it
cannot allow.26 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-
is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The
transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be
law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims
in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court
against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. 32
jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of
the decedent.28 In the instant case, there is no showing that the Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private
signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her
When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed
were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the
unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it
prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said
claim against the estate of the deceased. promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any
defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had
not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of
unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative.
Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not
sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and
liabilities.33 The petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of the
Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First
Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the
Philippines…"34 However, the documentary evidence35 clearly reflects
that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities
were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the
conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the
petitioner’s participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no
documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show
that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union
Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:

… [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff
failed to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial
notice does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be]
exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be promptly resolved in the negative." (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36

This being the case, the petitioner’s personality to file the complaint is
wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming
the same.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The

assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines In view of the issuance of letters of administration, the probate court, on
SUPREME COURT August 30, 1977, issued a Notice to Creditors16 for the filing of money
Manila claims against Flaviano’s estate. Accordingly, as one of the creditors of
Flaviano, respondent notified17 the probate court of its claim in the
SECOND DIVISION amount of ₱382,753.19 as of October 11, 1978, exclusive of interests and
charges.
G.R. No. 171206 September 23, 2013
During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Edgar and Oscar were
able to obtain several loans from respondent, secured by promissory
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES FLA VIANO MAGLASANG and SALUD
notes18 which they signed.
ADAZA-MAGLASANG, namely, OSCAR A. MAGLASANG, EDGAR A.
MAGLASANG, CONCEPCION CHONA A. MAGLASANG, GLENDA A.
MAGLASANG-ARNAIZ, LERMA A. MAGLASANG, FELMA A. · In an Order19 dated December 14, 1978 (December 14, 1978 Order),the
MAGLASANG, FE DORIS A. MAGLASANG, LEOLINO A. MAGLASANG, probate court terminated the proceedings with the surviving heirs
MARGIE LEILA A. MAGLASANG,MA. MILALIE A. MAGLASANG, SALUD A. executing an extra-judicial partition of the properties of Flaviano’s estate.
MAGLASANG, and MA. FLASALIE A. MAGLASANG, REPRESENTING THE The loan obligations owed by the estate to respondent, however,
ESTATES OF THEIR AFORE-NAMEDDECEASED PARENTS, Petitioners, remained unsatisfied due to respondent’s certification that Flaviano’s
vs. account was undergoing a restructuring. Nonetheless, the probate court
MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, now substituted by FIRST expressly recognized the rights of respondent under the mortgage and
SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT SPV-AMC, INC. FSAMI, Respondent. promissory notes executed by the Sps. Maglasang, specifically, its "right
to foreclose the same within the statutory period."20
DECISION
In this light, respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the
mortgage covering the Sps. Maglasang’s properties and emerged as the
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
highest bidder at the public auction for the amount of
₱350,000.00.21 There, however, remained a deficiency on Sps.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated Maglasang’s obligation to respondent. Thus, on June 24, 1981,
July 20, 2005 and Resolution3 dated January 4, 2006 of the Court of respondent filed a suit to recover the deficiency amount of ₱250,601.05
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50410 which dismissed petitioners’ appeal as of May 31, 1981 against the estate of Flaviano, his widow Salud and
and affirmed the Decision4 dated April 6, 1987 of the Regional Trial Court petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 1998-0.22
of Ormoc City, Branch 12 (RTC) directing petitioners to jointly and
severally pay respondent Manila Banking Corporation the amount of
The RTC Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings
₱434,742.36, with applicable interests, representing the deficiency of the
former’s total loan obligation to the latter after the extra-judicial
23
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage subject of this case, including After trial on the merits, the RTC (formerly, the probate court) rendered
a Decision 24 on April 6, 1987 directing the petitioners to pay respondent,
attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
jointly and severally, the amount of ₱434,742.36 with interest at the rate
of 12% p.a., plus a 4% penalty charge, reckoned from September 5,1984
The Facts
until fully paid.25 The RTC found that it was shown, by a preponderance
of evidence, that petitioners, after the extra-judicial foreclosure of all the
On June 16, 1975, spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps.Maglasang) properties mortgaged, still have an outstanding obligation in the amount
obtained a credit line from respondent5 in the amount of ₱350,000.00 and as of the date as above-stated. The RTC also found in order the
which was secured by a real estate mortgage6 executed over seven of payment of interests and penalty charges as above-mentioned as well as
their properties7 located in Ormoc City and the Municipality of Kananga, attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the outstanding obligation. 26
Province of Leyte.8 They availed of their credit line by securing loans in
the amounts of ₱209,790.50 and ₱139,805.83 on October 24, 1975and
Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the case to the CA on appeal,
March 15, 1976, respectively,9 both of which becoming due and
contending,27 inter alia, that the remedies available to respondent under
demandable within a period of one year. Further, the parties agreed that
Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court (Rules) are alternative and
the said loans would earn interest at 12% per annum (p.a.) and an
10
exclusive, such that the election of one operates as a waiver or
additional 4% penalty would be charged upon default.
abandonment of the others. Thus, when respondent filed its claim against
the estate of Flaviano in the proceedings before the probate court, it
After Flaviano Maglasang (Flaviano) died intestate on February 14,1977, effectively abandoned its right to foreclose on the mortgage. Moreover,
his widow Salud Maglasang (Salud) and their surviving children, herein even on the assumption that it has not so waived its right to foreclose, it
petitioners Oscar (Oscar), Concepcion Chona, Lerma, Felma, FeDoris, is nonetheless barred from filing any claim for any deficiency amount.
Leolino, Margie Leila, Ma. Milalie, Salud and Ma. Flasalie, all surnamed
Maglasang, and Glenda Maglasang-Arnaiz, appointed11 their brother
During the pendency of the appeal, Flaviano’s widow, Salud, passed away
petitioner Edgar Maglasang (Edgar) as their attorney-in-fact.12 Thus, on
on July 25, 1997.28
March 30, 1977, Edgar filed a verified petition for letters of administration
of the intestate estate of Flaviano before the then Court of First Instance
of Leyte, Ormoc City, Branch 5 (probate court), docketed as Sp. Proc. No. The CA Ruling
1604-0.13 On August 9, 1977, the probate court issued an Order14 granting
the petition, thereby appointing Edgar as the administrator15 of Flaviano’s In a Decision29 dated July 20, 2005, the CA denied the petitioners’ appeal
estate. and affirmed the RTC’s Decision. At the outset, it pointed out that the
probate court erred when it, through the December 14, 1978 Order,
closed and terminated the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 1604-0 without
first satisfying the claims of the creditors of the estate – in particular,
respondent – in violation of Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules.30 As a to be for the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be
consequence, respondent was not able to collect from the petitioners and made. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
thereby was left with the option of foreclosing the real estate
mortgage.31Further, the CA held that Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules does
As the foregoing generally speaks of "a creditor holding a claim against
not apply to the present case since the same does not involve a mortgage
the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security" as
made by the administrator over any property belonging to the estate of
above-highlighted, it may be reasonably concluded that the
the decedent.32According to the CA, what should apply is Act No. aforementioned section covers all secured claims, whether by mortgage
313533 which entitles respondent to claim the deficiency amount afteror any other form of collateral, which a creditor may enforce against the
the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage of Sps. estate of the deceased debtor. On the contrary, nowhere from its
Maglasang’s properties.34 language can it be fairly deducible that the said section would – as the CA
interpreted – narrowly apply only to mortgages made by the
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied in a administrator over any property belonging to the estate of the decedent.
Resolution35 dated January 4, 2006. Hence, the present recourse. To note, mortgages of estate property executed by the administrator, are
also governed by Rule 89 of the Rules, captioned as "Sales, Mortgages,
The Issue Before the Court and Other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent."

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in affirming In this accord, it bears to stress that the CA’s reliance on Philippine
the RTC’s award of the deficiency amount in favor of respondent. National Bank v. CA43 (PNB) was misplaced as the said case did not, in any
manner, limit the scope of Section 7, Rule 86. It only stated that the
36
aforesaid section equally applies to cases where the administrator
Petitioners assert that it is not Act No. 3135 but Section 7, Rule 86of the
mortgages the property of the estate to secure the loan he
Rules which applies in this case. The latter provision provides alternative
obtained.44 Clearly, the pronouncement was a ruling of inclusion and not
and exclusive remedies for the satisfaction of respondent’s claim against
one which created a distinction. It cannot, therefore, be doubted that it
the estate of Flaviano.37 Corollarily, having filed its claim against the
is Section 7, Rule 86which remains applicable in dealing with a creditor’s
estate during the intestate proceedings, petitioners argue that
claim against the mortgaged property of the deceased debtor, as in this
respondent had effectively waived the remedy of foreclosure and, even
case, as well as mortgages made by the administrator, as that in the PNB
assuming that it still had the right to do so, it was precluded from filing a
38
case.
suit for the recovery of the deficiency obligation.

Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains
Likewise, petitioners maintain that the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
that the secured creditor has three remedies/options that he may
subject properties was null and void, not having been conducted in the
alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness. In particular,
capital of the Province of Leyte in violation of the stipulations in the real
he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from
estate mortgage contract.39 They likewise deny any personal liability for
the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the
the loans taken by their deceased parents.40
mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c)
rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same
The Court’s Ruling before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any
deficiency.45 It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies are
The petition is partly meritorious. distinct, independent and mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the
election of one effectively bars the exercise of the others. With respect to
Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement real properties, the Court in Bank of America v. American Realty
46 pronounced:
41
proceedings of their estate. Such proceedings are primarily governed by Corporation
special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules, although rules
governing ordinary actions may, as far as practicable, apply In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are
suppletorily.42 Among these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one
(Section 7, Rule86) provides the rule in dealing with secured claims remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is
against the estate: deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing
of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the
SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. – A creditor holding a claim provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to
against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage
may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with
in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in
estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
47 (Emphasis supplied)
action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, No.4118.
and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged
premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding Anent the third remedy, it must be mentioned that the same includes the
to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the option of extra-judicially foreclosing the mortgage under Act No. 3135,as
manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his availed of by respondent in this case. However, the plain result of
mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right
within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall to recover any deficiency from the estate.48 These precepts were
not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the discussed in the PNB case, citing Perez v. Philippine National Bank49 which
distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein overturned the earlier Pasno v. Ravina ruling:50
contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming
the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held
as security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it
Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage
independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively of the properties previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their
pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest it be
the mortgagor dies, among them: misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim
against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified52the
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of
estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. 53 Thus,
having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial
foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency
filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.
as an ordinary claim; and

As a final point, petitioners maintain that the extra-judicial foreclosure of

(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at
the subject properties was null and void since the same was conducted in
anytime before it is barred by prescription without right to file
violation of the stipulation in the real estate mortgage contract stating
a claim for any deficiency
that the auction sale should be held in the capital of the province where
the properties are located, i.e., the Province of Leyte.
In Perez v. Philippine National Bank, reversing Pasno vs. Ravina, we held:
The Court disagrees.
The ruling in Pasno v. Ravina not having been reiterated in any other case,
we have carefully reexamined the same, and after mature deliberation
As may be gleaned from the records, the stipulation under the real estate
have reached the conclusion that the dissenting opinion is more in
mortgage54 executed by Sps. Maglasang which fixed the place of the
conformity with reason and law. Of the three alternative courses that
foreclosure sale at Tacloban City lacks words of exclusivity which would
section 7, Rule 87 (now Rule 86), offers the mortgage creditor, to wit, (1)
bar any other acceptable for a wherein the said sale may be conducted,
to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the
to wit:
mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) foreclose the mortgage judicially and
prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) to rely on the mortgage
exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by It is hereby agreed that in case of foreclosure of this mortgage under Act
prescription, without right to file a claim for any deficiency, the majority 3135, the auction sale shall be held at the capital of the province if the
opinion in Pasno v. Ravina, in requiring a judicial foreclosure, virtually property is within the territorial jurisdiction of the province concerned, or
wipes out the third alternative conceded by the Rules to the mortgage shall be held in the city if the property is within the territorial jurisdiction
creditor, and which would precisely include extra-judicial foreclosures by of the city concerned; x x x.55
contrast with the second alternative.
Case law states that absent such qualifying or restrictive words to indicate
The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the the exclusivity of the agreed forum, the stipulated place should only be as
56
creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate. an additional, not a limiting venue. As a consequence, the stipulated
Following the Perez ruling that the third mode includes venue and that provided under Act No. 3135 can be applied alternatively.

extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is In particular, Section 2 of Act No. 3135 allows the foreclosure sale to be
that the creditor waives any further deficiency claim. x x x. 51 (Emphases done within the province where the property to be sold is situated, viz.:
and underscoring supplied; italics in the original)
SEC. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province which the
To obviate any confusion, the Court observes that the operation of Act property sold is situated; and in case the place within said province in
No. 3135 does not entirely discount the application of Section 7, Rule 86, which the sale is to be made is subject to stipulation, such sale shall be
or vice-versa. Rather, the two complement each other within their made in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in which
respective spheres of operation. On the one hand, Section 7, Rule 86 lays the property or part thereof is situated. (Italics supplied) ..
down the options for the secured creditor to claim against the estate and,
according to jurisprudence, the availment of the third option bars him In this regard, since the auction sale was conducted in Ormoc City, which
from claiming any deficiency amount. On the other hand, after the third is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Leyte, then the Court
option is chosen, the procedure governing the manner in which the extra- finds sufficient compliance with the above-cited requirement.
judicial foreclosure should proceed would still be governed by the
provisions of Act No. 3135.Simply put, Section 7, Rule 86 governs the All told, finding that the extra-judicial foreclosure subject of this case was
parameters and the extent to which a claim may be advanced against the properly conducted in accordance with the formalities of Act No.
estate, whereas Act No. 3135sets out the specific procedure to be 3135,the Court upholds the same as a valid exercise of respondent's third
followed when the creditor subsequently chooses the third option – option under Section 7, Rule 86. To reiterate, respondent cannot,
specifically, that of extra-judicially foreclosing real property belonging to however, file any suit to recover any deficiency amount since it effectively
the estate. The application of the procedure under Act No. 3135 must be waived its right thereto when it chose to avail of extra-judicial foreclosure
concordant with Section 7, Rule 86 as the latter is a special rule applicable as jurisprudence instructs.
to claims against the estate, and at the same time, since Section 7, Rule
86 does not detail the procedure for extra-judicial foreclosures, the
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The complaint for the
formalities governing the manner of availing of the third option – such as
recovery of the deficiency amount after extra-judicial foreclosure filed by
the place where the application for extra-judicial foreclosure is filed, the
respondent Manila Banking Corporation is hereby DISMISSED. The extra-
requirements of publication and posting and the place of sale – must be
judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, however, stands. SO
governed by Act No. 3135.
ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION estate. She submitted an Inventory of Maximino's properties, which
included, among other things, the following parcels of land x x x.
[G.R. NO. 150175 : February 5, 2007]
x x x
ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES, namely:
ESTELA, ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA, The CFI would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2 October 1952,
ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES, ERNESTO MENDOZA, RIZALINA SANTOS, awarding ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata. On
ADOLFO MENDOZA and PACITA MENDOZA, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF 27 June 1960, Donata had the said CFI Order recorded in the Primary Entry
MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, namely: SILVERIO S. BRIONES, PETRA Book of the Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof, received new TCTs,
BRIONES, BONIFACIO CABAHUG, JR., ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA covering the said properties, now in her name.
FORTUNA, CRESENCIA BRIONES, FUGURACION MEDALLE and
MERCEDES LAGBAS, Respondents. Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata's nieces,
instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate
RESOLUTION estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by
the RTC as administrators of Donata's intestate estate. Controversy arose
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: among Donata's heirs when Erlinda claimed exclusive ownership of three
parcels of land, covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21545, and 58684, based on
two Deeds of Donation, both dated 15 September 1977, allegedly
On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its Decision1 in the above-
executed in her favor by her aunt Donata. The other heirs of Donata
entitled case, ruling in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive
opposed Erlinda's claim. This Court, however, was no longer informed of
portion2 reads as follows:
the subsequent development in the intestate proceedings of the estate
of Donata; and as far as this Petition is concerned, all the heirs of Donata,
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of including Erlinda, appear to be on the same side.
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194, dated 31 August 2001, affirming the
Decision of the Cebu City RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, dated 28
On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino,
September 1986, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the Complaint
filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate
for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession filed by the heirs of
estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also
Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 is hereby DISMISSED.
issued an Order, dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio to collect
rentals from Maximino's properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC
On 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration3 of the foregoing Decision a Motion to Set Aside the Order, dated 5 December 1985, claiming that
was filed by Atty. Celso C. Reales of the Reales Law Office on behalf of the the said properties were already under his and his wife's administration
respondents, heirs of Maximino R. Briones. On 19 May 2006, petitioners as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverio's Letters of
Erlinda Pilapil and the other co-heirs of Donata Ortiz Vda. de Briones, Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set
through counsel, filed an Opposition to Respondents' Motion for aside by the RTC.
Reconsideration,4 to which the respondents filed a Rejoinder5 on 23 May
2006. Thereafter, Atty. Amador F. Brioso, Jr. of the Canto Brioso Arnedo
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC
Law Office entered his appearance as collaborating counsel for the
6
against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of
respondents. Atty. Brioso then filed on 11 June 2006 and 16 June 2006,
possession of real property, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-5794. They
respectively, a Reply7 and Supplemental Reply8 to the petitioners'
later filed an Amended Complaint, on 11 December 1992. They alleged
Opposition to respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. Finally,
9
that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud
petitioners filed a Rejoinder to the respondents' Reply and Supplemental
and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of
Reply on 5 July 2006.
the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties
belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.
The facts of the case, as recounted in the Decision,10 are as follows'
x x x
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata),
consisting of her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalina's
After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986,
daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other nephews and nieces of
in favor of the heirs of Maximino x x x.
Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who had also passed
away. Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino
Briones (Maximino), composed of his nephews and nieces, and x x x
grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of the deceased
siblings of Maximino. x x x[T]he RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to - of
the real properties covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21543, 21544, 21545,
x x x 21546, and 58684. It also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs of
Maximino the said properties and to render an accounting of the fruits
thereof.
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any
children. When Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted
intestate proceedings to settle her husband's estate with the Cebu City The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986, to the
Court of First Instance (CFI), 14th Judicial District, designated as Special Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, promulgated on
Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued Letters of 31 August 2001, affirmed the RTC Decision, x x x.
Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximino's
x x x
Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of Appeals, the In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since there was
heirs of Donata filed the present Petition, x x x. insufficient evidence to establish that Donata committed fraud. It should
be remembered that Donata was able to secure certificates of title to the
In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court found the Petition disputed properties by virtue of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No.
meritorious and, reversing the Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the 928-R (the proceedings she instituted to settle Maximino's intestate
Regional Trial Court (RTC), dismissed the Complaint for partition, estate), which declared her as Maximino's sole heir. In the absence of
annulment, and recovery of possession of real property filed by the heirs proof to the contrary, the Court accorded to Special Proceedings No. 928-
of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794. This Court summed up its R the presumptions of regularity and validity. Reproduced below are the
findings,11 thus' relevant portions15 of the Decision'

In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real
properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in
her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established
between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New
Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in her name,
not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October
1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order,
presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole,
absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the
singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real
properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her
deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of
Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been
dismissed.
Respondents move for the reconsideration of the Decision of this Court
raising still the arguments that Donata committed fraud in securing the
Court of First Instance Order, dated 2 October 1952, which declared her
as the sole heir of her deceased husband Maximino and authorized her to
have Maximino's properties registered exclusively in her name; that
respondents' right to succession to the disputed properties was
transmitted or vested from the moment of Maximino's death and which
they could no longer be deprived of; that Donata merely possessed and
held the properties in trust for her co-heirs/owners; and that, by virtue of
this Court's ruling in Quion v. Claridad12 and Sevilla, et al. v. De Los
Angeles,13 respondents' action to recover title to and possession of their
shares in Maximino's estate, held in trust for their benefit by Donata, and
eventually, by petitioners as the latter's successors-in-interest, is
imprescriptible. Respondents also advance a fresh contention that the CFI
Order, dated 2 October 1952, being based on the fraudulent
misrepresentation of Donata that she was Maximino's sole heir, was a
void order, which produced no legal effect. Lastly, respondents
asseverate that, by relying on certain procedural presumptions in its
Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court has sacrificed their substantive
right to succession, thus, making justice "subservient to the dictates of
mere procedural fiats."14
At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able to secure the
TCTs covering the real properties belonging to the estate of Maximino by
virtue of a CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952. It is undisputed that the said
CFI Order was issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
instituted by Donata herself, to settle the intestate estate of Maximino.
The petitioners, heirs of Donata, were unable to present a copy of the CFI
Order, but this is not surprising considering that it was issued 35 years
prior to the filing by the heirs of Maximino of their Complaint in Civil Case
No. CEB-5794 on 3 March 1987. The existence of such CFI Order,
nonetheless, cannot be denied. It was recorded in the Primary Entry Book
of the Register of Deeds on 27 June 1960, at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No. 1714.
It was annotated on the TCTs covering the real properties as having
declared Donata the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino. The
non-presentation of the actual CFI Order was not fatal to the cause of the
heirs of Donata considering that its authenticity and contents were never
questioned. The allegation of fraud by the heirs of Maximino did not
pertain to the CFI Order, but to the manner or procedure by which it was
issued in favor of Donata. Moreover, the non-presentation of the CFI
Order, contrary to the declaration by the RTC, does not amount to a willful
suppression of evidence that would give rise to the presumption that it
would be adverse to the heirs of Donata if produced. x x x.
x x x
The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings No.
928-R, effectively settled the intestate estate of Maximino by declaring
Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of her deceased husband.
The issuance by the CFI of the said Order, as well as its conduct of the
entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy the presumption of validity
pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court, reproduced below'
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
x x x

While this Court is persuaded to reexamine and clarify some points in its
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
previous Decision in this case, it does not find any new evidence or
argument that would adequately justify a change in its previous position.
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
On the finding of fraud

By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must presume, in the

As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any trust relations
absence of any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, that the CFI in
between petitioners and respondents shall be examined in the light of
Special Proceedings No. 928-R had jurisdiction of the subject matter and
Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which provides that, "[i]f property is
the parties, and to have rendered a judgment valid in every respect; and
acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
it could not give credence to the following statements made by the Court
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
of Appeals in its Decision.
from whom the property comes." Hence, the foremost question to be
answered is still whether an implied trust under Article 1456 of the New
Civil Code had been sufficiently established in the present case. x x x
There was totally no evidentiary basis for the foregoing pronouncements. that she was the nearest surviving relative of the deceased Maximino
First of all, the Petition filed by Donata for Letters of Administration in Suico Briones at the time of the latter's death, and pursuant to the
Special Proceedings No. 928-R before the CFI was not even referred to pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code of the Philippines, the Court
nor presented during the course of the trial of Civil Case No. CEB-5794 hereby declares the aforesaid Donata G. Ortiz the sole, absolute and
before the RTC. How then could the Court of Appeals make a finding that exclusive heir of the estate of the deceased Maximino Suico Briones, and
Donata willfully excluded from the said Petition the names, ages, and she is hereby entitled to inherit all the residue of this estate after paying
residences of the other heirs of Maximino? Second, there was also no all the obligations thereof, which properties are those contained in the
evidence showing that the CFI actually failed to send notices of Special Inventory, dated October 2,
Proceedings No. 928-R to the heirs of Maximino or that it did not require 1952.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
presentation of proof of service of such notices. It should be remembered
that there stands a presumption that the CFI Judge had regularly Cebu City, January 15, 1960.
performed his duties in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, which included
sending out of notices and requiring the presentation of proof of service
From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this Court is able to deduce
of such notices; and, the heirs of Maximino did not propound sufficient
that the CFI Order was in fact issued on 15 January 1960 and not 2
evidence to debunk such presumption. They only made a general denial
October 1952, as earlier stated in the Decision. It was the inventory of
of knowledge of Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least until 1985. There
properties, submitted by Donata as administratrix of Maximino's
was no testimony or document presented in which the heirs of Maximino
intestate estate, which was dated 2 October 1952.18 Other than such
categorically denied receipt of notice from the CFI of the pendency of
observation, this Court finds nothing in the CFI Order which could change
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The only evidence on record in reference
its original position in the Decision under consideration.
to the absence of notice of such proceedings was the testimony of Aurelia
Briones (Aurelia), one of the heirs of Maximino, x x x.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had
surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings
x x x
be given personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne
in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a
Aurelia's testimony deserves scant credit considering that she was not proceeding in rem,19 and that the publication in the newspapers of the
testifying on matters within her personal knowledge. The phrase "I don't filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in
think" is a clear indication that she is merely voicing out her opinion on the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the
how she believed her uncles and aunts would have acted had they existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time
received notice of Special Proceedings No. 928-R. indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in
newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties
It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, the Court was in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement
proceeding from an evaluation of the evidence on record, which did not proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or
include an actual copy of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was
Respondents only submitted a certified true copy thereof on 15 June voluntarily or involuntarily made.
2006, annexed to their Supplemental Reply to petitioners' opposition to
their motion for reconsideration of this Court's Decision. Respondents did This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the
not offer any explanation as to why they belatedly produced a copy of the intestate proceedings instituted by Donata before the trial court. As this
said Order, but merely claimed to have been "fortunate enough to obtain Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which the CFI
a copy" thereof from the Register of Deeds of Cebu.16 judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity,
and encompassed in such presumption is the order of publication of the
Respondents should be taken to task for springing new evidence so late notice of the intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails to show
into the proceedings of this case. Parties should present all their available any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also failed to order the
evidence at the courts below so as to give the opposing party the publication in newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and
opportunity to scrutinize and challenge such evidence during the course to require proof from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can this
of the trial. However, given that the existence of the CFI Order in Special Court find any reason or explanation as to why Maximino's siblings could
Proceedings No. 928-R was never in issue and was, in fact, admitted by have missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of their
the petitioners; that the copy submitted is a certified true copy of the said brother.
Order; and that the said Order may provide new information vital to a just
resolution of the present case, this Court is compelled to consider the In relying on the presumptions of the regular performance of official duty
same as part of the evidence on record. and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned
Order, dated 15 January 1960, this Court is not, as counsel for
The CFI Order17 in question reads in full as' respondents allege, sacrificing the substantive right of respondents to
their share in the inheritance in favor of mere procedural fiats. There is a
ORDER rationale for the establishment of rules of procedure, as amply explained
by this Court in De Dios v. Court of Appeals20'
This is with reference to the Motion of the Administratrix, dated January
5, 1960, that she be declared the sole heir of her deceased husband, Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and expeditious
Maximino Suico Briones, the latter having died without any legitimateadministration of justice by providing for a practical system by which the
parties to a litigation may be accorded a full and fair opportunity to
ascendant nor descendant, nor any legitimate brother or sister, nephews
or nieces. present their respective positions and refute each other's submissions
under the prescribed requirements, conditions and limitations. Adjective
law is not the counterfoil of substantive law. In fact, there is a symbiotic
At the hearing of this incident today, nobody appeared to resist the
relationship between them. By complying faithfully with the Rules of
motion, and based on the uncontradicted testimony of Donata G. Ortiz
Court, the bench and the bar are better able to discuss, analyze and Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donata's misrepresentation
understand substantive rights and duties and consequently to more constitutes fraud that would impose upon her the implied trust provided
effectively protect and enforce them. The other alternative is judicial in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, this Court still cannot sustain
anarchy. respondents' contention that their right to recover their shares in
Maximino's estate is imprescriptible. It is already settled in jurisprudence
Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general rule, and that an implied trust, as opposed to an express trust, is subject to
abandonment thereof should only be done in the most exceptional prescription and laches.
circumstances. The presumptions relied upon by this Court in the instant
case are disputable presumptions, which are satisfactory, unless The case of Ramos v. Ramos23 already provides an elucidating discourse
contradicted or overcome by evidence. This Court finds that the evidence on the matter, to wit'
presented by respondents failed to overcome the given presumptions.
"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the
Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI that she was her intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being
husband's sole heir, it was not established that she did so knowingly, by operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning
maliciously and in bad faith, so as for this Court to conclude that she an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by oral evidence. An
indeed committed fraud. This Court again brings to the fore the delay by implied trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid; Arts. 1443 and 1457).
which respondents filed the present case, when the principal actors
involved, particularly, Donata and Maximino's siblings, have already "No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it
passed away and their lips forever sealed as to what truly transpired being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid; Art. 1444; Tuason de
between them. On the other hand, Special Proceedings No. 928-R took Perez v. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio v. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967,
place when all these principal actors were still alive and each would have 21 SCRA 543, 546). "Express trusts are those which are created by the
been capable to act to protect his or her own right to Maximino's estate. direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or
Letters of Administration of Maximino's estate were issued in favor of by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a
Donata as early as 8 July 1952, and the CFI Order in question was issued trust" (89 C.J. S. 122).
only on 15 January 1960. The intestate proceedings for the settlement of
Maximino's estate were thus pending for almost eight years, and it is the
"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible
burden of the respondents to establish that their parents or
from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are
grandparents, Maximino's surviving siblings, had absolutely no
superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity,
knowledge of the said proceedings all these years. As established
independently of the particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724).
in Ramos v. Ramos,21 the degree of proof to establish fraud in a case
They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts
where the principal actors to the transaction have already passed away is
(89 C.J.S. 722).
proof beyond reasonable doubt, to wit'

"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created

"x x x But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and
as it thus removes from the parties all the immediate means to verify
the nature of the original transactions, it operates by way of
presumption, in favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It
would be unreasonable, after a great length of time, to require exact
proof of all the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a
satisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent, with which it
may be encumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in such cases,
if the parties are living, from the frailty of memory, and human infirmity,
is, that the material facts can be given with certainty to a common intent;
and, if the parties are dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and in parol
agreements, the most that we can hope is to arrive at probable
conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact
knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to
the living; for, the legal presumption is the other way; as to the dead,
who are not here to answer for themselves, it would be the height of
injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of
the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable
doubt (Prevost v. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498).
Moreover, even if Donata's allegation that she was Maximino's sole heir
does constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI
Order, dated 15 January 1960,22 considering the nature of intestate
proceedings as being in rem and the disputable presumptions of the
regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by
the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
On prescription of the right to recover based on implied trust
by the act or construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a
trust raised by implication of law and presumed always to have been
contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is to be found in
the nature of their transaction, but not expressed in the deed or
instrument of conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts
are found in Article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. See Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179).
On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction
of law, or arising by operation of law." In a more restricted sense and as
contradistinguished from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust
not created by any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct
intention to create a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to
satisfy the demands of justice. It does not arise by agreement or intention
but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727). "If a person obtains legal
title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress
upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded
party." A constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense
(Gayondato v. Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See Art. 1456, Civil Code).
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership
of property entrusted to him (Palma v. Cristobal, 77 Phil. 712), or that an
action to compel a trustee to convey property registered in his name in
trust for the benefit of the cestui qui trust does not prescribe (Manalang
v. Canlas, 94 Phil. 776; Cristobal v. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810), or that the
defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action to recover property
held by a person in trust for the benefit of another (Sevilla v. De los
Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or that property held in trust can be recovered by
the beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time (Marabilles v. Quito, 100
Phil. 64; Bancairen v. Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126; Juan v. Zuñiga, 62 O.G.
1351; 4 SCRA 1221; Jacinto v. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962. See Tamayo (1) Upon a written contract;
v. Callejo, 147 Phil. 31, 37).
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that
the possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not (3) Upon a judgment.
acquire by prescription the property held in trust. Thus, Section 38 of Act
190 provides that the law of prescription does not apply "in the case of a
Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law (specifically, in this
continuing and subsisting trust" (Diaz v. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil.
case, by Article 1456 of the New Civil Code), then respondents had 10
261, 266; Laguna v. Levantino, 71 Phil. 566; Sumira v. Vistan, 74 Phil. 138;
years within which to bring an action for reconveyance of their shares in
Golfeo v. Court of Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12 SCRA 199; Caladiao v. Santos,
Maximino's properties. The next question now is when should the ten-
63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691).
year prescriptive period be reckoned from. The general rule is that an
action for reconveyance of real property based on implied trust
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust prescribes ten years from registration and/or issuance of the title to the
may possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not property,26 not only because registration under the Torrens system is a
repudiated the trust (Heirs of Candelaria v. Romero, 109 Phil. 500, 502-3; constructive notice of title,27 but also because by registering the disputed
Martinez v. Graño, 42 Phil. 35; Buencamino v. Matias, 63 O. G. 11033, properties exclusively in her name, Donata had already unequivocally
16 SCRA 849). repudiated any other claim to the same.

The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to constructive
trusts (Geronimo and Isidoro v. Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153.
Compare with Cuison v. Fernandez and Bengzon, 105 Phil. 135, 139; De
Pasion v. De Pasion, 112 Phil. 403, 407).
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the
trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust
where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui trust and (c) the
evidence thereon is clear and conclusive (Laguna v. Levantino, supra;
Salinas v. Tuason, 55 Phil. 729. Compare with the rule regarding co-
owners found in the last paragraph of Article 494, Civil Code; Casañas v.
Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona v. De Guzman, L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11
SCRA 153, 157).
With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is different. The
prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust
is now settled (Alzona v. Capunitan, L-10228, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA
450; Gerona v. De Guzman, supra; Claridad v. Henares, 97 Phil. 973;
Gonzales v. Jimenez, L-19073, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80; Boñaga v.
Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason & Co., v. Magdangal, L-15539, January
30, 1962, 4 SCRA 84). Prescription may supervene in an implied
trust (Bueno v. Reyes, L-22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1179; Fabian v.
Fabian, L-20449, January 29, 1968; Jacinto v. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, On laches as bar to recovery
1962, 5 SCRA 371).
And whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may
be barred by laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54 Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz v.
Gorricho and Aguado, supra; Compare with Mejia v. Gampona, 100 Phil.
277). [Emphases supplied.]
By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R, Donata was able to register and secure certificates of title over
the disputed properties in her name on 27 June 1960. The respondents
filed with the RTC their Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery
of possession of the disputed real properties, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-5794, only on 3 March 1987, almost 27 years after the registration of
the said properties in the name of Donata. Therefore, respondents' action
for recovery of possession of the disputed properties had clearly
prescribed.
Moreover, even though respondents' Complaint before the RTC in Civil
Case No. CEB-5794 also prays for partition of the disputed properties, it
does not make their action to enforce their right to the said properties
imprescriptible. While as a general rule, the action for partition among
co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or
impliedly recognized, as provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code,
it bears to emphasize that Donata had never recognized respondents as
co-owners or co-heirs, either expressly or impliedly.28 Her assertion
before the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R that she was Maximino's
sole heir necessarily excludes recognition of some other co-owner or co-
heir to the inherited properties; Consequently, the rule on non-
prescription of action for partition of property owned in common does
not apply to the case at bar.
Other than prescription of action, respondents' right to recover
possession of the disputed properties, based on implied trust, is also
barred by laches. The defense of laches, which is a question of inequity in
permitting a claim to be enforced, applies independently of prescription,
which is a question of time. Prescription is statutory; laches is equitable.29

A present reading of the Quion24 and Sevilla25 cases, invoked by Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and
respondents, must be made in conjunction with and guided accordingly unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party
by the principles established in the afore-quoted case. Thus, while entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This
respondents' right to inheritance was transferred or vested upon them at equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires
the time of Maximino's death, their enforcement of said right by the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.30
appropriate legal action may be barred by the prescription of the action.
This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its Decision the basis for
Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the disputed properties barring respondents' action for recovery of the disputed properties
based on implied trust is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, because of laches. This Court pointed out therein31 that -
which reads'
In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs of
ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from Maximino even emphasized that Donata lived along the same street as
the time the right of action accrues:
some of the siblings of Maximino and, yet, she failed to inform them of
the CFI Order, dated [15 January 1960], in Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
and the issuance in her name of new TCTs covering the real properties
which belonged to the estate of Maximino. This Court, however,
appreciates such information differently. It actually works against the
heirs of Maximino. Since they only lived nearby, Maximino's siblings had
ample opportunity to inquire or discuss with Donata the status of the
estate of their deceased brother. Some of the real properties, which
belonged to the estate of Maximino, were also located within the same
area as their residences in Cebu City, and Maximino's siblings could have
regularly observed the actions and behavior of Donata with regard to the
said real properties. It is uncontested that from the time of Maximino's
death on 1 May 1952, Donata had possession of the real properties. She
managed the real properties and even collected rental fees on some of
them until her own death on 1 November 1977. After Donata's death,
Erlinda took possession of the real properties, and continued to manage
the same and collect the rental fees thereon. Donata and, subsequently,
Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights of ownership over the real
properties, in exclusion of all others, which must have already put the
heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still had rights
thereto.
The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended
his wake. They did not offer any explanation as to why they had waited
33 years from Maximino's death before one of them, Silverio, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino
on 21 January 1985. After learning that the intestate estate of Maximino
was already settled in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited another
two years, before instituting, on 3 March 1987, Civil Case No. CEB-5794,
the Complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property
belonging to the estate of Maximino. x x x
Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as
respondents' conduct before this Court, particularly the belated
submission of evidence and argument of new issues, respondents are
consistently displaying a penchant for delayed action, without any
proffered reason or justification for such delay.
It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and
diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act. The
law does not encourage laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On
the contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he
must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.32
On void judgment or order
Respondents presented only in their Reply and Supplemental Reply to the
petitioners' Opposition to their Motion for Reconsideration the argument
that the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-
R is void and, thus, it cannot have any legal effect. Consequently, the
registration of the disputed properties in the name of Donata pursuant to
such Order was likewise void.
This Court is unconvinced.
In the jurisprudence referred to by the respondents,33 an order or
judgment is considered void when rendered by the court without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or in violation of a mandatory duty,
circumstances which are not present in the case at bar.
Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an action to annul an order
Distinction must be made between a void judgment and a voidable one, or judgment based on fraud must be brought within four years from the
thus ' discovery of the fraud.36 If it is conceded that the respondents came to
know of Donata's fraudulent acts only in 1985, during the course of the
"* * * A voidable judgment is one which, though not a mere nullity, is
liable to be made void when a person who has a right to proceed in the
matter takes the proper steps to have its invalidity declared. It always
contains some defect which may become fatal. It carries within it the
means of its own overthrow. But unless and until it is duly annulled, it is
attended with all the ordinary consequences of a legal judgment. The
party against whom it is given may escape its effect as a bar or an
obligation, but only by a proper application to have it vacated or reversed.
Until that is done, it will be efficacious as a claim, an estoppel, or a source
of title. If no proceedings are ever taken against it, it will continue
throughout its life to all intents a valid sentence. If emanating from a court
of general jurisdiction, it will be sustained by the ordinary presumptions
of regularity, and it is not open to impeachment in any collateral action.
* * *"
But it is otherwise when the judgment is void. "A void judgment is in legal
effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be
obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are
equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed
under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to
enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by
virtue of its authority finds himself without title and without redress."
(Freeman on Judgments, sec. 117, citing Campbell v. McCahan, 41 Ill., 45;
Roberts v. Stowers, 7 Bush, 295, Huls v. Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell v.
Goodrum, 3 Humph., 418; Andrews v. State, 2 Sneed, 549; Hollingsworth
v. Bagley, 35 Tex., 345; Morton v. Root, 2 Dill., 312; Commercial Bank of
Manchester v. Martin, 9 Smedes & M., 613; Hargis v. Morse, 7 Kan., 259.
See also Cornell v. Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dawson and Another v. Wells, 3 Ind.,
399; Meyer v. Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414; Olson v. Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391;
White v. Foote L. & M. Co., 29 W. Va., 385.)
It is not always easy to draw the line of demarcation between a void
judgment and a voidable one, but all authorities agree that jurisdiction
over the subject-matter is essential to the validity of a judgment and that
want of such jurisdiction renders it void and a mere nullity. In the eye of
the law it is non-existent. (Fisher v. Harnden, 1 Paine, 55; Towns v.
Springer, 9 Ga., 130; Mobley v. Mobley, 9 Ga., 247; Beverly and McBride
v. Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central Bank of Georgia v. Gibson, 11 Ga., 453;
Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and Sandoval Coal and Mining
Co. v. Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111 Ill., 32; Swiggart v. Harber, 4
Scam., 364; Miller v. Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seely v. Reid, 3 Greene [Iowa],
374.)34
The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by Donata on the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the case, namely, the intestate estate of Maximino.
Donata's fraud and misrepresentation may have rendered the CFI Order,
dated 15 January 1960, voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the said
Order, which already became final and executory, can only be set aside
by direct action to annul and enjoin its enforcement.35 It cannot be the
subject of a collateral attack as is being done in this case. Note that
respondents' Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 was
one for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed
properties. The annulment sought in the Complaint was not that of the
CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, but of the certificates of title over the
properties issued in Donata's name. So until and unless respondents bring
a direct action to nullify the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, and attain a favorable judgment therein, the
assailed Order remains valid and binding.
RTC proceedings which they instituted for the settlement of Maximino's
estate, then their right to file an action to annul the CFI Order, dated 15
January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (earlier instituted by
Donata for the settlement of Maximino's estate), has likewise prescribed
by present time.

In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines restraint and considering further, that the sales in favor of the x x x
SUPREME COURT offerors are most beneficial to the estate x x x". On January 21, 1987, the
Manila probate court issued another Order granting respondent’s motion for
issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. The writ of possession over
EN BANC Lot 11 was eventually issued on June 27, 1989.5

A.M. No. P-01-1448 June 25, 2013 On November 21, 1994, a Deed of Sale With Mortgage covering Lot 11
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-664-P) was executed between respondent and the Hodges Estate represented
by its Administratrix, Mrs. Ruth R. Diocares. Lot 11 was thereby conveyed
to respondent on installment for the total purchase price of ₱50,000.
RODOLFO C. SABIDONG, Complainant,
vs.
NICOLASITO S. SOLAS (Clerk of Court IV), Respondent. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11836 in the name
of C. N. Hodges was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. T-
107519 in the name of respondent was issued on December 5, 1994. Lot
DECISION
11 was later subdivided into two lots, Lots 11-A and 11-B for which the
corresponding titles (TCT Nos. T-116467 and T-116468), also in the name
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: of respondent, were issued on February 28, 1997.6

The present administrative case stemmed from a sworn letter- On motion of Ernesto Pe Benito, Administrator of the Hodges Estate, a
complaint1 dated May 29, 1999 filed before this Court by Rodolfo C. writ of demolition was issued on March 3, 1998 by the probate court in
Sabidong (complainant) charging respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of favor of respondent and against all adverse occupants of Lot 11.7
Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Iloilo City with grave and
serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression and abuse of authority.
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-complaint
asserting that as court employee respondent cannot buy property in
The Facts litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in good faith), commit
deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of authority.
Trinidad Sabidong, complainant’s mother, is one of the longtime Complainant specifically alleged the following:
occupants of a parcel of land, designated as Lot 11 (Lot 1280-D-4-11 of
consolidation-subdivision plan [LRC] Pcs-483) originally registered in the 3. Complainant and his siblings, are possessors and occupants
name of C. N. Hodges and situated at Barangay San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo of a parcel of land situated at Brgy. San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City,
City.2 The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of the then identified as Lot No. 1280-D-4-11, later consolidated and
said Estate (Hodges Estate), as the other half-portion was occupied by subdivided and became known as Lot 11, then registered and
Priscila Saplagio. Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed by the titled in the name of Charles Newton Hodges. The Sabidong
Hodges Estate, docketed as Civil Case No. 14706 of the MTCC Iloilo City, family started occupying this lot in 1948 and paid their monthly
Branch 4 ("Rosita R. Natividad in her capacity as Administratrix of C.N. rentals until sometime in 1979 when the Estate of Hodges
Hodges Estate, plaintiff vs. Priscila Saplagio, defendant"). On May 31, stopped accepting rentals. x x x
1983, a decision was rendered in said case ordering the defendant to
immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the
4. Upon knowing sometime in 1987 that the property over
plaintiff rentals due, attorney’s fees, expenses and costs.3 At the time,
which their house is standing, was being offered for sale by the
respondent was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
Estate, the mother of complainant, TRINIDAD CLAVERIO
SABIDONG (now deceased), took interest in buying said
Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to Purchase property, Lot 11;
on installment Lots 11 and 12. In a letter dated January 7, 1986, the
Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected respondent’s offer in view of
5. TRINIDAD CLAVERIO SABIDONG, was then an ordinary
an application to purchase already filed by the actual occupant of Lot 12,
housekeeper and a laundrywoman, who never received any
"in line with the policy of the Probate Court to give priority to the actual
formal education, and did not even know how to read and
occupants in awarding approval of Offers". While the check for initial
write. When Trinidad Claverio Sabidong, together with her
down payment tendered by respondent was returned to him, he was
children and the complainant in this case, tried to negotiate
nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to purchase Lot 11 and
with the Estate for the sale of the subject property, they were
that if he could put up a sufficient down payment, the Estate could
informed that all papers for transaction must pass through the
immediately endorse it for approval of the Probate Court so that the
respondent in this case, Nicolasito Solas. This is unusual, so they
property can be awarded to him "should the occupant fail to avail of the
made inquiries and they learned that, Nicolasito Solas was then
priority given to them."4
the Clerk of Court 111, Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Iloilo City and presently, the City Sheriff of Iloilo City;
The following day, January 8, 1986, respondent again submitted an Offer
to Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234 square meters for the amount of
6. The respondent Nicolasito Solas, then Clerk of Court III,
₱35,100. Under the Order dated November 18, 1986 issued by the
MTCC, Iloilo City, has knowledge, by reason of his position that
probate court (Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special
in 1983 Hodges Estate was ejecting occupants of its land. x x x
Proceedings No. 1672 ("Testate Estate of the Late Charles Newton
Taking advantage of this inside information that the land
Hodges, Rosita R. Natividad, Administratrix"), respondent’s Offer to
subject of an ejectment case in the Municipal Trial Court in
Purchase Lot 11 was approved upon the court’s observation that the
Cities, Iloilo City, whom respondent is a Clerk of Court III, the
occupants of the subject lots "have not manifested their desire to
respondent surreptitiously offered to buy the said lot in
purchase the lots they are occupying up to this date and considering time
litigation. x x x
7. Complainant nor any member of his family did not know that
as early as 1984, the respondent had offered to purchase the
subject lot from the estate x x x. After receiving the notice of
denial of his offer to purchase, dated January 7, 1986,
respondent made a second offer to purchase the subject
property the following day, January 8, 1986, knowing fully well
that the subject property was being occupied. x x x
8. Because of this denial, respondent met with the family of the
complainant and negotiated for the sale of the property and
transfer of the title in favor of the latter. Respondent made the
complainant and his family believed that he is the
representative of the estate and that he needed a
downpayment right away. All the while, the Sabidong family
(who were carpenters, laundrywomen, a janitor, persons who
belong to the underprivileged) relied on the representations of
the respondent that he was authorized to facilitate the sale,
with more reason that respondent represented himself as the
City Sheriff;
9. That between 1992-1993, a sister of the complainant who
was fortunate to have worked abroad, sent the amount of Ten
Thousand (₱10,000.00) Pesos to complainant’s mother, to be
given to respondent Nicolasito Solas. x x x After receiving the
money, respondent assured the Sabidong family that they will
not be ejected from the lot, he being the City Sheriff will take
care of everything, and taking advantage of the illiteracy of
Trinidad Claverio Sabidong, he did not issue any receipt;
10. True enough, they were not ejected instead it took the
respondent some time to see them again and demanded
additional payment. In the meanwhile, the complainant waited
for the papers of the supposed sale and transfer of title, which
respondent had promised after receiving the downpayment of
₱10,000.00;
11. That sometime again in 1995, respondent again received
from the mother of complainant the amount of Two Thousand
(₱2,000.00) Pesos, allegedly for the expenses of the
documentation of sale and transfer of title, and again
respondent promised that the Sabidong family will not be
ejected;
12. To the prejudice and surprise of the complainant and his
family, respondent was able to secure an order for the approval
of his offer to purchase x x x in Special Proceedings No. 1672 x
x x;
13. Worse, respondent moved for the issuance of a Writ of
Possession in his favor, which the probate court acted favorably
x x x. A writ of possession was issued on June 27, 1989 x x x;
14. x x x respondent took advantage of the trust and confidence
which the Sabidong family has shown, considering that
respondent was an officer of the court and a City Sheriff at that.
The complainant and his family thought that respondent, being
a City Sheriff, could help them in the transfer of the title in their
favor. Never had they ever imagined that while respondent had
been receiving from them hard-earned monies purportedly for
the sale of the subject property, respondent was also exercising
acts of ownership adverse to the interest of the complainant
and his family;
15. Being an officer of the court and supposed to be an
embodiment of fairness and justice, respondent acted with
malice, with grave abuse of confidence and deceit when he
represented that he can facilitate the sale and titling of the
subject property in favor of the complainant and his family;
16. That when several thousands of pesos were given to the
respondent as payment for the same and incidental expenses
relative thereto, he was able to cause the transfer of the title in
his favor. x x x;
17. After the death of Trinidad Claverio Sabidong x x x the
respondent received from the complainant the amount of Five
Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos x x x When a receipt was
demanded, respondent refused to issue one, and instead
promised and assured the complainant that they will not be
ejected;
xxxx
19. The complainant again, through his sister-in-law, Socorro
Sabidong, delivered and gave to the respondent the amount of
Three Thousand (₱3,000.00) Pesos as expenses for the
subdivision of the subject lot. The respondent facilitated the
subdivision and after the same was approved, the complainant
did not know that two (2) titles were issued in the name of the
respondent. x x x;
20. Meanwhile, respondent prepared a Contract to Sell, for the
complainant and his neighbor Norberto Saplagio to affix their
signatures, pursuant to their previous agreement for the buyers
to avail of a housing loan with the Home Development Mutual
Fund (PAG-IBIG). Complainant attended the seminar of the
HDMF for seven (7) times, in his desire to consummate the sale.
However, when the complainant affixed his signature in the
contract, he was surprised that the owner of the subject
property was the respondent. When complainant raised a
question about this, respondent assured complainant that
everything was alright and that sooner complainant will be the
owner of the property. Complainant and his family, all these
years, had believed and continued to believe that the owner
was the estate of Hodges and that respondent was only the
representative of the estate;
21. The Contract to Sell, appeared to have been notarized on
June 3, 1996, however, no copy thereof was given to the
complainant by the respondent. Respondent then, took the
papers and documents required by the HDMF to be completed,
from the complainant allegedly for the purpose of personally
filing the same with the HDMF. Complainant freely and
voluntarily delivered all pertinent documents to the
respondent, thinking that respondent was helping in the fast
and easy release of the loan. While the said documents were in
the possession of the respondent, he never made any
transaction with the HDMF, worse, when complainant tried to
secure a copy of the Contract to Sell, the copy given was not
signed by the Notary Public, x x x;
22. The complainant [was] shocked to learn that respondent
had canceled the sale and that respondent refused to return the
documents required by the HDMF. Respondent claimed that as
Sheriff, he can cause the demolition of the house of the
complainant and of his family. Respondent threatened the
 complainant and he is capable of pursuing a demolition order The Court, however, noted without action the Court Administrator’s
and serve the same with the assistance of the military. x x x; recommendation to suspend respondent for six months.

23. After learning of the demolition order, complainant On March 13, 2001, Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño
attempted to settle the matter with the respondent, however, forwarded the records of this case to Executive Judge Tito G. Gustilo of
the same proved futile as respondent boasted that the property the Iloilo City RTC.16 In a Resolution17 dated July 18, 2001, the Court
would now cost at Four Thousand Five Hundred (₱4,500.00) referred this case to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City for
Pesos; investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from notice. By
Order18 dated August 30, 2001, Executive Judge Gustilo set the case for
24. The threats of demolition is imminent. Clearly, complainant reception of evidence.
and his family were duped by the respondent and are helpless
victims of an officer of the court who took advantage of their On March 19, 2004, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 37, dismissed the case for
good faith and trust. Complainant later was informed that the annulment of title, damages and injunction against respondent for lack of
subject property was awarded to the respondent as his Sheriff’s merit.19
Fees, considering that respondent executed the decisions in
ejectment cases filed by the Hodges estate against the adverse In a Resolution20 dated June 15, 2005, the Court resolved to reassign the
occupants of its vast properties; instant administrative case to Executive Judge Rene S. Hortillo for
investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from notice. In
25. A civil case for the Annulment of Title of the respondent a Letter21 dated September 15, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo informed
over the subject property is pending before the Regional Trial the Court that per the records, the parties have presented their
Court of Iloilo, Branch 37 and a criminal complaint for Estafa is testimonial and documentary evidence before retired Executive Judge
also pending preliminary investigation before the Office of the Tito G. Gustilo.
City Prosecutor of Iloilo City, known as I.S. No. 1559-99, both
filed [by] the complainant against the respondent.8 On September 12, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo required the parties to
file their respective memoranda within 60 days from notice, upon
Acting on the complaint, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo issued submission of which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.22
a 1st Indorsement9 dated July 8, 1999, requiring respondent to file his
comment on the Complaint dated May 29, 1999. On October 21, 1999, In his Memorandum,23 respondent maintained that his purchase of the
respondent submitted his Comment.10 subject land is not covered by the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491
of the Civil Code. He pointed out that he bought Lot 11-A a decade after
In a Resolution11 dated July 19, 1999, Public Prosecutor Constantino C. the MTCC of Iloilo, Branch 3, had ordered the ejectment of Priscila
Tubilleja dismissed the Estafa charge against respondent for insufficiency Saplagio and Trinidad Sabidong from the subject lot. He insisted that
of evidence. public trust was observed when complainant was accorded his right of
first refusal in the purchase of Lot 11-A, albeit the latter failed to avail said
On November 29, 2000, Court Administrator Benipayo issued an right. Asserting that he is a buyer in good faith and for value, respondent
Evaluation and Recommendation12 finding respondent guilty of violating cited the dismissal of the cases for Estafa and annulment of title and
Article 149113 of the Civil Code. Said rule prohibits the purchase by certain damages which complainant filed against him.
court officers of property and rights in litigation within their jurisdiction.
Court Administrator Benipayo recommended that: On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily retired from service.
Prior to this, he wrote then Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N.
1. this administrative complaint be treated as an administrative Elepaño, requesting for the release of his retirement benefits pending
matter; resolution of the administrative cases against him.24 In a
Memorandum25 dated September 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court
Administrator Elepaño made the following recommendations:
2. respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV, OCC, MTCC,
Iloilo City be SUSPENDED for six (6) months, with warning that
a repetition of the same offense in the future will be dealt with a) The request of Nicolasito S. Solas, former Clerk of Court,
more severely; MTCC, Iloilo City for partial release of his retirement benefits be
GRANTED; and
3. inasmuch as there are factual issues regarding the delivery of
substantial amounts which complainant alleged and which b) Atty. Lilian Barribal Co, Chief, Financial Management Office,
defendant denied, this issue should be investigated and the Office of the Court Administrator be DIRECTED to (1)
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City should WITHHOLD the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
be designated to hear the evidence and to make a report and (₱200,000.00) from the retirement benefits of Nicolasito S.
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt.14 Solas to answer for any administrative liability that the Court
may find against him in A.M. No. P-01-1448 (Formerly
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 99-664-P); OCA IPI No. 99-
In a Resolution15 dated January 22, 2001, this Court adopted the
659-P; OCA IPI No. 99-670-P; and OCA IPI No. 99-753-P; and (2)
recommendation of the Court Administrator to treat the present
RELEASE the balance of his retirement benefits.26
administrative action as a regular administrative matter and to designate
the Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City to hear the evidence of the
parties. Eventually, the case was assigned to Judge Roger B. Patricio, the new
Executive Judge of the Iloilo City RTC for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On June 2, 2008, Judge Patricio submitted his final Report and property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
Recommendation27 finding respondent liable for grave misconduct and may take part by virtue of their profession.
dishonesty under A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC or the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel. Based on the evidence presented, Judge Patricio concluded x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
that respondent misappropriated the money which he received for the
filing of complainant’s loan application. Such money could not have been
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows
used for the partition of Lot No. 1280-D-4-11 since the same was already
the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the
subdivided into Lots 11-A and 11-B when respondent presented the
relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by
Contract to Sell to complainant. And despite respondent’s promise to
these persons.32"In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud, or
keep complainant and his family in peaceful possession of the subject
more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud, which is what can
property, respondent caused the issuance of a writ of demolition against
and must be done."33
them. Thus, Judge Patricio recommended the forfeiture of respondent’s
salary for six months to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must
take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
In a Resolution28 dated September 29, 2008, the Court noted Judge
property.34 Where the property is acquired after the termination of the
Patricio’s Investigation Report and referred the same to the Office of the
case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.35
Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21,
Findings and Recommendation of the OCA
1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May
31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it can not be said that
In a Memorandum29 dated January 16, 2009, then Court Administrator the property is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was
Jose P. Perez found respondent liable for serious and grave misconduct part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc.
and dishonesty and recommended the forfeiture of respondent’s salary No. 1672).
for six months, which shall be deducted from his retirement benefits.
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or
The Court Administrator held that by his unilateral acts of extinguishing litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes
the contract to sell and forfeiting the amounts he received from subject to the judicial action of the judge.36 A property forming part of the
complainant and Saplagio without due notice, respondent failed to act estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until
with justice and equity. He found respondent’s denial to be anchored the probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed
merely on the fact that he had not issued receipts which was belied by his and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution
admission that he had asked money for the expenses of partitioning Lot of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
11 from complainant and Saplagio. Since their PAG-IBIG loan applications cannot be deemed closed and terminated.37 The probate court loses
did not materialize, complainant should have returned the amounts given jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of
to him by complainant and Saplagio. all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same.38 Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No.
On February 11, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution30 requiring the 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and
parties to manifest whether they are willing to submit the case for terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With
decision on the basis of the pleadings and records already filed with the Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in
Court. However, the copy of the Resolution dated February 11, 2009 litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
which was sent to complainant was returned unserved with the postal
carrier’s notation "RTS-Deceased." Meanwhile, in a Compliance31 dated This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of
August 24, 2009, respondent expressed his willingness to submit the case respondent did not violate the rule on disqualification to purchase
for decision and prayed for an early resolution of the case. property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before another
court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
Our Ruling
On the charges against the respondent, we find him liable for dishonesty
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as and grave misconduct.
clerks of court from acquiring property involved in litigation within the
jurisdiction or territory of their courts. Said provision reads: Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior as well as gross negligence
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at by a public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct
a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous and not trifling.
another: The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation to and be
xxxx connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or
failure to discharge the duties of the office.39
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior
courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray;
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity
40
they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness."
of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
In this case, respondent deceived complainant’s family who were led to In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes,
believe that he is the legal representative of the Hodges Estate, or at least Court Stenographer III, RTC Br. 28 and Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process
possessed of such power to intercede for overstaying occupants of the Server, RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya,48 the Court stressed that
estate’s properties like complainant. Boasting of his position as a court to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply
officer, a City Sheriff at that, complainant’s family completely relied on his with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical
repeated assurance that they will not be ejected from the premises. Upon standards. In that case, we said that court employees are expected to be
learning that the lot they were occupying was for sale and that they had paragons of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in their official
to negotiate for it through respondent, complainant’s family readily gave conduct but also in their personal dealings, including business and
the amounts he demanded and, along with Saplagio, complied with the commercial transactions to avoid becoming the court’s albatross of
requirements for a loan application with PAG-IBIG. All the while and infamy.49
unknown to complainant’s family, respondent was actually working to
acquire Lot 11 for himself. More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 671350 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
Thus, while respondent was negotiating with the Hodges Estate for the mandates that public officials and employees shall remain true to the
sale of the property to him, he collected as down payment ₱5,000 from people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not
complainant’s family in July 1986. Four months later, on November 18, discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the
1986, the probate court approved respondent’s offer to purchase Lot 11. underprivileged.1âwphi1 They shall at all times respect the rights of
The latter received further down payment from complainant in the others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals,
amount of ₱10,000 between 1992 and 1993, or before the Deed of Sale good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
with Mortgage41 dated November 21, 1994 could be executed in interest.
respondent’s favor.
Under Section 52,51 Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
Thereafter, respondent demanded ₱3,000 from complainant supposedly in the Civil Service, dishonesty and grave misconduct are classified as
for the subdivision of Lot 11 between the latter and the Saplagios. Yet, it grave offenses with the corresponding penalty of dismissal for the first
was not until respondent obtained title over said lot that the same was offense. Section 58(a) states that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with
subdivided into Lots 11-A and 11-B. The records42 of the case show that it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the
the Subdivision Plan dated April 25, 1996, duly approved by the Land perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service.
Management Services (DENR) subdividing Lot 11 into sublots 11-A and 11-
B, was inscribed on February 28, 1997 – two years after TCT No. T-107519 Section 53 further provides that mitigating circumstances attendant to
covering Lot 11 was issued in respondent’s name on December 5, 1994. the commission of the offense should be considered in the determination
of the penalty to be imposed on the erring government employee.
Finally, in 1995, respondent received the amount of ₱2,000 to defray the However, no such mitigating circumstance had been shown. On the
expenses for documentation and transfer of title in complainant’s name. contrary, respondent had been previously held administratively liable for
In the latter instance, while it may be argued that respondent already had irregularities in the performance of his duties as Clerk of Court. In A.M.
the capacity to sell the subject property, the sum of all the circumstances No. P-01-1484,52 this Court imposed on respondent a fine of ₱5,000 for
belie an honest intention on his part to convey Lot 11-A to complainant. acting imprudently in notarizing documents and administering oath on
We note the inscription in TCT No. T-1183643 in the name of C.N. Hodges matters alien to his official duties. And in A.M. Nos. P-08-2567 (formerly
that respondent executed a Request dated February 19, 1997 "for the OCA IPI No. 99-670-P) and P-08-2568 (formerly OCA IPI No. 99-753-
issuance of separate titles in the name of the registered owner."44 Soon P),53 respondent was found liable for simple misconduct and ordered to
after, TCT No. T-11646745 covering Lot 11-A and TCT No. T- pay a fine equivalent to his three (3) months salary to be deducted from
11646846 covering Lot 11-B were issued in the name of respondent on his retirement benefits.
February 28, 1997 – only eight months after he executed the Contract to
Sell47 in favor of complainant on June 3, 1996. Since respondent had compulsorily retired from service on September 10,
2007, for this additional administrative case he should be fined in an
Respondent’s bare denials were correctly disregarded by the Court amount equivalent to his salary for six months which shall likewise be
Administrator in the light of his own admission that he indeed asked deducted from his retirement benefits.
money from both complainant and Saplagio. The evidence on record
clearly established that by misrepresenting himself as the estate’s WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, retired Clerk
representative and as a court officer having the power to protect of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, LIABLE FOR GRAVE
complainant’s family from eviction, respondent was able to collect sums MISCONDUCT AND DISHONESTY. Respondent is FINED in an amount
totaling ₱20,000 from complainant’s family. Even after the latter realized equivalent to his salary for six (6) months to be deducted from his
they were duped since respondent was already the owner of Lot 11, they retirement benefits.
still offered to buy the property from him. Respondent, however, changed
his mind and no longer wanted to sell the property after nothing
SO ORDERED.
happened to the loan applications of complainant and Saplagio. This
subsequent unilateral cancellation by respondent of the contract to sell
with complainant may have been an afterthought, and plainly unjustified,
based merely on his own assumption that complainant could not make
full payment. But it did not negate the deception and fraudulent acts
perpetrated against complainant’s family who were forced into
submission by the constant threat of eviction. Such acts constitute grave
misconduct for which respondent should be held answerable.
FIRST DIVISION assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real
properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00;5 and
the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock
of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.6
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V.
MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO,
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be
MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L.
examined under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed
MERCADO, Respondents.
30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the
inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted.
DECISION
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the
BERSAMIN, J.: parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the
court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.7cralawred
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of
properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and
to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the
the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third court on the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded
parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the issue.8cralawlawlibrary
determination of the status of each heir and whether property included
in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased Ruling of the RTC
spouse.
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued
Antecedents on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory
submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included,
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, and accordingly ruled:
survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five
children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the
Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his Court hereby denies the administratrix’s motion for approval of
two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. inventory. The Court hereby orders the said administratrix to re–do the
Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma). inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of
the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein the properties
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He mentioned in the last five immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and
owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and then submit the revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of
Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned this order.
his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and
sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her
Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty. administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had
come to her possession. She must render such accounting within sixty
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu (60) days from notice hereof.
City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of
9
Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094–CEB).1The RTC granted SO ORDERED. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
the petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of
administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992. On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely
sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian,
Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land
RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the possession
had “left no real properties but only personal properties” worth of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.10Thelma opposed the
P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and motion.
fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806
shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for
stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.2
reconsideration,11 stating that there was no cogent reason for the
reconsideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or excluded from
from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to
the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s pass upon the issue.
motion through the order of January 8, 1993.
Decision of the CA
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January
8, 1993,3 supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in
stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock;4the deed of
refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to
include real properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty,
Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the
adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18,
2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:
I intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance of and determine
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE
CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN HOLDING THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF
AND ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION
(MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING
ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES
SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari,
disposing as follows:13
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition
is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May
18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as the inclusion of
parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an
area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter
of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991
in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is
concerned and affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition
for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of
properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil
Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold “shall be
transferred to the vendee” upon its “actual and constructive delivery,”
and to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made
through a public instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the object
of the sale, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the
ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute
sale executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had
thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had
assigned the parcels of land to Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989
“for the purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference that in
the Deed of Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7)
parcels of land were included”; that as to the January 10, 1991 deed of
assignment, Mervir Realty had been “even at the losing end considering
that such parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment
dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary consideration
through shares of stock”; that even if the assignment had been based on
the deed of assignment dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of land could
not be included in the inventory “considering that there is nothing wrong
or objectionable about the estate planning scheme”; that the RTC, as an
the issue of title to property registered in the name of third persons or
corporation; that a property covered by the Torrens system should be
afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by
disregarding the presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of
law and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC
also gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were
estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because of their agreement to
submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be included in the
inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that
petitioners are estopped from questioning its jurisdiction considering that
they have already agreed to submit themselves to its jurisdiction of
determining what properties are to be included in or excluded from the
inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because actually, a
reading of petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001
filed before public respondent court clearly shows that petitioners are not
questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for
which they are not estopped, since that is their right, considering that
there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of limited
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001
denying the administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory of
properties which were already titled and in possession of a third person
that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the
law possessed a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders,
and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction,
the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty
Corporation should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no
authority to determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate fiction and even if public respondent court was not merely
acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, private respondent
nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that would have
justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction because to
disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of a corporation, the
wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established since it cannot
be presumed.14
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of
Teresita, et al.15
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the
inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such
properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate
shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
 final but an interlocutory order “in the sense that it did not settle once
I and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots.” The Court observed
there that:
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC? The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination
resort to the special civil action for certiorari to assail the orders of the is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
RTC by Teresita and her co–respondents was not proper. regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran’s
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448–9 and
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained. 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L–42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262,
266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy
depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court
interlocutory in nature. In Pahila–Garrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court
declared that a “probate court, whether in a testate or intestate
distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title provisionally,” and
reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that the “patent reason is
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well
the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of
known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.”
done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but
Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court
the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something
pointed out:
else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the
as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator
order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. (Bold
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for
emphasis supplied)
the writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order,
and should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an
appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for
single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final judgment
merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of
multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case Court,21 which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that
for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law “that
incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are declared by these Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of an appeal
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or
interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or
judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered)
being included in the appeal of the judgment itself. is expressly made non–appealable.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be
resorted to.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical
recognition of the possibility that material issues may be finally
determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule
109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in which
multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:

The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An
approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or
motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic
inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory
and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for (a) Allows or disallows a will;
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to
revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings. (b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the
distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming
the decision of the CA to the effect that the order of the intestate court (c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of
excluding certain real properties from the inventory was interlocutory a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in
and could be changed or modified at anytime during the course of the offset to a claim against it;
administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate ofadministrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition)
a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, estate.”23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an
except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties
administrator; and should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the
CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the
substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting inventory in the absence of “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the
or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. administration of the estates of deceased persons, “the judges enjoy
ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere
with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come
that there has been a positive abuse of discretion.”25 As long as the RTC
under any of the instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.
commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be
respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
II
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to
in directing the inclusion of the properties
properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to
in the estate of the decedent?
third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not
by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial
court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered
abuse of discretion for including properties in the inventory by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still
notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26
Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of the
properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do
with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As
reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully
held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate
warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of
are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased
surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person
and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties
dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving
is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory
spouse, the RTC becomes duty–bound to direct the preparation and
of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the
dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of
action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final
administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
determination of the conflicting claims of title.

Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
Within three (3) months after his appointment every executor or expediency and convenience.
administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of
all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a
possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final
their assistance. determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
the real and personal properties of the decedent in the jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the
the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)
being in the possession of another person or entity.
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and directive for the inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed
appraisal of the estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the order of March 14, 2001, viz:
accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio directive to include the properties in question in the inventory rested on
Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death, good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or
left several properties as listed in the inventory of properties submitted capricious.
in Court in Special Proceedings No. 306–R which are supposed to be
divided among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina
examined in Court by the counsel for the petitioner, that she did not Mercado should be included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did
include in the inventory submitted by her in this case the shares of not dispute the fact about the shares being inherited by Emigdio.
Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said
properties constituting Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the
Mercado should be included in the inventory of properties required to be effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime
submitted to the Court in this particular case. was the conjugal partnership of gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of
Emigdio’s estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado the conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific
also admitted in Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of property acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the
stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in her name and which were conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that party
paid by her from money derived from the taxicab business which she and must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical,
her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these shares of and convincing evidence.30 In the absence of or pending the presentation
stock partake of being conjugal in character, one–half thereof or of the of such proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be
value thereof should be included in the inventory of the estate of her provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected
husband. properties were,31 and which of the properties should form part of the
estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado must be included in the inventory.
admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank account in her name at Union
Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive. Again, the Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the
money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in character, and name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in
so, one–half thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties dispute. Civil Case No. CEB–12692, a dispute that had involved the
constituting as estate of her husband. ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case Emigdio’s name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001,
that Lot No. 3353 of Pls–657–D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the
of 53,301 square meters as described in and covered by Transfer name of Emigdio.
Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now. Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB–
When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB–12690 which was decided 12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB–12692 was susceptible
on October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which of various interpretations, including one to the effect that the heirs of
claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never Emigdio could have already threshed out their differences with the
intervened in the said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable considering
admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So that Mervir Realty, whose business was managed by respondent Richard,
the said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In other words, Mervir
inventory in this case. Realty appeared to be a family corporation.

Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor
by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the
10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed
day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its
a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy
on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of death is one of the transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to
prompted by the thought that the transferor has not long to live and be. The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear and
made in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). convincing evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has observed
Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that in Suntay v. Court of Appeals:33
the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the
value at the time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer in favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function
contemplation of death. So, the inventory to be approved in this case of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in
should still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties
transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary
actually appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado consideration in determining the true nature of a contract.(Bold
at least ten (10) months after his death, as shown by the certification emphasis supplied)
issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on October 31, 1991 (Exhibit
O).28
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of
Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio would still have
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two
the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory days prior to his death was a circumstance that should put any interested
by the administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the party on his guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was a
finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the pancreas at the of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of
time.34 In this regard, whether the CA correctly characterized the discretion means either that the judicial or quasi–judicial power was
exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
validated by the facts to be established in court. personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded
a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately exercising judicial or quasi–judicial powers acted in a capricious or
excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.39
admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This is
because: In light of the foregoing, the CA’s conclusion of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely
a system of registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May
of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial
persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094–
and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma
claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents
may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens to pay the costs of suit.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land
registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly SO ORDERED.
performed their duties.35
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo–De Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ. concur.
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of
assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should still be included in the
inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of
the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue on the validity of the
assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might
have constricted the determination of the rights to the properties arising
from that deed,36 but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate court from
ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that
deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with
special and limited jurisdiction, was still “deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.”37

Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and

submitted for the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of
collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil
Coderequired every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein
Teresita herself, to “bring into the mass of the estate any property or right
which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition.” Section 2, Rule 90 of
the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent
on the legitime of an heir “may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the
court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on
the heir.” Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of
the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory
of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of
properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory
heir by the decedent.38

The determination of which properties should be excluded from or

included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the
authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under
the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to
belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out
in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits
no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part
 Republic of the Philippines procedure of transferring the titles involved to the name of the
SUPREME COURT estate; and
Manila
(4) To apply the proceeds of the salementioned in Number 3
SECOND DIVISION above to the payment of the taxes, interests, penalties and
other charges, if any, and to distribute the residue among the
G.R. No. 186589 July 18, 2014 heirs Ricardo [C.] Silverio, Sr., Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S.
Silverio represented by Legal Guardian Nestor S. Dela Merced
II, Edmundo S. Silverio and Nelia S. Silverio-Dee in accordance
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. and LORNA CILLAN-SILVERIO, Petitioners,
with the law on intestacy.
vs.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., Respondent.
SO ORDERED.4
DECISION
Petitioner Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (Ricardo Sr.) is the surviving spouse of
the decedent Beatriz S. Silverio, with whomhe has children: herein
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
respondent Ricardo Jr. (Ricardo Jr.); Edmundo; Ligaya; and Nelia Silverio-
Dee (Nelia). Lorna Cillan-Silverio (Lorna) is Ricardo Sr.’s second wife. The
A hearing is required in order to resolve a charge of indirect contempt; subject matter of Spec. Proc. M-2629 is the decedent’s intestate estate
the respondent to the charge may not be convicted on the basis of written (the estate), which includes, among others, shares of stock in Pilipinas
pleadings alone. Development Corporation (PDC) and a residential house in Urdaneta
Village (house atUrdaneta Village).
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the February 25,
2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104060, Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorariwith the CA – docketed as CA-G.R. SP
entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. and Lorna Cillan-Silverio, Petitioners, No. 971965 – questioning the trial court’s October 31, 2006 Omnibus
versus Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Respondent." Order, particularly Ricardo Jr.’s appointment as the new administrator.
The CA later issued two Resolutions, which granted Nelia’s application for
Factual Antecedents a writ of preliminary injunction, to wit:

In an October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order3 issued by Branch 57 of the 1. A July 4, 2007 Resolution,6 with the following decretal portion:
Regional Trial Court of Makati in Spec. Proc. M-2629 entitled "In re:
Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz S. Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Private Respondents’ motion(s)
Petitioner, versus Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Heir-Administrator for the reconsideration of Our February 5, 2007 Resolution are DENIED.
Designate,Edmundo S. Silverio, Heir-Movant, and Ligaya S. Silverio, The Petitioner’s application for a writ of injunction is hereby GRANTED.
represented by her Legal Guardian Nestor Dela Merced II, Heir-
Intervenor," it was decreed as follows:
Accordingly, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue upon posting of the
bond in the amount of two million pesos (Ph₱2,000,000.00) enjoining the
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court for the foregoing Respondents from enforcing the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Orderissued
reasons resolves to grant the following: in Sp. Proc. M-2629; and, allowing Ricardo [C.] Silverio, Sr. to continue as
administrator, pending resolution of the instant petition.
(1) Partially reconsidering Nos. 1 and 5 of its Order dated
December 12, 2005, thus upholding the granting of Letters of It appearing that the required pleadings have already been filed and no
Administration to Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. anent the Estate of other pleading may be forthcoming per the Judicial Records Division’s
Beatriz S.Silverio in lieu of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., who is verification report of June 19, 2007, the main petition may be considered
removed as Administrator for gross violation of his duties and submitted for resolution.
functions under Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court;
SO ORDERED.7
(2) Allowing Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. to immediately take his oath
as Administrator and exercise his duties and functions under his
2. A February 29, 2008 Resolution,8 which decreed:
Administrator’s Bond Utassco No. JCL(1)-001-1001, if still valid,
or upon posting a new Administrator’s Bond of
PH₱1,000,000.00; WHEREFORE, the ten million[-]peso (Ph₱10,000,000.00) bond posted by
the Petitioner under PSIC Bond No. JCL (8) 00207102119 is APPROVED.
Accordingly, by this WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, the
(3) Allowing the sale of the properties located at (1) No. 82
Respondents, their agents or anybody acting in their behalf, are
Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City, covered by T.C.T.
ENJOINED from executing, enforcing or implementing any writ of
No. 137155 issued by Register of Deeds of Makati City; (2) No.
execution, order, or resolution for the enforcement ofthe October 31,
3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City covered by T.C.T. No.
2006 Omnibus Orderissued by the Respondent Court in Sp. Proc. M-2629
137154 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City; and (3)
thereby allowing Ricardo [C.] Silverio, Sr. to continue as administrator
No. 19 Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd., Makati City covered by TCT No.
during the pendency of this case.
137156 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City to
partially settle the intestate estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio,
and authorizing the Administrator to undertake the proper The Petitioner’s motion seeking the reconsideration of Our January 3,
2008 Resolution increasing the amount ofthe bond from two (2) million
to ten (10) million pesos, having been rendered mootand academic by her contempt as defined and punished under Rule 71, Section 3 of the 1997
subsequent submission of a bond in the increased amount, is DENIED. Rules of Civil Procedure14 (1997 Rules).

SO ORDERED.9 On February 25, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision, which held
thus –
On September 3, 2007, Ricardo Jr. filed with this Court an "Appeal under
Rule 45 and/or Certiorariunder Sec. 1, Rule 65" with a prayer for the After a careful evaluation of the evidentiary records, this Court finds it
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary inappropriate to make a ruling on whether or not the Respondent has
injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 178676,10 seeking among others a committed certain acts, supra., violative of Revised Rule 71 of the Rules.
reversal of the CA’s July 4, 2007 Resolution and the issuance of injunctive
relief. Respondentcontended therein that the CA acted with grave abuse Records show that on 3 September 2007, the Respondent has interposed
of discretion inissuing the July 4, 2007 Resolution and in granting an appeal from the CA Resolution dated 4 July 2007, supra., before the
injunctive relief against him. Supreme Court questioning in essence said resolution as having been
granted to the Petitioners with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
On June 13, 2008, Ricardo Jr. wrote and sent two letters, one each to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, hence, allegedly null and void.
petitioners. Ricardo Jr. demanded in the first letter that Ricardo Sr. cease
and desist from 1) exercising the rights of a stockholder in PDC; 2) Accordingly, in the light of the foregoing development, this Court is
managing PDC’s affairs and business; and 3) transacting withthird persons compelled to restrain itself from resolving the issuesin the instant
for and in behalf of PDC and to turn over all of its books and records. In petition.
the second letter, Ricardo Jr. demanded that Lorna immediately vacate
the house at Urdaneta Village.11 Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Otherwise put, it is imperative that We instantly pull the plug and let the
High Tribunal settle the controversy surrounding the propriety in the
On June 25, 2008, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Indirect issuance of CA Resolution dated 4 July 2007, supra., from which order the
Contempt,12 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 104060, seeking that herein Respondent has allegedly committed acts indefiance thereof.
respondent Ricardo Jr. be declared in indirect contempt of court and
punished accordingly. They charged that respondent’s June 13, 2008
As laid down by the High Tribunal in Manila Electric Company v. Phil.
demand letters violate and defy the CA’s July 4, 2007 and February 29,
Consumers Foundation, Inc. et al., thus:
2008 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196, which enjoined respondent’s
appointment as administrator pursuant to the October 31, 2006 Omnibus
Order; allowed petitioner Ricardo Sr. to continue as administrator of the …it is the duty of the lower courts to obey the Decisions of this Court and
estate; and enjoinedRicardo Jr. and his co-respondents in Spec. Proc. M- render obeisance toits status as the apex of the hierarchy of courts. "A
2629 from executing, enforcing or implementing any writ of execution, becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of
order, or resolution for the enforcement of the Omnibus Order. the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the
Petitioners likewise charged that – integrated judicial system of the nation." "There is only one Supreme
Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings"…
14. [Last] June 20, 2008 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, respondent
Silverio Jr., accompanied by his two lawyers: Attys. Efren Vincent M. Dizon WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby
and Charlie Mendoza and some John Does, without the benefit of a final DISMISSED.
court order or writ of execution and without the assistance of a sheriff,
attempted to enforce the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati SO ORDERED.15
City, Branch 145 which was appealed to the Court of Appeals by way of
Notice of Appeal, by trying to forcibly evict against their will, the On this account, petitioners filed the present Petition.
occupants of one of the residence(s) of his petitioner father Silverio Sr. at
#21 Cruzada, Urdaneta Village, Makati City, covered by the Testate
Intestate Case appealed to this Honorable Court which issued the Issue
aforementioned injunction. In the process, respondent Silverio Jr. created
quite a commotion and public disturbance inside the subdivision. Only In the Petition, it issubmitted that –
[with] the timely intervention of the officers of the homeowners
association, barangay officials, some policemen and this representation THE PENDENCY OF AN APPEAL BEFORE THE [SUPREME COURT] ON THE
was respondent Silverio Jr. prevailed upon topeacefully leave the place. VALIDITY OF AN INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES
NOT PRECLUDE THE [LATTER] FROM ADJUDICATING THE QUESTION
15. Such acts of respondent Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. in trying to eject his OFWHETHER X X X SUPERVENING ACTS COMMITTED BY ONE OF THE
father from his residence without the benefit of a final court order/writ PARTIES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS CASE CONSTITUTE INDIRECT
of execution, [are] not only x x x illegal and show disrespect for elders, but CONTEMPT BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT FOR HIERARCHY OF
also smack a lot of bad taste in contravention [of] our established customs COURTS. THUS, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT INVOKED THE
and tradition[s].13 PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT FOR HIERARCHY OF COURTS IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT.16
Petitioners argued further that PDC and the house at Urdaneta Village are
assets of the estate placed under Ricardo Sr.’s charge as administrator Petitioners’ Arguments
through the July 4, 2007 and February 29, 2008 Resolutions, which
characterize respondent’s acts as undue interferencewith Ricardo Sr.’s Petitioners, in praying that the assailed Decision be set aside and that the
administratorship; moreover, respondent’s acts contravene Philippine Court declare respondent guilty of indirectcontempt, maintain that the
customs and traditions. Thus, respondent’s acts constitute indirect July 4, 2007 and February 29, 2008 CAResolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196
are valid and standing orders that must be obeyed unless and until they pendency of G.R. No. 178676.1âwphi1 It need not wait for this Court to
are reversed or set aside, and despite the pendency of the petition in resolve G.R. No. 178676 before the petitioners’ contempt charge may be
G.R.No. 178676; respondent is bound by what is decreed in the July 4, heard.
2007 Resolution, and without injunctive relief from this Court, any act
performed incontravention thereof constitutes indirect contempt. However, at this point, this Court cannot grant petitioners’ plea to resolve
Petitionersthus conclude that in refusing to take cognizance of their the merits of their petition for indirect contempt; it is the CA that should
petition for indirect contempt, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 104060 properly try the same. Aside from the fact that the CA is the court against
committed error. which the alleged contempt was committed, a hearing is required in
resolving a charge for indirect contempt.1âwphi1 The respondent in an
Finally, petitioners urge this Court to take the initiative in finding indirect contempt charge may not be convicted on the basis ofwritten
respondent guilty of indirect contempt for issuing the June 13, 2008 pleadings alone.19
letters and for attempting to evict them from their Urdaneta Village home
on June 20, 2008, which acts they believe amount to a defiance and Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specifically [outline] the
disobedience of the CA’s dispositions in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect
contempt. First, there must be an order requiring the respondent to show
Respondent’s Arguments cause why he should not be cited for contempt. Second, the respondent
must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him.
Arguing for the denial of the Petition, respondent in his Third, there must be a hearingand the court must investigate the charge
Comment17 submits that the mere act of writing and sending the June 13, and consider respondent's answer. Finally, only if found guilty will
2008 letters to petitioners does not make him liable for indirect contempt respondent be punished accordingly. The law requires that there be a
of court, as they "do not deal directly or indirectly with any of the charge in writing, duly filed in court, and an opportunity given to the
enjoined acts enumeratedin the 31 October 2006" Omnibus Order. person charged tobe heard by himself or counsel. What is most essential
Respondent adds that petitioners have not shown that petitioner Ricardo is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the
Sr. has filed an administrator’s bond and has taken his administrator’s charges against him and to be heard in his defenses. This is due process,
oath; because ifhe has not, then it may notbe said that respondent acted which must be observed at all times.
in defiance of the appellate court’s Resolutions since he continued to act
as the administrator on the strength of the October 31, 2006 Omnibus xxxx
Order in Spec. Proc. M-2629. Finally, respondent submits that he may not
be found guilty of indirect contempt in the absence of proof that he In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. To
physically carried out the demands contained in his June 13, 2008 letters; be sure, since an indirectcontempt charge partakes the nature of a
though he admits that he wrote the letters, he nonetheless claims that criminal charge, conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written
hedid nothing more beyond sending them. pleadings. A respondent in a contempt charge must be served with a copy
of the motion/petition. Unlike in civil actions, the Court does not issue
Our Ruling summons on the respondent. While the respondent is not required to file
a formal answer similar to that in ordinary civil actions, the court must set
The Petition is granted in part. the contempt charge for hearing on a fixed date and time on which the
respondent must make his appearance to answer the charge. x x
x20 (Emphasis supplied)
The pendency of a special civil action for certiorariinstituted in relation to
a pending case does not staythe proceedings therein in the absence of a
writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. Rule 65, To be sure, there are more pressing matters that require the attention of
Section 7 of the 1997 Rules makes this clear: this Court; petitioners' complaint for indirect contempt could very well be
resolved by the appellate court. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN
PART. The February 25, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the
SP No. 104060 is SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is ORDERED to take
proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ
cognizance of petitioners' June 25, 2008 Petition for Indirect Contempt.
of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interruptthe course of
the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of SO ORDERED.
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent
from further proceeding in the case.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten
(10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorariwith a higher court or
tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with
the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.
(Emphasis supplied) Petitioners are thus correct in arguing that the
pendency of G.R. No. 178676 did not interrupt the course of CA-G.R. SP
No. 97196, in the absence of a temporary restraining order orwrit of
preliminary injunction issued in the former case. This is because "an
original action for certiorariis an independent action and is neither a
continuation nor a part of the trial resulting in the judgment complained
of."18 The CA therefore committed error in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No.
104060, or petitioners’ indirect contempt petition, on the ground of
Republic of the Philippines In their Answer, 9 petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on
SUPREME COURT the groun_d of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the
Manila subject properties. In the course of his testimony during trial, petitioner
Francisco further contended that what they purchased was only the
THIRD DIVISION resort. 10 He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides,
among others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the family home to the
G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015
spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well as a Deed
of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for ₱650, 000.00. 11
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES
MARIA FRANCISCO substituted by VILLAFRIA, Petitioners,
On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject
vs.
Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA ALARAS, Respondents.
Documents of conveyance offered by petitioner’s .as well as the
circumstances Surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the
DECISION Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public that was not
duly commissioned as such on the date it was executed. 12 The Deed of
PERALTA, J.: Sale was Undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left
blank, and the Typewritten name "Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on the left
13
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the side of the document Was not signed. The trial court also observed that
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and both documents were Never presented to the Office of the Register of
Resolution, 2 dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009·, respectively, of Deeds for registration and That the titles to the subject properties were
the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, Which affirmed the still in the names of Pedro and His second wife Benita. In addition, the
Judgment 3 dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of supposed notaries and buyers of the Subject properties were not even
Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217. presented as witnesses whom supposedly witnessed the signing and
execution of the documents of conveyance. 14 On The basis thereof, the
triaI court ruled in favor of respondents, in its Judgment, the pertinent
The antecedent facts are as follows: portions of its fallo provide:

On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is Hereby
heirs, including his_ children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia rendered as follows:
R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties including a resort
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No. 51355,
each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on xxxx
which it stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in
Nasugbu, Batangas. 4 4. A) Declaring as a nullity the ~'Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiation and Waiver of Rights and Sale" (Ex. "l ",
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title Villafria) notarized on December 23, 1991 by Notary Public Antonio G.
and Recovery of Possession 5 dated September 15, 1993, respondents Malonzo of Manila, Doc. No. 190, Page No. 20, Book No. IXII, Series of
alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that their co-heirs, 1991. .
Pedro’s second wife, Benita"Tenorio and other children, had sold the
subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed of Absolute Sale (Ex.
Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. "2", Villafria), purportedly executed by Benita T.
Villafria, without their knowledge and consent. When confronted about Rifioza in favor of spouses Francisco Villafria and
the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a Maria Butiong, purportedly notarized by one Alfredo
document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, de Guzman marked Doc. No. 1136, Page No. 141, and
however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtoiined Book. No. XXX, Series of 1991.
by Pedro and Benita from a bank. 6 The document actually evidenced
receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of ₱87, 352.62 releasing her c) Ordering the forfeiture of any and all
and her late husband’s indebtedness therefrom. 7 Upon inquiry, the improvements introduced By defendants Francisco
Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record Villafria and Maria Butiong in the properties Covered
of any transaction involving the subject properties, giving them certified by TCT No. 40807, 40808, 51354 and 51355 of the
true copies of the titles to the same. When respondents went to the Register of Deeds for Nasugbu, Batangas. .
subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the
resort had been demolished. They were not, however, able to enter as
5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons, whose
the premises were padlocked.
Occupancy within the premises of the four- (4) parcels of land described
in Par. 4-c above is derived from the rights and interest of defendant
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an Villafria, to vacate its premises and to deliver possession thereof, and all
extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was published in a improvements existing thereon to plaintiffs, for and in behalf of the estate
tabloid called Balita. Because of this, They caused the annotation of their of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza.
adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds
of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the
6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the defendants-heirs in the Amended
annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the
8
Complaint to be the legitimate heirs of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza, each in
petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.
the capacity and degree established, as well as their direct successors-in
interest, and ordering the defendant Registrar of Deeds to issue the
co1Tesponding titles in their names in the proportion established by law, private. Document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
pro in division, in TCT Nos. 40807, 40808, 51354, 51355 and 40353 (after execution a"Q.d. authenticity must be proved either:
restoration) within ten (10) days from finality of this Decision, 4pon
payment of lawful fees, except TCT No. 40353, which shall be exempt (a). By anyone who saw the document executed or
from all expenses for its restoration. written; or

With no costs. (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or

handwriting of the maker.
SO ORDERED. 15
The Complaining Heirs insist that the settlement/family home and the
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial ‘court’s Judgment in its resort deed are void, as their signatures thereon are forgeries as opposed
Decision 16 dated October 31, 2006 in the following wise: to the Villafrias who profess the deeds' enforceability. After the
Complaining Heirs presented proofs in support of their claim that their
The person before whom the resort deed was acknowledged, Alfredo de signatures were forged, the burden then fell upon the Villafrias to
Guzman, was not commissioned as a notary public from 1989 to July 3, disprove the ~ame2 or conversely, to prove the authenticity and due
1991, the date the certification was issued. Such being the case, the resort execution of the said deeds. The Villafrias failed in this regard.
deed is not a public document and the presumption of regularity
accorded to public documents will not apply to the same. As laid down in As forestalled, the Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a) the notary
Tigno, et al. v. Aquino, et al.: public who purportedly notarized the questioned instrument, (b) the
witnesses who appear [Ed] in the instruments as eyewitnesses to the
The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the signing, or (c) an expert to prove the authenticity and genuineness of all
authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public docs net have the the signatures appearing on the said instruments. Verily, the rule that,
capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary
should be treated as A. Unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh, evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be
and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying reasonably established as a pre requisite to its admission, was prudently
on the proferred authority of the notary public or the person pretending observed by the lower court when it refused to admit the
to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render merely officious the settlement/family home and the resort deeds as their veracity are
17
elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may receive doubtful.
a notarial commission. Without such a rule,
Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria, filed a
The notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary public will Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 2006 raising the trial
have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged court’s lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the Complaint for
in pretense. The notarization of a document carries considerable legal Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession was
effect. Notarization of a private document converts such document into filed, there was yet no settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to
a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of the nature thereof, nor was there an identification of the number of
its authenticity. Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the settlement of the
contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary· jurisdiction when the action filed
protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not was for Judidal Partition. Considering that the instant action is really one
qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the for settlement of intestate estate, the trial court, sitting merely in its
public and the courts and administrative offices generally. probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the
issues of forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that. Said ruling
is void and has no effect for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
Parenthetically, the settlement/family home deed cannot be considered
The Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied by the appellate
a public document. This is because the following cast doubt on the
court on February 26, 2007.
document's authenticity, to wit: J.

1.) The date of its execution was not indicated;
2.) The amount of consideration was superimposed;
3.) It was not presented to the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas for
annotation; and
4.) Not even the supposed notary public," Alfredo de Guzman, or the
purported buyer, the Spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc, were
presented as witnesses. · Concededly, the absence of notarization in the
resort deed and/or the lacking details in the settlement/family home
deed did not necessarily invalidate the transactions evidenced by the said
documents. However, since the said deeds are private documents,
perforce, their due execution and authenticity becomes subject to the
requirement of proof under the Rules on Evidence, Section 20, Rule 132
of which provides: Sec. 20. Proof of private document. - Before any
On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's Petition for
Review on Certiorari for submitting a verification of the petition, a
certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of service that failed to
comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice regarding competent
evidence of affiant' s identities. 18 In its Resolution 19 dated September 26,
2007, this Court also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in
the absence of any compelling reason to warrant a modification of the
previous denial. Thus, the June 20, 2007 Resolution became final and
executors on October 31, 2007 as certified by the Entry of Judgment
issued by the Court. 20 On January 16, 2008, the Court further denied
petitioner' s motion for leave to admit a second motion for
reconsideration of its September 26, 2007 Resolution, considering that
the same is a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to
Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Furthennore, petitioner's letter dated December 18, 2007 pleading the
Court to take a second. Look at his petition for review on certiorari and
that a decision thereon be rendered based purely on its merits was noted
without action. 21
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008 addressed to against him before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court's
then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno praying that a decision on the case be jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which
rendered based on the. Merits and not on formal requirements "as he will bar said party from later on impugning the court’s jurisdiction. ' In
stands to lose everything his parents had left him just because the fine, under the circumstances obtaining in this case the Petitioners are
verification against non-forum shopping is formally defective." However, stopped from assailing the Court a quo 's lack of jurisdiction. Too, We do
in view of the Entry of Judgment having been made on October 31, 2007, not find merit in the Petitioners' second issue, supra. As mentioned
the Court likewise noted said letter without action. 22 earlier, entry of judgment had already been made on the assailed
Decision and Order as early as 31 October 2007.
On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a Part Writ of
Execution of its October 1, 2001 Decision with respect to the portions x x x x
disposing of petitioner's claims as affirmed by the CA.
It maybe that the doctrine of finality of judgments permits certain
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 200 a equitable remedies such as a petition for annulment. But the I. Rules are
Petition for Annulment of Judgment and· Order before the CA assailing clear. The annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders
October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the November 27, 2008 Order of the and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial Courts is resorted to
RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In Decision only where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
dated March 13, 2009, however, the CA dismissed the petition a affirmed or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
the rulings of the trial court in the following wise: Although the assailed the petitioner, supra.
Decision of the Court a quo has already become final and executory and
in fact entry of judgment was issued on 31 October 2007, supra, If Petitioners lost their chance to avail themselves of the appropriate
nevertheless, to put the issues to rest,·We deem it apropos to tackle the remedies or appeal before the Supreme Court, that is their own look out.
same. The High Tribunal has emphatically pointed out in Mercado, et al. v.
Security Bank Corporation, thus:
The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of the Court a
quo, supra, should be annulled and set aside on the grounds of extrinsic A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for annulment of
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of·appeal." A
party must have first availed of appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition
We are not persuaded. for relief before an action for annulment can prosper. Its obvious
rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or
xxxx negligence. Also, the action for annulment of judgment must be based
either on (a) extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process. Having failed to avail of the remedies and there being 'a Clear
Section 2 of the Rules as stated above provides that the annulment of a
showing that neither of the grounds was present, the petition must be
judgment may "be based only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
dismissed. Only a disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition
jurisdiction." In RP v. The Heirs of Sancho Magdato, the High Tribunal
unacceptable. 23 When the appellate court denied Petitioner’s Motion
stressed that: There is extrinsic fraud when "the unsuccessful party had
for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated April 23, 2009, petitioner filed
been ·prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari on June 10, 2009, invoking
practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, ...
the following ground:
or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; ... "
I.
Otherwise put, extrinsic or collateral fraud pertains to such fraud, which
prevents the aggrieved party ·from having a trial or presenting his case to THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING
the court, or is used to procure the judgment without fair submission of THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, NASUGBU, BATANGAS,
the controversy. This refers to acts intended to keep the unsuccessful ACTED WITHOUT JURISDCITION IN ENTERTAINING THE SPECIAL
party away from the courts as when there is a false promise of PROCEEDING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF PEDRO RINOZA AND
compromise or when one is kept in ignorance of the suit. The pivotal THE CIVIL ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE HEIRS AND THIRD
issues before us are (1) whether. There was a time during the proceedings PERSONS IN ONE PROCEEDING. 24
below that the Petitioners ever prevented from exhibiting fully their case,
by fraud or deception, practiced on them by Respondents, and (2) Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was
whether the Petitioners were kept away from the court or kept in captioned as "Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
ignorance by the acts of the Respondent? Possession," the allegations therein show that the cause of action is
actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that
We find nothing of that sort. Instead, what we deduced as We carefully settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court
delved. Into the evidentiary facts surrounding the instant case as well as of limited jurisdiction while judicial partition with annulment of title and
the proceedings below as shown in the 36-page Decision of the Court a recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of
quo, is that the Petitioners were given ample time to rebut the allegations general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in
of the Respondents and had in fact addressed every detail of. entertaining the latter while it was sitting merely in its probate
Respondent's cause of action against them. Thus, Petitioners' allegation jurisdiction. This is in view of the prohibition found in the Rules on the
of the Court a quo ‘s lack of jurisdiction is misplaced. joiner of special civil actions and ordinary civil actions. 25 Thus, petitioner
argued that the ruling of the trial court is void and has no effect for having
been rendered in without jurisdiction.
Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the explicit ruling of
the Supreme Court in Sps. Santos, et al. v. Sps. Lumbao, thus: It is
elementary that' the active participation of a party in a case pending
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate court and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
that since the finding of forgery relates only to the signature of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
respondents and not to their co-heirs, who assented to the conveyance, estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds.
the transaction should be considered valid as to them. Petitioner also The parties to an Extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument
denies the indings of the courts below that his parents are builders in bad or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who
faith for they only took possession of the subject properties after the adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file,
execution of the transfer documents and after they paid the simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the
consideration on the sale. public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the
affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register
The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner maintains that since. of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property
Respondents’ complaint alleged the following causes of action, the same involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and
is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition: FIRST conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under
CAUSE OF ACTION section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts
if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2)
years after the death of the decedent.
1. That Pedro L. Rifi.oza, Filipino and resident of Nasugbu,
Batangas at the time of his death, died intestate on November
16, 1989. Copy of his death certificate is hereto attached as The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
Annex "A"; Published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided
in the next succeeding section; but no Extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants enumerated
notice thereof. 27
from paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the only known heirs of the
above-mentioned decedent. The plaintiffs and the Defendants
Rolando, Rafael, Antonio, Angelita, Loma all surnamed Rifioza, In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
and Myrna R. Limon or Myrna R. Rogador, Epifania Belo and Ma.
Theresa R. Demafelix are the decedent’s legitimate children Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A person
with his first wife, while Benita Tenorio Rifioza, is the having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as
decedent’s widow and Bernadette Rifioza, the decedent's provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent
daughter with said widow. As such, said parties are co-owners of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which
by virtue of an intestate inheritance from the decedent, of the partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons
properties enumerated in the succeeding paragraph; ‘ interested in the property. 28

3. That the decedent left the following real properties all As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of
located in Nasugbu, Batangas: respondents in their complaint are but customary, in fact, mandatory, to
a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint
xxxx alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with
their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is
represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the purpose;
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza has no known
(3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that
legal indebtedness;
there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5)
that Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents,
17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and it will as rightful heirs to the decedent’s estate, pray for the partition of the
be to the best interest of all heirs that it be partitioned same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that
judicially. 26. based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial
partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of of the decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does
action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon may fall
under an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies
the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
the llegations therein, and the relief’s prayed for, the action, is clearly one executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. Fails to furnish
for udicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession. the bond equipped by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall
be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court proyides: qualified administrator the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court. 29 An exception to this rule, however, is found in the
RULE 74 aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left
Summary Settlement of Estate no will and no debts due from is estate, may divide the estate either
extrajudicially or in an ordinary action or partition without submitting the
same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the administrator by the court. 30The reasons that where the deceased dies
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age5 or the without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly an administrator to administer the. Estate for hem and to deprive the real
authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled. 31
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not isputed, There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without any ending attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be
obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents were collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The'
under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate of certificate referred to is that -document issued by the Register of Deeds
a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means
encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially, by ownership, which is, more often than not, represented by that document.
ereira v. Court of Appeals: 32 Petitioner c.pparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a
concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the (Emphases supplied)
estate has no· debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner's petition for annulment
heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, qr. to of sale on the ground that it constituted a collateral attack since she was
resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando's title to the subject lands and not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course any Torrens certificate oftitle over the same.
of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the
have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as to the existence of the
partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be same is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition, as held in
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and Municipality of Bifzan·v. Garcia: 40
compelling reasons.
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
Thus, it has been repeatedly 4eld that when a person dies without leaving determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be
bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.
long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have
the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is_
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment
and unnecessary proceedings. 33 that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises
and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from
Thus, respondents committed no error in. filing an action for judicial the real estate in question is in order. x x x
partition instead of a special proceeding for the settlement of estate as
law expressly permits the same.1avvphi1 That the complaint contained The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are
allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not. Mean unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event
that there was a prohibited joined of causes of action for questions as to [,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c] ourt with the assistance
the estate's properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their status of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well
as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to the estate, may also also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by
be properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone.34 In fact, a the [c] ourt after the. Parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard
complete inventory of the estate may likewise be done during the Thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto
partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts.~5 Indeed, entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
where the more expeditious remedy 9f partition is available to the heirs, question. xx x. 41 ·
then they may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings,
dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated. 36
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non-
existence of co-ownership between the parties. 42 Unless and until the
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be premature to
annulment of title and recovery of possession does not strip the trial court effect a partition of an estate. 43
off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for the
annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in
In view of the foregoing, petitioner' s argument that the trial court acted
an action for partition, 37 as can be seen in cases where 1-ourts determine
without jurisdiction in entertaining the action of settlement of estate and
the parties' rights arising from complaints asking not only for the partition
annulment of title in a single proceeding is clearly erroneous for the
of estates but also for the annulment of titles and recovery of ownership
38 39 instant complaint is precisely one for judicial partition with annulment of
and possession of property. In fact, in Bagayas v. Bagayas, ·wherein a
title and recovery of possession, filed within the confines of applicable
complaint for annulment of sale and partition was dismissed by the trial
law and jurisprudence. Under Section 144 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA
court due to the impropriety of an action for annulment as it constituted
7691),45 amending Batas Pambansa Big. 129, the RTC shall exercise
a collateral attack on the certificates of title of the respondents therein,
exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of
this Court found the dismissal to be improper in the following manner:
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action herein
was not merely for partition and recovery of ownership but also for
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action. For partition annulment of title and documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the
parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on the issue trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the instant
of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily fail.
realties 'to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot
be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. As
pronounced in Lacbayan:
Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title alone,
without the prayer for judicial partition, the requirement of instituting a
separate special proceeding for the determination of the status and rights
of the respondents as putative heirs may be dispensed with, in light of the
fact that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court
and had already presented evidence regarding the issue of heirship. 46 In
Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, 47 the Court explained:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was
the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule
74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to
the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case
the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein.
xxxx
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject
it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which
could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the evil case - subject of
the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before
the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject · Portugal’s estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial
and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial,
x x x. 48
Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the causes of
action alleged therein, as well as the fact that the trial court, in arriving at
its decision, gave petitioner more than ample opportunity to advance his
claims, petitioner cannot now be permitted to allege lack of jurisdiction
just because the judgment rendered was adverse to them. To repeat, the
action filed herein is one for judicial partition and not for settlement of
intestate estate. Consequently, that respondents also prayed for the
annulment of title and recovery of possession in the same proceeding
does not strip the court off of its jurisdiction for asking for 'the annulment
of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in an action
for partition.
As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be considered valid as to
the heirs who assented to the conveyance as well as their allegation of
good faith, this Court does not find any compelling reason to deviate from
the ruling of the appellate court. As sufficiently found by both courts
below, the authenticity and due execution of the documents on which
petitioner’s claims are based were inadequately proven. They were
undated, forged, and acknowledged before a notary public who was not
commissioned as such on the date they were executed. They were never
presented to the Register of Deeds for registration. Neither were the
supposed notaries and buyers of the subject properties presented as
witnesses.
While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the estate,
actually acknowledged the sale of the resort, the circumstances
surrounding the same militate against the fact of its occurrence. Not only
was the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by Benita undated and
unsigned by Pedro, but the document she presented purportedly
evidencing her receipt of her share in the sale, did not refer to any sort of
sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate court’s observations
as to petitioners' actuations insofar as the transactions alleged herein are
concerned. First, they were seemingly uncertain as to the number and/or
identity of the properties bought by them. 49 In their Answer, they gave
the impression 'that· they bought both the resort and the family home
and yet, during trial, Francisco Villafria claimed they only bought the
resort. In fact, it was only then that they presented the subject Extra
Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale. 50 Second, they never presented any
other document which w0uld evidence their actual payment of
consideration to the selling heirs. 51 Third, in spite of the. Blatant legal
infirmities of the subject documents of conveyance, petitioners still took
possession of the properties, demolished several cottages, and
introduced permanent improvements thereon.
In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court: that petitioners failed to
adequately substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently
verifiable proof, their claim that they had, in fact, purchased the subject
properties. The circumstances surrounding the purported transfers cast
doubt on whether they actually took place. In substantiating their claim,
petitioners relied solely on the Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale,
who utterly failed to prove their authenticity and due execution. They
cannot, therefore, be permitted to claim. Absolute ownership of the
subject lands based on the same.
Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for value and
builders in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of title builder that
the land the latter is building on is one's own without knowledge of any
defect or flaw in one's. Title. 52 However, in view of .the manifest defects
in the instruments conveying their titles, petitioners should have been
placed on guard. Yet, they still demolished several cottages and
constructed improvement on the properties. Thus, their claim of. Good
faith cannot be given credence.
Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except to
correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties being
deemed resolved and. laid to rest. 53 it is a fundamental principle in our
judicial system and essential to an effective and efficient administration
of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be,
not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. 54 Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment is allowed only
under the most extraordinary of circumstances. 55 Yet, when petitioner is
given more than • ample opportunity to be heard, unbridled access to the
appellate courts, as well as unbiased judgments rendered after a
consideration of evidence presented by the parties, as in the case at hand,
the Court shall refrain from reversing the rulings of the courts below in
the absence of any showing that the same were rendered with fraud or
lack of jurisdiction. ·
WHEREFORE, premises considered, .the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009,
respectively, of the Court Appeals for CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, which
affirmed the Judgment dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217, insofar as it
conce1ns the resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 513 54
and No. 51355, and family home covered by TCT No. 40807 and 40808,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138953. June 6, 2002] earlier to her.[13]She added that the donation was void because of lack of
CASTORIO ALVARICO, petitioner, vs. AMELITA L. SOLA, respondent. approval from the Bureau of Lands, and that she had validly acquired the
DECISION land as Ferminas rightful heir. She also denied that she is a trustee of the
QUISUMBING, J.: land for petitioner.[14]

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the
March 23, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54624, reversing decretal portion of which reads:
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, for
reconveyance.Also sought to be reversed is the CA resolution dated June WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
8, 1999 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. favor of plaintiff and against the defendant. Lot 5, Sgs-3451, is hereby
The facts of this case are as follows: declared as lawfully owned by plaintiff and defendant is directed to
reconvey the same to the former.
Petitioner Castorio Alvarico is the natural father of respondent
Amelita Sola while Fermina Lopez is petitioners aunt, and also Amelitas No pronouncement as to damages and attorneys fees, plaintiff having
adoptive mother. opted to forego such claims.
On June 17, 1982, the Bureau of Lands approved and granted the
Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of Fermina over Lot 5, SGS-3451, SO ORDERED.[15]
with an area of 152 sq. m. at the Waterfront, Cebu City.[1]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its decision dated March 23,
On May 28, 1983,[2] Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication
1999 reversed the RTC. Thus:
and Transfer of Rights[3] over Lot 5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to
assume all the obligations, duties, and conditions imposed upon Fermina
under MSA Application No. V-81066. The document of transfer was filed WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby
with the Bureau of Lands.[4] The pertinent portions of the deed provide: REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by plaintiff-appellee
against defendant-appellant is hereby DISMISSED.
xxx
Costs against plaintiff-appellee.
That I, FERMINA A. LOPEZ, of legal age, Filipino, widow of Pedro C. Lopez
and a resident of Port San Pedro, Cebu City, Philippines, am the SO ORDERED.[16]
AWARDEE of Lots Nos. 4, 5, 3-B, 3-C and 6-B, Sgs-3451 And being the
winning bidder at the auction sale of these parcels by the Bureau of Petitioner sought reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA.[17]
Lands held on May 12, 1982, at the price of P150.00 per square meter
taking a purchase price of P282,900.00 for the tract; That I have made as Hence, the instant petition for certiorari seasonably filed on the
my partial payment the sum of P28,290.00 evidenced by Official Receipt following grounds:
No. 1357764-B representing ten (10%) per cent of my bid, leaving a I.
balance of P254,610.00 that shall be in not more than ten (10) years at
an equal installments of P25,461.00 beginning June 17, 1983 until the
full amount is paid. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR,
REFLECTIVE OF UNMINDFUL RECKLESSNESS WHICH IS THE VERY
OPPOSITE OF JUDICIAL CIRCUMSPECTION, IN DECLARING THAT THE
the Transferee Mrs. Amelita L. Sola, agrees to assume, all the DEED OF DONATION DATED JANUARY 4, 1984 (ANNEX C) IN FAVOR OF
obligations, duties and conditions imposed upon the Awardee in relation PETITIONER WAS EMBODIED ONLY IN A PRIVATE DOCUMENT (Page 6,
to the MSA Application No. V-81066 entered in their records as Sales Decision, Annex A), ALTHOUGH, BY A MERE CASUAL LOOK AT THE
Entry No. 20476. DOCUMENT, IT CAN BE READILY DISCERNED THAT IT IS NOTARIZED;

[I] hereby declare that I accept this Deed of Self-Adjudication and II.
Transfer of Rights and further agree to all conditions provided therein.[5]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
Amelita assumed payment of the lot to the Bureau of Lands. She APPLYING ON THE CASE AT BAR THE PRINCIPLE IN LAW THAT IT IS
paid a total amount of P282,900.[6] REGISTRATION OF THE SALES PATENT THAT CONSTITUTE THE
On April 7, 1989, the Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the OPERATIVE ACT THAT WOULD CONVEY OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND TO
transfer of rights and granting the amendment of the application from THE APPLICANT (Pp. 3-6, Decision, Annex A) BECAUSE THE LEGAL
Fermina to Amelita.[7] On May 2, 1989, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) CONTROVERSY BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT DOES NOT
No. 3439 was issued in favor of Amelita.[8] INVOLVE CONFLICTING CLAIMS ON SALES PATENT APPLICATIONS;

On June 24, 1993,[9] herein petitioner filed Civil Case No. CEB- III.
14191[10] for reconveyance against Amelita. He claimed that on January 4,
1984, Fermina donated the land to him[11] and immediately thereafter, he
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
took possession of the same. He averred that the donation to him had the
AND COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN MAKING A FINDING THAT
effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita.[12]
RESPONDENT ACQUIRED THE LAND IN QUESTION, IN GOOD FAITH (Page
For her part, Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is 7, Decision, Annex A), ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO BASIS NOR NEED TO
void because Fermina was no longer the owner of the property when it MAKE SUCH A FINDING; and
was allegedly donated to petitioner, the property having been transferred
 IV. of Amelita Sola in acquiring the title is devoid of evidentiary support. For
one, the execution of public documents, as in the case of Affidavits of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption of regularity, hence
ENUNCIATING THAT POSSESSION MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 1544 OF THE convincing evidence is required to assail and controvert them.[25] Second,
NEW CIVIL CODE INCLUDE SYMBOLIC POSSESSION, UPON WHICH THE it is undisputed that OCT No. 3439 was issued in 1989 in the name of
APPELLATE COURT BASED ITS CONCLUSION THAT RESPONDENT WAS Amelita. It requires more than petitioners bare allegation to defeat the
FIRST IN POSSESSION BECAUSE THE DEED OF SELF-ADJUDICATION AND Original Certificate of Title which on its face enjoys the legal presumption
TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT DATED MAY 28, 1983 of regularity of issuance.[26] A Torrens title, once registered, serves as
WAS EXECUTED MUCH EARLIER THAN THE DEED OF DONATION IN notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice and no one can
FAVOR OF PETITIONER DATED JANUARY 4, 1984 (Pages 7-8, Decision, plead ignorance of its registration.[27]
Annex A).[18] Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the
disputed property in bad faith, only the State can institute reversion
The crucial issue to be resolved in an action for reconveyance proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act.[28] Thus:
is: Who between petitioner and respondent has a better claim to the
land? Sec. 101.All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the
To prove she has a better claim, respondent Amelita Sola submitted public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
a copy of OCT No. 3439 in her name and her husbands,[19] a Deed of Self- Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts,
Adjudication and Transfer of Rights[20] over the property dated 1983 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
executed by Fermina in her favor, and a certification from the municipal
treasurer that she had been declaring the land as her and her husbands In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for
property for tax purposes since 1993.[21] reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling a free
patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis
For his part, petitioner Castorio Alvarico presented a Deed of thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the
Donation[22] dated January 4, 1984, showing that the lot was given to him public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead
by Fermina and according to him, he immediately took possession in 1985 may do so.[29] Since Amelita Solas title originated from a grant by the
and continues in possession up to the present. [23] government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the
Petitioner further contests the CA ruling that declared as a private grantee.[30] Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the
document said Deed of Donation dated January 4, 1984, despite the fact validity of Amelitas title. It follows that he cannot recover the property
that a certified true and correct copy of the same was obtained from the because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the rightful owner
Notarial Records Office, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City on June 11, 1993 thereof.
and acknowledged before Atty. Numeriano Capangpangan, then Notary Anent petitioners contention that it was the intention of Fermina
Public for Cebu.[24] for Amelita to hold the property in trust for him, we held that if this was
Given the circumstances in this case and the contentions of the really the intention of Fermina, then this should have been clearly stated
parties, we find that no reversible error was committed by the appellate in the Deed of Self-Adjudication executed in 1983, in the Deed of
court in holding that herein petitioners complaint against respondent Donation executed in 1984, or in a subsequent instrument. Absent any
should be dismissed. The evidence on record and the applicable law persuasive proof of that intention in any written instrument, we are not
indubitably favor respondent. prepared to accept petitioners bare allegation concerning the donors
state of mind.
Petitioner principally relies on Articles 744 and 1544 of the New Civil
Code, which provide: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 54624 is hereby AFFIRMED. The complaint filed by herein
petitioner against respondent in Civil Case No. CEB-14191 is declared
Art. 744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different donees
properly DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
shall be governed by the provisions concerning the sale of the same
thing to two or more different persons. SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., and Corona,

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees,
JJ., concur.
the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first
taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the

person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person

who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner claims that respondent was in bad faith when she

registered the land in her name and, based on the abovementioned rules,
he has a better right over the property because he was first in material
possession in good faith. However, this allegation of bad faith on the part
 their allegation.14 Further, the determination of their rights to succession
must be established in special proceedings.15
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172720, September 14, 2015 The trial court also ruled that "[t]he sale was null and void because it was
ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITA P. MALTOS, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF within the five (5) year prohibitionary [sic] period"16 under the Public Land
EUSEBIO BORROMEO, Respondents. Act.17 The defense of indefeasibility of title was unavailing because the
DECISION title to the property stated that it was "subject to the provisions of
LEONEN, J.: Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124"18 of the Public Land Act.19 Since the
property was sold within the five-year prohibitory period, such transfer
"result[ed] in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land
The sale of a parcel of agricultural land covered by a free patent during
to the public domain."20
the five-year prohibitory period under the Public Land Act is void.
Reversion of the parcel of land is proper. However, reversion under
As to the defense of in pari delicto, the trial court ruled against its
Section 101 of the Public Land Act is not automatic. The Office of the
applicability,21 citing Egao v. Court of Appeals (Ninth Division).22
Solicitor General must first file an action for reversion.
The rule of pari delicto non oritur action (where two persons are equally
On February 13, 1979, Eusebio Borromeo was issued Free Patent No.
at fault neither party may be entitled to relief under the law), admits of
586681 over a piece of agricultural land located in San Francisco, Agusan
1 exceptions and does not apply to an inexistent contract, such as, a sale
del Sur, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-9053.
void ab initio under the Public Land Act, when its enforcement or
application runs counter to the public policy of preserving the grantee's
On June 15, 1983, well within the five-year prohibitory period, Eusebio
2 right to the land under the homestead law.23 (Citation
Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo Maltos.
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Eusebio Borromeo died on January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed that prior
to his death, he allegedly told his wife, Norberta Borromeo,3 and his The trial court further held that since the sale was null and void, no title
children to nullify the sale made to Eliseo Maltos and have the Transfer passed from Eusebio Borromeo to Eliseo Maltos.24 The dispositive portion
Certificate of Title No. T-5477 cancelled because the sale was within the of the trial court's Decision states:
five-year prohibitory period.4
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the complaint under consideration is
On June 23, 1993, Norberta Borromeo and her children (heirs of hereby ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Borromeo) filed a Complaint for Nullity of Title and Reconveyance of Title
against Eliseo Maltos, Rosita Maltos, and the Register of Deeds of Agusan SO ORDERED.25
del Sur.5 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 946.6
On appeal, the heirs of Borromeo argued that they were able to prove
Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos (Maltos Spouses) filed their Answer,
their status as heirs through the testimony of their mother, Norberta
arguing that the sale was made in good faith and that in purchasing the
Borromeo.26
property, they relied on Eusebio Borromeo's title. Further, the parties
were in pari delicto. Since the sale was made during the five-year
The heirs of Borromeo also argued that the trial court should have
prohibitory period, the land would revert to the public domain and the
ordered the "revival of [Original Certificate of Title] No. P-9053 in the
proper party to institute reversion proceedings was the Office of the
name of the Heirs of EUSEBIO BORROMEO."27
Solicitor General.7
The Court of Appeals28 reversed the Decision of the trial court and held
The Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur also filed an Answer, arguing that
that since Eusebio Borromeo sold his property within the five-year
the deed of sale was presented for Registration after the five-year
prohibitory period, the property should revert to the state.29 However,
prohibitory period, thus, it was ministerial on its part to register the
the government has to file an action for reversion because "reversion is
deed.8
not automatic."30 While there is yet no action for reversion instituted by
the Office of the Solicitor General, the property should be returned to the
The heirs of Borromeo countered that good faith was not a valid defense
heirs of Borromeo.31 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals'
because the prohibitory period appeared on the face of the title of the
Decision states:
property.9

The Regional Trial Court10 of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur narrowed down WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is GRANTED. The
the issues to the following: Decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 946 is hereby SET ASIDE and
another one is entered (1) ordering Appellee ELISEO MALTOS to reconvey
the property subject matter of this litigation to Appellants upon the
1. Whether or not the herein plaintiffs are the legal heirs of the late
refund by the latter to Appellee ELISEO MALTOS the sum of P36,863.00,
Eusebio Borromeo.
all expenses for the reconveyance to be borne by the buyer, ELISEO
MALTOS, herein Appellee and (2) ordering the Register of Deeds of
2. Whether or not the sale of the disputed property within the prohibitory
11 Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur to cancel TCT No. T-5477 and revive OCT No.
period is valid or binding.
P-9053.

The trial court dismissed the Complaint on the ground of failure to state
a cause of action.12 Also, the heirs of Borromeo did not have a right of
action because they were unable to establish their status as heirs of the
late Eusebio Borromeo.13 They may have declared themselves the legal
heirs of Eusebio Borromeo, but they did not present evidence to prove
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished! the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) for its information and appropriate action and to inform this court
within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt hereof of the action done
under the premises.
 In addition, the Maltos Spouses pray for the reimbursement of the value
SO ORDERED.32 (Emphasis supplied) of the improvements on the property to prevent unjust enrichment on
the part of the heirs of Borromeo.64 The Maltos Spouses enumerate the
following circumstances to show why they should be reimbursed:
The Maltos Spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that since
the prohibition on transfers of property is provided by law, only the heirs
of Borromeo should be punished.33 Punishment, in this case, would come a. EUSEBIO has already long received and enjoyed the amount of the
in the form of preventing the heirs of Borromeo from re-acquiring the purchase price of the subject land from petitioners.
land.34 Instead, the land should revert back to the state.35 The Maltos
Spouses also prayed that they be reimbursed for the improvements they b. The value of the purchase price of PHP36,863.00 paid in 1983 have
introduced on the land.36 Assuming that they would be found to be also since then greatly depreciated. If petitioners had deposited that money
at fault, the principle of in pari delicto should apply.37 in bank or loaned it to another person instead of purchasing EUSEBIO's
property, it would have at least earned some interest. However, the Court
The Court of 38
Appeals denied the Motion for of Appeals incorrectly assumed that the return of the purchase price
Reconsideration, reasoning that it could not rule on the issue of who would
39 be sufficient compensation to the petitioners.
between the parties had the better right to the property. 40 Also, it was
the government who should decide whether the heirs of Borromeo c. The value of the improvements introduced by petitioners on the subject
"should retain ownership of the land."41 With regard to the applicability property is much greater than the purchase price that they initially paid
of the in pari delicto doctrine, the Court of Appeals held that in pari delicto on the land. Petitioners estimate the value of the improvements,
does not apply in cases where its application will violate the policy of the including hundreds of various fruit-bearing trees and four residential
state.42 houses, to be at least PHP900,000.00. Because of these improvements,
not only can respondents sell the land at a much higher price, they can
On May 10, 2006, the Maltos Spouses |filed a Petition for Review before even sell the improvements and profit from them. It would be the height
43

this court, questioning the Decision and Resolution of the Court of of injustice if all the petitioners would receive in turning over the subject
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77142.44 property to the respondents is the purchase price that was previously
paid EUSEBIO under the deed of sale.65ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This court, in a Resolution45 dated July 5, 2006, required the heirs of
Borromeo to file their Comment. On the other hand, the heirs of Borromeo argue that the testimonies of
Norberta Borromeo and Susan Borromeo Morales on their relationship to
The heirs of Borromeo filed their Comment,46 which was noted by this Eusebio Borromeo were not refuted by the Malios Spouses. Thus, they
court in a Resolution47 dated September 25, 2006. In the same Resolution, were able to prove their status as heirs. 66
this court required the Maltos Spouses to file their Reply. 48
The heirs of Borromeo also argue that the in pari delicto rule is not
In a Resolution dated March 28, 2007, this court required Attys. Ma. applicable because in Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, et
Cherell L. De Castro and Gener C. Sansaet, counsels for the Maltos al.,67 this court stated that the in pari delicto rule does not apply if its
Spouses, to show cause why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with application will have the effect of violating public policy.68
for their failure to file a Reply. They were also required to comply with the
Resolution dated September 25, 2006.50 With regard to the claim for reimbursements, the heirs of Borromeo
argue that the Maltos Spouses did not raise their claim for reimbursement
Counsels for the Maltos Spouses filed a] Compliance,51 together with the in their Answer to the Complaint. They are now barred from claiming
Reply.52 In a Resolution53dated August 15, 2007, this court noted and reimbursement since this was not raised at the first instance.69
accepted the Compliance, and also noted the Reply.
Based on the arguments of the parties, the issues for resolution are:
I
First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Decision of the
The Maltos Spouses argue that the heirs of Borromeo did not present trial court and ordering the reconveyance of the property from
evidence to prove that they are indeed the heirs of Eusebio Borromeo. petitioners Spouses Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos to respondents heirs
The heirs of Borromeo did not present the death certificate of Eusebio of Eusebio Borromeo;cralawlawlibrary
Borromeo, the marriage certificate of Eusebio Borromeo and Norberta
Borromeo, or any of the birth certificates of the children of Second, whether the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the doctrine
Eusebio.54 While Norberta Borromeo and two of her children of in pari delicto; and
testified,55 their testimonies should be considered as self-serving.56 The
Maltos Spouses cite Article 17257 of the Family Code, which enumerates Finally, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners
how filiation may be established.58 Spouses Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos are not entitled to
reimbursement for the improvements they introduced on the land.
The Maltos Spouses also contest the Court of Appeals' ruling stating that
they did not rebut the testimonies of the heirs of Borromeo because they II
continuously argued that the heirs of Borromeo were unable to prove
their status as heirs.59 The five-year period prohibiting the sale of land obtained under
homestead or free patent is provided under Section 118 of the Public
The Maltos Spouses further argue that it was error for the Court of Land Act, which states:
Appeals not to apply the in pari delicto rule, considering that the sale
violated Section 11860 of the Public Land Act.61 Since both parties are at SECTION 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches,
fault, it follows that Article 141262 of the Civil Code applies.63 units, or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands
acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject
to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the
application and for a term of five years from and after the date of
issuance1 of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period;
but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged] or
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his
widow or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from the terms of
the statute.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The effect of violating the five-year prohibitory period is provided under
Section 124 of the Public Land Act, which provides:

The reason for prohibiting the alienation or encumbrance of properties SECTION 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other
covered by patent or grant was explained in Metropolitan Bank and Trust contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections
Company v. Viray.70 one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and
twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-
In Metropolitan Bank, Edgardo D. Viray and his wife contracted several three of this. Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution
loans with Metrobank which they failed to pay.71 Metrobank filed a and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title,
Complaint for sum of money before the Regional Trial Court in patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or
Manila.72 In 1982, during the pendency of the case, free patents over presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its
three parcels of land were issued in favor of Viray.73 The Complaint for improvements to the State.
sum of money was decided in 1983 in favor of Metrobank.74 In 1984, the
trial court issued a writ of execution over the parcels of land.75 An auction
In this case, Section 10187 of the Public Land Act is applicable since title
sale was held, and Metrobank emerged as the winning bidder.76 Viray
already vested in Eusebio Borromeo's name. Both the trial court and the
filed an action for annulment of sale.77 This court ruled that the auction
78 Court of Appeals found that the sale was made within the five-year
sale was made within the five-year prohibitory period and explained
prohibitory period. Thus, there is sufficient cause to revert the property
that:
in favor of the state. However, this court cannot declare reversion of the
property in favor of the state in view of the limitation imposed by Section
[T]he main purpose in the grant of a freq patent of homestead is to
101 that an action for reversion must first be filed by the Office of the
preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public
Solicitor General.
land which the State has given to him so he may have a place to live with
his family and become a happy citizen and a useful member of the society.
III
In Jocson v. Soriano, we held that the conservation of a family home is the
purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster, families
The doctrine of in pari delicto non oritur actio is inapplicable when public
as the foundation of society, and thus promote general welfare. . . .
policy will be violated.
Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is predicated on public policy. Its
constitute criminal offenses.
violation gives rise to the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of
the land and its improvements to the government at the instance of the
The in pari delicto rule is provided under Articles 1411 and 1412 of the
latter. The provision that "nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction
Civil Code. Article 1411 pertains to acts that constitute criminal offenses,
of any debt contracted prior to that expiration of the five-year period" is
while Article 1412 pertains to acts that do not These provisions state:
mandatory and any sale made in violation of such provision is void and
produces no effect whatsoever, just like what transpired in this case.
Clearly, it is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what ART. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or
public policy by law seeks to preserve.79 (Citations omitted) object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both
parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other,
and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,80 Josefina L. Morato applied for free relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime shall be
patent over a parcel which was granted.81 Morato mortgaged and leased applicable to the things or the price of the contract.
a portion of the land within the five-year prohibitory period.82Later on, it
would also be discovered that Morato's land formed part of Calauag This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; but the
Bay.83 The Republic filed a Complaint for cancellation of title and innocent one may claim what he has given, and shall not be bound to
reversion of the parcel of land.84 This court held that "lease" and comply with his promise.
"mortgage" were encumbrances on the parcel of land. 85 This court also
discussed the policy behind the five-year prohibitory period: ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists
does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute observed:
disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their
home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State (1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may
prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the
five years after the grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law performance of the other's undertaking;cralawlawlibrary
impliedly permits alienation of the homestead; but in line with the
primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family the statute (2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover
provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfilment of
to the right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within what has been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand
five years. This section 117 is undoubtedly a complement of Section 116. the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his
It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion promise.
of public land which the State had gratuitously given to him. It would,
therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold,
Santos involved the sale of a parcel of land within the five-year
that the right to repurchase exists not only when the original
prohibitory period.88 The Roman Catholic Church raised the defense of in would then stand in the way of the ousted squatter from re-claiming his
pari delicto.89 It was also argued by the Rornan Catholic Church that the prior possession at all cost.
effect of the sale would be the reversion of the] property to the
state.90 This court held that: Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what ejectment
cases or actions for recovery of possession seek to prevent. Even the
Section 124 of the Public Land Act indeed provides that any acquisition, owner who has title over the disputed property cannot take the law into
conveyance or transfer executed in violation of any of its provisions shall his own hands to regain possession of his property. The owner must go to
be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling court.96 (Citation omitted)
the grant or patent and cause the reversion of the property to the State,
and the principle of pari delicto has been applied by this Court in a In Loria v. Muñoz, Jr.,97 Carlos Loria asked Ludolfo Muñoz, Jr. "to advance
number of cases wherein the parties to a transaction have proven to be [P]2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of a [P]50,000,000.00 river-dredging
guilty of effected the transaction with knowledge of the cause of its project in Guinobatan."98 Loria informed Muñoz that the project would
invalidity. But we doubt if these principles can now be invoked be awarded to Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation, and
considering the philosophy and the policy behind the approval of the Sunwest would subcontract to Muñoz.99 Muñoz agreed to Loria's
Public Land Act. The principle underlying pari delicto as known here and proposal.100 When the river-dredging project was finished, Loria did not
in the United States is not absolute in its application. It recognizes certain return the P2,000,000.00 despite Muñoz's demand.101 Complaint for sum
exceptions one of them being when its enforcement or application runs of money.102 Loria raised the argument that Muñoz "should not be
counter to an avowed fundamental policy or to public interest. As stated allowed to recover the money"103 since they were in pari delicto.104 This
by us in the Rellosa case, "This doctrine is subject to one important court held that under the principle of unjust enrichment, the sum of
limitation, namely, [']whenever public policy is considered advanced by money should be returned.105 In so ruling, this court cited Gonzalo v.
allowing either party to sue for relief against the transaction[']" Tarnate, Jr.106 where it was explained that:

The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted
. . . the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An
to. Here appellee desires to nullify a transaction which was done in
accepted exception arises when its application contravenes well-
violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would apply to
established public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been
her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale with the
defined as "that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen
presumed knowledge of its illegality, but because the subject of the
can lawfully do that which has a tendency to hi injurious to the public or
transaction is a piece of public land, public policy requires that she, as heir,
against the public good."ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
be not prevented from re-acquiring it because it was given by law to her
family for her home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., "when a
homestead law is predicated. This right cannot be waived. "It is not within person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person
the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles
seeks to preserve." We are, therefore, constrained to hold that appellee of justice, equity and good conscience." The prevention of unjust
can maintain the present action it being in furtherance of this enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State, for Article 22 of the
fundamental aim of our homestead law.91 (Emphasis supplied, citations Civil Code explicitly provides that "[e]very person who through an act of
omitted) performance by another, or any other meins, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him." It is wel I to note that Article 22 "is
The non-application of the in pari delicto rule where public policy would
part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions
be violated has also been applied in other cases.
of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,92 this court held that in pari delicto "is not
social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
[applicable to [e]jectment [c]ases"93 and cited Drilon v. Gaurana,94 which
fountain of good conscience; guides for human conduct that should run
discussed the policy behind ejectment cases:
as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its
supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of
It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and justice."107ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out
by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution As the in pari delicto rule is not applicable, the question now arises as to
the object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal who between the parties have a better right to possess the subject parcel
disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the of land. This issue was addressed in Santos:
reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage
must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the better
the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather thanentitled to the possession of the land while the government does not take
to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their steps to assert its title to the homestead. Upon annulment of the sale, the
claims.95ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary purchaser's claim is reduced to the purchase price and its interest. As
against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is no more entitled to keep
the land than any intruder. Such is the situation of the appellants. Their
This court elucidated that:
right to remain in possession of the land is no better than that of appellee
and, therefore, they should not be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice
Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of of appellee during and until the government takes steps toward its
ejectment between squatters is fraught with danger. To shut out relief to reversion to the State.108 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
squatters on the ground of pari delicto would openly invite mayhem and
lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter from possession of
109
the lot that the latter had illegally occupied, emboldened by the In Binayug v. Ugaddan, which involved the sale of two properties
knowledge that the courts would leave them where they are. Nothing covered by a homestead patent,110this court cited jurisprudence showing
that in cases involving the sale of a property covered by the five-year made thereon in the same manner that Appellants should lose the value
prohibitory period, the property should be returned to the grantee. 111 of the products gathered by the Appellees from the said land.118

Applying the ruling in Santos and Binayug, this court makes it clear that
The Court of Appeals cited Angeles, et at v. Court of Appeals, et
petitioners have no better right to remain in possession of the property
al.119 and Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court.120 In Angeles, this
against respondents.
court discussed that:
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that while there is yet no
The question that now poses is whether the return of the value of the
action for reversion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
products gathered from the land by the defendants and the expenses
property should be conveyed by petitioners to respondents.
incurred in the construction of the dike—all useful and necessary
expenses—should be ordered to be returned by the defendants to the
III
plaintiffs. While we believe that the rule of in pari delicto should not apply
to the sale of the homestead, because such sale is contrary to the public
Petitioners' argument that respondents failed to establish their status as
policy enunciated in the homestead law, the loss of the products realized
heirs is belied by their admissions during trial and in their pleadings.
by the defendants and the value of the necessary improvements made
Petitioners t know the identity of Eusebio Borromeo's wife. As quoted in
by them on the land should not be excepted from the application of the
the trial court's Decision, petitioners alleged in their Answer that:
said rule because no cause or reason can be cited to justify an exception.
It has been held that the rule of in pari delicto is inapplicable only where
[I]t was the late Eusebio Borromeo and his wife who came along in the same violates a well-established public policy.
Bayugan 2, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, requesting the said defendants
to purchase their land because they badly need money and . . . .
notwithstanding the fact that they have a little amount and out of pity
bought the said land.112ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary We are constrained to hold that the heirs of the homesteader should be
declared to have lost and forfeited the value of the products gathered
In the Reply, respondents alleged: from the land, and so should the defendants lose the value of the
necessary improvements that they have made
121
The allegation that the late Eusebio Borrjomeo and his wife went to thereon. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Bayugan II, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur in order to sell the land to the
defendant Eliseo Maltos has no factual basis, the truth of the matter is In Arsenal, the property covered by a homestead patent had been sold to
that the late Eusebio Borromeo, together with defendant Eliseo Maltos Suralta in 1957,122 while the Complaint was filed before the trial court in
went to Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat to secure the signature of the wife.113 1974.123 The case was decided by this court in 1986.124Thus, Suralta had
been in possession of the property for approximately 17 years before a
In addition, when petitioner Eliseo Maltos was presented in court, he Complaint was filed. This court held that:
identified the signatures of the witnesses on the deed of sale as the
signatures of Eusebio Borromeo's children, namely, Susan, Ana, and The value of any improvements made on the land and the interests on
Nicolas Borromeo.114 the purchase price are compensated by the fruits the respondent Suralta
and his heirs received from their long possession of the
Respondents' allegation that they are the heirs of Borromeo is admitted homestead.125ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
by petitioners. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that "the
fact that Appellants [referring to respondents] are the spouse and Angeles and Arsenal both involved the sale of a parcel of land covered by
children of the late EUSEBIO remains unrebutted."115 a homestead patent within the five-year prohibitory period. These cases
also involved the introduction of improvements on the parcel of land by
IV the buyer.

With regard to the claim for reimbursement, respondents argue that it Restating the rulings in Angeles and Arsenal, this court finds that while
was not raised as a counterclaim in the Answer to the Complaint. the rule on in pari delicto does not apply policy, if its effect is to violate
public policy it is applicable with regard to value of the
During trial, petitioner Eliseo Maltos testified that when he entered the improvements introduced by petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Petitioners had
land, there were around 100 trees, including coconut trees and a few been in possession of the land for 20 years before the heirs of Borromeo
banana trees. He then planted additional coconut trees which, at the time filed a Complaint. The expenses incurred by petitioners in introducing
of the trial, were already bearing fruit.116 Petitioner Eliseo Maltos' improvements on the land for which they seek reimbursement should
testimony was not rebutted by respondents. already be compensated by the fruits they received from the
improvements.
The general rule is that "[a] compulsory counterclaim . . . not set up shall
be barred."117 Further, the computation of the value of the improvements V
on the land entails findings of fact.
Reversion is a remedy provided under Section 101 of the Public Land Act:
In any case, the Court of Appeals did not err when it stated in its
Resolution dated April 7, 2006 that:
SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of
the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
With respect to Appellees' claim for the reimbursement of the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in
improvements on the land in question, they are hereby declared to have the name of Commonwealth of the Philippines.
lost and forfeited the value of the necessary improvements that they
The purpose of reversion is "to restore public land fraudulently awarded We clarify that the remedy of reversion is not the same as the remedy of
and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of declaration of nullity of free patents and certificate of title. In reversion,
public domain."126 the "allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the
disputed land[,]"149 while in an action for the declaration of nullity of free
The general rule is that reversion of lands to the state is not automatic, patent and certificate of title, the allegations would include "plaintiffs
and the Office of the Solicitor General is the proper party to file an action ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of [the] free patent
for reversion. and certificate of title[.]"150

In Villacorta v. Ulanday,127 defendant-appellee Vicente Ulanday admitted Since an action for reversion presupposes that the property in dispute is
that his purchase of a parcel of land covered by a homestead patent was owned by the state, it is proper that the action be filed by the Office of
made within the five-year prohibitory period, but argued that since the the Solicitor General, being the real party-in-interest.
sale was in violation of law,128 the property should automatically revert to
the state.129 This court held that reversion was not automatic, and There is, however, an exception to the rule that reversion is not
government must file an appropriate action so that the land may be automatic. Section 29 of the Public Land Act provides:
reverted to the state.130
SECTION 29. After the cultivation of the land has begun, the purchaser,
Ortega v. Tan131 involved the sale and mortgage of a parcel of land with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may
covered by a free patent.132 The series of transactions for the sale and convey or encumber his rights to any person, corporation, or association
mortgage of the property had been initiated within the five-year legally qualified under this Act to purchase agricultural public lands,
prohibitory period but was finalized after the prohibitory period. 133 This provided such conveyance or encumbrance does not affect any right or
court held that the sale and mortgage violated Section 118 of the Public interest of the Government in the land: And provided, further, That the
Land Act and that reversion was proper.134 This court also clarified that: transferee is not delinquent in the payment of any installment due and
payable. Any sale and encumbrance made without the previous approval
[Reversion] is not automatic. The government has to take action to cancel of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void and
the patent and the certificate of title in order that the land involved may shall produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the
be reverted to it. Correspondingly, any new transaction would be subject property and all rights to the State, and all payments on the purchase price
to whatever steps the government may take for the reversion to theretofore made to the Government shall be forfeited. After the sale has
it.135 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary been approved, the vendor shall not lose his right to acquire agricultural
public lands under the provisions of this Act, provided he has the
necessary qualifications. (Emphasis supplied)
Alvarico v. Solau136 involved a miscellaneous sales application over a
parcel of land by Fermina Lopez.137Subsequently, Lopez executed a deed
of self-adjudication and transfer of rights in favor of Amelita Sola. 138 The In Francisco v. Rodriguez, et al,151 this court differentiated reversion
Bureau of Lands approved the transfer of rights, and title was issued in under Sections 29 and 101 of the Public Land Act.152 This court explained
Sola's name.139Castorio Alvarico then filed an action for reconveyance, that reversion under Section 29 is self-operative, unlike Section 101 which
claiming that the parcel of land was donated to him.140 He also alleged requires the Office of the Solicitor General to institute reversion
that Sola acquired the property in bad faith.141 This court held that proceedings.153 Also, Section 101 applies in cases where "title has already
Alvarico's allegation of bad faith was not supported by evidence and that vested in the individual[.]"154 The Director of Lands sought to execute the
in any case, "only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Decision in Francisco v. Rodriguez which petitioner Ursula Francisco
Sec[tion] 101 of the Public Land Act."142 This court restated Section 101 opposed, arguing that only 29 hectares were reverted to the state since
of the Public Land Act: she was in possession of the remaining four hectares.155 This court held
that the entire property reverted to the state.156 This court also explained
[A] private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action why Francisco v. Rodriguez was covered by Section 29 and not Section
which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the 101 of the Public Land Act:
corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the
land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only the By transgressing the law, i.e., allowing herself to be a dummy in the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since [the] acquisition of the land and selling the same without the previous approval
title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, plaintiff-appellant
matter between the grantor and the grantee. 143 (Citations herself [referring to Ursula Francisco] has eliminated the very source
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary (Sales Application) of her claim to Lot No. 595, as a consequence of which,
she cannot later assert any right or interest thereon. This is the imperative
import of the pronouncements in G.R. No. L-8263 and in G.R. No. L-15605
The rule in Alvarico was cited in Cawis, et al. v. Hon. Cerilles, et
that the invalidity of the conveyance by plaintiff-appellant "produced as
al.144 In Cawis, the validity of a sales patent and original certificate of title
a consequence the reversion of the property with all rights thereto to the
over a parcel of land in Baguio was questioned.145 This court denied the
146 State." As a matter of fact, Section 29 of the Public Land Law
Petition and ruled that the Complaint was actually a reversion suit,
(Commonwealth Act No. 141) expressly ordains that any sale and
which can be filed only by the Office of the Solicitor General or a person
encumbrance made without the previous approval of the Secretary of
acting in its stead.147
Agriculture and Natural Resources "shall be null and void and shall
produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting property and
It was also discussed in Cawis that:
all rights thereto to the State, and all payments on the purchase price
theretofore made to the Government shall be forfeited." . . . .
The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the cancellation
of the certificate of title an|l the resulting reversion of the land covered
In fact, even if a sales application were already given due course by the
by the title to the State| This is why an action for reversion is oftentimes
148
Director of Lands, the applicant is not thereby conferred any right over
designated asj an annulment suit or a cancellation suit.
the land covered by the application. It is the award made by the Director
to the applicant (if he is the highest bidder) that confers upon him a
certain right over the land, namely, "to take possession of the land so that
he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law." It is at this
stage, when the award is made, that the land can be considered "disposed
of by the Government," since the aforestated right of the applicant has
the effect of withdrawing the land from the public domain that is
"disposable" by the Director of Lands under the provisions of the Public
Land Act. . . . However, the disposition is merely provisional because the
applicant has still to comply with the requirements prescribed by law
before . . . . any patent is issued. After the requisites of the law are
complied with by the applicant to the satisfaction of the Director [of]
Lands, the patent is issued. It is then that the land covered by the
application may be considered "permanently disposed of by the
Government."157 (Citations omitted)

In this case, a free patent over the subject parcel of land was issued to
Eusebio Borromeo. This shows that he already had title to the property
when he sold it to petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Thus, Section 101 of the Public
Land Act applies.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is denied, and the Decision and Resolution of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77142 are AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to the appropriate institution of a case for reversion.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General
for its appropriate action with respect to the reversion of the land in
question.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ. , concur.


THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 147148 January 13, 2003
PILAR Y. GOYENA, petitioner,
vs.
AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO, respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the Court of Appeals June 19, 2000 Decision which affirmed that of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 149 in Special Proceeding
No. N-4375 appointing herein respondent Amparo Ledesma Gustilo as
guardian over the person and property of her sister Julieta Ledesma, Pilar
Y. Goyena, Julieta's close friend and companion of more than 60 years,
comes to this Court on petition for review on certiorari.
On July 8, 1996, respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a "PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP"1 over the person and properties of her sister
Julieta, the pertinent allegations of which read:
2. That for the most part during the year 1995 and 1996, Julieta
Ledesma has been a patient in the Makati Medical Center
where she is under medical attention for old age, general
debility, and a "mini"-stroke which she suffered in the United
States in early 1995;
3. That Julieta Ledesma is confined to her bed and can not get
up from bed without outside assistance, and she has to be
moved by wheel chair;
4. That Julieta Ledesma owns real estate and personal
properties in Metro Manila and in Western Visayas, with an
aggregate estimated assessed and par value of P1 Million
By Decision2 of October 4, 1996, the trial court found Julieta
Pesos[;]
"incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property"
and appointed respondent as guardian of her person and properties,
5. That Julieta Ledesma is not in a position to care for herself, ratiocinating as follows:
and that she needs the assistance of a guardian to manage her
interests in on-going corporate and agricultural enterprises;
6. That the nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma are her sisters of
the full blood, namely, petitioner Amparo Ledesma Gustilo,
Teresa Ledesma (aka. Sister Cristina of the Religious of the
Assumption, and Loreto Ledesma Mapa, all of whom have given
their consent to the filing of this petition as shown by their
signatures at the bottom of this petition[;]
7. That petitioner has extensive experience in business
management of commercial, agricultural and corporate
enterprises, many of which are in the same entities where
Julieta Ledesma holds an interest, and that she is in a position
to monitor and supervise the delivery of vitally needed medical
services to Julieta Ledesma whether in the Metro Manila area,
or elsewhere.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship.
She later filed an Amended Opposition on August 15, 1996 reading in part:
2.03 The petition lacked factual and legal basis in that Julieta
Ledesma is competent and sane and there is absolutely no need
to appoint a guardian to take charge of her person/property.
She is very able to take charge of her affairs, and this is clearly
evident from her letters to the petitioner. Copies of her recent
letters are herewith attached as Annexes "A" to "E."
xxx xxx xxx
2.05 Petitioner is not fit to be appointed as the guardian of
Julieta Ledesma since their interests are antagonistic (Sudler v.
Sudler, 121 Md. 46. 49 L.R.A. 800, as cited in vol. V-B Francisco
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 93, Section 4, p. 414).
xxx xxx xxx
3.01 The above captioned petition should be dismissed for utter
lack of legal and/or factual basis.
3.02 In the remote event that this Honorable Court should find
that Julieta Ledesma is incompetent and resolve that there is
need to appoint a guardian over her person and property, this
Honorable Court should appoint as such guardian:
1. Oppositor Goyena;
2. Bart Lacson;
3. Fely Montelibano;
4. Jose T. Revilla; or
5. a qualified and reputable person as may be
determined fit by this Honorable Court.
A perusal of the records shows that petitioner (Amparo) is 72
years of age, the youngest sister of Julieta. Admittedly, the
Oppositor Pilar Goyena, 90 years of age has been the close
friend and companion of Julieta for 61 years. Julieta was with
Oppositor when she suffered her first stroke in Makati in 1991
which was the reason why Julieta had to give up the
management of their hacienda in Bacolod. It is also not disputed
that Julieta was with Pilar when she had her second stroke in
the U.S. In short, the special bond of friendship existing
between Julieta and the Oppositor cannot be denied. Now that
Julieta is unable to manage her personal life and business
concerns due to senility and "vascular dementia," the oppositor
wants to be appointed her guardian or else Bart Lacson, Fely
Montelibano and Jose T. Revilla.
It is interesting to note that the oppositor has interposed her
objection to the appointment of Amparo as guardian because
she thinks that the latter dislikes her. She further added that
there were a number of letters allegedly written by Julieta to
Amparo which showed Julieta's sentiments regarding certain
matters. Nevertheless, not one of the nearest of kin of Julieta
 opposed the petition. As a matter of fact, her sisters signified
their conformity thereto. Thus, Ms. Goyena's mere conjecture
that Amparo dislikes her is no sufficient reason why the petition
should be denied. Neither does it make Amparo unsuitable and
unfit to perform the duties of a guardian. On the contrary, it is
Ms. Goyena who could be considered as to have an adverse
interest to that of Julieta if it is true that 50% of Julieta's
holdings at the Makati Medical Center has been transferred to
her as alleged in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit A.
By and large, the qualification of Amparo to act as guardian over
the person and properties of Julieta has been duly established.
As a sister, she can best take care of Julieta's concerns and well
being. Now that Julieta is in the twilight of her life, her family
should be given the opportunity to show their love and
affection for her without however denying Pilar Goyena access
to her considering the special bond of friendship between the
two. Needless to say, the oppositor at 90 years of age could not
be said to be physically fit to attend to all the needs of Julieta.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Amparo Gustilo, is hereby appointed
guardian over the person and property of Julieta Ledesma, an
incompetent with all the powers and duties specified under the
law.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision
Accordingly, let letters of guardianship issue to petitioner upon having been denied, she filed the present petition which proffers that:
her filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to guarantee
the performance of the obligations prescribed for general
guardians.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision was,
by Order of November 4, 19963 , denied in this wise:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Oppositor
thru counsel, and finding no merits on the ground stated
therein, considering that petitioner appears to be most
qualified and suitable to act as Julieta Ledesma's guardian after
taking into consideration the qualifications of the oppositor and
her other recomendees [sic], aside from the fact that
petitioner's appointment as such was not objected to by any of
her nearest kin, in contrast to the hostile interest of oppositor,
the same is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal of petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's In the case at bar, the only issue before this Court is whether or not the
decision on the following ratiocination:4 appellate court and the trial court erred in finding that respondent is not
unsuitable for appointment as guardian of the person and properties of
Indeed, oppositor-appellant (Pilar) has not shown the Julieta. In support of an affirmative answer, petitioner posits as follows:
authenticity and due execution of the letters which purport to
show the existence of a rift between Julieta and her family and
dissatisfaction as to how the businesses were managed. At any
rate, while it is correct to say that no person should be
appointed guardian if his interest conflict with those of the
ward (Guerrero vs. Teran, 13 Phil. 212), there are really no
antagonistic interests to speak of between petitioner [Amparo]
and Julieta, they being co-owners of certain properties. There is
also no showing that petitioner's business decisions in the past
had resulted in the prejudice of Julieta.
While the oppositor may have been very close to Julieta, there
is no sufficient showing that petitioner is hostile to the best
interests of the latter. On the contrary, it was the petitioner
who, realizing the need for the appointment of a person to
guard her sister's interests, initiated the petition for
guardianship. We see no indication that petitioner is animated
by a desire to prejudice Julieta's health as well as financial
interests. In point of fact, it was oppositor-appellant who had
initially concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta
from the court. Oppositor's advanced age of 90 years also
militate against her assuming the guardianship of the
incompetent. The oppositor has declared that she is not
interested to be appointed legal guardian (p. 21[,] Appellant's
Brief, Rollo, p. 59). But the persons that she points to as being
better choices as Julieta's guardian over the appellee have not
acted, nor even indicated, their desire to act as such. In any
case, We see no cogent reason why We should reverse the well-
reasoned disquisition of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the
same is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN AFFIRMING
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DATED OCTOBER 4, 1996 AND IN
ISSUING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED JUNE 29, 2000 AND
FEBRUARY 9, 2001.
The petition fails.
It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact are not proper
subjects of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this
mode of appeal is confined to questions of law.5 The test of whether the
question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case it is a question of law; otherwise, it is question of
fact.6
1. The Court of Appeals' basis for its decision that there are no
antagonistic interests between [her] and [respondent] is
contrary to the evidence on record,7
2. The Court of Appeals' erred in holding that there is no
showing that [respondent] is hostile to the best interest of
Julieta,8 and
3. Julieta Ledesma's appointed representatives are most
suitable to be appointed as her guardian.9
Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of petitioner's position properties. Furthermore, he deliberately misinformed the said court that
require a review of the evidence, hence, not proper for consideration in the first mortgagee was the Santa Clara Monastery when it was him. None
the petition at bar. This Court cannot thus be tasked to go over the proofs of the said circumstances obtain in the present case.
presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain
if the trial court and appellate court were correct in according them Petitioner can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta to establish her
superior credit.10 claim that there existed16 a rift between the two which amounts to
antagonistic interests. The first letter17 sent by Julieta to respondent
That the issues raised are factual is in fact admitted by petitioner in her which reads:
Reply dated August 30, 2001:11
x x x So if you (appellee) do not agree with me (Julieta) my
Although the general rule is that this Honorable Court is not a decision is right to let us divide as soon as possible, so we will
trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing and have capital each of us to work, and keep the Hda, for [sic]
revising only errors of law, it is nonetheless subject to the generation to generation.
following exceptions which have been laid down in a number of
decisions of this Honorable Court: xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely For the last time I will repeat even if I have to kneel before you
on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) When and Carlos I have no interest anymore in any future investment
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or due to my age and being single and alone in life. I would like to
impossible; (3) When there is grave abuse of be able to enjoy whatever monies that correspond to me. I
discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a would like to have enough money as a reserve for any future
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of need that I might have like hospitalization, travel, buying
facts are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, whatever I like, etc. etc. (Letter to appellee; Exhibit "2")
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
merely shows Julieta's lack of interest in future investments, not
both appellants and appellee; (7) When the findings
necessarily a business disagreement, and certainly not per se amounting
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
to antagonistic interests between her and respondent to render the latter
trial court; (8) When the findings of facts are
unsuitable for appointment as guardian.
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and The second letter18 which reads:
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals My mind is still clear to tell you about Fortuna when I had my
is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and stroke I was confined in MMC for one month. If I am not
is contradicted by the evidence on record (Emphasis mistaken you did not visit me. One day Carlos came to visit me
supplied); (Rollo, 350–351) and asked me this question. Do you think you will be able to
continue managing the Hda? I answered him I don't know it all
Petitioner claims that "there is no doubt that the instant petition falls depends on my sickness. Carlos said who do you want to take
within the above-stated exceptions because the findings of the Court of your place? I said I want Cheling Zabaljauregui. Then Carlos said
Appeals are clearly belied by the evidence on record."12 O.K. He asked Pilar can you contact Cheling? Tell him to call me
or see me. The nephew of Cheling was a resident in MMC
through him Pilar was able to contact Cheling and gave him
In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge
Carlo's message. So I thought all the time it was agreeable. I left
who deals directly with the parties.13 As this Court said:
for USA for treatment. To my surprise when I came back from
USA it was not Cheling, but you (appellee) took over the
As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence management as you requested. Carlos did not tell me but
in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons decided in your favor. . . . (Letter to appellee; Exhibit "3";
for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his emphasis supplied)
action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has
fallen into grievous error.14
shows that: 1) respondent did not visit Julieta when she was confined at
the Makati Medical Center on account of her stroke, 2) there was
In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts disagreement as to who should run the hacienda, with Julieta favoring a
committed any error. certain Cheling Zabaljaurigue, and 3) respondent took over management
of the hacienda with their brother Carlos (Ledesma) supporting her. No
Petitioner cannot rely on Garchitorena v. Sotelo15 with respect to the inference as to the existence of antagonistic interests between
existence of antagonistic interests between respondent and Julieta. In respondent and Julieta can thus be made.
that case, the interest of Perfecto Gabriel as creditor and mortgagee of
the minor-wards' properties (a house and lot) is antagonistic to the The third letter19 which reads:
interest of the wards as mortgagors, hence, Gabriel's appointment as
guardian was erroneous. For while he sought to foreclose the wards'
. . . Carlos went to the house before I left and asked from me
properties as creditor and mortgagee on one hand, he had to, on the
twenty thousand (20,000) shares of San Carlos Milling which
other hand, endeavor to retain them for the wards as their guardian.
you gave because I wanted to sell all. . . . If he does not sell or
Added to that was Gabriel's appointment as guardian without him
cannot sell, just arrange to send them back to me. Amparing
informing the guardianship court that he held a mortgage on the
 since I came here to America and Vancouver my requests have
been ignored. Everyone is suspecting that Pilar is the one
ordering or commanding me that is not true. What I asked from
Julio is just to report to me or send me reports so I can follow
up from here. But up to now he has ignored my requests x x x .
(Letter to appellee Exhibit "4")

has no relevance to the issue of whether or not the lower courts erred in
finding that respondent is not unsuitable for appointment as guardian.
The letter in fact discloses, that it was Julieta's nephew Julio Ledesma, and
not respondent, who ignored the "request."

As for the fourth letter20 which reads:

I want all of you to know that whatever decision now and in the
future I want to do nobody can stop me especially regarding my
properties, money, etc. I will be the only one to dispose of it
because it is mine. You said to Raul you are going to court, you
are most welcome x x x . (Letter to Connie, Exhibit "5")

it has also no relevance to the issue in the case at bar. The letter is not
even addressed to respondent but to a certain Connie (a sister-in-law of
Julieta).

Petitioner's assertion that respondent's intent in instituting the

guardianship proceedings is to take control of Julieta's properties and use
them for her own benefit21 is purely speculative and finds no support
from the records.

The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also
lacks merit. That respondent removed Julieta from the Makati Medical
Center where she was confined after she suffered a stroke does not
necessarily show her hostility towards Julieta, given the observation by
the trial court, cited in the present petition, that Julieta was still placed
under the care of doctors22 after she checked out and was returned to the
hospital when she suffered another stroke.

Finally, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit: 1)
Petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment of respondent as
guardian before the trial court because, among other reasons, she felt she
was disliked by respondent,23 a ground which does not render
respondent unsuitable for appointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner
concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial
court, 24 which is reflective of a lack of good faith.

Discussion of the third argument is unnecessary, the suitability of Amparo

for appointment as guardian not having been successfully contested.

ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ ., concur.

 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 110427. February 24, 1997]
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented by her legal guardian,
AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife,
LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age,
Carmen Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of
the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the
Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment[1] of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107,[2] in a guardianship proceeding
instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista.[3] She was so adjudged
because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included
cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was
appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.
Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon
City. On September 17, 1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista
commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon
City (Branch 35) to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said
premises.[4] The complaint was later amended to identify the
incompetent Caiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo
Evangelista.
The amended Complaint[5] pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza
was the absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No.
27147; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their
children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her
house, rent-free; that Caiza already had urgent need of the house on
account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised
to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;"
that through her guardian, Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in
writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by
the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of
the house in question, they ** (were) enriching themselves at the
expense of the incompetent, because, while they ** (were) saving money
by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent ** (was) losing
much money as her house could not be rented by others." Also alleged
was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of
first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that
they had been living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in
consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Caiza
as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will
on September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the
house and lot in question.
Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Caiza's
favor,[6] the Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises and pay
Caiza P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
But on appeal,[7] the decision was reversed by the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96.[8] By judgment rendered on October 21,
1992,[9] the RTC held that the "action by which the issue of defendants'
possession should be resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining factual
and legal situation ** demanding adjudication by such plenary action for
recovery of possession cognizable in the first instance by the Regional
Trial Court."
Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of
October 21, 1992, but failed in that attempt. In a decision[10] promulgated
on June 2, 1993, the Appellate Court[11] affirmed the RTC's judgment in
toto. It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Caiza was indeed an accion
publiciana in the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the
"defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or
occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family
of Carmen Caiza," as evidenced by what purports to be the holographic
will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and until it has passed
probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim
to the property, ** it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of
Carmen Caiza that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their
occupancy and possession, so much so that Caiza's supervening
incompetency can not be said to have vested in her guardian the right or
authority to drive the defendants out."[12]
Through her guardian, Caiza came to this Court praying for reversal
of the Appellate Court's judgment. She contends in the main that the
latter erred in (a) holding that she should have pursued an accion
publiciana, and not an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight to
"a xerox copy of an alleged holographic will, which is irrelevant to this
case."[13]
In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's
requirement,[14] the Estradas insist that the case against them was really
not one of unlawful detainer; they argue that since possession of the
house had not been obtained by them by any "contract, express or
implied," as contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
their occupancy of the premises could not be deemed one "terminable
upon mere demand (and hence never became unlawful) within the
context of the law." Neither could the suit against them be deemed one
of forcible entry, they add, because they had been occupying the property
with the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen Caiza, which
"occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the holographic will
of petitioner Carmen Caiza is admitted to probate." They conclude, on
those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's legal guardian to
oust them from the disputed premises.
Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994,[15] and her heirs -- the
aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado,
her niece and nephew, respectively -- were by this Court's leave,
substituted for her.[16]
Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment
action is the appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the
property in dispute; (b) assuming desahucio to be proper, whether or not
Evangelista, as Caiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action;
and (c) assuming an affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not
Evangelista may continue to represent Caiza after the latter's death.
I
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well
as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint
and the character of the relief sought.[17] An inquiry into the averments of
the amended complaint in the Court of origin is thus in order.[18]
The amended Complaint alleges:[19]
"6. That the plaintiff, Carmen Caiza, is the sole and absolute owner of a
house and lot at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, which property is
now the subject of this complaint;
** ** **
9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law,
were allowed to live temporarily in the house of plaintiff, Carmen Caiza,
for free, out of her kindness;
10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has duly notified the
defendants, for them to vacate the said house, but the two (2) letters of
demand were ignored and the defendants refused to vacate the
same. **
11. That the plaintiff, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo
Evangelista, made another demand on the defendants for them to
vacate the premises, before Barangay Captain Angelina A. Diaz of
Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, but after two (2) conferences, the
result was negative and no settlement was reached. A photocopy of the
Certification to File Action dated July 4, 1990; issued by said Barangay
Captain is attached, marked Annex "D" and made an integral part
hereof;
12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than thirty (30) days
to vacate the house, but they still refused to vacate the premises, and
they are up to this time residing in the said place;
13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from the date of first
letter of demand dated February 3, 1990 (Annex "B") sent by the
plaintiff to the defendants, by her legal guardian -- Amparo Evangelista;
14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the plaintiff of the
possession of the house in question, they are enriching themselves at
the expense of the incompetent plaintiff, because, while they are saving
money by not paying any rent for the house, the plaintiff is losing much
money as her house could not be rented by others;
15. That the plaintiff's health is failing and she needs the house urgently,
so that funds could be raised to meet her expenses for her support,
maintenance and medical treatment;
16. That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the house at No. 61
Scout Tobias, Quezon City, the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, was
compelled to go to court for justice, and she has to spend P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees."
Its prayer[20] is quoted below:
"WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of law, plaintiff,
Carmen Caiza, represented by her legal guardian. Amparo Evangelista,
respectfully prays to this Honorable Court, to render judgment in favor
of plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren, sons-in-law
and other persons claiming under them, to vacate the house and
premises at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, so that its possession can
be restored to the plaintiff, Carmen Caiza: and
2. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00;
3. To pay the costs of the suit."
In essence, the amended complaint states:
1) that the Estradas were occupying Caiza's house by tolerance -- having
been "allowed to live temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of ** (Caiza's)
kindness;"
2) that Caiza needed the house "urgently" because her "health ** (was)
failing and she ** (needed) funds ** to meet her expenses for her
support, maintenance and medical treatment;"
3) that through her general guardian, Caiza requested the Estradas
several times, orally and in writing, to give back possession of the house;
4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to give back the
house to Caiza, to her continuing prejudice; and
5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the last demand to
vacate.
Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately
set out. It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to
allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the
plaintiff is deemed sufficient,[21] and a complaint for unlawful detainer is
sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to
vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the
law.[22]
The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal
construction of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter
alia authorizes the institution of an unlawful detainer suit when "the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied." They contend that since they did not
acquire possession of the property in question "by virtue of any contract,
express or implied" -- they having been, to repeat, "allowed to live
temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of ** (Caiza's) kindness" -- in no
sense could there be an "expiration or termination of ** (their) right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor would
an action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is no claim that
they had "deprived (Caiza) of the possession of ** (her property) by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth."
The argument is arrant sophistry. Caiza's act of allowing the
Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and
indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and
the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that act of liberality
be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden
on the Estradas of returning the house to Caiza upon her demand. More
than once has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of
another at the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract
between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against him.[23] The situation is not much different from
that of a tenant whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by
tolerance of the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of the demand to
vacate.[24] In other words, one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a
deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the moment he is
required to leave.[25] Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of
Appeals,[26] where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a
plant upon its undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it after
failing to fulfill its promise of payment despite demands, this Court held
that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, ** (its) continuing possession **
became illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the **
(plant's owner) was its proper remedy."
It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there
had been more than one demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing
the complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of
the last demand,[27] the reason being that the lessor has the option to
waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee
remain meanwhile in the premises.[28] Now, the complaint filed by Caiza's
guardian alleges that the same was "filed within one (1) year from the
date of the first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990." Although this
averment is not in accord with law because there is in fact a second letter
of demand to vacate, dated February 27, 1990, the mistake is
inconsequential, since the complaint was actually filed on September 17,
1990, well within one year from the second (last) written demand to
vacate.
The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's
express permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the
owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was
made through her judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed
with authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza
had executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas;
that circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises after
demand to vacate on the theory that they might in future become owners
thereof, that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of
ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly probated.
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the
Estradas had no legal right to the property, whether as possessors by
tolerance or sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right of
possession by sufferance, that had been legally ended. They could not
assert any right of possession flowing from their ownership of the house;
their status as owners is dependent on the probate of the holographic will
by which the property had allegedly been bequeathed to them -- an event
which still has to take place; in other words; prior to the probate of the
will, any assertion of possession by them would be premature and
inefficacious.
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under
the circumstances was that involving the Estradas' possession by
tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to
postulate that the proper remedy for Caiza is not ejectment but accion
publiciana, a plenary action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery
of the right to possession de jure.
II
The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza
clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and
legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from
evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with
the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's
death, it may be changed or revoked;[29] and until admitted to probate, it
has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the
being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time,
(ART. 838, id.).[30] An owner's intention to confer title in the future to the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a
persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the
former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in
resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
from her extreme age. substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad
general guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen litem for the minor heirs.
Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianship[31] dated December 19, 1989 clearly To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's
installed her as the "guardian over the person and properties of the demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her
incompetent CARMEN CAIZA with full authority to take possession of the guardian.[41] That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her
property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in
be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management the appeal at bar.
of her properties ** "[32] By that appointment, it became Evangelista's WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual Appeals promulgated on June 2, 1993 -- affirming the Regional Trial
needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in Court's judgment and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari -- is
preference to relatives and friends.[33] It also became her right and duty REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992 of the
to get possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's property, both real Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410
and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.
possession or control of his property during her incompetency.[34] That SO ORDERED.
right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to take Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, [35] and
bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose. [36]
Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely
discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable
maintenance of the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96
of the Rules of Court, viz.:
"SEC. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to
maintenance of ward. A guardian must manage the estate of his ward
frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereof, so
far as maybe necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of
the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits
be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the
real estate, upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply to such
of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance."
Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's defenses
in the ejectment action, that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve. "the issue of
ownership ** only to determine the issue of possession." [37]
III
As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency
of this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition,
arguing that Caiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship,
Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased
to have legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The
motion is without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of
guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the
guardian or the ward,[38] the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas.
Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only
two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado.
On their motion and by Resolution of this Court[39] of June 20, 1994, they
were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the
deceased, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:[40]
"SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 194366 : October 10, 2012
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-
CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D.
ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners, v. HEIRS
OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1ςrνll under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, petitioners Napoleon D. Neri (Napoleon), Alicia D. Neri-
Mondejar (Alicia), Visminda D. Neri-Chambers (Visminda), Rosa D. Neri-
Millan (Rosa), Douglas D. Neri (Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos
(Eutropia), and Victoria D. Illut-Piala (Victoria) seek to reverse and set
aside the April 27, 2010 Decision2ςrνll and October 18, 2010
Resolution3ςrνllof the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01031-
MIN which annulled the October 25, 2004 Decision4ςrνll of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo City, Davao del Norte and instead, entered a
new one dismissing petitioners complaint for annulment of sale, damages
and attorneys feesagainst herein respondents heirs of spouses Hadji
Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (heirs of Uy).
The Facts
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children,
two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely:
Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique
Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa.
Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they
acquired several homestead properties with a total area of 296,555
square meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte, embraced by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. (P-7998) P-21285ςrνll , (P-14608) P- The Issues
51536ςrνll and P-20551 (P-8348)7issued on February 15, 1957, August
27, 1962 and July 7, 1967, respectively. In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the following errors:
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband,
Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor
children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and
Vismindaexecuted an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale8ςrνll on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among
themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying
themto the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses
Uy)for a consideration of P 80,000.00.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment
of saleof the said homestead properties against spouses Uy (later III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN.
substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-
28, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the
prohibited period. Thecomplaint was later amended to include Eutropia
and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived
of their legitimes as childrenof Anunciacion from her first marriage.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered
that the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the
issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of
Eutropia and Victorias exclusionfrom the extrajudicial settlement and sale
of the subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of
prescription and laches.
The RTC Ruling
On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering, among
others, the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-
year prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria
were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial
authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and prescription raised
by spouses Uy, who claimed possession of the subject properties for 17
years, holding that co-ownership rights are imprescriptible.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April
27, 2010 Decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. It held
that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial
settlement and sale of the subject properties and as such, were not bound
by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the annulment of the sale
considering spouses Uys possession thereof for 17 years, and
thatEutropia and Victoriabelatedlyfiled their actionin 1997, ormore than
two years fromknowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994 when their
stepfather died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from
recovering their legitimes from their co-heirs.
Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the
subsequent saleas valid and binding with respect to Enrique and
hischildren, holding that as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of
their respective shares as they consider necessary or fit.While recognizing
Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have
ratified the sale whenthey failed to question it upon reaching the age of
majority.Italso found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a
long period of time.
I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" AS FAR AS THE SHARES
OF EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING
THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE;
II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" WITH
RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF ROSA AND DOUGLAS, THEREBY DEPRIVING
THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE; and
The Ruling of the Court
The petitionis meritorious.
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate
children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo
and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from
her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code
which read:
ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents isvalid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein.It
and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if cannot be denied that these heirs have acquired their respective shares
they should come from different marriages. in the properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death11and that,
as owners thereof, they can very well sell their undivided share in the
xxx estate.12ςrνll

ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the
their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father,
Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of
the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her
of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16
children and Enrique acquired their respective
9
shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
inheritances, ςrνll entitling them to their pro indiviso shares in her
whole estate, as follows:
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, provide:
Enrique 9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets + 1/16)
Eutropia 1/16 ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
Victoria 1/16
authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
Napoleon 1/16 father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of
First Instance.
Alicia 1/16
Visminda 1/16 ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two
Rosa 1/16 thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of
the childs property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians
Douglas 1/16
under the Rules of Court.

Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of
Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that Eutropia and
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. When the property of the child under
Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas
parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and
mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal
binding uponthem and consequently, a total nullity.
guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court the childs property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For
good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. x x x
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the
in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration.13ςrνll Thus, a
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental
notice thereof. (Underscoring added) authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property
of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further the wards property and even then only with courts prior approval secured
elucidated in Segura v. Segura,10ςrνll thus: in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.14ςrνll

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his
question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by
The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was them upon reaching the age of majority,15ςrνll is unenforceable in
invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which
shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial provide:
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being
did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to authorized by the latter or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two
years from its execution A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers,
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the
subsequent sale of the subject propertiesmade by Enrique and his person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the
children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents other contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
ratified:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary co-ownership.

(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso
given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his co-owners of the homestead properties with Eutropia, Victoria and
powers; Douglas, who retained title to their respective 1/16 shares. They were
deemed to be holding the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas
xxx under an implied constructive trust for the latters benefit, conformably
with Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:"if property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which
whom the property comes." As such, it is only fair, just and equitable that
without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary
the amount paid for their shares equivalent to P 5,000.0021ςrνll each or
choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was
a total of P 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy with legal interest.
theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party
so making the ratification.16ςrνll Once ratified, expressly or impliedly
such as when the person knowingly received benefits from it, the contract On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the
is cleansed from all its defects from the moment it was present action has not prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the
constituted,17ςrνll as it has a retroactive effect. extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the
prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules
of
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and
Rosas Manifestation18ςrνll before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds
stated: no application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were
deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides, an
"action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique
does not prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
Neri concurred in and conformed to by us and our other two sisters and
brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse
Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same was However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10
22
voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore the sale was years from the time the cause of action accrues, ςrνll which is from the
time of actual notice in case of unregistered deed. 23ςrνll In this case,
absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this case are
concerned;" (Underscoring supplied) Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the
extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of their father, Enrique,
in 1994 which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19ςrνll Napoleon and Rosa also
1997 was well within the prescriptive period of 10 years.
alleged:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010

"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we
Decision and October 18, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
do not have any intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is entered:
Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect and acknowledge the validity
of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied) 1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion
Neri NULL and VOID;
Clearly, the foregoing statements constitutedratification of the
settlement of the estate and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the 2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji
defects existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing the Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards the 13/16 total shares of the
conveyance of Rosas 1/16 share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses late Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D.
Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan VALID;
evidence showing ratification.
3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and D. Neri as the LAWFUL OWNERS of the 3/16 portions of the subject
therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares homestead properties, covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. (P-
ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead 7998) P-2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-8348); and
properties have effectivelybeen disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A
person can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the buyer 4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri,
can as a consequence acquire no more than what the sellercan legally Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-
transfer."20ςrνll On this score, Article 493 of the Civil Codeis relevant,
Millan to return to the respondents jointly and solidarily the amount paid
which provides: corresponding to the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in the
total amount of P 15,000.00, with legal interest at 6% per annum
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits computed from the time of payment until finality of this decision and 12%
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or per annum thereafter until fully paid.
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the No pronouncement as to costs.ςrαlαωlιbrαr SO ORDERED.
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
 Republic of the Philippines Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his
SUPREME COURT testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the
Baguio (respondent’s) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.

FIRST DIVISION After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated
May 29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written
G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012 formal offer of evidence.

NILO OROPESA, Petitioner, Thus, the (respondent) filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the
vs. petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the
CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent. presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered;
(2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3)
To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.
DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure of the Decision1 dated February 29, 2008, as well as the
Resolution2 dated September 16, 2008, both rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled "NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO
OROPESA." The Court of Appeals’ issuances affirmed the Order 3 dated
September 27, 2006 and the Order4 dated November 14, 2006 issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc.
Case No. 04-0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesa’s petition for
guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa
(a widower), and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof,
respectively.
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:
In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the
(respondent’s) Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed
his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006.5 (Citations omitted.)
The trial court granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence in an Order
dated September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide
sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent
to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, Oppositor’s
Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial
court in an Order dated November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of
which states:

On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be
appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent)
Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and raffled
off to Branch 260.
WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-
movant has failed to provide sufficient documentary and testimonial
evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his
personal affairs and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms
its earlier Order dated 27 September 2006.

In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has
been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10)
years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003,
that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been
evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the
(respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment,
showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to his
age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his
property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation
by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
Accordingly, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit.7
Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his
appeal was dismissed through the now assailed Decision dated February
29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
assailed orders of the court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and
November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.8

In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied
set the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct by the Court of Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution dated
a social case study and submit a report thereon. September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition was filed.

Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:
conducted her social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his
witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN "INCOMPETENT" PERSON AS
but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk
DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO
to the social worker.
SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP9

On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for
After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the
guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental
petition to be without merit.
Opposition.
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the
Court of Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and
reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the trial court
which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by
him showing respondent’s incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,10 we laid out the nature and purpose of
guardianship in the following wise:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which
one person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom
the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship
is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is
intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any
assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that
while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship
indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis
as well.11
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if
the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
d. The realty taxes for respondent’s various properties remain
unpaid and therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly
compelled to pay the necessary taxes;
e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan
Exalta car for the reason that the former would be purchasing
another vehicle, but when the car had been sold, respondent
did not procure another vehicle and refused to account for the
money earned from the sale of the old car;
f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint
account under his name and his daughter’s without the latter’s
knowledge or consent;
g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took
a kitchen knife to stab himself upon the "orders" of his girlfriend
during one of their fights;
h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his
house of groceries and furniture, despite protests from his
children.14

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited
who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or petitioner’s lack of material evidence to support his claims. According to
other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or
property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that
properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating
reads: medical and mental condition. In fact, respondent points out that the only
medical document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word competent to run his personal affairs and administer his properties.
"incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction Portions of the said document, entitled "Report of Neuropsychological
or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable Screening,"15 were quoted by respondent in his Memorandum16 to
to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have illustrate that said report in fact favored respondent’s claim of
lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of competence, to wit:
age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without
outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and
becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. participated meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate
in his responses on many of the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent his articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.
should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence."12 We
consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied x x x x
in the case at bar.
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains
In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, that were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental calculations
therefore, should be placed in guardianship, petitioner raises in his and keep track of number sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST
Memorandum13 the following factual matters: in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs
using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render and read the correct time on
a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has the Clock Drawing Test. x x x.
been sickly for over ten (10) years already;
xxxx
b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St.
Luke’s Medical Center after his stroke, he purportedly x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest
requested one of his former colleagues who was visiting him to effective solutions to problem situations. x x x. 17
file a loan application with the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence,
hospital bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had
his proof of his father’s incompetence consisted purely of testimonies
substantial amounts of money in various banks sufficient to
given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their father’s
cover his medical expenses;
real and personal properties) and their father’s former caregiver (who
admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did
c. Respondent’s residence allegedly has been left dilapidated not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince
due to lack of care and management; the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action and instead lead it to grant
the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s procedural lapse in failing to
make a formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised
mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his
father’s and his sister’s names as co-owners, tax declarations, and
receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned
properties, which do not in any way relate to his father’s alleged
incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical document on
record is the aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological Screening"
which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never
identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said
report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the
report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of
respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that
respondent on the average was indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the
proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the
sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that]
the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the
person’s state of mental sanity will suffice."18
A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection by one of the parties
in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced
is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue."23 We have also held that a demurrer to evidence
"authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant
having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do,
if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief
sought."24 1âwphi1
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the
petition for guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his
evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence
other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a
defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law,
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated
September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are
AFFIRMED.

Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which SO ORDERED.
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the trial court’s
unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the
fatal role that petitioner’s own documentary evidence played in
disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own
observation of respondent’s physical and mental state, to wit:

The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which
states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional,
and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary,
Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report
which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in
most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental
calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The
Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive
functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and
orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp,
alert and able.19 (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)

It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only questions of law may be raised

in a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of
facts."20 We only take cognizance of questions of fact in certain
exceptional circumstances;21 however, we find them to be absent in the
instant case. It is also long settled that "factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court.
As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight
and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when
supported by the evidence on record."22 We therefore adopt the factual
findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the
grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence was proper under the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.

Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. – After the plaintiff has completed the

presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on
the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.
 Republic of the Philippines a. To make and return to the Court within three (3) months true
SUPREME COURT and complete inventory of all the estate, real and personal, of
Manila his ward which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to
FIRST DIVISION the possession or knowledge of any other person for him;
G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012
EDUARDO T. ABAD, Petitioner, b. To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to manage and
vs. dispose of the estate according to these rules for the best
LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO, Respondents. interests of the ward, and to provide for the proper care,
RESOLUTION custody x x x of the ward;
REYES, J.:
c. To render a true and just account of all the estate of the ward
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of in his hands, and of all proceeds or interest derived therefrom,
the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 1 dated and of the management and disposition of the same, at the time
August 28, 2009 and Resolution2 dated April 19, 2010 of the Court of designated by these rules and such other times as the court
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No; 90145. directs, and at the expiration of his trust to settle his accounts
with the court and deliver and pay over all the estate, effects,
The facts show that on March 19, 2007, petitioner Eduardo Abad (Abad) and moneys remaining in his hands, or due from him on such
filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura settlement, to the person lawfully entitled thereto;
B. Abad (Maura) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Dagupan City, Branch
42, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2007-0050-D. In support thereof, d. To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.
Abad alleged that he maintains residence at No. 14 B St. Paul Street,
Horseshoe Village, Quezon City and that he is Maura’s nephew. He
SO ORDERED.6
averred that Maura, who is single, more than ninety (90) years old and a
resident of Rizal Street, Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in dire need
of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due to her Unyielding, Abad filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take decision but the RTC denied the same in an Order dated December 11,
care of herself and her properties unassisted thus becoming an easy prey 2007.
of deceit and exploitation.3
Abad filed an appeal to the CA. He argued that the RTC erred in
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC gave due disqualifying him from being appointed as Maura’s guardian despite the
course to the same and scheduled it for hearing. When the petition was fact that he has all the qualifications stated under the Rules. That he was
called for hearing on April 27, 2007, nobody entered an opposition and not a resident of Mangaldan, Pangasinan should not be a ground for his
Abad was allowed to present evidence ex parte. After Abad formally disqualification as he had actively and efficiently managed the affairs and
offered his evidence and the case was submitted for decision, Atty. properties of his aunt even if he is residing in Metro Manila. Moreover,
Gabriel Magno filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, together with an he was expressly chosen by Maura to be her guardian.7
Oppositionin- Intervention. Subsequently, on June 14, 2007, Leonardo
Biason (Biason) filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition Abad further averred that no hearing was conducted to determine the
and attached therewith his Opposition to the Appointment of Eduardo qualifications of Biason prior to his appointment as guardian. He claimed
Abad as Guardian of the Person and Properties of Maura B. Abad. that the RTC also overlooked Maura’s express objection to Biason’s
Specifically, Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he appointment.8
was not notified of the pendency of the petition for the appointment of
the latter’s guardian. He vehemently opposed the appointment of Abad On August 28, 2009, the CA issued a Decision,9 affirming the decision of
as Maura’s guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since the RTC, the pertinent portions of which read:
he resides in Quezon City while Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan,
Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed as Maura’s guardian
The petitioner-appellant may have been correct in arguing that there is
since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of attorney to
manage her properties.4 no legal requirement that the guardian must be residing in the same
dwelling place or municipality as that of the ward or incompetent, and
that the Vancil vs. Belmes case cited by the court a quo which held that
On September 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,5 denying Abad’s "courts should not appoint as guardians persons who are not within the
petition and appointing Biason as Maura’s guardian. The RTC disposed jurisdiction of our courts" pertains to persons who are not residents of
thus: the country.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied. Petitioner Eduardo T. Abad is However, we do not find that the court a quo, by deciding to appoint the
found to be disqualified to act as guardian of incompetent Maura B. Abad. oppositor-appellee as guardian, has fallen into grievous error.
Oppositor Leonardo A. Biason is established by this Court to be in a better
position to be the guardian of said incompetent Maura B. Abad.
For one, the oppositor-appellee, like petitioner-appellant, is also a
relative, a nephew of the incompetent. There are no vices of character
The Court hereby fixes the guardianship bond at [P]500,000.00 and the which have been established as to disqualify him from being appointed as
letters of guardianship shall be issued only upon the submission of the a guardian.
bond, conditioned on the following provisions of the Rule 94[,] Section 1,
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
xxxx
Anent the claim of the petitioner-appellant that he has been expressly Unfortunately, pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died.
chosen by her aunt to be her guardian as evidenced by her testimony, On May 11, 2012, Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion,18 informing
although it could be given weight, the same could not be heavily relied this Court that Biason passed away on April 3, 2012 at SDS Medical Center,
upon, especially considering the alleged mental state of the incompetent Marikina City due to multiple organ failure, septic shock, community
due to her advanced age. acquired pneumonia high risk, prostate CA with metastasis, and attached
a copy of his Death Certificate.19 Maura averred that Biason’s death
xxxx rendered moot and academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus
prayed that the petition be dismissed and the guardianship be
terminated.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City, Branch 42 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. On June 20, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution,20 requiring Abad to
comment on the manifestation filed by Maura. Pursuant to the
Resolution, Abad filed his Comment21 on August 9, 2012 and expressed
SO ORDERED.[10
his acquiescence to Maura’s motion to dismiss the petition. He
asseverated that the issues raised in the petition pertain to the
Dissatisfied, Abad filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied irregularity in the appointment of Biason as guardian which he believed
the same in a Resolution11 dated April 19, 2010, the dispositive portion of had been rendered moot and academic by the latter’s death. He also
which reads: supported Maura’s prayer for the termination of the guardianship by
asseverating that her act of filing of a petition-in-intervention is indicative
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is of the fact that she is of sound mind and that she can competently
DENIED for lack of merit. manage her business affairs.

SO ORDERED.12 We find Maura’s motion meritorious.

On June 7, 2010, Abad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present
Court. Subsequently, Maura filed a Motion for Leave to a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be
Intervene,13 together with a Petition-in-Intervention.14 without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which
The instant petition raises the following assignment of errors: would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.22

I In his petition, Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision dated
August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which dismissed his
appeal from the Decision dated September 26, 2007 of the RTC and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively. Basically, he was
DENIED THE PETITIONER’S APPEAL AND AFFIRMED THE TRIAL challenging Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC
COURT’S DECISION DESPITE VERY CLEAR VIOLATIONS OF DUE appointed him as guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s demise, it
PROCESS, DISREGARD OF THE RULES, AND IRREGULARITIES IN has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of
THE APPOINTMENT OF RESPONDENT BIASON AS GUARDIAN; the petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian
and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or
II the ward.23 The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve
into the propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT him and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its
DENIED THE PETITIONER’S APPEAL AND ERRONEOUSLY UPHELD disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any
RESPONDENT BIASON’S APPOINTMENT AS GUARDIAN BASED substantial relief.1âwphi1
ON SOLE GROUND OF RESIDENCE, AND FAILED TO CONSIDER
THE REQUIREMENTS AND QUALIFICATIONS PRESCRIBED BY THE Moreover, Abad, in his Comment, shared Maura’s belief that the petition
SUPREME COURT FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN.15 has lost its purpose and even consented to Maura’s prayer for the
dismissal of the petition.
Abad contends that that CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision despite
the fact that it did not hold any hearing to determine whether Biason WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition
possessed all the qualifications for a guardian as provided by law. Further, is hereby DISMISSED.
he was not given the opportunity to submit evidence to controvert
Biason’s appointment.16 SO ORDERED.

Abad also bewails his disqualification as guardian on the sole basis of his
residence. He emphasizes that it is not a requirement for a guardian to be
a resident of the same locality as the ward, or to be living with the latter
under the same roof in order to qualify for the appointment. The more
significant considerations are that the person to be appointed must be of
good moral character and must have the capability and sound judgment
in order that he may be able to take care of the ward and prudently
manage his assets.17
 Republic of the Philippines debts form part of its assets. Complying with the rehabilitation court’s
SUPREME COURT order and Atty. Concepcion’s demand letter, Belson turned over the
Manila subject dividends to him.

THIRD DIVISION Meanwhile, the Alcantaras filed a special civil action of certiorari before
the Court of Appeals (CA), seeking to annul the rehabilitation court’s
G.R. No. 183050 January 25, 2012 order. On January 30, 2008 the CA rendered a decision,10 granting the
petition and directing Atty. Concepcion to account for the dividends and
deliver them to the Alcantaras. The CA ruled that the Alcantaras owned
ADVENT CAPITAL AND FINANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner,
those dividends. They did not form part of Advent Capital’s assets as
vs.
contemplated under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
NICASIO I. ALCANTARA and EDITHA I. ALCANTARA, Respondents.
Rehabilitation (Interim Rules).

DECISION
The CA pointed out that the rehabilitation proceedings in this case
referred only to the assets and liabilities of the company proper, not to
ABAD, J.: those of its Trust Department which held assets belonging to other
people. Moreover, even if the Trust Agreement provided that Advent
This case is about the validity of a rehabilitation court’s order that Capital, as trustee, shall have first lien on the Alcantara’s financial
compelled a third party, in possession of money allegedly belonging to portfolio for the payment of its trust fees, the cash dividends in Belson’s
the debtor of a company under rehabilitation, to deliver such money to care cannot be summarily applied to the payment of such charges. To
its court-appointed receiver over the debtor’s objection. enforce its lien, Advent Capital has to file a collection suit. The
rehabilitation court cannot simply enforce the latter’s claim by ordering
The Facts and the Case Belson to deliver the money to it.11

On July 16, 2001 petitioner Advent Capital and Finance Corporation The CA denied Atty. Concepcion and Advent Capital’s motion for
(Advent Capital) filed a petition for rehabilitation1 with the Regional Trial reconsideration,12 prompting the filing of the present petition for review
Court (RTC) of Makati City.2 Subsequently, the RTC named Atty. Danilo L. under Rule 45.
Concepcion as rehabilitation receiver.3 Upon audit of Advent Capital’s
books, Atty. Concepcion found that respondents Nicasio and Editha The Issue Presented
Alcantara (collectively, the Alcantaras) owed Advent Capital
₱27,398,026.59, representing trust fees that it supposedly earned for The sole issue in this case is whether or not the cash dividends held by
managing their several trust accounts.4 Belson and claimed by both the Alcantaras and Advent Capital constitute
corporate assets of the latter that the rehabilitation court may, upon
Prompted by this finding, Atty. Concepcion requested Belson Securities, motion, require to be conveyed to the rehabilitation receiver for his
Inc. (Belson) to deliver to him, as Advent Capital’s rehabilitation receiver, disposition.
the ₱7,635,597.50 in cash dividends that Belson held under the
Alcantaras’ Trust Account 95-013. Atty. Concepcion claimed that the Ruling of the Court
dividends, as trust fees, formed part of Advent Capital’s assets. Belson
refused, however, citing the Alcantaras’ objections as well as the absence
Advent Capital asserts that the cash dividends in Belson’s possession
of an appropriate order from the rehabilitation court.5
formed part of its assets based on paragraph 9 of its Trust Agreement with
the Alcantaras, which states:
Thus, Atty. Concepcion filed a motion before the rehabilitation court to
direct Belson to release the money to him. He said that, as rehabilitation
9. Trust Fee: Other Expenses – As compensation for its services
receiver, he had the duty to take custody and control of Advent Capital’s
hereunder, the TRUSTEE shall be entitled to a trust or management fee of
assets, such as the sum of money that Belson held on behalf of Advent
6
1 (one) % per annum based on the quarterly average market value of the
Capital’s Trust Department.
Portfolio or a minimum annual fee of ₱5,000.00, whichever is higher. The
said trust or management fee shall automatically be deducted from the
The Alcantaras made a special appearance before the rehabilitation Portfolio at the end of each calendar quarter. The TRUSTEE shall likewise
court7 to oppose Atty. Concepcion’s motion. They claimed that the money be reimbursed for all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by it in
in the trust account belonged to them under their Trust Agreement8 with the discharge of its powers and duties under this Agreement, and in all
Advent Capital. The latter, they said, could not claim any right or interest cases, the TRUSTEE shall have a first lien on the Portfolio for the payment
in the dividends generated by their investments since Advent Capital of the trust fees and other reimbursable expenses.
merely held these in trust for the Alcantaras, the trustors-beneficiaries.
For this reason, Atty. Concepcion had no right to compel the delivery of
According to Advent Capital, it could automatically deduct its
the dividends to him as receiver. The Alcantaras concluded that, under
management fees from the Alcantaras’ portfolio that they entrusted to it.
the circumstances, the rehabilitation court had no jurisdiction over the
Paragraph 9 of the Trust Agreement provides that Advent Capital could
subject dividends.
automatically deduct its trust fees from the Alcantaras’ portfolio, "at the
end of each calendar quarter," with the corresponding duty to submit to
On February 5, 2007 the rehabilitation court granted Atty. Concepcion’s the Alcantaras a quarterly accounting report within 20 days after.13
motion.9 It held that, under Rule 59, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, a
receiver has the duty to immediately take possession of all of the
But the problem is that the trust fees that Advent Capital’s receiver was
corporation’s assets and administer the same for the benefit of corporate
claiming were for past quarters. Based on the stipulation, these should
creditors. He has the duty to collect debts owing to the corporation, which
have been deducted as they became due. As it happened, at the time
Advent Capital made its move to collect its supposed management fees,
it neither had possession nor control of the money it wanted to apply to
its claim. Belson, a third party, held the money in the Alcantaras’ names.
Whether it should deliver the same to Advent Capital or to the Alcantaras
is not clear. What is clear is that the issue as to who should get the same
has been seriously contested.
The practice in the case of banks is that they automatically collect their
management fees from the funds that their clients entrust to them for
investment or lending to others. But the banks can freely do this since it
holds or has control of their clients’ money and since their trust
agreement authorized the automatic collection. If the depositor contests
the deduction, his remedy is to bring an action to recover the amount he
claims to have been illegally deducted from his account.
collection. It cannot enforce its money claim by simply filing a motion in
the rehabilitation case for delivery of money belonging to the Alcantaras
but in the possession of a third party.
Rehabilitation proceedings are summary and non-adversarial in nature,
and do not contemplate adjudication of claims that must be threshed out
in ordinary court proceedings. Adversarial proceedings similar to that in
ordinary courts are inconsistent with the commercial nature of a
rehabilitation case. The latter must be resolved quickly and expeditiously
for the sake of the corporate debtor, its creditors and other interested
parties. Thus, the Interim Rules "incorporate the concept of prohibited
pleadings, affidavit evidence in lieu of oral testimony, clarificatory
hearings instead of the traditional approach of receiving evidence, and
the grant of authority to the court to decide the case, or any incident, on
the basis of affidavits and documentary evidence." 18

Here, Advent Capital does not allege that Belson had already deducted Here, Advent Capital’s claim is disputed and requires a full trial on the
the management fees owing to it from the Alcantaras’ portfolio at the end merits.1âwphi1 It must be resolved in a separate action where the
of each calendar quarter. Had this been done, it may be said that the Alcantaras’ claim and defenses may also be presented and heard. Advent
money in Belson’s possession would technically be that of Advent Capital. Capital cannot say that the filing of a separate action would defeat the
Belson would be holding such amount in trust for the latter. And it would purpose of corporate rehabilitation. In the first place, the Interim Rules
be for the Alcantaras to institute an action in the proper court against do not exempt a company under rehabilitation from availing of proper
Advent Capital and Belson for misuse of its funds. legal procedure for collecting debt that may be due it. Secondly, Court
records show that Advent Capital had in fact sought to recover one of its
But the above did not happen. Advent Capital did not exercise its right to assets by filing a separate action for replevin involving a car that was
19
cause the automatic deduction at the end of every quarter of its supposed registered in its name.
management fee when it had full control of the dividends. That was its
fault. For their part, the Alcantaras had the right to presume that Advent WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed
Capital had deducted its fees in the manner stated in the contract. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 98692 are
burden of proving that the fees were not in fact collected lies with Advent AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any action that petitioner Advent Capital
Capital. and Finance Corp. or its rehabilitation receiver might institute regarding
the trust fees subject of this case.
Further, Advent Capital or its rehabilitation receiver cannot unilaterally
decide to apply the entire amount of cash dividends retroactively to cover SO ORDERED.
the accumulated trust fees. Advent Capital merely managed in trust for
the benefit of the Alcantaras the latter’s portfolio, which under Paragraph
214 of the Trust Agreement, includes not only the principal but also its
income or proceeds. The trust property is only fictitiously attributed by
law to the trustee "to the extent that the rights and powers vested in a
nominal owner shall be used by him on behalf of the real owner."15

The real owner of the trust property is the trustor-beneficiary. In this case,
the trustors-beneficiaries are the Alcantaras. Thus, Advent Capital could
not dispose of the Alcantaras’ portfolio on its own. The income and
principal of the portfolio could only be withdrawn upon the Alcantaras’
written instruction or order to Advent Capital. 16 The latter could not also
assign or encumber the portfolio or its income without the written
consent of the Alcantaras.17 All these are stipulated in the Trust
Agreement.

Ultimately, the issue is what court has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate
the conflicting claims of the parties over the dividends that Belson held in
trust for their owners. Certainly, not the rehabilitation court which has
not been given the power to resolve ownership disputes between Advent
Capital and third parties. Neither Belson nor the Alcantaras are its debtors
or creditors with interest in the rehabilitation.

Advent Capital must file a separate action for collection to recover the
trust fees that it allegedly earned and, with the trial court’s authorization
if warranted, put the money in escrow for payment to whoever it rightly
belongs. Having failed to collect the trust fees at the end of each calendar
quarter as stated in the contract, all it had against the Alcantaras was a
claim for payment which is a proper subject for an ordinary action for
G.R. No. 166884 June 13, 2012 that the evidence presented by LBP failed to state the date when the
goods described in the letters of credit were actually released to the
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, possession of the respondents. Section 4 of P.D. 115 requires that the
vs. goods covered by trust receipts be released to the possession of the
LAMBERTO C. PEREZ, NESTOR C. KUN, MA. ESTELITA P. ANGELES- entrustee after the latter’s execution and delivery to the entruster of a
PANLILIO, and NAPOLEON O. GARCIA, Respondents. signed trust receipt. He adds that LBP’s evidence also fails to show the
date when the trust receipts were executed since all the trust receipts are
undated. Its dispositive portion reads:
DECISION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and for insufficiency of evidence, it is

BRION, J.:
respectfully recommended that the instant complaints be dismissed, as
upon approval, the same are hereby dismissed.11
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the decision2dated January 20, 2005 of the
LBP filed a motion for reconsideration which the Makati Assistant City
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76588. In the assailed decision, the
Prosecutor denied in his order of January 7, 2000.12
Court of Appeals dismissed the criminal complaint for estafa against the
respondents, Lamberto C. Perez, Nestor C. Kun, Ma. Estelita P. Angeles-
Panlilio and Napoleon Garcia, who allegedly violated Article 315, On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed the Resolution of the
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation with Section 13 of Assistant City Prosecutor. In his resolution of August 1, 2002,13 the
Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 115 – the "Trust Receipts Law." Secretary of Justice pointed out that there was no question that the goods
covered by the trust receipts were received by ACDC. He likewise adopted
LBP’s argument that while the subjects of the trust receipts were not
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government financial
mentioned in the trust receipts, they were listed in the letters of credit
institution and the official depository of the Philippines.3 Respondents are
referred to in the trust receipts. He also noted that the trust receipts
the officers and representatives of Asian Construction and Development
contained maturity dates and clearly set out their stipulations. He further
Corporation (ACDC), a corporation incorporated under Philippine law and
rejected the respondents’ defense that ACDC failed to remit the
engaged in the construction business.4
payments to LBP due to the failure of the clients of ACDC to pay them.
The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:
On June 7, 1999, LBP filed a complaint for estafa or violation of Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to P.D. 115,
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City
against the respondents before the City Prosecutor’s Office in Makati City.
Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby directed to file an information for
In the affidavit-complaint5 of June 7, 1999, the LBP’s Account Officer for
estafa under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
the Account Management Development, Edna L. Juan, stated that LBP
Section 13, Presidential Decree No. 115 against respondents Lamberto C.
extended a credit accommodation to ACDC through the execution of an
Perez, Nestor C. Kun, [Ma. Estelita P. Angeles-Panlilio] and Napoleon O.
Omnibus Credit Line Agreement (Agreement)6 between LBP and ACDC on
Garcia and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt
October 29, 1996. In various instances, ACDC used the Letters of
hereof.14
Credit/Trust Receipts Facility of the Agreement to buy construction
materials. The respondents, as officers and representatives of ACDC,
executed trust receipts7 in connection with the construction materials, The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution
with a total principal amount of ₱52,344,096.32. The trust receipts dated August 1, 2002, which the Secretary of Justice denied.15 He rejected
matured, but ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the the respondents’ submission that Colinares v. Court of Appeals16 does not
construction projects or the construction materials subject of the trust apply to the case. He explained that in Colinares, the building materials
receipts. LBP sent ACDC a demand letter,8 dated May 4, 1999, for the were delivered to the accused before they applied to the bank for a loan
payment of its debts, including those under the Trust Receipts Facility in to pay for the merchandise; thus, the ownership of the merchandise had
the amount of ₱66,425,924.39. When ACDC failed to comply with the already been transferred to the entrustees before the trust receipts
demand letter, LBP filed the affidavit-complaint. agreements were entered into. In the present case, the parties have
already entered into the Agreement before the construction materials
were delivered to ACDC.
The respondents filed a joint affidavit9 wherein they stated that they
signed the trust receipt documents on or about the same time LBP and
ACDC executed the loan documents; their signatures were required by Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for review before the
LBP for the release of the loans. The trust receipts in this case do not Court of Appeals.
contain (1) a description of the goods placed in trust, (2) their invoice
values, and (3) their maturity dates, in violation of Section 5(a) of P.D. 115.
After both parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the Court of
Moreover, they alleged that ACDC acted as a subcontractor for Appeals promulgated the assailed decision of January 20,
2005.17 Applying the doctrine in Colinares, it ruled that this case did not
government projects such as the Metro Rail Transit, the Clark Centennial
Exposition and the Quezon Power Plant in Mauban, Quezon. Its clients for
involve a trust receipt transaction, but a mere loan. It emphasized that
the construction projects, which were the general contractors of theseconstruction materials, the subject of the trust receipt transaction, were
projects, have not yet paid them; thus, ACDC had yet to receive the delivered to ACDC even before the trust receipts were executed. It noted
proceeds of the materials that were the subject of the trust receipts and
that LBP did not offer proof that the goods were received by ACDC, and
were allegedly used for these constructions. As there were no proceedsthat the trust receipts did not contain a description of the goods, their
received from these clients, no misappropriation thereof could have invoice value, the amount of the draft to be paid, and their maturity dates.
taken place. It also adopted ACDC’s argument that since no payment for the
construction projects had been received by ACDC, its officers could not
On September 30, 1999, Makati Assistant City Prosecutor Amador Y. have been guilty of misappropriating any payment. The dispositive
Pineda issued a Resolution10 dismissing the complaint. He pointed out portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. is covered by the provision referring to merchandise received under the
The assailed Resolutions of the respondent Secretary of Justice dated obligation to return it (devolvera) to the owner. Thus, under the Trust
August 1, 2002 and February 17, 2003, respectively in I.S. No. 99-F-9218- Receipts Law,22 intent to defraud is presumed when (1) the entrustee fails
28 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.18 to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods covered by the trust receipt
to the entruster; or (2) when the entrustee fails to return the goods under
LBP now files this petition for review on certiorari, dated March 15, 2005, trust, if they are not disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust
raising the following error: receipts.23

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE BY
APPLYING THE RULING IN THE CASE OF COLINARES V. COURT OF APPEALS,
339 SCRA 609, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.19
On April 8, 2010, while the case was pending before this Court, the
respondents filed a motion to dismiss.20 They informed the Court that LBP
had already assigned to Philippine Opportunities for Growth and Income,
Inc. all of its rights, title and interests in the loans subject of this case in a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 23, 2005 (attached as Annex "C" of the
motion). The respondents also stated that Avent Holdings Corporation, in
behalf of ACDC, had already settled ACDC’s obligation to LBP on October
8, 2009. Included as Annex "A" in this motion was a certification21 issued
by the Philippine Opportunities for Growth and Income, Inc., stating that
it was LBP’s successor-in-interest insofar as the trust receipts in this case
are concerned and that Avent Holdings Corporation had already settled
the claims of LBP or obligations of ACDC arising from these trust receipts.
In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of the trustee
exist in the alternative – the return of the proceeds of the sale or the
return or recovery of the goods, whether raw or processed.24 When both
parties enter into an agreement knowing that the return of the goods
subject of the trust receipt is not possible even without any fault on the
part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized under
Section 13 of P.D. 115; the only obligation actually agreed upon by the
parties would be the return of the proceeds of the sale transaction. This
transaction becomes a mere loan,25 where the borrower is obligated to
pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the goods.
Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n order to judge the
intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered." Under this provision, we
can examine the contemporaneous actions of the parties rather than rely
purely on the trust receipts that they signed in order to understand the
transaction through their intent.

We deny this petition. We note in this regard that at the onset of these transactions, LBP knew
that ACDC was in the construction business and that the materials that it
sought to buy under the letters of credit were to be used for the following
The disputed transactions are not trust receipts.
projects: the Metro Rail Transit Project and the Clark Centennial
Exposition Project.26 LBP had in fact authorized the delivery of the
Section 4 of P.D. 115 defines a trust receipt transaction in this manner: materials on the construction sites for these projects, as seen in the
letters of credit it attached to its complaint.27 Clearly, they were aware of
Section 4. What constitutes a trust receipt transaction. A trust receipt the fact that there was no way they could recover the buildings or
transaction, within the meaning of this Decree, is any transaction by and constructions for which the materials subject of the alleged trust receipts
between a person referred to in this Decree as the entruster, and another had been used. Notably, despite the allegations in the affidavit-complaint
person referred to in this Decree as entrustee, whereby the entruster, wherein LBP sought the return of the construction materials,28 its demand
who owns or holds absolute title or security interests over certain letter dated May 4, 1999 sought the payment of the balance but failed to
specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to the ask, as an alternative, for the return of the construction materials or the
possession of the entrustee upon the latter's execution and delivery to buildings where these materials had been used.29
the entruster of a signed document called a "trust receipt" wherein the
entrustee binds himself to hold the designated goods, documents or The fact that LBP had knowingly authorized the delivery of construction
instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of materials to a construction site of two government projects, as well as
the goods, documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over to unspecified construction sites, repudiates the idea that LBP intended to
the entruster the proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount owing to be the owner of those construction materials. As a government financial
the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the goods, documents institution, LBP should have been aware that the materials were to be
or instruments themselves if they are unsold or not otherwise disposed used for the construction of an immovable property, as well as a property
of, in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the trust of the public domain. As an immovable property, the ownership of
receipt, or for other purposes substantially equivalent to any of the whatever was constructed with those materials would presumably belong
following: to the owner of the land, under Article 445 of the Civil Code which
provides:
1. In the case of goods or documents, (a) to sell the goods or procure their
sale; or (b) to manufacture or process the goods with the purpose of Article 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and
ultimate sale: Provided, That, in the case of goods delivered under trust the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the
receipt for the purpose of manufacturing or processing before its ultimate land, subject to the provisions of the following articles.
sale, the entruster shall retain its title over the goods whether in its
original or processed form until the entrustee has complied fully with his
Even if we consider the vague possibility that the materials, consisting of
obligation under the trust receipt; or (c) to load, unload, ship or tranship
cement, bolts and reinforcing steel bars, would be used for the
or otherwise deal with them in a manner preliminary or necessary to their
construction of a movable property, the ownership of these properties
sale[.]
would still pertain to the government and not remain with the bank as
they would be classified as property of the public domain, which is
There are two obligations in a trust receipt transaction. The first is defined by the Civil Code as:
covered by the provision that refers to money under the obligation to
deliver it (entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise sold. The second
Article 420. The following things are property of public dominion: Even if we assume that the transactions were trust receipts, the
complaint against the respondents still should have been dismissed. The
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another, regardless of
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; whether the latter is the owner or not. The law does not singularly seek
to enforce payment of the loan, as "there can be no violation of [the] right
against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt."34
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. In order that the respondents "may be validly prosecuted for estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code,35 in relation with
Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law, the following elements must be
In contrast with the present situation, it is fundamental in a trust receipt
established: (a) they received the subject goods in trust or under the
transaction that the person who advanced payment for the merchandise
obligation to sell the same and to remit the proceeds thereof to [the
becomes the absolute owner of said merchandise and continues as owner
trustor], or to return the goods if not sold; (b) they misappropriated or
until he or she is paid in full, or if the goods had already been sold, the
converted the goods and/or the proceeds of the sale; (c) they performed
proceeds should be turned over to him or to her.30
such acts with abuse of confidence to the damage and prejudice of
Metrobank; and (d) demand was made on them by [the trustor] for the
Thus, in concluding that the transaction was a loan and not a trust receipt, remittance of the proceeds or the return of the unsold goods."36
we noted in Colinares that the industry or line of work that the borrowers
were engaged in was construction. We pointed out that the borrowers
In this case, no dishonesty or abuse of confidence existed in the handling
were not importers acquiring goods for resale.31 Indeed, goods sold in
of the construction materials.
retail are often within the custody or control of the trustee until they are
purchased. In the case of materials used in the manufacture of finished
products, these finished products – if not the raw materials or their In this case, the misappropriation could be committed should the
components – similarly remain in the possession of the trustee until they entrustee fail to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered
are sold. But the goods and the materials that are used for a construction by the trust receipt transaction or fail to return the goods themselves. The
project are often placed under the control and custody of the clients respondents could not have failed to return the proceeds since their
employing the contractor, who can only be compelled to return the allegations that the clients of ACDC had not paid for the projects it had
materials if they fail to pay the contractor and often only after the undertaken with them at the time the case was filed had never been
requisite legal proceedings. The contractor’s difficulty and uncertainty in questioned or denied by LBP. What can only be attributed to the
claiming these materials (or the buildings and structures which they respondents would be the failure to return the goods subject of the trust
become part of), as soon as the bank demands them, disqualify them receipts.
from being covered by trust receipt agreements.
We do not likewise see any allegation in the complaint that ACDC had
Based on these premises, we cannot consider the agreements between used the construction materials in a manner that LBP had not authorized.
the parties in this case to be trust receipt transactions because (1) from As earlier pointed out, LBP had authorized the delivery of these materials
the start, the parties were aware that ACDC could not possibly be to these project sites for which they were used. When it had done so, LBP
obligated to reconvey to LBP the materials or the end product for which should have been aware that it could not possibly recover the processed
they were used; and (2) from the moment the materials were used for materials as they would become part of government projects, two of
the government projects, they became public, not LBP’s, property. which (the Metro Rail Transit Project and the Quezon Power Plant Project)
had even become part of the operations of public utilities vital to public
service. It clearly had no intention of getting these materials back; if it
Since these transactions are not trust receipts, an action for estafa should
had, as a primary government lending institution, it would be guilty of
not be brought against the respondents, who are liable only for a loan. In
extreme negligence and incompetence in not foreseeing the legal
passing, it is useful to note that this is the threat held against borrowers
complications and public inconvenience that would arise should it decide
that Retired Justice Claudio Teehankee emphatically opposed in his
to claim the materials. ACDC’s failure to return these materials or their
dissent in People v. Cuevo,32 restated in Ong v. CA, et al.:33
end product at the time these "trust receipts" expired could not be
attributed to its volition. No bad faith, malice, negligence or breach of
The very definition of trust receipt x x x sustains the lower court’s contract has been attributed to ACDC, its officers or representatives.
rationale in dismissing the information that the contract covered by a Therefore, absent any abuse of confidence or misappropriation on the
trust receipt is merely a secured loan. The goods imported by the small part of the respondents, the criminal proceedings against them for estafa
importer and retail dealer through the bank’s financing remain of their should not prosper.
own property and risk and the old capitalist orientation of putting them
in jail for estafa for non-payment of the secured loan (granted after they
In Metropolitan Bank,37 we affirmed the city prosecutor’s dismissal of a
had been fully investigated by the bank as good credit risks) through the
complaint for violation of the Trust Receipts Law. In dismissing the
fiction of the trust receipt device should no longer be permitted in this
complaint, we took note of the Court of Appeals’ finding that the bank
day and age.
was interested only in collecting its money and not in the return of the
goods. Apart from the bare allegation that demand was made for the
As the law stands today, violations of Trust Receipts Law are criminally return of the goods (raw materials that were manufactured into textiles),
punishable, but no criminal complaint for violation of Article 315, the bank had not accompanied its complaint with a demand letter. In
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation with P.D. 115, addition, there was no evidence offered that the respondents therein had
should prosper against a borrower who was not part of a genuine trust misappropriated or misused the goods in question.
receipt transaction.

Misappropriation or abuse of confidence is absent in this case.

The petition should be dismissed because the OSG did not file it and the by Avent Holdings Corporation, in behalf of ACDC. These facts have not
civil liabilities have already been settled. been disputed by LBP. Therefore, we can reasonably conclude that LBP
no longer has any claims against ACDC, as regards the subject matter of
The proceedings before us, regarding the criminal aspect of this case, this case, that would entitle it to file a civil or criminal action.
should be dismissed as it does not appear from the records that the
complaint was filed with the participation or consent of the Office of the WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the January 20, 2005
Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76588. No costs.
Administrative Code of 1987 provides that:
SO ORDERED.
Section 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceedings,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. x x x It shall have
the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and all other courts
or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
(Emphasis provided.)

In Heirs of Federico C. Delgado v. Gonzalez,38 we ruled that the

preliminary investigation is part of a criminal proceeding. As all criminal
proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals may be
brought and defended by only the Solicitor General in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, a criminal action brought to us by a private
party alone suffers from a fatal defect. The present petition was brought
in behalf of LBP by the Government Corporate Counsel to protect its
private interests. Since the representative of the "People of the
Philippines" had not taken any part of the case, it should be
dismissed.1âwphi1

On the other hand, if we look at the mandate given to the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel, we find that it is limited to the civil
liabilities arising from the crime, and is subject to the control and
supervision of the public prosecutor. Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules
Governing the Exercise by the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel of its Authority, Duties and Powers as Principal Law Office of All
Government Owned or Controlled Corporations, filed before the Office of
the National Administration Register on September 5, 2011, reads:

Section 2. Extent of legal assistance – The OGCC shall represent the

complaining GOCC in all stages of the criminal proceedings. The legal
assistance extended is not limited to the preparation of appropriate
sworn statements but shall include all aspects of an effective private
prosecution including recovery of civil liability arising from the crime,
subject to the control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

Based on jurisprudence, there are two exceptions when a private party

complainant or offended party in a criminal case may file a petition with
this Court, without the intervention of the OSG: (1) when there is denial
of due process of law to the prosecution, and the State or its agents refuse
to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended
party;39 and (2) when the private offended party questions the civil aspect
of a decision of the lower court.40

In this petition, LBP fails to allege any inaction or refusal to act on the part
of the OSG, tantamount to a denial of due process. No explanation
appears as to why the OSG was not a party to the case. Neither can LBP
now question the civil aspect of this decision as it had already assigned
ACDC’s debts to a third person, Philippine Opportunities for Growth and
Income, Inc., and the civil liabilities appear to have already been settled
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998]
HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses
RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA
CLAVANO, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent
of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned
them? The answer to this interesting query, certainly not one of first
impression, would have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law and
jurisprudence, but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decree of adoption issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 14,[2] in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, In the Matter of the
Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph
Anthony, all surnamed Cang, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara
Diago Clavano, petitioners.
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married
on January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3,
1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born
on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couples
relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie
learned of her husbands alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a
family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husbands alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie
filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite[3] with the
then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu[4] which rendered a
decision[5]approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses
providing that they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and
board. They further agreed:
(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly
support of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) effective
from the date of the filing of the complaint. This shall
constitute a first lien on the net proceeds of the house and
lot jointly owned by the parties situated at Cinco Village,
Mandaue City;
(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract or
agreement with any person or persons, natural or juridical
without the written consent of the husband; or any
undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husbands
consent as the parties are by this agreement legally
separated;[6]
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce
from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole
custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of
visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner.[7]
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a
naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and
never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical
Clinic earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month[8] a portion of which was
remitted to the Philippines for his childrens expenses and another,
deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V.
Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and
sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for
the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith
signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit
of consent alleging that her husband had evaded his legal obligation to
support his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V.
Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because
she would be going to the United States to attend to a family business,
leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper
(her) job-seeking venture abroad; and that her husband had long forfeited
his parental rights over the children for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any
contract without the written consent of her husband;
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the
United States and had been transferring from one place to another to
avoid detection by Immigration authorities, and
3. Her husband had divorced her.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately
returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that,
although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were
financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were too
meager compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow anybody to
strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children.
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved
to reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had
transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children
to private respondents.On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in
effect, relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such
custody should be transferred to the father. The court then directed the
Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
14, issued a decree of adoption with a dispositive portion reading as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the
minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the
petitioners-spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is
hereby granted and approved. These children shall henceforth be known
and called as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine D. Clavano and Joseph
Anthony D. Clavano respectively. Moreover, this Decree of Adoption
shall:
(1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and
duties as though they were in fact the legitimate
children of the petitioners;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of the
children; and,
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a copy of
this Decree of Adoption for registration purposes.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the lower court was impelled by these reasons:
(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed close filial ties
with the Clavano family, especially their maternal uncle,
petitioner Ronald Clavano.
(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with their
printing press, real estate business, export business and
gasoline station and mini-mart in Rosemead, California,
U.S.A., had substantial assets and income.
(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie, nicknamed
Menchu, approved of the adoption because of her heart
ailment, near-fatal accident in 1981, and the fact that she
could not provide them a secure and happy future as she
travels a lot.
(4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual
direction as they would go to church together and had sent
the children to Catholic schools.
(5) The children themselves manifested their desire to be adopted
by the Clavanos Keith had testified and expressed the wish
to be adopted by the Clavanos while the two younger ones
were observed by the court to have snuggled close to
Ronald even though their natural mother was around.
 On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of
petitioner to rest on a very shaky foundation because of its findings that:
(1) Petitioner was morally unfit to be the father of his children on
account of his being an improvident father of his family and
an undisguised Lothario. This conclusion is based on the
testimony of his alleged paramour, mother of his two sons
and close friend of Anna Marie, Wilma Soco, who said that
she and petitioner lived as husband and wife in the very
house of the Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City.
(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of
comparatively recent dates were attempts at verisimilitude
as these were joint deposits the authenticity of which could
not be verified.
(3) Contrary to petitioners claim, the possibility of his
reconciliation with Anna Marie was dim if not nil because it
was petitioner who devised, engineered and executed the
divorce proceedings at the Nevada Washoe County court.
(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner is now an alien
from the standpoint of Philippine laws and therefore, how
his new attachments and loyalties would sit with his
(Filipino) children is an open question.
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the
RTC Social Worker in her Child Study Report, the lower court concluded
as follows:
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And
abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by
statute as a ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic) adoption
(Re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such
case, adoption will be allowed not only without the consent of the
parent, but even against his opposition (Re McKeag, 141 Cal. 403, 74 P.
1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Re Camp. 131 Cal. 469, 63 P. 736, 82 Am. St.
Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83 Colo. 346, 265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.;
Seibert, 170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing R.C.L.; Stearns v. Allen, 183
Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349; 97 Am. St. Rep. 441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483,
53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep. 564; Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23,
20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17.)[9]
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower
court erred in holding that it would be in the best interest of the three
children if they were adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria
Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally
defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he
did not have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned
his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written
consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness
the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
who made the case study report required by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Article 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the
natural parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held however
that the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not
necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA
344). The question therefore is whether or not oppositor may be
considered as having abandoned the children. In adoption cases,
abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to forego
parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, or the neglect
or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations which parents
owe their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding of
the parents presence, his care and the opportunity to display voluntary
affection. The issue of abandonment is amply covered by the discussion
of the first error.
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the
children and has in fact even maintained bank accounts in their names.
His duty to provide support comes from two judicial
pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra, obliges
him to pay the children P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by
the divorce decree of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court which orders him
to pay monthly support of US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor has not
submitted any evidence to show compliance with the decision in JD-101
CEB, but he has submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45)
drawn in the childrens names totalling $2,126.98. The last remittance
was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to provide support
commenced under the divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that as of
October 6, 1987, oppositor should have made 53 remittances of
$150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No other remittances were shown to
have been made after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date, oppositor
was woefully in arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And since
he was totally in default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable
conclusion is oppositor had not really been performing his duties as a
father, contrary to his protestations.
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts
in different banks, as follows
Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name of Bank
1) 118- July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great Western Savings,
606437-4 Oct. 29, 1987 Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan National Bank of
2) 73-166-8 Oct. 26, 1987 Williamson, West Virginia,
U.S.A.
December 31, 2,622.19
3) 564-1468831986 Security Pacific National
Oct. 29, 1987 Bank, Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositors name
as trustee for Charmaine Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang,
respectively. In other words, the accounts are operated and the
amounts withdrawable by oppositor himself and it cannot be said that
they belong to the minors. The second is an `or account, in the names of
Herbert Cang or Keith Cang. Since Keith is a minor and in the Philippines,
said account is operable only by oppositor and the funds withdrawable
by him alone.
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his
offer of evidence `the aim and purpose of providing for a better future
and security of his family.[10]
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of
Appeals. He emphasized that the decree of legal separation was not
based on the merits of the case as it was based on a manifestation
amounting to a compromise agreement between him and Anna
Marie. That he and his wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the
United States was borne out by the fact that prior to his departure to the
United States, the family lived with petitioners parents. Moreover, he
alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he and his wife initiated
the joint complaint for divorce.
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and
care for his children was belied by the award to him of custody over the
children in Civil Case No. JD-707. He took exception to the appellate
courts findings that as an American citizen he could no longer lay claim to
custody over his children because his citizenship would not take away the
fact that he is still a father to his children. As regards his alleged illicit
relationship with another woman, he had always denied the same both
in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the instant adoption case. Neither was it true
that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family friend of the Clavanos as she
was residing in Mandaue City seven (7) kilometers away from the
Clavanos who were residents of Cebu City. Petitioner insisted that the
testimony of Wilma Soco should not have been given weight for it was
only during the hearing of the petition for adoption that Jose Clavano, a
brother of Ronald, came to know her and went to her residence in Iligan
City to convince her to be a witness for monetary considerations. Lastly,
petitioner averred that it would be hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim
that they could love the children much more than he could.[11]
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is
now before this Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally
defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as
required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
Article 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides -
ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or
over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian of
the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed
child placement agency under whose care the child
may be;
(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the
adopting parents. (Underscoring supplied)
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 91 amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code. As thus amended, Article 31 read:
ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or
over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after
receiving counselling and appropriate social services
from the Ministry of Social Services and
Development or from a duly licensed child-
placement agency;
(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any
duly licensed child-placement agency under whose
care and legal custody the child may be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the
adopting parents. (Underscoring supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule
is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
determines the jurisdiction of the court. [12] As such, when private
respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the
applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by
Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3,
1988, the Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code
took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. As amended by the Family
Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads:
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be
necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or
the proper government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or
over, of the adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the
adopting parents, if living with said parent and the
latters spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted. (Underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the
amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such
requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:
SEC. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition
a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years
of age or over and not incompetent, and by the childs spouse, if any,
and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly
intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or if there are no such
parents by the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if
the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, childrens home, or
benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such
asylum, home, or society, or by such persons; but if the child is
illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the
adoption shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written
consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent
can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child[13] or that
such parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parents
or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts
sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in
consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural
aspect of adoption. Thus, the Court declared:
x x x. The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to
adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the
petition should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which
may give information to those interested, than that it should be formally
correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will
confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute,
alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction.[14]
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural
mother was attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioners consent, as
the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged
the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father
as follows:
3. That the childrens mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V. CLAVANO,
has given her express consent to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of
Consent, Annex `A. Likewise, the written consent of Keith Cang, now 14
years of age appears on page 2 of this petition; However, the father of
the children, Herbert Cang, had already left his wife and children and
had already divorced the former, as evidenced by the xerox copy of the
DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe, State of Nevada,
U.S.A. (Annex `B) which was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long
after he abandoned his family to live in the United States as an illegal
immigrant.[15]
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even
absent the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower
court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural
parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence[16] dispense with the requirement of written consent to the
adoption of their minor children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily
because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he
had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The
issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary
issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the
oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he
did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on
its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding
upon this Court.[17] This Court is not expected nor required to examine or
contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties.[18] However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the
authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if
it finds that these do not conform to the evidence on record.[19]
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[20] this Court has held that the
exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are the following: (1)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the
finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4)
when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties
and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion
and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals
failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a
different conclusion[21] on the issue of whether petitioner has so
abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption
unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word abandon means to forsake entirely,
to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root
idea of putting under a ban. The emphasis is on the finality and publicity
with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence,
the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim
ones rights or interests.[22] In reference to abandonment of a child by his
parent, the act of abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their
children.[23]
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not
manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment.[24] While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss
in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his
children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and
children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail
and catered to their whims.
Petitioners testimony on the matter is supported by documentary
evidence consisting of the following handwritten letters to him of both
his wife and children:
1. Exh. 1 a 4-page undated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie)
addressed to Dear Bert on a C.Westates Carbon Phil. Corp.
stationery. Menchu stated therein that it had been a long time
since the last time youve heard from me excluding that of the
phone conversation weve had. She discussed petitioners intention
to buy a motorbike for Keith, expressing apprehension over risks
that could be engendered by Keiths use of it. She said that in the
last phone conversation she had with petitioner on the birthday of
Ma, she forgot to tell petitioner that Keiths voice had changed; he
had become a bagito or a teen-ager with many fans who sent him
Valentines cards. She told him how Charmaine had become quite
a talkative almost dalaga who could carry on a conversation with
her angkong and how pretty she was in white dress when she won
among the candidates in the Flores de Mayo after she had prayed
so hard for it. She informed him, however, that she was worried
because Charmaine was vain and wont to extravagance as she
loved clothes. About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told petitioner
that the boy was smart for his age and quite spoiled being the
youngest of the children in Lahug. Joeton was mischievous but
Keith was his idol with whom he would sleep anytime. She
admitted having said so much about the children because they
might not have informed petitioner of some happenings and
spices of life about themselves. She said that it was just very
exciting to know how theyve grown up and very pleasant, too,
that each of them have (sic) different characters. She ended the
letter with the hope that petitioner was at the best of health.
After extending her regards to all, she signed her name after the
word Love. This letter was mailed on July 9, 1986 from Cebu to
petitioner whose address was P.O. Box 2445, Williamson, West
Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2. Exh. 2 letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden
print of a note from Menchu on the left upper corner. Anna Marie
stated that we wrote to petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and that Keith
and Joeton were very excited when petitioner called up last
time. She told him how Joeton would grab the phone from Keith
just so petitioner would know what he wanted to
order. Charmaine, who was asleep, was so disappointed that she
missed petitioners call because she also wanted something that
petitioner should buy. Menchu told petitioner that Charmaine
wanted a pencil sharpener, light-colored T-shirts for her walking
shorts and a (k)nap sack. Anna Marie informed petitioner that the
kids were growing up and so were their needs. She told petitioner
to be very fatherly about the childrens needs because those were
expensive here. For herself, Anna Marie asked for a subscription
of Glamour and Vogue magazines and that whatever expenses he
would incur, she would replace these. As a postscript, she told
petitioner that Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored Sperry topsider
shoes.
3. Exh. 3 an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that reads:
Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful
one. By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. Its nice to be
thought of at Xmas. Thanks again.
Sincerely,
Menchu
4. Exh. 4 a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose
Clavano, Inc. addressed to Dear Dad. Keith told his father that
they tried to tell their mother to stay for a little while, just a few
weeks after classes start(s) on June 16. He informed petitioner
that Joeton would be in Kinder I and that, about the motorbike, he
had told his mother to write petitioner about it and well see what
youre (sic) decision will be. He asked for chocolates, nuts,
basketball shirt and shorts, rubber shoes, socks, headband, some
clothes for outing and perfume. He told petitioner that they had
been going to Lahug with their mother picking them up
after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or dinner. From her
aerobics, his mother would go for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or
10:00 oclock in the evening. He wished his father luck and the best
of health and that they prayed for him and their other relatives.
The letter was ended with Love Keith.
5. Exh. 5 another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his
father for the Christmas card with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00 and
the card of Joeton with $5.00 inside. He told petitioner the
amounts following his fathers instructions and promise to send
money through the mail. He asked his father to address his letter
directly to him because he wanted to open his own letters. He
informed petitioner of activities during the Christmas season that
they enjoyed eating, playing and giving surprises to their mother.
He apprised him of his daily schedule and that their mother had
been closely supervising them, instructing them to fold their
blankets and pile up their pillows. He informed petitioner that
Joeton had become very smart while Charmaine, who was also
smart, was very demanding of their mother. Because their mother
was leaving for the United States on February 5, they would be
missing her like they were missing petitioner. He asked for his
things and $200.00. He told petitioner more anecdotes about
Joeton like he would make the sign of the cross even when they
would pass by the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his insistence that
Aquino was not dead because he had seen him on the betamax
machine. For Keith, Charmaine had become very maldita who was
not always satisfied with her dolls and things but Joeton was full
of surprises. He ended the letter with Love your son, Keith. The
letter was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).
6. Exh. 6 an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for
the bathing suit, key chain, pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil
sharpener and $50.00. She reminded him of of her birthday on
January 23 when she would turn 9 years old. She informed him
that she wore size 10 and the size of her feet was IM. They had
fun at Christmas in Lahug but classes would start on January 9
although Keiths classes had started on January 6. They would feel
sad again because Mommy would be leaving soon. She hoped
petitioner would keep writing them. She signed, Love, Charmaine.
7. Exh . 7 an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner
that they had not been remiss in writing letters to him. He
informed him of their trip to Manila they went to Malacaang, Tito
Doy Laurels house, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the executive
house, Tagaytay for three days and Baguio for one week. He
informed him that he got honors, Charmaine was 7th in her class
and Joeton had excellent grades. Joeton would be enrolled in
Sacred Heart soon and he was glad they would be together in that
school. He asked for his reward from petitioner and so with
Charmaine and Joeton. He asked for a motorbike and dollars that
he could save. He told petitioner that he was saving the money he
had been sending them. He said he missed petitioner and wished
him the best. He added that petitioner should call them on
Sundays.
8. Exh. 8 a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently
written by the latter. She asked for money from petitioner to buy
something for the school and something else. She promised not to
spend so much and to save some. She said she loved petitioner
and missed him. Joeton said hi! to petitioner. After ending the
letter with Love, Joeton and Charmaine, she asked for her prize
for her grades as she got seventh place.
9. Exh. 9 undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he had
been writing him; that he would like to have some money but he
would save them; that he learned that petitioner had called them
up but he was not around; that he would be going to Manila but
would be back home May 3; that his Mommy had just arrived
Thursday afternoon, and that he would be the official altar boy.
He asked petitioner to write them soon.
10. Exh. 10 Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He
told petitioner that he was saving some in the bank and he was
proud because he was the only one in his group who saved in the
bank. He told him that Joeton had become naughty and would
claim as his own the shirts sent to Keith by petitioner. He advised
petitioner to send pants and shirts to Joeton, too, and asked for a
pair of topsider shoes and candies. He informed petitioner that he
was a member of the basketball team and that his mom would
drive for his group. He asked him to call them often like the father
of Ana Christie and to write them when he would call so that they
could wait for it. He informed petitioner that they had all grown
bigger and heavier. He hoped petitioner would be happy with the
letter that had taken him so long to write because he did not want
to commit any mistakes. He asked petitioner to buy him perfume
(Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner, added that the latter
should buy something for Mommy.
11. Exh. 11 a Christmas card For My Wonderful Father dated
October 8, 1984 from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
12. Exh. 12 another Christmas card, Our Wish For You with the
year 83 written on the upper right hand corner of the inside page,
from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
13. Exh. 13 a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written
him even when their Mom was there where she bought them
clothes and shoes. Keith asked petitioner for $300.00. Because his
mother would not agree to buy him a motorbike, he wanted a
Karaoke unit that would cost P12,000.00. He informed petitioner
that he would go to an afternoon disco with friends but their
grades were all good with Joeton receiving stars for excellence.
Keith wanted a bow and arrow Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He
expressed his desire that petitioner would come and visit them
someday.
14. Exh. 14 a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing the
date January 1986. Keith told his father that they had received the
package that the latter sent them. The clothes he sent, however,
fitted only Keith but not Charmaine and Joeton who had both
grown bigger. Keith asked for grocery items, toys and more
clothes. He asked, in behalf of his mother, for low-heeled shoes
and a dress to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards that
would make her look sexy. He intimated to petitioner that he had
grown taller and that he was already ashamed to be asking for
things to buy in the grocery even though his mother had told him
not to be shy about it.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of
banks in the U.S.A. showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for
adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his
children.[25] Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the
children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite
surprising why the courts below simply glossed over these, ignoring not
only evidence on financial support but also the emotional exchange of
sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below
emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and
the fact that, as regards the bank deposits, these were withdrawable by
him alone. Simply put, the courts below attached a high premium to the
prospective adopters financial status but totally brushed aside the
possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological
well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and
aunt. However, his seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his
testimony is contradicted by his feelings towards his father as revealed in
his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that Keiths
testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for adoption
that would certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to
the capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents emotional attachment
to the children. This is hardly surprising for, from the very start of their
young lives, the children were used to their presence. Such attachment
had persisted and certainly, the young ones act of snuggling close to
private respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their emotional
detachment from their father. Private respondents, being the uncle and
aunt of the children, could not but come to their succor when they
needed help as when Keith got sick and private respondent Ronald spent
for his hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority
cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a
larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in David
v. Court of Appeals,[26] the Court awarded custody of a minor illegitimate
child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead
of to his affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the
child opted to go with his mother. The Court said:
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that
private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough,
however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support
her children according to her means.
In Celis v. Cafuir[27] where the Court was confronted with the issue
of whether to award custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster
mother, this Court said:
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having
deprived mother and son of the beautiful associations and tender,
imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent and
child. We should not take away from a mother the opportunity of
bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to
poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look
back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her
efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come
true. We should not forget that the relationship between a foster
mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be
a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him, said
parents might yet count and appraise (sic) all that they have done and
spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and even
rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into their
hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never
counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her
associations with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh
and blood count. x x x.
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals,[28] the Court stated that (I)n
ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the father, the
Court said:
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least,
her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the `torture and agony of a
mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as
a result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the
feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While
the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature,
either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and
pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is
greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering,
pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child
which is the paramount consideration. (Italics supplied)[29]
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding
whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his children. There
should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the
physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of
the child.[30] The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner
abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than his
inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent
in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally
abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and
counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he received
from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more important
emotional tie between him and his children. The children needed him not
only because he could cater to their whims but also because he was a
person they could share with their daily activities, problems and
triumphs.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look
beyond petitioners meager financial support to ferret out other
indications on whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his family. The
omission of said courts has led us to examine why the children were
subjected to the process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties
that bound them to their father. To our consternation, the record of the
case bears out the fact that the welfare of the children was not exactly
the paramount consideration that impelled Anna Marie to consent to
their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving
the children in the country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was
a problem that would naturally hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other
words, the adoption appears to be a matter of convenience for her
because Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her
children.[31] In his testimony, private respondent Ronald swore that Anna
Marie had been out of the country for two years and came home twice or
three times,[32] thereby manifesting the fact that it was she who actually
left her children to the care of her relatives. It was bad enough that their
father left their children when he went abroad, but when their mother
followed suit for her own reasons, the situation worsened. The Clavano
family must have realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed the
adoption of the children, they decided that the prospective adopter
should be Anna Maries brother Jose. However, because he had children
of his own, the family decided to devolve the task upon private
respondents.[33]
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the
children. A businessman, private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes
between Cebu and Manila while his wife, private respondent Maria Clara,
is an international flight stewardess.[34] Moreover, private respondent
Ronald claimed that he could take care of the children while their parents
are away,[35] thereby indicating the evanescence of his intention. He
wanted to have the childrens surname changed to Clavano for the reason
that he wanted to take them to the United States as it would be difficult
for them to get a visa if their surname were different from his.[36] To be
sure, he also testified that he wanted to spare the children the stigma of
being products of a broken home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private
respondent Ronald, his sister Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to
the inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to keep the children
away from their father. One of the overriding considerations for the
adoption was allegedly the state of Anna Maries health she was a victim
of an almost fatal accident and suffers from a heart ailment. However,
she herself admitted that her health condition was not that serious as she
could still take care of the children.[37] An eloquent evidence of her ability
to physically care for them was her employment at the Philippine
Consulate in Los Angeles[38]- she could not have been employed if her
health were endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos attempt at
depriving petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed from their
notion that he was an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact
expressed fear that her children would never be at ease with the wife of
their father.[39]
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being
a womanizer and father to the sons of Wilma Soco. [40] As to whether he
was telling the truth is beside the point. Philippine society, being
comparatively conservative and traditional, aside from being Catholic in
orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the part of a family
man, considering the baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his
family. Neither may the Court place a premium on the inability of a man
to distinguish between siring children and parenting them. Nonetheless,
the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot
be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner was
necessarily an unfit father.[41] Conventional wisdom and common human
experience show that a bad husband does not necessarily make a bad
father. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly
speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent
right to parental authority over the children.[42] Petitioner has
demonstrated his love and concern for his children when he took the
trouble of sending a telegram[43]to the lower court expressing his
intention to oppose the adoption immediately after learning about it. He
traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify about his
love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in the
United States.[44]
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to
abide by the agreement with his wife on the support of the
children. Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United States. As such, he
could not have procured gainful employment. Private respondents failed
to refute petitioners testimony that he did not receive his share from the
sale of the conjugal home,[45] pursuant to their
manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal separation
case. Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale
redounded to the benefit of his family, particularly his children. The
proceeds may not have lasted long but there is ample evidence to show
that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by his agreement with his wife
and sent his family money, no matter how meager.
 The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to
adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to
ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom,
ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and
interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context
and perspective. The Courts position should not be misconstrued or
misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of
law and jurisprudence.[46] The discretion to approve adoption
proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but
likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the
child.[47]
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents reliance on the
manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna
Marie which became the basis of the decree of legal separation.
According to private respondents counsel,[48] the authority given to Anna
Marie by that decree to enter into contracts as a result of the legal
separation was all embracing[49] and, therefore, included giving her sole
consent to the adoption. This conclusion is however, anchored on the
wrong premise that the authority given to the innocent spouse to enter
into contracts that obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall
include entering into agreements leading to the adoption of the
children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis as private
respondents apparent reliance on the decree of legal separation for doing
away with petitioners consent to the adoption.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of
the decree of legal separation did not, of necessity, deprive petitioner of
parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for
adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: . . . in case of legal
separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the court. In awarding custody, the court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
It should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the
innocent spouse the exercise of parental authority. Having custody of the
child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of parental rights with
respect to his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have the right
to the childs services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities
and make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and
religion.[50]
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority,
the joint exercise of which is vested by the law upon the parents,[51] as
x x x a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for
the purpose of the childrens physical preservation and development, as
well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their hearts
and senses. As regards parental authority, `there is no power, but a task;
no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred
trust for the welfare of the minor.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company.[52] (Italics supplied)
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having
been completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the
award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate,
that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the
agreement of the spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject
to a compromise,[53] there was no factual finding in the legal separation
case that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be
deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds under the
law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal
separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over
the children from Anna Marie back to petitioner. The order was not
implemented because of Anna Maries motion for reconsideration
thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer of
custody to the petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a
contempt charge against them.[54]
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over
the child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the
legal separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is
whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant
dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental
authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption.[55] But there cannot
be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because, as this Court
has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the issue of
petitioners abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation
that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has
ruled in Tenchavez v. Escao[56] that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens
after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction
as it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an American
citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino
citizen, the divorce has no legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne
out of established customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v.
Court of Appeals,[57] a case involving the visitorial rights of an illegitimate
parent over his child, the Court expressed the opinion that:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to
care for their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best
interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly
denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when
the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the
attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged.
Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of
course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the
child.
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil
Code, there has been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption
proceedings, not so much on the need of childless couples for a child, as
on the paramount interest of a child who needs the love and care of
parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the
Family Code, the discernible trend has impelled the enactment
of Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry Adoption[58] and Republic Act
No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of Filipino
children.[59]
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws,
such as the following policies in the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998:
(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody
of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care,
understanding and security towards the full and harmonious
development of his/her personality.[60]
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a
child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration
in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations
(UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child.[61]
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her
biological parent(s).[62]
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the government and its officials are
duty bound to comply with its mandates. Of particular relevance to
instant case are the following provisions:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of
parents . . . to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the
exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present
Convention.[63]
States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from
one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact
with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the childs
best interests.[64]
A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to
maintain on a regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal
relations and direct contacts with both parents . . .[65]
States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to
provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.[66]
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions
and the domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding
principle that all actuations should be in the best interests of the
child. This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the
primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over
him. The rights of parents vis--vis that of their children are not antithetical
to each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the
fullest extent possible.
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and
Charmaine are now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching
eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be endowed with the
discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state
that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare
and best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the
time that the petition for adoption was filed.[67] Said petition must be
denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who,
by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are
SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine
and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate
Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the
Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of
"Balalong," respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other
than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due
execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of
marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage
contract.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals1 (CA) dated January 15,
1998, and its Resolution dated August 24, 1998, denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision
appealed from it being more consistent with the facts and the
applicable law, the challenged Decision dated 05 April 1994 of
the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in toto.2
The decretal portion of the trial court Decision3 is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered
in favor of [herein Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against
[herein Petitioner] Tomasa Guison as follows:
a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called "reconstructed
marriage contract" excluded under the best evidence
rule, and therefore declaring said Exh. B spurious and
non-existent.
b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the
signature of the issuing Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34)
to be genuine.
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the
provisional writ of injunction earlier issued; and
d) To pay attorney's fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the
surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was
appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract
between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the
legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he
presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding
Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro
Pilapil.1âwphi1.nêt
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled "Tomasa vda. de
Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro
sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s
estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir.
Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between
appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and
filed a complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-
83) questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-
appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid;
b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally
adopted son of deceased Jacob.
On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between
her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C.
Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could
not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract
stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana
allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu
of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a
reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.
During the trial, the court a quo observed the following
irregularities in the execution of the reconstructed Marriage
Contract, to wit:
1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the
local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer thus
giving the implication that there was no copy of the
marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the
civil registry of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo
Jacob merely placed his "thumbmark" on said
contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of
the marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit
executed between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a
day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15
September 1975 attesting that both of them lived
together as husband and wife for five (5) years,
 Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the
trial court concluded that the "thumbmark" was
logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo
Jacob’s;
3. Contrary to appellant’s claim, in his Affidavit stating
the circumstances of the loss of the Marriage
Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned
that he allegedly "gave the copies of the Marriage
Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration". And
as admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera
(who allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at
the date of the marriage since he was then in
Australia. In fact, on the face of the reconstructed
Marriage Contract, it was one "Benjamin Molina"
who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose
Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana
allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to
Mr. Jose Centenera;
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
the thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In
his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant
similarities of unconscious habitual pattern within allowable
variation of writing characteristics between the standard and
the questioned signatures and concluded that the signature of
Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting
the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court
sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of
Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for
defendant-appellee sustaining his claim as the legally adopted
child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-
existent."4 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)

4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the

In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in
purported marriage entered in the book of records in
this wise:
San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly
solemnized.
Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage
Contract, Article 6, par. 1 of the Family Code provides that the
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18
declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other
July 1961 in Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by then
as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument signed
Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by
by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person
deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the
solemnizing the marriage." Accordingly, the primary evidence
legally adopted son of Alfredo.
of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage
contract.
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the
signature of Judge Moya.
And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in
relation to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of provides:
Judge Moya's signature in the Order granting the petition for
adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced;
residence on 01 October 1990.
exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer admissible other than the original document itself,
remember the facts in judicial proceedings taken about twenty- except in the following cases:
nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding judge since he
was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma".
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to part of the offeror;
test the authenticity and genuineness of Judge Moya's
signature.
xxx xxx xxx

A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C.

Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. —
Albacea, NBI Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea used
When the original document has been lost or
thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya and compared
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
it with the questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
and "significant fundamental differences in handwriting
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the
part, may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital
"standard" signature" and concluded that the questioned and
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
the standard signatures "JOSE L. MOYA" were NOT written by
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
one and the same person.

As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in

On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's
reality may be established by secondary evidence, it is
signature, appellee presented the comparative findings of the
necessary that the due execution of the document and
handwriting examination made by a former NBI Chief
subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the
Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined
transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the
thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of
 document and subsequent loss that would constitute the The Court's Ruling
foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove
the contents of such document. The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, but
respondent’s adoption has not been sufficiently established.
In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of
the three (3) copies of the marriage contract has not been First Issue:
shown for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant failed to
Validity of Marriage
sufficiently establish the circumstances of the loss of the
original document.
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a
voidable one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.8 Aware of this
With regard to the trial court's finding that the signature of then
fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage
Judge Moya in the questioned Order granting the petition for
between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because
adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine, suffice it to state
there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony. 9 We
that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the
cannot sustain this contention.
contrary, the presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing
the order acted in the performance of his regular duties.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void
because the parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced,
Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged
because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived
Order was subjected to a rigid examination of two (2)
together as husband and wife for at least five years. 10 An affidavit to this
handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of forgery of
effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. 11Clearly then, the
Judge Moya's signature. The value of the opinion of a
marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage
handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statement of
license under Article 76 of the Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance
case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took
he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.
characteristics, and discrepancies in and between genuine and
false specimens of writing of which would ordinarily escape
notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed observer. And in the When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?
final analysis, the assessment of the credibility of such expert
witnesses rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and "It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or
the test of qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or
upon the subject under investigation and the fitness of the destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a
particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of
court will not reverse on account of a mistake of judgment on witnesses."13 Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and
the part of the trial court in determining qualifications of this subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror,
case. secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.14

Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court's findings of fact

The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when
when ably supported by substantial evidence on record are they (1) excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr.
accorded with great weight and respect by the Court. Thus, Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the
upon review, We find that no material facts were overlooked or
wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of
ignored by the court below which if considered might vary theMonsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between
outcome of this case nor there exist cogent reasons that would
Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the
warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the
wedding had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same
trial court are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal
time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent
especially when established by unrebutted testimony and authorization issued by the Archbishop — through his vicar general and
documentary evidence.5 (citations omitted, emphasis in the chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino — ordaining that the union
original) between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding
entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana
Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.
before this Court.6
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage
The Issues contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction
of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence
they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show
In her Memorandum petitioner presents the following issues for the
due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage.
resolution of this Court:
In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception thus:

a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa

Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and
b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son
of Alfredo E. Jacob.7
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol
evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The
court confounded the execution and the contents of the
document. It is the contents, . . . which may not be prove[n] by
secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible.
 Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or In Balogbog v. CA,23 we similarly held:
non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such
proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution, besides
the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of
secondary evidence of the contents.
xxx xxx xxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis,
necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol
testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is
actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all,
determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol
evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when
available, to establish its execution may affect the weight of the
evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
(emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on for record purposes does not invalidate the marriage. 28 In the second
this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said place, it was not the petitioner’s duty to send a copy of the marriage
that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence."17
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and
recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the
parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.18 The Court has Likewise, we have held:
also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the
fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the
court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document
or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who
has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court
19
that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of
Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of
petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown
by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence — testimonial and documentary — may
be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage
contract were certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently
been obtained.20 Even if we were to agree with the trial court and to
disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that
this certificate is not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and
petitioner.
Proof of Marriage
As early as Pugeda v. Trias, 21 we have held that marriage may be proven Validity of Adoption Order
by any competent and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of
the witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible
to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to
the fact of marriage.22 (emphasis supplied)
[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence
of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove
marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote ommitted)
In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of
marriage. We reiterated this principle in Trinidad v. CA,24 in which,
because of the destruction of the marriage contract, we accepted
testimonial evidence in its place.25
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry
pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO).26 He finds
it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three years before
registering their marriage.27 On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong
premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate
certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the
solemnizing officer.29
Presumption in Favor of Marriage
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . .
of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always
presume marriage.30 (emphasis supplied)
This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima
facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.32 Given
the undisputed, even accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived
together as husband and wife,34 we find that the presumption of marriage
was not rebutted in this case.
Second Issue:
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that
the signature of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid,
the Court of Appeals relied on the presumption that the judge had acted
in the regular performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave
credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting expert, for "the
assessment of the credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the
discretion of the trial court . . . "35
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded
great weight and respect by appellate courts, because it had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale
signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however,
is not applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O.
Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two expert
witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and found that the Court
of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion."36 Hence,
the present case is an exception to the general rule that only questions of
law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.37
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not
discredit his statements. At the time, he could with medication still read
the newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read
a document shown to him.42 Indeed, we find no reason – and the
respondent has not presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge
Moya.
Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI
Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:
Atty. Paraiso

Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's

signature on the questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial
court on this matter, two expert witnesses were presented, one for
petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on
respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya
himself.38 Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial judge’s action by arguing
that the Deposition was ambiguous. He contends that Judge Moya could
not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and cites the
following portion as proof:39
Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in
your examination of this document?
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the
questioned and the standard signature Jose L. Moya were not
written by one and the same person. On the basis of my findings
that I would point out in detail, the difference in the writing
characteristics [was] in the structural pattern of letters which is
very apparent as shown in the photograph as the capital letter
"J".43

It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services

A: I said I do not remember.
having been sought without any compensation. Moreover, his
competence was recognized even by Respondent Pilapil’s expert witness,
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judge's Atty. Desiderio Pagui.44
testimony out of its context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition,
Judge Moya's statements contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The
answered the queries in the following manner:
alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition,
however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in
Atty. Benito P. Fabie adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal
cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.45 Moreover, Judge Moya
Q. What else did she tell you[?] insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in
his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order. information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he
signed and other acts that he performed thereafter.46 In the same vein,
Q. What was your response sir[?]
no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted
child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management47 in Manila and
A. I said I do not remember.40 the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, 48 issued
Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been
The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya was adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably
unsure of what he was declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical negate the alleged adoption of respondent.49
in the subsequent exchanges during the Deposition:
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming
Atty. Benito P. Fabie such relationship.50 This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the
evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] will sham.
you please recall whether you issued this Order and whether
the facsimile of the signature appearing thereon is your WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the
signature. Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between
Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and hereby recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption of
the signature reading Jose[;] I can’t make out clearly what Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No
comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature.41 pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt

Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of SO ORDERED.
Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his name,
he positively declared that it was not his. Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION in their favor. The records show that the latter have commendably
established their qualifications under the law to be adopters,[6] and have
[G.R. No. 117209. February 9, 1996] amply complied with the procedural requirements for the petition for
[7]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. adoption, with the findings of the trial court being recited thus:
HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court
NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents. dated March 16, 1994 setting this petition for hearing (Exh. A) was
published in the March 31, April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila
DECISION Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation (Exhs. B to E and
submarkings). x x x
REGALADO, J.:
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, whats in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by
any other name would smell as sweet? Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor
derogatory record (Exhs. K to V); and are physically fit to be the adoptive
This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari parents of the minor child Kevin (Exh. W). Their qualification to become
which challenges, on pure questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl finds support also in the Social Case
Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, dated September 13, 1994[1] in JDRC Case Study Report prepared by the DSWD through Social Worker Luz Angela
No. 2964. Said court is faulted for having approved the petition for Sonido, the pertinent portion of which reads:
adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the
prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature and
Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he friendly individuals. They are found physically healthy, mentally fit,
acquired consequent to his adoption. spiritually and financially capable to adopt Kevin Earl Moran a.k.a Aaron
Joseph.
The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private
respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y
Andrade, filed a petition[2] to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs. They
Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of unselfishly share their time, love and attention to him. They are ready
the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be and willing to continuously provide him a happy and secure home life.
adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of
which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under the care of
same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first the Munsons. He had comfortably settled in his new environment. His
name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name stay with the Munsons during the six months trial custody period has
with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by resulted to a close bond with Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.
which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends
since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents residence.[3] We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption of
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion Kevin Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph by Mr. and Mrs. Van Munson be
[8]
of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its legalized.
formal opposition dated May 3, 1995,[4] petitioner reiterated its objection
to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the
name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petitions should be lower court, when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support,
conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. are accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive upon this
Court.[9] Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the
After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending order of the court below granting the petition for adoption.
parties, the trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents in this
wise: The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be
synthesized mainly as follows: (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in
WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name
legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2)
natural parents, and for all legal intents and purposes shall be known as whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name.
Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the legally adopted child of Van I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his
Munson and Regina Munson effective upon the filing of the petition jurisdiction when he additionally granted the prayer for the change of the
on March 10, 1994. As soon as the decree of adoption becomes final and given or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
executory, it shall be recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for
103, respectively, of the Rules of Court, and shall be annotated in the change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and
record of birth of the adopted child, which in this case is in Valenzuela, purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being
Metro Manila, where the child was born. Likewise, send a copy of this respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be
Order to the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila, for its entitled to both reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption and an authority to
appropriate action consisten(t) herewith.[5] change the given or proper name of the adoptee, the respective
proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the substantive
At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been and procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the
raised by petitioner regarding the fitness of herein private respondents to Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and
be adopting parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption rendered
Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority
Court for change of name, must correspondingly be complied with. [10] over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and

A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only

the laws and rules on adoption have been observed, but not those for a
petition for change of name.[11] Petitioner further contends that what the
law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of
right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence
of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the
registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a
substantial change of ones legal name, a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and
adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.[12]
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other
blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and
obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the
decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow
that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a
grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the
court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition
for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon
Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in
order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of
discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there
is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change
of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a
single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive joinder of causes of
action, i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties,
have been met.[13]
However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was
originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the
adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change
thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the
purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an
adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be
granted.

Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be
regarding change of name in view of the natural interest of the State in used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with
maintaining a system of identification of its citizens and in the orderly jurisdiction to hear and determine the same,[17] and shall continue to be
administration of justice.[14] Private respondents argue otherwise and so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper
invoke a liberal construction and application of the Rules, the welfare and name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change
interest of the adoptee being the primordial concern that should be in ones official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial
addressed in the instant proceeding.[15] order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of
name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in
On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is
made should normally make its decree recording such change)[18]
Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome
to Aaron Joseph should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil
rights have been prejudiced by said change of name. The strict and register is the name appearing therein, If a change in ones name is
meticulous observation of the requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the
Rules of Court is indubitably for the purpose of preventing fraud, substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for
ensuring that neither State nor any third person should be prejudiced by change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
the grant of the petition for change of name under said rule, to a sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and
petitioner of discernment. accordingly determined.

Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a regional trial court of the province where the person desiring to change
year old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any
his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his
contractual obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf, be name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state
deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where
cha(n)ge of name. It stands to reason that there is no way that the state the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause
or any person may be so prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin for which the change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order
Earls first name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on the intent offor the date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the
petitioners, the prayer for change of name was caused to be published Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for
together with the petition for adoption.[16] the Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the
veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge that the name
legal effects of adoption: be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said
judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall
forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication.[19] It is an independent
and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other
shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another
special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be
appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system. some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and
fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not
subject petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the authorized.[30]
adoptee,[20] all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion
that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso
name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a parties[31] and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented.
change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter effectively disallows unlimited joinder.[32]
relief at law.
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for
imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between
joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much
respondents on the pronouncements in Briz vs. Briz, et al.[21] and Peyer less do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly
vs. Martinez, et al.[22] is misplaced. would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet
the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their
A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of joinder under our Rules.
action would, therefore, appear to be called for.
As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of General
action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in
one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a
declaration.[23] It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two
of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from
complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain each other. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws
circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of and rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition
action in one declaration, complaint or petition.[24] for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopters
fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for
generally not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is
action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds
permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory supporting the proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).
provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same factual
setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined.[25] Modern xxx xxx xxx
statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity
of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever
x x x Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately
this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To
[26] assessed and determined for neither action is dependent on the
achieve these ends, they are liberally construed.
other.[33]
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a
party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of The rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is clear. Joinder may
action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following be allowed only if the actions show a commonality of relationship and
requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties
of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, (Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for
money or are of the same nature and character. These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of in our Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an action for
suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by change of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each other
effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in and do not arise out of the same relation between the parties. While
controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the proposed adopters
matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name
provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where may only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds
possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of a supporting the change requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative
remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the end of the sufficiency of reasons justifying a change of name. And similarly, a
that related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated change of first name cannot be justified in view of a finding that the
at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable,[27] with proposed adopter was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that the
the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice.[28] two actions can connect and find a common ground, thus the joinder
would be improper.
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of
action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly
to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not sought in one petition, private respondents rely upon Peyer vs.
succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment).
developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit
joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some
substantial unity between them.[29] While the rule allows a plaintiff to join
We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases,
the fact of intimacy and relatedness of the issues is so
pronounced. In Peyer, an application to pronounce the husband an
absentee is obviously intertwined with the action to transfer the
management of conjugal assets to the wife. In Briz, an action for
declaration of heirship was deemed a clear condition precedent to an
action to recover the land subject of partition and distribution
proceeding.However, the commonality of relationship which stands out
in both cases does not characterize the present action for adoption and
change of name. Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the
case at bar.
Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two
actions was, in Briz, declared feasible, the Supreme Court did not
indorse an automatic joinder and instead remanded the matter for
further proceedings, granting leave to amend the pleadings and implead
additional parties-defendants for a complete determination of the
controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all
the more emphasizes that although joinders are generally accepted,
they are not allowed where the conditions are not satisfactorily met.[34]
It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this
instance will make for a complete determination of all matters pertaining
to the coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee
in one petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly
insufficient in form and substance with respect to the prayer for change
of name of the adoptee. The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which
underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is
addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven
and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and
comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not
to suits or actions whose subject matters or corresponding reliefs are
unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up individually.
In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al. ,[35] the Court clarified the rule persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
on permissive joinder of causes of action:
The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule,
as there is no positive provision of law or any rule of jurisprudence
which compels a party to join all his causes of action and bring them at
one and the same time.Under the present rules, the provision is still
that the plaintiff may, and not that he must, unite several causes of
action although they may be included in one of the classes
specified. This, therefore, leaves it to the plaintiffs option whether the
causes of action shall be joined in the same action, and no unfavorable
inference may be drawn from his failure or refusal to do so. He may
always file another action based on the remaining cause or causes of
action within the prescriptive period therefor. (Italics supplied.)
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception
from the Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general,
and for change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents
and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may
be invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal
deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert
the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt
at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly
be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and
lawyers alike would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but
imperative justice requires correct observance of indispensable
technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation.[36] It
has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is
indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly
and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.[37]
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that
may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is
important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights
through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are
not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to
provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct
form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation
before a judge whose authority they acknowledge.[38]
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own
wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has
to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate
arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.[39] We have been cautioned and
reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et al. that:[40]
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of
justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and
extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that substantive law
and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been
suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As
a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as
complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the
dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights is
equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights,
be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
xxx xxx xxx
x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the procedure prescribed. x x x. While it is true that
a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the
Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of
the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just
resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates
rather than promotes substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant
consideration from the court. In such situations, the courts are
empowered, even obligated, to suspend the operation of the rules.[41]
We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon
private respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the
change in the proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child.
We are hard put to descry the indispensability of a change of the first
name of the adoptee to his welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of
such urgency that would justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the
Rules. It is the State that stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard
of Rule 103 in this case, considering its natural interest in the methodical
administration of justice and in the efficacious maintenance of a system
of identification of its citizens.
The danger wrought by non-observance, of the Rules is that the
violation of or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law
prevents the proper determination of the questions raised by the parties
with respect to the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide,
in the first place, such questions as relate to the form of the action. The
rules and procedure laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of The given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or
cases are matters of public policy.[42] They are matters of public order and proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
interest which can in no wise be changed or regulated by agreements baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or
between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and
convenience.[43] is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child
In Garcia vs. Republic,[44] we are reminded of the definiteness in the is entitled is fixed by law.[48]
application of the Rules and the importance of seeking relief under the
appropriate proceeding:
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be entered in
the civil register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil
x x x The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not register. That is his name in the eyes of the law.[49] And once the name of
confuse or misapply one procedure for another lest we create confusion a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same
in the application of the proper remedy. Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change
his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction
Respondent judges unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at is premised on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and
achieving stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his entities for purposes of identification.[50]
prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of name, his order being
unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be
manner in which he adjudicated this case may be characterized as a changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103
[51]
regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law of the Rules of Court. For purposes of an application for change of
and jurisprudence. name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented
by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the name recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for
petition for change of name without citing or proving any lawful change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public
ground. Indeed, the only justification advanced for the change of name interest, strict compliance with all the requisites therefor in order to vest
was the fact of the adoptees baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the
by which he has been known since he came to live with private proceedings a nullity.[52]
respondents.[45]
It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a
Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the
that upon the grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a
facto assumed a new identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are
which was the name given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his
change of his first name as prayed for in the petition, so they claim, merely true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is
confirms the designation by which he is known and called in the entered in the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable cause
community in which he lives. This largely echoes the opinion of the lower or any convincing reason which may justify such change. [53]
court that naming the child Aaron Joseph was symbolic of naming him at
birth, and that they, as adoptive parents, have as much right as the Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as
natural parents to freely select the first name of their adopted child. [46] being sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or
ruled on this point in this manner: adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name
As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a
first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage,
child is entitled that is fixed by law. x x x. all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
xxx xxx xxx
would prejudice public interest.[54]

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that
purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a one was baptized by another name, under which he has been known and
woman who had all intentions of giving him away. The naming of the which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names
minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon the grant of their petition for is not sanctioned.[55] For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua
adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.[47] non to a change of name.[56] Neither does the fact that the petitioner has
been using a different name and has become known by it constitute
[57]
We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. A
attenuated ruling of respondent judge and must thus set it aside. name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which
he is known in the community - when at variance with that entered in the
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a persons name is civil register - is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.[58]
a word or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and
distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal from such rulings of long accepted wisdom and applicability. The only
as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name grounds offered to justify the change of name prayed for was that the
of an individual has two parts: adopted child had been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the
religious faith of private respondents and that it was the name by which
he had been called and known by his family, relatives and friends from the adoptee cannot be claimed as a right. It is merely a privilege
the time he came to live with private respondents.[59] Apart from necessitating judicial consent upon compelling grounds. [61]
suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious entreaties for compassion,
none of the justified grounds for a change of name has been alleged or The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to
established by private respondents. The legal bases chosen by them to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and
bolster their cause have long been struck down as unavailing for their ensures to the adopted child the rights and privileges arising therefrom,
present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee herein to use his baptismal ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and
name, instead of his name registered in the civil register, would be to interest of the adopted child,[62] should be understood in its proper
countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon.[60] context. It should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to
The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
his assailed order that The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select
the proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name
(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select for it has theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name
the first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which is registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be
the child is entitled that is fixed by law x x x. solely for the purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official
name. This effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other remain unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in
purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a an appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.
woman who had all the intentions of giving him away. The naming of the While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized,
minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon grant of their petition for guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an
adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth. adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a
consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving
and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably
and Maximo Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a
enunciated. result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully
extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of
realities and legal consequences, rather than sentimentality and
the case at bar. In the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong
symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.
sought the change of his surname which he acquired by virtue of the
decree of adoption granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose
Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon reaching the age of majority, he filed a and is without prejudice to, private respondents privilege to legally
petition in court to change his surname from Wong to Alcala, which was change the proper or given name of their adopted child, provided that the
his surname prior to the adoption. He adduced proof that the use of the same is exercised, this time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of
surname Wong caused him embarrassment and isolation from friends course, the grant thereof is conditioned on strict compliance with all
and relatives in view of a suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is jurisdictional requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling
a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, thereby hampering his reasons advanced therefor.
business and social life, and that his surviving adoptive mother consented
to the change of name sought. This Court granted the petition and WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of
regarded the change of the surname as a mere incident in, rather than respondent judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of
the object of, the adoption. private respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl
Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in
It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the accordance with law. In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
given name, and the legal consequences thereof in view of the adoption
were at issue. That it was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for SO ORDERED.
that purpose with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves
Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
to reinforce the imperative necessity of seeking relief under and through
the legally prescribed procedures.

Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:

Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a

child is being named for the first time by his natural parent, as against
one wherein, a child is previously conferred a first name by his natural
parent, and such name is subsequently sought to be disregarded and
changed by the adoptive parents. In the first case, there is no dispute
that natural parents have the right to freely select and give the childs
first name for every person, including juridical persons, must have a
name (Tolentino, A., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code,
Vol. 1, 1987 edition, page 721). In the second case, however, as in the
case at bar, private respondents, in their capacities as adopters, cannot
claim a right to name the minor adoptee after such right to name the
child had already been exercised by the natural parent. Adopting
parents have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right
asserted by private respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in
addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of
a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's
effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to
declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the
present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to
be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as
the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in
addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging
the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional
3 present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on
the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the
San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that
after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend
more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;
that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent
quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very
intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that
in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live
with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature
and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king
to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended
that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on
April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert
Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more
than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her
child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the
custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and
that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well
as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present
recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals
made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code)
and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case,"
adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the
parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities."
Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded
that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view
psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental
and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union,
his or her personal relationship with the other
 spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul A Yes, Your Honor.
for the attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as Q There is no hope for the marriage?
a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to
their individual fates.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge
committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding
the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent A Yes, Your Honor.
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus
made. Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court A Yes, Your Honor.
of Appeals.
The Court has no more questions.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality
that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
responsibilities and duties." gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
The Court's Ruling indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
The petition is meritorious.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of
Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced
than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the which they followed up with written memoranda.
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us
to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the
some psychological (nor physical) illness. foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing
of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Dr. Sison testified:8 (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
COURT by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage? The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to
grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of
the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima,
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles

68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal

of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to

harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject
to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is
 Republic of the Philippines Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and
SUPREME COURT respondents. He clarified that Godofredo’s occupation of the subject
Manila premises was based on the former’s mere tolerance and accommodation.
Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person
FIRST DIVISION to sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by
a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she
was fully aware of the contents of the document. Moreover, Librada
G.R. No. 175080 November 24, 2010
received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of
the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA since the principal relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the
S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio
REYES, Petitioners, also asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the present
vs. suit. 4
LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F.
MAURICIO, Respondents.
Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, the Provincial
Adjudicator5 concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and
DECISION Librada, being the surviving spouse, should be maintained in peaceful
possession of the subject land. The dispositive portion of the decision
PEREZ, J.: reads:

Subject of this petition is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 10 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in
August 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148, affirming the Decision dated 7 July favor of plaintiff Librada Mauricio and against defendant Eugenio R. Reyes
1998 and Resolution dated 28 September 2004 of the Department of and order is hereby issued:
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
1. Declaring the kasunduan null and void;
Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land
located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, with an area of four thousand five 2. Ordering defendant to respect the peaceful possession of
hundred twenty-seven (4,527) square meters, more or less, and covered herein plaintiff Librada Mauricio over the subject landholding;
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 109456(M). Said title came from
and cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in the name of Eufracia and
3. Ordering plaintiff to return the amount of P50,000.00 to
Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated
herein defendant;
to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs
following the death of his parents.
4. No pronouncement as to costs.6
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of
Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada), now On appeal, two issues were presented to and taken up by the DARAB,
deceased, and her alleged daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for namely: (1) Whether or not there is tenancy relation between the parties;
annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and (2) whether or not the Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 is valid
and Eugenio as parties. Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their and enforceable. The DARAB held that the Mauricio’s are former tenants
peaceful possession with damages. of Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses Reyes died, siblings
Eufracia, Susana and Eugenio, among others inherited the subject
property. Under the law, they were subrogated to the rights and
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo
substituted to the "obligations" of their late parents as the agricultural
Mauricio (Godofredo), who was the lawful and registered tenant of
lessors over the farmholding tenanted by respondents. Moreover, the
Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that
DARAB banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan or the leasehold
from 1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working on
contract executed by Susana in favor of Godofredo to support the tenancy
the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing
relationship. Furthermore, the DARAB declared the other Kasunduan as
trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent
void by relying on the evaluation of the Provincial Adjudicator as to the
improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful
legal incapacity of Librada to enter into such a contract.7
means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as
Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the
subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah Eugenio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the DARAB on 28 September 2004.8
Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the
Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue Aggrieved by the DARAB ruling, Eugenio filed a petition for review with
advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other the Court of Appeals. On 10 July 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a
handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void resolution regarding the status of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her
for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means to substitute Librada, who died during the pendency of the case.9 On 10
to eject respondents from the subject property. Respondents prayed for August 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and resolution of
the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio the DARAB. It sustained the factual findings of the DARAB with respect to
to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the the tenancy relation between Godofredo and Spouses Reyes and the
subject property. Respondents likewise demanded payment of nullity of the Kasunduan.10
damages.2 During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract
executed between Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy
agreement.3
Undaunted, Eugenio filed the instant petition. Eugenio submits that no other hand, Eugenio disputes the claims of Librada and presented another
tenancy relationship exists between him and respondents. He insists that Kasunduan executed between him and Librada on 28 September 1994
the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan allegedly executed between which effectively terminates the leasehold tenancy when the latter
Godofredo and Susana in 1993 giving the former the right to occupy and allegedly agreed to vacate the subject premises in exchange of monetary
cultivate the subject property is unenforceable against Eugenio, having considerations.
been entered into without his knowledge and consent. Eugenio further
asserts that per records of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), no This second Kasunduan is the subject of the instant complaint. In its
leasehold contract was entered into by Godofredo and Eugenio with disquisition, the DARAB nullified the second Kasunduan, to wit:
respect to the disputed property. Eugenio attributes error on the part of
the Court of Appeals in concluding that a tenancy relationship existed
x x x Insofar as this "Kasunduan" is concerned, and after reading the
between the parties despite the absence of some of the essential
transcript of the testimony of the old woman Librada Mauricio, this Board
requisites of a tenancy relationship such as personal cultivation and the
is convinced that indeed the purpose of the document was to eject her
subject land being agricultural. Finally, Eugenio defends the validity of the
from the farmholding but that Librada Mauricio wanted to return the
Kasunduan entered into between him and Librada wherein the latter
money she received because the contents of the document was never
agreed to vacate the subject property, in that it was voluntarily entered
explained to her being illiterate who cannot even read or write. This Board
into and the contents thereof were mutually understood by the parties.11
is even further convinced after reading the transcript of the testimonies
that while the document was allegedly signed by the parties in Turo,
In a Resolution dated 7 February 2007, this Court denied the petition for Bocaue, Bulacan, the same document was notarized in Pasig, Metro
failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its Manila, thus, the Notary Public was not in a position to explain much less
challenged decision and resolution. The Court also dismissed the issues ascertain the veracity of the contents of the alleged "Kasunduan" as to
raised as factual. However, upon filing of a motion for reconsideration by whether or not Plaintiff-Appellee Librada Mauricio had really understood
Eugenio, this Court reinstated the petition and required respondent the contents thereof. This Board further adheres to the principle that it
Leonida to comment on the petition.12 cannot substitute its own evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses
with that of the personal evaluation of the Adjudicator a quo who, in the
In her comment, respondent prayed for the denial of the petition because case at bar, had the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to review of errors of law and not witness Librada Mauricio while testifying on the circumstances relevant
of facts.13 to the execution of the alleged "Kasunduan." Furthermore, this Board
adheres to the principle that in all contractual, property or other
In the main, Eugenio insists that no tenancy relationship existed between relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his
him and Godofredo. This is a question of fact beyond the province of this moral dependence, ignorance, mental weakness or other handicap, the
Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which courts (and in the case at bar, this Board) must be vigilant for his
only questions of law may be raised.14 Absent any of the obtaining protection (Art. 24, New Civil Code). In the case at bar, Plaintiff-Appellee
exceptions15 to this rule, the findings of facts of the Provincial is already eighty-one (81) years old who can neither read nor write, thus,
Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and especially by the Court of Appeals, she just simply signs her name with her thumbmark.17
are binding on this Court.
Applying the principle that only questions of law may be entertained by
The DARAB ruling outlined how the tenancy relationship between this Court, we defer to the factual ruling of the Provincial Adjudicator, as
Godofredo and the Mauricio’s came about, thus: affirmed by DARAB and the Court of Appeals, which clearly had the
opportunity to closely examine the witnesses and their demeanor on the
witness stand.
This Board, after a thorough evaluation of the evidences, is convinced that
the Mauricios are former tenants of the parents of the herein Defendant-
Appeallant. A perusal of Exhibit "H" which is the Tax Declaration of the Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo is
property in controversy proves that upon the death of the parents of void, our conclusion remains. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a
Defendant-Appellant, the property was the subject matter of their extra- tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term
judicial partition/settlement and this property was initially under the or period in a leasehold contract; or by the sale, alienation or the transfer
ownership of the appellant’s sisters, Eufracia and Susana Reyes until the of legal possession of the landholding. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199
same property was finally acquired/transferred in the name of or the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides:
Respondent-Appellant. Obviously, in order to re-affirm the fact that the
Mauricios are really the tenants, Susana Reyes had voluntarily executed
SECTION 9. Severance of Relationship. — The tenancy relationship is
the Leasehold Contract with Godofredo Librada being the tenant on the extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or
property and to prove that she (Susana Reyes) was the predecessor-in- incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate
interest of Respondent-Appeallant Eugenio Reyes. x x x. The "Kasunduang
farm household may continue to work the land until the close of the
Buwisan sa Sakahan" alleging that their tenancy relationship began in the
agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by
year 1973 and their agreement as to the rental shall remain until further
the parties, and the sale or alienation of the land does not of themselves
revised.16 extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee
shall assume the rights and obligations of the former landholder in
This is a contest of "Kasunduans." Respondents rely on a Kasunduan of relation to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs
tenancy. Petitioners swear by a Kasunduan of termination of tenancy. shall likewise assume his rights and obligations. (Emphasis supplied)

Librada claims that her late husband had been working on the land since Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms
1936 until his death in 1994. She presented the Kasunduang Buwisan sa of the Philippines) likewise provides:
Sakahan dated 26 May 1993 and executed by Godofredo and Susana
which reaffirmed the leasehold tenancy over the subject land. On the
SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of
Period, etc. — The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall
not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a
leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells,
alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the
purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. (Emphasis
supplied)

As an incidental issue, Leonida’s legal standing as a party was also assailed

by Eugenio.1avvphi1 Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered
moot with the death of Librada, Godofredo’s sole compulsory heir.
Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and
Librada, thus, not a legal heir.18

We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio
cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition.19

It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.20 Well-

known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book "Civil Code of the
Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted that the aforecited
doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
He explained thus:

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a

collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of
an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly
expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: "The contest
of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any
other way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles
170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the
action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the
husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.21

In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros

Occidental,22 the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
and not through collateral attack.23

The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made
subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,24 this Court reiterated
that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the
settlement of a decedent’s estate.25 Furthermore, in Austria v.
Reyes,26 the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the
testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose
and cannot be subject to collateral attack.27

Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of

Leonida from the case for annulment of the "Kasunduan" that supposedly
favors petitioners’ cause.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition for

review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision dated 10 August 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
GARCIA when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner. Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie
of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no
DECISION law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there
is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial
is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name
the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name
raised in the instant case. Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and;
(6) her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by
The facts are undisputed. either the Catindig or Garcia families.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
a petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on
middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following
June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
reasons:
Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and
that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation
prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code,
mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any
his surname. confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof
of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
granting the adoption, thus: Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the not prohibit, it allows.
petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which
Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none
is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized
of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and
by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees
that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to
agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be
interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The
before the surname of the mother.[7]
Court further holds that the petitioners care and custody of the child
since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough We find merit in the petition.
compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree
No. 603.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same
is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby
freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation
her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the
by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and
petitioners legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the
is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which
Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE
a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or
NATHY CATINDIG.
appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.[8] It is both of
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper
name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for
that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish
record purposes.
him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to
SO ORDERED.[4] child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. rules which regulate the use of surname[10] of an individual whatever may
be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in
the surname of the father. Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and
surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. middle name or the mothers surname shall be added.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an

xxx adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise
marriage shall principally use the surname of the father. silent on the matter, thus:

Art. 370. A married woman may use: "(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname,
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
or

xxx
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is
his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty
party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the
innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname.
However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's
surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs
mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the
suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father, thus
Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use
by the wife of the surname and that of the child because the fathers
surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he
would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if
he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname
continue using her name and surname employed before the legal of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied
separation. that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that
the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though the surname of the mother.
he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person present Article 364, which reads:
shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid
confusion. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of
the father.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants
and descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of
and other direct male descendants shall either: the person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then
cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, Ponce since the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty.
Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his
mothers surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to

xxx
the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of
the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this
Middle Name for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed
Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating
that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
the use of a middle name. Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to xxx
what middle name a child may use.
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested
by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last
because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where
they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is
also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only
sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also
eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter
on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that
the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.
Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee
approved the suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent
purposes of adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the adopted child
are of primary and paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.[27]

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted
shall bear the surname of the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether he
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter,
upon issuance of the decree of adoption. [14]
This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so
The Underlying Intent of that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is
Adoption Is In Favor of the doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to
Adopted Child avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law.[28]
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether
related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
legitimate child.[15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be
legitimate paternity and filiation.[16] The modern trend is to consider allowed to do so.
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
[17]
status. This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the mothers surname GARCIA as her middle name.
United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be
social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared entered in the decree of adoption.
to favor the adopted child.[18]Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,[19] secures these rights and privileges SO ORDERED.
for the adopted.[20]
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia,
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be JJ., concur.
a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 189[21] of the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA
8552.[23]

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that

Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that
the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued

use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain
her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family
Code and Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide
that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her
natural mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living
together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San
Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is
closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim
(petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004
of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in
SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice
the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael
Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by
profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted
to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child
of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear
that they were the children’s parents. The children2 were named Michelle
P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely
eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on
15 March 1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to
petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own.
They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim"
in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28
November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married
Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty5 given under Republic Act No. 85526(RA 8552) to those
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002,
petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and
1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption,
Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18
years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as
evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent
to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband
Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent9 for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child
and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.10 The DSWD
issued a similar Certification for Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried,
petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband.
The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the
Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the
motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the
motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the
exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s argument
that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because,
under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and
certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even
made a party in this case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint
adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial
court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising
parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights
from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether
or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed
because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount
interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the
legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She
argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at
the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is
not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having
attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself,
without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse
but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for
adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the
8552 reads: illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the
and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12
position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with
the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having
difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent; herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated
for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the
he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third,
adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his
agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/herAffidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
enter his/her country as his/her adopted
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least
in his/her country may be waived for the following: three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption;
(3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child.
consanguinity or affinity; or None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7.
The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the
to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of
the Filipino spouses; or Effects of Adoption

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore
of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the
accountabilities. age of majority. This is untenable.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
cases: consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental
and physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
son/daughter of the other; or children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.15
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That
the other spouse has signified his/her consent It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is,
thereto; or when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 — emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child,
who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each
life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
other.
adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make
our own legislation to suit petitioner.
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent
is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would
and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on show that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has
the adopter(s). filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles
Superior Court.
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between
entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage
the means of the family. still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the
wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint
the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction adoption is mandatory.
from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological
parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15
September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological
parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate SO ORDERED.
child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights
and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the
child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be
legal and compulsory heirs of each other.18 Therefore, even if
emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights19 of a
legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled
to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to
which biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional
rights.22

We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child
in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural
parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the
law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is

the promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should
be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat
said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s
decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is
amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for
adoption. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 10196 September 9, 2014
MELODY R. NERY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against
Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana (Sampana) for failing to file the petition for
adoption despite receiving his legal fees and for making Nery believe
that the petition was already filed.
The Facts
In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010,1 Nery alleged that in
June 2008, she engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of
her marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for
annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid ₱200,000.00 to
Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt,
whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana
then gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they would
use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana ₱100,000.00, in
installment: (a) ₱10,000.00 on 10 September 2008; (b) ₱50,000.00 on 2
October 2008; and (c) ₱40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer
asked for receipts since she trusted Sampana.
On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that
he already filed the petition for adoption and it was already published.
Sampana further informed Nery that they needed to rehearse before
the hearing. Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the hearing was set
on 5 March 2010 in Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan. When Nery asked
why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that
her presence was no longer necessary because the hearing was only
jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery that the hearing was reset to 12 March
2010.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan
about the status of the petition for adoption and discovered that there
was no such petition filed in the court.2 Thus, in the afternoon of the
same day, Nery met Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the
₱100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would
deduct the filing fee worth ₱12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee
should not be deducted, since the petition for adoption was never filed.
Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the reimbursement of the
₱100,000.00 from Sampana, but the demands were left unheeded.
In an Order dated 25 February 2011,3 the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through
Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera),
stated that Sampana failed to file his answer to the complaint and to
appear during the mandatory conference. Thus, both parties were
directed to submit their position papers.
In her position paper,4 Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.
On the other hand, in his position paper dated 25 March
2011,5 Sampana argued that Nery’s allegations were self-serving and
unsubstantiated. However, Sampana admitted receiving "one package
fee" from Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage and adoption.
Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption
because of the old age, civil status and nationality of the alien adopter,
but Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that "if
the [alien] adopter would be married to a close relative of [Nery], the
intended [adoption by an alien] could be possible." Sampana, then,
required Nery to submit the documents, including the marriage
contracts and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt from
the Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery furnished the blurred
marriage contract, but not the certification. Sampana alleged that he
prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it because he was still
waiting for the certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for
adoption. Sampana claimed that Nery could have mistaken the
proceeding for the annulment case with the petition for adoption, and
that the annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption case. In
any case, Sampana committed to refund the amount Nery paid him,
after deducting his legal services and actual expenses.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation,6 Commissioner Antiquiera found
Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already
filed the petition for adoption and for failing to file the petition despite
receiving his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera recommended a
penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-217 passed on 20 March 2013, the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Antiquiera’s report
and recommendation, as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, [t]he Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent is
guilty of malpractice by his failure to file a petition for adoption and
made complainant believe that he filed the petition in Court, Atty.
Glicerio Sampana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months and ORDERED to RETURN to complainant the amount
of One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos with legal interest within
thirty days from receipt of notice.7
The Ruling of the Court
The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken,
except as to the penalty.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the dutyof fidelity to the client’s
cause.8 Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. 9 A lawyer also
owes it to the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and
fair.10Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client thatmay come into his possession.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice
of law for THREE (3) YEARS with a stern warning that a repetition of a
similar act shall be dealt with more severely. We also ORDER Atty.
Glicerio A. Sampana to RETURN to complainant Melody R. Nery the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00), with 12%
interest per annum from the time of his receipt of the full amount of
money on 17 November 2008 until 30 June 2013, then 6% interest per
annum from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
included in the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the
when due or upon demand. x x x.
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and

diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package

fee" for both cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this
fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short
of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampana’s
proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition
for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. Inhis position paper, he
suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her
close relative, the intended adoption could be possible. Under the
Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien
adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification
of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.11

Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana
misinformed Nery of the status of the petition.1âwphi1He then
conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for
adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted tohim.
He even kept the money given him, in violation of the Code’s mandate
to deliver the client’s funds upon demand. A lawyer’s failure to return
upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that
he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal
profession.12

This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v.
Sampana,13 we already found Sampana guilty of violating Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for his unethical and illegal act
relative to his double sale of a parcel of land. We imposed upon him the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and
warned him that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

In Rollon v. Naraval,14 we imposed upon the respondent therein the

penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years for
failing to render any legal service after receiving the filing and partial
service fee. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment and the
previous rulings of this Court, we deem it proper to increase the penalty
for Sampana’s malpractice and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years.
 SECOND DIVISION with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed
on August 1987, and Regina on March 1989.14 Under "Motivation for
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014 Adoption," the social welfare officer noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M.
not able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However, with the
CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M.
presence of his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is
CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA
his intention to legalize their relationship and surname. . . .15
MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.

DECISION At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina
temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The children have allegedly been in
his custody since Lilibeth's death in July 1995.17chanrobleslaw
LEONEN, J.:
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption,18 having
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must ruled that "[n]o opposition had been received by this Court from any
be a showing of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere person including the government which was represented by the Office
procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse of the Solicitor General."19 A certificate of finality20 was issued on
attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other February 9, 2006.
legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service
of summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified through Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V.
constructive service. Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.21 In her complaint, she alleged that
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the Jose had been remiss in providing support for their daughter, Joanne, for
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied the petition for the past 36 years.22 She alleged that she single-handedly raised and
annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering
appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and
granted respondents' decree of adoption.3chanrobleslaw even went to the extent of adopting Larry's two children, Jed and
Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and consent.23 She also
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed
Lemuel Gregorio (Jéd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. and Regina were his illegitimate children with Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to
Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata cover up for his homosexual relationship with Larry.24chanrobleslaw
Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M.
Castro (Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies
Castro" and her nickname, "Jayrose." being remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He
alleged that he always offered help, but it was often declined.25 He also
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina because they are his illegitimate
Laoag City. Their marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, children. He denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to
Rose Marie, who was born in 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart by Rosario. He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left
disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a him paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been diminished because
couple of months because of the incompatibilities between several properties had to be sold to pay for medical treatments.26 He
them.4chanrobleslaw then implored the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to weigh on the case
with "justice and equity."27chanrobleslaw
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth
to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos
for about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Norte.28chanrobleslaw
Jose would visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they
separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment
homosexual tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they "remained of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court
friends for fifteen (15) years despite their separation(.)"6chanrobleslaw of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial
court approving Jed and Regina's adoption.29chanrobleslaw
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the
that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth adoption sometime in 2005.30 They allege that Rosario's affidavit of
Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth),8 whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile consent, marked by the trial court as "Exh. K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They
housekeeper.9 At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years also allege that Jed and Regina's birth certificates showed different sets
old.10chanrobleslaw of information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she
gave birth. They argue that one set of birth certificates states the father
According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare to be Jose and in another set of National Statistic Office certificates
Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected shows the father to be Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover.33 It was
family, being one of the three children of former Governor Mauricio further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose's illegitimate
Castro. children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were
married at the time of their birth.34chanrobleslaw
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte.12 The
report mentioned that he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
did not produce any children.13 It also stated that he met and fell in love

While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and
Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "no
explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the
adopter . . . should be personally notified of the
hearing."35chanrobleslaw
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by
[Jose] in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate
children] to the prejudice of the interests of his legitimate heirs"36 but
stated that its hands were bound by the trial court decision that had
already attained "finality and immutability."37chanrobleslaw
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information
contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the
determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was,
therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment.
The alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be
classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment
of judgment.38chanrobleslaw
When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied on
July 10, 2009,39 they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
denying the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of
extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its
application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a
judgment.40 They argue that because of the fabricated consent obtained
by Jose and the alleged false information shown in the birth certificates
presented as evidence before the trial court,41 they were not given the
opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were
concealed from them.42chanrobleslaw
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and
misapplied the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due process,
notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable parties.43 They argue that the
adoption of illegitimate children requires the consent, not only of the
spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter,
and such consent was never secured from Joanne.44chanrobleslaw
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could
not have been deprived of their day in court since their interest was
"amply protected by the participation and representation of the Solicitor
45
General through the deputized public prosecutor." chanrobleslaw
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through
publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but also notice to
the world of the adoption proceedings.46 They argue that since the
alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be
extrinsic fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment
of judgment.47 They also argue that petitioners were not indispensable
parties because adoption is an action in rem and, as such, the only
indispensable party is the state.48chanrobleslaw
The petition is granted.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file
an action with the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders
and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will
only be available if "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through
no fault of the petitioner."49chanrobleslaw
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:50chanrobleslaw
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so
exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies
are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution
sought, to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or
through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character,
is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by
the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted
safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47
of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A
petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards
cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a
judgment, final order or final resolution is understandable, for the
remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and
unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation
of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability
serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the
courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in
any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous
conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by
the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land.
As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand
that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in
suspense for an indefinite period of time.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two
grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic
fraud, which must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of
jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or
laches.52chanrobleslaw
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the
parties.53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is "[that which] prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court,
or [that which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment
itself but to the manner in which it is procured."54chanrobleslaw
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial
court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the
favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
vis-a-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial
court of the adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a
requisite in the proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action."55 As
Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act
No. 855256 which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption
requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock
obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his
legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must
first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children
born out of wedlock:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may
adopt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified, his/her consent
thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis
supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife
must file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated
in In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim:57chanrobleslaw
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that
joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the
level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.58
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a
situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born
out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary.
However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of
his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and
Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For
Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her
consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's
consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name
cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had
Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she
would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the
affidavit. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to
adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if
they are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No.
8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After being
properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold
his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to
the adoption is hereby required:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures
harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the
other children on notice that they will have to share their parent's love
and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and
that she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings.
Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be
valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial
court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne
from being notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was
never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by
Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been
effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive
notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities
cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and
Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may
have been committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than
extrinsic fraud. This is erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59chanrobleslaw
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in
litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by
keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a
compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the
suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an
attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his
defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought
within four years from discovery.61Petitioners alleged that they were
made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on
October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation
to any of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City, llocos
Norte.62 Larry and Lilibeth were residents of Barangay 6, Laoag
City.63 Jed and Regina were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.64 Rosario provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No.
and Joanne were residents of Parañaque City, Manila.65 The petition for 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
adoption, however, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos
Norte.66 The trial court gave due course to the petition on Jose's bare ARTICLE VII
allegation in his petition that he was a resident of Batac,67 even though VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
it is admitted in the Home Study Report that he was a practicing lawyer
in Laoag City.68chanrobleslaw SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. —

Second, using the process of delayed registration, 69 Jose was able to

(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1)
secure birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be the father
70 day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand
and Larry as merely the informant. Worse still is that two different sets
pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos
of fraudulent certificates were procured: one showing that Jose and
71 (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any
Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila, and another
person who shall commit any of the following acts:
wherein the portion for the mother's name was not filled in at all.72 The
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence,
birth certificates of Jed and Regina from the National Statistics Office,
fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar acts;
however, show that their father was Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the
certificates are in clear contradiction to the birth certificates submitted
law for adoption; or
by Jose to the trial court in support of his petition for adoption.
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or
exploitation.
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a
motivation for adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were
child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological
childless,74 to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent of
parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be punished
Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario and alleged to be
75 by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty
fraudulent. chanrobleslaw
thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial
Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of
court in approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne
his criminal liabilities.78 Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any
from participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.
provision on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to
have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as
VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 855279 since rescission of adoption can
intrinsic on the basis that they were "forged instruments or perjured
only be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no
testimonies"76 presented during the trial. It failed to understand,
other remedy in law other than the annulment of the judgment.
however, that fraud is considered intrinsic when the other party was
either present at the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is
such instrument or testimony was presented in court,
reason to believe that Joanne has grown up having never experienced
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the love and care of a father, her parents having separated a year after
her birth. She has never even benefited from any monetary support
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a
from her father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain
fair and just determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts
a medical degree from the University of the Philippines College of
or things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated
Medicine80 and is now working as a doctor in Canada.81 These
and determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. In other
accomplishments, however, are poor substitutes if the injustice done
words, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court
upon her is allowed to continue.
because he can guard against that kind of fraud through so many
means, including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16,
examination, resorting to the modes of discovery, and proper scientific or
2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP.
forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and evidence for use
Proc. No. 3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID.
at the trial and perjury in court testimony have been regarded as not
preventing the participation of any party in the proceedings, and are
SO ORDERED.
not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud.77 (Emphasis supplied)

When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation

of any other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic,
regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of
forged documents or perjured testimony during the trial.

Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable

opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been
allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant
Jose's petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under
the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose's
acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.

The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the
March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P.
Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services,
Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased
employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as
the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by of the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville,
since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's
Employees' Compensation Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2,
2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell
on John, which led to his untimely death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus,
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits
under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10,
20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim
because you are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as
he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you
submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission
(ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the
assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled
against petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after under
PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary
beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth
were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather,
Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No.
8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985,
which decree of adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by
the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary,
not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as
John’s secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that Cornelio has
already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that
beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence,
the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary
when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and
eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the
legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV,
Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a
legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for
adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested
her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent
this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the
beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of
the deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on
record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the
just, due and lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful
beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in
not giving due course/denying petitioner’s otherwise
meritorious motion for reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents
of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary
beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the
benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or
secondary, and determined atthe time of employee’s death.
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s
claim for death benefits is that eventhough she is John’s biological
mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio,
was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the
legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately
qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence,
absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will
presume him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to
claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus,
assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the
Social Security law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot
claim the benefit legally provided by law to the primary beneficiary, in
this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agenciesover
matters falling under their jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case,
the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the
petitioner – Cornelio’s death certificate.13
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive
father died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since
the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality.15 As
such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven
that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is
contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to
the death benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise. The
pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as
amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context
indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence,
the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary
when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and
eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the
ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the processing of
claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by
the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at
the time of the employee’s death until he remarries;
and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or
acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried
not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or
over 21 years of age provided that he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to
physicalor mental defect which is congenital or
acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary only when there
are no other dependent children who are qualified
and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided
finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged
natural children, they shall be counted from the
youngest and without substitution, but not
exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon
the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate
children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed,
and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age
providedthat he is incapacitated and incapable of
self - support dueto physical or mental defect which
is congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis
supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground
that she is no longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by
the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree
severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting
her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being
a secondary beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the
Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of
the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC
indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the
ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated
by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish,
or non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents,
to the contrary. whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in
need of support or assistance.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,
the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that
Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to
Constitution.(Emphasis supplied) the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children
and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the
lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
16
parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate
Fortune Tobacco Corporation that:
descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was
crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by
details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into nature or adoption.
effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to
amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in
Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause
harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the
basic law. (Emphasis supplied) To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an
affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the
laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on
from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended
Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a
by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it
interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate
parents." As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this
manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law
wise:
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its legitimate governmental objective.19
general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
by it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as
interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a general and inclusive determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
debemus. xxx germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."20
a more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by
any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to
intends to use the termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited
with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the
Code. legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the
classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute pressing government concern or interest that requires protection so as
it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and
person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more the rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can
restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that employees and
so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied) their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event
of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if Article
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to
be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries
parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take
therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as
appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted
rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims
for and receive death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to
the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its
assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she
could have still claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that
"legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority
over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed
Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming
arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the
adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and be governed by the following rules:
that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority,
petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years
old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest
it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s
death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years
after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years
of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in
the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise,
taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of
adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the
adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of
the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act,
provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of
adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological
parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other
shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the
restoration of custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of
terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations
between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent
restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left
to fend for himself at such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA
8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna
in the law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all fours
with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are
guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA
855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the
child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the
best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his
welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered
incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee
isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in
this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be
expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s
biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though
parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the
adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To
demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to
inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family
Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the
entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and
the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the
ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the
New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or
descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by
adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their
rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of
adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the
pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the
policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-
vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that
certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should
certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental
authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s
adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor
child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive
parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the
adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being
adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus,
We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’sminority resulted in
the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s
dependence on John can be established from the documentary evidence
submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner, prior to
John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984,
leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable
to "give a bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she
consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.

Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner

and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte"
as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in John’s Death
Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or
Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by
John.26 Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed
Decision.27Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing
her claim before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal
with the ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been
restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed actually
execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his

beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the
"Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for
work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of
beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD
626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at
least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent.
Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death
during John’s minority, the restoration ofpetitioner’s parental authority,
the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention
to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to
Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary
under PD 626 as a dependent parent.

All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal
basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s
death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during
John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the
death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall
accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010

Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No.
SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby
directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the
deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
HABEAS CORPUZ
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA
ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, respondents. Ilusorio vs. Bildner, 332 SCRA 169, G.R. No.
139789, G.R. No. 139808 May 12, 2000
Actions; Habeas corpus; A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto—it is devised as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint,
as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.—As
heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional
freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are
not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of
freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint,
as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Ilusorio vs.
Bildner, 332 SCRA 169, G.R. No. 139789, G.R. No. 139808 May 12, 2000
Same; Same; The essential object and purpose of the writ of ha-beas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve
a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.—The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint
is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must
be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal
restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or
moral.
Same; Same; Mental Incapacity; The fact that a person is about 86 years
of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated; Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical
condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.—
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86
years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or
medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his
actions.
Same; Same; Right to Privacy; A person of sound mind is possessed with
the capacity to make choices, and even as the choices he makes may not
appeal to some of his family members these are choices which exclusively
belong to him.—As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s mental state, the
Court of Appeals observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having
answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court. Being
of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In
this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he
opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of
his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to
Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not
prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration,
and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Same; A person with full mental capacity coupled with the
right of choice may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free
choice.—With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his
free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy.
Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation
rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for
such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity.
Same; Same; Same; Husband and Wife; Marriage; In case the husband
refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without
threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.—When the
court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the
same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or
refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary. The
Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of
a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In
case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at
liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of
his right.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No court is empowered as a judicial
authority to compel a husband to live with his wife; Coverture cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs
or by any other mesne process.—No court is empowered as a judicial
authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs
or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority
and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO
ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES
and JANE DOES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by
conflicts on expectancy in fabled fortune.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly
inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the
Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in
consortium.
On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing She claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to
the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by
Potenciano Ilusorio. Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired as director
and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control.
15
Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.
husband Potenciano Ilusorio.2 This case was consolidated with another
case3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the
Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999.16 Potenciano himself declared that
wife, asserting that he never refused to see her. he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that he
had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus4 for lack of
merit, and granted the petition5 to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling6 Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments.
giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7 Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to decide for
himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the
What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state.
decision.8
We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally
On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a
October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m., without requiring the mandatory question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
presence of the parties.
As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation,
In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit: these are matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding,
irrelevant in habeas corpus.
(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical
examination of petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio; Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should
not rely on the facts found by the Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed that
the facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and incomplete. We
(b) Whether the same is relevant; and
see no reason why the High Court of the land need go to such length. The
hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower courts are
(c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.9 conclusive on the Supreme Court.17 We emphasize, it is not for the Court
to weigh evidence all over again.18 Although there are exceptions to the
The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its resolution, rule,19 Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance.
enjoined the parties and their lawyers to initiate steps towards an
amicable settlement of the case through mediation and other means. Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles
68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses, they
On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each
compliance of the parties with the resolution of October 11, 2000.10 other. We agree.

On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
and motion praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be produced before the together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.20 The sanction
Court and be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and
by the Court.11 wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.21

On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
the Court's order of January 31 , 2001.12 Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined
empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not
The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for reconsideration only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
are mere reiterations of her arguments that have been resolved in the communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
decision.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with
Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus: "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. 22

First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano
to live with her in consortium and that Potenciano's mental state was not On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his
an issue. However, the very root cause of the entire petition is her desire Creator and Supreme Judge. Let his soul rest in peace and his survivors
to have her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that continue the much prolonged fracas ex aequo et bono.
she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any
Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband rate, the case has been rendered moot by the death of subject.
was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-
Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed. 14 Santiago, JJ ., concur.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 148468 January 28, 2003
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 148769 January 28, 2003
EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 149116 January 28, 2003
EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Criminal Procedure; Information; The Information must allege clearly and
accurately the elements of the crime charged; The use of derivatives or
synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is
sufficient.—The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to
know the proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and
accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined
by reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes. The
purpose of the requirement of alleging all the elements of the crime in
the Information is to inform an accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare for his defense.
Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his
conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The use of
derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the
offense charged is sufficient.
Same; Same; Matters of evidence need not be alleged in the dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by the facts, and that a
Information.—It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a reinvestigation was necessary.
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the Same; Bail; The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the
same is evidentiary and the general rule is that matters of evidence need conduct of hearings on his petition for bail.—The arraignment of an
not be alleged in the. Information.
Same; Preliminary Investigations; Court does not interfere with the
Ombudsman’s discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigations.—
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s
discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro vs.
Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled: “x x x. In the performance of his task to
determine probable cause, the Ombudsman’s discretion is paramount.
Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court said: ‘x x x. (S)uffice it to state
that this Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, and leaves to the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish ‘probable cause’ for filing
of information against the supposed offender.’ ”
Same; Same; Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against
petitioner for plunder.—Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish
that the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that matter committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing their resolution and joint resolution,
respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court
finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan and
the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against petitioner for plunder.
Neither did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion for reinvestigation of the charges against him in the amended
Information.
Same; Same; The right to a preliminary investigation is not a
constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute.—It bears
stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a
constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute. The
absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
Information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for
quashing the Information.
Same; Same; The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.—The purpose of a
preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial. As the Court held in Webb vs. De Leon, “[a] finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither
on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely,
not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.”
Same; Same; The determination of the existence of probable cause is the
function of the prosecutor.—Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the
part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said officer’s
finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of
the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. The
Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to establish
that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was
tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint resolution
accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for
bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of
his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need
not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
Same; Same; When bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and
be granted bail even prior to arraignment.—For when bail is a matter of
right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to
arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for bail
in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the
court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the
evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty
even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be
“authorized” under the circumstances.
Same; Same; Court finds no such inconsistency exists between an
application of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash.—The
Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an
accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by
him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its
purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an
offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his
appearance at the trial. As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from
the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
voluntary surrender. On the other hand, a motion to quash an
Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its
face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
Information. An accused may file a Motion to quash the Information, as a
general rule, before arraignment.
Same; Same; The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of
two or more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct
a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another accused is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.—There is no
provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of
Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more
petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an
accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the
other accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of
two or more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct
a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another accused is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the
Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its
discretion.
Same; Same; Court finds that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of petitioner and the trial
of former President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly.—While the
Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No. 26558, is
empowered “to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy
termination of the case,” the Court finds that it gravely abused its
discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of petitioner and the trial
of former President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly. It bears stressing
that the Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged in its May 4, 2001 Order the
“pre-eminent position and superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to have
the matter of his provisional liberty resolved . . . without unnecessary
delay,” only to make a volte face and declare that after all the hearing of
petition for bail of petitioner and Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada and the trial as
against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be held
simultaneously.
Same; Same; A person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely
denied the opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the
judgment of his case.—A person charged with a capital offense is not
absolutely denied the opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on bail
pending the judgment of his case. However, as to such person, bail is not
a matter of right but is discretionary upon the court. Had the rule been
otherwise, the Rules would not have provided for an application for bail
by a person charged with a capital offense under Rule 114, Section 8.
Same; Same; Upon an application for bail by the person charged with a
capital offense, a hearing thereon must be conducted, where the
prosecution must be accorded an opportunity to discharge its burden of
proving that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong; When the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of right.—There
must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against a person charged
with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him bail. Thus,
upon an application for bail by the person charged with a capital offense,
a hearing thereon must be conducted, where the prosecution must be
accorded an opportunity to discharge its burden of proving that the
evidence of guilt against an accused is strong. The prosecution shall be
accorded the opportunity to present all the evidence it may deem
necessary for this purpose. When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the
evidence of guilt is strong, it is the court’s duty to deny the application for
bail. However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a
matter of right.
Same; Same; Even in cases where the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence in opposition to an application for bail by an accused charged
with a capital offense, the trial court is still under duty to conduct a
hearing on said application; Rationale for such requirement explained in
Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz.—The Court has previously ruled that even
in cases where the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition
to an application for bail by an accused charged with a capital offense, the
trial court is still under duty to conduct a hearing on said application. The
rationale for such requirement was explained in Narciso vs. Sta-Romana-
Cruz (supra), citing Basco vs. Rapatalo: “When the grant of bail is
discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a
matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion, by
the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence
is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed
to the weight of the evidence and since everything cannot properly be
weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious
that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of
guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-
examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.”
Constitutional Law; Habeas Corpus; In exceptional circumstances, habeas
corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is
detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender; Writ issued
where the deprivation of liberty while initially valid under the law had
later become invalid.—As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will
not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has
jurisdiction to do so. In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus, may be
granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained
pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty
is recognized as “the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual
freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action” due to “its ability to
cut through the barriers of form and procedural mazes.” Thus, in previous
cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially
valid under the law, had later become invalid, and even though the
persons praying for its issuance were not completely deprived of their
liberty. Same; Same; Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus in favor of petitioner.—The Court finds no basis for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule
that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies, because petitioner is
under detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of
the amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-
accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest
had been issued.
Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA 443, G.R. No. 148468, G.R. No.
148769, G.R. No. 149116 January 28, 2003
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner
Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation
and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to
Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the
accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose
"Jinggoy" P. Estrada and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of
Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a
non-stock, non-profit foundation established in February 2000
ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational opportunities for the
poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and
support to research and advance studies of young Muslim educators and
scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation,
received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million
Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson
through the latter's assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner received
the donation and turned over the said amount to the Foundation's
treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundation's account with the
Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then
President Joseph E. Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal
activities, including its operation on the illegal numbers game known as
jueteng. This triggered the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of
several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and
petitioner, together with other persons. Among such complaints were:
Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754;
Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and
Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph
Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo
Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1757.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February 21,
2001. The other respondents likewise filed their respective counter-
affidavits. The Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary
investigation of the complaints and on April 4, 2001, issued a joint
resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada, petitioner and
several others be charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several
Informations against former President Estrada, who earlier had resigned
from his post as President of the Republic of the Philippines. One of
these Informations, docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, charged
Joseph Estrada with plunder. On April 18, 2001, the Ombudsman filed an
amended Information in said case charging Estrada and several co-
accused, including petitioner, with said crime. No bail was
recommended for the provisional release of all the accused, including
petitioner. The case was raffled to a special division which was
subsequently created by the Supreme Court. The amended Information
reads:
"That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in
the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC
OFFICER BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF
HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY
SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND
TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A
series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly,
on SEVERAL INSTANCES MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE,
PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connivance with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG,
Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit public
fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED
MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00]) tobacco excise
tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur
under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS
PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE,
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS,
 and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000
SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A
TOTAL OR MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS
OR PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE
ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM
COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS,
IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME
UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including
petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on June 27, 2001. In the
meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an
Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001.6 For
his part, petitioner's co-accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed on April 20,
2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail
as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner's Urgent Petition for
Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the
accused earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an
order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard before
petitioner's arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their respective petitions for
bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of
evidence on petitioner's petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioner's petition
for bail, the Ombudsman filed an urgent motion for early arraignment of
Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner and a motion for joint
bail hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner. The
following day, petitioner filed a manifestation questioning the propriety
of including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his
(petitioner's) petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001 resetting the
hearings on petitioner's petition for bail to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable
the court to resolve the prosecution's pending motions as well as
petitioner's motion that his petition for bail be heard as early as
possible, which motion the prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
petitioner's April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that
the issues posed by petitioner had already been resolved in its April 25,
2001 Resolution finding probable cause to hold petitioner and his co-
accused for trial.7 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
said May 31, 2001 Resolution.

On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the Ombudsman's Joint

On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the
Resolution finding probable cause against him for plunder. The next day,
attendance of petitioner as well as all the other accused in Criminal Case
April 6, 2001, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for
No. 26558 during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation.2 Petitioner likewise filed on said
waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent
date, this time with the Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a)
powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines
To Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Further
best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the
Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of Probable Cause; (c) For
case, directed the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing
Leave to File Accused's Motion for Reconsideration and/or
considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,
Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a
whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall be
Reinvestigation of the Charges against accused Edward Serapio.3
considered automatically reproduced at the trial.8

On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order denying petitioner's

However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it on June
motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation on the ground of lack
18, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June 15, 2001 canceling
of jurisdiction since the amended Information charging petitioner with
the said bail hearing due to pending incidents yet to be resolved and
plunder had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan.4
reset anew the hearing to June 26, 2001.9

In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on

On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
April 25, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding probable cause to
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001
justify the issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused, including
Resolution. The bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed
petitioner. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on the same
because on said date petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion
date for the arrest of petitioner.5 When apprised of said order,
to quash the amended Information on the grounds that as against him,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same day to
the amended Information does not allege a combination or series of
Philippine National Police Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has
overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the
since been detained at Camp Crame for said charge.
amended Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts
indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy; the money Omnibus Motion and its June 25, 2001 Resolution denying his motion
alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended Information to have been for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution.
illegally received or collected does not constitute "ill-gotten wealth" as
defined in Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and the amended Re: G.R. No. 148769
Information charges him of bribery and illegal gambling.10 By way of
riposte, the prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until
Petitioner avers that:
petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution
contended that petitioner's motion to quash the amended Information
was antithetical to his petition for bail. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIO'S MOTION
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the hearing on
TO QUASH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT —
the petition for bail of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10,
2001 to enable it to resolve the pending incidents and the motion to
quash of petitioner. However, even before the Sandiganbayan could I
resolve the pending motions of petitioner and the prosecution,
petitioner filed with this Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS AGAINST
Corpus and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying that the PETITIONER SERAPIO DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
Court declare void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the
Sandiganbayan on his claim that he was thereby effectively denied of his A The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio,
right to due process. Petitioner likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal
of habeas corpus; that the People be declared to have waived their right acts constitutive of plunder.
to present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised
on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of petitioner's
guilt of plunder, that he be granted provisional liberty on bail after due B The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio,
proceedings.11 does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion praying that said court resolve his motion to fix C The money described in paragraph (a) of the Amended
his bail. Information and alleged to have been illegally received or
collected does not constitute 'ill-gotten wealth' as defined in
Section 1(d), Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
petitioner's motion to quash the amended Information. Petitioner,
through counsel, received on said date a copy of said resolution.12 The II
motion to fix bail filed by Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada was also resolved by the
Sandiganbayan. THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE."13

On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 26558, Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended Information, he is
petitioner manifested to the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a charged with plunder only in paragraph (a) which reads:
motion for reconsideration of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his
motion to quash and for the deferment of his arraignment. The "(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on
Sandiganbayan, however, declared that there was no provision in the SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT
Rules of Court or in the Sandiganbayan's rules granting the right to OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
petitioner to file a motion for the reconsideration of an interlocutory (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING
order issued by it and ordered petitioner to orally argue his motion for IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR
reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
proceeded with his arraignment. Petitioner refused to plead, impelling connivance with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose
the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him. 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari, OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;"14
docketed as G.R. No. 148769, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its July 9, 2001 amended Information of a "combination or series of overt or criminal
Resolution denying his motion to quash, notwithstanding the fact that acts" constituting plunder as described in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 as
material inculpatory allegations of the amended Information against him amended. Neither does the amended Information allege "a pattern of
do not constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is charged, under the criminal acts." He avers that his single act of toleration or protection of
said amended Information, for more than one offense. Jose "Jinggoy" illegal gambling impelled by a single criminal resolution does not
Estrada likewise filed petition for certiorari with the Court docketed as constitute the requisite "combination or series of acts" for plunder. He
G.R. No. 148965 for the nullification of a resolution of the further claims that the consideration consisting of gifts, percentages or
Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail. kickbacks in furtherance of said resolution turned over to and received
by former President Joseph E. Estrada "on several occasions" does not
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another Petition for cure the defect in the amended information. Petitioner insists that on
Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 149116, assailing the Sandiganbayan's the face of the amended Information he is charged only with bribery or
Resolution dated 31 May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001 Urgent illegal gambling and not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part of the
P4,097,804,173.17 amassed by former President Joseph E. Estrada in
confabulation with his co-accused is not ill-gotten wealth as defined in
Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
"Sec. 6 Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended information is ill-gotten wealth
or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, as contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 1(d) of Republic Act 7080, as
the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or amended, and that all the accused in paragraph (a) to (d) of the
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name amended information conspired and confederated with former
of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense
was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person,
all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information."15
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the
proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the
elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to
the definition and elements of the specific crimes. The purpose of the
requirement of alleging all the elements of the crime in the Information held that petitioner is not charged with the predicate acts of bribery and
is to inform an accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as illegal gambling but is charged only with one crime that of plunder:
to enable him to suitably prepare for his defense.16 Another purpose is
to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.17 The use of derivatives
or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense
charged is sufficient.18
In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the
accused, including petitioner, connived and conspired with former
President Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder "through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or
means." And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information, petitioner
and his co-accused are charged with receiving or collecting, directly or
indirectly, on several instances money in the aggregate amount of
P545,000,000.00. In Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third
Division), et al.,19 we held that the word "series" is synonymous with the
clause "on several instances"; it refers to a repetition of the same
predicate act in any of the items in Section 1(d) of the law. We further
held that the word "combination" contemplates the commission of at
least any two different predicate acts in any of the said items. We ruled
that "plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended information charges
accused therein, including petitioner, with plunder committed by a
series of the same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law" and
that:
"x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving,
on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling,
and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired
with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This
predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item
[2] of the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x x
x."20
It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the
same is evidentiary and the general rule is that matters of evidence
need not be alleged in the Information.21
The Court also ruled in Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan22 that
the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million
President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17.
Under the amended Information, all the accused, including petitioner,
are charged of having conspired and confabulated together in
committing plunder. When two or more persons conspire to commit a
crime, each is responsible for all the acts of others. In contemplation of
law, the act of the conspirator is the act of each of them.23 Conspirators
are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield
one arm and the law says that the acts, words and declarations of each,
while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and
declarations of all.24
Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended information of
bribery and illegal gambling and others. The Sandiganbayan, for its part,
"THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION CHARGES MORE
THAN ONE OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the
information charges more than one offense, namely, bribery
(Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code), malversation of public
funds or property (Article 217, Revised Penal Code) and
violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and
Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in
the information are not charged as separate offenses but as
predicate acts of the crime of plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically
Section 1(d) thereof does not make any express reference to
any specific provision of laws, other than R.A. No. 7080, as
amended, which coincidentally may penalize as a separate
crime any of the overt or criminal acts enumerated therein.
The said acts which form part of the combination or series of
act are described in their generic sense. Thus, aside from
'malversation' of public funds, the law also uses the generic
terms 'misappropriation', 'conversion' or 'misuse' of said fund.
The fact that the acts involved may likewise be penalized
under other laws is incidental. The said acts are mentioned
only as predicate acts of the crime of plunder and the
allegations relative thereto are not to be taken or to be
understood as allegations charging separate criminal offenses
punished under the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees."25
This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the face of the
amended Information that petitioner and his co-accused are charged
only with one crime of plunder and not with the predicate acts or crimes
of plunder. It bears stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute
acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and independent of the
crime of plunder. Resultantly then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his April 4, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion
contending that:
"GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING PETITIONER
SERAPIO'S URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (RE: RESOLUTION DATED 31 MAY 2001),
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD TOTALLY
DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED GRAVE AND
MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS
AND INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO PROBABLE
CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR PLUNDER AS AGAINST
PETITIONER SERAPIO."26
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying his omnibus motion to hold in abeyance the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest as well as the proceedings in Criminal trial where his guilt or innocence may finally be determined.39
Case No. 26558; to conduct a determination of probable cause; and to
direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges him. The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave
Petitioner asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally disregarded
exculpatory evidence and committed grave abuse of discretion in
charging him with plunder. He further argues that there exists no
probable cause to support an indictment for plunder as against him.27
Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the Ombudsman does
not even mention him in relation to the collection and receipt of jueteng
money which started in 199828 and that the Ombudsman inexplicably
arrived at the conclusion that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation was a
money laundering front organization put up by Joseph Estrada, assisted
by petitioner, even though the latter presented evidence that said
Foundation is a bona fide and legitimate private foundation.29 More
importantly, he claims, said joint resolution does not indicate that he
knew that the P200 million he received for the Foundation came from
jueteng. 30
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since: (1) the
P200 million he received does not constitute "ill-gotten wealth" as
defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080;31 (2) there is no evidence linking
him to the collection and receipt of jueteng money;32 (3) there was no
showing that petitioner participated in a pattern of criminal acts
indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, or that his act of receiving the
P200 million constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder.33
Petitioner argues further that his motion for reinvestigation is premised
on the absolute lack of evidence to support a finding of probable cause
for plunder as against him,34 and hence he should be spared from the
inconvenience, burden and expense of a public trial.35
Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government prosecutors is
not beyond judicial scrutiny. He asserts that while this Court does not
ordinarily look into the existence of probable cause to charge a person
for an offense in a given case, it may do so in exceptional circumstances,
which are present in this case: (1) to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority; and (4) where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.36 Petitioner
claims that he raised proper grounds for a reinvestigation by asserting
that in issuing the questioned joint resolution, the Ombudsman
disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from the charge of plunder
and committed errors of law or irregularities which have been
prejudicial to his interest.37 He also states that during the joint
preliminary investigations for the various charges against Joseph Estrada
and his associates, of which the plunder charge was only one of the
eight charges against Estrada et al., he was not furnished with copies of
the other complaints nor given the opportunity to refute the evidence
presented in relation to the other seven cases, even though the
evidence presented therein were also used against him, although he was
only charged in the plunder case.38
The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse
of discretion in denying petitioner's omnibus motion. They assert that
since the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner with
the crime of plunder, the Sandiganbayan is bound to assume jurisdiction
over the case and to proceed to try the same. They further argue that "a
finding of probable cause is merely preliminary and prefatory of the
eventual determination of guilt or innocence of the accused," and that
petitioner still has the chance to interpose his defenses in a full blown
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's omnibus motion asking for,
among others, a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman, because his motion
for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's joint resolution did not raise
the grounds of either newly discovered evidence, or errors of law or
irregularities, which under Republic Act No. 6770 are the only grounds
upon which a motion for reconsideration may be filed.40
The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause to charge
petitioner with plunder as a co-conspirator of Joseph Estrada.41
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's
discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro vs.
Sandiganbayan42 , the Court ruled:
"x x x. In the performance of his task to determine probable
cause, the Ombudsman's discretion is paramount. Thus, in
Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court said:
'x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted
a policy of non-interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, and leaves to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the exercise of determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish
'probable cause' for filing of information against the
supposed offender."
In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,43 the Court ruled thus:
 "Furthermore, the Ombudsman's findings are essentially
factual in nature. Accordingly, in assailing said findings on the
contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of
discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for estafa through
falsification of public documents, petitioner is clearly raising
questions of fact here. His arguments are anchored on the
propriety or error in the Ombudsman's appreciation of facts.
Petitioner cannot be unaware that the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari where neither question of fact nor even of law
are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Insofar as the third
issue is concerned, we find that no grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by respondents which would warrant the
granting of the writ of certiorari."
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the Sandiganbayan
and the Ombudsman for that matter committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing their resolution and joint resolution, respectively.
Petitioner failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court finds no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan and the
Ombudsman in finding probable cause against petitioner for plunder.
Neither did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying
petitioner's motion for reinvestigation of the charges against him in the
amended Information. In its Resolution of April 25, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the Ombudsman that probable
cause exists against petitioner and his co-accused for the crime of
plunder, thus:
"In the light of the foregoing and considering the allegations of
the Amended Information dated 18 April 2001 charging the
accused with the offense of PLUNDER and examining carefully
the evidence submitted in support thereof consisting of the
affidavits and sworn statements and testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and several other pieces of
documentary evidence, as well as the respective counter-
affidavits of accused former President Joseph Estrada dated
March 20, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy" Pimentel Estrada dated
February 20, 2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte dated January 21,
2001 and Edward S. Serapio dated February 21, 2001, the
Court finds and so holds that probable cause for the offense of
PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants of arrest of
accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a
Delia Rajas."44
Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of petitioner's omnibus
motion, the Sandiganbayan noted that a preliminary investigation was
fully conducted in accordance with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of
the Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18, 23 and 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989); and that all the
basic complaints and evidence in support thereof were served upon all
the accused.45 It was in light of such findings that the Sandiganbayan
held that there was no basis for the allegation that accused therein
(including petitioner) were deprived of the right to seek a
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution dated April 4, 2001
finding probable cause to charge them with plunder after the conduct of
preliminary investigation in connection therewith. In addition, the
Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's resolution, but failed to show in
his motion that there were newly discovered evidence, or that the
preliminary investigation was tainted by errors of law or irregularities,
which are the only grounds for which a reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's resolution may be granted.46
It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a
constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute.47 The
absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
Information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground
for quashing the Information.48 If the lack of a preliminary investigation
does not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the
court over the case, with more reason can it be said that the denial of a
motion for reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust the
court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it be said that
petitioner had been deprived of due process. He was afforded the
opportunity to refute the charges against him during the preliminary
investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.49 As the Court held in Webb vs. De
Leon, "[a] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt.''50
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any
other officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a
rule must defer to said officer's finding and determination of probable
cause, since the determination of the existence of probable cause is the
function of the prosecutor.51 The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan
that petitioner failed to establish that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity or that its
findings stated in the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not
supported by the facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayan's resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reinvestigation since there is nothing to
substantiate petitioner's claim that it gravely abused its discretion in
ruling that there was no need to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.52
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals53 that an accused shall not be
deemed to have waived his right to ask for a preliminary investigation
after he had been arraigned over his objection and despite his insistence
on the conduct of said investigation prior to trial on the merits does not
apply in the instant case because petitioner merely prayed for a
reinvestigation on the ground of a newly-discovered evidence.
Irrefragably, a preliminary investigation had been conducted by the
Ombudsman prior to the filing of the amended Information, and that
petitioner had participated therein by filing his counter-affidavit.
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan had already denied his motion for
reinvestigation as well as his motion for reconsideration thereon prior to
his arraignment.54 In sum then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings of the
parties, the issues for resolution are: (1) Whether or not petitioner
should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be
conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the
amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail; (3)
Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals,65 this Court ruled on the issue of whether
the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 is mandatory; (4) Whether an accused must first be arraigned before he may be granted bail.
the People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the Lavides involved an accused charged with violation of Section 5(b)
petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and (5) Whether petitioner was Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense punishable by reclusion
deprived of his right to due process in Criminal Case No. 26558 and temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The accused
should thus be released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus. therein assailed, inter alia, the trial court's imposition of the condition
that he should first be arraigned before he is allowed to post bail. We
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan held therein that "in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing
jurisdiction when it deferred the hearing of his petition for bail to July a motion to quash."66
10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and entered a plea of not guilty for
him when he refused to be arraigned. He insists that the Rules on However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean
Criminal Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be arraigned that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede
first prior to the conduct of bail hearings since the latter can stand alone arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by
and must, of necessity, be heard immediately.55 Petitioner maintains virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as
that his arraignment before the bail hearings are set is not necessary he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is
since he would not plead guilty to the offense charged, as is evident in filed against him.67 The Court's pronouncement in Lavides should be
his earlier statements insisting on his innocence during the Senate understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a
investigation of the jueteng scandal and the preliminary investigation petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed
before the Ombudsman.56 Neither would the prosecution be prejudiced against him. Hence, we explained therein that to condition the grant of
even if it would present all its evidence before his arraignment because, bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
under the Revised Penal Code, a voluntary confession of guilt is position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash
mitigating only if made prior to the presentation of evidence for the and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can
prosecution,57 and petitioner admitted that he cannot repudiate the be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing
evidence or proceedings taken during the bail hearings because Rule of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter
114, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to
evidence present during bail hearings are automatically reproduced be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to
during the trial.58 Petitioner likewise assures the prosecution that he is charge him with a crime and his right to bail.68
willing to be arraigned prior to the posting of a bail bond should he be
granted bail.59 It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before
the conduct of hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a
The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior
be commenced, because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for
joined. The People stress that it is only when an accused pleads not bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to
guilty may he file a petition for bail and if he pleads guilty to the charge, death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if
there would be no more need for him to file said petition. Moreover, the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because
since it is during arraignment that the accused is first informed of the the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional
precise charge against him, he must be arraigned prior to the bail liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be
hearings to prevent him from later assailing the validity of the bail "authorized" under the circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan
hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed of the charge committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of
against him, especially considering that, under Section 8, Rule 114 of the jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding
Revised Rules of Court, evidence presented during such proceedings are with the hearing of his petition for bail.
considered automatically reproduced at the trial.60 Likewise, the
arraignment of accused prior to bail hearings diminishes the possibility With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner may file a motion
of an accused's flight from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to quash during the pendency of his petition for bail, petitioner
because trial in absentia may be had only if an accused escapes after he maintains that a motion to quash and a petition for bail are not
has been arraigned.61 The People also contend that the conduct of bail inconsistent, and may proceed independently of each other. While he
hearings prior to arraignment would extend to an accused the agrees with the prosecution that a motion to quash may in some
undeserved privilege of being appraised of the prosecution's evidence instances result in the termination of the criminal proceedings and in
before he pleads guilty for purposes of penalty reduction.62 the release of the accused therein, thus rendering the petition for bail
moot and academic, he opines that such is not always the case; hence,
Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10, 2001 and a an accused in detention cannot be forced to speculate on the outcome
plea of not guilty had been entered by the Sandiganbayan on his behalf, of a motion to quash and decide whether or not to file a petition for bail
thereby rendering the issue as to whether an arraignment is necessary or to withdraw one that has been filed.69 He also insists that the grant of
before the conduct of bail hearings in petitioner's case moot, the Court a motion to quash does not automatically result in the discharge of an
takes this opportunity to discuss the controlling precepts thereon accused from detention nor render moot an application for bail under
pursuant to its symbolic function of educating the bench and bar. 63 Rule 117, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.70

The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The arraignment of an
accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition
for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived
of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.64 An accused
need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application
of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the
security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before
any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of
Court.71 Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person
charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same time
securing his appearance at the trial.72 As stated earlier, a person may
apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by
virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.73
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by
which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law,
or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information.74 An
accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a general rule,
before arraignment.75
These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical
to each other. Certainly, the right of an accused right to seek provisional
liberty when charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense
punishable by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt
is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the
validity of the Information charging him with such offense. It must be
conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or
Information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense is
granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered released,
the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is mandatory that the
hearings on the petitions for bail of petitioner and accused Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26558 and the trial of the said
case as against former President Joseph E. Estrada be heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings would negate
his right to have his petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding
since said hearings might be converted into a full blown trial on the
merits by the prosecution.76
For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings will save the
court from having to hear the same witnesses and the parties from
presenting the same evidence where it would allow separate bail
hearings for the accused who are charged as co-conspirators in the
crime of plunder.77
In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in Criminal Case
No. 26558 to participate in the bail hearings, the Sandiganbayan
explained that the directive was made was in the interest of the speedy commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces essentially
disposition of the case. It stated:
" x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused other than case against former President Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely different
the accused Serapio were to be excused from participating in
the hearing on the motion for bail of accused Serapio, under
the pretext that the same does not concern them and that
they will participate in any hearing where evidence is
presented by the prosecution only if and when they will
already have filed their petitions for bail, or should they decide Moreover, following our ruling in Jose Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, supra
not to file any, that they will participate only during the trial where we stated that Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada can only be charged with
proper itself, then everybody will be faced with the daunting
prospects of having to go through the process of introducing
the same witness and pieces of evidence two times, three
times or four times, as many times as there are petitions for
bail filed. Obviously, such procedure is not conducive to the
speedy termination of a case. Neither can such procedure be
characterized as an orderly proceeding."78
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the
Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two
or more petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a petition for
bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case
against the other accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a
joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different
accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial
against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by
the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the
Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the convenience of the
State, including the prosecution, but also that of the accused and the
witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and the right of
accused to a speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the
complexities of the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving
petitioner and the other accused. After all, if this Court may echo the
observation of the United States Supreme Court, the State has a stake,
with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic individual
protections, including those surrounding criminal prosecutions. About
them, this Court dares not become careless or complacent when that
fashion has become rampant over the earth.79
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,80 this Court held
that in a petition for bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary
hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with
the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter
into any inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the evidence
against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or
on what further evidence may be offered therein. It may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable minimum the
amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to
the purpose of the hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of
course avoid duplication of time and effort of both the prosecution and
the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused, especially so if
both movants for bail are charged of having conspired in the
the same evident against them. However, in the cases at bar, the joinder
of the hearings of the petition for bail of petitioner with the trial of the
matter. For, with the participation of the former president in the hearing
of petitioner's petition for bail, the proceeding assumes a completely
different dimension. The proceedings will no longer be summary. As
against former President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be a
full-blown trial which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing.
conspiracy to commit the acts alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the
amended Information since it is not clear from the latter if the accused
in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) thereof conspired with each other to assist
Joseph Estrada to amass ill-gotten wealth, we hold that petitioner can
only be charged with having conspired with the other co-accused named
in sub-paragraph (a) by "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on
several instances, money x x x from illegal gambling, x x x in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling.81 Thus, with
respect to petitioner, all that the prosecution needs to adduce to prove
that the evidence against him for the charge of plunder is strong are to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
those related to the alleged receipt or collection of money from illegal writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
gambling as described in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended Information. required."88
With the joinder of the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and the
trial of the former President, the latter will have the right to cross- The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the Revised Rules of
examine intensively and extensively the witnesses for the prosecution in Court which provide:
opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. If petitioner will adduce
evidence in support of his petition after the prosecution shall have
"Sec. 7 Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
concluded its evidence, the former President may insist on cross-
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person
examining petitioner and his witnesses. The joinder of the hearing of
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
petitioner's bail petition with the trial of former President Joseph E.
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly delay the
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain provisional
the criminal prosecution.
liberty and seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the
respondent court. The indispensability of the speedy resolution of an
application for bail was succinctly explained by Cooley in his treatise Sec. 4 Bail, a matter of right, exception. — All persons in
Constitutional Limitations, thus: custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed
by law or this Rule x x x (b) and before conviction by the
"For, if there were any mode short of confinement which
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
would with reasonable certainty insure the attendance of the
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment."89
accused to answer the accusation, it would not be justifiable
to inflict upon him that indignity, when the effect is to subject
him in a greater or lesser degree, to the punishment of a guilty Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely
person, while as yet it is not determined that he has not denied the opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the
committed any crime."82 judgment of his case. However, as to such person, bail is not a matter of
right but is discretionary upon the court.90 Had the rule been otherwise,
the Rules would not have provided for an application for bail by a person
While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No. 26558, is
charged with a capital offense under Rule 114, Section 8 which states:
empowered "to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy
termination of the case,"83 the Court finds that it gravely abused its "Sec. 8 Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of
discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of petitioner and the trial an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for
of former President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly. It bears stressing the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
that the Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged in its May 4, 2001 Order the perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the
"pre-eminent position and superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The
have the matter of his provisional liberty resolved . . . without evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered
unnecessary delay,"84 only to make a volte face and declare that after all automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of
the hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada either party, the court may recall any witness for additional
and the trial as against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines,
held simultaneously. In ordering that petitioner's petition for bail to be or otherwise unable to testify."91
heard jointly with the trial of the case against his co-accused former
President Joseph E. Estrada, the Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing that the
and unnecessary delay in the resolution thereof to the prejudice of evidence of guilt against a person charged with a capital offense is not
petitioner. In fine then, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of strong for the court to grant him bail. Thus, upon an application for bail
its discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioner's petition by the person charged with a capital offense, a hearing thereon must be
for bail with the trial of the case against former President Joseph E. conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an opportunity to
Estrada on its merits. discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of guilt against an
accused is strong.92 The prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity
With respect to petitioner's allegations that the prosecution tried to to present all the evidence it may deem necessary for this purpose.93
delay the bail hearings by filing dilatory motions, the People aver that it When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is
is petitioner and his co-accused who caused the delay in the trial of strong, it is the court's duty to deny the application for bail. However,
Criminal Case No. 26558 by their filing of numerous manifestations and when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of
pleadings with the Sandiganbayan.85 They assert that they filed the right.94
motion for joint bail hearing and motion for earlier arraignment around
the original schedule for the bail hearings which was on May 21–25, In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of right at this
2001.86 stage of the proceedings. Petitioner's claim that the prosecution had
refused to present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of his bail
They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in capital offenses.87 application and that the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a hearing
In support thereof, they cite Article III, Sec 13 of the Constitution, which thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution did not waive,
states that — expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition to
the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the
Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for petitioner's
"All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
application for bail but the same were reset due to pending incidents
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall
raised in several motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to be
before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing was
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the
hearing did not push through due to the filing of this petition on June 29,
2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioner's application for bail is
therefore not imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the
prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is evident
from the following list of motions filed by him and by the prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:
• Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001, for (1)
leave to file motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation and to
direct ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation; (2) conduct a
determination of probable cause as would suggest the
issuance of house arrest; (3) hold in abeyance the issuance of
warrant of arrest and other proceedings pending
determination of probable cause;
• Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24, 2001;
• Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation or
Service of Warrant of Arrest for Immediate Grant of bail or For
Release on Recognizance, dated April 25, 2001;
• Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to Vote at
Obando, Bulacan, dated May 11, 2001;
• Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 22, 2001,
praying for Resolution of May 18, 2001 be set aside and bail
hearings be set at the earliest possible time;
• Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail or
Recognizance, dated May 27, 2001;
• Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent Omnibus
Motion, dated June 13, 2001, praying that he be allowed to file
a Motion for Reinvestigation; and
• Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.95
Motions filed by the prosecution:
• Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8, 2001;96
• Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused Joseph
Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Edward Serapio, dated
May 8, 2001;97
• Opposition to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
and Omnibus Motion to Adjust Earlier Arraignment, dated May
25, 2001;98 and
• Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony and
Transcription in Filipino, dated June 19, 2001.99
The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also contributed to the
aforesaid delay by their filing of the following motions:
• Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24, 2001, filed
by Jinggoy Estrada, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7080 and praying that the Amended Information be quashed;
• Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30, 2001, filed
by Jinggoy Estrada, praying that he be (1)excluded from the
Amended Information for lack of probable cause; (2) released
from custody; or in the alternative, (3) be allowed to post bail;
• Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest, dated
April 25, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying
that they be placed on house arrest during the pendency of
the case;
• Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Supplemental Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated
May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by Joseph
Estrada, praying by reinvestigation of the case by the
Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of the case;
• Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated May 2,
2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for five (5) days
within which to respond to the Opposition to Motion to Quash
in view of the holidays and election-related distractions;
• Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier Arraignment,
dated May 10, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;
• Omnibus Manifestation on voting and custodial
arrangement, dated May 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada, praying that they be placed on house arrest;
• Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated May 6,
2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Summation regarding house arrest, dated May 23, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6, 2001 filed
by Jinggoy Estrada;
• Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be allowed to be confined in
Tanay;
• Motion to charge as Accused Luis "Chavit" Singson, filed
by Joseph Estrada;
• Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed by Joseph
and Jinggoy Estrada, seeking reconsideration of denial of
requests for house arrest, for detention in Tanay or Camp
Crame; motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;
• Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His Desk as
Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated June 28, 2001, filed
by Jinggoy Estrada;
 • Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that the resolution
compelling them to be present at petitioner Serapio's hearing
for bail be reconsidered;
• Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by Joseph
Estrada;
• Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14, 2001, filed
by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada stating that Bishop Teodoro
Bacani favors their house arrest;
• Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, waiving their right to be present at the June
18 and 21, 2001 bail hearings and reserving their right to trial
with assessors;
• Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day House Arrest;
Production, Inspection and Copying of Documents; and
Possible Trial with Assessors, dated June 19, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
• Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up Affairs,
dated June 20, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
• Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, asking for free dates for parties, claiming that denial
of bail is cruel and inhuman, reiterating request for gag order
of prosecution witnesses, availing of production, inspection
and copying of documents, requesting for status of alias case;
and
• Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, requesting for permission to attend some municipal
affairs in San Juan, Metro Manila.100
Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in cases where
the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to an
application for bail by an accused charged with a capital offense, the
trial court is still under duty to conduct a hearing on said application.101
The rationale for such requirement was explained in Narciso vs. Sta.
Romana-Cruz (supra), citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:102
"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has
the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial
discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the very
nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since
evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise
of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-
examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."103
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the
Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve
the same in his favor. Even then, there must first be a finding that the
evidence against petitioner is not strong before he may be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus for petitioner, he contends that he is entitled to the issuance of
said writ because the State, through the prosecution's refusal to present
evidence and by the Sandiganbayan's refusal to grant a bail hearing, has
failed to discharge its burden of proving that as against him, evidence of
guilt for the capital offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner contends that
the prosecution launched "a seemingly endless barrage of obstructive
and dilatory moves" to prevent the conduct of bail hearings. Specifically,
the prosecution moved for petitioner's arraignment before the
commencement of bail hearings and insisted on joint bail hearings for
petitioner, Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it
was only petitioner who asked for a bail hearing; manifested that it
would present its evidence as if it is the presentation of the evidence in
chief, meaning that the bail hearings would be concluded only after the
prosecution presented its entire case upon the accused; and argued that
petitioner's motion to quash and his petition for bail are inconsistent,
and therefore, petitioner should choose to pursue only one of these two
remedies.104 He further claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its
questioned orders and resolutions postponing the bail hearings
effectively denied him of his right to bail and to due process of law.105
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the Sandiganbayan of new
orders canceling the bail hearings which it had earlier set did not render
moot and academic the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
since said orders have resulted in a continuing deprivation of
petitioner's right to bail.106 He argues further that the fact that he was
arrested and is detained pursuant to valid process does not by itself
negate the efficacy of the remedy of habeas corpus. In support of his
contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs. Enrile,107 where the Court held
that habeas corpus extends to instances where the detention, while
valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.108
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper because
petitioner was arrested pursuant to the amended information which
was earlier filed in court,109 the warrant of arrest issuant pursuant
thereto was valid, and petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities.110
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer
under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so.111 In
exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts
even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest
or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as "the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut through
barriers of form and procedural mazes."112 Thus, in previous cases, we
issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid
under the law, had later become invalid,113 and even though the persons
praying for its issuance were not completely deprived of their liberty.114
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in
favor of petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie
where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to
issue the same115 applies, because petitioner is under detention
pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25,
2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended information for
plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact
voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001
upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile116 that habeas corpus will lie where the
deprivation of liberty which was initially valid has become arbitrary in
view of subsequent developments finds no application in the present
case because the hearing on petitioner's application for bail has yet to
commence. As stated earlier, they delay in the hearing of petitioner's
petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the
prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be blamed.
Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy
for asserting one's right to bail.117 It cannot be availed of where accused
is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the
court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant
bail,118 or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is
to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is
pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.

The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified

but would also preempt the Sandiganbayan's resolution of the pending
application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to
forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:

1 In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are DISMISSED.
The resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions
are AFFIRMED; and

2 In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The resolution

of respondent Sandiganbayan, Annex "L" of the petition, ordering a joint
hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of Criminal Case No.
26558 as against former President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE; the
arraignment of petitioner on July 10, 2001 is also SET ASIDE.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Vitug, J ., see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J ., joins the dissent of Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J ., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio, J ., no part, prior inhibition in plunder cases.
G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001 Same; Same; Mandamus will not issue unless the right to relief is clear at
the time of the award.—The petition herein is denominated by petitioner
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, Defensor-Santiago as one for mandamus. It is basic in matters relating to
petitioners, petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the
vs. performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled must be
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue unless the right to relief is
P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents. clear at the time of the award (Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to
the present time, petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is
in imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. In point of fact,
Constitution Law; Arrest; The instant petitions have been rendered moot
the authorities have categorically stated that petitioner will not be
and academic.—All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a
arrested without a warrant.
state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis
both in fact and in law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Remedial Law; Action; Party; Every action must be brought in the name
MacapagalArroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a “state of of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed, or whose
rebellion” in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.—
rendered moot and academic. Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest.
The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome
of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable
Same; Same; The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is not based on
decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to
the declaration of a “state of rebellion.”—In quelling or suppressing the
justify the exercise of the court’s remedial powers in his behalf (KMU
rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here, petitioner has not
persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of
demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court.
the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest
Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim
feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a “state of
to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders,
rebellion.”
members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest
and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in
Same; Same; Resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed, or
prohibition not justified since an individual subjected to warrantless whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.— Lacson vs. Perez, 357 SCRA 756, G.R. No. 147780, G.R. No. 147781, G.R.
Moreover, petitioners’ contention in G.R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), No. 147799, G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001
147781 (Defensor-Santiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that
they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do
G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001
not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and
prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not
without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO,
individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the petitioners,
Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may vs.
submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and
should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the
proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of ----------------------------------------
the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held
liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001
be without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting
officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the
vs.
Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents.
can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition and
mandamus improper at this time (Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules of
Court). SEPARATE OPINION

Same; Same; Court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in
accordance with the Rules of Court for by that time any arrest would have
been in pursuance of a duly issued warrant.—In connection with their
alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and
Mancao pray that the “appropriate court before whom the informations
against petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and
proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally
resolved.” This relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date,
no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners
for any crime. And in the event that the same are later filed, this Court
cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in accordance with the
Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuance
of a duly issued warrant.
VITUG, J.:
I concur insofar as the resolution enjoins any continued warrantless
arrests for acts related to, or connected with, the May 1st incident but
respectfully dissent from the order of dismissal of the petitions for
being said to be moot and academic. The petitions have raised
important constitutional issues that, in my view, must likewise be fully
addressed.
G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO,
petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and
P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001
RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA,
P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO
BERROYA, respondents.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001
THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL DIOMEDIO
VILLANUEVA, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR
GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been
characterized as belonging "in the catalog of indispensable freedoms."
Among deprivation of rights, none is so effective in cowing a
population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting
terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of
the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every
arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt
and worked among a people know that the human personality
deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where
homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to
unheralded search and seizure by the police.1
Invoking the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
petitioners Panfilo Lacson, Michael Ray Aquino and Cezar O. Mancao II
now seek a temporary restraining order and/or injunction from the
Court against their impending warrantless arrests upon order of the
Secretary of Justice.2 Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),
likewise, seeks to enjoin the arrests of its senatorial candidates, namely,
Senator Juan Ponce-Enrile, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Senator
Gregorio B. Honasan and General Panfilo Lacson.3 Separate petitioners
were also filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile.4 Former Ambassador
Ernesto M. Maceda,5 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago,6 Senator
Gregorio B. Honasan,7 and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).8
Briefly, the order for the arrests of these political opposition leaders and
police officers stems from the following facts:
On April 25, 2001, former President Joseph Estrada was arrested upon
the warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan in connection with the
criminal case for plunder filed against him. Several hundreds of
policemen were deployed to effect his arrest. At the time, a number of
Mr. Estrada's supporters, who were then holding camp outside his
residence in Greenhills Subdivision, sought to prevent his arrest. A
skirmish ensued between them and the police. The police had to employ
batons and water hoses to control the rock-throwing pro-Estrada
rallyists and allow the sheriffs to serve the warrant. Mr. Estrada and his
son and co-accused, Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, were then brought to Camp
Crame where, with full media coverage, their fingerprints were obtained
and their mug shots taken.
Later that day, and on the succeeding days, a huge gathered at the EDSA
Shrine to show its support for the deposed President. Senators Enrile,
Santiago, Honasan, opposition senatorial candidates including petitioner
Lacson, as well as other political personalities, spoke before the crowd
during these rallies.
In the meantime, on April 28, 2001, Mr. Estrada and his son were
brought to the Veterans memorial Medical Center for a medical check-
up. It was announced that from there, they would be transferred to Fort
Sto. Domingo in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
In the early morning of May 1, 2001, the crowd at EDSA decided to
march to Malacañang Palace. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
was called to reinforce the Philippine National Police (PNP) to guard the
premises of the presidential residence. The marchers were able to
penetrate the barricades put up by the police at various points leading
to Mendiola and were able to reach Gate 7 of Malacañan. As they were
being dispersed with warning shots, tear gas and water canons, the
rallyists hurled stones at the police authorities. A melee erupted. Scores
of people, including some policemen, were hurt.
At noon of the same day, after the crowd in Mendiola had been
dispersed, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
38 declaring a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila:
Presidential Proclamation No. 38
DECLARING STATE OF REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION
WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives,
firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons, in great part coming from the mass gathering at the
EDSA Shrine, and other armed groups, having been agitated
and incited and, acting upon the instigation and under the
command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have
and continue to assault and attempt to break into Malacañang
with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted
Government and forcibly seize power, and have and continue
to rise publicly, shown open hostility, and take up arms against
the duly constituted Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police, and to deprive the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, wholly and partially, of her powers and
prerogatives which constitute the continuing crime of
rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code;
WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown
leaders, conspirators, and plotters have continue (sic) to rise
publicly by the use of arms to overthrow the duly constituted
Government and seize political power;
WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution,
whenever necessary, the President as the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such
armed forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by law hereby recognize and
confirm the existence of an actual and on-going rebellion
compelling me to declare a state of rebellion;
In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order NO. 1 in
accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
calling upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National police to suppress and quell the rebellion.
City of Manila, May 1, 2001.
The President likewise issued General Order No. 1 which
reads:
GENERAL ORDER NO. 1
DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPIENS AND THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS THE REBELLION IN
THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives,
firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons, in great part coming from the mass gathering at the
EDSA Shrine, and other armed groups, having been agitated
and incited and, acting upon the instigation and under the
command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have
and continue to assault and attempt to break into Malacañang
with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted
Government and forcibly seize political power, and have and
continue to rise publicly, show open hostility, and take up
arms against the duly constituted Government certain bodies
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police, and to deprive the President of the Republic of
the Philippines, wholly and partially, of her powers and
prerogatives which constitute the continuing crime of
rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code;
WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown
leaders, conspirators, and plotters have continue (sic) to rise
publicly by the use of arms to overthrow the duly constituted
Government and seize political power;
WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution,
whenever necessary, the President as the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such
armed forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue
of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as
President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-
in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 38, dated May 1, 2001, do hereby call upon
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
national police to suppress and quell the rebellion.
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Chief of the Philippine National Police and
the officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the
necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress
and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.
City of Manila, May 1, 2001.
Pursuant to the proclamation, several key leaders of the opposition
were ordered arrested. Senator Enrile was arrested without warrant in
his residence at around 4:00 in the afternoon. Likewise arrested without
warrant the following day was former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda.
Senator Honasan and Gen. Lacson were also ordered arrested but the
authorities have so far failed to apprehend them. Ambassador Maceda
was temporarily released upon recognizance while Senator Ponce Enrile
was ordered released by the Court on cash bond.
The basic issue raised by the consolidated petitions is whether the arrest
or impending arrest without warrant, pursuant to a declaration of "state
of rebellion" by the President of the above-mentioned persons and
unnamed other persons similarly situated suspected of having
committed rebellion is illegal, being unquestionably a deprivation of
liberty and violative of the Bill of Rights under the Constitution.
The declaration of a "state of rebellion" is supposedly based on Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon
the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period
to be determined by the Congress if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
 of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Section 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power to
call out the armed forces in cases of (1) lawless violence, (2) rebellion
and (3) invasion.9 In the latter two cases, i.e., rebellion or invasion, the
President may, when public safety requires, also (a) suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or (b) place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. However, in the exercise of this calling
out power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the Constitution
does not require the President to make a declaration of a "state of
rebellion" (or, for that matter, of lawless violence or invasion). The term
"state of rebellion" has no legal significance. It is vague and amorphous
and does not give the President more power than what the Constitution
says, i. e, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. As
Justice Mendoza observed during the hearing of this case, such a
declaration is "legal surplusage." But whatever the term means, it
cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-protected rights, such as the
right to due process,10 the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly
to petition the government for redress of grievances, 11 and the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures,12 among others.
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al.,13 the Court held
that:
x x x [T]he distinction (between the calling out power, on one
hand, and the power to suspend the privilege of the write of
habeas corpus and to declare martial law, on the other hand)
places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers
of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the
three powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
xxx
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the
aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using
the "calling out" power because it is considered as the lesser
and more benign power compared to the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitating affirmation by Congress and,
in appropriate cases, review by this Court.
On the other hand, if the motive behind the declaration of a "state of
rebellion" is to arrest persons without warrant and detain them without
bail and, thus, skirt the Constitutional safeguards for the citizens' civil
liberties, the so-called "state of rebellion" partakes the nature of martial
law without declaring on its face, yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye so as to practically make it unjust and
oppressive, it is within the prohibition of the Constitution.14 In an ironic
sense, a "state of rebellion" declared as a subterfuge to effect
warrantless arrest and detention for an unbailable offense places a
heavier burden on the people's civil liberties than the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus the declaration of martial law
because in the latter case, built-in safeguards are automatically set on
motion: (1) The period for martial law or suspension is limited to a
period not exceeding sixty day; (2) The President is mandated to submit
a report to Congress within forty-eight hours from the proclamation or
suspension; (3) The proclamation or suspension is subject to review by
Congress, which may revoke such proclamation or suspension. If
Congress is not in session, it shall convene in 24 hours without need for
call; and (4) The sufficiency of the factual basis thereof or its extension is
subject to review by the Supreme Court in an appropriate proceeding. 15
No right is more fundamental than the right to life and liberty. Without
these rights, all other individual rights may not exist. Thus, the very first
section in our Constitution's Bill of Rights, Article III, reads:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
And to assure the fullest protection of the right, more especially against
government impairment, Section 2 thereof provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Indeed, there is nothing in Section 18 which authorizes the President or
any person acting under her direction to make unwarranted arrests. The
existence of "lawless violence, invasion or rebellion" only authorizes the
President to call out the "armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion."
Not even the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
the declaration of martial law authorizes the President to order the
arrest of any person. The only significant consequence of the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus is to divest the courts of the power to issue
the writ whereby the detention of the person is put in issue. It does not
by itself authorize the President to order the arrest of a person. And
even then, the Constitution in Section 18, Article VII makes the following
qualifications:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion.
 During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.
In the instant case, the President did not suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. Nor did she declare martial law. A declaration of a "state of
rebellion," at most, only gives notice to the nation that it exists, and that theory is based on Umil vs. Ramos,17 where this Court held:
the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it, as in fact she
did. Such declaration does not justify any deviation from the
Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.
As a general rule, an arrest may be made only upon a warrant issued by
a court. In very circumscribed instances, however, the Rules of Court
allow warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A police officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
xxx
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It must be noted that the above are exceptions to the constitutional
norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights that a person may only be arrested
on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by a "judge" after
determining "personally" the existence of "probable cause" after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. Its requirements should, therefore, be
scrupulously met:
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable
seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most
basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows
exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrests is strictly
construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations
when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally
construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To
do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic
right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.16
A warrantless arrest may be justified only if the police officer had facts
and circumstances before him which, had they been before a judge,
would constitute adequate basis for a finding of probable cause of the
commission of an offense and that the person arrested is probably guilty
of committing the offense. That is why the Rules of Criminal Procedure
At this point, it must be stressed that apart from being inapplicable to
require that when arrested, the person "arrested has committed, is
the cases at bar, Umil is not without any strong dissents. It merely re-
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" in the
affirmed Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,24 a case decided during the Marcos
presence of the arresting officer. Or if it be a case of an offense which
martial law regime.25 It cannot apply when the country is supposed to be
had "just been committed," that the police officer making the arrest
"has personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it."
Petitioners were arrested or sought to be arrested without warrant for
acts of rebellion ostensibly under Section 5 of Rule 113. Respondents'
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute
direct assault against the State and are in the nature of
continuing crimes.18
Following this theory, it is argued that under Section 5(a), a person who
"has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit"
rebellion and may be arrested without a warrant at any time so long as
the rebellion persists.
Reliance on Umil is misplaced. The warrantless arrests therein, although
effected a day or days after the commission of the violent acts of
petitioners therein, were upheld by the Court because at the time of
their respective arrests, they were members of organizations such as the
Communist Party of the Philippines, the New Peoples Army and the
National United Front Commission, then outlawed groups under the
Anti-Subversion Act. Their mere membership in said illegal organizations
amounted to committing the offense of subversion19 which justified
their arrests without warrants.
In contrast, it has not been alleged that the persons to be arrested for
their alleged participation in the "rebellion" on May 1, 2001 are
members of an outlawed organization intending to overthrow the
government. Therefore, to justify a warrantless arrest under Section
5(a), there must be a showing that the persons arrested or to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to
commit the offense of rebellion.20 In other words, there must be an
overt act constitutive of rebellion taking place in the presence of the
arresting officer. In United States vs. Samonte,21 the term" in his [the
arresting officer's] presence" was defined thus:
An offense is said to be committed in the presence or within
the view of an arresting officer or private citizen when such
officer or person sees the offense, even though at a distance,
or hears the disturbance created thereby and proceeds at
once to the scene thereof; or the offense is continuing, or has
not been consummated, at the time the arrest is made.22
This requirement was not complied with particularly in the arrest of
Senator Enrile. In the Court's Resolution of May 5, 2001 in the petition
for habeas corpus filed by Senator Enrile, the Court noted that the sworn
statements of the policemen who purportedly arrested him were
hearsay.23 Senator Enrile was arrested two (2) days after he delivered
allegedly seditious speeches. Consequently, his arrest without warrant
cannot be justified under Section 5(b) which states that an arrest
without a warrant is lawful when made after an offense has just been
committed and the arresting officer or private person has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person arrested has committed the offense.
under the regime of freedom and democracy. The separate opinions of
the following Justices in the motion for reconsideration of said case26
are apropos:
FERNAN C.J., concurring and dissenting:
Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the
arresting officers are not sure what particular provision of law
had been violated by the person arrested. True it is that law
enforcement agents and even prosecutors are not all adept at
the law. However, erroneous perception, not to mention
ineptitude among their ranks, especially if it would result in
the violation of any right of a person, may not be tolerated.
That the arrested person has the "right to insist during the pre-
trial or trial on the merits" (Resolution, p. 18) that he was
exercising a right which the arresting officer considered as
contrary to law, is beside the point. No person should be
subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the law
enforcers wrongly perceived his action.27 (Underscoring
supplied)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting opinion
Insofar as G.R. NO. 81567 is concerned, I joint the other
dissenting Justices in their observations regarding "continuing
offenses." To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of
continuing offense is to give a license for the illegal detention
of persons on pure suspicion. Rebellion, insurrection, or
sedition are political offenses where the line between overt
acts and simple advocacy or adherence to a belief is extremely
thin. If a court has convicted an accused of rebellion and he is
found roaming around, he may be arrested. But until a person
is proved guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to a
personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a rebel and
must be picked up on sight whenever seen. The grant of
authority in the majority opinion is too broad. If warrantless
searches are to be validated, it should be Congress and not this
Court which should draw strict and narrow standards.
Otherwise, the non-rebels who are critical, noisy, or obnoxious
will be indiscriminately lumped up with those actually taking
up arms against the Government.
The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how
well-grounded on past events, that the petitioner would
probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet does not
validate warrantless arrests. I cannot understand why the
authorities preferred to bide their time, await the petitioner's
surfacing from underground, and ounce on him with no legal
authority instead of securing warrants of arrest for his
apprehension.28 (Underscoring supplied)
CRUZ, J., concurring and dissenting:
I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla
decision to justify the illegal arrests made in the cases before
us is a step back to that shameful past when individual rights
were wantonly and systematically violated by the Marcos
dictatorship. It seem some of us have short memories of that
repressive regime, but I for one am not one to forget so soon.
As the ultimate defender of the Constitution, this Court should
not gloss over the abuses of those who, out of mistaken zeal,
would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of
national security. Whatever their ideology and even if it be
hostile to ours, the petitioners are entitled to the protection of
the Bill of Rights, no more and no less than any other person in
this country. That is what democracy is all about.29
(Underscoring supplied)
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:
12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing
crimes," which has its own legitimate function to serve in our
criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening
and dissolving the constitutional guarantee against
warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts comprising all or some
of the elements of the offense charged are shown to have
been committed by the person arrested without warrant, the
"continuing crime" doctrine should not be used to dress up the
pretense that a crime, begun or committed elsewhere,
continued to be committed by the person arrested in the
presence of the arresting officer. The capacity for mischief of
such a utilization of the "continuing crimes" doctrine, is
infinitely increased where the crime charged does not consist
of unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and
end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of a
person or kidnapping and illegal detention or arson) but rather
or such problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation
with or becoming a member of, a subversive association or
organization. For in such cases, the overt constitutive acts may
be morally neutral in themselves, and the unlawfulness of the
acts a function of the aims or objectives of the organization
involved. Note, for instance, the following acts which
constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any
subversive association:"
a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or
any of the lists, records, correspondence, or any other
document of the organization;
b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such or association or
organization in any form whatsoever;
c) Giving financial contribution to such association or
organization in dues, assessments, loans or in any other forms;
xxx
f) Conferring with officers or other members of such
association or organization in furtherance of any plan or
enterprise thereof;
xxx
g) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any
other type of publication to promote the objectives and
purposes of such association or organization;
xxx
k) Participating in any way in the activities, planning action,
objectives, or purposes of such association or organization.
It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional
rule against warrantless arrests and seizures makes the law
enforcement work of police agencies more difficult to carry
 out. It is not our Court's function, however, and the Bill of The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and
Rights was not designed, to make life easy for police forces but controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rather to protect the liberties of private individuals. Our police rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar
forces must simply learn to live with the requirements of the on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
Bill of Rights, to enforce the law by modalities which
themselves comply with the fundamental law. Otherwise they Petitioners look up in urgent supplication to the Court, considered the
are very likely to destroy, whether through sheer ineptness or last bulwark of democracy, for relief. If we do not act promptly, justly
excess of zeal, the very freedoms which make our policy worth and fearlessly, to whom will they turn to?
protecting and saving.30 (Underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, I vote as follows:
It is observed that a sufficient period has lapsed between the fateful day
of May 1, 2001 up to the present. If respondents have ample evidence
(1) Give DUE COURSE to and GRANT the petitions;
against petitioners, then they should forthwith file the necessary
criminal complaints in order that the regular procedure can be followed
and the warrants of arrest issued by the courts in the normal course. (2) Declare as NULL and VOID the orders of arrest issued
When practicable, resort to the warrant process is always to be against petitioners;
preferred because "it interposes an orderly procedure involving 'judicial
impartiality' whereby a neutral and detached magistrate can make (3) Issue a WRIT OF INJUNCTION enjoining respondents, their
informed and deliberate determinations on the issue of probable agents and all other persons acting for and in their behalf from
cause."31 effecting warrantless arrests against petitioners and all other
persons similarly situated on the basis of Proclamation No. 38
The neutrality, detachment and independence that judges are supposed and General Order No. 1 of the President.
to possess is precisely the reason the framers of the 1987 Constitution
have reposed upon them alone the power to issue warrants of arrest. To SO ORDERED.
vest the same to a branch of government, which is also charged with
prosecutorial powers, would make such branch the accused's adversary
and accuser, his judge and jury.32

A declaration of a state of rebellion does not relieve the State of its

burden of proving probable cause. The declaration does not constitute a
substitute for proof. It does not in any way bind the courts, which must
still judge for itself the existence of probable cause. Under Section 18,
Article VII, the determination of the existence of a state of rebellion for
purposes of proclaiming martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus rests for which the President is granted ample,
though not absolute, discretion. Under Section 2, Article III, the
determination of probable cause is a purely legal question of which
courts are the final arbiters.

Justice Secretary Hernando Perez is reported to have announced that

the lifting of the "state of rebellion" on May 7, 2001 does not stop the
police from making warrantless arrests.33 If this is so, the pernicious
effects of the declaration on the people's civil liberties have not abated
despite the lifting thereof. No one exactly knows who are in the list or
who prepared the list of those to be arrested for alleged complicity in
the "continuing" crime of "rebellion" defined as such by executive fiat.
The list of the perceived leaders, financiers and supporters of the
"rebellion" to be arrested and incarcerated could expand depending on
the appreciation of the police. The coverage and duration of effectivity
of the orders of arrest are thus so open-ended and limitless as to place
in constant and continuing peril the people's Bill of Rights. It is of no
small significance that four of he petitioners are opposition candidates
for the Senate. Their campaign activities have been to a large extent
immobilized. If the arrests and orders of arrest against them are illegal,
then their Constitutional right to seek public office, as well as the right
of he people to choose their officials, is violated.

In view of the transcendental importance and urgency of the issues

raised in these cases affecting as they do the basic liberties of the
citizens enshrined in our Constitution, it behooves us to rule thereon
now, instead of relegating the cases to trial courts which unavoidably
may come up with conflicting dispositions, the same to reach this Court
inevitably for final ruling. As we aptly pronounced in Salonga vs. Cruz
Paño:34
Sangca vs. City Prosecutor of Cebu City, 524 SCRA 610, June 08,
2007
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175864 June 8, 2007
ANISAH IMPAL SANGCA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF CEBU CITY and THE PRESIDING
JUDGE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Cebu City, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On January 4, 2007, petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca filed the
instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus and the release of Lovely Impal Adam who was detained
in the Cebu City Jail for alleged violation of Section 5, Article 2 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts are as follows:
In the first week of July 2006, the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), Regional Office VII, received information that
Adam was engaged in illegal drug trafficking activities in Cebu
City and neighboring cities and municipalities. After evaluating
the information, Police Chief Inspector Josefino Ligan, PDEA VII
Asst. Regional Director for Administration/Operation, together
with FO1 Rayford A. Yap and PO2 Dindo M. Tuliao, planned an
entrapment operation.
The events leading to the arrest of Adam, as summarized in the
Resolution of the Department of Justice dated November 10,
2006, are as follows:
On July 7, 2006, at about 2:00 P.M., Yap and Tuliao were able to
contact the informant and inquired from him if he was really
sincere with his words and the latter replied affirmatively. Ligan
immediately composed a team and planned for an entrapment
operation against respondent and her cohorts. A short briefing
was conducted where Yap was tasked to receive the shabu while
Tuliao would be the back up and at the same time the arresting
officer. They prepared a Pre-Operation Report and the same was
coordinated with the Tactical Operation Center of Cebu City
Police Office. The pre-arranged signal in the operation was that
Yap would miscall them once the transaction is consummated. x
xx
On or about 9:30 P.M. of the same day, the team,
including Yap, Tuliao and the informant, proceeded to
Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City for the said purpose. Upon
arrival thereat, Yap and the informant proceeded to
Pizza Hut while Tuliao stayed behind near the parking
area and so with the members of the team closely
watching them. When Yap and the informant entered
Pizza Hut, respondent was already there waiting for
them. They immediately approached her and the
informant introduced Yap to respondent as his former
customer. They had a short conversation and Yap asked
respondent if she has with her the item. Respondent
told him that it is in her car at the parking area.
Respondent asked where the money is. Yap told her no
problem as long as she has the item, he will give her the
money. Respondent instructed Yap to go with her at the
parking area so that she could give it to him and there,
she got inside her car. She took the shabu inside the
compartment of her Toyota Fortuner with plate number
YCX 965 and handed to him one (1) packed medium size
of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet filled with
white crystalline substance believed to be shabu. Upon
receiving the said item, Yap pressed it to determine if it
was really shabu or not and when he noticed that it was
shabu, he immediately miscalled the members of the
team informing them that the transaction was
consummated and subsequently held respondent. He
then introduced himself as PDEA 7 operative. Tuliao,
who was just at the side of the car, assisted Yap in
apprehending the suspect. They also seized her cellular
phone and the Toyota Fortuner which she used in
delivering and transporting illegal drugs. Thereafter,
they informed her that she is under arrest for violation
of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165 and likewise apprised
her of the Miranda Doctrine in the language she knew
and understood but she opted to remain silent. After
which, they asked her name and she introduced herself
as Lovely Adam y Impal, 29 years old, married,
businesswoman and a resident of Celiron, Iligan City.
They brought her along with the confiscated items to
their office for proper disposition. Later on, they found
out that the item that Yap bought from respondent,
marked "LA" dated 07-07-06 with Yap’s signature,
weighing 50.27 grams which was submitted before the
PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, yielded
positive results for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or Shabu, a dangerous drug.
Respondent denies the charge against her. She claims
that she is a trader of ready to wear clothing. As such,
she frequently travels to different Asian countries to buy
goods for sale in Cebu and in Mindanao. She supplies
various boutiques in Cebu City, including Salad Dressing
at SM, D. Blaz., Beauty Land and Lovely’s Closet. She
also operates a beauty parlor in Talamban.
Respondent claims that on July 7, 2006, at around 10:00
in the evening, she was at Pizza Hut, Fuente Osmeña
Boulevard, together with her four children and their
"yayas". A friend of hers, Ana, had called her earlier in
 the day saying that she would pay off her loan to her
(respondent) at Pizza Hut that evening. Ana arrived a
short time later. They were eating when Ana received a
call over her cellphone. From the gist of it, Ana was
talking to a certain Rose. Respondent did not mind them
because the conversation was only between Ana and
Rose. A short time later, a woman, who was introduced
to her by Ana as a certain Rose, arrived. Ana and Rose
then proceeded to talk with each other, and respondent
did not mind them. A while after, respondent saw Ana
hand over a parcel to Rose, and the latter, on the other
hand, hand a green bag to Ana. Rose then left. As
respondent was about to leave, Ana requested that she
be allowed to hitch a ride and respondent agreed. When
they were outside, respondent noticed a vehicle
blocking her car, making it impossible for her to back
out into the road, without hitting the car. She then
beeped her car. Instead of moving their car, one of the
men went down and thereafter, entered her vehicle and
demanded for the bag that was allegedly given to Ana
by Rose. Respondent told them to ask Ana since they
claimed that it was given to Ana. However, the men
pointed their guns at respondent, including her children,
claiming that they were elements of PDEA and they
were placing her under arrest for illegal drug trafficking.
They then grabbed respondent’s green bag and from
then on, she was never able to recover the contents
thereof, including the bag itself. Thereafter, respondent
was brought to the PDEA office where a certain Ryan
Rubi was also booked for alleged drug trafficking. During
her conversation with Ryan Rubi, she found out that he
was arrested a few hours earlier likewise by the PDEA,
and during his alleged arrest, he was required to
produce a drug trafficker in exchange for his release.
Having been unable to produce any, he was charged.
The name of Rose cropped up, and he said that during
his arrest, the police officers informed him that they
were after Rose. His wife was out to raise money for his
release, or to produce a drug trafficker so that he can be
released. It was further ascertained by Ryan Rubi that
this Rose was actually arrested by the police officers but
was conditionally released on condition that she would
produce someone who would take her place.
Thereafter, he claimed that he overheard them refer to
a certain Ana, who said that she would also produce
respondent to take her place. The circumstances of
respondent’s arrest and that of the said Ryan Rubi are
closely intertwined. In the police blotter, the vehicle
pertaining to respondent, which is the Toyota Fortuner
was ascribed to Ryan Rubi, while the latter’s vehicle was
ascribed to her. x x x1
The inquest prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case
but was disapproved by the City Prosecutor. Consequently, an
information charging Adam with violation of Section 5, Article 2
of R.A. No. 9165 was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No.
CBU-77562 before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
58.
On petition for review before the Department of Justice,
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez found no probable cause to hold
Adam liable for the offense charged, to wit:
A very thorough and careful scrutiny of the records, particularly
the affidavit of arrest, reveals that no payment was ever made by
the police officers for the supposed object of the buy-bust
operations. The police officers have not even alleged in their
affidavits that payment was made to respondent in exchange for
the shabu. No buy-bust money was ever presented. The
certificate of inventory does not show any buy-bust money.
These stick out like a sore thumb in the case at bar.
Suffice it to say that one of the essential elements to be
established in the prosecution of the drug "buy-bust" cases, that
is, "the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore" is
wanting. It was aptly said in the case of People v. Alilin, 206 SCRA
773, that: "To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs,
the same must be clearly and unmistakably established."2
The Justice Secretary directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to
withdraw the information.3 PDEA filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Justice Secretary on
December 8, 2006.4
In his Comment, Judge Gabriel T. Ingles, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58, stated that at the
hearing of the motion to withdraw information on January 5,
2007, it was found that:
In the affidavit of FO1 Rayford A. Yap and PO2 Dindo M. Tuliao,
there is indeed no mention of their preparation of a buy bust
money before, during or after their briefing prior to the alleged
buy bust operation, nor is there any mention of the price or
consideration of the sale. What is merely stated is that they had
enough money.
xxxx
Further convincing this court that there was no buy bust money
prepared are the following:
a) In the "Pre-Operation Report" dated July 7, 2006, bearing
Control Number 07-07-2006-03, there is no mention of the buy-
bust money in the operational requirements;
b) In the "Excerpt From the Records of the PDEA 7
Blotter/Logbook bearing the same date and entry number 02422;
c) In another "Excerpt From the Records of the PDEA 7
Blotter/Logbook bearing the same date and entry number 02422
there is a mention in "Facts of the Case" the recovery of "3
bundles of boodle money with two (2) pieces of genuine five
hundred peso bills wrapped with newspaper and packed with
packaging tape." However, while the name of the suspect is
indicated in this excerpt is Lovely Adam y Impal and the evidence
enumerated are as follows:
1) one (1) medium size of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a
filled with crystalline substance believed to be shabu; person from it if such restraint is illegal. The singular function of a
petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic
2) one (1) unit Nokia cellphone; freedom of physical liberty.7

3) one (1) unit Toyota Fortuner with plate number XCX 956 In the instant case, records show that Adam has been released
registered under the name of Lovely Adam;" upon order of the trial judge on January 26, 2007. Therefore, the
petition has become moot.8
the narration of the facts of the case in said excerpt also included
the following statement: "Likewise, the apprehending officers WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
seized one (1) unit cellular phone (Sony Erickson) and the
Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number GHC color black registered SO ORDERED.
under the name of Roberto Rubi, which was used by the
aforementioned suspects in transporting illegal drugs." Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, JJ., concur.

This Roberto Rubi could not have been arrested together with
accused herein because there is no mention of such fact in the
Affidavit of Officers Yap and Tuliao.

In fact, the head of the arresting team of herein accused Josefino

D. Liga[n] filed a Motion to Withdraw Said Excerpt because there
was an inadvertent interchange of facts in another case
obviously against Mr. Rubi.

The problem, however, is that from the Excerpts presented, it is

not clear to this court to which case the mention of boodle
money applies. This court cannot merely assume or conclude
that the boodle money has reference to the case of herein
accused because as stated, nowhere in the separate affidavits of
office[r]s Tuliao and Yap can one find any mention of such. It is
not even mentioned in the other "Excerpt" also dated July 10,
2006 also submitted by the PDEA.5

Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime charged,
Judge Ingles issued an Order on January 26, 2007 granting the
Motion to Withdraw Information and ordering the release of the
accused, unless otherwise held for another valid ground. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads:

Accordingly, the "Motion to Withdraw Information" is hereby

GRANTED and the accused is ordered immediately released
unless another valid ground exists for her continued detention.

The prosecution and/or PDEA are/is ordered to turn over to this

court within three (3) days from receipt hereof the dangerous
drug described in the information which shall in turn be
confiscated in favor of the state for proper disposition unless the
prosecution intends to refile or file another case against the
accused which it deems appropriate as double jeopardy has not
attached.

SO ORDERED.6

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal

confinement or detention in which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is
G.R. No. 160739. July 17, 2013.*
ANITA MANGILA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE HERIBERTO M.
PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR II LUCIA JUDY SOLINAP,
and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (DIRECTOR
REYNALDO WYCOCO), respondents.
Constitutional Law; Habeas Corpus; The object of the writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and,
if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of
the detainee.—The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is
found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally
well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the
person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge G.R. No. 160739
with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record. Mangila vs. Pangilinan, 701 SCRA 355, G.R. No. 160739
July 17, 2013
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrants of Arrest; The
investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the
preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion
should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of
the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and that
there was a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.—Under
Section 6(b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest
during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its
conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and
under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers that a probable cause existed,
and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
In the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of
arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA
properly denied Mangila’s petition for habeas corpus because
she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant
issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer
undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.
Same; Same; It was clear that under Section 5, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the resolution of the
investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the
review by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the
release of the detainee if no probable cause should be ultimately
found against her.—It was clear that under Section 5, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the resolution of the
investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the
review by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the
release of the detainee if no probable cause should be ultimately
found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no
need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure
her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the
supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to
the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile
given the most direct access to the entire records of the case,
including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan’s
transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action.
We agree with the CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus
could not be used as a substitute for another available remedy.
Mangila vs. Pangilinan, 701 SCRA 355, G.R. No. 160739 July 17,
2013
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
July 17, 2013
ANITA MANGILA, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR II LUCIA
JUDY SOLINAP, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (DIRECTOR
REYNALDO WYCOCO), Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be
inquired into through habeas corpus.
Antecedents
On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita
Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689,
and with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities in Puerto Princesa City (MTCC), docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 16916 to No. 16922. The complaints arose from the recruiting
and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private
complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and
from the collection of visa processing fees, membership fees and on-line
application the private complainants without lawful authority from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).1
On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan,
Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on
the complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the
complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of
Mangila and her cohorts without bail.2 On the next day, the entire
records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted
to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings
and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules.3
As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained
at the headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).4
Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation; that the preliminary investigation he
conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest;
and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient
justification or without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in
the Court of Appeals (CA)a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her
release from detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas
corpus was available to her because she could no longer file a motion to
quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest considering that Judge
Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the
City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant. 5
In its resolution promulgated on October 14, 2003,6 the CA denied the
petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit, explaining:
As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where
relief may be had or could have been procured by resort to another
general remedy. As pointed out in Luna vs. Plaza, if petitioner is
detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest, which is allegedly invalid, the before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant.
remedy available to her is not a petition for habeas corpus but a petition In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a
to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the
case by the Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that the Municipal Judge who conducted the preliminary investigation
shall transmit his resolution, together with the record of the case,
including the warrant of arrest, to the Provincial Prosecutor, who shall
review the same and order the release of an accused who is detained if
no probable cause is found against him. Thus, the proper remedy
available to petitioner is for her to file with the Provincial Prosecutor a Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in
motion to be released from detention on the grounds alleged in the
instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.7
Mangila moved for the reconsideration of the denial of her petition for
habeas corpus,8 but the CA denied the motion on November 19, 2003.9
Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy
to obtain the release of Mangila from detention?
Ruling of the Court
The petition for review lacks merit.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy
and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. In
Caballes v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court discoursed on the nature of the
special proceeding of habeas corpus in the following manner:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In
Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil
proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights.
Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the
complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act
and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint.
The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution
and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that
court.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as
substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of
appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate
and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to
procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is
addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed
order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular
course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover,
habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly
course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities
not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of
the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human
life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been
held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and
irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not
grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint
is not illegal.
rem when instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of
restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his
detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of
habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but
upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful
authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only
question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to
deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the
petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito
justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty," is
a prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter of right but in the
sound discretion of the court or judge. It is, however, a writ of right on
proper formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ is not to
inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the
right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to
be served is relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if not the only
object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to determine
the legality of the restraint under which a person is held.11 (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of
the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the
release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ
will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out
on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record.12
There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged
against Mangila and her cohorts on June 16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan, as
the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct
preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper
court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority was
expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 2.Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.
– The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)

(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws supposedly committed by
Judge Pangilinan in her attempt to convince the Court on her
entitlement to the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. She insists that
the illegality and invalidity of the warrant of arrest because of its having
been issued without an exhaustive examination of the complainants and
the witnesses in writing and under oath; without a prior finding of
probable cause; and without consideration of the necessity for its
issuance in order not to frustrate the ends of justice were enough
reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus.14

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all

crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial Mangila fails to persuade.
jurisdictions. (2a)
To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after
Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal examining Palayon, one of the complainants against Mangila and her
Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge, considered Palayon’s evidence
the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion sufficient for finding probable cause against her and her cohorts, which
should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the finding the Court justifiably presumes from his act of referring the case
complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and and its records to the Office of the City Prosecutor on the day
answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of immediately following the preliminary investigation he conducted, her
placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to petition for habeas corpus could not be the proper remedy by which she
frustrate the ends of justice.1âwphi1 In the context of this rule, Judge could assail the adequacy of the adverse finding. Even granting that
Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. there was a failure to adhere to the law or rule, such failure would not
Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangila’s petition for habeas be the equivalent of a violation of her constitutional rights. 15
corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the
warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance
undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so. of the warrant of arrest by hinting that the investigating judge did not at
all consider the necessity of determining the existence of probable cause
It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC for its issuance due to time constraints and in order not to frustrate the
and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was removed ends of justice, for that consideration was presumed.
only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.
And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5,16 Rule 112 of the Revised
With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order Rules of Criminal Procedure, the resolution of the investigating judge
lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not was not final but was still subject to the review by the public prosecutor
an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no probable
This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court cause should beultimately found against her. In the context of the rule,
process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus. To quote the Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
dictum enunciated by Justice Malcolm in Quintos v. Director of Prisons:13 to secure her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring
the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the
The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the
cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, most direct access to the entire records of the case, including the
and to have ascertained if he is held under lawful authority. The function warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to
of habeas corpus, where the party who has appealed to its aid is in the City Prosecutor for appropriate action.17 We agree with the CA,
custody under process, does not extend beyond an inquiry into the therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a
jurisdiction of the court by which it was issued and the validity of the substitute for another available remedy.18
process upon its face. It is not a writ of error. xxx (Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on
October 14, 2003 and November 19, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 79745; and
Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly states: ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

Section 4.When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears SO ORDERED.

that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
G.R. No. 210636. July 28, 2014.* The Facts

MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE, in behalf of the minor On March 24, 2011, respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the
CRISELDA M. CADA, petitioner, vs. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, R TC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus, docketed as
Special Civil Action Case No. C-4344. In the said petition, respondent
respondent.
demanded the immediate issuance of the special writ, directing
petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to produce before the court
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Habeas Corpus; Considering respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada (Criselda), and
that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, to return to her the custody over the child. Additionally, respondent
petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether indicated that petitioner has three (3) known addresses where she can be
they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to served with summons and other court processes, to wit: (1) 24 Bangkal
Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with St., Amparo Village, Novaliches, Caloocan City; (2) 118B K9Street, Kamias,
any of the proper Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) within the judicial Quezon City; and (3) her office at the Ombudsman-Office of the Special
Prosecutor, 5th Floor, Sandiganbayan, Centennial Building,
region where enforcement thereof is sought.—Considering that
Commonwealth Avenue cor. Batasan Road, Quezon City.2
the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed
The next day, on March 25, 2011, the RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of
under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of
habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the child to court on March
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any of the 28, 2011. Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the
proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally serving petitioner copies of the
thereof is sought. habeas corpus petition and of the writ. Instead, on March 29, 2011, the
Sheriff left copies of the court processes at petitioner’s Caloocan
Same; Same; Same; Summons; Service of summons is not required in a residence, as witnessed by respondent’s counsel and barangay officials.3
habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearings
No. 03-04-04-SC.—As regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons before the RTC-Caloocan.
was improperly served, suffice it to state that service of summons, to
begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for
102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the RTC, Branch 89 in
Cruz, 105 Phil. 315 (1959), a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat Quezon City (RTC-Quezon City). Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the
comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of petition for guardianship on the ground of litis pendentia, among others.
said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the Thereafter, or on June 3, 2011, respondent filed a criminal case for
respondent. Tujan-Militante vs. Cada-Deapera, 731 SCRA 194, G.R. No. kidnapping before the Office of the City Prosecutor – Quezon City against
210636 July 28, 2014 petitioner and her counsel.

Republic of the Philippines On July 12, 2011, the RTC-Quezon City granted respondent’s motion and
SUPREME COURT dismissed the guardianship case due to the pendency of the habeas
Manila corpuspetition before RTC-Caloocan.4

THIRD DIVISION The falloof the Order reads:

G.R. No. 210636 July 28, 2014 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,the subject motion is hereby
GRANTED.Accordingly, the case is hereby DISMISSED.
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJANMILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA
M. CADA, Petitioner, SO ORDERED.5
vs.
RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, Respondent. Then, on August 4, 2011, Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an
alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC-Caloocan, which was granted
DECISION by the trial court on August 8, 2011. On even date, the court directed the
Sheriff to serve the alias writ upon petitioner at the Office of the
VELASCO, JR., J.: Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City on August 10, 2011.6 In
compliance, the Sheriff served petitioner the August 8, 2011 Order as
well as the Alias Writ during the preliminary investigation of the
Nature of the Case
kidnapping case.7

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

Following this development, petitioner, by way of special appearance,
of Court with prayer for injunctive relief seeking the reversal of the Court
moved for the quashal of the writ and prayed before the RTC Caloocan
of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 17, 2013 as well as its Resolution
for the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition,8 claiming, among others,
dated December 27, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 123759. In the main,
that she was not personally served with summons. Thus, as argued by
petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
petitioner, jurisdiction over her and Criselda’sperson was not acquired by
130 in Caloocan City (RTC-Caloocan) to hear and decide a special civil
the RTCCaloocan.
action for habeas corpus in relation to the custody of a minor residing in
Quezon City.
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 20, 2012, the RTC-Caloocan issued an Order denying
petitioner’s omnibus motion, citing Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz,9 where the
Court held that a writ of habeas corpus, being an extraordinary process
requiring immediate proceeding and action, plays a role somewhat
comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of
said writ, the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent, as petitioner herein.10
Moreover, personal service, the RTC said, does not necessarily require
that service be made exclusively at petitioner’s given address, for service
may be made elsewhere or wherever she may be found for as long as she
was handed a copy of the court process in person by anyone authorized
by law. Since the sheriff was able to personally serve petitioner a copy of
the writ, albeit in Quezon City, the RTC-Caloocan validly acquired
jurisdiction over her person.11 The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:
The Issues
At the core of this controversy isthe issue of whether or not the RTC
Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeascorpus petition filed by
respondent and, assuming arguendo it does, whether or not it validly
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of Criselda. Likewise
pivotal is the enforce ability of the writ issued by RTC-Caloocan in Quezon
City where petitioner was served a copy thereof.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit. The RTC-Caloocan correctly took cognizance of
the habeas corpus petition. Subsequently, it acquired jurisdiction over
petitioner when the latter was served with a copy of the writ in Quezon
City.

The RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Very Urgent Motion (Motion to
Quash Alias Writ; Motion to Dismiss)filed by respondent Ma. Hazelina
Tujan-Militante dated August 11, 2011 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Arguing that the RTC-Caloocan lacked jurisdiction over the case,
petitioner relies on Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and maintains that
the habeas corpus petition should have been filed before the family court
In the meantime, respondent Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante is hereby
that has jurisdiction over her place of residence or that of the minor or
directed to appear and bring Criselda Martinez Cada before this Court on
wherever the minor may be found.18 As to respondent, she asserts,
February 10, 2012 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.
among others, that the applicable rule is not Section 3 but Section 20 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.19
SO ORDERED.12
We find for respondent.
Aggrieved, petitioner, via certiorari to the CA, assailed the issued Order.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance
Ruling of the Court of Appeals of a writ of habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.20 As provided:
Over a year later, the CA, in the challenged Decision dated May 17,
2013,13 dismissed the petition for certiorari in the following wise: Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a
writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Family Court. The writ shall beenforceable within its judicial region to
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 130 of Caloocan City is DIRECTED to which the Family Court belongs.
proceed with due dispatch in Spec. Proc. Case No. C-4344 for Habeas
Corpus, giving utmost consideration tothe best interest of the now nearly However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence
14-year old child. of the presiding judge of the Family Court, provided, however, that the
regular court shall refer the case tothe Family Court as soon as its
SO ORDERED.14 presiding judge returns to duty.

In so ruling, the CA held that jurisdiction was properly laid when The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in
respondent filed the habeas corpus petition before the designated Family places where there are no Family Courts.
Court in Caloocan City.15 It also relied on the certification issued by the
punong barangay of Brgy. 179, Caloocan City, stating that petitioner is a The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be
bona fide resident thereof, as well as the medical certificate issued by enforceable in the judicial region where they belong.
Criselda’s doctor on April 1, 2011, indicating that her address is "Amparo
Village, KC."16 Anent the RTC-Caloocan’s jurisdiction, the appellate court
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
ruled that service of summons is not required under Section 20 of A.M.
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted,the writ shall be
No. 03-04-04-SC, otherwise known as the Rules on Custody of Minors
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made
and Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. According tothe CA,
returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region
the rules on summons contemplated in ordinary civil actions have no
where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for
place in petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it being a
hearing and decision on the merits.
special proceeding.17

Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of
Petitioner sought reconsideration ofthe above Decision but the same was
minors. The appellate court, or the member thereof, issuing the writ shall
denied by the CA in its December 27, 2013 Resolution.1âwphi1
be furnished a copy of the decision. (emphasis added)

Hence, this Petition.

Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region,
petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be
filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court orpursuant to Section 20 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed withany of the proper RTCs
within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought.21

On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, finds relevance. Said
provision, which contains the enumeration of judicial regions in the
country, states:

Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. – There are hereby created
thirteen Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the following judicial
regions:

xxxx

The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila,

Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of
Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina,
Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela. (emphasis ours)

In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the filing of a

petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court
in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to
be enforced within the National Capital Judicial Region, as here.

In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of
Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the
same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be
implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or
the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.

Anent petitioner’s insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No.

03-04-04-SC, a plain reading of said provision reveals that the provision
invoked only applies to petitions for custody of minors, and not to habeas
corpus petitions. Thus:

Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of minors shall
be filed with the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner
resides or where the minormay be found. (emphasis added)

Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was

improperly served, suffice it to state thatservice of summons, to begin
with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a
writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons,
in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.22

In view of the foregoing, We need not belabor the other issues raised.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals

Decision dated May 1 7, 2013 and its Resolution dated December 27,
2013 are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 197597. April 8, 2015.* Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a Return of
the Writ. As to the legality of his acts, this court ruled that Mayor Justo
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN Lukban illegally deprived the women he had deported to Davao of their
MALANG SALIBO, liberty, specifically, of their privilege of domicile. It said that the women,
“despite their being in a sense lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not
chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, petitioner, vs. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL
guaranties as are other citizens[.]” The women had the right “to change
ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY and all other
their domicile from Manila to another locality.” The writ of habeas corpus
persons acting on his behalf and/or having custody of DATUKAN MALANG
is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of the
SALIBO, respondents.
writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the
person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Habeas Corpus; An application for a the final decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.
writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition
court or any of its members, the Court of Appeals (CA) or any of its for its issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance
members in instances authorized by law, or the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any
or any of its presiding judges.—An application for a writ of habeas corpus deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus
may be made through a petition filed before this court or any of its even if the petition for its issuance “on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]”
members, the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in
authorized by law, or the Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires it, the writ
judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or itself may not be suspended.
person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file
a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is then
Same; Same; Same; It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer
conducted. The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from
be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a
that which issued the writ. Should the court issuing the writ designate a
lawful process or order of the court.—It is true that a writ of habeas
lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall
corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty
proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the
is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint
designation, the lower court “acquire[s] the power and authority to
then has become legal, and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered
determine the merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.]” Therefore, the
moot and academic. Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
Same; Same; Same; Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
writ of habeas corpus “shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality
thereto.”—Called the “great writ of liberty[,]” the writ of habeas corpus or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this
“was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
defense of personal freedom.” The remedy of habeas corpus is imprisonment under lawful judgment.
extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the law’s “zealous
regard for personal liberty.” Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of
Same; Same; Same; Moot and Academic; The filing of the Informations,
Court, the writ of habeas corpus “shall extend to all cases of illegal
according to the Supreme Court (SC), rendered the Petitions for habeas
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty,
corpus moot and academic.—This court likewise dismissed the Petitions
or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
for habeas corpus in Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990). Roberto Umil,
person entitled thereto.” The primary purpose of the writ “is to inquire
Rolando Dural, Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra,
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary,
Atty. Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya, Deogracias
and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.” “Any
Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all arrested without a warrant for
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.”
their alleged membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People’s Army. During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings,
Same; Same; Same; The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be however, Informations against them were filed before this court. The
related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of filing of the Informations, according to this court, rendered the Petitions
habeas corpus.—The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be for habeas corpus moot and academic, thus: It is to be noted that, in all
related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the
habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged
there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode. In other words, to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before
the Constitution. Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right, any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that
the substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the
Same; Same; Same; Instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary
labyrinth of other processes.
remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful
process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and
Same; Same; Same; The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final exhaust the usual remedies.—Instead of availing themselves of the
decision on the petition for the issuance of the writ.—This court cited extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly
course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies. This ordinary remedy is to
file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Motion to Quash; At any time before a plea is
entered, the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or
information based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court.—At any time before a plea is entered, the
accused may file a motion to quash complaint or information based on
any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court: SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint
or information on any of the following grounds: (a) That the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; (b) That the court trying the case
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) That the court trying the
case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) That the
officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) That it
does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) That more
than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) That the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished; (h) That it contains averments which, if
true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) That the
accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
Same; Same; Same; If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion
to quash, the accused “hypothetically admits the facts alleged in the
information.”—In filing a motion to quash, the accused “assails the
validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him [or her]
for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information.” If the accused avails himself or
herself of a motion to quash, the accused “hypothetical[ly] admits the
facts alleged in the information.” “Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic
from the information are not to be considered.”
Same; Same; Same; If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect
of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the
court shall order the amendment of the complaint or information. If the
motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts alleged in the
complaint or information do not constitute an offense, the trial court
shall give the prosecution an opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment.—“If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of
the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the
court shall order [the] amendment [of the complaint or information].” If
the motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts alleged in the
complaint or information do not constitute an offense, the trial court
shall give the prosecution “an opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment.” If after amendment, the complaint or information still
suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall quash the complaint or
information. In The Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan
Malang Salibo vs. Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, BJMP Building, Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, 755 SCRA 296, G.R. No. 197597 April 8, 2015
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN,
QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA,
TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF
AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,
Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due
to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful
process and is continuously being illegally detained.
This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals
Decision2 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153,
Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting Datukan Malang Salibo's
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo
(Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj
Pilgrimage.4 "While in Saudi Arabia, . . . Salibo visited and prayed in the
cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah."5 He returned to the
Philippines on December 20, 2009.6
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer
Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.7
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder
for allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao
Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan
S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23,
2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that
time.9
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent
portions of his passport, boarding passes and other documents" 10
tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi
Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009.11
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him
because he was not Butukan S. Malang.12
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore
off page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi
Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu
Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days.13
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10
days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.14
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail
Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong
Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained. 15
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the
Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus16 questioning the legality of his
detention and deprivation of his liberty.17 He maintained that he is not
the accused Butukan S. Malang.18
In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals
issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the
Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City
(Taguig Hall of Justice).20 The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of
the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ one day before
the scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00
a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010.21
Proceedings before the trial court
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex
brought Salibo before the trial court. The Warden, however, failed to file On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and
a Return one day before the hearing. He also appeared without counsel set aside the trial court's Decision.38 Through its Decision dated April 19,
during the hearing.22
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29,
2010 at 2:00 p.m.23
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ.
However, during the September 29, 2010 hearing on the Return, the
Warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr., Legal
Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology. 24
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted
Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release
from detention.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed Salibo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found that
Salibo's arrest and subsequent detention were made under a valid
Information and Warrant of Arrest.39 Even assuming that Salibo was not
the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court
of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and
the usual remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be
invoked[.]"40 According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy
was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.41

Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,42 which the Court of Appeals
behalf of the Warden and argued that only the Office of the Solicitor denied in the Resolution43 dated July 6, 2011.
General has the authority to appear on behalf of a respondent in a
habeas corpus proceeding.25 Proceedings before this court

The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial On July 28, 2011,44 petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition
court reset the hearing on the Return to October 1, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.26 for Review (With Urgent Application for a Writ of Preliminary

The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment,45 after
Noel Salo and Isar Pepito appeared on behalf of the Warden of the which petitioner Salibo filed a Reply.46
Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that Salibo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus should be dismissed. Since Salibo was charged under a valid
Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was "no Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged
longer availing."27 with 57 counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221,
Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding, he, Datukan
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant Malang Salibo, was not duly charged in court. He is being illegally
of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of Arrest referred to by the Warden all deprived of his liberty and, therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for
point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused. Habeas Corpus.47
Reiterating that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi
Arabia on the day of the Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo pleaded the Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the
trial court to order his release from detention.28 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City before the
Court of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals delegated to the trial
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"29 under any court the authority to hear respondent Warden on the Return, the trial
resolution, information, or amended information. The Resolution, court's Decision should be deemed a Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Information, and Amended Information presented in court did not Therefore, respondent Warden should have directly filed his appeal
charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly before this court.48
arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest
against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly
restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court.30 charged in court. Even assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang
named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have
pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Petition for Habeas Corpus.49
Malang charged with murder in connection with the Maguindanao
Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated August The issues for our resolution are:
27, 2009 showed that Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of the
date of the certificate.31 A Philippine passport bearing Salibo's picture First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig
showed the name "Datukan Malang Salibo."32 City on petitioner Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to
the Court of Appeals; and Second, whether petitioner Salibo's proper
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
of the country"33 from November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009. This
fact was supported by a Certification34 from Saudi Arabian Airlines We grant the Petition.cralawlawlibrary
confirming Salibo's departure from and arrival in Manila on board its
flights.35 A Flight Manifest issued by the Bureau of Immigration and I
Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact.36

Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly
appealed before the Court of Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a
petition filed before this court or any of its members,50 the Court of
Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law,51 or the
Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges.52 The court or judge
grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the
person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. 53 A
hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.54
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which
issued the writ.55 Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower
court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall
proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the
designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to
determine the merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.]"56 Therefore,
the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that
has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.57
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,58 "a petition for habeas corpus was filed
before this Court . . . [o]n behalf of. . . Alfredo B. Saulo [(Saulo)]."59 This
court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of
the Writ. This court made the Writ returnable to the Court of First
Instance of Manila.60
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of First
Instance denied Saulo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.61
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First Instance which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
heard the Petition for Habeas Corpus "not by virtue of its original
jurisdiction but merely delegation[.]"62 Consequently, "this Court should The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of
have the final say regarding the issues raised in the petition, and only
[this court's decision] . . . should be regarded as operative."63
This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic is more
apparent than real."64 It ruled that when a superior court issues a writ of The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense
habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves whether the respondent so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may
should be ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in
whose behalf the petition was filed was being detained or deprived of
his or her liberty.65 However, once the superior court makes the writ
returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower
court designated "does not thereby become merely a recommendatory the Constitution.86 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional
body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of effect[.]"66 The
decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the lower
court, not of the superior court.
In Medina v. Gen. Yan,67 Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this
court a Petition for Habeas Corpus. This court issued a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, making it returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City. After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance granted
Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered that Medina be
released from detention.68
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the
Court of Appeals.69
Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of
Appeals a "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court."
The Court of Appeals, however, denied the Motion.70
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion
for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court," citing Saulo as legal
basis.71 The Court of First Instance of Rizal, in deciding Medina's Petition
for Habeas Corpus, "acquired the power and authority to determine the
merits of the case[.]"72 Consequently, the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable
to the Court of Appeals.73
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153,
Pasig City. The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return
and decided the Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the
power and authority to determine the merits"74 of petitioner Salibo's
Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was
the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the
Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of
trial courts,75 respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the
Court of Appeals.cralawlawlibrary
II
Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"76 the writ of habeas corpus "was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom."77 The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary78
and summary79 in nature, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for
personal liberty."80
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."81
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."82 "Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient."83
be availed of as a post-conviction remedy84 or when there is an alleged
violation of the liberty of abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus
effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens
constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of
right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny
so that the substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the
labyrinth of other processes.87
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,88 Mario
Gumabon (Gumabon), Bias Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol), Gaudencio Agapito
(Agapito), Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno Palmares (Palmares)
were convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. They
commenced serving their respective sentences of reclusion perpetua.89
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were serving
their sentences, this court promulgated People v. Hernandez90 in 1956,
ruling that the complex crime of rebellion with murder does not exist.91
Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua,
and Palmares filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus. They prayed for their
release from incarceration and argued that the Hernandez doctrine
must retroactively apply to them.92
This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and
Palmares properly availed of a petition for habeas corpus.93 Citing Harris
v. Nelson,94 this court said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state or order of the court.111 The restraint then has become legal,112 and the
remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.113 Rule 102,
action. . . . The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all
manner of illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
and procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears
guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
corrected.95cralawlawlibrary jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
96 order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, the Provincial Board of Mindoro
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
issued Resolution No. 25, Series of 1917. The Resolution ordered the
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
Mangyans removed from their native habitat and compelled them to
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
permanently settle in an 800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
Resolution, Mangyans who refused to establish themselves in the Tigbao
97 suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
reservation were imprisoned.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,114 elements of the Philippine
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of Constabulary-Integrated National Police arrested Atty. Laurente C.
Rubi and all the other Mangyans being held in the reservation.98 Since Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission Order allegedly issued by then
the application questioned the legality of deprivation of liberty of Rubi Minister of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the
and the other Mangyans, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and day of Atty. Ilagan's arrest,115 from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
ordered the Provincial Board of Mindoro to make a Return of the Writ.99 Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in Camp Catitipan, where he was
detained.115
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. Lukban.100
"[T]o exterminate vice,"101 Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila ordered the Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano).
brothels in Manila closed. The female sex workers previously employed Atty. Arellano, however, no longer left Camp Catitipan as the military
by these brothels were rounded up and placed in ships bound for Davao. detained and arrested him based on an unsigned Mission Order.116
The women were expelled from Manila and deported to Davao without
their consent.102 Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the military
informed the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter of the
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women, impending arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty. Risonar). To verify his
this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered Mayor Justo arrest papers, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. Like Atty. Arellano,
Lukban, among others, to make a Return of the Writ. Mayor Justo the military did not allow Atty. Risonar to leave. He was arrested based
Lukban, however, failed to make a Return, arguing that he did not have on a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified
custody of the women.103 Commander.117

This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to
make a Return of the Writ.104 As to the legality of his acts, this court
ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally deprived the women he had
deported to Davao of their liberty, specifically, of their privilege of
domicile.105 It said that the women, "despite their being in a sense
lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other
citizens[.]"106 The women had the right "to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality."107
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the
petition for the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the
production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her
liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court
determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition
for its issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The
issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the
legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of
habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is]
devoid of merit[.]"108 Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the public
safety requires it,109 the writ itself may not be suspended.110
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group,
and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and
Nationalism filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf
of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.118
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile,
Armed Forces of the Philippines Acting Chief of Staff Lieutenant General
Fidel V. Ramos (General Ramos), and Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police Regional Commander Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-
Gatue (General Tan-Gatue) to make a Return of the Writ.119 This court
set the hearing on the Return on May 23, 1985.120
In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue
contended that the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was
suspended as to Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar by virtue of
Proclamation No. 2045-A.121 The lawyers, according to respondents,
allegedly "played active roles in organizing mass actions of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic
Front."122
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the
temporary release of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar on the
recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
and retired Associate Justice Jose B.L. Reyes.123

III Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however,

Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue filed a Motion
for Reconsideration.124 They filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion
stating that Informations for rebellion were filed against Attys. Ilagan,
Arellano, and Risonar. They prayed that this court dismiss the Petition
for Habeas Corpus for being moot and academic.125
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group,
and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and
Nationalism opposed the motion. According to them, no preliminary
investigation was conducted before the filing of the Information. Attys.
Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were deprived of their right to due process. (h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
Consequently, the Information was void.126
This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it
became moot and academic with the filing of the Information against
Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar in
court:127ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered
moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them
for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function
of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality
of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by
virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed
against them before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, the remedy
of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.128
(Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v.
Ramos.129 Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, Renato Villanueva, Amelia
Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple,
Vicky A. Ocaya, Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all
arrested without a warrant for their alleged membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army.130
During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however,
Informations against them were filed before this court. The filing of the
Informations, according to this court, rendered the Petitions for habeas
corpus moot and academic, thus:131ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal
charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The
rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the
order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas
corpus will not be allowed.132 (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary
remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a
lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of
trial and exhaust the usual remedies.133 This ordinary remedy is to file a
motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.134
At any time before a plea is entered,135 the accused may file a motion to
quash complaint or information based on any of the grounds
enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of
the accused;.
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or information filed against him [or her] for insufficiency on
its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of
the information."136 If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion
to quash, the accused "hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the
information."137 "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the
information are not to be considered."138ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order
[the] amendment [of the complaint or information]."139 If the motion to
quash is based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or
information do not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the
prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."140 If
after amendment, the complaint or information still suffers from the
same defect, the trial court shall quash the complaint or information.141
IV
However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo
was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He
was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was
illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself
of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 221, Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal
Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not
Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the
Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a
warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
instances when a warrantless arrest may be
made:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on- personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section
7 of Rule 112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu
Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the
accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence
of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers
had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner
Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty
without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may
be issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in
the "disturbing"143 case of Ilagan.144 Like petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar
went to Camp Catitipan to verify and contest any arrest papers against
him. Then and there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In
145
his dissenting opinion in Ilagan, Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that
the lack of preliminary investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together
with Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, of his right to due process of law — a
ground for the grant of a petition for habeas corpus: 146
The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without
preliminary investigation falls within the exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7
and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Again, this witnesses. As of November 23, 2014, 111 of the accused have been
is erroneous premise. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited
rules. The petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested without a
warrant." The fiscal could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of
January 25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would be rendered nugatory, if
all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one's whim
and caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is premised on its
imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the President himself.
The majority decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5 which authorizes
arrests without warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed
the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of committing the
offense. Quite obviously, the arrest was not a citizen's arrest nor were
they caught in flagrante delicto violating the law. In fact, this Court in
promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure have tightened and
made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an offense
"has in fact just been committed." This connotes immediacy in point of
time and excludes cases under the old rule where an offense "has in fact
been committed" no matter how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must
have "personal knowledge of facts indicating that the [arrestee] has
committed it" (instead of just "reasonable ground to believe that the
[arrestee] has committed it" under the old rule). Clearly, then, an
information could not just be filed against the petitioners without due
process and preliminary investigation.147 (Emphasis in the original,
citation omitted)
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to
Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion
to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere
amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the
name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not
cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of
preliminary investigation. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest
were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan
Malang Salibo are the same person. There is evidence, however, that
the person detained by virtue of these processes is not Butukan S.
Malang but another person named Datukan Malang Salibo.
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport,148 his
identification card from the Office on Muslim Affairs,149 his Tax
Identification Number card,150 and clearance from the National Bureau
of Investigation151 all bearing his picture and indicating the name
"Datukan Malang Salibo." None of these government-issued documents
showed that petitioner Salibo used the alias "Butukan S. Malang."
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the
country on November 23, 2009 when the Maguindanao Massacre
occurred.
A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner
Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009 and arrived in the
Philippines only on December 20, 2009. A Certification153 from Saudi
Arabian Airlines attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia
on board Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and
that he arrived in the Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870
on December 20, 2009.cralawlawlibrary
V
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably
the most complex case pending in our courts. The case involves 57
victims154 and 197 accused, two (2) of which have become state
155
arraigned, and 70 have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have already
been resolved.156 To require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be
to further illegally deprive him of his liberty. Urgency dictates that we
resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that he is not
Butukan S. Malang.
In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his
guilt nor his innocence. However, between a citizen who has shown that
he was illegally deprived of his liberty without due process of law and
the government that has all the "manpower and the resources at [its]
command"157 to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule
in favor of the citizen.
Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must
pursue the proper remedies against him as provided in our Rules. Until
then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. His
Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.cralawred
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated April 19, 2011 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, is
ORDERED to immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang Salibo
from detention.
The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to
this court is hereby NOTED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Eleosida vs. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, 382 SCRA 22, May 09,
2002
G.R. No. 130277. May 9, 2002.*
MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor
child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON,
respondents.
Civil Law; Civil Registry; Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena
corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the Borbon as respondents.3
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.—Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in
nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical,
then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects
the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our
ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that even substantial errors
in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under
Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s
case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.
Same; Same; Substantial changes are now allowed under Rule 108 in
accordance with the ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the
appropriate procedural requirements are complied with.—It is true in the
case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not
merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would
affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon,
as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such
nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our
ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural
requirements are complied with. Eleosida vs. Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City, 382 SCRA 22, G.R. No. 130277 May 9, 2002
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 130277 May 9, 2002
MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor
child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner,
vs.
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA
BORBON, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89, which dismissed motu proprio the
petition of Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to correct some entries in the birth
certificate of her son, Charles Christian. The birth certificate shows,
among others, that the child's full name is Charles Christian Eleosida
Borbon. He was born on May 24, 1992 to Ma. Lourdes Barrientos
Eleosida and Carlos Villena Borbon. The birth certificate also indicates
that the child's parents were married on January 10, 1985 in Batangas
City.2
On January 30, 1997, petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking to correct the
following entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian:
first, the surname "Borbon" should be changed to "Eleosida;" second,
the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the
informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma.
Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged that
she gave birth to her son out of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and
the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child
is therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother's surname. The
On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of hearing stating:
"Verified petition having been filed by petitioner Ma. Lourdes
Barrientos Eleosida, praying that the entries in the Certificate
of Live Birth of her minor child, Charles Christian Eleosida
Borbon, be changed and/or corrected, such that, his last name
BORBON be deleted and instead place therein the name
ELEOSIDA, which is the surname of his mother-petitioner; the
entry "January 10, 1985 – Batangas City", be likewise deleted,
since the petitioner and respondent Carlos Villena Borbon, at
the time of the minor's birth were not legally married; and the
surname BORBON of petitioner Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon under
the column Informant, be also deleted;
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that this petition is set for hearing
on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning, in the Session
Hall of this Court sitting at the Ground Floor, Room 118, Hall of
Justice, Quezon City, which is ordered published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general
circulation and published in Metro Manila, to be selected by
raffle, at the expense of the petitioner, at which date, time
and place, the petitioner shall appear and prove her petition,
in that all other persons having or claiming any interest
thereon shall also appear and show cause why, if any, they
have, the petition shall not be granted.1âwphi1.nêt
Let copies of this notice be furnished the petitioner, and
together with copies of the petition, respondent Carlos Villena
Borbon; the Offices of the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
and the Solicitor General, who are given fifteen (15) days from
notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, within which to file their opposition thereto, if
any. In the event that the Solicitor General may not be able to
appear on the scheduled hearing, to designate the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear for and in behalf of the
State.
SO ORDERED."4
On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued another order setting the date
for the presentation of evidence on July 23, 1997. It stated:
"Considering that there is no opposition filed despite notice to
the Solicitor General as contained in the notice of hearing
dated April 23, 1997 requiring that office to file their
opposition, if any, to the petition for correction of entries in provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the
the birth certificate of minor child Charles Christian Eleosida, civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or
the petitioner will be allowed to present compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements and at the same time initially
present evidence on July 23, 1997, at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning."5
On August 25, 1997, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition
for lack of merit. It ruled:
"It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS
OF A HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled
name, occupation of the parents, etc., may be the subject of a
judicial order (contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil
Code), authorizing changes or corrections and: NOT as may
affect the CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE
PERSONS INVOLVED.
In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by
the petitioner will ultimately affect the CIVIL STATUS OF
CHARLES CHRISTIAN, as she wants the Court to Direct the Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to substitute her maiden name,
ELEOSIDA, with that of BORBON; to delete the information
supplied in ITEM 12, respecting the date and place of marriage
of parents, on the ground that she was never married to
respondent CARLOS VILLENA BORBON and amend the
information in ITEM 14, respecting the name of the informant,
from MA. LOURDES E. BORBON to MA. LOURDES B. ELEOSIDA,
and is indicative of petitioner's intention and device to
establish that CHARLES CHRISTIAN's civil status as
ILLEGITIMATE.
With the petition's ultimate purpose on the part of petitioner
to secure judicial order, which would authorize a change in the
civil status of CHARLES CHRISTIAN, this Court, finds the action
improper. The matters desired to be cancelled and/or changed
by petitioner cannot be considered falling under the ambit of
the words 'clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.'
WHEREFORE, for LACK OF MERIT, the petition is now MOTU
PROPIO (sic) dismissed."6
Petitioner fled the instant petition for review raising the issue of
whether corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to
Article 412 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are substantial and
not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.7
The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in Lieu of
Comment. The OSG submitted that even substantial errors in the civil
registry may be corrected provided that the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. Thus it
argued that even if the petition seeks the correction and eventual
change in the civil status of Charles Christian, the same can be ordered
by the court as long as all the parties who may be affected by the entries
are notified and represented.8 Respondent Carlos Borbon, on the other
hand, failed to submit his comment on the petition despite several
notices from this Court. Hence, on January 24, 2001, the Court
dispensed with the filing of respondent Borbon's comment and gave due
course to the petition.9
We find merit in the petition. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil
register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it
is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.10
This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia11 where we held that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. The Court
further laid down the procedural requirements to make the proceedings
under Rule 108 adversary, thus:
"The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.1âwphi1.nêt
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of
the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once in a week for three 93)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any
person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within fifteen (15) days from notice, file his
opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding
concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register are—(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby.
Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the
court to—(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the
hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to
be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The
following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition:--(1) the
civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a
petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the
 record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as
'summary'. xxx"12

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by

petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones
as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and
Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian.
Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the
appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. The records
show that upon receipt of the petition, the trial court issued a notice of
hearing setting the hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning at
Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise ordered
the publication of said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation and its posting in selected
places in Metro Manila. The notice stated that the petitioner shall prove
her petition during said hearing and all other persons having or claiming
any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is any reason
why the petition should not be granted. Respondents Carlos Villena
Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor General
were all furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing together with a
copy of the petition. On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued a second
order giving the petitioner an opportunity to show compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements and to present evidence during the hearing
set on July 23, 1997. The foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule
108 to make it an adversary proceeding. It was therefore an error for the
trial court to dismiss the petition motu proprio without allowing the
petitioner to present evidence to support her petition and all the other
persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the
same.1âwphi1.nêt

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated

August 25, 1997 of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 89, subject of the
petition at bar is set aside. The case is REMANDED to the court a quo for
further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x x What is meant by “appropriate
adversary proceeding?” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary
proceeding[”] as follows: One having opposing parties; contested, as
distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking
relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter
an opportunity to contest it. x x x Republic vs. Kho, 526 SCRA 177, G.R.
No. 170340 June 29, 2007

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 9048; The enactment
in March 2001 of R.A. No. 9048 has been considered to lend legislative
Republic vs. Kho 526 SCRA 177 , June 29, 2007 affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the
civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected
through the filing of a petition under Rule 108—the obvious effect of
G.R. No. 170340. June 29, 2007.* Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction
of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of
KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial
DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and KELLY DOGMOC KHO (Minor), respondents. proceedings.—The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048,
otherwise known as “AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL
Civil Registry; Correction of Entries; Names; Citizenship; Marital Status; CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
Substantial and controversial amendments in entries in the Civil Registry TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME
can only be granted in an adversary proceeding.—It can not be gainsaid OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF JUDICIAL
that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of Carlito’s ORDER,” has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial
mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the “married” precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons
status of Carlito’s parents in his and his siblings’ respective birth recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a
certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel petition under Rule 108. Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito, 425
involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and SCRA 488 (2004), observed that the obvious effect of Republic Act No.
innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or
controversial amendments. For the change involving the nationality of typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the
Carlito’s mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a grave and civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in
important matter that has a bear-ing and effect on the citizenship and the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring. Further, the
deletion of the entry that Carlito’s and his siblings’ parents were Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Publication of the order of
“married” alters their filiation from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” with hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cures the failure to implead an
significant implications on their successional and other rights. Clearly, the indispensable party.—What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to
changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding. Labayo- implead Marivel and Carlito’s parents rendered the trial short of the
Rowe v. Republic, 168 SCRA 294 (1988), explains the raison d’être: x x x. required adversary proceeding and the trial court’s judgment void. A
The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals, 420 SCRA 162
making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be (2004). That case stemmed from a petition for correction of entries in the
prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. If the entries in the birth certificate of a minor, June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name
civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary of her real father (Armando Gustilo) and to correspondingly change her
proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who surname. The petition was granted by the trial court. Barco, whose minor
may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo, however, sought to annul
fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which the trial court’s decision, claiming that she should have been made a party
might be detrimental and far reaching. to the petition for correction. Failure to implead her deprived the RTC of
jurisdiction, she contended. In dismissing Barco’s petition, this Court held
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Even substantial that the publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108
errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under cured the failure to implead an indispensable party.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; “Adversary proceeding” has been defined
as one having opposing parties, contested, as distinguished from an ex Same; Same; Same; The cancellation or correction of entries involving
parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal changes of name falls under letter “o” of Section 2 of Rule 108; Even if the
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for
contest it.—In Republic v. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462 (1986), however, this change of name) were not complied with, observance of the provisions of
Court ruled, and has since repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.—With respect to the
in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108. correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name from “Carlito John” to
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the “Carlito,” the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction
involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as of entries involving changes of name falls under letter “o” of the following
well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding provision of Section 2 of Rule 108: Section 2. Entries subject to
summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be cancellation or correction.—Upon good and valid grounds, the following
enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments of annulment of
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. (Emphasis and italics
supplied) Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which
governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with,
observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction
sought for.
Same; Same; Same; The correction of the name of the wife of one of the
petitioners, from “Maribel” to “Marivel,” is appropriate, the mistake
being clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes,
but is also obvious to the understanding considering that the name
reflected in the marriage certificate is “Marivel.”—Outside the ambit of
substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the name of
Carlito’s wife from “Maribel” to “Marivel.” The mistake is clearly clerical
or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious
to the understanding considering that the name reflected in the marriage
certificate of Carlito and his wife is “Marivel.” Apropos is Yu v. Republic,
21 SCRA 1018 (1967), which held that changing the appellant’s Christian
name of “Sincio” to “Sencio” amounts merely to the righting of a clerical
error. The change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to
Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous alteration, which
can be granted through a summary proceeding. The same ruling holds
true with respect to the correction in Carlito’s marriage certificate of his
father’s name from “John Kho” to “Juan Kho.” Except in said marriage
certificate, the name “Juan Kho” was uniformly entered in the birth
certificates of Carlito and of his siblings. Republic vs. Kho, 526 SCRA 177,
G.R. No. 170340 June 29, 2007
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170340 June 29, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY
MOIRA KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and KELLY
DOGMOC KHO (Minor), respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the October 27, 2005
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78124 which
affirmed the September 4, 2002 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 5 granting the prayer of respondents Carlito
I. Kho (Carlito), Michael Kho, Mercy Nona Kho-Fortun, and Heddy Moira
Kho-Serrano for the correction of entries in their birth certificates as
well as those of Carlito’s minor children Kevin and Kelly Dogmoc Kho.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and
Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for
correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes
in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf
of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some
entries in their birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate
of the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well
as the deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of
marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco
(Epifania), were allegedly not legally married.
The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from
their respective birth certificates was made by Carlito’s siblings Michael,
Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that
the date of his and his wife’s marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989
to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition3 in which it
was additionally prayed that Carlito’s second name of "John" be deleted
from his record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlito’s
father in his (Carlito’s) marriage certificate be corrected from "John Kho"
to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks4 in
Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation,
after which it was set for hearing on August 9, 2001.
In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city civil
registrar5 stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed
corrections in the birth records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed
no objections to the other amendments.
On the scheduled hearing of the petition on August 9, 2001, only the
counsel for respondents appeared as the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) had yet to enter its appearance for the city civil registrar. The trial
court thus reset the hearing to October 9, 2001.6 On September 14,
2001,7 the OSG entered its appearance with an authorization to the city
prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the case and render assistance to
it (the OSG).
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence
showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition.
They also presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies
of Carlito and his mother, Epifania. During the same hearing, an
additional correction in the birth certificates of Carlito’s children was
requested to the effect that the first name of their mother be rectified
from "Maribel" to "Marivel."
By Decision8 of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil
registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of birth of
Carlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from
"Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John" from his name; and (3) delete
the word "married" opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The
last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth
certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth
certificates of the minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of
marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc (Marivel) as January 21, 2000,
instead of April 27, 1989, and the name "Maribel" as "Marivel."
With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the
corrections ordered pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlito’s
father from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and the latter’s citizenship from
"Filipino" to "Chinese."
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the
CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of
entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to
implead the minors’ mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to
offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the
questioned "married" status of Carlito and his siblings’ parents, and the
latter’s citizenship.
Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the
name "Carlito John Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for non-compliance with
jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court.
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioner’s
appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic12 explains the raison d etre:
the proper procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry, was observed in the case.
Regarding Carlito’s minor children Kevin and Kelly, the appellate court
held that the correction of their mother’s first name from "Maribel" to
"Marivel" was made to rectify an innocuous error.
As for the change in the date of the marriage of Carlito and Marivel,
albeit the CA conceded that it is a substantial alteration, it held that the of which might be detrimental and far reaching. x x x (Emphasis
date would not affect the minors’ filiation from "legitimate" to
"illegitimate" considering that at the time of their respective births in
1991 and 1993, their father Carlito’s first marriage was still subsisting as
it had been annulled only in 1999.
In light of Carlito’s legal impediment to marry Marivel at the time they
were born, their children Kevin and Kelly were illegitimate. It followed,
the CA went on to state, that Marivel was not an indispensable party to
the case, the minors having been represented by their father as required
under Section 5 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the
requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, he had complied
nonetheless with the jurisdictional requirements for correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
petition for correction of entry in Carlito’s birth record, it noted, falls
under letter "o" of the enumeration under Section 2 of Rule 108.
In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes
sought by respondents were substantial in nature, they could only be
granted through an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable
parties, such as Marivel and respondents’ parents, should have been
notified or impleaded.
Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to
change Carlito’s name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
were not satisfied because the Amended Petition failed to allege
Carlito’s prior three-year bona fide residence in Butuan City, and that
the title of the petition did not state Carlito’s aliases and his true name
as "Carlito John I. Kho." Petitioner concludes that the same jurisdictional
defects attached to the change of name of Carlito’s father.
The petition fails.
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the
citizenship of Carlito’s mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and
delete the "married" status of Carlito’s parents in his and his siblings’
respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of
Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature.10 Rather, the changes entail substantial
and controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlito’s mother as reflected
in his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing
and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but
also of the offspring.11
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito’s and his siblings’ parents
were "married" alters their filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate,"
with significant implications on their successional and other rights.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary
x x x. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the
books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. If the
entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all
parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented,
the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence
supplied)
In Republic v. Valencia,13 however, this Court ruled, and has since
repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108.14
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for
the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but
one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial
as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in
law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
xxxx
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black’s Law
Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding["] as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex
parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. x x x 15 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise
known as "An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the
Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry
and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without
Need of Judicial Order," has been considered to lend legislative
affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the
civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected
through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.16
Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito17 observed that the obvious
effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative
correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or
nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate
adversarial proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed,
the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial
18
corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied. The pertinent
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court read:
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
There is no dispute that the trial court’s Order19 setting the petition for
hearing and directing any person or entity having interest in the petition
to oppose it was posted20 as well as published for the required period;
that notices of hearings were duly served on the Solicitor General, the
city prosecutor of Butuan and the local civil registrar; and that trial was
conducted on January 31, 2002 during which the public prosecutor,
acting in behalf of the OSG, actively participated by cross-examining
Carlito and Epifania.
What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel and
Carlito’s parents rendered the trial short of the required adversary
proceeding and the trial court’s judgment void.
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals.21 That case
stemmed from a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate
of a minor, June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real
father (Armando Gustilo) and to correspondingly change her surname.
The petition was granted by the trial court.
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo,
however, sought to annul the trial court’s decision, claiming that she
should have been made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to
implead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she contended.
In dismissing Barco’s petition, this Court held that the publication of the
order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to
implead an indispensable party.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in
the civil registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate
adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, which states:
Section 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
xxxx
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule
108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any
judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would
affect her ward’s share in the estate of her father. x x x.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance
with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world
to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision
would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under
Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x
xxxx
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a
thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not
only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the
whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings
in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.22
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether
Marivel or respondents’ parents should have been impleaded as parties
to the proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention, however, that during
the hearing on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as
representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the non-
inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s parents as parties to the proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of
the proceedings to correct the entries in her children’s birth certificates,
especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court eHe
were all sent to the residence23 she shared with Carlito and the children.
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition
to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth
about the facts recorded therein.24
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their
certificate of marriage25 shows that indeed they were married on
January 21, 2000, not on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito
declared that the date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his helper,
adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons were
born because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999.26 Given
the evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the
minors were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring
about no change at all in the nature of their filiation.
correction in Carlito’s birth record of his mother’s citizenship would
perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings
who are unquestionably born of the same mother and father.
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction
of the name of Carlito’s wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel." The mistake is
clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but
is also obvious to the understanding34 considering that the name
reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is "Marivel."

With respect to Carlito’s mother, it bears noting that she declared at the
witness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959.27
Again, that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlito’s and
his siblings’ birth certificates of the entry "Married" opposite the date of
marriage of their parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued
on November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene
van Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had been living together as
common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted marriage
legally.28
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended
to respondents’ Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record
of marriage between Juan Kho and Epifania.29 Under the circumstances,
the deletion of the word "Married" opposite the "date of marriage of
parents" is warranted.
Apropos is Yu v. Republic35 which held that changing the appellant’s
Christian name of "Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the righting of
a clerical error. The change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu
to Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous alteration,
which can be granted through a summary proceeding.36 The same ruling
holds true with respect to the correction in Carlito’s marriage certificate
of his father’s name from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho." Except in said
marriage certificate, the name "Juan Kho" was uniformly entered in the
birth certificates of Carlito and of his siblings.37
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name

from "Carlito John" to "Carlito," the same was properly granted under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the
cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name falls
under letter "o" of the following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108:30

Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good

and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separation; (e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs

petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of
the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.

More importantly, Carlito’s official transcript of record from the Urious

College in Butuan City,31 certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service
Commission,32 and voter registration record33 satisfactorily show that he
has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to
arise from the dropping of the second name.

The correction of the mother’s citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as

appearing in Carlito’s birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact
that during the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he
did not deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the
correction prayed for, which certainly was not respondents’ fault, does
not in any way change the adversarial nature of the proceedings.

Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlito’s siblings

uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino." To disallow the
 the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, 454 SCRA 155, G.R. No.
159966 March 30, 2005.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR

CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN
CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be
amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly
represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, Petitioners,
In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of vs.
Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang 454 CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO, Respondents.
SCRA 155 , March 30, 2005 DECISION
TINGA, J.:
G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005.*
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN Revelation 3:5
CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be
amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor,
represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY
represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19
CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO,
September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of
respondent.
entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought
to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from
Civil Registry; Change of Name; Before a person can be authorized to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry,
he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB
which may justify such change.—The Court has had occasion to express
and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals
and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a
privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to The RTC established the following facts:
change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry,
he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to
which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet
married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on
Same; Same; Grounds Held Valid for a Change of Name.— Among the September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their son
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or Lin Carulasan Wang….
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, long time because they will let him study there together with his sister
and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore…. Since in
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes carried in a person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name will be discriminated against because of his current registered name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking
public interest. whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames.
Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do
Same; Same; It is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for
judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of major-ity.—In these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to
1
addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation be changed to Julian Lin Wang.
on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter
of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.2 The
reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in
understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and the petition—that is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against
granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under when studies in Singapore because of his middle name—did not fall
our laws. In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the
change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State
has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit
the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and
the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken
from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court
added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could
then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle
name.3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was
denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004.4 The trial court maintained
that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not
justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who
intends to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be
tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of
Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the change
of name would not prejudice public interest or would not be for a
fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if the reason
for the change of name is itself not reasonable.5
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45)6
arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance not
theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping
the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 1747 of the Family
Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith globalization and mixed
marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of
dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for
consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the
"best interest of the child."8 It is argued that convenience of the child is a
valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the
State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name "Carulasan"
will cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or
pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and
integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges that it
is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for change of name
until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to
use, contrary to previous cases9 decided by this Court that allowed a
minor to petition for change of name.10
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment
on the petition. The OSG filed its Comment11 positing that the trial court
correctly denied the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that
under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right
to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot
be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the
OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name
"Carulasan" is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience
is not sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or
cancellation of entry.12 The OSG also adds that the petitioner has not
shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the
dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioner’s allegation that
the continued use of the middle name may result in confusion and
difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its
argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the child’s
middle name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true
parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister named
Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both use the surname of
their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to
drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of such
middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law.13
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so
that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him
either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.14
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper
and reasonable cause’ for which the change is sought.15 To justify a
request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper
or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name
which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is
no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.16
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court.
The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all
the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of
allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of
the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support
thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and
with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in
the courts.17
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it
does not simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and
adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether.
Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name
usually deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a
handful of cases involving requests for change of the given name18 and
none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the
law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We
have to answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a person’s name is relevant at
this point. We quote, thus:
…For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is
best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a
person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or
appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used
merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are
descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential
thing and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a
variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or
proper name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper
name is that which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from
parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for should be granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child.
the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. The Court took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor
petitioner to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, she continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court
intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of
is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as doing so he
is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other
changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside people.
the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by
act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.19 Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,25 in arguing that although Article 174 of
the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does of the father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child
not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance. could use only one family name, even the family name of the mother. In
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno
person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria
same given name and surname as he has. Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local
Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since
childhood, in her school records and in her voter’s registration). The trial
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
court denied her petition but this Court overturned the denial, ruling that
children shall principally use the surname of the father.20 The Family
while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child,
Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the
21
should principally use the surname of her father, there is no legal
father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname
obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of herm other to which
of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which
she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample
case they may bear the father’s surname.22
justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized

by the father bears only a given name and his mother’s surname, and
does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate
child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child
is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten
instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name
and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such
individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate.
The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized
illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name,
and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his
middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and
integrate himself into Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v.
Republic23 and Calderon v. Republic,24 which, however, are not apropos
both.
Weighing petitioner’s reason of convenience for the change of his name
against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention
would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could
not warrant favorable action on his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are
not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly
distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners
were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name.
Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and
judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their
surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the
grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the
presence of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in
Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that
time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the
fact of therein petitioner’s election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the
Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since
childhood by a name different from her registered name and she had not
used her registered name in her school records and voter’s registration
records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion.

In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino
mother, Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita,
sought to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina
Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the following
considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; her other siblings who had also elected Philippine
citizenship have been using their mother’s surname; she was
embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still being ill feeling
against the Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no
showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose
or that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado,
an illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the
petition in her behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, name.
taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mother’s
husband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name
filed by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites
this case to buttress his argument that he does not have to reach the age
of majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest in
Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of name,
gave paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor
petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the
dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of
name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his
middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous
foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best
that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority.26 As he is of tender age,
he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his
name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his
rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur.
Braza vs. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, 607
SCRA 638, December 04, 2009
G.R. No. 181174. December 4, 2009.*
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN
T. BRAZA, petitioners, vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN
CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA,
represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR,
respondents.
Civil Registry; Correction of Entry; In a special proceeding for correction
of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages
and rule on legitimacy and filiation.—In a special proceeding for
correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court vis-à-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The
proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake
in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name
that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded
and due process is properly observed.
Same; Same; Marriages; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Filiation;
Jurisdiction; Doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through collateral attack; An action seeking the
declaration of marriage as void for being bigamous and one impugning a
child’s legitimacy are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively, and the petition
should be filed in a Family Court.—The allegations of the petition filed
before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous
and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the
court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test. Petitioners insist,
however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s
birth records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental
thereto. Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is
actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void
for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of
action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code,
respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as
expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally,
validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a
quo. Braza vs. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,
607 SCRA 638, G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE
ANN T. BRAZA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by
LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr.
(Pablo), also known as "Pablito Sicad Braza," were married1 on January
4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef2 and
Janelle Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian
Carlo4 on June 4, 1980.
Pablo died5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West
Java, Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the
Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-
respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's
son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she
obtained Patrick's birth certificate6 from the Local Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:
Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL
TITULAR
Date of Birth : 01 January 1996
Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular
Father : Pablito S. Braza
Date Received at the January 13, 1997
Local Civil Registrar :

Annotation : "Late Registration"
Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father
Pablito Braza on January 13,
1997"
Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of
subsequent marriage of parents
on April 22, 1998 at Manila.
Henceforth, the child shall be
known as Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy7 of a marriage contract showing
that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and
her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial
Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition8 to correct the
entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the
supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being
bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly
Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries provided in said Code.1avvphi1
in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the
father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2)
a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians
of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his
paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the
legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this
purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as
bigamous.
On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by
Order9 of September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice,
it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court,
which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no
jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo,
impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a
DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary
adversarial action.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order10
of November 29, 2007, they filed the present petition for review.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of
marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct
entries in the civil registrar. Citing Cariño v. Cariño,11 Lee v. Court of
Appeals12 and Republic v. Kho,13 they contend that even substantial
errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be
the subject of a petition under Rule 108.14
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under
Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry),
the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code15
charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be
cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may
generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a
clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless
change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a
misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings,
in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly
observed.16
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show
that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille
on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in
connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the
correction of Patrick’s birth records17 and that the rest of the prayers are
merely incidental thereto.
Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek
the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being
bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are
governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect
on March 15, 2003, and Art. 17118 of the Family Code, respectively,
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack
such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife against the first
wife for the return of one-half of the death benefits received by the first
after the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted
marriage with the husband while the latter’s marriage to the first wife
was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two marriages,
it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the
death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention
that the petitions filed by the therein petitioners before the lower courts
were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that
the petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in
their records of birth but to establish that they are not the latter’s
children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood
relation at all between
the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the
cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners’ mother
and the substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is their biological
mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed
as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the
correction of the entries in their respective birth records to reflect that
they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino," not
Chinese, because their parents were never legally married. Again,
considering that the changes sought to be made were substantial and
not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule
108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower court’s grant of the
petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different
from those obtaining in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, October 19, 2007
G.R. No. 174689. October 19, 2007.*
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Change of Name; The State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification; A change of name
is a privilege, not a right.—The State has an interest in the names borne
by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of
name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides: ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
Same; Clerical Error Law (RA 9048); Administrative Law; Jurisdictions; RA
9048 now governs the change of first name, and vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned; The intent and
effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied—in sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature,
not judicial.—RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the
power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to
the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under
the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name
is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers.
The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until
and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed
and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature,
not judicial.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Sex Change; A change of name does not alter
one’s legal capacity or civil status—RA 9048 does not sanction a change
of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.— Petitioner’s basis in
praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name
does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his
given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that
he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Same; Same; A petition in the trial court in so far as it prays for change
of first name is not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the
petition should be filed with the local civil registrar concerned, namely,
where the birth certificate is kept.—The petition in the trial court in so
far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within
that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed
with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally
done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in
the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly,
it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name
was concerned.
Same; Same; Sex Change; No law allows the change of entry in the birth
certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment; Under RA 9048,
a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error—it is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.—Section 2(c) of
RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is: SECTION 2.
Definition of Terms. this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x x x x
x x x x (3) “Clerical or typographical error” refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the
like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and
can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record
or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied) Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction; No
reasonable interpretation of Art. 407 of the Civil Code can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment; To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute.”—The acts, events or factual errors contemplated
under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment. To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute.” The birth certificate of petitioner contained no
error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary. female” or “the distinction between male and female.” Female is “the
sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the sex that has
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Status” refers to the circumstances affecting organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words
the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) “male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not include persons
of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.— who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, “words that are
“Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are
the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels
age, nationality and his family membership. The status of a person in law to the contrary.” Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law
includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be
in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being argued that the term “sex” as used then is something alterable through
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and transsexual to be included in the category “female.” For these reasons,
end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
(emphasis supplied) reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person’s sex is an essential factor in
marriage and family relations—it is a part of a person’s legal capacity Same; Same; Same; Marriage; To grant the changes in name and sex
and civil status; There is no such special law in the Philippines governing sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
sex reassignment and its effects.—A person’s sex is an essential factor in laws on marriage and family relations—it will allow the union of a man
marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-
civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: female post-operative transsexual).—The changes sought by petitioner
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.
shall be governed by special laws. But there is no such special law in the First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but
Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé.
petitioner’s cause. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One
of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Register Law (Act 3753); Under the Civil
who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by
Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
existed at the time of birth—thus, the sex of a person is determined at
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
examining the genitals of the infant; Considering that there is no law
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code
immutable.—Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a
and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131
historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus,
of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public
the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; Article 9
of the Civil Code which mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline
to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; When words
the law” is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation; In our
are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and
system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so,
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent; The
to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and
effects of sex reassignment.—It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code
laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should
mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it
being no legislative intent to the contrary; Sex is defined as “the sum of
is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. In our
female” or “the distinction between male and female”; The words
system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so,
“male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not include persons
to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
who have undergone sex reassignment; While a person may have
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
statutebased.
the civil registry for that reason.— When words are not defined in a
statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the
absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” and Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the legislature intends to confer on a
“female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his
registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment
the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as “the sum of of that privilege; The Supreme Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists.—To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for
change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil
registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what
proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with
his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines
in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. It might be
theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person
may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this
Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything
else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply
or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court recognizes that there are people
whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal, but the remedies involve questions of public
policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.—
Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of
happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams.” No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not
by the courts.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created
them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard
voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind!
Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice.
All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human
beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the
man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The
Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular,
does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel,
drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth
certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed
a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as
SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as
respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila
to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April
4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in
his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically
male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman"
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr.
Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the
People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr.
Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of
petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to
the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition
would be more in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who
has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now
possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to
be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should
not be in any way taken against him.
 Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or]
prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in
granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition
would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the
petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or
ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and
publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not
seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change
the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto"
to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in
favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal
basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the
certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name
decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-
105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence,9
this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his
birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code,
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for
change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a
female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We
disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a
right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law).
In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16
form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature,
not judicial.
may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. –
The petition for change of first name or nickname may be
allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the
sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA
9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in
the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change
of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction
as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper
remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the
proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his
birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use
of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these
reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in
so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex
On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended
by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error"
is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a
mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled
place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes
or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of
nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of
sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 25 However, no
reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that
it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from" while to change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex,
were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal
separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name).
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that
touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their
effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article
407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly
or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is,
the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his
age, nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status… include such matters as the
beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights
in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as
birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce,
and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is
a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection,
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of
civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The
declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the
 birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his
the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a
birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil
registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify
to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother
alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of
the facts as they existed at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person
is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment,
the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their
common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative
intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other
laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary
usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction
between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or
bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female"
in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone
sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36
Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the
early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term
"sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something
that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included
in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no
law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance
with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the
petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is
wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging
legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself
eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the
most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the
legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations.
It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone
sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such
as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain
felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of
41
among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition
were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or
court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for
courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply
or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to
do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of
the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines
becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted
are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of
first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry,
where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof
must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with
his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines
in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on
when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his
sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that
matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal
branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of
happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not
by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
 Same; Same; Intersexuality; Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH); Words
and Phrases; During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term
“intersexuality” to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as
either male or female—an organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes.—Respondent
undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or “inappropriate”
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this
condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn
who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen
clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia
often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of
the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian
tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such
as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at
puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH. CAH is
one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. During the
twentieth century, medicine adopted the term “intersexuality” to apply
to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. The
term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality “is
the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008.*
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with
intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, sexes.”
respondent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The current state of Philippine statutes
Civil Registry; Correction of Entries in Birth Certificates; Clerical Error Law apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a
(R.A. No. 9048); R.A. No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature
Rules of Court the correction of such errors—Rule 108 now applies only itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.—Intersex
to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.—The individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most
determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a
issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article male or female gender role. Since the rise of modern medical science in
412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external
be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together with Article genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either
376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. male or female genitals. More commonly, an intersex individual is
9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The considered as suffering from a “disorder” which is almost always
correction or change of such matters can now be made through recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible
effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules into the category of either male or female. In deciding this case, we
of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
“It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the
Same; Same; The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in nor truly ‘female.’” The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code; The acts, events or factual errors compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but
contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
occur after birth.—Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the person is biologically or naturally
108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts, events thinks of his/her sex; Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive—it is at maturity that
recorded in the civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.—Biologically, nature
the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically
(5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. The male. Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically
acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classifica tion
Code include even those that occur after birth. would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks
of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of
male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for G.R. No. 166676
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex
persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at Present:
maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
Same; Same; Same; Same; To the person with Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness Carpio Morales,
and of health, and to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and Tinga,
maturation.—In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not
dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s VELASCO, JR., and
sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to
undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The BRION, JJ.
Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to
undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will Promulgated:
the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication
in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows September 12, 2008
this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial DECISION
choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that QUISUMBING, J.:
respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show
that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated
valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan,
being a male. Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following
changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name
Same; Same; Names; There is merit in the change of name of a person
"Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender
with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) where the same is the
from "female" to "male."
consequence of the recognition of his preferred gender.—As for
respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a
The facts are as follows.
change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition
will follow. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from
for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of
Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Siniloan, Laguna.
Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while
certificate from female to male.
growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE – FULL TEXT characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound
G.R. No. xgrno September xdate, 2008 where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests
xcite revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped
growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then
Republic of the Philippines alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
SUPREME COURT emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
Manila certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to
male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
SECOND DIVISION
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff
of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized
Petitioner, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

- versus - To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of
Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical
certificate stating that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He
Respondent. explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and
she has two sex organs – female and male. He testified that this condition
is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because of
lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further
testified that respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the
change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to
her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous
to her.
is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide
resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3)
years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule
103 of the Rules of Court.6 The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow
change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.7

The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12, On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil
2005 which reads: Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition
for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December
entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth
petition. It was medically proven that petitioner’s body produces male certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,9 change of
hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially
a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
acknowledged and identified as a male. Court.11

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate
of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees: Rule 103

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CHANGE OF NAME

CAGANDAHAN; and
Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall present
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE. the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides,
[or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry,
baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name shall be
conform with the foregoing corrected data. signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some
other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
SO ORDERED.[3]
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of
reversal of the abovementioned ruling. such filing;

The issues raised by petitioner are: (b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING (c) The name asked for.
THAT:
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
I. substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition,
shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week
HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND, for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation
published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for
II. the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor
within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF
"SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT’S Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the hearing and
MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city
NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."4 fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the
correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her
sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while
the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court, respondent’s petition before the court a quo did not implead
the local civil registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondent’s petition
Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date
fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed and that
the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and
reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner,
adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the
petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in
connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the
municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall
forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108 speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We
agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.

IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection,
Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional a judicial order.
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss in entries in the civil register.18
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination
of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
name. change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any Rules of Court.19
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court and 408 of the Civil Code:
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
(7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children;
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
pending such proceedings. Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.20

Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or
issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either
case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil
registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because
respondent’s petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3,
Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a
party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is
an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case
can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly
notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much
too short of the requirements of the rules.13 The corresponding petition
should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other
persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be
affected thereby.14 Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1
of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules
liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just,
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
"inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like
respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually
has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an
ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal
internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries,
uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start
to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with
CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During
the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to
apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or
female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia,
intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species
whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics
are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism
with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female
sexes."
 of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to
science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court
either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal
individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost judgment of being a male.
always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking
lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature;
into the category of either male or female. and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other
words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We
of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and
subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is some thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in
middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals this case.
who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’."[25] The current state of
Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held
as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences
classification. that will follow.[28] The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of
name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change
is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in
determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform with the
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

subject’s birth certificate entry is in order. WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically
male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, SO ORDERED.
respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia
and the phenotypic features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or

naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks
of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of
male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex
persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent
could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female
but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due
course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male
characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the
Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in
order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows
this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit

G.R. No. 198010. August 12, 2013.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY
UY, respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry; Adversarial Proceedings; Even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.―It has been settled in a number of cases starting with
Republic v. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462 (1986), that even substantial errors in
a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided
the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. The pronouncement of the Court in that case is
illuminating: It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition
is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably
substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted
in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in
law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves
of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x What is meant by
“appropriate adversary proceeding?” Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“adversary proceeding” as follows: One having opposing parties;
contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption
proceeding.
Same; Civil Procedure; Notice of Hearing; The fact that the notice of
hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken.―Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full
name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy
Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the
correction of her first name and surname, her status from “legitimate” to
“illegitimate” and her citizenship from “Chinese” to “Filipino.” Thus,
respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil
Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have
interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent
wanted to make. The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a
newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the
State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules
mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given
to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons
who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not
for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with
the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. While
there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and
notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication
of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in
bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such failure was likewise
excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections
proceedings; when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the
existence of the interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left
out.
Same; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry;
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those
on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is mandated.―When a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with
the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the
entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all
parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented,
the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence
of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
vs.
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals (CA)1 Decision2 dated February
18, 2011 and Resolution3 dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-
MIN. The assailed decision dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines and, consequently, affirmed in toto the June
28, 2004 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Gingoog
City in Special Proceedings No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for
Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr.
Norma S. Lugsanay Uy; while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in
her Certificate of Live Birth.5 Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on February 8,
1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay6 Her
Certificate of Live Birth7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in
fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S.
Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate,8 and
passport9 bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she
is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married,
so she had to follow the surname of her mother.10 She also contended
that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the
surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.11
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries
with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the
corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly
granted.12 However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not
bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order13 finding the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance and setting the case for hearing, with
the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at
least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of
respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office for their
information and guidance.14 Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent
complied with the publication requirement.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GINGOOG CITY, or any person
acting in his behalf is directed and ordered to effect the correction or
change of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner’s name
and citizenship so that the entries would be:
a) As to petitioner’s name :
First Name : NORMA
Middle Name : SY
Last Name : LUGSANAY
b) As to petitioner’s nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC concluded that respondent’s petition would neither prejudice
the government nor any third party. It also held that the names "Norma
Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person,
especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the
correction. Considering that respondent has continuously used and has
been known since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino
citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion.16
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA
held that respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties
was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing
in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks
and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG
and the City Prosecutor’s Office.17 As to whether the petition is a
collateral attack on respondent’s filiation, the CA ruled in favor of
respondent, considering that her parents were not legally married and
that her siblings’ birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is
Lugsanay and their citizenship is Filipino.18 Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is
dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and
valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled
or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations;
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination
of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceeding is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also
grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the
parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition
or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In
either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the
civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. 19
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth
certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname and
citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name
which she has been known for since childhood, including her legal
documents such as passport and school and professional records. She
likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear
the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino"
instead of "Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously not mere
clerical as they touch on respondent’s filiation and citizenship. In
changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to
"Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes
her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship
from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in
this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v.
Valencia20 that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. 21
The pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for
the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but
one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial
as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in
law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black’s Law
Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex
parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.22
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court’s conclusion in surname from "Magpayo" to "Coseteng"; deleting the entry "Coseteng"
Republic v. Kho,23 Alba v. Court of Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of
Appeals,25 that the failure to implead indispensable parties was cured by in the space for his father. The Republic of the Philippines, through the
the publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of
26
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v. Kho, petitioner therein
appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for correction of entries civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected
despite respondents’ failure to implead the minor’s mother as an
indispensable party. The Court, however, did not strictly apply the
provisions of Rule 108, because it opined that it was highly improbable
that the mother was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries
in her children’s birth certificates especially since the notices, orders and of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, assuming that he filed a
decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the petition
them.27
28
In Alba v. Court of Appeals, the Court found nothing wrong with the
trial court’s decision granting the petition for correction of entries filed
by respondent although the proceedings was not actually known by
petitioner. In that case, petitioner’s mother and guardian was impleaded and annulment of the birth certificate of respondent on the ground that
in the petition for correction of entries, and notices were sent to her
address appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the notice
was returned unserved, because apparently she no longer lived there.
Thus, when she allegedly learned of the granting of the petition, she
sought the annulment of judgment which the Court denied. Considering
that the petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in rem, the
Court held that acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner is, therefore, not required and the absence of personal
service was cured by the trial court’s compliance with Rule 108 which
requires notice by publication.29
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court addressed the question of
whether the court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and all other
indispensable parties to the petition for correction of entries despite the
failure to implead them in said case. While recognizing that petitioner
was indeed an indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured
by compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by
publication. In so ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a
petition for correction cannot be presumed to be aware of all the parties
whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. It
emphasized that the petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply
with the provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of the notice of
hearing was considered to have cured the failure to implead
indispensable parties.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was
impleaded as respondent in the petition below. This, notwithstanding,
the RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction sought by
respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue
involved in this case. Aside from Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court has
addressed the same in Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,31 Ceruila v.
Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.33
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,34 claiming that his parents were never
legally married, respondent therein filed a petition to change his name
from "Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing
in his birth certificate to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim
Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for hearing was published and
there being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of
general default and eventually granted respondent’s petition deleting
the entry on the date and place of marriage of parties; correcting his
for middle name; and deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr."
OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that the corrections
made on respondent’s birth certificate had the effect of changing the
through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the
RTC decision for respondent’s failure to comply strictly with the
procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from the
wrong remedy availed of by respondent as he filed a petition for Change
still failed because of improper venue and failure to implead the Civil
Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as respondents in the
case.
In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation
the same was made as an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth
and, therefore, invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries
therein. The RTC issued an order setting the case for hearing with a
directive that the same be published and that any person who is
interested in the petition may interpose his comment or opposition on
or before the scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise sent to the Civil
Register of Manila. After which, the trial court granted the petition and
nullified respondent’s birth certificate. Few months after, respondent
filed a petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and her
guardian were not notified of the petition and the trial court’s decision,
hence, the latter was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her
right to due process. The Court annulled the trial court’s decision for
failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 108, especially the non-
impleading of respondent herself whose birth certificate was
nullified.1âwphi1
appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief
would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and
far reaching.45
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated
July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004 granting the Petition
for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr.
Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the
Associate Justice
correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, specifically
to change her name from Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to
Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from "married" to "single," and the
date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." The
Court modified the trial court’s decision by nullifying the portion thereof
which directs the change of petitioner’s civil status as well as the filiation
of her child, because it was the OSG only that was made respondent and
the proceedings taken was summary in nature which is short of what is
required in cases where substantial alterations are sought.

Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that
she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera
Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her
first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate"
and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent
should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but
also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are
affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of

general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not
change the nature of the proceedings taken.37 A reading of Sections 4
and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two
sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the
persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who
are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties.38 Summons must, therefore, be served
not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply
with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.39

While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to
implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by
the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by
petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties.40 Such
failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves
initiated the corrections proceedings;41 when there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties;42 or
when a party is inadvertently left out.43

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for

cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is
mandated.44 If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through

Fujiki vs. Marinay 700 SCRA 69 , June 26, 2013
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law; For
Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country,
the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under
the Rules of Court.—For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific,
a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven
as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as
Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine
courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.—A foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is
not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article
15 of the Civil Code provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.” This
is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the
Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A petition to recognize a foreign judgment
declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.—A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of
the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws
under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute
their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the
rules of evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Once a foreign judgment is admitted and
proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external
to its merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”—Section 48(b), Rule 39
of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a “presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.”
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that “the judgment or
final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments.
Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment.
Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it
can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., “want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.” The rule on limited review embodies the policy
of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as well as
respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Law; Divorce; While the Philippines does
not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.—Since 1922 in Adong
v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 (1922), Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.
Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines
does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize
a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the recognition of a foreign judgment
only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.”—Since the
recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact.” Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil
Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence
such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in
recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,
628 SCRA 266 (2010), this Court declared that “[t]he recognition of the not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
particular fact.” safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment
Civil Law; Marriages; Parties; When Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
the husband or the wife” — it refers to the husband or the wife of the case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
subsisting marriage; The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.—Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Civil Law; Conflict of Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Foreign
Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of Judgments; Divorce; Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife” — it refers Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the dissolution of the marriage.—Article 26 of the Family Code confers
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Parties; Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in under Philippine law.” In Republic v. Orbecido, 472 SCRA 114 (2005), this
the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article
action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 26 which is “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
wife of a subsisting marriage.—Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which longer married to the Filipino spouse” under the laws of his or her
declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason
to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting Same; Same; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Divorce; Foreign
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of Judgments; The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage. judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy; If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries; A petition for discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot spouse cannot remarry.—The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the
and other related laws.—To be sure, a petition for correction or marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited will be discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry while the
grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the investigation of the public prosecutor Same; Same; Same; Bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is
to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4)
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.—Under
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
“where the corresponding civil registry is located.” In other words, a Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. However, this does judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does
not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the DECISION
case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of CARPIO, J.:
marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal
The Case
Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The
bigamy. petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Conflict of Law; Philippine courts
for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of
with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.—Philippine courts will only The Facts
determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23
i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents.
clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity
of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
foreign judgment is already “presumptive evidence of a right between Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
the parties.” Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent
event that establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be
reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
the public records in the Philippines. family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed
a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law; The (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio
Revised Penal Code.—The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, “[t]he term of in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is
absent from the Philippine archipelago.” Fujiki vs. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69,
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013 The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Republic of the Philippines A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an
SUPREME COURT Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active
Manila civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
SECOND DIVISION

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL xxxx
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,
RESPONDENTS.
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been
residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case
of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines,
at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in
"gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that
"[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a
ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC
took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either
Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x." 23 On the other hand, the
and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."
and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply.
A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding,
which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for
prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the
RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki
and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore
entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied
only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply
Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course,
difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-
existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the
"procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15
in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law
imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of
marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local
registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage
was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage"
and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are
subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought
(among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court
on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial
court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based
on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the
concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited
Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial
court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20
Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have
"immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds
for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under
Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki
as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband
in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he
RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal
of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by
24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based
correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is
a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the
verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was
not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition
under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General
and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment
on the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor
General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the
trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can
sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held
that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of
bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or
she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage
was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured
spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of
the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign
divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment
also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a
Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the
procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of
the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court
judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition
therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional
infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v.
De Castro and Niñal v. Bayadog which declared that "[t]he validity of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It
39 40
a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply
with the directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara
wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back
married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of
44
violence on Marinay. On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had
no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her
silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested
by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be
made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine
foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties
should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the
petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of
will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to
limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign
on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of
a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity
in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating
to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void
does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it
were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the
foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment
on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is
under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign
judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve
into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on
grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on
limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of
party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64
Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines
does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize
a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact
the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines
has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute
the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus,
person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil
Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence
66
such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in
recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the
Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property
interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the
spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting
the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a
subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on
the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that
"[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or
the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties
in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the
law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages
void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised
anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77 If anyone can file
a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes,
he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the
spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the
79
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens
the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage
but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80
Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order
to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a
court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage
and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to
cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt
the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the
merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to
address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino,
Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entrywhose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow
divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x
x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his
The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines
foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
Marinay and Maekara. country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v.
Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the
served."91
parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A
nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse
direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No.
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the
or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85
Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign
and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86
spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is
be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign
civil registry. judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does
not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the
case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of
of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal
country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and
Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a
procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a
SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine
foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment,
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
bigamy.
foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court. incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties,
or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."
In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and
the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of
entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a
new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous

marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal
liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription
[of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the
need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of
the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011

and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the
petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

 proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s
case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.

Same; Same; Same; As long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108

of the Rules of Court are followed, it is the appropriate adversary
proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the
civil register.—It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and
a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere
application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the
inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be
affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil
registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it
states that although the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the
procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in
entries of the civil register.
G.R. No. 189538. February 10, 2014.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR,

respondent. Same; Same; Same; A Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.—
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru
A direct recourse to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar
orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may be taken where only of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
questions of law are raised or involved.—At the outset, it is necessary to National Statistics Office, 700 SCRA 69 (2013), that: To be sure, a petition
stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
of the probative value of the evidence of the parties. Here, the issue other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support
marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and
undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the
question of law. public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Same; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry; Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462 in 1986, the or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional
Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that “even substantial errors in a civil Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108 of the words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
Rules of Court, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. Republic
by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial vs. Olaybar, 715 SCRA 605, G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
proceeding.”—Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
Republic of the Philippines
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings
may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the SUPREME COURT
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and Manila
the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of
Republic v. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that “even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected THIRD DIVISION
through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established
and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
appropriate adversarial proceeding.” An appropriate adversary suit or
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed
Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling,
vs. typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent. to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2)
granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
DECISION alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab
initio.11
PERALTA, J.:
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules for reconsideration couched in this wise:
of Court are the Regional Trial Court1 (RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009
and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration
assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for filed by the Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the
cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioner’s counsel, and all concerned
order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic government agencies.
of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
SO ORDERED.12
The facts of the case are as follows:
Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors
Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary
marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she proceeding required. Considering that respondent’s identity was used by
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would
Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of
Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles
said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she 35 and 36 of the Family Code.13
did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on
Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following grounds:
Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to I.
the case.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR
could not have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed CORRECTED.
solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated,
because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in II.
Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed
husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE
the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT
in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14
certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be
personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.6 cancelled or corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of
Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared and
employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latter’s
Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the allegedpersonal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in
wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a document the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared
examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contractthe marriage null and void ab initio.16 Thus, the petition instituted by
was forged.8 respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
portion of which reads: We deny the petition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court
favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar offrom the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only
Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of thequestions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when
alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune. the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which
SO ORDERED.9 does not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence
of the parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies
not that of respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter’s the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily,
prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake.10 petitioner raised a pure question of law.
 Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may
correction of entries in the civil registry, to wit: be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or
motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that
located. although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order
valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule
or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determinationlatter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the
of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other
name. words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was,
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought
proceeding. the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.

SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent
and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The
circulation in the province. Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents
were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties signature appearing in some of her government issued identification
pending such proceedings. cards.23 The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s
signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was
SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no
or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In such marriage was celebrated.
either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil
registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru
Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either National Statistics Office24 that:
be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure
to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition 11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the
proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and
the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct
been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.21 the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented

to show the existence of marriage.1âwphi1 Rather, respondent showed
by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that
she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and
documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we
maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where
all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations
of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the
parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed
sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the
truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife
portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order
dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice
 Thus, petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the correction
of his and his mother’s first name.

Same; Same; Same; Correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate

that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to “not
married” is a substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings.—
We also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on
petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December
23, 1983 in Bicol to “not married” is a substantial correction requiring
adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his
legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one.
In Republic v. Uy, 703 SCRA 425 (2013), we held that corrections of entries
in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity
or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial alterations.
Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves
of the appropriate adversary proceedings.

Onde vs. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City 734 SCRA 661 Same; Same; Same; Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
, September 10, 2014 corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of
Court] provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries in the Civil
appropriate adversary proceeding.—The RTC’s dismissal is without
Register; Clerical or Typographical Errors; Changes of First Name; Under
prejudice. As we said, petitioner can avail of the administrative remedy
Section 1 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors
for the correction of his and his mother’s first name. He can also file a new
on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of first name petition before the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth
can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol.
order.—We agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city
As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, 382
civil registrar under R.A. No 9048. We note that petitioner no longer
SCRA 22 (2002): x x x This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia, where we
contested the RTC’s ruling on this point. Indeed, under Section 1 of R.A. held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and
No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can the true facts established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of Court] provided
be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
civil registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as
adversary proceeding. x x x x x x It is true in the case at bar that the
amended by R.A. No. 10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct
changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or
Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.— harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature,
or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a person
however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling
where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error
in Republic v. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural
or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the requirements are complied with.
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance
with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. Same; Same; Same; Parties; A petition seeking a substantial correction of
an entry in a civil register must implead as parties to the proceedings not
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The remedy and the proceedings
only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not correction of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest
judicial; The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which would be affected by the correction.—A petition seeking a
the correction of clerical or typographical errors.—In Silverio v. Republic,
substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must implead as parties
537 SCRA 373 (2007), we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over
to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with
dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all persons who have
administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the or claim any interest which would be affected by the correction. This is
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 3. Parties.—
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative
in nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72 (2008), we Same; Same; Same; Same; In Republic v. Uy, 703 SCRA 425 (2013), the
said that under R.A. No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical Supreme Court (SC) has similarly ruled that when a petition for
errors can now be made through administrative proceedings and without cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
the need for a judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical errors. legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated.
Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and
mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also
affect them.—In Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, 382 SCRA
22 (2002), we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, as the procedural requirements laid down by the Court to
make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy, 703
SCRA 425 (2013), we have similarly ruled that when a petition for
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated.
Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and
mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also
affect them. Onde vs. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City,
734 SCRA 661, G.R. No. 197174 September 10, 2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 197174 September 10, 2014
FRANCLER P. ONDE, Petitioner,
vs.
THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF LAS PIÑAS CITY,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Orders1 dated
October 7, 2010 and March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 201, Las Piñas City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The
RTC dismissed the case filed by petitioner Francler P. Onde for
correction of entries in his certificate of live birth.
The antecedent facts follow:
Petitioner filed a petition2 for correction of entries in his certificate of
live birth before the R TC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole respondent. Petitioner alleged that he
is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC
Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his parents were married.
His birth certificate also stated that his mother's first name is Tely and
that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on
his birth certificate be corrected as follows:
Entry From To
1) Date and place of December 23, Not
marriage of his parents 1983 - Bicol Married
2) First name of his Tely Matilde
mother
3) His first name Franc Ler Francler
In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for
correction of entries on the ground thatit is insufficient in form and
substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial since the
first correction is substantial in nature and would affect petitioner’s
status as a legitimate child. It was further held that the correction in the
first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil
registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing
the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the ConsulGeneral to Correct a
Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name
or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order,
Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
In its Order dated March 1, 2011,the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, as it found no proof that petitioner’s parents were not
married on December 23, 1983.
Essentially, the petition raises fourissues: (1) whether the RTC erred in
ruling that the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother
can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048; (2) whether
the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol
to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring adversarial
proceedings; (3) whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for
correction of entries; and (4) whether the RTC erred in ruling that there
is no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on December 23,
1983.
Petitioner argues that Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court allows a substantial
correction of entries in the civil registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City,3 the case cited by the RTC, we have
actually ruled that substantial changes in the civil registry are now
allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He likewise adds that
proof that his parents were not married will be presented during the
trial, not during the filing of the petition for correction of entries.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that
the RTC correctly dismissed the petition for correction of entries. It
points out that the first names of petitioner and his mother can be
corrected thru administrative proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such
correction of the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents
were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a
substantial correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt
with in adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are
impleaded.
We deny the petition.
On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of
petitioner and his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be
corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that
petitioner no longer contested the RTC’s ruling on this point.4 Indeed,
under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on
entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of first name can
be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial
order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No. 10172, now reads:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or correctedwithout a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and
month in the dateof birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear
that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry,
which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipalcivil registraror consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Silverio v. Republic,6 we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction
over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with
administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name)
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative
in nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan,7 we said that under
R.A.No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules
ofCourt the correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus petitioner
can avail of this administrative remedy for the correction of his and his
mother’s first name.
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting
the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married
on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial
correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is
substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a
legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy,8 we held that
corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship,
legitimacyof paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,involve
substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversaryproceedings.9
Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian.
Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108in
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciaprovided that the
appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an
entry in a civil register must implead as parties to the proceedings not
only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition
for correction of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by the correction. This is required by
Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Eleosida,11 we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, as the procedural requirements laid down by the Court
to make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy,12
we have similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with
the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new
petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as
parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect
them.
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on
the last issue as petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim
that his parents were not married on December 23, 1983 when he files
the new petition for the purpose.

On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated
for correction of entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested
October 7, 2010 and March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
the RTC ruling that the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first
201, Las Pifias City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The
name can be done by the city civil registrar. Under the circumstances,
dismissal ordered by the Regional Trial Court is, however, declared to be
we are constrained to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of
without prejudice.
entries before the RTC bereinstated since the same petition includes the
correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name.
No pronouncement as to costs.
We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without prejudice. As we
said, petitioner can avail ofthe administrative remedy for the correction SO ORDERED.
of his and his mother’s first name.1âwphi1 He can also file a new
petition before the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Associate Justice
Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City:10

x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciawhere we held that even

substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of Court]provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. x x x

xxxx

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by

petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones
as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and

Tapuz vs. Del Rosario, 554 SCRA 768, June 17, 2008
G.R. No. 182484. June 17, 2008.*
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M.
ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA,
EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay
Island, represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18TH DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO
SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON, respondents.
Forum Shopping; Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their
processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court
dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground
for summary dismissal of the case, it may also constitute direct
contempt.—To restate the prevailing rules, “forum shopping is the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make
a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party
against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one
forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than
by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles
with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of
justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the
rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also
constitute direct contempt.” Additionally, the required verification and
certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one (1) of the seven
(7) petitioners—Ivan Tapuz—did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule
56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five (5)
exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.
Writ of Amparo; The Writ of Amparo, Explained.—To start off with the
basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances,
and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules,
or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo—in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its
issuance demands—requires that every petition for the issuance of the
writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact.
Same; The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminary satisfied with the
prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the
supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what
extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of
the aggrieved party was or is being committed.—The writ shall issue if the
Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the
rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed. The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is
anchored on the factual allegations heretofore quoted, that are
essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition.
Same; If the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged
perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the
realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.—Under these legal and
factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence
of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo.
Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons
of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely
property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the
petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators
criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary
criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy
of the writ of amparo.
Same; The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for
as substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will
inordinately interfere with these processes—the situation obtaining in
the present case.—Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail
but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that
the petitioners’ present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is
a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners
sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use
of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners’
misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum
shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of
the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from
forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the
ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the
use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that
of amparo—extraordinary though they may be—will suffice to serve as a
curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue
when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or
when it will inordinately interfere with these processes—the situation
obtaining in the present case. While we say all these, we note too that the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of
separate actions, for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions, and for the
consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a
subsequently filed criminal and civil action. These rules were adopted to
promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance
of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Writ of Habeas Data; Section 6 of the Rule of the Writ of Habeas Data
requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data.—Section 6 of the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of
ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data: “(a)
The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent; (b) The
manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party; (c) The actions
and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office,
and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information, if known; (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the
updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent. In case of threats, the relief
may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and (f)
Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.”
Same; Allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data
requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.—
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data
requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.
Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful
violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or
security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated,
any need for information under the control of police authorities other
than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or
justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of
previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In
sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more
than the “fishing expedition” that this Court—in the course of drafting the
Rule on habeas data—had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ
of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order. Tapuz vs. Del
Rosario, 554 SCRA 768, G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision5
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M.
ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA,
EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in
Boracay Island, represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18 th DIVISION, SPOUSES
GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance
(pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court;
Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;1 and Sections 1 and 6
of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data2) is the petition for certiorari and
for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by the
above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario
[in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de
la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police
stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station Commander,
the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th Division, and the spouses
Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T.
Sanson (the "private respondents"), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the "MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24
April 2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners
Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion,
Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz
and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John Does numbering
about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1)
they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare
parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan
(the "disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed land's prior possessors
when the petitioners - armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms
and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the
disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents'
permission and against the objections of the private respondents' security
men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material
allegations of the complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are
the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary,
the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private
respondents' certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They
asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim
for damages.
in the private respondents' favor. It found prior possession - the key issue
in forcible entry cases - in the private respondents' favor, thus:
"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in
the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch found on
pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties
have submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioner's
Report and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a
concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green
highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter
fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The
foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch
collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired
the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale
(Annex 'A', Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they
caused the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in
1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred
that the plaintiffs were in actual physical possession of the
whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the
defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the
Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question
with view of inhabiting the same and building structures therein
prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before
BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay
Captain Glenn Sacapaño. As a result of their confrontation, the
parties signed an Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint p. 20) From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident
wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land of forcible entry happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on
in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon. April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered by their
numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the controversy.
incident of January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted security
guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures
2006, the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack depicted in their pictures attached as annexes to their position
suspected to contain firearms with other John Does numbering paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report and
about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered sketch submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely
the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo inferred that these structures are built and (sic) situated outside
structure (Annex 'E', Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question the premises of the land in question, accordingly, they are
which incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as
as shown by plaintiffs' Certification (Annex 'F', Complaint, p. 12) evidence of their actual possession of the land in question prior
of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April 19, to April 19, 20066."
2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court
Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their ("RTC," Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady
Certificate to File Action (Annex 'G', Complaint, p. 13); hence M. Marin ("Judge Marin").
the present action.
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the
Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order
4, 2005, they were already occupants of the property, being dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private
indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by respondents' posting of a bond. The writ7 - authorizing the immediate
open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other implementation of the MCTC decision - was actually issued by respondent
(sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25). Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the "respondent Judge") on 12 March 2007
after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition.
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private
question is enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his
Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for
that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of the Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory
land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 20078.
ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force.
Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. 9 The
in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the
respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order10 a writ of
land were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19,
demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written
2006, defendants' claims to an older possession must be
notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow
rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be
the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
recognized at the same time in two different personalities.

The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of

Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who
Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for Review11 (under Rule 42 of the 1997
forcibly entered the land in question on April 18, 2006 at about
Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon as shown in their Certification
Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
(Annex 'D', Defendants' Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).

Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to

The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their
Vacate and for Demolition on 19 March 2008.12
allegations made to the commissioner who constituted (sic) the
land in question that they built structures on the land in
question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioner's It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present
Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto petition last 29 April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three
on even date. remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical
under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
statements of defendants' witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida
Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda,
in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- '144, rec.) [sic] categorically To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners
stated 'that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men present factual positions diametrically opposed to the MCTC's findings
entered the property of our said neighbors and built plastic and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims
roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by
neighbors away from their homes but they refused to leave and the private respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition -
resisted the intruding armed men'. bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo - read:
 "29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting
12 gauge shot guns intruded into the property of the
defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in uniform.
They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the following
day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were burned to
ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed
wire fence put up by defendants to protect their property from
intruders. Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the
defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was
identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single,
and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants
reducing them to ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON
were reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...].
The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors
namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who
resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the
law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children,
which is aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.
[…]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent
and unlettered petitioners continue because the private
respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and
they are influential with the police authorities owing to their
financial and political clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the
lot in dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists
[introduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are
attested by witnesses who are persons not related to the
defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in the case
namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin
Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia
T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners
atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict have been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this
the defendants.13" Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping.
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the
complaint for forcible entry that the private respondents filed below.
Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7691,14 they maintain that the forcible entry case in
fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest
therein, with the assessed value of the property involved exceeding
P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC.
Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC
decision was appealed - equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on
appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data
fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective
with respect to content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the
petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders
has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a
pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the "CA petition") for the
review of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition,
although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present
petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA petition,
however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which
indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of
the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the
latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008
or more than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus,
the present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed
receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond
the reglementary period of sixty (60) days15 from receipt of the assailed
order or orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion
for reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached
"Certificate of Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court"16
("Certificate of Compliance") that "in the meantime the RTC and the
Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to
counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to
their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC." To guard against any insidious
argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this Notice
to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day
reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008
date cited by the petitioners' counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition is not an order that exists independently from the RTC orders
assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merely
a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus
an administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own
separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot
therefore be the appropriate subject of an independent petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date
cannot likewise be the material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-
mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this petition,
as the petition's Prayer patently shows.17
By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of
Appeals (docketed as CA - G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders
now also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us,
allegedly because "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and
for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and
would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to resolve
pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of
demolition despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION."18
Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body
of the petition - at the same time represented in his Certificate of
Compliance19 that:
"x x x
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question
the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is
attached (sic);
 (f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The
because it held that the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,
DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases lies
of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
resolution of the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring supplied) Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over
these cases - called accion interdictal - even before the R.A. 7691
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed
2007 but up to this date the same had not been resolved copy to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed
of the MR is attached (sic). value of the property involved; the law established no distinctions based
on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully detained.
Separately from accion interdictal are accion publiciana for the recovery
x x x"
of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion
for the recovery of ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at ones the petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation
the appellate court level is replete with significance regarding the with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
petitioners' intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners' act of amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be
misrepresenting in the body of their petition that "the CA did not act on with the first-level courts or the regional trial courts, depending on the
the petition up to this date" while stating the real Court of Appeals action assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at
in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of the the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no
remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into action jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.
on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the Court
of Appeals had already undertaken.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited
formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
via the present petition, the same relief that it could not wait for from the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking
The Writ of Amparo
against the same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before
the appellate court and before us at the same time, although made
through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived
willful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined application enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended
5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security,
That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals and as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available
possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
violation where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
interlocutory orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
time. uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line
with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty
that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance
To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two
of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum "(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse
judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court assumed appellation;
dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground
for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
contempt."20 violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
shopping is defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - supporting affidavits;
did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46;
Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
identification cards with the Notary Public. authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of
the investigation, together with any report;
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on
the basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint, determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and
which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not - as petitioners the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or
may have misread or misappreciated - a case involving title to or omission; and
 (f) The relief prayed for. Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two
residential houses was "accidental."
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable
reliefs."22 As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its
decision in the forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners'
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting they were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat examination and evaluation of the contending parties' positions,
to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed
party was or is being committed. commissioner.

The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the
factual allegations heretofore quoted,23 that are essentially repeated in backdrop of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence
paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC;
following documents: subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still
much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results; and
then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the
"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag,
issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate,
Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo
may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners,
id., petitioners' prior possession, private respondents' intrusion
and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the
their security guards on 19 April 2006; prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance
of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing
threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging
appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed
the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security
land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged
guard against minors - descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the
realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
essentially corroborating Nemia's affidavit;
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings,
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer as our action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the
Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners' intrusion MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place,
into the disputed land; but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though
unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not
Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family intend to weaken or negate.
and the security guards of the private respondents, including
the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at
security guards; this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners'
present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and
Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an
rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners'
by a fire." misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum
shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from
unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the
traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the
disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that
or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a
occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue
other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or
implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the when it will inordinately interfere with these processes - the situation
alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting obtaining in the present case.
affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty
and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing. While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
provides for rules on the institution of separate actions,24 for the effect of
25
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the earlier-filed criminal actions, and for the consolidation of petitions for
statements of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and
civil action. 26 These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure
identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod,
on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the
parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly
with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and
harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening
through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing
that the right to life, liberty or security - the personal concern that the
writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or
that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to
an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in
a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the
provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal
case.
violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or
security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated,
any need for information under the control of police authorities other
than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or
justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of
previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In
sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more
than the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the
Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ
of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.

The Writ of Habeas Data WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present
petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following body and attachments.
material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data: SO ORDERED.

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the

respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened

and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure

the data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the

government office, and the person in charge, in possession or
in control of the data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order

enjoining the act complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges
that:

"1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is

prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on the
burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence
employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing
the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;

[…]

66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding

the Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police
report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners
in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an
investigation was conducted by the PNP."

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data
requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.
Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful

Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Ass'n., I-XIII, Inc., 554 SCRA 208, June 05,
2008
G.R. No. 182795. June 5, 2008.*
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated
ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA, in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have either
petitioners, vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N., I- XIII, INC., ET AL., been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be
respondents. demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Petitioners’ claim to their dwelling, While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be
assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment fraudulent and spurious land titles, to wit:
adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security;
There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.—
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of
the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R.
Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the
enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which
the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their
dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory
judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and
security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of
amparo.
Same; Same; No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear
allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be
protected.—The factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land
in question is not alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only surmise
that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled
in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless
there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the
right sought to be protected. Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court
shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the
court ought to issue said writ. Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Ass'n., I-
XIII, Inc., 554 SCRA 208, G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008
G.R. No. 182795. Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Ass'n., I-XIII, Inc., 554
SCRA 208, G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008
ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA,
petitioners,
vs.
NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N., I – XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ
of Amparo upon the following premise:
Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or
rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our Constitution,
as the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private
and Public Respondents. This ardent request filed before this
Honorable Supreme Court is the only solution to this problem
via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the Rules –
the "RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO."1
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the
best way they can, to unearth these so-called "syndicates"
clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the
"squatting syndicates" - - - - the low so defines. If only to give
its proper meanings, the Government must be the first one to
cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous political
protégées. If unabated would certainly ruin and/or destroy the
efficacy of the Torrens System of land registration in this
Country. It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein
Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be
summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of
these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands of
the Private Respondents. The Courts of Justice, including this
Honorable Supreme Court, are likewise being made to
believe that said titles in the possession of the Private
Respondents were issued untainted with frauds.2
what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Court’s dismissal
of petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, thus:
That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be
no motion for reconsideration for the second or third time to
be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such
therefore, Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this
present petition should not in any way be treated as such
motions fore reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for
the possible issuance of the writ of amparo, although it might
affect the previous rulings of this Honorable Supreme Court in
these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038.
Inherent in the powers of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own
previous decision, that can not be thwarted nor influenced
by any one, but, only on the basis of merits and evidence.
This is the purpose of this petition for the Writ of Amparo.3
We dismiss the petition.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
 Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced

disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of

the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in
G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the
enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which
the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their
dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory
judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and
security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of
amparo.

Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land in
question is not alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only surmise
that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled
in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless
there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the
right sought to be protected.

Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon
the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said
writ.

Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. – Upon the filing of the

petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the
issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of
court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case
of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ
under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or
person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing
of the petition which shall not be later than seven (7) days
from the date of its issuance.

Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case,
the writ will not be issued and the petition will be dismissed outright.

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court
is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any
person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court
will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to
petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its
precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense
that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition
for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs
may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the
criminal proceedings. Castillo vs. Cruz, 605 SCRA 628, G.R. No. 182165
November 25, 2009

Castillo vs. Cruz, 605 SCRA 628, November 25, 2009

Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 182165. November 25, 2009.*
SUPREME COURT
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, Manila
RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES,
ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, EN BANC
ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR.
ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, “TISOY,” and JOHN DOES, petitioners, vs. DR. G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009
AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, respondents.
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS,
Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data; The coverage of the writs is limited RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES,
to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security; The writs cover not ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN,
only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.—The coverage ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR.
of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and JOHN DOES, Petitioners,
security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful vs.
acts or omissions. DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ,
Respondents.
Same; Same; To be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondent must
meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and DECISION
security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission.—To
thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the
Petitioners1 , employees and members of the local police force of the
present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the
City Government of Malolos, challenge the March 28, 2008 Decision of
Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in a petition for
between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents.
life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of
petitioners’ entry into the property.
The factual antecedents.
Same; Same; Absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition
that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty and/or that Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband
there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at
to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the
justified.—Although respondents’ release from confinement does not property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of
Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.
necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any
evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and
continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the
Spouses Cruz before the then Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan,
intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their
Bulacan.
persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.

Same; Same; Petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are
extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the
execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.—It need
not be underlined that respondents’ petitions for writs of amparo and
habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to
stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.
Same; Same; Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted
thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and
not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.—At all events,
respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had
commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded
By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against
the Spouses Cruz, which judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC,
became final and executory.
The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the
spouses Cruz refused to vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases
against the Province2 and the judges who presided over the case.3 Those
cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of judgment
lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for
injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before Branch 10 of the same RTC
Malolos.
The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners
permanent writ of injunction to prevent the execution of the final and unlawfully entered the property with the use of heavy equipment, tore
executory judgment against them. down the barbed wire fences and tents,6 and arrested them when they
resisted petitioners’ entry; and that as early as in the evening of
By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes’ February 20, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police had
allegation that subsequent events changed the situation of the parties already camped in front of the property.
to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and executory
judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion On the basis of respondents’ allegations in their petition and the
of which reads: supporting affidavits, the RTC, by Order of March 4, 2008, issued writs of
amparo and habeas data.7
WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order dated August 10, 2004 is hereby GRANTED. Order dated The RTC, crediting respondents’ version in this wise:
August 10, 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the
verified petition dated November 05, 2002 are hereby REINSTATED and Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and
MADE PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the circumstances of the alleged offenses examined into on Writs of Amparo
pending motions of petitioners with the same determines the metes and and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going hearings on the
bounds of 400 sq. meters leased premises subject matter of this case verified Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-
with immediate dispatch. Accordingly, REMAND the determination of M-2006, before this Court for alleged violation by the respondents of
the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued writ of demolition to
the Preliminary Injunction Order dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil
the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan. Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held on January 25, 2008,
February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents prayed for an April
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) 22, 2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February 20,
2008, police officers, some personnel from the Engineering department,
Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a and some civilians proceeded purposely to the Pinoy Compound,
suspensive condition for the lifting of the permanent injunction, the converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily harm and
determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned danger and stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from
the issue for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineer’s voices around its premises, on a pretext of an ordinary police operation
Report submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at 8:00 a.m. to
of the property were indicated. late in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners,
subjecting them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the
debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police
The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled
brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen,8
that the permanent injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective. On
motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus
issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition. rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of
respondents, disposing as follows:
On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz
filed a motion before Branch 10 of the RTC for the issuance of a "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and
temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on January waivers in Crim. Cases Nos. 08-77 for Direct assault; Crim. Case No. 08-
25, 2008 on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, 77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78 for Light
been implemented. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO.5 The Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were
Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, deprived of their substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded
thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and fear of personal violence. Accordingly, the commitment orders and
purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property which waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners
was for lease. is declared ABSOLUTE.

On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto
Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with
a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him
to "protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,"
entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property,
however. Insisting that the RTC July 19, 2005 Order of Permanent
Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved
petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment
for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a "Respectful Motion-Petition
for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data," docketed as Special Civil Action
No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC
Malolos.
Without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section
1910 of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC),11 which is
essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No.
08-1-16-SC).12
In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for
… giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when
from the allegations of the petition, the same ought not to have been
issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in substance as the same
involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases had already been filed
and pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of
Malolos. (Underscoring supplied)
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules
for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.13 In view of
the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took
effect on October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of
United Nations Day and affirmed the Court’s commitment towards
internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or
on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was
promulgated.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ
shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited
to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs
cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo14 teaches:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
"Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other
hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal
of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of law.15 (Underscoring
supplied, citations omitted)
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet
the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the
present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the
Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus
between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to
life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of
petitioners’ entry into the property.
Apropos is the Court’s ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:16
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived
as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is
intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those
available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the
reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every
petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying
allegations of fact, to wit:
xxxx
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a
threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party was or is being committed.17 (Emphasis and italics in the
original, citation omitted)
Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private
individuals, with the petitioners therein branding as "acts of terrorism"
the therein respondents’ alleged entry into the disputed land with
armed men in tow. The Court therein held:
On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and
unsworn – is the overriding involvement of property issues as the
petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the
property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the
right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent
that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to
security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats
and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the
waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of
the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the
rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or
continuing.18 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual
violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and
security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in
contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with
the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically
manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein
petitioners (respondents)"19 will not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was
present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses
a day after their arrest.20
Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily
hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even
an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint
on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that
destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the
issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property
rights is gathered from their Joint Affidavit, viz:
xxxx

11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na

hawak hawak ang nasabing kautusan ng RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT
INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February 12, 17 at 19 2008) upang
ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng
"SELF-HELP" at batas ukol sa "PROPERTY RIGHTS", Wala kaming nagawa
ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming "IN
POSSESSION." (Underscoring supplied)

Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when
it is not even alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing
data or information regarding their person, family, home and
correspondence.

As for respondents’ assertion of past incidents21 wherein the Province

allegedly violated the Permanent Injunction order, these incidents were
already raised in the injunction proceedings on account of which
respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners. 22

Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or
on February 22, 2008, petitioners even instituted a petition for habeas
corpus which was considered moot and academic by Branch 14 of the
Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008.

More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise
filed a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data before the
Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by
petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition was
dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping.

It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in
fact taken full advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil,
criminal and administrative charges.231avvphi1

It need not be underlined that respondents’ petitions for writs of

amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be
used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a
property dispute.

At all events, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and
habeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against
them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and
proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 11224 of the Rules
of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter
is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not
before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs
afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved
party by motion in the criminal proceedings.25

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008

Order of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED
NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 indirect acquiescence; Commanders may be impleaded—not actually on
the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their
responsibility, or at least accountability.—It must be clarified, however,
that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an
amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading
military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in
the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In
which case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of
command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility,
or at least accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis (606 SCRA 598 [2009]), the
Roxas vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 630 SCRA 211, September 07, 2010 distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability
were given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo
G.R. No. 189155. September 7, 2010.* proceeding.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE Same; Same; In Amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends
largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence
MELISSA C. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the
GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME
perpetrators; Direct evidence of identity when obtainable must be
VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ,
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND
similarity.—In Amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to
CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE,
parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends
respondents.
largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence
Writ of Amparo; Doctrine of Command Responsibility; The doctrine of that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the
command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be
liability and by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
party-respondent in an amparo petition; The doctrine is used to pinpoint similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to
liability.—It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court
the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise
the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not clearly and directly ascertain.
incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive
Same; Same; An order directing the public respondents to return the
law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal
personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive
basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition. The case of
pronouncement of liability.—To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the
Rub-rico v. Arroyo (613 SCRA 233 [2010]), which was the first to examine
petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of
command responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding,
whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents
observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability.
responsible for the abduction of the petitioner. In the first place, an order
Same; Same; The doctrine is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the
or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding; The petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of
writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted
consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and
be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability
of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.—Since are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.
the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of
Same; Same; Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines the scope and
individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or
extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.—But
administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The
perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the
obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is
petitioner, lies with the fact that a person’s right to be restituted of his
a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the
rights—which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo. Section 1 of
court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the
the Amparo Rule, which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal
excludes the protection of property rights.
objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an
enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had Same; Same; Inspection Order; An inspection order is an interim relief
transpired—the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an
disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision.—An
administrative under the applicable substantive law. inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or
strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid
Same; Same; The inapplicability of the doctrine of command
the court before making a decision. A basic requirement before an
responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure,
amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be
preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party
the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or
seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place
to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby
a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie
case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do. Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or
causing the distribution to the public of any records in whatever form,
Same; Same; Same; An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioner’s Melissa C.
allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.—Since the Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently
very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough related to the complained incident. Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection
to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, order, production order and for the return of the specified personal
an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no evidence
cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or
and doubtful. torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally
mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the
Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those
judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to who are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide
informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines
person’s right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as
3
instances where such information is being collected through unlawful may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.
means in order to achieve unlawful ends.—The writ of habeas data was
conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most We begin with the petitioner’s allegations.
especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ
operates to protect a person’s right to control information regarding Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.4 While in the United
himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.5 During the course of her
immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central
the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence,
Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-
of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty
Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future
or security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed medical mission.7
to do. Roxas vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 630 SCRA 211, G.R. No. 189155
September 7, 2010
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet
with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital
Republic of the Philippines camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,8
SUPREME COURT wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines. 9
Manila
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her
EN BANC companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc
(Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo)
G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010 in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around
1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone 11
banging at the front
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. door and a voice demanding that they open up.
ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs. Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door,
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the
IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. ground face down.12 The armed men were all in civilian clothes and,
BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal
VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN their faces.13
PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents.
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men
DECISION ganged up on her and tied her hands.14 At this juncture, petitioner saw
the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded
PEREZ, J.: and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to
shout her name.15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men
dragged petitioner towards the van—bruising her arms, legs and
At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded,
dated 26 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036- petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting
WRA — a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on the beside her.17 The van then sped away.
Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In
its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C.
Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.18 Petitioner, Carabeo
19
the latter’s prayers for an inspection order, production order and return and Jandoc were ordered to alight. After she was informed that she is
of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads: being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated
from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was
a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors.20 From there, she could hear
the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and
some construction bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the
military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with
torture.23 The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to
abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold." 24 The
torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and
suffocating the petitioner.25
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in
blindfolds even in her sleep.26 Petitioner was only relieved of her
blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she
became acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her.27
There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was
able to peek at her surroundings.28
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to
learn the names of three of her interrogators who introduced
themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC."29 "RC" even told
petitioner that those who tortured her came from the "Special
Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her name is
included in the "Order of Battle."30
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her
uncle’s house in Quezon City.31 Before being released, however, the
abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM32 card, a slip of
paper containing an e-mail address with password,33 a plastic bag
containing biscuits and books,34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and
a pair of shoes.35 Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the
incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to
her and her family.36
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from
RC via the cellular phone given to her.37 Out of apprehension that she
was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family,
petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the
suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the
communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of
Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009.38 Petitioner
impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the
military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was
government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC."39
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be
enjoined from harming or even approaching petitioner and her family;
(2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the
7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents
be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of
petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation
reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es
prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be
ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents any document
pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name
which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to
petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop
computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer,
stethoscope, medicines and her ₱15,000.00 cash.40
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs
and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of
evidence and appropriate action.41 The Resolution also directed the
respondents to file their verified written return.42
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return
of the Writs43 on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents.
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.
The public respondents label petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture
as "stage managed."44 In support of their accusation, the public
respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained
in the Special Report45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report,
Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner
and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving
the house.46 From this statement, the public respondents drew the
distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolo’s
house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her
companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted. 47 This can
only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any
"abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the
consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves.48
Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner,
as actually belying her claims that she was subjected to serious torture
for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner
alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductors—inflictions
that could have easily produced remarkable bruises—her Medical
Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps.50
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the
very authenticity of petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture, more so
any military or police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents
conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a
charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light,
and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group
that she represents.51
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine,
the public respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas
Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her
immunity from suit,52 and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in
general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition
that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of
such atrocities.53
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in
their duty to ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the
petitioner.54 In both the police and military arms of the government
machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner:
Police Action
Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30
o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain
Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to
report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere in Barangay
Kapanikian.55 Acting on the report, the police station launched an initial Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent
investigation.56 General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio
Message73 addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N.
The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army, relaying
who informed the investigators of an abduction incident involving three the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.74
(3) persons—later identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito
Carabeo and John Edward Jandoc—who were all staying in his house.57 For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition,
Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 o’clock in public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public respondent Major
the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of
men who forced their way inside his house.58 Other witnesses to the the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in
abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van with motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any
an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no personnel assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the
plate numbers.59 petitioner.75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the
Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to
At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a conduct the investigation.76
Flash Message to the different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac,
in an effort to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects. On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an
Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results.60 Investigation Report77 detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance,
the report described petitioner’s allegations as "opinionated" and
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged
a Special Report61 that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial abduction and torture.78
Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt.
Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction. 62 Follow-up
investigations were, at the same time, pursued.63 In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration
to the petitioner’s version that she was indeed abducted and then
On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted
Director of the Regional Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents
of Special Investigation Task Group—CAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter
conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, was telling the truth.80
Carabeo and Jandoc.64
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of the public respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was "stage
background examinations on the victims of the purported abduction, in managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only
order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the
identity of the perpetrators.65 Task Group CAROJAN also maintained time they were forcibly taken.81 The Court of Appeals further stressed
liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of People’s that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the
Rights—organizations trusted by petitioner—in the hopes of obtaining existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very
the latter’s participation in the ongoing investigations.66 Unfortunately, injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal,
the letters sent by the investigators requesting for the availability of the particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by her
petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.67 abductors onto their van.82

The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN
had been detailed in the reports68 that it submitted to public respondent
General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine National Police.
However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group
CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true
identity and affiliation of the abductors—a fact that task group CAROJAN
attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to
cooperate in their investigative efforts.69
Military Action
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat
against the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of
"RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was released.83 This
threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded
by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material
perpetrators who are still at large.84 Thus, the appellate court extended
to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the
public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as
continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing
investigations involving the abduction.85

Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense,
first came to know about the alleged abduction and torture of the
petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing him and
the other respondents to file their return.70 Immediately thereafter, he
issued a Memorandum Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the
AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an inquiry to
determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the
abduction.72
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to
informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of "records
of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member
of the CPP-NPA.86 The appellate court derived the existence of such
records from a photograph and video file presented in a press
conference by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and
Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner
participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed
that the photograph and video came from a female CPP-NPA member
who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals,
the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes
media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only that:102
constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also
puts further strain on her already volatile security.87 To this end, theThe evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in
appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr.
mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioner’s alleged ties
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.88 members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control
in international wars or domestic conflict."103 In this sense, command
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague
convinced that the military or any other person acting under the Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,104
acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
and torture of the petitioner.89 The appellate court stressed that, accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he
judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated,
the military was behind her abduction.90 Thus, the Court of Appeals command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal
absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes
and torture of petitioner.91 The petition was likewise dismissed as committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of perpetrators105 (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the
her immunity from suit.92 orginal, underscoring supplied)

Accordingly, the petitioner’s prayers for the return of her personal
belongings were denied.93 Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order
and production order also met the same fate.94
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
AMPARO
A.
Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does not, by so doing, fix
public respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and
torture.95 Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.107
of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal
belongings.96
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture
was carried out, as well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and
airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were detailed in
her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already
sufficient evidence to prove government involvement.97
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of
command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and
military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo
petition.98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement
holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as
well as liable for the return of her belongings.99
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the
doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the Razon v. Tagitis, the distinct, but interrelated concepts of
public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not
incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of
substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be
a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo
petition.100
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine
command responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding,
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an
imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown
criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo
proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial
relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives
that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations
or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security.106 While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing
liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be
The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has
been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo:108
x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make
the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any
measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the
ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with
their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be
impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but
rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In
110
responsibility and accountability were given special and unique
significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established
by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action
or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the
proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure
of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command.
their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed Magsaysay was not adequately established by her mere estimate of the
to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the
of the enforced disappearance. sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are
not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as
Responsibility of Public Respondents accurate on its face—not only because they were made mostly while she
was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and
116
petitioner in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful. With nothing
of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that she
way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture. 111 was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.

To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was
government agents who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner
calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and
torture—i.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with
no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to
elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical abuse—
which, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced
disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state
forces.112
Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military
camp Fort Magsaysay—a conclusion that she was able to infer from the
travel time required to reach the place where she was actually detained,
and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she
heard while thereat.113
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that
her abductors were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally,
with the military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence
at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort
Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in
turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction
and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the
acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency
in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public
respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her
personal belongings.

We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the
petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors petitioner by reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the public
were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort respondents were involved in her abduction and torture.117 We agree
Magsaysay. with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the
reason used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless
case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents
disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.
that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that
insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the
stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government. personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a
conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public
circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As
the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a
the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the mere summary amparo proceeding.118
perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the
similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to petitioner, lies with the fact that a person’s right to be restituted of his
the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property
cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could rights—which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.119 Section
otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. 1 of the Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ,
clearly excludes the protection of property rights.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer
of Exhibits,114 the cartographic sketches115 of several of her abductors B.
whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these
cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of
greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort
abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been Magsaysay.121
realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches
remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military
involvement in petitioner’s ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part
of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at
Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary
stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which
was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim
relief of inspection order.122 Contrary to the explicit position123 espoused available to the public, Petitioner’s security and privacy will certainly be
by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition"
for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or
strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to
aid the court before making a decision.124 A basic requirement before an violates Petitioner’s right to privacy which must be protected by this
amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party
seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the
place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is,
nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that
the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make privacy of individuals.126 The writ operates to protect a person’s right to
a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not
strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in
Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered.
An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents
from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in
whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the
petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her
abduction and torture." Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this
Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the
Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error
infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of
Appeals in granting the privilege of the writ of habeas data, We quote
hereunder the relevant portion125 of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence
reports and reports on the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas
or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the
records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Government’s Order of
Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against
whom false criminal charges were filed based on made up and perjured
information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify
before Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and
Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list
held a press conference where they revealed that they received an
information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the
organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed
that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of
Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of
the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner’s denial that she was the person
in said video, there were records of other investigations on Melissa C.
Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a
doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one way or
another, to petitioner’s abduction where she claimed she had been
subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her
life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the CPP-
NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made
in danger of being violated or transgressed by persons who have strong
sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated
dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioner’s
alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for public
consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly
Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational
control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of
the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim.127 This, in the case at bench, the
petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there
is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public
respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the
petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public
respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy
of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other
reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not
adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were
virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the
appellate court from the video and photograph released by
Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No
evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had
access to such video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of
Appeals enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing
the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties
with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public
respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something
that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to
be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner,
any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation
of the petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down
the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate
insufficiency to impute any form of responsibility on the part of the
public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide Us to
a proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the
use of extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the
perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and
two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its
Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate
legal measures for the protection of human rights,"128 must be tapped in
order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner
was not able to adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of
government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed
to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the
government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons
alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing
are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the
matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main
source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any
amparo case.129
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent
safeguard—requiring the "respondent who is a public official or
employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the
performance of duty."130 Thus, unless and until any of the public
respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that fitting, nay, necessary to shift the primary task of conducting further
extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they
cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing
scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by
the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the conduct of the police
and military investigations in the case at bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just
shows modest effort on the part of the police investigators to identify
the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete
with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the
same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the
investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime.
Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a
logical first step in exposing the motive behind the abduction—its
necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators,
especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in
captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her
captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations
solely on the cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitioner—who,
they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their
investigative efforts.131 While it may be conceded that the participation
of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group
CAROJAN’s investigation, this Court believes that the former’s reticence
to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore
other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads.132
Indeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner
cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court of
law—they are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads
that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high
standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of
investigations.
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJAN’s
reports still failed to explain why it never considered seeking the
assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo—who, along with the victims, is a central
witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in
any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the
abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioner’s account,
was not wearing any mask.1avvphi1
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative
material to the sketches included in petitioner’s offer of exhibits that, it
may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first
submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latter’s independent investigation
on the abduction and torture of the petitioner.133 But as mentioned
earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that
further investigation under the norm of extraordinary diligence should
be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the
basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the
military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is
continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that
directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before
the bar of justice.
To add teeth to the appellate court’s directive, however, We find it
investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the
CHR.134 We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to
enjoy the trust and confidence of the petitioner—as evidenced by her
attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the
commission.135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such
cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the
very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of
locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final
and appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to
the petitioner, also to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further
investigation, as follows—
1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with
conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and
torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the
norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the
necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the
cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as
their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant
to petitioner’s abduction and torture.
2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff
of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the
ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to
furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the
time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and
existing laws.
 3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his
successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and
the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of
its investigations and their recommendations, other than
those that are already part of the records of this case, within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of
Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a
copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide
protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the
Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined
by this Court.
Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for
the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and
determining whether, in light of any recent reports or
recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold
any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After
making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own
report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of
Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to
accomplish its tasks under this decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We
hereby render a decision:
1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the
return of her personal belongings;
2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for an
inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.
3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data,
without prejudice, however, to any modification that this
Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and
recommendations submitted to it under this decision.
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be
undertaken, as follows—
a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as
the lead agency tasked with conducting further
investigation regarding the abduction and torture of
the petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on
Human Rights shall, under the norm of extraordinary
diligence, take or continue to take the necessary
steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the
cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner,
as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any
other leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and
torture.
b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine
National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the Commission on Human Rights,
including but not limited to furnishing the latter a
copy of its personnel records circa the time of the
petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the
Constitution and existing laws.
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the
Philippine National Police, or his successor, to
furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the
petitioner or her representative, a copy of the
reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already
part of the records of this case, within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision.
d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human
Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy
of the reports on its investigation and its
corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide
or continue to provide protection to the petitioner
during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such
time as may hereinafter be determined by this
Court.
5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals
for the following purposes:
a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken
by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;
b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports
and recommendations of the CHR, the abduction
and torture of the petitioner was committed by
persons acting under any of the public respondents;
and on the basis of this determination—
c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from
receipt of the report and recommendation of the
Commission on Human Rights—its own report,
which shall include a recommendation either for the
DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public
respondents who were found not responsible and/or
accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL
MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO
AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as
against those found responsible and/or accountable.
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded
in this petition to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities
they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August
2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision dated

March 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No.
00009.2 This CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance of
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at
the petition of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis (respondent). The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The

Court hereby FINDS that this is an "enforced disappearance" within the
meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo
Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr.
Morced Tagitis.

Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief,

Razon vs. Tagitis, 621 SCRA 459, June 22, 2010
G.R. No. 182498. June 22, 2010.*
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP);
Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTA-ÑEDA, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response; and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP,
petitioners, vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY.
FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact, respondent.
Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) who should order
COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him;
(2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order
his men, namely: (a) respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director
of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE
TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A.
ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response, to aid him as
their superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence and
efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced
Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr.
Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly report of their
actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court
to monitor the action of respondents.

Writs of Amparo; The Court resolves to DIRECT the Court of Appeals to This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN.
submit to the Supreme Court, within ten (10) days from receipt of this ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and as to
Resolution, its 1st quarterly report and recommendations, copy respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet,
furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs, and the respondent, Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and
as directed in the Decision of 3 December 2009.—Considering the distinct organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of
foregoing, the Court resolves to DIRECT the Court of Appeals to submit operations, chain of command and budget.
to this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, its 1st
quarterly report and recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo – a protective
PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs, and the respondent, as directed in our remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life,
Decision of December 3, 2009. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG are likewise liberty and security.3 It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive to
reminded to faithfully and promptly comply with the directives in ourpolice agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the
Decision of December 3, 2009. Razon vs. Tagitis, 621 SCRA 459, G.R. No.
disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It
182498 June 22, 2010 does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least
Republic of the Philippines accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing
SUPREME COURT the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility
Manila refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
EN BANC an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court
shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal
and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to
Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners, enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of
vs. Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance,
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are
JR., Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent. restored.

DECISION
We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress
that the unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as
the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations,
may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in
ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo4 (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The
Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions
and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and
through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case,
are summarized below.
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank
and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank
(IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with
Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by
boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in
Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House.
Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the
following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand,
Tagitis was no longer around.5 The receptionist related that Tagitis went
out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room
key with the desk.6 Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text
message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did not know of
Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to
simply wait.7
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a men;
UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at
the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.8 On
November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to
9 subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives,
what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed
a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her
Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.10 The petition was directed
against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army;
Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen.
Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group 17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the
(CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; their help to find her husband, but [respondent’s] request and pleadings
and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively failed to produce any positive results;
referred to as petitioners]. After reciting Tagitis’ personal circumstances
and the facts outlined above, the petition went on to state:
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the
pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a
couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,
forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped
away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong;
8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong
returned to the pension house, and was surprised to find out that
subject Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and was not
also around and his room was closed and locked;
9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house
who [sic] assisted him to open the room of Engr. Tagitis, where they
discovered that the personal belongings of Engr. Tagitis, including cell
phones, documents and other personal belongings were all intact inside
the room;
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the
help of another IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police
agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo,
exerted efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and
when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been
abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be
fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the
police officers, Kunnong reported the matter to the [respondent, wife of
Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators
of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the
office of the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the
OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-
employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur
who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who
could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive
results except the information from persons in the military who do not
want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent],
specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his
will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr.
Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;
xxxx
ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking
18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an
intriguing tale by the police that her husband, subject of the petition,
was not missing but was with another woman having good time
somewhere, which is a clear indication of the [petitioners’] refusal to
help and provide police assistance in locating her missing husband;
19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release
and/or turn-over subject Engr. Tagitis to his family or even to provide
truthful information to [the respondent] of the subject’s whereabouts,
and/or allow [the respondent] to visit her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis,
caused so much sleepless nights and serious anxieties;
20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the
[petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police Headquarters again in Cotobato
City and also to the different Police Headquarters including [those] in
Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
and all these places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for
her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places
thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help
from friends and relatives only to try complying [sic] to the different
suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts
produced no positive results up to the present time;
21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the
sufferings undergone by the [respondent], informed her that they are
not the proper persons that she should approach, but assured her not to
worry because her husband is [sic] in good hands;
22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the
[respondent’s] request for help and failure and refusal of the
[petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance in
locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared
missing since October 30, 2007 which is almost two (2) months now,
clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in physical possession
and custody of [respondent’s] husband, Engr. Tagitis;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and
remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, [the respondent]
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the
release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the
[petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total
violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except the
issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. [Emphasis supplied]
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the
Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and
directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two
(72) hours from service of the writ.11
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the
petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged
abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were
incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were
baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay
evidence. 12
The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return,
stated that: he did not have any personal knowledge of, or any
participation in, the alleged disappearance; that he had been designated
by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body
called TASK FORCE USIG, to address concerns about extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances; the Task Force, inter alia, coordinated
with the investigators and local police, held case conferences, rendered
legal advice in connection to these cases; and gave the following
summary:13
xxxx
4.
a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police
Regional Office ARMM submitted a report on the alleged
disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis. According to the
said report, the victim checked-in at ASY Pension House on
October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning and then
roamed around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It
was only after a few days when the said victim did not return
that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards,
elements of Sulu PPO conducted a thorough investigation to
trace and locate the whereabouts of the said missing person,
but to no avail. The said PPO is still conducting investigation
that will lead to the immediate findings of the whereabouts of
the person.
b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress
Report to the Director, CIDG. The said report stated among
others that: subject person attended an Education
Development Seminar set on October 28, 2007 conducted at
Ateneo de Zamboanga, Zamboanga City together with a Prof.
Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 o’clock in the
morning, Engr. Tagitis reportedly arrived at Jolo Sulu wharf
aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then billeted at ASY
Pension House. At about 6:15 o’clock in the morning of the
same date, he instructed his student to purchase a fast craft
ticket bound for Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo,
Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on or about 10:00 o’clock in
the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY Pension
House as stated by the cashier of the said pension house. Later
in the afternoon, the student instructed to purchase the ticket
arrived at the pension house and waited for Engr. Tagitis, but
the latter did not return. On its part, the elements of 9RCIDU is
now conducting a continuous case build up and information
gathering to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis.
c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search
in all divisions of the CIDG to find Engr. Tagitis who was
allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP
Intelligence Operatives since October 30, 2007, but after
diligent and thorough search, records show that no such
person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or
divisions.
5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all
possible efforts, steps and actions available under the circumstances and
continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant case. This immense
mandate, however, necessitates the indispensable role of the citizenry,
as the PNP cannot stand alone without the cooperation of the victims
and witnesses to identify the perpetrators to bring them before the bar
of justice and secure their conviction in court.
The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as
well his affidavit, also attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that
upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo, he caused the following:14
xxxx
That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution
of the Honorable Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, I
immediately directed the Investigation Division of this Group [CIDG] to
conduct urgent investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of
Engineer Morced Tagitis.
That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education
Development Seminar on October 28, 2007 at Ateneo de Zamboanga at
Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli. On October 30,
2007, at around six o’clock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He
was assisted by his student identified as Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic
Development Bank who was also one of the participants of the said
seminar. He checked in at ASY pension house located [sic] Kakuyagan,
Patikul, Sulu on October 30, 2007 with [sic] unidentified companion. At
around six o’clock in the morning of even date, Engr. Tagitis instructed
his student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the
afternoon of the same date, Kunnong arrived at the pension house
carrying the ticket he purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter was
nowhere to be found anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof.
Abdulnasser Matli who reported the incident to the police. The CIDG is
not involved in the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make out a
case of an enforced disappearance which presupposes a direct or
indirect involvement of the government.
That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a
person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, who was allegedly abducted or
illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since
October 30, 2007 and after a diligent and thorough research records
show that no such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its
department or divisions.
That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding
Engr. Morced Tagitis [sic] alleged enforced disappearance, the
undersigned had undertaken immediate investigation and will pursue
investigations up to its full completion in order to aid in the prosecution
of the person or persons responsible therefore.
Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER15 Chief PS
Supt. Leonardo A. Espina’s affidavit which alleged that:16
xxxx
That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any
participation in the alleged abduction or illegally [sic] detention of ENGR.
MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact, nowhere
in the writ was mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated
by elements of PACER nor was there any indication that the alleged
abduction or illegal detention of ENGR. TAGITIS was undertaken jointly
by our men and by the alleged covert CIDG-PNP intelligence operatives
alleged to have abducted or illegally detained ENGR. TAGITIS.
That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged
disappearance of ENGR. MORCED in my capacity as the chief PACER [sic]
considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER), a special task force created for the purpose of
neutralizing or eradicating kidnap-for-ransom groups which until now
continue to be one of the menace of our society is a respondent in
kidnapping or illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is to go after
kidnappers and charge them in court and to abduct or illegally detain or
kidnap anyone is anathema to our mission.
That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I
directed the Chief of PACER Mindanao Oriental (PACER-MOR) to conduct
pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the subject, identify
and apprehend the persons responsible, to recover and preserve
evidence related to the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS,
which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible,
to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the
disappearance and to determine the cause, manner, location and time
of disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the disappearance.
That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent
JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES JR., to submit a written report regarding the
disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.
That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent
through fax his written report.
That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search
the subject in coordination with Police Regional Office, Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police Provincial
Office (PPO) and other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are
ongoing with the instruction not to leave any stone unturned so to
speak in the investigation until the perpetrators in the instant case are
brought to the bar of justice.
That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the
WRIT OF AMPARO just issued.
Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao
(Gen. Goltiao), also submitted his affidavit detailing the actions that he
had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis’ disappearance, viz:17
xxxx
3) For the record:
1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and
during the time of the incident;
xxxx
4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases
of reported enforced disappearances and when they are being alluded
to my office;
5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial
Office reported to me through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-
2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a certain
Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared
before the Office of the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported
the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis, scholarship coordinator of
Islamic Development Bank, Manila;
6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company
of or taken by any member of the Philippine National Police but rather
he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at Kakuyagan
Village, Village, Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of
forcible abduction or arrest;
7. The last known instance of communication with him was when
Arsimin Kunnong, a student scholar, was requested by him to purchase a
vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however, when the
student returned back to ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr.
Tagitis there and when he immediately inquired at the information
counter regarding his whereabouts [sic], the person in charge in the
counter informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on
October 30, 2007 around 1 o’clock p.m. and never returned back to his
room;
8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the
Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office and other units
through phone call and text messages to conduct investigation [sic] to
determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or
persons responsible for the threat, act or omission, to recover and
preserve evidence related to the disappearance of Engr. Tagitis, to
identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning his
disappearance, to determine the cause and manner of his
disappearance, to identify and apprehend the person or persons
involved in the disappearance so that they shall be brought before a
competent court;
9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and
Detection Management Division, I have caused the following directives:
a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated
November 22, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to conduct joint
investigation with CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the matter;
b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated
November 28, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to expedite
compliance to my previous directive;
c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD
Sulu PPO reiterating our series of directives for investigation
and directing him to undertake exhaustive coordination efforts
with the owner of ASY Pension House and student scholars of
IDB in order to secure corroborative statements regarding the
disappearance and whereabouts of said personality;
d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD
Sulu PPO directing him to maximize efforts to establish clues
on the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by seeking the
cooperation of Prof. Abdulnasser Matli and Arsimin Kunnong
and/or whenever necessary, for them to voluntarily submit for
polygraph examination with the NBI so as to expunge all
clouds of doubt that they may somehow have knowledge or
idea to his disappearance;
e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the
Regional Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,
Police Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City, requesting
assistance to investigate the cause and unknown
disappearance of Engr. Tagitis considering that it is within their
area of operational jurisdiction;
f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM
dated December 30, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO requiring
them to submit complete investigation report regarding the
case of Engr. Tagitis;
10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic]
efforts to conduct investigation [sic] on the matter to determine the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances related to his
disappearance and submitted the following:
a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio
Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-10-2007;
b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this
office that they are still monitoring the whereabouts of Engr.
Tagitis;
c) Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the
Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, Sulu PPO;
11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters
as shown in the following:
a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the
Chief, PNP informing him of the facts of the disappearance and
the action being taken by our office;
b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the
Director, Directorate for Investigation and Detection
Management, NHQ PNP;
c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the
Director, DIDM;
4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis
cannot be determined but our office is continuously intensifying the
conduct of information gathering, monitoring and coordination for the
immediate solution of the case.
Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking
note of favorable actions so far taken on the disappearance, the CA
directed Gen. Goltiao – as the officer in command of the area of
disappearance – to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS.18
Task Force Tagitis
On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS
Supt. Ajirim) to head TASK FORCE TAGITIS.19 The CA subsequently set
three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS was exerting
"extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance of Tagitis.20 As
planned, (1) the first hearing would be to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga
City; (2) the second hearing would be to mobilize intelligence with Abu
Sayyaf and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the
Chief of Police of Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of Police of Zamboanga City
and other police operatives.21
In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to
the CA an intelligence report from PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of
Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a possible motive for Tagitis’
disappearance.22 The intelligence report was apparently based on the
sworn affidavit dated January 4, 2008 of Muhammad Abdulnazeir N.
Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of the
Philippines and an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB Scholarship
Program in the Philippines, who told the Provincial Governor of Sulu
that:23
[Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in
Manila, Tagitis has reportedly taken and carried away… more or less Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to his …
[personal] bank accounts by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, which [was] intended for the … IDB Scholarship Fund.
In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was
alleged to be responsible, he personally went to the CIDG office in
Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular inspection/investigation,
particularly of their detention cells.24 PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the
CIDG, while helping TASK FORCE TAGITIS investigate the disappearance
of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any
abduction.25 He further testified that prior to the hearing, he had
already mobilized and given specific instructions to their supporting
units to perform their respective tasks; that they even talked to, but
failed to get any lead from the respondent in Jolo.26 In his submitted
investigation report dated January 16, 2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded:27
9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the
Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the documents at hand, it is my own initial
conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had no
participation neither [sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious
disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis last October 30, 2007. Since
doubt has been raised regarding the emolument on the Islamic
Development Bank Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly
deposited in the personal account of Engr. Tagitis by the IDB central
office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might [sic]
be done by resentment or sour grape among students who are applying
for the scholar [sic] and were denied which was allegedly
conducted/screened by the subject being the coordinator of said
program.
20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic]
presumed that the motive behind the disappearance of the subject
might be due to the funds he maliciously spent for his personal interest
and wanted to elude responsibilities from the institution where he
belong as well as to the Islamic student scholars should the statement of
Prof. Matli be true or there might be a professional jealousy among
them.
xxxx
It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the
respondents be dropped and dismissed considering on [sic] the police
and military actions in the area particularly the CIDG are exerting their
efforts and religiously doing their tasked [sic] in the conduct of its
intelligence monitoring and investigation for the early resolution of this
instant case. But rest assured, our office, in coordination with other law-
enforcement agencies in the area, are continuously and religiously
conducting our investigation for the resolution of this case. On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that
she is Tagitis’ second wife, and they have been married for thirteen
On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force years; Tagitis was divorced from his first wife. She last communicated
Tagitis did not appear to be exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving with her husband
Tagitis’ disappearance on the following grounds: 28 messaging;
City.34
(1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28,
2008, after the hearing, that GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO and COL.
AHIRON AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it
should have been standard operating procedure in
kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda was for
the police to secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr.
Morced Tagitis, for dissemination to all parts of the country
and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3) months
since GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO admitted having been informed on
November 5, 2007 of the alleged abduction of Engr. Morced
Tagitis by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been more
than one (1) month since the Writ of Amparo had been issued
on December 28, 2007. It had been three (3) weeks when
battle formation was ordered through Task Force Tagitis, on
January 17, 2008. It was only on January 28, 2008 when the
Task Force Tagitis requested for clear and recent photographs
of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, despite the Task
Force Tagitis’ claim that they already had an "all points
bulletin", since November 5, 2007, on the missing person,
Engr. Morced Tagitis. How could the police look for someone
who disappeared if no clear photograph had been
disseminated?
(2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis’ COL. AHIROM AJIRIM
informed this Court that P/Supt KASIM was designated as Col.
Ahirom Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s official designated
post. Yet, P/Supt KASIM’s subpoena was returned to this Court
unserved. Since this Court was made to understand that it was
P/Supt KASIM who was the petitioner’s unofficial source of the
military intelligence information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was
abducted by bad elements of the CIDG (par. 15 of the
Petition), the close contact between P/Supt KASIM and Col.
Ahirom Ajirim of TASK FORCE TAGITIS should have ensured the
appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this court’s subpoena
and COL. KASIM could have confirmed the military intelligence
information that bad elements of the CIDG had abducted Engr.
Morced Tagitis.
Testimonies for the Respondent
On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on
direct examination that she went to Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts
to locate her husband. She said that a friend from Zamboanga holding a
high position in the military (whom she did not then identify) gave her
information that allowed her to "specify" her allegations, "particularly
paragraph 15 of the petition."29 This friend also told her that her
husband "[was] in good hands."30 The respondent also testified that she
sought the assistance of her former boss in Davao City, Land Bank
Bajada Branch Manager Rudy Salvador, who told her that "PNP CIDG is
holding [her husband], Engineer Morced Tagitis."31 The respondent
recounted that she went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City where she met
Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who read to her
and her friends (who were then with her) a "highly confidential report"
that contained the "alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis" and informed
her that her husband was abducted because "he is under custodial
investigation" for being a liaison for "J.I. or Jema’ah Islamiah."32
33
on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through text
Tagitis was then on his way to Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga
The respondent narrated that she learned of her husband’s
disappearance on October 30, 2007 when her stepdaughter, Zaynah
Tagitis (Zaynah), informed her that she had not heard from her father
since the time they arranged to meet in Manila on October 31, 2007.35
The respondent explained that it took her a few days (or on November
5, 2007) to personally ask Kunnong to report her husband’s
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station, since she had the impression
that her husband could not communicate with her because his cellular
phone’s battery did not have enough power, and that he would call her
when he had fully-charged his cellular phone’s battery.36
The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who
gave her the information found in paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt.
Col. Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr (Col. Ancanan). She met him in Camp Karingal,
Zamboanga through her boss.37 She also testified that she was with
three other people, namely, Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin and her two
friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when Col. Kasim read to them
the contents of the "highly confidential report" at Camp Katitipan,
Davao City. The respondent further narrated that the report indicated
that her husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group and
that he was under custodial investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that
her husband was a diabetic taking maintenance medication, and asked
that the Colonel relay to the persons holding him the need to give him
his medication.38
On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative
reports,39 signed by the respondent, detailing her efforts to locate her
husband which led to her meetings with Col. Ancanan of the Philippine
Army and Col. Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her
meeting with Col. Ancanan, the respondent recounted, viz:40
On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs.
Marydel Talbin. Our flight from Davao City is 9:00 o’clock in the morning;
we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00 o’clock. We [were]
fetched by the two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic]
to West Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM).
On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He
interviewed me and got information about the personal background of
Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all information, he revealed
to us the contents of text messages they got from the cellular phone of
the subject Engr. Tagitis. One of the very important text messages of
Engr. Tagitis sent to his daughter Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not
allowed to answer any telephone calls in his condominium unit.
While we were there he did not tell us any information of the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After the said meeting with Col. Ancanan,
he treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to the
mall to purchase our plane ticket going back to Davao City on November
12, 2007.
When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the
morning, Col. Ancanan and I were discussing some points through phone
calls. He assured me that my husband is alive and he’s last looked [sic] in
Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given statements of the
whereabouts of my husband, because I contacted some of my friends
who have access to the groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG. I called up Col.
Ancanan several times begging to tell me the exact location of my
husband and who held him but he refused.
While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again
because the PNP, Jolo did not give me any information of the
whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that "Sana ngayon
alam mo na kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng asawa mo." When I was in
Zamboanga, I was thinking of dropping by the office of Col. Ancanan, but
I was hesitant to pay him a visit for the reason that the Chief of Police of
Jolo told me not to contact any AFP officials and he promised me that he with the respondent together with two other companions, namely,
can solve the case of my husband (Engr. Tagitis) within nine days.
I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my
husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, yet failed to do so.
The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as
follows:41
On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada
Branch, Davao City to meet Mr. Rudy Salvador. I told him that my
husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be abducted in Jolo, it was a "raw report."45 She also related that the Col. Kasim did not tell
Sulu on October 30, 2007. I asked him a favor to contact his connections them exactly where Tagitis was being kept, although he mentioned
in the military in Jolo, Sulu where the abduction of Engr. Tagitis took
place. Mr. Salvador immediately called up Camp Katitipan located in
Davao City looking for high-ranking official who can help me gather
reliable information behind the abduction of subject Engineer Tagitis.
On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza,
Executive Secretary, accompanied me to Camp Katitipan to meet Col.
Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a short
conversation. And he assured me that he’ll do the best he can to help
me find my husband.
After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing
me that I am to go to Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim for he has an
urgent, confidential information to reveal.
On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three
friends. That was the time that Col. Kasim read to us the confidential
report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with] different
terrorist [groups], one of which he mentioned in the report was OMAR
PATIK and a certain SANTOS - a Balik Islam.
It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the
injured terrorists as a supplier. These are the two information that I can
still remember. It was written in a long bond paper with PNP Letterhead.
It was not shown to us, yet Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us.
He asked a favor to me that "Please don’t quote my Name! Because this
is a raw report." He assured me that my husband is alive and he is in the
custody of the military for custodial investigation. I told him to please
take care of my husband because he has aliments and he recently took
insulin for he is a diabetic patient.
In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I
got from Kasim.
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin
Talbin (Mrs. Talbin) to corroborate her testimony regarding her efforts
to locate her husband, in relation particularly with the information she
received from Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the
respondent when she went to Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to
Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim.42
In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan,
who told them that there was a report and that he showed them a
series of text messages from Tagitis’ cellular phone, which showed that
Tagitis and his daughter would meet in Manila on October 30, 2007.43
She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went
Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk to Col.
Kasim.44 The respondent asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location
of Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim told them that Tagitis was in good hands,
although he was not certain whether he was with the PNP or with the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She further recounted that based
on the report Col. Kasim read in their presence, Tagitis was under
custodial investigation because he was being charged with terrorism;
Tagitis in fact had been under surveillance since January 2007 up to the
time he was abducted when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and a
certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Col.
Kasim also told them that he could not give a copy of the report because
Talipapao, Sulu.Prof., lalabas din yan."50 Prof. Matli also emphasized that
despite what his January 4, 2008 affidavit indicated,51 he never told PS
Supt. Pingay, or made any accusation, that Tagitis took away money
entrusted to him.52 Prof. Matli confirmed, however, that that he had
received an e-mail report53 from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim
Affairs in Manila that the IDB was seeking assistance of the office in
locating the funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis’ personal
account.54
On cross-examination by the respondent’s counsel, Prof. Matli testified Talbin. The CA noted that the information that the CIDG, as the police
that his January 4, 2008 affidavit was already prepared when PS Supt. intelligence arm, was involved in Tagitis’ abduction came from no less
Pingay asked him to sign it.55 Prof Matli clarified that although he read than the military – an independent agency of government. The CA thus
the affidavit before signing it, he "was not so much aware of… [its] greatly relied on the "raw report" from Col. Kasim’s asset, pointing to
contents."56 the CIDG’s involvement in Tagitis’ abduction. The CA held that "raw
reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world.
On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent and belated
material portions of the respondent’s testimony, particularly the retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was
allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was in the custody of either the involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
military or the PNP.57 Col. Kasim categorically denied the statements
made by the respondent in her narrative report, specifically: (1) that The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a
Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of medicines as supplier for the injured bedlam of speculation" police theories painting the disappearance as
terrorists; (2) that Tagitis was under the custody of the military, since he "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the
merely said to the respondent that "your husband is in good hands" and law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding
is "probably taken cared of by his armed abductors;" and (3) that Tagitis money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program
was under custodial investigation by the military, the PNP or the CIDG ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her
Zamboanga City.58 Col. Kasim emphasized that the "informal letter" he stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was
received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife," on the basis of
the custody of the CIDG.59 He also stressed that the information he the respondent’s testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have
provided to the respondent was merely a "raw report" sourced from many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all
"barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow-up" as when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the second.
to its veracity.60 Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf
or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’ disappearance,
On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave since the respondent, the police and the military noted that there was
the respondent was given to him by his informant, who was a "civilian no acknowledgement of Tagitis’ abduction or demand for payment of
asset," through a letter which he considered as "unofficial." Col. Kasim ransom – the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.
61

stressed that the letter was only meant for his "consumption" and not
for reading by others.62 He testified further that he destroyed the letter Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the
right after he read it to the respondent and her companions because "it writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose
was not important to him" and also because the information it Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen.
contained had no importance in relation with the abduction of Tagitis.63 Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo
He explained that he did not keep the letter because it did not contain A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life,
any information regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the person(s) liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly
responsible for his abduction.64 reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed
the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen
In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was
presented Police Senior Superintendent Jose Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
Chief of the CIDG-9, to disprove the respondent’s allegation that Tagitis
was in the custody of CIDG-Zamboanga City.65 Col. Pante clarified that On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA
the CIDG was the "investigative arm" of the PNP, and that the CIDG decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 9,
"investigates and prosecutes all cases involving violations in the Revised 2008.73
Penal Code particularly those considered as heinous crimes."66 Col.
Pante further testified that the allegation that 9 RCIDU personnel were THE PETITION
involved in the disappearance of Tagitis was baseless, since they did not
conduct any operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis’ reported
In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CA’s March 7, 2008 decision, the
disappearance.67 Col. Pante added that the four (4) personnel assigned
petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the
to the Sulu CIDT had no capability to conduct any "operation," since they
Amparo petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of the legal
were only assigned to investigate matters and to monitor the terrorism
68 remedies the respondent took before petitioning for the writ; the
situation. He denied that his office conducted any surveillance on
finding that the rights to life, liberty and security of Tagitis had been
Tagitis prior to the latter’s disappearance.69 Col. Pante further testified
violated; the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that
that his investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance was unsuccessful; the
Tagitis was abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was
investigation was "still facing a blank wall" on the whereabouts of
70 responsible for the abduction; and, generally, the ruling that the
Tagitis.
respondent discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the
petition by substantial evidence.74
THE CA RULING
THE COURT’S RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision71 confirming that the
disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under the
We do not find the petition meritorious.
United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances.72 The CA ruled that when military intelligence
pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the Sufficiency in Form and Substance
abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced
disappearance. The conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondent’s
the respondent’s testimony, corroborated by her companion, Mrs. Amparo petition, the petitioners contend that the petition violated
Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the petitioners
allege that the respondent failed to:
1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in
violation of Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security;
2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the
persons responsible for his disappearance, and the
respondent’s source of information;
3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners’
instructions or with their consent;
4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga
alleged to have custody over her husband;
5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her
accusations;
6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners
in the performance of their duties in the investigation of
Tagitis’ disappearance; and
7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine
the fate or whereabouts of her husband.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall
allege, among others (in terms of the portions the petitioners cite):75
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be
complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a
victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of
course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting
76
the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this
requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner
may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or
her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may
purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of
specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to
read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of
judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his
and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing
the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be
to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner
under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a
violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State
or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its
totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to
determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the
State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the
rights to life, liberty or security – are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11
the circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight
after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be
found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its
paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to
reliable information, police operatives were the perpetrators of the
abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and
security were violated when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a
motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives," and then taken "into custody by the respondents’ police
intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG,
PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt of
the police to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist
groups."77
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within
the pleader’s knowledge about Tagitis’ disappearance, the participation
by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to
release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his
whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus,
the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause
of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of
supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule.
facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated
the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that
these can be used as the affiant’s direct testimony.78 This requirement,
however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to
the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this
case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by
submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon,
the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is
essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required
affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs.
Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17
and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the
petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an
alleged disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner
and results of the investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to
establish at the earliest opportunity the level of diligence the public
authorities undertook in relation with the reported disappearance. 79
We reject the petitioners’ argument that the respondent’s petition did
not comply with the Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule, as
companions immediately reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the police
authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively certain that he
indeed had disappeared. The police, however, gave them the "ready
answer" that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group
or other anti-government groups. The respondent also alleged in
paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a "complaint" with
the PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of "an
intriguing tale" by the police that her husband was having "a good time
with another woman." The disappearance was alleged to have been
reported, too, to no less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed by
the respondent’s personal inquiries that yielded the factual bases for her
petition.80
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have
been made to the police authorities, and that investigations should have
followed. That the petition did not state the manner and results of the
investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated
the inaction of the police, their failure to perform their duty to
investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts, should not
be a reflection on the completeness of the petition. To require the
respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority, as well the manner and
conduct of the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section
5(d), given the respondent’s frustrations in securing an investigation
with meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are more than
satisfied that the allegations of the petition on the investigations
undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing the
petition forward.
Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition – that
otherwise is not supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a
proper cause of action – as a means to "fish" for evidence.81 The
petitioners contend that the respondent’s petition did not specify what
"legally available efforts were taken by the respondent," and that there
was an "undue haste" in the filing of the petition when, instead of
cooperating with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked the
Court’s intervention.
We do not see the respondent’s petition as the petitioners view it.
Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
in the present case) allege "the actions and recourses taken to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the
identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission." The thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help
following allegations of the respondent’s petition duly outlined the
actions she had taken and the frustrations she encountered, thus
compelling her to file her petition.
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the
pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a
couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,
forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped
away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong;
xxxx
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the
help of another IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police
agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo,
exerted efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and
when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been]
abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be
fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police
officers, Kunnong reported the matter to the [respondent](wife of Engr.
Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of the
IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of
the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC
meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-
employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del
Sur, who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military
who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
xxxx
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent],
subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives,
specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his
will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr.
Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at
the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking
their help to find her husband, but [the respondent’s] request and
pleadings failed to produce any positive results
xxxx
20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to
go to the ARMM Police Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to
the different Police Headquarters including the police headquarters in
and all these places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for
her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places
from friends and relatives only to try complying to the different
suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts
produced no positive results up to the present time;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and
remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, [respondent] has
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the
release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the
petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total
violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except the
issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent’s petition
for the Writ of Amparo is sufficient in form and substance and that the
Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with its consideration of
the case.
The Desaparecidos
The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in an enforced disappearance situation.
For a deeper appreciation of the application of this Rule to an enforced
disappearance situation, a brief look at the historical context of the writ
and enforced disappearances would be very helpful.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action
first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and
Fog Decree of December 7, 1941.82 The Third Reich’s Night and Fog
Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories
"endangering German security"; they were transported secretly to
Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize
the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government
officials from providing information about the fate of these targeted
persons.83
In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances
resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world when individuals,
numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have
"disappeared" during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced
disappearances spread in Latin America, and the issue became an
international concern when the world noted its widespread and
systematic use by State security forces in that continent under
Operation Condor84 and during the Dirty War85 in the 1970s and 1980s.
The escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly arrested,
tortured, and killed as part of governments’ counter-insurgency
campaigns. As this form of political brutality became routine elsewhere
in the continent, the Latin American media standardized the term
"disappearance" to describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced
disappearances were called the "desaparecidos,"86 which literally means
the "disappeared ones."87 In general, there are three different kinds of
"disappearance" cases:
1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without
positive identification of the arresting agents and are never
found again;
2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an
appropriate warrant and held in complete isolation for weeks
or months while their families are unable to discover their
whereabouts and the military authorities deny having them in
custody until they eventually reappear in one detention center
or another; and
3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until
their lifeless bodies are later discovered.88
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first
two categories,89 and 855 cases were recorded during the period of
martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately
132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former President
Corazon C. Aquino’s term, 820 people were reported to have
disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number, Penal Code and special laws.99 The simple reason is that the Legislature
407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The
number of enforced disappearances dropped during former President
Fidel V. Ramos’ term when only 87 cases were reported, while the
three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58
reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization,
reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a
total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent
President Gloria M. Arroyo’s administration. The Commission on Human
Rights’ records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced
disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained
missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have
undetermined status.90 Currently, the United Nations Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance91 reports 619 outstanding cases
of enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the period
December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.92
Enforced Disappearances
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof."93 We note that
although the writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this
concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records
of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee)
reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing
an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance:94
JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up
or formulate a specific definition [for] extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. From that definition, then we can proceed to formulate
the rules, definite rules concerning the same.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: … As things stand, there is no law penalizing
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances… so initially also we
have to [come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because our
concept of killings and disappearances will define the jurisdiction of the
courts. So we’ll have to agree among ourselves about the nature of
killings and disappearances for instance, in other jurisdictions, the rules
only cover state actors. That is an element incorporated in their concept
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In other
jurisdictions, the concept includes acts and omissions not only of state
actors but also of non state actors. Well, more specifically in the case of
the Philippines for instance, should these rules include the killings, the
disappearances which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or the
leftist organizations and others. So, again we need to define the nature
of the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances that will be
covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95
In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the
House of Representatives96 and in the Senate97 on extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear
textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead
focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to
address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an
elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts.98
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced
from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings
and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised
has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are
criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should
carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the
power to enact under the country’s constitutional scheme and power
structure.
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the
Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional
mandate to promulgate "rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts,"100 since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by
their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of
the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security.
Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that
the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it
sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The
Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards
and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or
threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious,
judicial intervention can make a difference – even if only procedurally –
in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may
have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional
rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again
that we do not rule on any issue of criminal culpability for the
extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that
requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing
penal laws. Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced
disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable
for this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate
remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to
discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is
twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and
investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this
Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual
situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that
the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security
restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ
are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the
extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the
complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim,
by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his
or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the
commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
Enforced Disappearance
Under International Law
From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced
disappearance is considered a flagrant violation of human rights.101 It
does not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of the
desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial of their
right to information regarding the circumstances of the disappeared
family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been said to be "a
double form of torture," with "doubly paralyzing impact for the victims,"
as they "are kept ignorant of their own fates, while family members are
deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved ones" and
suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most
cases follow the disappearance of the household breadwinner.102
The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of "Disappeared
Persons" in December 1978 under Resolution 33/173. The Resolution
expressed the General Assembly’s deep concern arising from "reports
from various parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary
disappearances," and requested the "UN Commission on Human Rights
to consider the issue of enforced disappearances with a view to making
appropriate recommendations."103
In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced
disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the UN General
Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (Declaration).104 This Declaration, for the first
time, provided in its third preambular clause a working description of
enforced disappearance, as follows:
Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner,
enforced disappearances occur, in the sense that persons are arrested,
detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their
liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by
organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the
support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government,
followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty,
which places such persons outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis
supplied]
Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General
Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention).105 The Convention
was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007.106 Article
2 of the Convention defined enforced disappearance as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is
considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or
by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis
supplied]
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert
that there is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance107 and
that this right is non-derogable.108 It provides that no one shall be
subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a
state of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency.
It obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an offense
punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law.109 It also
recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the
society as a whole to know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the
disappeared and on the progress and results of the investigation.110
Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing offense, such
that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and
whereabouts of the victim are established.111
Binding Effect of UN
Action on the Philippines
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention,
so that the country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing
enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal law,
however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as
heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance is a
violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the
Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its
rule-making powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the
Court is guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the
Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the
various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions
touching on humans rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines
pledged to "promote universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race,
sex, language or religion."112 Although no universal agreement has been
reached on the precise extent of the "human rights and fundamental
freedoms" guaranteed to all by the Charter,113 it was the UN itself that
issued the Declaration on enforced disappearance, and this Declaration
states:114
Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is
condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United
Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and reaffirmed and developed in international
instruments in this field. [Emphasis supplied]
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy
matter made in a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance
cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own adherence to
"generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land."115
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines v. Duque III,116 we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by
mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]
We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as
norms of general or customary international law that are binding on all
states. We held further:117
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical
formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as
binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates
(opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief
that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]
The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law
today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
which provides that the Court shall apply "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law."118 The material sources
of custom include State practice, State legislation, international and
national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international
instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of
international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the
UN General Assembly.119 Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of
international law,120 these sources identify the substance and content of
the obligations of States and are indicative of the "State practice" and
"opinio juris" requirements of international law.121 We note the
following in these respects:
First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the
Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly adopted the
Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in
June 1994.122 State parties undertook under this Convention "not to
practice, permit, or tolerate the forced disappearance of persons, even
in states of emergency or suspension of individual guarantees." 123 One
of the key provisions includes the States’ obligation to enact the crime of
forced disappearance in their respective national criminal laws and to
establish jurisdiction over such cases when the crime was committed
within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State, and
"when the alleged criminal is within its territory and it does not proceed
to extradite him," which can be interpreted as establishing universal
jurisdiction among the parties to the Inter-American Convention.124 At
present, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have
enacted separate laws in accordance with the Inter-American
Convention and have defined activities involving enforced
disappearance to be criminal.1251avvphi1
Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no
explicit provision dealing with the protection against enforced
disappearance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however,
has applied the Convention in a way that provides ample protection for
the underlying rights affected by enforced disappearance through the
Convention’s Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on the prohibition of
torture; Article 5 on the right to liberty and security; Article 6, paragraph
1 on the right to a fair trial; and Article 13 on the right to an effective
remedy. A leading example demonstrating the protection afforded by
the European Convention is Kurt v. Turkey,126 where the ECHR found a
violation of the right to liberty and security of the disappeared person
when the applicant’s son disappeared after being taken into custody by
Turkish forces in the Kurdish village of Agilli in November 1993. It further
found the applicant (the disappeared person’s mother) to be a victim of
a violation of Article 3, as a result of the silence of the authorities and
the inadequate character of the investigations undertaken. The ECHR
also saw the lack of any meaningful investigation by the State as a
violation of Article 13.127
Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced
disappearance as part of customary international law is recognized in
the most recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The Third,128 which
provides that "[a] State violates international law if, as a matter of State
policy, it practices, encourages, or condones… (3) the murder or causing
the disappearance of individuals."129 We significantly note that in a
related matter that finds close identification with enforced
disappearance – the matter of torture – the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala130 that
the prohibition on torture had attained the status of customary
international law. The court further elaborated on the significance of UN
declarations, as follows:
These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great
precision the obligations of member nations under the Charter. Since
their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they do not
know what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote."
Moreover, a U.N. Declaration is, according to one authoritative
definition, "a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions
when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated."
Accordingly, it has been observed that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of ‘binding treaty’
against ‘non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative
statement of the international community." Thus, a Declaration creates
an expectation of adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is
gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom
become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States."
Indeed, several commentators have concluded that the Universal
Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary
international law. [Citations omitted]
Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy)
of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to
which the Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the UN
Human Rights Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, has stated that the act of enforced disappearance
violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and
security of the person) of the ICCPR, and the act may also amount to a
crime against humanity. 131
Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC) also covers enforced disappearances
insofar as they are defined as crimes against humanity,132 i.e., crimes
"committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack." While more than 100
countries have ratified the Rome Statute,133 the Philippines is still merely
a signatory and has not yet ratified it. We note that Article 7(1) of the
Rome Statute has been incorporated in the statutes of other
international and hybrid tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special Court,
the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.134 In addition, the
implementing legislation of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC
has given rise to a number of national criminal provisions also covering
enforced disappearance. 135
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the
Convention on enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the
Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as
a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as
a State practice has been repudiated by the international community, so
that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international
law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which
we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and
the international conventions that bind us.
The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the ICCPR and the International Convention on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the course of a
disappearance:136
1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;
2) the right to liberty and security of the person;
3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed;
5) the right to an identity;
6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;
7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and
compensation;
8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a arise notably in respect of those violations recognized as criminal under
disappearance.
9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;
10) the right to an adequate standard of living;
11) the right to health; and
12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]
Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party,
provides:
Article 2
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall
have his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce
such remedies when granted. [Emphasis supplied]
In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined
that the right to an effective remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR
includes the obligation of the State to investigate ICCPR violations
promptly, thoroughly, and effectively, viz:137
15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective
protection of Covenant rights, States Parties must ensure that
individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate
those rights… The Committee attaches importance to States Parties'
establishing appropriate judicial and administrative mechanisms for
addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law…
Administrative mechanisms are particularly required to give effect to the
general obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly,
thoroughly and effectively through independent and impartial bodies. A
failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in
and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of
an ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an effective
remedy. [Emphasis supplied]
The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General
Comment No. 31 that failure to investigate as well as failure to bring to
justice the perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and of itself give rise
to a separate breach of the Covenant, thus:138
18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal
violations of certain Covenant rights, States Parties must ensure that
those responsible are brought to justice. As with failure to investigate,
failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of
itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. These obligations
either domestic or international law, such as torture and similar cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment (article 7), summary and arbitrary
killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance (articles 7 and 9 and,
frequently, 6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these violations, a
matter of sustained concern by the Committee, may well be an
important contributing element in the recurrence of the violations.
When committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a
civilian population, these violations of the Covenant are crimes against
humanity (see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article
7). [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,139 this Court, in ruling that
the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one’s
right by the government, held that:
Amparo by the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule, we shall
discuss briefly the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced
disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting that the
implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter.
These difficulties largely arise because the State itself – the party whose
involvement is alleged – investigates enforced disappearances. Past
experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties
are generally threefold.

The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the
policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under direct perpetrators.141 Experts note that abductors are well organized,
Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the armed and usually members of the military or police forces, thus:
chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of
the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons
government does not afford protection to these rights especially when acting under some form of governmental authority. In many countries
they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective the units that plan, implement and execute the program are generally
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend specialized, highly-secret bodies within the armed or security forces.
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances They are generally directed through a separate, clandestine chain of
(or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the command, but they have the necessary credentials to avoid or prevent
bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the any interference by the "legal" police forces. These authorities take their
importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz: victims to secret detention centers where they subject them to
interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or other controls.142
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and
not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are,
must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on
duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the the disappearance out of fear for their own lives.143 We have had
initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without occasion to note this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo144
an effective search for the truth by the government. [Emphasis supplied] when we acknowledged that "where powerful military officers are
implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against
Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,140 where the ECHR interpreted them comes as no surprise."
the "right to security" not only as a prohibition on the State against
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition of a positiveSecond, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the
duty to afford protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence in an
quoted the following ECHR ruling: enforced disappearance – i.e., the corpus delicti or the victim’s body – is
usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or
[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in the progress of one that may have begun.145 The problem for the
conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but victim’s family is the State’s virtual monopoly of access to pertinent
must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to evidence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed
protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over in the landmark case of Velasquez Rodriguez146 that inherent to the
that individual, it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of the State’s
her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the
the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk concealment as a clear attempt by the State to commit the perfect
of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into crime.147
an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not
been seen since. [Emphasis supplied] Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities
deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred.148
These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the
of Amparo, which the Court made effective on October 24, 2007. absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the
Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled through application of legal standards ensuring the victim’s human rights.149
substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete Experience shows that government officials typically respond to
definition of "enforced disappearance," the materials cited above, requests for information about desaparecidos by saying that they are
among others, provide ample guidance and standards on how, through not aware of any disappearance, that the missing people may have fled
the medium of the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide remedies and the country, or that their names have merely been invented.150
protect the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that underlie
every enforced disappearance. These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties
we confront, in one form or another, in our consideration of this case.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed
by the Unique Nature of an Evidence and Burden of Proof in
Enforced Disappearance Enforced Disappearances Cases

Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged
the burden of proving the allegations of the petition for the Writ of
Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an
Amparo proceeding and the degree and burden of proof the parties to
the case carry, as follows:
Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be
summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of
obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
xxxx
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. – The
parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that
extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and
regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed or evade
responsibility or liability.
Section 18. Judgment. – … If the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ
and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied. [Emphasis supplied]
These characteristics – namely, of being summary and the use of
substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the
usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in
court proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the framers of the
Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding,
albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The
standard of diligence required – the duty of public officials and
employees to observe extraordinary diligence – point, too, to the
extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional
rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to
properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of
Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by
substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the
standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must
show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances
showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to
appropriately respond.
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations151
provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial
evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative
proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that ‘the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the
mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order.
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without
a basis in evidence having rational probative force. [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,152 which was the Court’s first petition
for a Writ of Amparo, we recognized that the full and exhaustive
proceedings that the substantial evidence standard regularly requires do
not need to apply due to the summary nature of Amparo proceedings.
We said:
The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is
not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence
that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. [Emphasis supplied]
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo
petitions are the unique difficulties presented by the nature of enforced
disappearances, heretofore discussed, which difficulties this Court must
frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its
objectives. These evidentiary difficulties compel the Court to adopt
standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without
transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every
proceeding.
In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,153 the IACHR – faced with a
lack of direct evidence that the government of Honduras was involved in
Velasquez Rodriguez’ disappearance – adopted a relaxed and informal
evidentiary standard, and established the rule that presumes
governmental responsibility for a disappearance if it can be proven that
the government carries out a general practice of enforced
disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice.154
The IACHR took note of the realistic fact that enforced disappearances
could be proven only through circumstantial or indirect evidence or by
logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an
individual had been made to disappear. It held:
130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct
evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, is not the only type of
evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a decision.
Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered,
so long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the facts.
131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in
allegations of disappearances, because this type of repression is
characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the
kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis
supplied]
In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez
(Manfredo) was carried out by agents who acted under cover of public
authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including the
hearsay testimony of Zenaida Velásquez, the victim’s sister, who
described Manfredo’s kidnapping on the basis of conversations she had
with witnesses who saw Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian clothes
in broad daylight. She also told the Court that a former Honduran
military official had announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a
special military squadron acting under orders of the Chief of the Armed
Forces.155 The IACHR likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a
second witness who asserted that he had been told by a Honduran
military officer about the disappearance, and a third witness who
testified that he had spoken in prison to a man who identified himself as
Manfredo.156
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the
unique circumstances that enforced disappearance cases pose to the
courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be
responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we
cannot be arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as
arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an
effective counter-measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is
addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the other hand, we
cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider
evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely,
the proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule,
technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we
must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in
considering the evidence we shall take into account.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of
evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence
otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we
reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance
of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other
pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be
admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of
evidence is not at all novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse
cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness157 is
expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule
allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any
act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal
proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-
examination by the adverse party. The admission of the statement is
determined by the court in light of specified subjective and objective
considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child
witness.158 These requisites for admission find their counterpart in the
present case under the above-described conditions for the exercise of
flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence,
in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Assessment of the Evidence
The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced
disappearance within the meaning of this term under the UN
Declaration we have cited?
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law."159 Under this definition, the
elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially
fourfold:160
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a
concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the
protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually
disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went
out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the
hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed
conclusion, however, from all concerned – the petitioner, Tagitis’
colleagues and even the police authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared
under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. The
respondent injected the causal element in her petition and testimony, as
we shall discuss below.
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP
CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested Tagitis. If at all, only the
respondent’s allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga
custody stands on record, but it is not supported by any other evidence,
direct or circumstantial.
In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of
information as her bases for her allegation that Tagistis had been placed
under government custody (in contrast with CIDG Zamboanga custody).
The first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col.
Ancanan), who occupied a high position in the military and who
allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands. Nothing came out
of this claim, as both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs.
Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any information
that Tagitis was in government custody. Col. Ancanan, for his part,
admitted the meeting with the respondent but denied giving her any
information about the disappearance.
The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim,
whom the respondent, together with her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in
Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote the relevant portions of the
respondent’s testimony:
Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the
whereabouts of your husband particularly those in charge of any records
or investigation?
A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col.
Casim, told me that my husband is being abducted [sic] because he is
under custodial investigation because he is allegedly "parang liason ng
J.I.", sir.
Q: What is J.I.?
A: Jema’ah Islamiah, sir.
Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those
visits of yours in that Camp?
A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said
those reports are highly confidential, sir.
Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?
A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report?
A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.161 [Emphasis supplied]
She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:
Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted
and under custodial investigation?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report?
A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic]
were highly confidential. That is a military report, ma’am.
Q: But you were able to read the contents?
A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, ma’am.
Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim?
A: There were three of us, ma’am.
Q: Who were your companions?
A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao
Oriental, ma’am.162
xxxx
Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was
your reaction and what did you do?
A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other investigation. He said until we can get some information. But he also
people na parang mga terorista na mga tao. Tapos at the end of the
report is [sic] under custodial investigation. So I told him "Colonel, my was not official, sir.
husband is sick. He is diabetic at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi
lang sa naghohold sa asawa ko na bigyan siya ng gamot, ma’am."163
xxxx
Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is
being held by the CIDG in Zamboanga, did you go to CIDG Zamboanga to
verify that information?
A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead.
Enough na yun na effort ko because I know that they would deny it,
ma’am.164
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to
corroborate her testimony that her husband was abducted and held
under custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz:
Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime
November 24, 2007, who was with you when you went there?
A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.
Q: Only the two of you?
A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.
Q: Who were they?
A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan
during that time?
A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The four of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time?
A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact
location, if he can furnish us the location of Engr. Tagitis. And he was
reading this report. He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands. He is
with the military, but he is not certain whether he is with the AFP or
PNP. He has this serious case. He was charged of terrorism because he
was under surveillance from January 2007 up to the time that he was
abducted. He told us that he was under custodial investigation. As I’ve
said earlier, he was seen under surveillance from January. He was seen
talking to Omar Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is also a Balik
Islam and charged with terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of
medicines. Then we asked him how long will he be in custodial
told us that he cannot give us that report because it was a raw report. It
Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document
form, in a piece of paper or was it in the computer or what?
A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I don’t know informant’s letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had
if it was computerized but I’m certain that it was typewritten. I’m not been under surveillance since January 2007, was "in good hands" and
sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir. under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen
talking to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik
Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he Islam" charged with terrorism. The respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s
was reading in a summary form? testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasim’s plain denial and
his claim that he had destroyed his informant’s letter, the critical piece
of evidence that supports or negates the parties’ conflicting claims. Col.
A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir.165
Kasim’s admitted destruction of this letter – effectively, a suppression of
this evidence – raises the presumption that the letter, if produced,
xxxx would be proof of what the respondent claimed.171 For brevity, we shall
call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to be
Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during the "Kasim evidence."
that time?
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept
A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he this evidence, in lieu of direct evidence, as proof that the disappearance
mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir. of Tagitis was due to action with government participation, knowledge
or consent and that he was held for custodial investigation. We note in
Q: After that incident, what did you do if any? this regard that Col. Kasim was never quoted to have said that the
custodial investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence
only implies government intervention through the use of the term
A: We just left and as I’ve mentioned, we just waited because that raw "custodial investigation," and does not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga
information that he was reading to us [sic] after the custodial as Tagitis’ custodian.
investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis supplied]166
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay
Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her evidence – i.e., evidence whose probative value is not based on the
friends, and that he provided them information based on the input of an personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and
unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that the "informal Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on
letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that the witness stand (the informant).172
Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the
information he provided the respondent was merely a "raw report" from
"barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow up" as To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible
to its veracity.167 evidence of what it substantively states is to acknowledge – as the
petitioners effectively suggest – that in the absence of any direct
evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an
To be sure, the respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies were far immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from a statement that
from perfect, as the petitioners pointed out. The respondent mistakenly the Amparo Rule – despite its terms – is ineffective, as it cannot allow
characterized Col. Kasim as a "military officer" who told her that "her for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in
husband is being abducted because he is under custodial investigation Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced
because he is allegedly ‘parang liason ng J.I.’" The petitioners also noted disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent
that "Mrs. Talbin’s testimony imputing certain statements to Sr. Supt. or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for
Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the military, but he is not certain whether constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely
it is the PNP or AFP is not worthy of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in
ranking police officer who would certainly know that the PNP is not part extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may
of the military." require. Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary
difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that
Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what these difficulties demand.1avvphi1
appears clear to us is that the petitioners never really steadfastly
disputed or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we
respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the
petitioners point out relate, more than anything else, to details that available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of
should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the evidence – even of those usually considered inadmissible under the
inconsistencies are not on material points.168 We note, for example, that general rules of evidence – taking into account the surrounding
these witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police matters circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum
are concerned, and confusion between the police and the military is not admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least
unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and
truthfulness rather than prevarication169and only tend to strengthen meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent
their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses with other evidence in the case.
dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that
the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well
thought of and prefabricated story.170 The evidence about Tagitis’ personal circumstances surrounded him
with an air of mystery. He was reputedly a consultant of the World Bank
and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a seminar in
Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay,
enforced disappearance cases, we hold it duly established that Col. indicated by his request to Kunnong for the purchase of a return ticket
Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based on the to Zamboanga the day after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records
indicates the purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when
IDB, Prof. Matli, early on informed the Jolo police that Tagitis may have the CA constituted Task Force Tagitis, with specific directives on what to
taken funds given to him in trust for IDB scholars. Prof Matli later on do. The negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ were again
stated that he never accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust, replicated during the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the
although he confirmed that the IDB was seeking assistance in locating previously mentioned "retraction" that Prof. Matli made to correct his
funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis’ personal account. Other than accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for students, PS Supt.
these pieces of evidence, no other information exists in the records Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that the CIDG consistently denied any
relating to the personal circumstances of Tagitis. knowledge or complicity in any abduction and said that there was no
basis to conclude that the CIDG or any police unit had anything to do
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal with the disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it premature
circumstances. While the Amparo petition recited that he was taken to conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his custody.
away by "burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," no As already noted above, the Task Force notably did not pursue any
evidence whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation. Thus, investigation about the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his
the available direct evidence is that Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of background in relation to the IDB and the background and activities of
October 30, 2007 – the day he arrived in Jolo – and was never seen this Bank itself, and the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and
again. his alleged custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever
been made to look into the alleged IDB funds that Tagitis held in trust, or
to tap any of the "assets" who are indispensable in investigations of this
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of
nature. These omissions and negative results were aggravated by the CA
direct evidence on the above aspects of the case, as it supplies the gaps
findings that it was only as late as January 28, 2008 or three months
that were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the
after the disappearance that the police authorities requested for clear
evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an
pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not attend the trial because his
enforced disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation
subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he was designated as
by agents of the State and thus brings into question how the State
Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not
reacted to the disappearance.
then questioned. No investigation – even an internal one – appeared to
have been made to inquire into the identity of Col. Kasim’s "asset" and
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part what he indeed wrote.
of the respondent, characterize the attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in
Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been taken by
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a
the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the government. No evidence
consistency in the government’s denial of any complicity in the
was ever offered on whether there was active Jolo police investigation
disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col.
and how and why the Jolo police arrived at this conclusion. The
Kasim to the respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however,
respondent’s own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was not
eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was
missing but was with another woman somewhere. Again, no evidence
under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another
exists that this explanation was arrived at based on an investigation. As
distinctive trait that runs through these developments is the
already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga
government’s dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from
yielded ambivalent results not useful for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it
the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnong’s initial reports of the
was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col.
disappearance, to the responses made to the respondent when she
Kasim’s story, however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial
herself reported and inquired about her husband’s disappearance, and
investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction), without
even at Task Force Tagitis itself.
identifying his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody. The more
significant part of Col. Kasim’s story is that the abduction came after
Tagitis was seen talking with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best
a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too, that haphazard since the authorities were looking for a man whose picture
Tagitis was being held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the police agencies they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the
participating in the investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, Task CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to
Force Tagitis to which this information was relayed did not appear to searching for custodial records of Tagitis in their various departments
have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case. and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a
"black" operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized,
no record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis,
More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA
too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention places.
made by the petitioners. Then PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely
In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or
reported the directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and the
details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure,
Regional Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely
reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they
reiterated the open-ended initial report of the disappearance. The CIDG
directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful
directed a search in all of its divisions with negative results. These, to the
investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities
PNP Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all possible efforts." PNP-CIDG
undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities
Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for his part, also reported negative
from the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence
results after searching "all divisions and departments [of the CIDG] for a
that the Amparo Rule requires.
person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent and
thorough research, records show that no such person is being detained
in the CIDG or any of its department or divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Supt. Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC
Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better in their affidavits-returns, Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure,
as they essentially reported the results of their directives to their units made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some
to search for Tagitis. government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but
unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to
this conclusion. For why would the government and its officials engage
in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what
they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and
thorough investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of
Tagitis be a feather in the government’s cap under the circumstances of
the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and
developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a
concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers.
From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted,173
the evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact
of the enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a
background of consistent and unfounded government denials and
haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis
outside the protection of the law – a situation that will subsist unless
this Court acts.
This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without
precedent in international enforced disappearance rulings. While the
facts are not exactly the same, the facts of this case run very close to
those of Timurtas v. Turkey,174 a case decided by ECHR. The European
tribunal in that case acted on the basis of the photocopy of a "post-
operation report" in finding that Abdulvahap Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this
abducted and later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the government
of Turkey. The victim's father in this case brought a claim against Turkey
for numerous violations of the European Convention, including the right WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners’ petition for
to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and security of a person (Article review on certiorari for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the
5). The applicant contended that on August 14, 1993, gendarmes
apprehended his son, Abdulvahap for being a leader of the Kurdish
Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Silopi region. The petition was filed in
southeast Turkey nearly six and one half years after the apprehension.
According to the father, gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap and then
transferred him to another detainment facility. Although there was no
eyewitness evidence of the apprehension or subsequent detainment,
the applicant presented evidence corroborating his version of events,
including a photocopy of a post-operation report signed by the
commander of gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey. The report
included a description of Abdulvahap's arrest and the result of a
subsequent interrogation during detention where he was accused of
being a leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was
held responsible for Abdulvahap’s enforced disappearance.
Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine
legal setting and the Amparo remedy this Court has established, as
applied to the unique facts and developments of this case – we believe
and so hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the
PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together
with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Tagitis.
The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act
No. 6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law,"175 specifies the PNP as the
governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent
crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice
and assist in their prosecution." The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane
Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the "investigative arm"
of the PNP and is mandated to "investigate and prosecute all cases
involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, particularly those
considered as heinous crimes."176 Under the PNP organizational
structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes
involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and operates against
organized crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).177 No indication exists in
this case showing that the President ever directly intervened by
assigning the investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance exclusively to the
NBI.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members
were the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government
completely failed to exercise the extral'>To fully enforce the Amparo
remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings
directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations
and actions, and the validation of their results through hearings the CA
may deem appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these investigations,
the PNP/PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the CA a plan of action for
further investigation, periodically reporting the detailed results of its
investigation to the CA for its consideration and action. On behalf of this
Court, the CA shall pass upon: the need for the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to
make disclosures of matters known to them as indicated in this Decision
and as further CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners’ submissions;
the sufficiency of their investigative efforts; and submit to this Court a
quarterly report containing its actions and recommendations, copy
furnished the petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due
at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision.
The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their
investigation. The CA shall submit its full report for the consideration of
Decision.
Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms:
a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N.
Tagitis is an enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo;
b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship
and responsibility, declaring the government (through the PNP
and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer
Morced N. Tagitis;
c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court
of Appeals issued;
d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG,
through its Chief, directly responsible for the disclosure of
material facts known to the government and to their offices
regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis,
and for the conduct of proper investigations using
extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show
investigation results acceptable to this Court;
e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this
case and holding him accountable with the obligation to
disclose information known to him and to his "assets" in
relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced
N. Tagitis;
f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP
and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of
their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present
to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further
investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court
of Appeals for consideration and action;
 g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a
quarterly report with its recommendations, copy furnished the
incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the
respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first
quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to
undertake their investigations; the Court of Appeals shall
submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the
end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this
Decision;
These directives and those of the Court of Appeals’ made pursuant to
this Decision shall be given to, and shall be directly enforceable against,
whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police
and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of
contempt from this Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure
and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case
demand. Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying
attendant circumstances, these directives – particularly, the referral
back to and monitoring by the CA – are specific to this case and are not
standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander
Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael,
Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, is hereby
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183713. June 22, 2010.*
EDITA T. BURGOS, petitioner, vs. CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.; Commanding
General of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO; and Chief of
the Philippine National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR.,
respondents.
Writ of Amparo; The Court concludes that the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have so far failed to
conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the
disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary
diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo requires.—Considering the findings of the CA and our review of
the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP
have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation
into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary
diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot
rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using
extraordinary diligence, is undertaken. From the records, we note that
there are very significant lapses in the handling of the investigation—
among them the PNP-CIDG’s failure to identify the cartographic sketches
of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas based on
their interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction. This lapse is based on
the information provided to the petitioner by no less than State
Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the DOJ who identified the persons who
were possibly involved in the abduction, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas
(Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force),
M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly
assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the
AFP. No search and certification were ever made on whether these
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, v. CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
persons were AFP personnel or in other branches of the service, such as
the Philippine Air Force. As testified to by the petitioner, no significant
follow through was also made by the PNP-CIDG in ascertaining the
identities of the cartographic sketches of two of the abductors despite the
evidentiary leads provided by State Prosecutor Velasco of the DOJ.
Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the lead investigating agency in the present
case, did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the
case.
Same; Commission on Human Rights; The Court resolves to refer the
present case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the Court’s
directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the
investigation of the Burgos abduction and the gathering of evidence, with
the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this
Court.—Based on these considerations, we conclude that further
investigation and monitoring should be undertaken. While significant
leads have been provided to investigators, the investigations by the PNP-
CIDG, the AFP Provost Marshal, and even the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) have been less than complete. The PNP-CIDG’s investigation
particularly leaves much to be desired in terms of the extraordinary
diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. For this reason,
we resolve to refer the present case to the CHR as the Court’s directly
commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation
of the Burgos abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the
obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this
Court. We take into consideration in this regard that the CHR is a
specialized and independent agency created and empowered by the
Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines. Under
this mandate, the CHR is tasked to conduct appropriate investigative
proceedings, including field investigations—acting as the Court’s directly
commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo—
with the tasks of: (a) ascertaining the identities of the persons appearing
in the cartographic sketches of the two alleged abductors as well as their
whereabouts; (b) determining based on records, past and present, the
identities and locations of the persons identified by State Prosecutor
Velasco alleged to be involved in the abduction of Jonas Burgos vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 621 SCRA 481, G.R. No. 183711 June 22, 2010
EN BANC
G.R. No. 178497, February 04, 2014
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, v. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT.
GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN.
DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES
FELICIANO, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 183711]
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, v. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT.
GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN.
DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES
FELICIANO, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 183712]
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, v. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT.
GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL.
MELQUIADES FELICIANO, AND LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 183713]
OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.;
COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY, LT. GEN.
 ALEXANDER YANO; AND CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, security were violated by the Government have been fully determined.
DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., Respondents.
Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day
RESOLUTION of April 28, 2007 the forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of
about seven (7) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag
Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall,
BRION, J.:
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.

We resolve in this Resolution all the pending incidents in this case,
specifically:
(a) The determination of the relevance and advisability of the public
disclosure of the documents submitted by respondents President
Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo, Lt. Gen. Romeo P. Tolentino, Maj. Gen.
Juanito Gomez, Maj. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Lt. Col. Noel Clement, Lt.
Col. Melquiades Feliciano, Director General Oscar Calderon, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon, Jr.; Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen.
Alexander Yano; and Chief of the Philippine National Police, Director
General Avelino Razon, Jr. to this Court per paragraph III (i) of the
fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution; and
xxx
The eyewitnesses mentioned above were Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey) and
Elsa Agasang (Elsa), who at the time of the abduction were working as
busboy and Trainee–Supervisor, respectively, at Hapag Kainan
Restaurant.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the face
of HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors,
apart from the faces of the two abductors in the cartographic sketches
that he described to the police, after he was shown by the Team the
pictures in the PMA Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and group
pictures of men taken some years thereafter.

(b) The Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela1 (together with The same group of pictures were shown to detained former 56th IB
sealed attachments) filed by petitioner Edita T. Burgos praying that Army trooper Edmond M. Dag–uman (Dag–uman), who also positively
the Court: (1) order the persons named in the sealed documents identified Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr. Daguman’s Sinumpaang Salaysay states
impleaded in CA–G.R. SP No. 00008–WA and G.R. No. 183713; (2) that he came to know Lt. Baliaga as a Company Commander in the 56th
issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly discovered evidence IB while he was still in the military service (with Serial No. 800693,
(the sealed attachments to the motion); and (3) refer the cases to from 1997 to 2002) also with the 56th IB but under 1Lt. Usmalik
the Court of Appeals (CA) for further hearings on the newly Tayaban, the Commander of Bravo Company. When he was arrested
discovered evidence. and brought to the 56th IB Camp in April 2005, he did not see Lt. Baliaga
anymore at the said camp. The similar reaction that the pictures elicited
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS from both Jeffrey and Daguman did not pass unnoticed by the Team.
Both men always look pensive, probably because of the pathetic plight
A. The Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution they are in right now. It came as a surprise therefore to the Team when
they could hardly hide their smile upon seeing the face of Baliaga, as if
These incidents stemmed from our June 22, 2010 Resolution referring they know the man very well.
the present case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the
Court’s directly commissioned agency, tasked with the continuation of Moreover, when the Team asked how certain Jeffrey was or [sic] that it
the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos’ abduction with the was indeed Baliaga that he saw as among those who actually
obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this participated in Jonas’ abduction. Jeffrey was able to give a graphic
Court. This referral was necessary as the investigation by the Philippine description and spontaneously, to boot, the blow by blow account of the
National Police–Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP–CIDG), incident, including the initial positioning of the actors, specially Baliaga,
by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Provost Marshal, and even who even approached, talked to, and prevented him from interfering in
the initial CHR investigation had been less than complete. In all of them, their criminal act.
there were significant lapses in the handling of the investigation. In
particular, we highlighted the PNP–CIDG’s failure to identify the A Rebel–returnee (RR) named Maria Vita Lozada y Villegas @KA MY, has
cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five identified the face of the female in the cartographic sketch as a certain
abductors of Jonas, based on their interview with the eyewitnesses to Lt. Fernando. While Lozada refuses to include her identification of Lt.
the abduction. Fernando in her Sinumpaang Salaysay for fear of a backlash, she told the
Team that she was certain it was Lt. Fernando in the cartographic sketch
In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CA’s dismissal of the since both of them were involved in counter–insurgency operations at
petitions for Contempt and issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to the 56th IB, while she was under the care of the battalion from March
President Macapagal–Arroyo who was then entitled, as President, to 2006 until she left the 56th IB Headquarters in October 2007. Lozada’s
immunity from suit. involvement in counter–insurgency operations together with Lt.
Fernando was among the facts gathered by the CHR Regional Office 3
The March 15, 2011 CHR Report Investigators, whose investigation into the enforced disappearance of
Jonas Joseph Burgos was documented by way of an After Mission Report
On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation dated August 13, 2008.
Report on the Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in
compliance with our June 22, 2010 Resolution. On the basis of the Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified had it
gathered evidence, the CHR submitted the following not been for what is otherwise called as evidentiary difficulties
findings:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary shamelessly put up by some police and military elites. The deliberate
Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case, the refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with the requested documents
CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos does not only defy the Supreme Court directive to the AFP but ipso
had transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life liberty and facto created a disputable presumption that AFP personnel were
responsible for the abduction and that their superiors would be found
accountable, if not responsible, for the crime committed. This
observation finds support in the disputable presumption “That evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.” (Paragraph (e),
Section 3, Rule 131 on Burden of Proof and Presumptions, Revised Rules
on Evidence of the Rules of Court of the Philippines).
In saying that the requested document is irrelevant, the Team has
deemed that the requested documents and profiles would help
ascertain the true identities of the cartographic sketches of two
abductors because a certain Virgilio Eustaquio has claimed that one of
the intelligence operatives involved in the 2007 ERAP 5 case fits the
description of his abductor.
As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56th IB
officer Lt. HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors has
effectively crushed the theory of the CIDG witnesses that the NPAs
abducted Jonas. Baliaga’s true identity and affiliation with the military
have been established by overwhelming evidence corroborated by
detained former Army trooper Dag–uman.
For lack of material time, the Commission will continue to investigate
the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos as an independent body
and pursuant to its mandate under the 1987 Constitution. Of particular
importance are the identities and locations of the persons appearing in
the cartographic sketches; the allegations that CIDG Witnesses Emerito
G. Lipio and Meliza Concepcion–Reyes are AFP enlisted personnel and
the alleged participation of Delfin De Guzman @ Ka Baste in the
abduction of Jonas Burgos whose case for Murder and Attempted
Murder was dismissed by the court for failure of the lone witness, an
army man of the 56th IB to testify against him.
Interview with Virgilio Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for
Democracy and Justice (UMDJ), revealed that the male abductor of
Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic sketch was among the
raiders who abducted him and four others, identified as Jim
Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona
otherwise known as ERAP FIVE.
Unfortunately, and as already pointed out above, The Judge Advocate
General (TJAG) turned down the request of the Team for a profile of the
operatives in the so–called “Erap 5” abduction on the ground of
relevancy and branded the request as a fishing expedition per its
Disposition Form dated September 21, 2010.
Efforts to contact Virgilio Eustaquio to secure his affidavit proved futile,
as his present whereabouts cannot be determined. And due to lack of
material time, the Commission decided to pursue the same and
determine the whereabouts of the other members of the “Erap 5” on its
own time and authority as an independent
body.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
B. The Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution
On July 5, 2011, in light of the new evidence and leads the CHR
uncovered, we issued a Resolution: (1) issuing anew a Writ of Habeas
Corpus and referring the habeas corpus petition to the CA; (2) holding in
abeyance our ruling on the merits of the Amparo aspect of the case;
referring back the same to the CA in order to allow Lt. Harry A. Baliaga,
Jr. and the present Amparo respondents to file their Comments on the
CHR Report; and ordering Lt. Baliaga to be impleaded as a party to the
Amparo petition; and (3) affirming the dismissal of the petitioner’s
petition for Contempt, without prejudice to the re–filing of the
contempt charge as may be warranted by the results of the subsequent
CHR investigation. To quote the exact wording of our Resolution:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, we
RESOLVE to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. IN G.R. NO. 183711 (HABEAS CORPUS PETITION,
CA–G.R. SP No. 99839)
II. ISSUE a Writ of Habeas Corpus anew, returnable to
the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals who
shall immediately refer the writ to the same Division
that decided the habeas corpus petition;
III. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. impleaded in CA–G.R.
SP No. 99839 and G.R. No. 183711, and REQUIRE
him, together with the incumbent Chief of Staff,
Armed Forces of the Philippines; the incumbent
Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the
Commanding Officer of the 56th IB, 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army at the time of the
disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, Lt. Col.
Melquiades Feliciano, to produce the person of
Jonas Joseph T. Burgos under the terms the Court of
Appeals shall prescribe, and to show cause why
Jonas Joseph T. Burgos should not be released from
detention;
IV. REFER back the petition for habeas corpus to the
same Division of the Court of Appeals which shall
continue to hear this case after the required Returns
shall have been filed and render a new decision
within thirty (30) days after the case is submitted for
decision; and
V. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, separate
from the original respondents impleaded in the
petition, and the dropping or deletion of President
Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo as party–respondent.
IN G.R. NO. 183712 (CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE, CA–G.R. SP No.
100230)
e. AFFIRM the dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for Contempt in CA–
G.R. SP No. 100230, without prejudice to the re–filing of the contempt
charge as may be warranted by the results of the subsequent CHR
investigation this Court has ordered; and
f. ORDER the dropping or deletion of former President Gloria
Macapagal–Arroyo as party–respondent, in light of the unconditional
dismissal of the contempt charge against her.
IN G.R. NO. 183713 (WRIT OF AMPARO PETITION, CA–G.R. SP No.
00008–WA)
g. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., impleaded in CA–G.R. SP No. 00008–
WA and G.R. No. 183713, without prejudice to similar directives we may
issue with respect to others whose identities and participation may be
disclosed in future investigations and proceedings;
h. DIRECT Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., and the present Amparo respondents
to file their Comments on the CHR report with the Court of Appeals,
within a non–extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Resolution.
i. REQUIRE General Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General,
AFP; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our
June 22, 2010 Resolution; and then Chief of Staff, AFP, Gen. Ricardo
David, (a) to show cause and explain to this Court, within a non–
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution,
why they should not be held in contempt of this Court for their defiance
of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and (b) to submit to this Court, within a
non–extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Resolution, a copy of the documents requested by the CHR, particularly:
1) The profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason
Roxas (Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air
Force); M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force); an alias T.L. – all
reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines – and 2Lt.
Fernando, a lady officer involved in the counter–insurgency
operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007;
2) Copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning,
Quezon City and the complete list of the intelligence operatives
involved in that said covert military operation, including their
respective Summary of Information and individual pictures; and
3) Complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th
and 69th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division from January
1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of
Information and pictures; including the list of captured rebels and
rebels who surrendered to the said camps and their corresponding
pictures and copies of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and the
cases filed against them, if any.
These documents shall be released exclusively to this Court for our
examination to determine their relevance to the present case and the
advisability of their public disclosure.
j. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Commanding General of the Philippine Army to be impleaded as
parties, in representation of their respective organizations, separately
from the original respondents impleaded in the petition; and the
dropping of President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo as party–respondent;
k. REFER witnesses Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the
Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection Security
and Benefit Program, subject to the requirements of Republic Act No.
6981; and
l. NOTE the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the DOJ which
the latter may investigate and act upon on its own pursuant to Section
3
21 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
C. The Court’s August 23, 2011 Resolution
On August 23, 2011, we issued a Resolution resolving among others:
(a) to NOTE the Explanation separately filed by Brigadier Gen. Gilberto
Jose C. Roa, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo
A. David, Jr., AFP (ret.), and Rear Admiral Cornelio A. dela Cruz, Jr.,
AFP;
xxx
(c) to LIMIT the documents to be submitted to this Court to those
assigned at the 56th Infantry Battalion (IB) from January 1, 2004 to
June 30, 2007, and to SUBMIT these materials within ten (10) days
from notice of this Resolution, without prejudice to the submission
of the other documents required under the Court’s July 5, 2011
Resolution, pertaining to those assigned at the other units of the
AFP, should the relevance of these documents be established during
the Court of Appeal’s hearing;
(d) to REQUIRE the submission, within ten (10) days from notice of this
Resolution, of the Summary of Information and individual pictures of
the intelligence operatives involved in the ERAP 5 incident, in
compliance with the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution;
(e) to REQUIRE the submission, within ten (10) days from notice of this
Resolution, of the profile and Summary of Information and pictures
of an alias T.L., reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group
15 of the Intelligence Service of the AFP and of a 2Lt. Fernando, a
lady officer in the counter–insurgency operations of the 56th IB in
2006 to 2007, in compliance with the Court’s July 5, 2011
Resolution.4
The Respondents’ September 23, 2011 Manifestation and Motion
On September 23, 2011, the respondents submitted a Manifestation and
Motion in compliance with the Court’s August 23, 2011 Resolution.
Attached to this Manifestation and Motion are the following
documents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the officers and
enlisted personnel of the 56th IB, 7th ID from January
1, 2004 to June 30, 2007;
b. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the intelligence
operatives who were involved in the ERAP 5
incident; and
c. The Summary of Information (SOI) of 2Lt. Fernando,
who was a member of the 56th IB, 7th ID.5
D. The Court’s September 6, 2011 Resolution
On August 19, 2011, the petitioner filed a Manifestation and a Motion
for Clarificatory Order praying among others that she be allowed to
examine the documents submitted to the Court pursuant to paragraph
III (i) of the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution. In our September 6, 2011
Resolution, we resolved, among others, to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(3) DENY the petitioner’s request to be allowed to examine the
documents submitted to this Court per paragraph (i) of the fallo of
our July 5, 2011 Resolution, without prejudice to our later
determination of the relevance and of the advisability of public
disclosure of those documents/materials;6
E. The Court’s October 11, 2011 Resolution
On October 11, 2011, we issued a Resolution requiring the CHR to
secure Virgilio Eustaquio’s affidavit, and to submit a report of its ongoing
investigation of Jonas’ abduction, viz:
(1) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to undertake all
available measures to obtain the affidavit of witness Virgilio
Eustaquio in connection with his allegation that one of the male
abductors of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, appearing in the cartographic
sketch, was among the “raiders” who abducted him and four others,
identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and
Dennis Ibona (otherwise known as the “ERAP FIVE”);
(2) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court,
within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Resolution, a Report, with
its recommendations of its ongoing investigation of Burgos’
abduction, and the affidavit of Virgilio Eustaquio, if any, copy
furnished the petitioner, the Court of Appeals, the incumbent Chiefs
of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP–CIDG, and all the present
respondents before the Court of Appeals.7
F. The Court’s November 29, 2011 Resolution
On November 2, 2011, we received a letter dated October 28, 2011 from
Commissioner Jose Manuel S. Mamauag, Team Leader, CHR Special
Investigation Team, requesting photocopies of the following
documents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
i. SOI of the officers and enlisted personnel of the 56th
IB, 7th ID from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007;
ii. SOI of the intelligence operatives who were involved
in the ERAP 5 incident; and
iii. SOI of 2Lt. Fernando who was a member of the 56th
IB, 7th ID.8
In our November 29, 2011 Resolution, we denied the CHR’s request
considering the confidential nature of the requested documents and
because the relevance of these documents to the present case had not
been established. We referred the CHR to our July 5, 2011 Resolution
where we pointedly stated that these documents shall be “released
exclusively to this Court for our examination to determine their
relevance to the present case and the advisability of their public
disclosure.”9
We held that “[w]e see no reason at this time to release these
confidential documents since their relevance to the present case has not
been established to our satisfaction. It is precisely for this reason that
we issued our October 24, 2011 Resolution and directed the CHR to
submit to this Court, within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
Resolution, a Report with its recommendations of its ongoing
investigation of Jonas Burgos’ abduction, and the affidavit of Virgilio
Eustaquio, if any. Simply stated, it is only after the CHR’s faithful
compliance with our October 24, 2011 Resolution that we will be able to
determine the relevance of the requested documents to the present
case.”10
G. The March 20, 2012 CHR Progress Report and Eustaquio’s Affidavit
On March 20, 2012, the CHR submitted its Progress Report detailing its
efforts to secure the affidavit of witness Eustaquio in relation with his
allegation that one of the male abductors of Jonas, appearing in the
cartographic sketch, was among the raiders who abducted him and four
others, identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and
Dennis Ibona (otherwise known as the “ERAP FIVE”). Attached to this
Report is Eustaquio’s sworn affidavit dated March 16, 2012, which
pertinently stated:
1. I was one of the victims in the abduction incident on
May 22, 2006 otherwise known as ERAP 5 and
because of that, we filed a case with the
Ombudsman against Commodore Leonardo
Calderon, et al., all then ISAFP elements, docketed as
OMB–P–C–06–04050–E for Arbitrary Detention,
Unlawful Arrest, Maltreatment of Prisoners, Grave
Threats, Incriminatory Machination, and Robbery.
2. On March 16, 2012, I was approached again by the
CHR Special Investigation Team regarding the
information I have previously relayed to them
sometime in September 2010 as to the resemblance
of the cartographic sketch of the man as described
by the two eyewitnesses Elsa Agasang and Jeffrey
Cabintoy in the abduction case of Jonas Burgos;
3. I can say that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos
appearing in the cartographic sketch is among the
raiders who abducted me and my four other
companions because the cartographic sketch almost
exactly matched and/or resembled to the
cartographic sketch that I also provided and
described in relation to the said incident at my
rented house in Kamuning, Quezon City on May 22,
2006.
4. I am executing this affidavit voluntarily, freely and
attest to the truth of the foregoing.11cralawred
H. The March 18, 2013 CA Decision
On March 18, 2013, the CA issued its decision pursuant to the Court’s
July 5, 2011 Resolution referring the Amparo and Habeas Corpus aspects
of the case to the CA for appropriate hearings and ruling on the merits
of the petitions.
Petition for Habeas Corpus
The CA held that the issue in the petition for habeas corpus is not the
illegal confinement or detention of Jonas, but his enforced
disappearance. Considering that Jonas was a victim of enforced
disappearance, the present case is beyond the ambit of a petition for
habeas corpus.
Petition for the Writ of Amparo
Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance,
the CA concluded that the present case falls within the ambit of the Writ
of Amparo. The CA found that the totality of the evidence supports the
petitioner’s allegation that the military was involved in the enforced
disappearance of Jonas. The CA took note of Jeffrey Cabintoy’s positive
identification of Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors who approached him
and told him not to interfere because the man being arrested had been
under surveillance for drugs; he also remembered the face of Lt. Baliaga
– the face he identified in the pictures because he resembles his friend
Raven. The CA also held that Lt. Baliaga’s alibi and corroborative
evidence cannot prevail over Cabintoy’s positive identification,
considering especially the absence of any indication that he was
impelled by hatred or any improper motive to testify against Lt. Baliaga.
Thus, the CA held that Lt. Baliaga was responsible and the AFP and the
PNP were accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas.
Based on these considerations, the CA resolved to:
1) RECOGNIZING the abduction of Jonas Burgos as an enforced
disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
2) With regard to authorship,
a) DECLARING Maj. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. RESPONSIBLE for the
enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos; and
b) DECLARING the Armed Forces of the Philippines and elements of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine
Army, ACCOUNTABLE for the enforced disappearance of Jonas
Burgos;
3) DECLARING the Philippine National Police ACCOUNTABLE for the
conduct of an exhaustive investigation of the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos. To this end, the PNP through its
investigative arm, the PNP–CIDG, is directed to exercise
 extraordinary diligence to identify and locate the abductors of Jonas
Burgos who are still at large and to establish the link between the That the Honorable Court found a member of the Philippine Army or
abductors of Jonas Burgos and those involved in the ERAP 5 incident. even a group of military men to be responsible for the abduction of
Jonas Burgos, does not necessarily make the same a case of “enforced
(4) DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the disappearance” involving the State. There is dearth of evidence to show
Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National that the government is involved. Respondent Baliaga’s alleged
Police, and their successors, to ensure the continuance of their participation in the abduction and his previous membership in the 56th
investigation and coordination on the enforced disappearance of Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army, by themselves, do not prove
Jonas Burgos until the persons found responsible are brought before the participation or acquiescence of the
the bar of justice; State.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I. The CA Resolution dated May 23, 2013
(5) DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights to continue with its
own independent investigation on the enforced disappearance of
On May 23, 2013, the CA issued its resolution denying the respondents’
Jonas Burgos with the same degree of diligence required under the
motion for partial reconsideration. The CA ruled that as far as the PNP
Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and
was concerned, its failure to elicit leads and information from Cabintoy
who witnessed Jonas’ abduction is eloquent proof of its failure to
(6) DIRECTING the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
exercise extraordinary diligence in the conduct of its investigation. As far
National Police to extend full assistance to the Commission on
as the AFP was concerned, the CA held that the fact that Lt. Baliaga of
Human Rights in the conduct of the latter’s investigation.
the Philippine Army was positively identified as one of the abductors of
Jonas, coupled with the AFP’s lack of serious effort to conduct further
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Director General,
investigation, spoke loudly of the AFP leadership’s accountability.
Philippine National Police and the Chairman, Commission on Human
Rights are hereby DIRECTED to submit a quarterly report to this Court
To date, the respondents have not appealed to this Court, as provided
on the results of their respective investigation.
under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.14
The filing of petitioner’s Affidavit–Complaint against Maj. Harry A.
J. The Petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela dated
Baliaga, Jr., et al. before the Department of Justice on June 9, 2011 is
April 1, 2013
NOTED. Petitioner is DIRECTED to immediately inform this Court of any
development regarding the outcome of the case.12
On April 1, 2013, the petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela asking the Court to: (1) order the persons named in the sealed
The Respondent’s April 3, 2013 Motion for Partial Reconsideration
documents to be impleaded in CA–G.R. SP No. 00008–WA and G.R. No.
183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly discovered
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents (the AFP Chief
evidence (the sealed attachment to the motion); and (3) refer the cases
of Staff and the PNP Director General), filed a motion for partial
to the CA for further hearing on the newly discovered evidence.
reconsideration of the March 18, 2013 CA decision. The motion made
the following submissions:
The petitioner alleged that she received from a source (who requested
5. x x x[T]he Director General, PNP, respectfully takes exception to the
to remain anonymous) documentary evidence proving that an
Honorable Court’s findings that the PNP, specifically the CIDG, “failed to
intelligence unit of the 7th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army and
exercise extraordinary diligence in the conduct of its investigation.” x x x
56th Infantry Battalion, operating together, captured Jonas on April 28,
[T]hat this Honorable Court arrived at a conclusion different from that of
2007 at Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. This
the CIDG, or accorded different credence to the statements of the
documentary evidence consists of: (1) After Apprehension Report dated
witnesses presented by the parties, does not necessarily translate to the
April 30, 2007; (2) Psycho Social Processing Report dated April 28, 2007;
CIDG’s failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
and (3) Autobiography of Jonas. The petitioner also claimed that these
are copies of confidential official reports on file with the Philippine
6. The Chief of Staff, AFP also takes exception to the Honorable Court’s
Army.
findings that the “Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Commanding General should be held accountable for Jonas
i. After Apprehension Report dated April 30, 2007
Burgos disappearance for failing to exercise extraordinary diligence in
conducting an internal investigation on the matter. The unwillingness of
This report is a photocopy consisting six pages dated April 30, 2007,
the respondent officers of the 56th IB to cooperate in the investigation
addressed to the Commanding Officer, 7MIB, 7ID, LA, Fort Magsaysay,
conducted by the CHR is a persuasive proof of the alleged cover up of
NE. The report detailed the planning and the objective of apprehending
the military’s involvement in the enforced disappearance of Jonas
target communist leaders, among them, one alias “Ramon” who was
Burgos.”
captured at Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth, Quezon City on April 28,
2007 by joint elements of the 72 MICO and S2, 56th IB. This report also
The AFP and the Philippine Army conducted a thorough investigation to
listed the names of the military personnel belonging to task organization
determine the veracity of the allegations implicating some of its officers
72 MICO and 56th IB who conducted the operation.
and personnel. After the conduct of the same, it is the conclusion of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Army, based on the
ii. Psycho Social Processing Report dated April 28, 2007
evidence they obtained, that Jonas Burgos has never been in custody.
This report details Jonas’ abduction and “neutralization”; the results of
7. The Chief of Staff, AFP, also respectfully takes exception to the finding
his interrogation and the intelligence gathered on his significant
of the Honorable Court “recognizing the abduction of Jonas Burgos as an
involvements/activities within the CPP/NPA/NDF organization.
enforced disappearance.”
iii. Undated Autobiography
xxx
This autobiography narrates how Jonas started as a student activist, his
recruitment and eventual ascent in the CPP/NPA as an intelligence
officer.
K. The Court’s April 11, 2013 Resolution
In our April 11, 2013 Resolution, the Court resolved to require the
respondents to Comment on the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela and its attachments, within ten (10) days from
receipt of the Resolution. In the same Resolution, the
Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) required BGen. Roa and Lt. Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista to fully
comply with the terms of Section III (i) of the dispositive portion of
our July 5, 2011 Resolution within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the resolution;
d. Certification dated May 24, 2013 from 1Lt. Donal S. Frias,
Acting Commanding Officer, 72nd Military Intelligence
Company, 7th Military Intelligence Battalion, 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army stating that the documents
submitted by the petitioner “do not exist at the records or in
the possession of this unit.”17
The respondents also submitted the affidavits of Lt. Col. Melquiades
Feliciano, Maj. Allan M. Margarata and Cpl. Ruby Benedicto, viz:
a. In his June 3, 2013 Affidavit, Col. Feliciano stated:
1. That I was assigned as Battalion Commander of 56th
Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division, PA last 17
January 2007 to 17 August 2007.

(2) required Lt. Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista to submit a written
assurance within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Resolution that
the military personnel listed in the submitted After Apprehension
Report can be located and be served with the processes that the
Court may serve;
(3) issued a Temporary Protection Order in favor of the petitioner and
all the members of her immediate family;
(4) directed the DOJ and the NBI to provide security and protection to
the petitioner and her immediate family and to submit a confidential
memorandum on the security arrangements made;
2. That I was showed a photocopy of the After
Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007 wherein
members of 56th IB, 7ID, PA were included therein.
3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the
said document and the participation of my men
listed thereat. There were no military operations
that I have authorized or approved regarding Jonas
Burgos. The contents thereof are false and utter
fabrication of facts.
b. In his May 31, 2013 Affidavit, Maj. Margarata stated:

(5) directed the NBI to coordinate and provide direct investigative
assistance to the CHR as it may require pursuant to the authority
granted under the Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution.15
i. The respondents’ Comment from the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte
Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela dated June 6, 2013
On June 6, 2013, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed their comments on the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte
Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
First, the respondents alleged that the documents submitted by the
petitioner do not exist in the concerned military units’ respective
records, nor are they in the custody or possession of their respective
units. To support their allegations, the respondents submitted the
following:
a. Certification dated May 29, 2013 from Maj. Gen. Gregorio Pio
P. Catapang, Jr. Commander, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine
Army stating that the documents16 submitted by the petitioner
“do not exist nor in the possession/custody of this
Headquarters.”
b. Certification dated May 29, 2013, from Lt. Col. Louie D.S.
Villanueva, Assistant Chief of Staff, Office of the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Personnel, G1, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army
c. In her May 31, 2013 Affidavit, Cpl. Benedicto stated:
stating that the documents submitted by the petitioner “could
not be found nor do they exist in the records of this
Command.”
c. Certification dated May 24, 2013 from Lt. Col. Bernardo M.
Ona, Commanding Officer, 56th Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army stating that the documents
submitted by the petitioner “do not exist at this unit.”
1. That I was assigned at 72nd Military Intelligence
Company (72MICO), 7th Infantry Division, PA from 01
July 2006 to 01 July 2008.
2. That I was showed a photocopy of the Psycho–Social
Processing Report dated 28 April 2007 and After
Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007, both of
which purportedly came from 72MICO, 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army and that on the last page of
the Pyscho–Social Processing Report appears my
name therein.
3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the
said documents and the implication of my name in
the said documents. The contents thereof are purely
a product of wild imagination. I have never seen
such document until now.
4. I can only surmise that these are plainly a fishing
expedition on the part of Mrs. Edita Burgos. A ploy
to implicate any military personnel especially those
belonging to the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine
Army.
1. That I was never assigned at 72nd Military
Intelligence Company, 7th Infantry Division, PA.
2. That I was showed a photocopy of the Psycho–Social
Processing Report dated 28 April 2007 and After
Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007, both of
which purportedly came from 72MICO, 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army and that on the last page of
 the Psycho–Social Processing Report appears my
name therein.
3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the
said documents and the implication of my name in
the said documents. The contents thereof are false
and utter fabrication of facts. How can I ever be at
72MICO if I was never assigned thereat.
4. I have never been an interrogator in my entire
military service. I have never been a member of any
operation which involves the name of Jonas Burgos
or any other military operation for that matter. I
have never seen such document until now.
5. Furthermore, I have never worked with Maj. Allan
Margarata or of his unit, 72MICO.18
Second, the respondents note that none of the documents submitted by
the petitioner were signed; a writ of Amparo cannot be issued and the
investigation cannot progress on the basis of false documents and false
information.
Lastly, the respondents argue that since the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and CHR are conducting their own investigations of
the case, the petitioner’s motion at this point is premature; the
proceedings to be conducted by the CA will be at the very least
redundant.
ii. The Respondents’ Compliance dated June 7, 2013
On June 7, 2013, the respondents, through the Office of Judge Advocate
General, complied with our April 11, 2013 Resolution by submitting the
following documents:
a. Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with pictures of the
th th th
personnel of 56 Infantry Battalion (IB), 69 IB, and 7
Infantry Division, Philippine Army (PA). These documents were
submitted by the 7th ID in sealed nine (9) small and three (3)
big boxes (total of twelve (12) sealed boxes);
b. Investigation Report of the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces
of the Philippines (ISAFP) on the 2007 “ERAP 5” incident in
Kamuning, Quezon City; Profile/Summary of Information (SOI)
with pictures of the Intel Operatives involved in the “ERAP 5”
incident; and certification issued by the Command Adjutant of
ISAFP concerning T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl.
Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron
Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), an alias T.L., all reportedly
assigned with the Military Intelligence Group 15 of the
Intelligence Service, AFP (MIG 15, ISAFP). These documents
were submitted by ISAFP in a sealed envelope;
c. Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with a picture of 2LT
Fernando PA. This document was submitted by Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel, G1, PA in a sealed envelope;
d. A certification issued by 56IB and 69IB, 7ID, PA concerning
captured/surrendered rebels;
e. A certification stating the present location and whereabouts of 11, 2011 Resolutions, we resolve to grant the CHR access to these
military personnel listed in the submitted After Apprehension requested documents to allow them the opportunity to ascertain the
Report, dated April 30, 2007, allegedly identified as members
of the Task Organization –72 MICO and 56th IB with the
inclusion of four (4) separate certifications from Commander,
7ID, PA, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1,
7ID, PA, Commanding Officer, 72 MICO, and 56Ib, 71ID, PA,
respectively, stating the non–existence of the following
documents: Psycho–Social Processing Report dated 28 April
2007; After–Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007;
Autobiography of Jonas Burgos; and Picture of Jonas Burgos;
f. Affidavit of Compliance of General Emmanuel T. Bautista, AFP,
the Chief of Staff, assuring that the active military personnel
mentioned in the purported apprehension report can be
located at their given locations and be served with the
processes that may be issued by the Honorable Court. 19
OUR RULING
A. On the relevancy and disclosure of the documents submitted to this
Court per paragraph III(i) of the fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution
The directive for the submission of the above–mentioned documents
arose from our determination in our June 22, 2010 Resolution that the
PNP–CIDG failed to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male
and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on their interview
with eyewitnesses to the abduction. For this reason, the Court directly
commissioned the CHR to continue the investigation of Jonas’ abduction
and the gathering of evidence.
Based on its March 15, 2011 Report, the CHR uncovered a lead – a claim
made by Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy and
Justice, that the male abductor of Jonas appearing in the cartographic
sketch was among the raiders who abducted him and four others,
known as the “ERAP FIVE.”
This prompted the CHR to request copies of the documents embodied in
par. III(i) of the fallo of the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution from General
Gilberto Jose C. Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP.
Gen. Roa initially denied this request but eventually complied with the
Court’s directive of July 5, 2011 to submit the documents via the
September 23, 2011 Manifestation and Motion and the June 7, 2013
Compliance. In the same July 5, 2011 Resolution, the Court made it plain
that these documents shall be released exclusively to the Court for its
examination to determine their relevance to the present case and the
advisability of their public disclosure.
Pursuant to the Court’s October 11, 2011 Resolution, the CHR submitted
its March 20, 2012 Progress Report on its continuing investigation of
Jonas’ abduction. Attached to this Progress Report was Virgilio
Eustaquio’s sworn affidavit stating that: (1) he was one of the victims of
the abduction incident on May 22, 2006, otherwise known as the “ERAP
FIVE” incident; (2) as a result of this incident, they filed a case with the
Ombudsman against Commodore Leonardo Calderon and other
members of the Intelligence Service, AFP (ISAFP) for arbitrary detention,
unlawful arrest, maltreatment of prisoners, grave threats, incriminatory
machination and robbery; and (3) the male abductor of Jonas appearing
in the cartographic sketch shown to him by the CHR was among the
raiders who abducted him and his four companions because it
resembled the cartographic sketch he described in relation to the ERAP
FIVE incident on May 22, 2006.
After reviewing the submissions of both the respondents20 and the
CHR21 pursuant to the Court’s July 5, 2011, August 23, 2011 and October
true identities of the persons depicted in the cartographic sketches.
At this point, we emphasize that the sworn affidavit of Eustaquio (that complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are
attests to the resemblance of one of Jonas’ abductors to the abductors imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
of the ERAP FIVE) constitutes the sought–after missing link that who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed
establishes the relevance of the requested documents to the present to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation
case. We note that this lead may help the CHR ascertain the identities of of the enforced disappearance.26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
those depicted in the cartographic sketches as two of Jonas’ abductors
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated
(one male and one female) who, to this day, remain unidentified.
directives issued by the Court outlined above and the extraordinary
diligence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the
In view of the sensitive and confidential nature of the requested
criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take judicial notice of the fact
documents, we direct the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court to allow
that the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 216, has already
the duly–authorized representatives of the CHR to inspect the requested
found probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has
documents in camera within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution.
ordered his arrest in connection with Jonas’ disappearance.27
The documents shall be examined and compared with the cartographic
sketches of the two abductors of Jonas, without copying and without
We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision already
bringing the documents outside the premises of the Office of the Clerk
ruled with finality on the entities responsible and accountable (as these
of Court of the Supreme Court. The inspection of the documents shall be
terms are defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis) for the enforced disappearance
within office hours and for a reasonable period of time sufficient to
of Jonas. In its March 18, 2013 decision, the CA found, by substantial
allow the CHR to comprehensively investigate the lead provided by
evidence, that Lt. Baliaga participated in the abduction on the basis of
Eustaquio.
Cabintoy’s positive identification that he was one of the abductors of
Jonas who told him not to interfere because the latter had been under
To fully fulfill the objective of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, further
surveillance for drugs. In the same Decision, the CA also held the AFP
investigation using the standard of extraordinary diligence should be
and the PNP accountable for having failed to discharge the burden of
undertaken by the CHR to pursue the lead provided by Eustaquio. We
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation being conducted by the
disappearance of Jonas. Thus, the CA issued the following directives to
Department of Justice (DOJ), through the NBI, on the disappearance of
address the enforced disappearance of Jonas:
Jonas.22 In this regard, we direct the NBI to coordinate and provide
direct investigative assistance to the CHR as the latter may require,
(1) DIRECT the PNP through its investigative arm, the PNP–CIDG, to
pursuant to the authority granted under the Court’s June 22, 2010
identify and locate the abductors of Jonas Burgos who are still at
Resolution.
large and to establish the link between the abductors of Jonas
Burgos and those involved in the ERAP 5 incident;
For this purpose, we require the CHR to submit a supplemental
investigation report to the DOJ, copy furnished the petitioner, the NBI,
(2) DIRECT the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP–CIDG, and all the
Philippines and the Director General of the Philippines National
respondents within sixty days (60) days from receipt of this Resolution.
Police, and their successors, to ensure the continuance of their
investigation and coordination on the enforced disappearance of
B. On the Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela
Jonas Burgos until the persons found responsible are brought before
the bar of justice;
After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the
petitioner and considering all the developments of the case, including
(3) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to continue with its own
the March 18, 2013 CA decision that confirmed the validity of the
independent investigation on the enforced disappearance of Jonas
issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case, we resolve to deny
Burgos with the same degree of diligence required under the Rule on
the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
the Writ of Amparo;
We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above,
(4) DIRECT the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
that the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the
National Police to extend full assistance to the Commission on
present case. As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,23 the writ merely
Human Rights in the conduct of the latter’s investigation; and
embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake
specified courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of an
(5) DIRECT the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative
Director General, Philippine National Police and the Chairman,
role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
Commission on Human Rights to submit a quarterly report to the
perpetrators through the investigation and remedial action that it
Court on the results of their respective investigation.28
directs.24 The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than on
the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of administrative
We note that the respondents did not appeal the March 18, 2013 CA
liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo proceedings has led us to define
decision and the May 23, 2013 CA resolution denying their motion for
terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to achieve. In
partial reconsideration.
Razon Jr., v. Tagitis,25 we defined what the terms “responsibility” and
“accountability” signify in an Amparo case. We said:
Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of the
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
CA that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
its determination of the entities responsible for the enforced
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies
disappearance of Jonas, we resolve to deny the petitioner’s prayer to
this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
issue the writ of Amparo anew and to refer the case to the CA based on
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
the newly discovered evidence. We so conclude as the petitioner’s
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of
request for the reissuance of the writ and for the rehearing of the case
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement
by the CA would be redundant and superfluous in light of: (1) the
in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
ongoing investigation being conducted by the DOJ through the NBI; (2)
the CHR investigation directed by the Court in this Resolution; and (3)
the continuing investigation directed by the CA in its March 18, 2013
decision.
We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the
Court a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address an enforced
disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of
Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant
remedies that would complicate and prolong rather than expedite the
investigations already ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined
with finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance.
We clarify that by denying the petitioner’s motion, we do not thereby
rule on the admissibility or the merits of the newly discovered evidence
submitted by the petitioner. We likewise do not foreclose any
investigation by the proper investigative and prosecutory agencies of
the other entities whose identities and participation in the enforced
disappearance of Jonas may be disclosed in future investigations and
proceedings. Considering that the present case has already reached the
prosecution stage, the petitioner’s motion should have been filed with
the proper investigative and prosecutory agencies of the government.
To expedite proceedings, we refer the petitioner’s motion, this
Resolution and its covered cases to the DOJ for investigation, for the
purpose of filing the appropriate criminal charges in the proper courts
against the proper parties, if warranted, based on the gathered
evidence. For this purpose, we direct the petitioner to furnish the DOJ
and the NBI copies of her Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, (5) DIRECT the National Bureau of Investigation to coordinate and
together with the sealed attachments to the Motion, within five (5) days
from receipt of this Resolution.
As mentioned, we take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation by the
DOJ, through the NBI, of the disappearance of Jonas. This DOJ
investigation is without prejudice to the Office of the Ombudsman’s
exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the investigation of the criminal
aspect of this case should the case be determined to be cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan.29
As we direct below, further investigation for purposes of the present
proceedings shall continue to be undertaken by the CHR, in close
coordination with the NBI, for the completion of the investigation under (7) DECLARE this Writ of Amparo proceeding closed and terminated,
the terms of our June 22, 2010 Resolution and the additional directives
under the present Resolution.
As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo
proceeding is merely to determine whether an enforced disappearance SO ORDERED.
has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to
define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance.
(2) REFER the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,
this Resolution and its covered cases to the Department of Justice
for investigation for the purpose of filing the appropriate criminal
charges in the proper courts against the proper parties if such action
is warranted by the gathered evidence. The referral to the
Department of Justice is without prejudice to the Office of the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the
investigation should the case be determined to be cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan;
(3) DIRECT the petitioner to furnish the Department of Justice and the
National Bureau of Investigation copies of her Urgent Ex Parte
Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, together with the sealed attachments
to the Motion, within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution;
(4) DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court to allow the duly–
authorized representatives of the Commission on Human Rights to
inspect the requested documents in camera within five (5) days from
receipt of this Resolution. For this purpose, the documents shall be
examined and compared with the cartographic sketches of the two
abductors of Jonas Burgos without copying and bringing the
documents outside the premises of the Office of the Clerk of Court
of the Supreme Court. The inspection of the documents shall be
conducted within office hours and for a reasonable period of time
that would allow the Commission on Human Rights to
comprehensively investigate the lead provided by Virgilio Eustaquio;
provide direct investigative assistance to the Commission on Human
Rights as the latter may require, pursuant to the authority granted
under the Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution.
(6) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to submit a
supplemental investigation report to the Department of Justice, copy
furnished the petitioner, the National Bureau of Investigation, the
incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
Philippine National Police and the Philippine National Police–
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, and all the respondents,
within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Resolution.
without prejudice to the concerned parties’ compliance with the
above directives and subject to the Court’s continuing jurisdiction to
enforce compliance with this Resolution.

As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been
served in the present case with the CA’s final determination of the
persons responsible and accountable for the enforced disappearance of
Jonas and the commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At
this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are
already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before
us.

Based on the above developments, we now hold that the full extent of
the remedies envisioned by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been
served and exhausted.Considering the foregoing, the CourtRESOLVES to:

(1) DENY petitioner Edita Burgos’ Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti

Cautela;
 v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 670 SCRA 545 (2012), where this Court explicitly
declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof.
As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v.
Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012), enumerated the elements constituting
“enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section
3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit: (a) that there be an arrest, detention,
abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out
by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State or political
organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that
the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

Same; Same; Child Custody; Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that
what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental
rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly
applied.—Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved
is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child,
who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of
the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied. To reiterate, the
privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of
G.R. No. 193652. August 5, 2014.* extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar
nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or
Infant JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA
omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is
YUSAY CARAM, petitioner, vs. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D.
envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and
ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA YANGCO, respondents.
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of
Constitutional Law; Writs of Amparo; The Amparo Rule was intended to life. Caram vs. Segui, 732 SCRA 86, G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014
address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced
disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these Republic of the Philippines
two instances or to threats thereof.—Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of SUPREME COURT
Amparo provides as follows: SECTION 1. Petition.—The petition for a writ Manila
of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or EN BANC
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014
disappearances or threats thereof. In the landmark case of Secretary of
National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., 568 SCRA 1 (2008), this Court Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA.
held: [T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner,
of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its vs.
present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA,
“Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without due process of law, and CELIA C. YANGCO, Respondents.
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.” On the other hand,
“enforced disappearances” are “attended by the following DECISION
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the
State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and Section 191 of the Rule on the
persons outside the protection of law. Writ of Amparo2 seeking to set aside the August 17, 20103 and
September 6, 20104 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106
Same; Same; Enforced Disappearances; Words and Phrases; As to what of Quezon City, in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604. The RTC had dismissed
constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Supreme Court in Navia v. petitioner’s petition for the issuance ofa writ of amparo which petitioner
Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012), enumerated the elements constituting filed in order for her to regain parental authority and custody of Julian
“enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section Yusay Caram (Baby Julian), her biological child, from the respondent
3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851.—This pronouncement on the officers of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).
coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records follow:
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous
relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and
eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit
of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into
believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to
complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to
have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun
and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family ina potentially
embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.5
On July 26, 2009, Christina gavebirth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez
Memorial MedicalCenter, Marikina City.6 Sun and Moon shouldered all
the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina
voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment7 to the DSWD.
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition17 for the issuance of a writ of
amparo before the RTC of Quezon City seeking to obtain custody of Baby
Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant Secretary Cabrera and
Acting Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the DSWD.
In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into
surrendering custody of her childto the DSWD utilizing what she claims
to be an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which respondents
allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for
adoption of the minor child had been complied with.
Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the
respondents had acted beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby
causing the enforced disappearance of the said child and depriving her
of her custodial rights and parental authority over him.

On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died8
without knowing about the birth of his son. Thereafter, during the wake,
Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she and the deceased had
a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial
embarrassment. Marcelino’s family was taken aback by the revelation
and sympathized with Christina. After the emotional revelation, they
vowed to help her recover and raise the baby.9 On November 27, 2009,
the DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate10
declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available for Adoption." A local
matching conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on February 5,
2010, Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel and Filomina
Medina (Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation.
Supervised trial custody then commenced.11
On the basis of the said petition,the RTC, Branch 106 of Quezon City,
through its Presiding Judge, the Honorable Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-
Sale, issued a Writ of Amparo18 on July 28, 2010 commanding the four
respondents to produce the body of Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled
on August 4, 2010. Respondents were alsorequired to file their verified
written return to the writ pursuant to Section 919 of the Amparo Rule,
within five working days from the service of the writ.
The respondents complied with the writ and filed their Return20 on
August 2, 2010 praying that the petition be denied for being the
improper remedy to avail of in a case relating toa biological parent’s
custodial rights over her child.

On August 4, 2010, respondents appeared before the RTC but

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the
respondents did not bring the child, stating that threats of kidnapping
adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWDasking for the suspension of Baby
were made on the child and his caregivers. To give respondents another
Julian’s adoption proceedings. She alsosaid she wanted her family back
chance, the RTC reset the hearing to August 5, 2010.
together.12

At the August 5, 2010 hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui,
entered its appearance as representative of the State and prayed that its
sent a Memorandum13 to DSWD Assistant Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera
lawyers be given time to file their memorandum or position paper in this
informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available
case. In turn, the RTC acknowledged the appearance of the OSG and
for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three
allowed its representatives to actively participate in the arguments
months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which
raised during the said hearing. Relative to the matter of the parties
terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a
submitting additional pleadings, Judge Sale narrowed the issues to be
ward of the State. The said Memorandum was noted by respondent
discussed by providing for the following guidelines, thus:
Atty. Sally D. Escutin, Director IV of the Legal Service, DSWD.

To abbreviate the proceedings, in view of all the manifestations and

On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelino’s brother, sent a
counter-manifestations made by the counsels, the court enjoined the
letter to Atty. Escutin informing her that a DNA testing was scheduled on
parties to file their respective position papers on the following issues:
July 16, 2010 at the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the University of the
Philippines.14
1. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction over the instant case;
On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter15 to Noel
Constantino stating that it would not allow Baby Julian to undergo DNA 2. Whether or not this petition isthe proper remedy based on the facts
testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed Noel Constantino that the of the case and prayer in the petition; and
procedures followed relative to the certification on the availability of the
child for adoption and the child’s subsequent placement to prospective 3. Whether or not the prayer in the petition should be granted and
adoptive parents were proper, and that the DSWD was no longer in the custody of the child be given to his biological mother.
position to stop the adoption process. Assistant Secretary Cabrera
further stated that should Christina wish to reacquire her parental The parties were given five (5) days from today to file their respective
authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption process, she may bring position papers based on these three main issues. They may include
the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period for her to other related issues they deem essential for the resolution of this case.
regain her parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Set this case for further hearing, if necessary, on August 18, 2010 at 9:00
Act (R.A.) No. 9523.16 a.m.21
In the same order, Judge Sale alsoacknowledged that the child subject of SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy
the case was brought before the court and the petitioner was allowed to available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
see him and take photographs of him. violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful actor omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ
of amparo without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
court. The RTC held that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain threats thereof.
custody of her child Baby Julian.22 The RTC further stated that Christina
should have filed a civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo,
Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas et al.,31 this Court held:
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is extreme urgency to
secure custody of a minor who has been illegallydetained by another, a
[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of,
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its
either as a principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the Rule on
present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus inRelation to Custody of
"Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law,
Minors.23
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other
hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following
On August 20, 2010, Christina filed a motion for reconsideration24 characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
arguing that since the RTC assumed jurisdiction of the petition for the government official or organized groupsor private individuals acting with
issuance of a writ of amparo, the latter is duty-bound to dispose the the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the
case on the merits.25 The RTC, however, deniedChristina’s motion for State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
reconsideration on September 6, 2010 maintaining that the latter refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
availed of the wrong remedy and that the Supreme Court intended the persons outside the protection of law.
writ of amparo to address the problem of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.26
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented
in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo32 where this Court
On September 28, 2010, Christina directly elevated the case before this explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only
Court, via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 19 of the threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In her petition, Christina prayed that the Court in Navia v. Pardico33 enumerated the elementsconstituting
Court (1) set aside the August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section
the RTC, (2) declare R.A. No. 9523 unconstitutional for being contrary to 3(g) of R.A. No. 985134 to wit:
A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC,27 which was promulgated by the Supreme Court,
and for violating the doctrine of separation of powers, (3) declare the
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form
"enforced separation" between her and Baby Julian as violative of her
of deprivation of liberty;
rights to life, liberty and security, and (4) grant her the privilege of
availing the benefits of a writ of amparo so she could be reunited with
her son.28 (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of, the State ora political organization;
The only relevant issue presented before the Court worthy of attention
is whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for (c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s
obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child. This Court will refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
not belabor to discuss Christina’s argumentsrelating to the whereabouts of the person subject of the amparopetition;
supposedunconstitutionality or R.A. No. 9523 as Congress has the and,
plenary power to repeal, alter and modify existing laws29 and A.M. No.
02-6-02-SC functions only as a means to enforce the provisions of all (d) that the intention for such refusal isto remove subject
adoption and adoption-related statutes before the courts. person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period
of time.1âwphi1
Now, in her petition, Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of
Baby Julian is being violated or threatened by the respondent DSWD In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused
officers’ enforcement of an illegal Deed of Voluntary Commitment her "enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their action
between her and Sun and Moon. She claims thatshe had been amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context of the
"blackmailed" through the said Deed by the DSWD officers and Sun and Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD
Moon’s representatives into surrendering her child thereby causing the officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina
"forced separation" of the said infant from his mother. Furthermore, she obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum35 explicitly
also reiterates that the respondent DSWD officers acted beyond the stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when
scope of their authority when they deprived her of Baby Julian’s she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her
custody.30 petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers
presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the
The Court rejects petitioner’s contentions and denies the petition. afternoon of August 5, 2010.36 There is therefore, no "enforced
disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third
and fourth elements are missing.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her
from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly
without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child
for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child
but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting
custody over him.37 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what
is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental
rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly
applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to
victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats
of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the
unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private
individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to
life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that
vitiate the quality of life.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and
September 6, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106,
Quezon City in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604 are AFFIRMED without
prejudice to petitioner's right to avail of proper legal remedies afforded
to her by law and related rules.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202666. September 29, 2014.*
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,
petitioners, vs. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO,
and JOHN DOES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); Writ of
Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.—The writ of habeas
data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed
to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s
right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Same; Same; Same; The existence of a person’s right to informational
privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be
extended.—In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to
protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. A
comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a
procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age.” The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely
of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.
Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other. Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational
privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be
extended.
Same; Same; Same; Informational Privacy; The writ of habeas data can
be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to
privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy.—Had the
framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to
cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above
underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data
situations, would not have been made. Habeas data, to stress, was
designed “to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age.” As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the
annotations to the Rule prepared by the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data
complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that: The writ of habeas
data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce
one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational
privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the
updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or in control of respondents.
(emphasis ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data
may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
Same; Same; Same; Nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas
data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or
entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of
data.—Nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As
provided under Section 1 of the Rule: Section 1. Habeas Data.—The writ
of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.
Same; Same; Same; Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or
omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved
party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family.—The
provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly
conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts
or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved
party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing
data. To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It
does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a
business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering,
collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party
or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of
regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a
personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said
person or entity.
Same; Same; Same; The Court saw the pressing need to provide for
judicial remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful
use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right
to privacy.—The Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial
remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of
data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to
privacy. In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in
the landmark case, H v. W, promulgated on January 30, 2013,
recognized that “[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities
not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in
the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond
appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom.”
Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as
the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized
that, generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy
is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities,
including those that occur in OSNs.
Same; Same; Same; Online Social Networks; The purpose of an Online
Social Networks (OSN) is precisely to give users the ability to interact
and to stay connected to other members of the same or different social
media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among
others, depending on the services provided by the site.—Briefly, the
purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to
stay connected to other members of the same or different social media
platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others,
depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a
room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or “walls,” the
contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In his or
her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything –– from text, to
pictures, to music and videos –– access to which would depend on
whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see his
or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved
the way to the creation of various social networking sites, including the
one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which,
according to its developers, people use “to stay connected with friends
and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and
express what matters to them.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Facebook; Facebook connections are
established through the process of “friending” another user.—Facebook
connections are established through the process of “friending” another
user. By sending a “friend request,” the user invites another to connect
their accounts so that they can view any and all “Public” and “Friends
Only” posts of the other. Once the request is accepted, the link is
established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s
“Public” or “Friends Only” posts, among others. “Friending,” therefore,
allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other
users, whereby the user gives his or her “Facebook friend” access to his
or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Informational Privacy; Before one can
have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Networks
(OSN) activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children
of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to
limit its visibility.—Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his
or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the
children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto
or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace
through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words,
utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of
the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the default setting for
Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in
question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph.—Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is
“Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question were
viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’
children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were
the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez,
214 F. Supp. 2d, is most instructive: [A] person who places a photograph
on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy
rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here,
where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices
that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph
itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Messages sent to the public at large in
the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.—Also, United States v.
Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, held that “[t]he more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages
sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded
from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Setting a post’s or profile detail’s
privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by
another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the
content.—That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not
necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the cyber
community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still
remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the
following: (1) Facebook “allows the world to be more open and
connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any
conceivable way”; (2) A good number of Facebook users “befriend”
other users who are total strangers; (3) The sheer number of “Friends”
one user has, usually by the hundreds; and (4) A user’s Facebook friend
can “share” the former’s post, or “tag” others who are not Facebook
friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own
Facebook friends. It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a
post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can
no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with
the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share
said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with
the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged,
the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or
who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set
at “Friends.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There can be no quibbling that the
images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students
scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately
circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative
institution.—In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in
question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily
clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated,
the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution.
However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare
assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the
photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they
placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their
protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As a cyberspace community member,
one has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.—It has
been said that “the best filter is the one between your children’s ears.”
This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet
consumers in general is the best means of avoiding privacy rights
violations. As a cyberspace community member, one has to be proactive
in protecting his or her own privacy. It is in this regard that many OSN
users, especially minors, fail. Responsible social networking or
observance of the “netiquettes” on the part of teenagers has been the
concern of many due to the widespread notion that teenagers can
sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people skills or
general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering the complexity of the
cyber world and its pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these
children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their
unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the parents in
disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital
citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations.—
Considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness, as
well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly
exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children
about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and
organizations. In fact, it is believed that “to limit such risks, there’s no
substitute for parental involvement and supervision.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is, thus, incumbent upon internet
users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and
must not be negligent in protecting their rights.—It is, thus, incumbent
upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and
activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity
serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires
that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right
which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We
cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to
place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users
must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if
they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of
changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook,
especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and
the site’s layout often. Vivares vs. St. Theresa's College, 737 SCRA 92,
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,
Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN
DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation
in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is
continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he
balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and
communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental
conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1
otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners
herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which
dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both
minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school
students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January
2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were
about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took
digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her
Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer
teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that
some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from
the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her
students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they
readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe),
among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective
personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified
students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and
smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the
streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the
entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students
claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the
identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook
friends,4 but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her
student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol
(Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter,
following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have
deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student
Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
 5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts
obscenity; contains sexually suggestive messages, language or
symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet
that entail ample body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the
pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste
Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and ICM6
Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated
and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference,
including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller,
and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the
following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining
the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr.
Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages
before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through
implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the
commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother working days from service of the writ.
of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants
inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed
copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to
attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the
sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing
that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion
for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of habeas data. The dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:
a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the
basis of the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g.,
bra) were taken for posterity before they changed into their
swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts
was set at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable
expectation of privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew
or ought to have known of laws that safeguard the right to
privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known
that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims
in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the
photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were punished
outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court
used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero,
pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10
however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the
photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials.
Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children were
intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the
copying of information, data, and digital images happened at
STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were
boldly broadcasted by respondents through their
memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil
Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the
foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy
and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b)
respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the
court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at
the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be
rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images
accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to
have been illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s right
to privacy.
an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the
same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified
written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5)
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their
verified written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial
of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the
petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant
case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can
be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual
or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the
preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the
court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook
without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some
way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through
legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the
school’s policies and rules on discipline.
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of
habeas datashould be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving
the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there
was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide
a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.
It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative
law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age."13 The
writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment of the
writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.14
Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are
indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to
informational privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed
from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this question:
given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates
and promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of
users, sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical
space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible
trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the
end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of
its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the
procedural issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not
enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin
cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the
writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved
party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity
or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the
writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the
above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas
data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom
from abuse in the information age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its
applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In
fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas
Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent
remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to
informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right
can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue
against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is,
nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As
provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly
conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts
or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved
party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing
data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in something."19 It
business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering,
collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party
or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of
regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a
personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said
person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly
limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons
and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the
process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument
designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid
advancements in the information and communications technology––a
right which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are
not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to
the core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with
technological advancements having an influential part therein. This
evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the
three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational
privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the
three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational
privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and
data sharing nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent
vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every
individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected
and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation
of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and
social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN
users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer
grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical
protocol better known as wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide
for judicial remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the
unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of
the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in
its Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26 promulgated on January30,
2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the changing
realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose
credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts
respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with
wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be
viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect,
recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of
informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in
cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy
protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves
personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is
socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would
have otherwise remained personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN
activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to
interact and to stay connected to other members of the same or
different social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos,
videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It
is akin to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or
"walls," the contents of which are under the control of each and every
user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––from
text, to pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend
on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see
his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has
paved the way to the creation of various social networking sites,
includingthe one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com
(Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use "to stay
connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the
world, and to share and express what matters to them."28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending"
another user. By sending a "friend request," the user invites another to
connect their accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and
"Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link
is established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s
"Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore,
allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other
users, whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his
or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose,
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate
the accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well as information uploaded by
the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this
ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with
this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every
effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not
foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility
of digital images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or
"wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her
desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view
the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and
their friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the
photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends
and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to
set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific
profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another
user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an
avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their
choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about
[themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s
desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to
withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his
or her personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting
becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s
particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be
correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of
said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective
expectation that only those to whomthey grant access to their profile
will view the information they post or upload thereto.35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has
a protected expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity,
it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of
petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private, through
the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the
utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these
privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s invocation
of his or her right to informational privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to
grant or deny access to his or her post orprofile detail should not be
denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies
said choice.38 Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless
exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any
personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy
level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few
can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if
the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such
position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their
function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to
keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her private
space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were
visible to other Facebook users and whether the disclosure was
confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure
of the photos such that the images were kept within their zones of
privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue of
whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were
uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected against
unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right
being violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their children’s
Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said
photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since
their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only
Friends" setting safeguarded with a password.39 Ultimately, they posit
that their children’s disclosure was only limited since their profiles were
not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who
are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from
accessing said post without their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s
children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which
were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who these five are
do not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students
showed me some pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of
mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of STC,
who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are
still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls.
At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook
account [sic], and accessed from there the various photographs x x x.
They even told me that there had been times when these photos were
‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies
for one key reason: failure to question the students’ act of showing the
photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable
only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their
statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were
able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn
account that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends,"
showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only
goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly
private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,43 and that
it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality,
viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at
large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can
be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children
positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case,
they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational
privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most
instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to
forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly
under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the
Web page or the photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method
of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages
sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded
from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily
bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the cyber community
is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be
outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and
connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in
any conceivable way;"47
 (2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users
who are total strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the
hundreds; and
Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or
to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject
of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they
cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect
to the photographs in question.

(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to
or "tag"50 others who are not Facebook friends with the the original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the
former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few,
Facebook friends. through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in
such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post,
instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s
friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by
another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the
content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag On Cyber Responsibility
his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user
tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s
when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective ears."53 This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy
can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." rights violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be
proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B many OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or
are not Facebook friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been
which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can
friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people skills or
friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.57
the audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a
very large extent. Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on
good cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a
Facebook’s proclivity towards user interaction and socialization rather number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important
than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective
user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed
self-tribute, thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame."51 to every time they participate in online activities.58 Furthermore,
Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as
"Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly
private," contrary to petitioners’ argument. exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children
about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the
organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no
sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be
substitute for parental involvement and supervision."59
taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’
Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given its students to beresponsible in their dealings and activities in
to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary
the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the
however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of process, it violated the students’ rights.
privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that whenever they engage incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly,
respondents reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise
what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves
disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that,
said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are
connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the
to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control.
petitioners’ assertion. Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise private,
voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third
parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be
more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in
nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in
the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in
are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from
the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care
in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These
are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they
themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their
private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of
privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private,
and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as
those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for
changing these settings and the site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the
privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise
disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned
errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in
Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Manila Electric Company vs. Lim, 632 SCRA 195, October 05, 2010
G.R. No. 184769. October 5, 2010.*
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A.
SAPITULA, petitioners, vs. ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, respondent.
Writ of Habeas Data; Right to Privacy; Labor Law; Transfers; An
employee’s plea that she be spared from complying with her employer’s
Memorandum directing her reassignment under the guise of a quest for
information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall
within the province of a writ of habeas data; The habeas data rule, in
general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual—it is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the
truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional
guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in
this age of information technology.—Respondent’s plea that she be
spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her
reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for
information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall
within the province of a writ of habeas data. Section 1 of the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data provides: Section 1. Habeas Data.—The writ of
habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The habeas data rule, in
general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual.
It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of
a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of
information technology.
Same; Same; Same; Like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived
as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to
address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances—its intent is to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those
provided under prevailing Rules; The writs of amparo and habeas data will
NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when
the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful—employment constitutes a property right under the context of
the due process clause of the Constitution.—It bears reiteration that like
in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a
remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz, 605 SCRA 628 (2009), underscores the emphasis laid down
in Tapuz v. del Rosario, 554 SCRA 768 (2008), that the writs of amparo and
habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions
therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right
under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is
evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her
transfer—a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of
one’s employment—are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably
lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
Same; Same; Same; To argue that the employer’s refusal to disclose the
contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to the employee’s
safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative.—In another vein, there is no showing from the facts
presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful
violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-à-vis the right to life, liberty
or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of
reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts
to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in
fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in
her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as “highly suspicious,
doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” And she even
suspects that her transfer to another place of work “betray[s] the real
intent of management]” and could be a “punitive move.” Her posture
unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related. Manila Electric
Company vs. Lim, 632 SCRA 195, G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A.
SAPITULA, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action
evolving metes and bounds of the writ of habeas data. May an employee would be a punitive one.4 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides
to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of
posted therein ─ imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised.
her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of
the details thereof?
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a
petition5 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). 213-M-2008.

On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the
Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel,
Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent.
The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON
NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA
BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO,
WALANG UTANG NA LOOB….1
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO
linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5,
2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.2
By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’ unlawful act and omission
consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details
or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly
received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a
violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by
habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ
commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent
in relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners on
the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such
data and the purpose for its collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the
confidentiality of such data or information; and

By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information
of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of obtained.
respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS
Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of "… reports that Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer
individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
security."
By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. petitioners to file their verified written return. And by Order of September
Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondent’s application for a TRO.
Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she
could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO
"punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process.
on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data
Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and
was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which
back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their
properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).7
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her
thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in this wise:
By Decision8 of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of
respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
xxxx
directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s transfer
until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me
the nature of the alleged accusations and threats so that at least I could
The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to
have found out if these are credible or even serious. But as you stated,
a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal
these came from unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it
killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent
appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic]
whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners’ refusal to
highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.
provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her
person.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as
the management apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil
place and environment which will make me a "sitting duck" so to speak,
Procedure and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data9 contending that 1)
seems to betray the real intent of management which is contrary to its
the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s
expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think
prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees,
twice on the rationale for management’s initiated transfer. Reflecting
and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set
further, it appears to me that instead of the management supposedly
forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.101avvphi1
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that
clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that "although ingeniously petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security.
questioning the transfer of her place of work by her employer"11 and the To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports
terms and conditions of her employment which arise from an employer- allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a
employee relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact
Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction. trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her
earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious,
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all." 18 And she even
implementation of the Memorandum transferring respondent’s place of suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real
work which is purely a management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture
No. 79-200312 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
in labor-related cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is
directs the issuance of the writ only against public officials or employees, hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is,
or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or accordingly, DISMISSED.
storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person,
family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged No costs.
in such activities.
SO ORDERED.
The petition is impressed with merit.

Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s

Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under
the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of
petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to

any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of

judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding
the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and
security against abuse in this age of information technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats
to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from
those provided under prevailing Rules.13

Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del

Rosario15 that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.16
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due
process clause of the Constitution.17 It is evident that respondent’s
reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern
respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment - are what
prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data.
Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiters.

Lee vs. Ilagan 738 SCRA 59 , October 08, 2014
G.R. No. 203254. October 8, 2014.*
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, petitioner, vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN,
respondent.
Constitutional Law; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); A.M. No. 08-
1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances.—A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary
rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. It was
conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of individuals, which is
defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of data about oneself.”
Same; Same; As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of
habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence
of the aggrieved party.”—As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule,
the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a
petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule
essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others,
“[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it
affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other
words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty
or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must
be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In
this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not
issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and
doubtful.
Same; Same; Right to Privacy; Sex Videos; As the rules and existing
jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the
nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or
security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on
either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible.—In
this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that
his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated
through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the
subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the
suppression of this video — which he fears would somehow find its way
to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption — he
failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation
of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or
contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing
jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the
nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or
security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on
either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in
this case. Lee vs. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59, G.R. No. 203254 October 8, 2014
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN,
Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
Decision2 dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 224 (RTC) in SP No. 12-71527, which extended the privilege
of the writ of habeas data in favor of respondent Police Superintendent
Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).
The Facts
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data3 dated June 22,
2012, Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee)
were former common law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited
Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for a while and
thereafter,proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his
digital camera was missing.4 On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan
at the latter’s office regarding a purported sex video (subject video) she
discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another
woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the
camera, but to no avail.5 During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly
slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked
away.6Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing
various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for
violation of Republic Act No. 9262,7otherwise known as the “Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,” before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative
complaint for grave misconduct before the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM).8 Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject
video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data
the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his now stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
warranted.9 entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the
Habeas Data10 dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially
court a quo, and to produce Ilagan’s digital camera, as well as the requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he
negative and/or original of the subject video and copies thereof, and to manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
file a verified written return within five (5) working days from date of the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other
receipt thereof. words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
In her Verified Return11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed liberty or security on the other .19 Corollarily, the allegations in the
kept the memory card of the digital camera and reproduced the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual
aforesaid video but averred that she only did so to utilize the same as or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that her the victim.20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas
relationship with Ilagan started sometime in 2003 and ended under data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns
disturbing circumstances in August 2011, and that she only happened to nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are
discover the subject video when Ilagan left his camera in her vague and doubtful.21
condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan’s petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a) its In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege
filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be
cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan.12 dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy
interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would
The RTC Ruling somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for
public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such
In a Decision13 dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed,
the writ of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor, and accordingly, ordered the courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions.
implementing officer to turn-over copies of the subject video to him, As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and
and enjoined Lee from further reproducing the same.14 eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent
rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much
The RTC did not give credence to Lee’s defense that she is not engaged so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data regarding the person of petition dismissible, as in this case.
Ilagan, finding that her acts of reproducing the subject video and
showing it to other people, i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers, violated the In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition
latter’s right to privacy in life and caused him to suffer humiliation and would equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence
mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC opined that Lee’s use of the presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of
subject video as evidence in the various cases she filed against Ilagan is his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the
not enough justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data
clarified that it is only ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and not Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually
on its admissibility before other tribunals.15 proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s
right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition. even lead a reasonable mind to conclude22 that Lee was going to use the
subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to
The Issue Before the Court spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly,
Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the RTC reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as
correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against
Ilagan. Ilagan.23 Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the
glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to
The Court’s Ruling reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.

The petition is meritorious.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas
Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and
available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances.16 It was conceptualized as a
judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right
to informational privacy of individuals,17 which is defined as “the right
to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data
about oneself.”18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-
71527is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for
Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A.
Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ.,
concur.

Dolot vs. Paje, 703 SCRA 650, August 27, 2013
G.R. No. 199199. August 27, 2013.*
MARICRIS D. DOLOT, Chairman of the BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON PAJE, in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, REYNULFO A. JUAN, Regional Director, Mines and Geosciences
Bureau, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE, Governor, Province of Sorsogon,
ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR,
and JUAN M. AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES
DEV’T CORP., and TR ORE, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; None is more well-
settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of
the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law.―None is
more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and
authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law.
It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter,
over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the
pleadings. By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly,
Section 21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise original
jurisdiction — in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court does not have the power
to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of
jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress.―A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular
No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which
gave the Court authority to define the territory over which a branch of
the RTC shall exercise its authority. These administrative orders and
circulars issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where an
action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer
jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is
lodged solely in Congress. It also cannot be delegated to another office or
agency of the Government. Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly
states that the territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial
area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of
all suits, proceedings or actions.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Continuing Mandamus; The concept of
continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 574 SCRA
661 (2008); Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section
4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-
6-8-SC) requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and
substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court
may dismiss the petition outright.―The concept of continuing mandamus
was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 574 SCRA 661 (2008). Now cast in
stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys
a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the
enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part
II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be
sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action;
otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be
cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to the
petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be
applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law
and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.
Same; Same; Same; On matters of form, the petition for continuing
mandamus must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well
as a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that
the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the
government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency
of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must
contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable
neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie
basis for the issuance of the writ.―On matters of form, the petition must
be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the
petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the
government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency
of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must
contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable
neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie
basis for the issuance of the writ, viz.: (1) an agency or instrumentality of
government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2)
the act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its
officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from
an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation
of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4)
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil
action that may be availed of “to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law.” The petition should mainly involve an
environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right
therein.―The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that
may be availed of “to compel the performance of an act specifically
enjoined by law.” The petition should mainly involve an environmental
and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s
mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is
apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus
under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit: (c) Continuing mandamus is a
writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environment Protection
series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until Order.
judgment is fully satisfied.
Same; Same; Same; A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a
command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it “permits
the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s
decision.”―Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in
conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has become final,
the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the
government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law
and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full
satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of
the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment
has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered
in the court docket. A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a
command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it “permits
the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s
decision.”
Same; Same; Same; Failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the
respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should be
dismissed.―Failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is
not a fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed. The RTC could
have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to the
respondents. It should be remembered that “courts are not enslaved by
technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with
procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the
duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and
the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard.” Dolot vs. Paje, 703 SCRA
650, G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013
MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON, PETITIONER
vs.
HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
REYNULFO A. JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES
BUREAU, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE, GOVERNOR, PROVINCE OF
SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO
M. AGUILAR, AND JUAN M. AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL
SUMMIT MINES DEV'T CORP., AND TR ORE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review oncertiorari1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Order2 dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution3
dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sorsogon, Branch 53. The assailed issuances dismissed Civil Case No.
2011-8338 for Continuing Mandamus, Damages and Attorney’s Fees
Antecedent Facts
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together
with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of
Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for
continuing mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of
Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.4 The petition contained
the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they
protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore
in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of
Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon
and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological
foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and
landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood
hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and
landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining
operators did not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon
Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators
a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue;
(6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite
knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people of
Matnog;5 and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076
or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code.6 Thus,
they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ
commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining
operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a
temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an
inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4)
award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.7
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon,
Branch 53 being the designated environmental court.8 In the Order9
dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in
the Resolution10 dated October 18, 2011. Aside from sustaining the
dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC11 further ruled that:
(1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public
officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of
the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as
the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies;
and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of
the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by
the rules.12
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
The main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction
to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338. The other issue is whether the
petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no final court
decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly failed to act
on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial
affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or
appropriate agency.
Ruling of the Court
Jurisdiction and Venue
In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order
dated September 16, 2011, apparently relied on SC Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in
Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-
13
2008, designating the environmental courts "to try and decide
violations of environmental laws x x x committed within their respective
territorial jurisdictions."14 Thus, it ruled that its territorial jurisdiction
was limited within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring
municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban and that it
was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide [the] case, as
such authority rests before another co-equal court."15
Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its
four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action
filed by the petitioners.
None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the
power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is
conferred by law.16 It may either be over the nature of the action, over
the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues
framed in the pleadings.17 By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil
actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC.
Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise
original jurisdiction –
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any
part of their respective regions. (Emphasis ours)
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to
Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the Court authority to define the
territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority.
These administrative orders and circulars issued by the Court merely
provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not
have the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the
allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress.18 It also cannot be
delegated to another office or agency of the Government.19 Section 18
of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly states that the territory thus defined
shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for
purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions. It
was also clarified in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Matas20
that –
Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region] and, in like court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the
manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the
covered regional trial courts or its branches, such that non-observance
thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in
defines the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in mind
court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by of seeing to it that justice is served.31
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.21
The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of
trial or the geographical location in which an action or proceeding
should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court.
It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the
place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts.22
Consequently, the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-
8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently incorrect.
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with
the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically
states that a special civil action for continuing mandamus shall be filed
with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the
actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x."23 In this case, it appears
that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the
Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been filed
in the RTC of Irosin.24 But even then, it does not warrant the outright
dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be waived.25
Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature
where venue is an essential element of jurisdiction.26 In Gomez-Castillo
v. Commission on Elections,27 the Court even expressed that what the
RTC should have done under the circumstances was to transfer the case
(an election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly, it would serve the
higher interest of justice28 if the Court orders the transfer of Civil Case
No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution,
with the RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of the case.
At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin.
Circular No. 23-2008 constituting the different "green courts" in the
country and setting the administrative guidelines in the raffle and
disposition of environmental cases. While the designation and guidelines
were made in 2008, the same should operate in conjunction with the
Rules.
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the RTC further
ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following grounds: (1)
there is no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public
officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to
attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the
government or appropriate agency.29 The respondents, and even the
Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents, all
concur with the view of the RTC.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay.30 Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of
continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary
civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which
are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that
the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a
determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition
filed under Rule 8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to
thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in court’s decision."35
connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law
rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners
the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy should have first filed a case with the Panel of Arbitrators (Panel), which
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942.
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence,
Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction
specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or
over mining disputes.36 But the petition filed below does not involve a
regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
mining dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative
respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully
environmental impact of the small-scale mining operation being
satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under
Corporation and TR Ore in the Municipality of Matnog; the authority of
the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn
the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of these
certification of non-forum shopping.1âwphi1
entities; and the perceived indifference of the DENR and local
government officials over the issue. Resolution of these matters does
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain not entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the members of the
supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum Panel but requires an exercise of judicial function. Thus, in Olympic
shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is Mines and Development Corp. v. Platinum Group Metals Corporation,37
aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency, the Court stated –
instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the
other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a
allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission
disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of the contract
and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance
between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of
of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its
that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that
officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully
Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence
excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be
or validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or
performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is
oppression as in this case. The validity of the contract cannot be subject
specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an
of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the
office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation
execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the
of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4)
ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal in nature and require
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of
the application and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is
law.32
necessarily a judicial function.38 (Emphasis supplied in the former and
ours in the latter)
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be
availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by
Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and
law."33 The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other
unnecessary.
related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken
notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently
based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is
Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit: infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. As previously stated, Rule 8
requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting
evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental
forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of
case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or
judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the
officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would be the
judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and
(Emphasis ours)
answer form) must be attached to the petition/complaint.39

The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the

Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not
RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would
a fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed. The RTC could
eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus
have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to the
and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.
respondents. It should be remembered that "courts are not enslaved by
technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the
with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and
court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard."40
government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by
law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 16,
upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final
2011 and Resolution dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial
return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that
Court of Sorsogon, Branch 53, dismissing Civil Case No. 2011-8338 are
the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment
NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
shall be entered in the court docket.34 A writ of continuing mandamus is,
Court of Sorsogon is DIRECTED to transfer the case to the Regional Trial
in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment
Court of Irosin, Branch 55, for further proceedings with dispatch.
Petitioner Maricris D. Dolot is also ORDERED to furnish the respondents
with a copy of the petition and its annexes within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Decision and to submit its Compliance with the RTC of
Irosin.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 207257. February 3, 2015.*
HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
petitioner, vs. HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO,
HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE
G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO, HON.
JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH
LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE
GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG,
RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV.
FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO,
MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN
CARLO DELOS REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 207276. February 3, 2015.*
REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. TEODORO A.
CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON.
EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. ROLEN C.
PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON.
AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA,
NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO
SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX
CORPUS HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO
P. JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE
LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q. RODRI-
GUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS REYES, RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity
as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES and SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 207282. February 3, 2015.*
HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON.
EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. RAFAEL V.
MARIANO, HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO, HON.
JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH
LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE
GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG,
RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSA, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, et al.,
petitioners, vs. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SUBIC
BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, and REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY,
INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 207366. February 3, 2015.*
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON. TEODORO
A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO,
HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON.
ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES,
HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA LIPUMANO-
-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA,
GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS
HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P.
JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE
LATINAZO,
EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS REYES, HON. RAMON
JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES and REDONDO PENINSULA
ENERGY, INC., respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; The Rules on the
Writ of Kalikasan, which is Part III of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (RPEC), was issued by the Court pursuant to its
power to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, in particular, the individual’s right to a balanced and
healthful ecology.—The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan, which is Part III of
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, was issued by the Court
pursuant to its power to promulgate rules for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, in particular, the individual’s right to
a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 1 of Rule 7 provides: Section 1.
Nature of the writ.—The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical
person, entity authorized by law, people’s organization,
non-govern-mental organization, or any public interest group accredited
by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of kalikasan is categorized as a special civil
action and was, thus, conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which
aims to provide judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or
degree of damage that transcends political and territorial boundaries.—
The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus,
conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide
judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of
damage that transcends political and territorial boundaries. It is intended
“to provide a stronger defense for environmental rights through judicial
efforts where institutional arrangements of enforcement,
implementation and legislation have fallen short” and seeks “to address
the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.”
Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to
avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
(2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity;
and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) sustains the appellate court’s
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health findings that the Casiño Group failed to establish the alleged grave
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. Expectedly, environmental damage which will be caused by the construction and
the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of environmental operation of the power plant.—In upholding the evidence and arguments
damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the of RP Energy, relative to the lack of proof as to the alleged significant
territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for the grant of this environmental damage that will be caused by the project, the appellate
extraordinary remedy. The gravity of environmental damage sufficient to court relied mainly on the testimonies of experts, which we find to be in
grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case basis. accord with judicial precedents. Thus, we ruled in one case: Although
courts are not ordinarily bound by testimonies of experts, they may place
whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with
Same; Same; Same; The writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide,
healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the
that transcends political and territorial boundaries.—As earlier noted, the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or threatened supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for
which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends study and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any
political and territorial boundaries. A party, therefore, who invokes the other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of
writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the
must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when
also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given
the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or controlling effects. (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058) The problem of the credibility
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the
healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in
Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the action the absence of an abuse of that discretion. Hence, we sustain the
refiled before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of appellate court’s findings that the Casiño Group failed to establish the
exhaustion of administrative remedies. This must be so if we are to alleged grave environmental damage which will be caused by the
preserve the noble and laudable purposes of the writ against those who construction and operation of the power plant.
seek to abuse it. Same; Same; Same; The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
Same; Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Due to the liberally provide the courts with means and methods to obtain sufficient
extreme urgency of the matter at hand, the present case is an exception information in order to adequately protect or safeguard the right to a
to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.—Be that as it healthful and balanced ecology.—The Rules of Procedure for
may, we shall resolve both the issues proper in a writ of kalikasan case Environmental Cases liberally provide the courts with means and
and those which are not, commingled as it were here, because of the methods to obtain sufficient information in order to adequately protect
exceptional character of this case. We take judicial notice of the looming or safeguard the right to a healthful and balanced ecology. In Section 6(l)
power crisis that our nation faces. Thus, the resolution of all the issues in of Rule 3 (Pre-Trial), when there is a failure to settle, the judge shall,
this case is of utmost urgency and necessity in order to finally determine among others, determine the necessity of engaging the services of a
the fate of the project center of this controversy. If we were to resolve qualified expert as a friend of the court (amicus curiae). While, in Section
only the issues proper in a writ of kalikasan case and dismiss those not 12 of Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), a party may avail of discovery measures:
proper therefor, that will leave such unresolved issues open to another (1) ocular inspection and (2) production or inspection of documents or
round of protracted litigation. In any case, we find the records sufficient things. The liberality of the Rules in gathering and even compelling
to resolve all the issues presented herein. We also rule that, due to the information, specifically with regard to the Writ of Kalikasan, is explained
extreme urgency of the matter at hand, the present case is an exception in this wise: [T]he writ of kalikasan was refashioned as a tool to bridge the
to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As we have gap between allegation and proof by providing a remedy for would-be
often ruled, in exceptional cases, we can suspend the rules of procedure environmental litigants to compel the production of information within
in order to achieve substantial justice, and to address urgent and the custody of the government. The writ would effectively serve as a
paramount State interests vital to the life of our nation. remedy for the enforcement of the right to information about the
environment. The scope of the fact-finding power could be: (1) anything
Same; Same; Same; The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the parties related to the issuance, grant of a government permit issued or
to raise, on appeal, questions of fact — and, thus, constitutes an information controlled by the government or private entity and (2)
exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court — because of the extraordinary [i]nformation contained in documents such as environmental compliance
nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of certificate (ECC) and other government records. In addition, the [w]rit
kalikasan.—It is worth noting that the Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow may also be employed to compel the production of information, subject
the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact — and, thus, constitutes to constitutional limitations. This function is analogous to a discovery
an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court — because of the measure, and may be availed of upon application for the writ.
extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a
writ of kalikasan. Thus, we shall review both questions of law and fact in Same; Same; Same; In environmental cases, the power to appoint friends
resolving the issues presented in this case. of the court in order to shed light on matters requiring special technical
expertise as well as the power to order ocular inspections and production
of documents or things evince the main thrust of, and the spirit behind,
the Rules to allow the court sufficient leeway in acquiring the necessary
information to rule on the issues presented for its resolution, to the end
that the right to a healthful and balanced ecology may be adequately
protected.—In environmental cases, the power to appoint friends of the
court in order to shed light on matters requiring special technical
expertise as well as the power to order ocular inspections and production
of documents or things evince the main thrust of, and the spirit behind,
the Rules to allow the court sufficient leeway in acquiring the necessary
information to rule on the issues presented for its resolution, to the end
that the right to a healthful and balanced ecology may be adequately
protected. To draw a parallel, in the protection of the constitutional rights
of an accused, when life or liberty is at stake, the testimonies of witnesses
may be compelled as an attribute of the Due Process Clause. Here, where
the right to a healthful and balanced ecology of a substantial magnitude
is at stake, should we not tread the path of caution and prudence by
compelling the testimonies of these alleged experts?
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; A court has the power to suspend its
rules of procedure in order to attain substantial justice so that it has the
discretion, in exceptional cases, to take into consideration matters not
originally within the scope of the issues raised in the pleadings or set
during the preliminary conference, in order to prevent a miscarriage of
justice.—A court has the power to suspend its rules of procedure in order
to attain substantial justice so that it has the discretion, in exceptional
cases, to take into consideration matters not originally within the scope
of the issues raised in the pleadings or set during the preliminary
conference, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In the case at bar,
the importance of the signature cannot be seriously doubted because it
goes into the consent and commitment of the project proponent to
comply with the conditions of the ECC, which is vital to the protection of
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology of those who may be
affected by the project.
Environmental Compliance Certificate; The laws governing the
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), i.e., Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1151 and PD 1586, do not specifically state that the lack of signature
in the Statement of Accountability has the effect of invalidating the
ECC.—The laws governing the ECC, i.e., Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151
and PD 1586, do not specifically state that the lack of signature in the
Statement of Accountability has the effect of invalidating the ECC. Unlike
in wills or donations, where failure to comply with the specific form
prescribed by law leads to its nullity, the applicable laws here are silent
with respect to the necessity of a signature in the Statement of
Accountability and the effect of the lack thereof. This is, of course,
understandable because the Statement of Accountability is a mere
offshoot of the rule-making powers of the DENR relative to the
implementation of PD 1151 and PD 1586. To determine, therefore, the
effect of the lack of signature, we must look at the significance thereof
under the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Rules of the DENR and
the surrounding circumstances of this case.
Same; While the signature is necessary for the validity of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), the particular circumstances
of this case show that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy) were
not properly apprised of the issue of lack of signature in order for them
to present controverting evidence and arguments on this point, as the
matter only developed during the course of the proceedings upon
clarificatory questions from the appellate court.—In sum, we rule that the
appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack of
signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the ECC’s Statement of Accountability relative
to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the appellate court.
While the signature is necessary for the validity of the ECC, the particular
circumstances of this case show that the DENR and RP Energy were not
properly apprised of the issue of lack of signature in order for them to
present controverting evidence and arguments on this point, as the
matter only developed during the course of the proceedings upon
clarificatory questions from the appellate court. Consequently, RP Energy
cannot be faulted for submitting the certified true copy of the ECC only
after it learned that the ECC had been invalidated on the ground of lack
of signature in the January 30, 2013 Decision of the appellate court.
“License” and “Permit,” Distinguished.—The IPRA Law and its
implementing rules do not define the terms “license” and “permit” so that
resort to their plain or ordinary meaning in relation to the intendment of
the law is appropriate. A “license” has been defined as “a governmental
permission to perform a particular act (such as getting married), conduct
a particular business or occupation, operate machinery or vehicles after
proving capacity and ability to do so safely, or use property for a certain
purpose” while a “permit” has been defined as “a license or other
document given by an authorized public official or agency (building
inspector, department of motor vehicles) to allow a person or business to
perform certain acts.”
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; Ancestral Domain;
Even if the indigenous community does not actually reside on the
proposed lease site, the government agency would still be required to
obtain the Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO) precisely to rule out the
possibility that the proposed lease site encroaches upon an ancestral
domain.—Even if the indigenous community does not actually reside on
the proposed lease site, the government agency would still be required
to obtain the CNO precisely to rule out the possibility that the proposed
lease site encroaches upon an ancestral domain. The reason for this is
that an ancestral domain does not only cover the lands actually occupied
by an indigenous community, but all areas where they have a claim of
ownership, through time immemorial use, such as hunting, burial or
worship grounds and to which they have traditional access for their
subsistence and other traditional activities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; That the project site was formerly used as the
firing range of the U.S. Armed Forces does not preclude the possibility
that a present or future claim of ancestral domain may be made over the
aforesaid site.—That the project site was formerly used as the firing range
of the U.S. Armed Forces does not preclude the possibility that a present
or future claim of ancestral domain may be made over the aforesaid site.
The concept of an ancestral domain indicates that, even if the use of an
area was interrupted by the occupation of foreign forces, it may still be
validly claimed to be an ancestral domain.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority; Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court (SC)
finds that the power to approve or disapprove projects within the Subic
Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) is one such power over which the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority’s (SBMA’s) authority prevails over the Local
Government Unit’s (LGU’s) autonomy.—In the case at bar, we find that
the power to approve or disapprove projects within the SSEZ is one such
power over which the SBMA’s authority prevails over the LGU’s
autonomy. Hence, there is no need for the SBMA to secure the approval
of the concerned sanggunians prior to the implementation of the subject
project. This interpretation is based on the broad grant of powers to the
SBMA over all administrative matters relating to the SSEZ under Section
13 of RA 7227, as aforediscussed. Equally important, under Section 14,
other than those involving defense and security, the SBMA’s decision
prevails in case of conflict between the SBMA and the LGUs in all matters
concerning the SSEZ.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; In exceptional
cases, a writ of kalikasan may be availed of to challenge defects in the
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).—In general, the proper
procedure to question a defect in an ECC is to follow the appeal process
provided in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. After complying with
the proper administrative appeal process, recourse may be made to the
courts in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. However, as earlier discussed, in exceptional cases, a writ of
kalikasan may be availed of to challenge defects in the ECC provided that
(1) the defects are causally linked or reasonably connected to an
environmental damage of the nature and magnitude contemplated under
the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan, and (2) the case does not violate, or falls
under an exception to, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. HON. TEODORO
remedies and/or primary jurisdiction. Paje vs. Casiño, 749 SCRA 39, G.R. A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO,
No. 207366 February 3, 2015
EN BANC
G.R. No. 207257, February 03, 2015
V. MARIANO, HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO, HON.
JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH
LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA
CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA
MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSA, RODOLFO
SAMBAJON, ET AL., Petitioners,
[G.R. NO. 207282]
RAMON JESUS P. PAJE IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SUBIC
BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, AND REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY,
INC., Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 207366]
HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON.
ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS
REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA
LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE
GAMBOA, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX
CORPUS HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO
GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO
ESQUILLO, ELLE LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO
DELOS REYES, HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES AND REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC., Respondents.

HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DECISION

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
Petitioner, v. HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. DEL CASTILLO, J.:
PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE
JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON.
Before this Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari1
EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y.
assailing the Decision2 dated January 30, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated
CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA
May 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00015,
VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS,
entitled “Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, et al. v. Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, et
GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS
al.”
HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P.
JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE
Factual Antecedents
LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS REYES,
Respondents.
In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a
government agency organized and established under Republic Act No.
[G.R. NO. 207257]
(RA) 7227,4 and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to
REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC., Petitioner, v. HON. TEODORO A.
build a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and
CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO,
affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park
HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON.
(SBIP).5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS
REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA
On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby
LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE
TCC undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power plant.6 In the said
GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA
MOU, TCC identified 20 hectares of land at Sitio Naglatore, Mt.
MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSO, RODOLFO
Redondo, Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) as the suitable area for the
SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A.
project and another site of approximately 10 hectares to be used as an
BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE LATINAZO,
ash pond.7 TCC intends to lease the property from SBMA for a term of
EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS REYES, RAMON
50 years with rent fixed at $3.50 per square meter, payable in 10 equal
JESUS P. PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
5-year installments.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, Respondents.
On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) No. EC-SBFZ-ECC-69-21-500 in favor of
[G.R. NO. 207276]
Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of
TCC,9 for the construction, installation, and operation of 2x150-MW
HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON.
Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio
EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. RAFAEL
Naglatore.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On July 20, 2012, Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, Hon. Raymond V. Palatino,
On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU Hon. Rafael V. Mariano, Hon. Emerenciana A. De Jesus, Clemente G.
dated July 28, 2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy),11 a Bautista, Jr., Hon. Rolen C. Paulino, Hon. Eduardo Piano, Hon. James de
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the los Reyes, Hon. Aquilino Y. Cortez, Jr., Hon. Sarah Lugerna Lipumano-
Philippines with the primary purpose of building, owning, and operating Garcia, Noraida Velarmino, Bianca Christine Gamboa Espinos, Charo
power plants in the Philippines, among others.12 Accordingly, an Simons, Gregorio Llorca Magdaraog, Rubelh Peralta, Alex Corpus
Addendum to the said MOU was executed by SBMA and RP Hermoso, Rodolfo Sambajon, Rev. Fr. Gerardo Gregorio P. Jorge, Carlito
Energy.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary A. Baloy, Ofelia D. Pablo, Mario Esquillo, Elle Latinazo, Evangeline Q.
Rodriguez, and John Carlo delos Reyes (Casiño Group) filed before this
RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty, Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an Court a Petition for Writ of kalikasan against RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon.
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed coal-fired power Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity as Secretary of the
plant and to assist RP Energy in applying for the issuance of an ECC from DENR.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary On July 31, 2012, this Court resolved, among others, to: (1) issue a Writ
of kalikasan; and (2) refer the case to the CA for hearing and reception
On August 27, 2008, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City of evidence and rendition of judgment.29chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
issued Resolution No. 131, Series of 2008, expressing the city
government’s objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy While the case was pending, RP Energy applied for another amendment
source and urging the proponent to consider safer alternative sources of to its ECC (third amendment) and submitted another EPRMP to the
energy for Subic Bay.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary DENR-EMB, proposing the construction and operation of a 2x300-MW
coal-fired power plant.30chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through former Secretary Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., issued an ECC for the proposed 2x150-MW coal-fired power On September 11, 2012, the Petition for Writ of kalikasan was docketed
plant.16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary as CA-G.R. SP No. 00015 and raffled to the Fifteenth Division of the CA.31
In the Petition, the Casiño Group alleged, among others, that the power
Sometime thereafter, RP Energy decided to include additional plant project would cause grave environmental damage;32 that it would
components in its proposed coal-fired power plant. Due to the changes adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of
in the project design, which involved the inclusion of a barge wharf, Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo;33 that the
seawater intake breakwater, subsea discharge pipeline, raw water ECC was issued and the LDA entered into without the prior approval of
collection system, drainage channel improvement, and a 230kV double- the concerned sanggunians as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the
circuit transmission line,17 RP Energy requested the DENR Environmental Local Government Code (LGC);34 that the LDA was entered into without
Management Bureau (DENR-EMB) to amend its ECC.18 In support of its securing a prior certification from the National Commission on
request, RP Energy submitted to the DENR-EMB an Environmental Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as required under Section 59 of RA 8371 or
Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP), which was the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA Law);35 that Section 8.3
19
prepared by GHD. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary of DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 (DAO 2003-30) which allows
amendments of ECCs is ultra vires because the DENR has no authority to
On June 8, 2010, RP Energy and SBMA entered into a Lease and decide on requests for amendments of previously issued ECCs in the
Development Agreement (LDA) over a 380,004.456-square meter parcel absence of a new EIS;36 and that due to the nullity of Section 8.3 of DAO
of land to be used for building and operating the coal-fired power 2003-30, all amendments to RP Energy’s ECC are null and
plant.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary void.37chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On July 8, 2010, the DENR-EMB issued an amended ECC (first
amendment) allowing the inclusion of additional components, among
others.21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to
amend the ECC.22 Instead of constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired power
plant, as originally planned, it now sought to construct a 1x300-MW
coal-fired power plant.23 In support of its request, RP Energy submitted a
Project Description Report (PDR) to the DENR-
EMB.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and further
amended the ECC (second amendment).25chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On August 1, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Zambales issued
Resolution No. 2011-149, opposing the establishment of a coal-fired
thermal power plant at Sitio Naglatore, Brgy. Cawag, Subic,
Zambales.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On August 11, 2011, the Liga ng mga Barangay of Olongapo City issued
Resolution No. 12, Series of 2011, expressing its strong objection to the
coal-fired power plant as an energy
source.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On October 29, 2012, the CA conducted a preliminary conference
wherein the parties, with their respective counsels, appeared except for
Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, Hon. Rafael V. Mariano, Hon. Emerencia A. De
Jesus, Clemente G. Bautista, Mario Esquillo, Elle Latinazo, Evangeline Q.
Rodriguez, and the SBMA.38 The matters taken up during the preliminary
conference were embodied in the CA’s Resolution dated November 5,
2012, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I. ISSUES
A. Petitioners (Casiño Group)
1. Whether x x x the DENR Environmental
Compliance Certificate (‘ECC’ x x x) in favor of RP
Energy for a 2x150 MW Coal-Fired Thermal Power
Plant Project (‘Power Plant,’ x x x ) and its
amendment to 1x300 MW Power Plant, and the
Lease and Development Agreement between SBMA
and RP Energy complied with the Certification
Precondition as required under Section 59 of
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act of 1997 (‘IPRA Law,’ x x x);
 2. Whether x x x RP Energy can proceed with the
construction and operation of the 1x300 MW Power
Plant without prior consultation with and approval
of the concerned local government units (‘LGUs,’ x x
x ), pursuant to Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act
No. 7160 or the Local Government Code;
3. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DENR Administrative
Order No. 2003-30 (‘DAO No. 2003-30,’ x x x )
providing for the amendment of an ECC is null and
void for being ultra vires; and
4. Whether x x x the amendment of RP Energy’s ECC
under Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 is null and
void.
B. Respondent RP Energy
1. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 can
be collaterally attacked;
1.1 Whether x x x the same is valid until
annulled;
2. Whether x x x petitioners exhausted their
administrative remedies with respect to the
amended ECC for the 1x300 MW Power Plant;
2.1 Whether x x x the instant Petition is
proper;
3. Whether x x x RP Energy complied with all the
procedures/requirements for the issuance of the
DENR ECC and its amendment;
3.1 Whether x x x a Certificate of Non-
Overlap from the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples is applicable in the
instant case;
4. Whether x x x the LGU’s approval under Sections
26 and 27 of the Local Government Code is
necessary for the issuance of the DENR ECC and its
amendments, and what constitutes LGU approval;
5. Whether x x x there is a threatened or actual
violation of environmental laws to justify the
Petition;
5.1 Whether x x x the approved 1x300 MW
Power Plant complied with the accepted
legal standards on thermal pollution of
coastal waters, air pollution, water
pollution, and acid deposits on aquatic and
terrestrial ecosystems; and
6. Whether x x x the instant Petition should be
dismissed for failure to comply with the
requirements of proper verification and certification
of non-forum shopping with respect to some
petitioners.
C. Respondent DENR Secretary Paje
1. Whether x x x the issuance of the DENR ECC and
its amendment in favor of RP Energy requires
compliance with Section 59 of the IPRA Law, as well
as Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government
Code;
2. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 can
be collaterally attacked in this proceeding; and
3. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 is
valid.
II. ADMISSIONS/DENIALS
Petitioners, through Atty. Ridon, admitted all the allegations in RP
Energy’s Verified Return, except the
following:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. paragraphs 1.4 to 1.7;
2. paragraphs 1.29 to 1.32; and
3. paragraphs 1.33 to 1.37.
Petitioners made no specific denial with respect to the allegations of
DENR Secretary Paje’s Verified Return. x x x
Respondent RP Energy proposed the following stipulations, which were
all admitted by petitioners, through Atty. Ridon,
viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. The 1x300 MW Power Plant is not yet operational;
2. At present, there is no environmental damage;
3. The 1x300 MW Power Plant project is situated within the Subic
Special Economic Zone; and
4. Apart from the instant case, petitioners have not challenged the
validity of Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30.
Public respondent DENR Secretary Paje did not propose any matter for
stipulation.39
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Casiño Group presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Raymond V.
Palatino, a two-term representative of the Kabataan Partylist in the
House of Representatives;40 (2) Alex C. Hermoso, the convenor of the
Zambales-Olongapo City Civil Society Network, a director of the PREDA41
Foundation, and a member of the Zambales Chapter of the Kaya Natin
Movement and the Zambales Chapter of the People Power Volunteers
for Reform;42 and (3) Ramon Lacbain, the Vice-Governor of the Province
of Zambales.43chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RP Energy presented five witnesses, namely: (1) Junisse P. Mercado (Ms.
Mercado), an employee of GHD and the Project Director of ongoing
projects for RP Energy regarding the proposed power plant project;44 (2)
Juha Sarkki (Engr. Sarkki), a Master of Science degree holder in Chemical
Engineering;45 (3) Henry K. Wong, a degree holder of Bachelor of Science
Major in Mechanical Engineering from Worcester Polytechnic Institute;46
(4) Dr. Ely Anthony R. Ouano (Dr. Ouano), a licensed Chemical Engineer,
Sanitary Engineer, and Environmental Planner in the Philippines; 47 and
(5) David C. Evangelista (Mr. Evangelista), a Business Development
Analyst working for RP Energy.48chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SBMA, for its part, presented its Legal Department Manager, Atty. Von F.
Rodriguez (Atty. Rodriguez).49chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 Peninsula Energy, Inc. by former Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr. of the
The DENR, however, presented no Department of Environment and Natural Resources;
evidence.50chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. The ECC first amendment dated 08 July 2010 and ECC second
Meanwhile, on October 31, 2012, a Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO) amendment dated 26 May 2011, both issued in favor of respondent
was issued in connection with RP Energy’s application for the 2x300-MW Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. by OIC Director Atty. Juan Miguel T.
coal-fired power plant.51chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Cuna of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Environmental Management Bureau; and
On November 15, 2012, the DENR-EMB granted RP Energy’s application
for the third amendment to its ECC, approving the construction and 3. The Lease and Development Agreement dated 08 June 2010 entered
operation of a 2x300-MW coal-fired power plant, among into by respondents Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and Redondo
others.52chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Peninsula Energy, Inc. involving a parcel of land consisting of
380,004.456 square meters.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
SO ORDERED.65
On January 30, 2013, the CA rendered a Decision denying the privilege
of the writ of kalikasan and the application for an environment
The DENR and SBMA separately moved for reconsideration.66 RP Energy
protection order due to the failure of the Casiño Group to prove that its
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,67 attaching thereto a signed
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or
Statement of Accountability.68 The Casiño Group, on the other hand,
threatened.53 The CA likewise found no reason to nullify Section 8.3 of
filed Omnibus Motions for Clarification and
DAO No. 2003-30. It said that the provision was not ultra vires, as the
Reconsideration.69chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
express power of the Secretary of the DENR, the Director and Regional
Directors of the EMB to issue an ECC impliedly includes the incidental
On May 22, 2013, the CA issued a Resolution70 denying the aforesaid
power to amend the same.54 In any case, the CA ruled that the validity of
motions for lack of merit. The CA opined that the reliefs it granted in its
the said section could not be collaterally attacked in a petition for a writ
Decision are allowed under Section 15, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure
of kalikasan.55chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
for Environmental Cases as the reliefs enumerated therein are broad,
comprehensive, and non-exclusive.71 In fact, paragraph (e) of the said
Nonetheless, the CA resolved to invalidate the ECC dated December 22,
provision allows the granting of “such other reliefs” in consonance with
2008 for non-compliance with Section 59 of the IPRA Law56 and Sections
the objective, purpose, and intent of the Rules. 72 SBMA’s contention
26 and 27 of the LGC57 and for failure of Luis Miguel Aboitiz (Mr.
that the stoppage of a project for non-compliance with Section 59 of the
Aboitiz), Director of RP Energy, to affix his signature in the Sworn
58
IPRA Law may only be done by the indigenous cultural communities or
Statement of Full Responsibility, which is an integral part of the ECC.
indigenous peoples was also brushed aside by the CA as the Casiño
Also declared invalid were the ECC first amendment dated July 8, 2010
Group did not file a case under the IPRA Law but a Petition for a Writ of
and the ECC second amendment dated May 26, 2011 in view of the
kalikasan, which is available to all natural or juridical persons whose
failure of RP Energy to comply with the restrictions set forth in the ECC,
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
which specifically require that “any expansion of the project beyond the
threatened to be violated.73 As to RP Energy’s belated submission of a
project description or any change in the activity x x x shall be subject to
signed Statement of Accountability, the CA gave no weight and credence
a new Environmental Impact Assessment.”59 However, as to the ECC
to it as the belated submission of such document, long after the
third amendment dated November 15, 2012, the CA decided not to rule
presentation of evidence of the parties had been terminated, is not in
on its validity since it was not raised as an issue during the preliminary
accord with the rules of fair play.74 Neither was the CA swayed by the
conference.60chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
argument that the omitted signature of Luis Miguel Aboitiz is a mere
formal defect, which does not affect the validity of the entire
The CA also invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy as
document.75 The dispositive portion of the ++Resolution
it was issued without the prior consultation and approval of all the
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
sanggunians concerned as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the
LGC,61 and in violation of Section 59, Chapter VIII of the IPRA Law, which
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents Subic Bay Metropolitan
enjoins all departments and other governmental agencies from granting
Authority’s Motion for Reconsideration dated 18 February 2013,
any lease without a prior certification that the area affected does not
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary Ramon
overlap with any ancestral domain.62 The CA noted that no CNO was
Jesus P. Paje’s Motion for Reconsideration dated 19 February 2013, and
secured from the NCIP prior to the execution of the LDA,63 and that the
Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
CNO dated October 31, 2012 was secured during the pendency of the
dated 22 February 2013, as well as petitioners’ Omnibus Motions for
case and was issued in connection with RP Energy’s application for a
Clarification and Reconsideration dated 25 February 2013, are all
2x300-MW coal-fired power plant.64chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
DENIED for lack of merit.
Thus, the CA disposed of the case in this
SO ORDERED.76
wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
DENYING the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and the application for an
environmental protection order. The prayer to declare the nullity of
Section 8.3 of the DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 for being
ultra vires is DENIED; and the following are all declared INVALID:
1. The Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC Ref. Code: 0804-011-
4021) dated 22 December 2008 issued in favor of respondent Redondo
Unsatisfied, the parties appealed to this Court.
The Casiño Group’s arguments
The Casiño Group, in essence, argues that it is entitled to a Writ of
kalikasan as it was able to prove that the operation of the power plant
would cause environmental damage and pollution, and that this would
adversely affect the residents of the provinces of Bataan and Zambales,
particularly the municipalities of Subic, Morong, Hermosa, and the City
of Olongapo. It cites as basis RP Energy’s EIS, which allegedly admits that
acid rain may occur in the combustion of coal;77 that the incidence of
asthma attacks among residents in the vicinity of the project site may
increase due to exposure to suspended particles from plant
operations;78 and that increased sulfur oxides (SOx) and nitrogen oxides
(NOx) emissions may occur during plant operations. 79 It also claims that
when the SBMA conducted Social Acceptability Policy Consultations with
different stakeholders on the proposed power plant, the results
indicated that the overall persuasion of the participants was a clear
aversion to the project due to environmental, health, economic and
socio-cultural concerns.80 Finally, it contends that the ECC third
amendment should also be nullified for failure to comply with the
procedures and requirements for the issuance of the
ECC.81chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The DENR’s arguments
The DENR imputes error on the CA in invalidating the ECC and its
amendments, arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC
as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ of
kalikasan.82 And even if it is within the scope, there is no reason to
invalidate the ECC and its amendments as these were issued in
accordance with DAO No. 2003-30.83 The DENR also insists that contrary
to the view of the CA, a new EIS was no longer necessary since the first
EIS was still within the validity period when the first amendment was
requested, and that this is precisely the reason RP Energy was only
required to submit an EPRMP in support of its application for the first
amendment.84 As to the second amendment, the DENR-EMB only
required RP Energy to submit documents to support the proposed
revision considering that the change in configuration of the power plant
project, from 2x150MW to 1x300MW, was not substantial.85
Furthermore, the DENR argues that no permits, licenses, and/or
clearances from other government agencies are required in the
processing and approval of the ECC.86 Thus, non-compliance with
Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC as well as Section 59 of the IPRA Law is
not a ground to invalidate the ECC and its amendments.87 The DENR
further posits that the ECC is not a concession, permit, or license but is a
document certifying that the proponent has complied with all the
requirements of the EIS System and has committed to implement the
approved Environmental Management Plan.88 The DENR invokes
substantial justice so that the belatedly submitted certified true copy of
the ECC containing the signature of Mr. Aboitiz on the Statement of
Accountability may be accepted and accorded weight and
credence.89chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SBMA’s arguments
For its part, SBMA asserts that since the CA did not issue a Writ of
kalikasan, it should not have invalidated the LDA and that in doing so,
the CA acted beyond its powers.90 SBMA likewise puts in issue the legal
capacity of the Casiño Group to impugn the validity of the LDA91 and its
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.92 In any case, SBMA
contends that there is no legal basis to invalidate the LDA as prior
consultation under Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC is not required in this
case considering that the area is within the SBFZ.93 Under RA 7227, it is
the SBMA which has exclusive jurisdiction over projects and leases
within the SBFZ and that in case of conflict between the LGC and RA
7227, it is the latter, a special law, which must prevail.94 Moreover, the
lack of prior certification from the NCIP is also not a ground to invalidate
a contract.95 If at all, the only effect of non-compliance with the said
requirement under Section 59 of the IPRA Law is the stoppage or
suspension of the project.96 Besides, the subsequent issuance of a CNO
has cured any legal defect found in the
LDA.97chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RP Energy’s arguments
RP Energy questions the propriety of the reliefs granted by the CA
considering that it did not issue a writ of kalikasan in favor of the Casiño
Group.98 RP Energy is of the view that unless a writ of kalikasan is
issued, the CA has no power to grant the reliefs prayed for in the
Petition.99 And even if it does, the reliefs are limited to those
enumerated in Section 15, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases and that the phrase “such other reliefs” in
paragraph (e) should be limited only to those of the same class or
general nature as the four other reliefs enumerated.100 As to the validity
of the LDA, the ECC and its amendments, the arguments of RP Energy
are basically the same arguments interposed by SBMA and the DENR. RP
Energy maintains that the ECC and its amendments were obtained in
compliance with the DENR rules and regulations;101 that a CNO is not
necessary in the execution of an LDA and in the issuance of the ECC and
its amendments;102 and that prior approval of the local governments,
which may be affected by the project, are not required because under
RA 7227, the decision of the SBMA shall prevail in matters affecting the
Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), except in matters involving defense
and security.103 RP Energy also raises the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies on the part of the Casiño
Group.104chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Preliminaries
This case affords us an opportunity to expound on the nature and scope
of the writ of kalikasan. It presents some interesting questions about
law and justice in the context of environmental cases, which we will
tackle in the main body of this Decision.
But we shall first address some preliminary matters, in view of the
manner by which the appellate court disposed of this case.
The Rules on the Writ of kalikasan,105 which is Part III of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases,106 was issued by the Court pursuant
to its power to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights,107 in particular, the individual’s right to a balanced
and healthful ecology.108 Section 1 of Rule 7
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural
or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people’s organization, non-
governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or
registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus,
conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide
judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of
damage that transcends political and territorial boundaries.109 It is
intended “to provide a stronger defense for environmental rights
through judicial efforts where institutional arrangements of
enforcement, implementation and legislation have fallen short”110 and
seeks “to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale
ecological threats.”111chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to
avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
(2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity;
and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of
environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in
terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for the grant
of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of environmental damage
sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case basis. ecosystems, which will adversely affect the residents of the Provinces of
If the petitioner successfully proves the foregoing requisites, the court
shall render judgment granting the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
Otherwise, the petition shall be denied. If the petition is granted, the
court may grant the reliefs provided for under Section 15 of Rule 7, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition of an ECC, particularly, DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Procedural Manual
is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or
denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from
committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of
environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private
person or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the
environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private
person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and
orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or
private person or entity to make periodic reports on the execution of
the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation,
rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of
damages to individual petitioners.
It must be noted, however, that the above enumerated reliefs are non-
exhaustive. The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are broad,
comprehensive and non-exclusive.112chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Prescinding from the above, the DENR, SBMA and RP Energy are one in
arguing that the reliefs granted by the appellate court, i.e. invalidating
the ECC and its amendments, are improper because it had denied the
Petition for Writ of kalikasan upon a finding that the Casiño Group failed
to prove the alleged environmental damage, actual or threatened,
contemplated under the Rules.
Ordinarily, no reliefs could and should be granted. But the question may
be asked, could not the appellate court have granted the Petition for
Writ of kalikasan on the ground of the invalidity of the ECC for failure to
comply with certain laws and rules?
This question is the starting point for setting up the framework of
analysis which should govern writ of kalikasan cases.
In their Petition for Writ of kalikasan,113 the Casiño Group’s allegations,
relative to the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology, may be grouped into two.
The first set of allegations deals with the actual environmental damage
that will occur if the power plant project is implemented. The Casiño
Group claims that the construction and operation of the power plant will
result in (1) thermal pollution of coastal waters, (2) air pollution due to
dust and combustion gases, (3) water pollution from toxic coal
combustion waste, and (4) acid deposition in aquatic and terrestrial
Bataan and Zambales, particularly the Municipalities of Subic, Morong
and Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo.
The second set of allegations deals with the failure to comply with
certain laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC
and amendments thereto. The Casiño Group claims that the ECC was
issued in violation of (1) the DENR rules on the issuance and amendment
for DAO 2003-30 (Revised Manual), (2) Section 59 of the IPRA Law, and
(3) Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC. In addition, it claims that the LDA
entered into between SBMA and RP Energy violated Section 59 of the
IPRA Law.
As to the first set of allegations, involving actual damage to the
environment, it is not difficult to discern that, if they are proven, then
the Petition for Writ of kalikasan could conceivably be granted.
However, as to the second set of allegations, a nuanced approach is
warranted. The power of the courts to nullify an ECC existed even prior
to the promulgation of the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan for judicial
review of the acts of administrative agencies or bodies has long been
recognized114 subject, of course, to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.115chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
But the issue presented before us is not a simple case of reviewing the
acts of an administrative agency, the DENR, which issued the ECC and its
amendments. The challenge to the validity of the ECC was raised in the
context of a writ of kalikasan case. The question then is, can the validity
of an ECC be challenged via a writ of kalikasan?
We answer in the affirmative subject to certain qualifications.
As earlier noted, the writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a
magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries. A party,
therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or
irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove
such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at
least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in
the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition
should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper
forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. This must be so if we are to preserve the noble and laudable
purposes of the writ against those who seek to abuse it.
An example of a defect or an irregularity in the issuance of an ECC,
which could conceivably warrant the granting of the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of kalikasan, is a case where there are serious and
substantial misrepresentations or fraud in the application for the ECC,
which, if not immediately nullified, would cause actual negative
environmental impacts of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules,
because the government agencies and LGUs, with the final authority to
implement the project, may subsequently rely on such substantially
defective or fraudulent ECC in approving the implementation of the
project.
To repeat, in cases of defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC,
it is not sufficient to merely allege such defects or irregularities, but to In view of the foregoing, we shall resolve the following issues:
show a causal link or reasonable connection with the environmental
damage of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. In the case at
bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even
attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere
listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the
ECC. This would have been sufficient reason to disallow the resolution of
such issues in a writ of kalikasan case.
However, inasmuch as this is the first time that we lay down this
principle, we have liberally examined the alleged defects or irregularities
in the issuance of the ECC and find that there is only one group of
allegations, relative to the ECC, that can be reasonably connected to an
environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules.
This is with respect to the allegation that there was no environmental
impact assessment relative to the first and second amendments to the
subject ECC. If this were true, then the implementation of the project
can conceivably actually violate or threaten to violate the right to a
healthful and balanced ecology of the inhabitants near the vicinity of the
power plant. Thus, the resolution of such an issue could conceivably be
resolved in a writ of kalikasan case provided that the case does not
violate, or is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and primary
jurisdiction.116chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As to the claims that the issuance of the ECC violated the IPRA Law and
LGC and that the LDA, likewise, violated the IPRA Law, we find the same
not to be within the coverage of the writ of kalikasan because, assuming
there was non-compliance therewith, no reasonable connection can be
made to an actual or threatened violation of the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules.
To elaborate, the alleged lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians
over the subject project would not lead to or is not reasonably
connected with environmental damage but, rather, it is an affront to the
local autonomy of LGUs. Similarly, the alleged lack of a certificate
precondition that the project site does not overlap with an ancestral
domain would not result in or is not reasonably connected with
environmental damage but, rather, it is an impairment of the right of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their
ancestral domains. These alleged violations could be the subject of
appropriate remedies before the proper administrative bodies (like the
NCIP) or a separate action to compel compliance before the courts, as
the case may be. However, the writ of kalikasan would not be the
appropriate remedy to address and resolve such issues.
Be that as it may, we shall resolve both the issues proper in a writ of
kalikasan case and those which are not, commingled as it were here,
because of the exceptional character of this case. We take judicial notice
of the looming power crisis that our nation faces. Thus, the resolution of
all the issues in this case is of utmost urgency and necessity in order to
finally determine the fate of the project center of this controversy. If we
were to resolve only the issues proper in a writ of kalikasan case and
dismiss those not proper therefor, that will leave such unresolved issues
open to another round of protracted litigation. In any case, we find the
records sufficient to resolve all the issues presented herein. We also rule
that, due to the extreme urgency of the matter at hand, the present
case is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.117 As we have often ruled, in exceptional cases, we can
suspend the rules of procedure in order to achieve substantial justice,
and to address urgent and paramount State interests vital to the life of
our nation.cralawred
Issues
1. Whether the Casiño Group was able to prove that the
construction and operation of the power plant will cause grave
environmental damage.
1.1.
2. The alleged thermal pollution of coastal waters, air
pollution due to dust and combustion gases, water
pollution from toxic coal combustion waste, and acid
deposition to aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems that
will be caused by the project.
1.2. The alleged negative environmental assessment of
the project by experts in a report generated during
the social acceptability consultations.
1.3. The alleged admissions of grave environmental
damage in the EIS itself of the project.
3.
4. Whether the ECC is invalid for lack of signature of Mr. Luis
Miguel Aboitiz, as representative of RP Energy, in the
Statement of Accountability of the ECC.
5. Whether the first and second amendments to the ECC are
invalid for failure to undergo a new environmental impact
assessment (EIA) because of the utilization of inappropriate
EIA documents.
6. Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap, under Section 59 of
the IPRA Law, is a precondition to the issuance of an ECC and
the lack of its prior issuance rendered the ECC invalid.
7. Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap, under Section 59 of
the IPRA Law, is a precondition to the consummation of the
Lease and Development Agreement (LDA) between SBMA and
RP Energy and the lack of its prior issuance rendered the LDA
invalid.
8. Whether compliance with Section 27, in relation to Section 26,
of the LGC (i.e., approval of the concerned sanggunian
requirement) is necessary prior to the implementation of the
power plant project.
9. Whether the validity of the third amendment to the ECC can
be resolved in this case.
Ruling
The parties to this case appealed from the decision of the appellate
court pursuant to Section 16, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 16. Appeal. - Within fifteen (15) days from the date of notice of
the adverse judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration, any party
may appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The appeal may raise questions of fact. (Emphasis supplied)
It is worth noting that the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan allow the
parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an
exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because of the
extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a
writ of kalikasan. 118 Thus, we shall review both questions of law and
fact in resolving the issues presented in this case.
We now rule on the above-mentioned issues in detail.cralawred
I.
Whether the Casiño Group was able to prove that the construction and
operation of the power plant will cause grave environmental damage.
The alleged thermal
pollution of coastal waters,
air pollution due to dust and
combustion gases, water
pollution from toxic coal
combustion waste, and acid
deposition in aquatic and
terrestrial ecosystems that
will be caused by the
project.
As previously noted, the Casiño Group alleged that the construction and
operation of the power plant shall adversely affect the residents of the
Provinces of Bataan and Zambales, particularly, the Municipalities of
Subic, Morong and Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo, as well as the
sensitive ecological balance of the area. Their claims of ecological
damage may be summarized as follows:
1. Thermal pollution of coastal waters. Due to the discharge of
heated water from the operation of the plant, they claim that
the temperature of the affected bodies of water will rise
significantly. This will have adverse effects on aquatic
organisms. It will also cause the depletion of oxygen in the
water. RP Energy claims that there will be no more than a 3°C
increase in water temperature but the Casiño Group claims
that a 1°C to 2°C rise can already affect the metabolism and
other biological functions of aquatic organisms such as
mortality rate and reproduction.
2. Air pollution due to dust and combustion gases. While the
Casiño Group admits that Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal
technology, which will be used in the power plant, is a clean
technology because it reduces the emission of toxic gases, it
claims that volatile organic compounds, specifically, polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) will also be emitted under the
CFB. PAHs are categorized as pollutants with carcinogenic and
mutagenic characteristics. Carbon monoxide, a poisonous gas,
and nitrous oxide, a lethal global warming gas, will also be
produced.
3. Water pollution from toxic coal combustion waste. The waste
from coal combustion or the residues from burning pose
serious environmental risk because they are toxic and may
cause cancer and birth defects. Their release to nearby bodies
of water will be a threat to the marine ecosystem of Subic Bay.
The project is located in a flood-prone area and is near three
prominent seismic faults as identified by Philippine Institute of
Volcanology and Seismology. The construction of an ash pond
in an area susceptible to flooding and earthquake also
undermines SBMA’s duty to prioritize the preservation of the
water quality in Subic Bay.
4. Acid deposition in aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. The
power plant will release 1,888 tons of nitrous oxides and 886
tons of sulfur dioxide per year. These oxides are responsible
for acid deposition. Acid deposition directly impacts aquatic
ecosystems. It is toxic to fish and other aquatic animals. It will
also damage the forests near Subic Bay as well as the wildlife
therein. This will threaten the stability of the biological
diversity of the Subic Bay Freeport which was declared as one
of the ten priority sites among the protected areas in the
Philippines and the Subic Watershed and Forest Reserve. This
will also have an adverse effect on tourism.119
In its January 30, 2013 Decision, the appellate court ruled that the
Casiño Group failed to prove the above allegations.
We agree with the appellate court.
Indeed, the three witnesses presented by the Casiño Group are not
experts on the CFB technology or on environmental matters. These
witnesses even admitted on cross-examination that they are not
competent to testify on the environmental impact of the subject project.
What is wanting in their testimonies is their technical knowledge of the
project design/implementation or some other aspects of the project,
even those not requiring expert knowledge, vis-à-vis the significant
negative environmental impacts which the Casiño Group alleged will
occur. Clearly, the Casiño Group failed to carry the onus of proving the
alleged significant negative environmental impacts of the project. In
comparison, RP Energy presented several experts to refute the
allegations of the Casiño Group.
As aptly and extensively discussed by the appellate
court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners120 presented three (3) witnesses, namely, Palatino, Hermoso,
and Lacbain, all of whom are not experts on the CFB technology or even
on environmental matters. Petitioners did not present any witness from
Morong or Hermosa. Palatino, a former freelance writer and now a
Congressman representing the Kabataan Partylist, with a degree of BS
Education major in Social Studies, admitted that he is not a technical
expert. Hermoso, a Director of the PREDA foundation which is allegedly
involved on environmental concerns, and a member of Greenpeace, is
not an expert on the matter subject of this case. He is a graduate of BS
Sociology and a practicing business director involved in social
development and social welfare services. Lacbain, incumbent Vice-
Governor of the Province of Zambales, an accounting graduate with a
Master in Public Administration, was a former Banco Filipino teller,
entertainment manager, disco manager, marketing manager and college
instructor, and is also not an expert on the CFB technology. Lacbain also
admitted that he is neither a scientist nor an expert on matters of the
environment.
Petitioners cited various scientific studies or articles and websites culled
from the internet. However, the said scientific studies and articles
including the alleged Key Observations and Recommendations on the
EIS of the Proposed RPE Project by Rex Victor O. Cruz (Exhibit “DDDDD”)
attached to the Petition, were not testified to by an expert witness, and
are basically hearsay in nature and cannot be given probative weight.
The article purportedly written by Rex Victor O. Cruz was not even
signed by the said author, which fact was confirmed by Palatino.
 department manager, director of boiler performance and mechanical
Petitioners’ witness, Lacbain, admitted that he did not personally design engineering and pulverized coal product director. He explained
conduct any study on the environmental or health effects of a coal-fired that: CFB stands for Circulating Fluidized Bed; it is a process by which
power plant, but only attended seminars and conferences pertaining to fuel is fed to the lower furnace where it is burned in an upward flow of
climate change; and that the scientific studies mentioned in the combustion air; limestone, which is used as sulfur absorbent, is also fed
penultimate whereas clause of Resolution No. 2011-149 (Exhibit to the lower furnace along with the fuel; the mixture of fuel, ash, and
“AAAAA”) of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zambales is based on the boiler bed sorbent material is carried to the upper part of the
what he read on the internet, seminars he attended and what he heard furnace and into a cyclone separator; the heavier particles which
from unnamed experts in the field of environmental protection. generally consist of the remaining uncombusted fuel and absorbent
material are separated in the cyclone separator and are recirculated to
In his Judicial Affidavit (Exhibit “HHHHH”), Palatino stated that he was the lower furnace to complete the combustion of any unburned
furnished by the concerned residents the Key Observations and particles and to enhance SO2 capture by the sorbent; fly ash and flue gas
Recommendations on the EIS of Proposed RPE Project by Rex Victor O. exit the cyclone and the fly ash is collected in the electrostatic
Cruz, and that he merely received and read the five (5) scientific studies precipitator; furnace temperature is maintained in the range of 800° to
and articles which challenge the CFB technology. Palatino also testified 900° C by suitable heat absorbing surface; the fuel passes through a
that: he was only furnished by the petitioners copies of the studies crusher that reduces the size to an appropriate size prior to the
mentioned in his Judicial Affidavit and he did not participate in the introduction into the lower furnace along with the limestone; the
execution, formulation or preparation of any of the said documents; he limestone is used as a SO2 sorbent which reacts with the sulfur oxides to
does not personally know Rex Cruz or any of the authors of the studies form calcium sulfate, an inert and stable material; air fans at the bottom
included in his Judicial Affidavit; he did not read other materials about of the furnace create sufficient velocity within the steam generator to
coal-fired power plants; he is not aware of the acceptable standards as maintain a bed of fuel, ash, and limestone mixture; secondary air is also
far as the operation of a coal-fired power plant is concerned; petitioner introduced above the bed to facilitate circulation and complete
Velarmino was the one who furnished him copies of the documents in combustion of the mixture; the combustion process generates heat,
reference to the MOU and some papers related to the case; petitioner which then heats the boiler feedwater flowing through boiler tube
Peralta was the one who e-mailed to him the soft copy of all the bundles under pressure; the heat generated in the furnace circuit turns
documents [letters (a) to (o) of his Judicial Affidavit], except the LGU the water to saturated steam which is further heated to superheated
Resolutions; and he has never been at the actual Power Plant project steam; this superheated steam leaves the CFB boiler and expands
site. It must be noted that petitioners Velarmino and Peralta were never through a steam turbine; the steam turbine is directly connected to a
presented as witnesses in this case. In addition, Palatino did not identify generator that turns and creates electricity; after making its way
the said studies but simply confirmed that the said studies were through the steam turbine, the low-pressure steam is exhausted
attached to the Petition. downwards into a condenser; heat is removed from the steam, which
cools and condenses into water (condensate); the condensate is then
Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those pumped back through a train of feedwater heaters to gradually increase
facts which the witness knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, its temperature before this water is introduced to the boiler to start the
which are derived from the witness’ own perception. Concomitantly, a process all over again; and CFB technology has advantages over
witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely learned from pulverized coal firing without backend cleanup systems, i.e., greater fuel
others either because said witness was told or read or heard those flexibility, lower SO2 and NOx emissions. Moreover, Wong testified,
matters. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received inter alia, that: CFBs have a wider range of flexibility so they can
as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned. This is known as environmentally handle a wider range of fuel constituents, mainly the
the hearsay rule. Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; constituent sulfur; and is capable of handling different types of coal
the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as within the range of the different fuel constituents; since CFB is the
well as oral statements. There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule newer technology than the PC or stalker fire, it has better environmental
under the Rules of Court, among which are learned treatises under production; 50 percent of the electric generation in the United States is
Section 46 of Rule 130, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary still produced by coal combustion; and the CFB absorbs the sulfur
“SEC. 46. Learned treatises. -A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet dioxide before it is emitted; and there will be a lower percentage of
on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to emissions than any other technology for the coal.
prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial
notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the In his Judicial Affidavit, Sarrki, stated that: he is the Chief Engineer for
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his Process Concept in Foster Wheeler; he was a Manager of Process
profession or calling as expert in the subject.” Technology for Foster Wheeler from 1995 to 2007; and he holds a
Master of Science degree in Chemical Engineering. He explained that:
The alleged scientific studies mentioned in the Petition cannot be
CFB boilers will emit PAHs but only in minimal amounts, while BFB will
classified as learned treatises. We cannot take judicial notice of the
produce higher PAH emissions; PAH is a natural product of any
same, and no witness expert in the subject matter of this case testified,
combustion process; even ordinary burning, such as cooking or driving
that the writers of the said scientific studies are recognized in their
automobiles, will have some emissions that are not considered harmful;
profession or calling as experts in the subject.
it is only when emissions are of a significant level that damage may be
caused; a CFB technology has minimal PAH emissions; the high
In stark contrast, respondent RP Energy presented several witnesses on
combustion efficiency of CFB technology, due to long residence time of
the CFB technology.
particles inside the boiler, leads to minimal emissions of PAH; other
factors such as increase in the excess air ratio[,] decrease in Ca/S, as well
In his Judicial Affidavit, witness Wong stated that he obtained a Bachelor
as decrease in the sulfur and chlorine contents of coal will likewise
of Science, Major in Mechanical Engineering from Worcester Polytechnic
minimize PAH production; and CFB does not cause emissions beyond
Institute; he is a Consulting Engineer of Steam Generators of URS; he
scientifically acceptable levels. He testified, inter alia, that: the CFB
was formerly connected with Foster Wheeler where he held the
technology is used worldwide; they have a 50% percent share of CFB
positions of site commissioning engineer, testing engineer,
market worldwide; and this will be the first CFB by Foster Wheeler in the
instrumentation and controls engineer, mechanical equipment
Philippines; Foster Wheeler manufactures and supplies different type[s]
of boilers including BFB, but CFB is always applied on burning coal, so
they do not apply any BFB for coal firing; CFB has features which have
much better combustion efficiency, much lower emissions and it is more
effective as a boiler equipment; the longer the coal stays in the
combustion chamber, the better it is burned; eight (8) seconds is already
beyond adequate but it keeps a margin; in CFB technology, combustion
technology is uniform throughout the combustion chamber; high
velocity is used in CFB technology, that is vigorous mixing or turbulence;
turbulence is needed to get contact between fuel and combustion air;
and an important feature of CFB is air distribution.
In his Judicial Affidavit, Ouano stated that: he is a licensed Chemical
Engineer, Sanitary Engineer and Environmental Planner in the
Philippines; he is also a chartered Professional Engineer in Australia and
a member of the colleges of environmental engineers and chemical
engineers of the Institution of Engineers (Australia); he completed his
Bachelor in Chemical Engineering in 1970, Master of Environmental
Engineering in 1972 and Doctor of Environmental Engineering in 1974;
he also graduated from the University of Sydney Law School with the
degree of Master of Environmental Law in 2002 and PhD in Law from
Macquarie University in 2007. He explained in his Judicial Affidavit that:
the impacts identified and analyzed in the EIA process are all potential
or likely impacts; there are a larger number of EIA techniques for
predicting the potential environmental impacts; it is important to note
that all those methods and techniques are only for predicting the
potential environmental impacts, not the real impacts; almost all
environmental systems are non-linear and they are subject to chaotic
behavior that even the most sophisticated computer could not predict
accurately; and the actual or real environmental impact could only be
established when the project is in actual operation. He testified, inter
alia, that: the higher the temperature the higher the nitrous oxide
emitted; in CFB technology, the lower the temperature, the lower is the
nitrogen oxide; and it still has a nitrogen oxide but not as high as
conventional coal; the CFB is the boiler; from the boiler itself, different
pollution control facilities are going to be added; and for the overall
plant with the pollution control facilities, the particulate matters,
nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide are under control. (Citations
omitted)121
We also note that RP Energy controverted in detail the afore-
summarized allegations of the Casiño Group on the four areas of
environmental damage that will allegedly occur upon the construction
and operation of the power plant:
1. On thermal pollution of coastal waters.
As to the extent of the expected rise in water temperature once the
power plant is operational, Ms. Mercado stated in her Judicial Affidavit
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q: What was the result of the Thermal Plume Modeling that was
conducted for RP Energy?
A: The thermal dispersion modeling results show that largest warming
change (0.95°C above ambient) is observed in the shallowest (5 m)
discharge scenario. The warmest surface temperature change for
the deepest (30 m) scenario is 0.18°C. All the simulated scenarios
comply with the DAO 90-35 limit for temperature rise of 3°C within
the defined 70 x 70 m mixing zone. The proposed power plant
location is near the mouth of Subic Bay, thus the tidal currents
influence the behavior of thermal discharge plume. Since the area is
well-flushed, mixing and dilution of the thermal discharge is
expected.
It also concluded that corals are less likely to be affected by the cooling
water discharge as corals may persist in shallow marine waters with
temperatures ranging from 18°C to 36°C. The predicted highest
temperature of 30.75°C, from the 0.95°C increase in ambient in the
shallowest (5 m) discharge scenario, is within this range.122
In the same vein, Dr. Ouano stated in his Judicial
Affidavit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q: In page 41, paragraph 99 of the Petition, it was alleged that: “x x x a
temperature change of 1°C to 2°C can already affect the metabolism
and other biological functions of aquatic organisms such as
mortality rate and reproduction.” What is your expert opinion, if
any, on this matter alleged by the Petitioners?
A: Living organisms have proven time and again that they are very
adaptable to changes in the environment. Living organisms have
been isolated in volcanic vents under the ocean living on the acidic
nutrient soup of sulfur and other minerals emitted by the volcano to
sub-freezing temperature in Antarctica. As a general rule,
metabolism and reproductive activity [increase] with temperature
until a maximum is reached after which [they decline]. For this
reason, during winter, animals hibernate and plants become
dormant after shedding their leaves. It is on the onset of spring that
animals breed and plants bloom when the air and water are
warmer. At the middle of autumn when the temperature drops to
single digit, whales, fish, birds and other living organisms, which are
capable of migrating, move to the other end of the globe where
spring is just starting. In the processes of migration, those migratory
species have to cross the tropics where the temperature is not just
one or two degrees warmer but 10 to 20 degrees warmer.
When discussing the impact of 1 to 2 degrees temperature change and
its impact on the ecosystem, the most important factors to consider are
– (1) Organism Type – specifically its tolerance to temperature change
(mammals have higher tolerance); (2) Base Temperature – it is the
temperature over the optimum temperature such that an increase will
result in the decline in number of the organisms; (3) Mobility or Space
for Migration (i.e., an aquarium with limited space or an open ocean
that the organism can move to a space more suited to [a] specific need,
such as the migratory birds); and (4) Ecosystem Complexity and
Succession. The more complex the ecosystem the more stable it is as
succession and adaptation [are] more robust.
Normally, the natural variation in water temperature between early
morning to late afternoon could be several degrees (four to five degrees
centigrade and up to ten degrees centigrade on seasonal basis).
Therefore, the less than one degree centigrade change predicted by the
GHD modeling would have minimal
impact.123chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On cross-examination, Dr. Ouano further explained—
ATTY. AZURA:
x x x When you say Organism Type – you mentioned that mammals have
a higher tolerance for temperature change?
DR. OUANO:
Yes.
ATTY. AZURA:
What about other types of organisms, Dr. Ouano? Fish for example?
DR. OUANO:
Well, mammals have high tolerance because mammals are warm[-
]blooded. Now, when it comes to cold[-]blooded animals the tolerance is
much lower. But again when you are considering x x x fish [e]specially in ATTY AZURA:
open ocean you have to remember that nature by itself is x x x very Specifically, Dr. Ouano, what does negligible mean, what level of
brutal x x x where there is always the prey-predator relationship. Now, variation are we talking about?
most of the fish that we have in open sea [have] already a very strong
adaptability mechanism. And in fact, Kingman back in 1964 x x x studied DR. OUANO:
the coal reef around the gulf of Oman where the temperature variation If you are talking about a thermometer, you might be talking about,
on day to day basis varied not by 1 degree to 2 degrees but by almost 12 normally about .1 degrees centigrade. That’s the one that you could
degrees centigrade. Now, in the Subic Bay area which when you’re more or less ascertain. x x x
looking at it between daytime variation, early dawn when it is cold, the
air is cold, the sea temperature, sea water is quite cold. Then by 3:00 ATTY. AZURA:
o’clock in the afternoon it starts to warm up. So the variation [in the] Dr. Ouano, you mentioned in your answer to the same question,
Subic Bay area is around 2 to 4 degrees by natural variation from the sun Question 51, that there is a normal variation in water temperature. In
as well as from the current that goes around it. So when you are talking fact, you said there is a variation throughout the day, daily and also
about what the report has said of around 1 degree change, the total throughout the year, seasonal. Just to clarify, Dr. Ouano. When the
impact x x x on the fishes will be minimal. x x x power plant causes the projected temperature change of 1 degree to 2
degrees Celsius this will be in addition to existing variations? What I
ATTY. AZURA: mean, Dr. Ouano, just so I can understand, how will that work? How will
x x x So, you said, Dr. Ouano, that fish, while they have a much lower the temperature change caused by the power plant work with the
tolerance for temperature variation, are still very adaptable. What about existing variation?
other sea life, Dr. Ouano, for example, sea reptiles?
DR. OUANO:
DR. OUANO: There is something like what we call the zonal mixing. This is an area of
That’s what I said. The most sensitive part of the marine ecology is approximately one or two hectares where the pipe goes out, the hot
physically the corals because corals are non-migratory, they are fix[ed]. water goes out. So that x x x, we have to accept x x x that [throughout it]
Second[ly] x x x corals are also highly dependent on sunlight the zone will be a disturb[ed] zone. After that one or two hectares park
penetration. If they are exposed out of the sea, they die; if they are so the water temperature is well mixed [so] that the temperature above
deep, they die. And that is why I cited Kingman in his studies of coral the normal existing variation now practically drops down to almost the
adaptability [in] the sea of Oman where there was a very high normal level.124chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
temperature variation, [they] survived.
On air pollution due to dust and combustion gases.
ATTY. AZURA:
Would you be aware, Dr. Ouano, if Kingman has done any studies in To establish that the emissions from the operation of the power plant
Subic Bay? would be compliant with the standards under the Clean Air Act,125 Ms.
Mercado stated in her Judicial Affidavit thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
DR. OUANO:
Not in Subic Bay but I have reviewed the temperature variation, natural 271. Q: What was the result of the Air Dispersion Modeling that was
temperature variation from the solar side, the days side as well as the conducted for RP Energy?
seasonal variation. There are two types of variation since temperatures
are very critical. One is the daily, which means from early morning to A: The Air Dispersion Modeling predicted that the Power Plant Project
around 3:00 o’clock, and the other one is seasonal variation because will produce the following emissions, which [are] fully compliant with
summer, December, January, February are the cold months and then by the standards set by DENR:
April, May we are having warm temperature where the temperature
goes around 32-33 degrees; Christmas time, it drops to around 18 to 20
Predicted GLC126 for 1-hr National Ambient Air Quality
degrees so it[']s a variation of around seasonal variation of 14 degrees
averaging period Guideline Values
although some of the fish might even migrate and that is why I was
trying to put in corals because they are the ones that are really fix[ed]. SO2 45.79 µg/Nm3 340 µg/Nm3
They are not in a position to migrate in this season. NO2 100.8 µg/Nm3 260 µg/Nm3
CO 10 µg/Nm3 35 µg/Nm3
ATTY. AZURA:
To clarify. You said that the most potentially sensitive part of the
ecosystem would be the corals.
Predicted GLC for 8-hr National Ambient Air Quality
DR. OUANO: averaging period Guideline Values
Or threatened part because they are the ones [that] are not in a position CO 0.19 mg/ncm 10 µg/Nm3
to migrate.

ATTY AZURA:
In this case, Dr. Ouano, with respect to this project and the projected Predicted GLC for 24-hr National Ambient Air Quality
temperature change, will the corals in Subic Bay be affected? averaging period Guideline Values
SO2 17.11 µg/Nm3 180 µg/Nm3
DR. OUANO: NO2 45.79 µg/Nm3 150 µg/Nm3
As far as the outlet is concerned, they have established it outside the
coral area. By the time it reaches the coral area the temperature
variation, as per the GHD study is very small, it[’]s almost negligible.
 Predicted GLC for 1-yr National Ambient Air Quality
averaging period Guideline Values
SO2 6.12 µg/Nm3 80 µg/Nm3
NO2 No standard ---
CO No standard ---
272. Q: What other findings resulted from the Air Dispersion Modeling,
if any? J. LEAGOGO:
A: It also established that the highest GLC to Clean Air Act Standards
ratio among possible receptors was located 1.6 km North NorthEast
(“NNE”) of the Power Plant Project. Further, this ratio was valued
only at 0.434 or less than half of the upper limit set out in the Clean
Air Act. This means that the highest air ambient quality disruption
will happen only 1.6 km NNE of the Power Plant Project, and that
such disruption would still be compliant with the standards imposed
by the Clean Air Act.127
The Casiño Group argued, however, that, as stated in the EIS, during
upset conditions, significant negative environmental impact will result
from the emissions. This claim was refuted by RP Energy’s witness
during cross-examination:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ATTY. AZURA:
If I may refer you to another page of the same annex, Ms. Mercado,
that’s page 202 of the same document, the August 2012. Fig. 2-78
appears to show, there’s a Table, Ms. Mercado, the first table, the one
on top appears to show a comparison in normal and upset conditions. I
noticed, Ms. Mercado, that the black bars are much higher than the bars
in normal condition. Can you state what this means?
MS. MERCADO:
It means there are more emissions that could potentially be released
when it is under upset condition.
ATTY. AZURA:
I also noticed, Ms. Mercado, at the bottom part of this chart there are
Receptor IDs, R1, R2, R3 and so forth and on page 188 of this same
document, Annex “9-Mercado,” there is a list identifying these
receptors, for example, Receptor 6, Your Honor, appears to have been
located in Olongapo City, Poblacion. Just so I can understand, Ms.
Mercado, does that mean that if upset condition[s] were to occur, the
Olongapo City Poblacion will be affected by the emissions?
MS. MERCADO:
All it means is that there will be higher emissions and a higher ground
concentration. But you might want to also pay attention to the “y axis,”
it says there GLC/CAA [Ground Level Concentration/Clean Air Act limit].
So it means that even under upset conditions… say for R6, the ground
level concentration for upset condition is still around .1 or 10% percent
only of the Clean Air Act limit. So it’s still much lower than the limit.
ATTY. AZURA:
But that would mean, would it not, Ms. Mercado, that in the event of
upset conditions[,] emissions would increase in the Olongapo City
Poblacion?
MS. MERCADO:
Not emissions will increase. The emissions will be the same but the
ground level concentration, the GLC, will be higher if you compare
normal versus upset. But even if it[’]s under upset conditions, it is still
only around 10% percent of the Clean Air Act Limit.
xxxx
So you are trying to impress upon this Court that even if the plant is in
an upset condition, it will emit less than what the national standards
dictate?
MS. MERCADO:
Yes, Your Honor.128chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
With respect to the claims that the power plant will release dangerous
PAHs and CO, Engr. Sarrki stated in his Judicial Affidavit
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Q: In page 42, paragraph 102 of the Petition, the Petitioners alleged
that Volatile Organic Compounds (“VOC”) specifically Polycyclic
Aromatic Hydrocarbon (“PAH”) will be emitted even by CFB boilers.
What can you say about this?
A: Actually, the study cited by the Petitioners does not apply to the
present case because it does not refer to CFB technology. The study
refers to a laboratory-scale tubular Bubbling Fluidized Bed (“BFB”)
test rig and not a CFB. CFB boilers will emit PAHs but only in minimal
amounts. Indeed, a BFB will produce higher PAH emissions.
xxxx
Q: Why can the study cited by Petitioners not apply in the present
case?
A: The laboratory-scale BFB used in the study only has one (1) air
injection point and does not replicate the staged-air combustion
process of the CFB that RP Energy will use. This staged-air process
includes the secondary air. Injecting secondary air into the system
will lead to more complete combustion and inhibits PAH
production. There is a study entitled “Polycyclic Aromatic
Hydrocarbon (PAH) Emissions from a Coal-Fired Pilot FBC System”
by Kunlei Liu, Wenjun Han, Wei-Ping Pan, John T. Riley found in the
Journal of Hazardous Materials B84 (2001) where the findings are
discussed.
Also, the small-scale test rig utilized in the study does not simulate the
process conditions (hydrodynamics, heat transfer characteristics, solid
and gas mixing behavior, etc.) seen in a large scale utility boiler, like
those which would be utilized by the Power Plant Project.
xx
xx
Q: Aside from residence time of particles and secondary air, what other
factors, if any, reduce PAH production?
A: Increase in the excess air ratio will also minimize PAH production.
Furthermore, decrease in Calcium to Sulfur moral ratio (“Ca/S”), as
well as decrease in the sulfur and chlorine contents of coal will
likewise minimize PAH production. This is also based on the study
entitled “Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH) Emissions from a
Coal-Fired Pilot FBC System” by Kunlei Liu, Wenjun Han, Wei-Ping
Pan, John T. Riley.
In RP Energy’s Power Plant Project, the projected coal to be utilized has
low sulfur and chlorine contents minimizing PAH production. Also, due
to optimum conditions for the in-furnace SO2 capture, the Ca/S will be
relatively low, decreasing PAH production.
Q: In paragraph 104 of the Petition, it was alleged that “Carbon
monoxide (CO), a poisonous, colorless and odorless gas is also
produced when there is partial oxidation or when there is not
enough oxygen (O2) to form carbon dioxide (CO2).” What can you
say about this?
A: CFB technology reduces the CO emissions of the Power Plant
Project to safe amounts. In fact, I understand that the projected
emissions level of the Power Plant Project compl[ies] with the
International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) standards. Furthermore,
characteristics of CFB technology such as long residence time,
uniform temperature and high turbulence provide an effective
combustion environment which results [in] lower and safer CO
emissions.
Q: I have no further questions for you at the moment. Is there anything
you wish to add to the foregoing?
A: Yes. PAH is a natural product of ANY combustion process. Even
ordinary burning, such as cooking or driving automobiles, will have
some emissions that are not considered harmful. It is only when
emissions are of a significant level that damage may be caused.
Given that the Power Plant Project will utilize CFB technology, it will
have minimal PAH emissions. The high combustion efficiency of CFB
technology, due to the long residence time of particles inside the boiler,
leads to the minimal emissions of PAH. Furthermore, other factors such
as increase in the excess air ratio, decrease in Ca/S, as well as decrease
in the sulfur and chlorine contents of coal will likewise minimize PAH
production. CFB does not cause emissions beyond scientifically
acceptable levels, and we are confident it will not result in the damage
speculated by the Petitioners.129
3. On water pollution from toxic coal combustion waste.
With regard to the claim that coal combustion waste produced by the
plant will endanger the health of the inhabitants nearby, Dr. Ouano
stated in his Judicial Affidavit thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q: In page 43, paragraph 110 of the Petition, it was alleged that:
“[s]olid coal combustion waste is highly toxic and is said to cause
birth defects and cancer risks among others x x x.” What is your
expert opinion, if any, on this matter alleged by the Petitioners?
A: Coal is geologically compressed remains of living organisms that
roamed the earth several million years ago. In the process of
compression, some of the minerals in the soil, rocks or mud, the
geologic media for compression, are also imparted into the
compressed remains. If the compressing media of mud, sediments
and rocks contain high concentration of mercury, uranium, and
other toxic substances, the coal formed will likewise contain high
concentration of those substances. If the compressing materials
have low concentration of those substances, then the coal formed
will likewise have low concentration of those substances. If the coal
does not contain excessive quantities of toxic substances, the solid
residues are even used in agriculture to supply micronutrients and
improve the potency of fertilizers. It is used freely as a fill material
in roads and other construction activities requiring large volume of
fill and as additive in cement manufacture. After all, diamonds that
people love to hang around their necks and keep close to the chest
are nothing more than the result of special geologic action, as those
in volcanic pipes on coal.130
RP Energy further argued, a matter which the Casiño Group did not
rebut or refute, that the waste generated by the plant will be properly
handled, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4.1.49 When coal is burned in the boiler furnace, two by-products are
generated - bottom and fly ash. Bottom ash consists of large and fused
particles that fall to the bottom of the furnace and mix with the bed
media. Fly ash includes fine-grained and powdery particles that are
carried away by flue gas into the electrostatic precipitator, which is then
sifted and collected. These by-products are non-hazardous materials. In
fact, a coal power plant’s Fly Ash, Bottom Ash and Boiler Slag have
consequent beneficial uses which “generate significant environmental,
economic, and performance benefits.” Thus, fly ash generated during
the process will be sold and transported to cement manufacturing
facilities or other local and international industries.
4.1.50 RP Energy shall also install safety measures to insure that waste
from burning of coal shall be properly handled and stored.
4.1.51 Bottom ash will be continuously collected from the furnace and
transferred through a series of screw and chain conveyors and bucket
elevator to the bottom ash silo. The collection and handling system is
enclosed to prevent dust generation. Discharge chutes will be installed
at the base of the bottom ash silo for unloading. Open trucks will be
used to collect ash through the discharge chutes. Bottom ash will be
sold, and unsold ash will be stored in ash cells. A portion of the bottom
ash will be reused as bed material through the installation of a bed
media regeneration system (or ash recycle). Recycled bottom ash will be
sieved using a vibrating screen and transported to a bed material surge
bin for re-injection into the boiler.
4.1.52 Fly ash from the electrostatic precipitator is pneumatically
removed from the collection hopper using compressed air and
transported in dry state to the fly ash silo. Two discharge chutes will be
installed at the base of the fly ash silo. Fly ash can either be dry-
transferred through a loading spout into an enclosed lorry or truck for
selling, re-cycling, or wet-transferred through a wet unloader into open
dump trucks and transported to ash cells. Fly ash discharge will operate
in timed cycles, with an override function to achieve continuous
discharge if required. Fly ash isolation valves in each branch line will
prevent leakage and backflow into non-operating lines.
4.1.53 Approximately 120,000m² will be required for the construction of
the ash cell. Ash will be stacked along the sloping hill, within a grid of
excavations (i.e. cells) with a 5m embankment. Excavated soils will be
used for embankment construction and backfill. To prevent infiltration
[of] ash deposits into the groundwater, a clay layer with minimum depth
of 400mm will be laid at the base of each cell. For every 1-m depth of
ash deposit, a 10-cm soil backfill will be applied to immobilize ash and
prevent migration via wind. Ash cell walls will be lined with high-density
polyethylene to prevent seepage. This procedure and treatment method
is in fact suitable for disposal of toxic and hazardous wastes although fly
ash is not classified as toxic and hazardous materials.131
Anent the claims that the plant is susceptible to earthquake and
landslides, Dr. Ouano testified thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
J. LEAGOGO:
In terms of fault lines, did you study whether this project site is in any
fault line?
DR. OUANO:

There are some fault lines and in fact, in the Philippines it is very difficult Affidavit, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
to find an area except Palawan where there is no fault line within 20 to
30 [kilometers]. But then fault lines as well as earthquakes really
[depend] upon your engineering design. I mean, Sto. Tomas University
has withstood all the potential earthquakes we had in Manila[,] even
sometimes it[’]s intensity 8 or so because the design for it back in 1600
they are already using what we call floating foundation. So if the
engineering side for it[,] technology is there to withstand the expected
fault line [movement].
J. LEAGOGO:
What is the engineering side of the project? You said UST is floating.
DR. OUANO:
Relative to the threat of acid rain, Dr. Ouano stated in his Judicial
Q: In page 44, paragraph 114 of the Petition, it was alleged that “the
coal-fired power plant will release 1,888 tons of nitrous oxides
(NOx) per year and 886 tons of sulfur dioxide (SO2) per year. These
oxides are the precursors to the formation of sulfuric acid and nitric
acid which are responsible for acid deposition.” What is your expert
opinion on this matter alleged by the Petitioners?
A: NO2 is found in the air, water and soil from natural processes such
as lightning, bacterial activities and geologic activities as well as
from human activities such as power plants and fertilizer usage in
agriculture. SO2 is also found in air, water and soil from bacterial,
geologic and human activities.

The foundation, that means to say you don’t break… NO2 and SO2 in the air are part of the natural nitrogen and sulfur cycle
to widely redistribute and recycle those essential chemicals for use by
J. LEAGOGO: plants. Without the NO2 and SO2 in the air, plant and animal life would
be limited to small areas of this planet where nitrogen and sulfur are
Floating foundation. What about this, what kind of foundation? found in abundance. With intensive agricultural practices, nitrogen and
sulfur are added in the soil as fertilizers.
DR. OUANO:
Acid rain takes place when the NO2 and SO2 concentration are excessive
It will now depend on their engineering design, the type of equipment… or beyond those values set in the air quality standards. NO2 and SO2 in
the air in concentrations lower than those set in the standards have
J. LEAGOGO: beneficial effect to the environment and agriculture and are commonly
known as micronutrients.133
No, but did you read it in their report?
On clarificatory questions from the appellate court, the matter was
DR. OUANO: further dissected thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It[’]s not there in their report because it will depend on the supplier, the J. LEAGOGO:
equipment supplier. x x x The project will release 1,888 tons of nitrous oxide per year. And he
said, yes; that witness answered, yes, it will produce 886 tons of sulfur
J. LEAGOGO: dioxide per year. And he also answered yes, that these oxides are the
precursors to the formation of sulfuric acid and nitric acid. Now my
So it[’]s not yet there? clarificatory question is, with this kind of releases there will be acid rain?

DR. OUANO: DR. OUANO:

No.
It[’]s not yet there in the site but it is also covered in our Building Code
what are the intensities of earthquakes expected of the different areas J. LEAGOGO:
in the Philippines. Why?

J. LEAGOGO: DR. OUANO:

Because it[’]s so dilute[d].
Have you checked our geo-hazard maps in the Philippines to check on
this project site? J. LEAGOGO:
It will?
DR. OUANO:
DR. OUANO:
Yes. It is included there in the EIA Report. Because the acid concentration is so dilute[d] so that it is not going to
cause acid rain.
J. LEAGOGO:
J. LEAGOGO:
It[’]s there? The acid concentration is so diluted that it will not cause acid rain?

DR. OUANO: DR. OUANO:

Yes.
It[’]s there.132
J. LEAGOGO:
4. On acid deposition in aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. What do you mean it[’]s so diluted? How will it be diluted?
DR. OUANO:
Because it[’]s going to be mixed with the air in the atmosphere; diluted
in the air in the atmosphere. And besides this 886 tons, this is not
released in one go, it is released almost throughout the year.
J. LEAGOGO:
You also answered in Question No. 61, “acid rain takes place when the
NO2 AND SO2 concentration are excessive.” So when do you consider it
as excessive?
DR. OUANO:
That is something when you are talking about acid…
J. LEAGOGO:
In terms of tons of nitrous oxide and tons of sulfur oxide, when do you
consider it as excessive?
DR. OUANO:
It is in concentration not on tons weight, Your Honor.
J. LEAGOGO:
In concentration?
DR. OUANO:
In milligrams per cubic meter, milligrams per standard cubic meter.
J. LEAGOGO:
So being an expert, what will be the concentration of this kind of 1,888
tons of nitrous oxide? What will be the concentration in terms of your…?
DR. OUANO:
If the concentration is in excess of something like 8,000 micrograms per
standard cubic meters, then there is already potential for acid rain.
J. LEAGOGO:
I am asking you, Dr. Ouano, you said it will release 1,888 tons of nitrous
oxide?
DR. OUANO:
Yes.
J. LEAGOGO:
In terms of concentration, what will that be?
DR. OUANO:
In terms of the GHD study that will result [in] 19 milligrams per standard
cubic meters and the time when acid rain will start [is when the
concentration gets] around 8,000 milligrams per standard cubic meters.
So we have 19 compared to 8,000. So we are very, very safe.
J. LEAGOGO:
What about SO2?
DR. OUANO:
SO2, we are talking about ... you won’t mind if I go to my codigo. For
sulfur dioxide this acid rain most likely will start at around 7,000
milligrams per standard cubic meter but then … sorry, it[’]s around 3,400
micrograms per cubic meter. That is the concentration for sulfur dioxide,
and in our plant it will be around 45 micrograms per standard cubic
meter. So the acid rain will start at 3,400 and the emission is estimated
here to result to concentration of 45.7 micrograms.
J. LEAGOGO:
That is what GHD said in their report.
DR. OUANO:
Yes. So that is the factor of x x x safety that we have.134
Apart from the foregoing evidence, we also note that the above and
other environmental concerns are extensively addressed in RP Energy’s
Environmental Management Plan or Program (EMP). The EMP is “a
section in the EIS that details the prevention, mitigation, compensation,
contingency and monitoring measures to enhance positive impacts and
minimize negative impacts and risks of a proposed project or
undertaking.”135 One of the conditions of the ECC is that RP Energy shall
strictly comply with and implement its approved EMP. The Casiño Group
failed to contest, with proof, the adequacy of the mitigating measures
stated in the aforesaid EMP.
In upholding the evidence and arguments of RP Energy, relative to the
lack of proof as to the alleged significant environmental damage that
will be caused by the project, the appellate court relied mainly on the
testimonies of experts, which we find to be in accord with judicial
precedents. Thus, we ruled in one case:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by testimonies of experts, they
may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in
accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and
sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the
trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness,
his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the
reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in
favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness,
the relative opportunities for study and observation of the matters
about which he testifies, and any other matters which serve to
illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be
arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the
facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge
utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effects (20 Am.
Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness
and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial
court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion.136
Hence, we sustain the appellate court’s findings that the Casiño Group
failed to establish the alleged grave environmental damage which will be
caused by the construction and operation of the power plant.
In another vein, we, likewise, agree with the observations of the
appellate court that the type of coal which shall be used in the power
plant has important implications as to the possible significant negative
environmental impacts of the subject project.137 However, there is no
coal supply agreement, as of yet, entered into by RP Energy with a third-
party supplier. In accordance with the terms and conditions of the ECC
and in compliance with existing environmental laws and standards, RP
Energy is obligated to make use of the proper coal type that will not
cause significant negative environmental impacts.
The alleged negative environmental
assessment of the project by experts
in a report generated during the social
acceptability consultations
The Casiño Group also relies heavily on a report on the social
acceptability process of the power plant project to bolster its claim that
the project will cause grave environmental damage. We purposely
discuss this matter in this separate subsection for reasons which will be
made clear shortly.
But first we shall present the pertinent contents of this report.
According to the Casiño Group, from December 7 to 9, 2011, the SBMA
conducted social acceptability policy consultations with different
stakeholders on RP Energy’s proposed 600 MW coal plant project at the
Subic Bay Exhibition and Convention Center. The results thereof are
contained in a document prepared by SBMA entitled “Final Report:
Social Acceptability Process for RP Energy, Inc.’s 600-MW Coal Plant
Project” (Final Report). We note that SBMA adopted the Final Report as
a common exhibit with the Casiño Group in the course of the
proceedings before the appellate court.
The Final Report stated that there was a clear aversion to the concept of
a coal-fired power plant from the participants. Their concerns included
environmental, health, economic and socio-cultural factors. Pertinent to
this case is the alleged assessment, contained in the Final Report, of the
potential effects of the project by three experts: (1) Dr. Rex Cruz (Dr.
Cruz), Chancellor of the University of the Philippines, Los Baños and a
forest ecology expert, (2) Dr. Visitacion Antonio, a toxicologist, who
related information as to public health; and (3) Andre Jon Uychiaco, a
marine biologist.
The Final Report stated these experts’ alleged views on the project,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
IV. Experts’ Opinion
xxxx
The specialists shared the judgment that the conditions were not
present to merit the operation of a coal-fired power plant, and to
pursue and carry out the project with confidence and assurance that the
natural assets and ecosystems within the Freeport area would not be
unduly compromised, or that irreversible damage would not occur and
that the threats to the flora and fauna within the immediate community
and its surroundings would be adequately addressed.
The three experts were also of the same opinion that the proposed coal
plant project would pose a wide range of negative impacts on the
environment, the ecosystems and human population within the impact
zone.
The specialists likewise deemed the Environment Impact Assessment
(EIA) conducted by RPEI to be incomplete and limited in scope based on
the following observations:
i. The assessment failed to include areas
10km. to 50km. from the operation site,
although according to the panel, sulfur
emissions could extend as far as 40-50 km.
ii. The EIA neglected to include other forests
in the Freeport in its scope and that there
were no specific details on the protection
of the endangered flora and endemic
fauna in the area. Soil, grassland, brush
land, beach forests and home gardens
were also apparently not included in the
study.
iii. The sampling methods used in the study
were limited and insufficient for effective
long-term monitoring of surface water,
erosion control and terrestrial flora and
fauna.
The specialists also discussed the potential effects of an operational
coal-fired power plant [on] its environs and the community therein.
Primary among these were the following:
i. Formation of acid rain, which would
adversely affect the trees and vegetation
in the area which, in turn, would diminish
forest cover. The acid rain would
apparently worsen the acidity of the soil in
the Freeport.
ii. Warming and acidification of the seawater
in the bay, resulting in the bio-
accumulation of contaminants and toxic
materials which would eventually lead to
the overall reduction of marine
productivity.
iii. Discharge of pollutants such as Nitrous
Oxide, Sodium Oxide, Ozone and other
heavy metals such as mercury and lead to
the surrounding region, which would
adversely affect the health of the populace
in the vicinity.
V. Findings
Based on their analyses of the subject matter, the specialists
recommended that the SBMA re-scrutinize the coal-fired power plant
project with the following goals in mind:
i. To ensure its coherence and compatibility
to [the] SBMA mandate, vision, mission
and development plans, including its
Protected Area Management Plan;
ii. To properly determine actual and potential
costs and benefits;
iii. To effectively determine the impacts on
environment and health; and
iv. To ensure a complete and comprehensive
impacts zone study.
The specialists also urged the SBMA to conduct a Comprehensive Cost
And Benefit Analysis Of The Proposed Coal Plant Project Relative To Each
Stakeholder Which Should Include The Environment As Provider Of
Numerous Environmental Goods And Services.
They also recommended an Integrated/Programmatic Environmental
Impact Assessment to accurately determine the environmental status of
the Freeport ecosystem as basis and reference in evaluating future
similar projects. The need for a more Comprehensive Monitoring System
for the Environment and Natural Resources was also reiterated by the
panel.138
Of particular interest are the alleged key observations of Dr. Cruz on the
EIS prepared by RP Energy relative to the
project:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Key Observations and Recommendations on the EIS of Proposed RPE
Project
 Rex Victor O. Cruz
Based on SBMA SAP on December 7-9, 2011
1. The baseline vegetation analysis was limited only within the project
site and its immediate vicinity. No vegetation analysis was done in the
brushland areas in the peninsula which is likely to be affected in the
event acid rain forms due to emissions from the power plant.
2. The forest in the remaining forests in the Freeport was not considered
as impact zone as indicated by the lack of description of these forests
and the potential impacts the project might have on these forests. This
appears to be a key omission in the EIS considering that these forests
are well within 40 to 50 km away from the site and that there are
studies showing that the impacts of sulphur emissions can extend as far
as 40 to 50 km away from the source.
3. There are 39 endemic fauna and 1 endangered plant species (Molave)
in the proposed project site. There will be a need to make sure that
these species are protected from being damaged permanently in
wholesale. Appropriate measures such as ex situ conservation and
translocation if feasible must be implemented.
4. The Project site is largely in grassland interspersed with some trees.
These plants if affected by acid rain or by sulphur emissions may
disappear and have consequences on the soil properties and
hydrological processes in the area. Accelerated soil erosion and
increased surface runoff and reduced infiltration of rainwater into the
soil.
5. The rest of the peninsula is covered with brushland but were never
included as part of the impact zone.
6. There are home gardens along the coastal areas of the site planted to
ornamental and agricultural crops which are likely to be affected by acid
rain.
7. There is also a beach forest dominated by aroma, talisai and agoho
which will likely be affected also by acid rain.
8. There are no Environmentally Critical Areas within the 1 km radius
from the project site. However, the Olongapo Watershed Forest
Reserve, a protected area is approximately 10 km southwest of the
project site. Considering the prevailing wind movement in the area, this
forest reserve is likely to be affected by acid rain if it occurs from the
emission of the power plant. This forest reserve is however not included
as part of the potential impact area.
9. Soil in the project site and the peninsula is thin and highly acidic and
deficient in NPK with moderate to severe erosion potential. The sparse
vegetation cover in the vicinity of the project site is likely a result of the
highly acidic soil and the nutrient deficiency. Additional acidity may
result from acid rain that may form in the area which could further make
it harder for the plants to grow in the area that in turn could exacerbate
the already severe erosion in the area.
10. There is a need to review the proposal to ensure that the proposed
project is consistent with the vision for the Freeport as enunciated in the
SBMA Master Plan and the Protected Area Management Plan. This will
reinforce the validity and legitimacy of these plans as a legitimate
framework for screening potential locators in the Freeport. It will also
reinforce the trust and confidence of the stakeholders on the
competence and authority of the SBMA that would translate in stronger
popular support to the programs implemented in the Freeport.
11. The EGF and Trust Fund (Table 5.13) should be made clear that the
amounts are the minimum amount and that adequate funds will be
provided by the proponent as necessary beyond the minimum amounts.
Furthermore the basis for the amounts allocated for the items (public
liability and rehabilitation) in Trust Fund and in EGF (tree planting and
landscaping, artificial reef establishment) must be clarified. The specific
damages and impacts that will be covered by the TF and EGF must also
be presented clearly at the outset to avoid protracted negotiations in
the event of actual impacts occurring in the future.
12. The monitoring plan for terrestrial flora and fauna is not clear on the
frequency of measurement. More importantly, the proposed method of
measurement (sampling transect) while adequate for estimating the
diversity of indices for benchmarking is not sufficient for long[-]term
monitoring. Instead, long[-]term monitoring plots (at least 1 hectare in
size) should be established to monitor the long[-]term impacts of the
project on terrestrial flora and fauna.
13. Since the proposed monitoring of terrestrial flora and fauna is
limited to the vicinity of the project site, it will be useful not only for
mitigating and avoiding unnecessary adverse impacts of the project but
also for improving management decisions if long[-]term monitoring plots
for the remaining natural forests in the Freeport are established. These
plots will also be useful for the study of the dynamic interactions of
terrestrial flora and fauna with climate change, farming and other
human activities and the resulting influences on soil, water, biodiversity,
and other vital ecosystem services in the Freeport.139
We agree with the appellate court that the alleged statements by these
experts cannot be given weight because they are hearsay evidence.
None of these alleged experts testified before the appellate court to
confirm the pertinent contents of the Final Report. No reason appears in
the records of this case as to why the Casiño Group failed to present
these expert witnesses.
We note, however, that these statements, on their face, especially the
observations of Dr. Cruz, raise serious objections to the environmental
soundness of the project, specifically, the EIS thereof. It brings to fore
the question of whether the Court can, on its own, compel the
testimonies of these alleged experts in order to shed light on these
matters in view of the right at stake— not just damage to the
environment but the health, well-being and, ultimately, the lives of
those who may be affected by the project.
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberally provide the
courts with means and methods to obtain sufficient information in order
to adequately protect or safeguard the right to a healthful and balanced
ecology. In Section 6 (l)140 of Rule 3 (Pre-Trial), when there is a failure to
settle, the judge shall, among others, determine the necessity of
engaging the services of a qualified expert as a friend of the court
(amicus curiae). While, in Section 12141 of Rule 7 (Writ of kalikasan), a
party may avail of discovery measures: (1) ocular inspection and (2)
production or inspection of documents or things. The liberality of the
Rules in gathering and even compelling information, specifically with
regard to the Writ of kalikasan, is explained in this
wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he writ of kalikasan was refashioned as a tool to bridge the gap
between allegation and proof by providing a remedy for would-be
environmental litigants to compel the production of information within
the custody of the government. The writ would effectively serve as a
remedy for the enforcement of the right to information about the
environment. The scope of the fact-finding power could be: (1) anything
related to the issuance, grant of a government permit issued or
information controlled by the government or private entity and (2)
[i]nformation contained in documents such as environmental
compliance certificate (ECC) and other government records. In addition,
the [w]rit may also be employed to compel the production of
information, subject to constitutional limitations. This function is
analogous to a discovery measure, and may be availed of upon
application for the writ.142
Clearly, in environmental cases, the power to appoint friends of the
court in order to shed light on matters requiring special technical
expertise as well as the power to order ocular inspections and
production of documents or things evince the main thrust of, and the
spirit behind, the Rules to allow the court sufficient leeway in acquiring
the necessary information to rule on the issues presented for its
resolution, to the end that the right to a healthful and balanced ecology
may be adequately protected. To draw a parallel, in the protection of
the constitutional rights of an accused, when life or liberty is at stake,
the testimonies of witnesses may be compelled as an attribute of the
Due Process Clause. Here, where the right to a healthful and balanced
ecology of a substantial magnitude is at stake, should we not tread the
path of caution and prudence by compelling the testimonies of these
alleged experts?
After due consideration, we find that, based on the statements in the
Final Report, there is no sufficiently compelling reason to compel the
testimonies of these alleged expert witnesses for the following reasons.
First, the statements are not sufficiently specific to point to us a flaw (or
flaws) in the study or design/implementation (or some other aspect) of
the project which provides a causal link or, at least, a reasonable
connection between the construction and operation of the project vis-à-
vis potential grave environmental damage. In particular, they do not
explain why the Environmental Management Plan (EMP) contained in
the EIS of the project will not adequately address these concerns.
Second, some of the concerns raised in the alleged statements, like acid
rain, warming and acidification of the seawater, and discharge of
pollutants were, as previously discussed, addressed by the evidence
presented by RP Energy before the appellate court. Again, these alleged
statements do not explain why such concerns are not adequately
covered by the EMP of RP Energy.
Third, the key observations of Dr. Cruz, while concededly assailing
certain aspects of the EIS, do not clearly and specifically establish how
these omissions have led to the issuance of an ECC that will pose
significant negative environmental impacts once the project is
constructed and becomes operational. The recommendations stated
therein would seem to suggest points for improvement in the operation
and monitoring of the project, but they do not clearly show why such
recommendations are indispensable for the project to comply with
existing environmental laws and standards, or how non-compliance with
such recommendations will lead to an environmental damage of the
magnitude contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. Again, these
statements do not state with sufficient particularity how the EMP in the
EIS failed to adequately address these concerns.
Fourth, because the reason for the non-presentation of the alleged
expert witnesses does not appear on record, we cannot assume that
their testimonies are being unduly suppressed.
By ruling that we do not find a sufficiently compelling reason to compel
the taking of the testimonies of these alleged expert witnesses in
relation to their serious objections to the power plant project, we do not full:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
foreclose the possibility that their testimonies could later on be
presented, in a proper case, to more directly, specifically and sufficiently
assail the environmental soundness of the project and establish the
requisite magnitude of actual or threatened environmental damage, if
indeed present. After all, their sense of civic duty may well prevail upon
them to voluntarily testify, if there are truly sufficient reasons to stop
the project, above and beyond their inadequate claims in the Final
Report that the project should not be pursued. As things now stand,
however, we have insufficient bases to compel their testimonies for the
reasons already proffered.
The alleged admissions of grave
environmental damage in the EIS
of the project.
In their Omnibus Motions for Clarification and Reconsideration before
the appellate court and Petition for Review before this Court, the Casiño
Group belatedly claims that the statements in the EIS prepared by RP
Energy established the significant negative environmental impacts of the
project. They argue in this manner:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Acid Rain
35. According to RP Energy’s Environmental Impact Statement for its
proposed 2 x 150 MW Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant Project, acid rain
may occur in the combustion of coal, to wit –
xxxx
During the operation phase, combustion of coal will result in emissions
of particulates SOx and NOx. This may contribute to the occurrence of
acid rain due to elevated SO2 levels in the atmosphere. High levels of
NO2 emissions may give rise to health problems for residents within the
impact area.
xxxx
Asthma Attacks
36. The same EPRMP143 mentioned the incidence of asthma attacks [as
a] result of power plant operations, to wit –
xxxx
The incidence of asthma attacks among residents in the vicinity of the
project site may increase due to exposure to suspended particulates
from plant operations.144
RP Energy, however, counters that the above portions of the EIS were
quoted out of context. As to the subject of acid rain, the EIS states in
full:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Operation
During the operation phase, combustion of coal will result in emissions
of particulates, SOx and NOx. This may contribute to the occurrence of
acid rain due to elevated SO2 levels in the atmosphere. High levels of
NO2 emissions may give rise to health problems for residents within the
impact area. Emissions may also have an effect on vegetation (Section
4.1.4.2). However, the use of CFBC technology is a built-in measure
that results in reduced emission concentrations. SOx emissions will be
minimised by the inclusion of a desulfurisation process, whilst NOx
emissions will be reduced as the coal is burned at a temperature lower
than that required to oxidise nitrogen.145 (Emphasis supplied)
As to the subject of asthma attacks, the EIS states in
The incidence of asthma attacks among residents in the vicinity of the
project site may increase due to exposure to suspended particulates
from plant operations. Coal and ash particulates may also become
suspended and dispersed into the air during unloading and transport,
depending on wind speed and direction. However, effect on air quality
due to windblown coal particulates will be insignificant as the coal
handling system will have enclosures (i.e. enclosed conveyors and coal
dome) to eliminate the exposure of coal to open air, and therefore
greatly reduce the potential for particulates from being carried away
by wind (coal handling systems, Section 3.4.3.3). In addition, the
proposed process will include an electrostatic precipitator that will
remove fly ash from the flue gas prior to its release through the stacks,
and so particulates emissions will be minimal.146 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with RP Energy that, while the EIS discusses the subjects of
acid rain and asthma attacks, it goes on to state that there are mitigating
measures that will be put in place to prevent these ill effects. Quite
clearly, the Casiño Group quoted piecemeal the EIS in such a way as to
mislead this Court as to its true and full contents.
We deplore the way the Casiño Group has argued this point and we take And on page 3, Dr. Julian Amador recommended approval and it was
this time to remind it that litigants should not trifle with court processes. approved by Sec. Atienza. You see that on page 3?
Along the same lines, we note how the Casiño Group has made serious
allegations in its Petition for Writ of kalikasan but failed to substantiate MS. MERCADO:
the same in the course of the proceedings before the appellate court. In Yes, Your Honor.
particular, during the preliminary conference of this case, the Casiño
Group expressly abandoned its factual claims on the alleged grave
environmental damage that will be caused by the power plant (i.e., air,
water and land pollution) and, instead, limited itself to legal issues
regarding the alleged non-compliance of RP Energy with certain laws
and rules in the procurement of the ECC.147 We also note how the
Casiño Group failed to comment on the subject Petitions before this
Court, which led this Court to eventually dispense with its comment.148
We must express our disapproval over the way it has prosecuted its
claims, bordering as it does on trifling with court processes. We deem it
proper, therefore, to admonish it to be more circumspect in how it
prosecutes its claims.
In sum, we agree with the appellate court that the Casiño Group failed
to substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the
power plant will cause environmental damage of the magnitude
contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. The evidence it presented is
inadequate to establish the factual bases of its claims.cralawred
II.
Whether the ECC is invalid for lack of signature of Mr. Luis Miguel
Aboitiz (Mr. Aboitiz), as representative of RP Energy, in the Statement of
Accountability of the ECC.
The appellate court ruled that the ECC is invalid because Mr. Aboitiz
failed to sign the Statement of Accountability portion of the ECC.
We shall discuss the correctness of this ruling on both procedural and
substantive grounds.
Procedurally, we cannot fault the DENR for protesting the manner by
which the appellate court resolved the issue of the aforesaid lack of
signature. We agree with the DENR that this issue was not among those
raised by the Casiño Group in its Petition for Writ of kalikasan.149 What
is more, this was not one of the triable issues specifically set during the
preliminary conference of this case.150chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
How then did the issue of lack of signature arise?
A review of the voluminous records indicates that the matter of the lack
of signature was discussed, developed or surfaced only in the course of
the hearings, specifically, on clarificatory questions from the appellate
court, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
J. LEAGOGO:
I would also show to you your ECC, that’s page 622 of the rollo. I am
showing to you this Environmental Compliance Certificate dated
December 22, 2008 issued by Sec. Jose L. Atienza, Jr. of the DENR. This is
your “Exhibit “18.” Would you like to go over this? Are you familiar with
this document?
MS. MERCADO:
Yes, it[’]s my Annex “3,” Your Honor.
J. LEAGOGO:
I would like to refer you to page 3 of the ECC dated December 22, 2008.
Page 2 refers to the Environmental Compliance Certificate, ECC Ref. No.
0804-011-4021. That’s page 2 of the letter dated December 22, 2008.
J. LEAGOGO:
Okay. On the same page, page 3, there’s a Statement of Accountability.
MS. MERCADO:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. LEAGOGO:
Luis, who is Luis Miguel Aboitiz?
MS. MERCADO:
During that time he was the authorized representative of RP Energy,
Your Honor.
J. LEAGOGO:
Now, who is the authorized representative of RP Energy?
MS. MERCADO:
It would be Mr. Aaron Domingo, I believe.
J. LEAGOGO:
Please tell the Court why this was not signed by Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz,
the Statement of Accountability?
Because the Statement of Accountability says, “Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz,
Director, representing Redondo Peninsula Energy with office address
located at 110 Legaspi Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City, takes full
responsibility in complying with all conditions in this Environmental
Compliance Certificate [ECC][.]” Will you tell this Court why this was not
signed?
MS. MERCADO:
It was signed, Your Honor, but this copy wasn’t signed. My apologies, I
was the one who provided this, I believe, to the lawyers. This copy was
not signed because during….
J. LEAGOGO:
But this is your exhibit, this is your Exhibit “18” and this is not signed. Do
you agree with me that your Exhibit “18” is not signed by Mr. Aboitiz?
MS. MERCADO:
1.0 SCREENING Screening determines
That’s correct, Your Honor.151 if a project is covered
or not covered by the
We find this line of questioning inadequate to apprise the parties that PEISS.154 If a project is
the lack of signature would be a key issue in this case; as in fact it covered, screening
became decisive in the eventual invalidation of the ECC by the appellate further determines
court. what document type
the project should
Concededly, a court has the power to suspend its rules of procedure in prepare to secure the
order to attain substantial justice so that it has the discretion, in needed approval, and
exceptional cases, to take into consideration matters not originally what the rest of the
within the scope of the issues raised in the pleadings or set during the requirements are in
preliminary conference, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In terms of EMB office of
the case at bar, the importance of the signature cannot be seriously application, endorsing
doubted because it goes into the consent and commitment of the 2.0 SCOPING and decision
project proponent to comply with the conditions of the ECC, which is authorities, duration
vital to the protection of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology of of processing.
those who may be affected by the project. Scoping is a
Proponent-driven
Nonetheless, the power of a court to suspend its rules of procedure in multi-sectoral formal
exceptional cases does not license it to foist a surprise on the parties in a process of
given case. To illustrate, in oral arguments before this Court, involving determining the
sufficiently important public interest cases, we note that individual focused Terms of
members of the Court, from time to time, point out matters that may Reference of the EIA
not have been specifically covered by the advisory (the advisory Study. Scoping
delineates the issues to be argued and decided). However, a directive is identifies the most
given to the concerned parties to discuss the aforesaid matters in their significant
memoranda. Such a procedure ensures that, at the very least, the issues/impacts of a
parties are apprised that the Court has taken an interest in such matters proposed project, and
and may adjudicate the case on the basis thereof. Thus, the parties are then, delimits the
given an opportunity to adequately argue the issue or meet the issue extent of baseline
head-on. We, therefore, find that the appellate court should have, at the information to those
very least, directed RP Energy and the DENR to discuss and elaborate on necessary to evaluate
the issue of lack of signature in the presentation of their evidence and and mitigate the
memoranda, before making a definitive ruling that the lack thereof impacts. The need for
invalidated the ECC. This is in keeping with the basic tenets of due and scope of an
process. Environmental Risk
Assessment (ERA) is
At any rate, we shall disregard the procedural defect and rule directly on also done during the
whether the lack of signature invalidated the ECC in the interest of scoping session.
substantial justice. Scoping is done with
the local community
The laws governing the ECC, i.e., Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151 and through Public
PD 1586, do not specifically state that the lack of signature in the Scoping and with a
EIA STUDY and
Statement of Accountability has the effect of invalidating the ECC. Unlike third party EIA Review
3.0 REPORT
in wills or donations, where failure to comply with the specific form Committee (EIARC)
PREPARATION
prescribed by law leads to its nullity,152 the applicable laws here are through Technical
silent with respect to the necessity of a signature in the Statement of Scoping, both with the
Accountability and the effect of the lack thereof. This is, of course, participation of the
understandable because the Statement of Accountability is a mere off- DENR-EMB. The
shoot of the rule-making powers of the DENR relative to the process results in a
implementation of PD 1151 and PD 1586. To determine, therefore, the signed Formal Scoping
effect of the lack of signature, we must look at the significance thereof Checklist by the
under the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Rules of the DENR review team, with
and the surrounding circumstances of this case. final approval by the
EMB Chief.
To place this issue in its proper context, a helpful overview of the stages The EIA Study
of the EIA process, taken from the Revised Manual, is reproduced below: involves a description
of the proposed
Figure 1-3 Overview of Stages of the Philippine EIA Process153 project and its
alternatives,
EIA REPORT characterization of
4.0 REPORT and the project
EVALUATION environment, impact
 identification and EIA recommendations
prediction, evaluation and the draft decision
of impact significance, document, resulting
impact mitigation, to the issuance of an
formulation of ECC, CNC or Denial
Environmental Letter. When
Management and approved, a covered
Monitoring Plan, with project is issued its
corresponding cost certificate of
estimates and Environmental
institutional support Compliance
commitment. The Commitment (ECC)
study results are while an application
presented in an EIA of a non-covered
Report for which an project is issued a
outline is prescribed Certificate of Non-
by EMB for every Coverage (CNC).
major document type. Endorsing and
Review of EIA Reports deciding authorities
normally entails an are designated by AO
EMB procedural 42, and further
screening for detailed in this
compliance with Manual for every
minimum report type.
5.0 DECISION requirements Moreover, the
MAKING specified during Proponent signs a
Scoping, followed by a sworn statement of
substantive review of full responsibility on
either composed third implementation of its
party experts commitments prior to
commissioned by the release of the
EMB as the EIA ECC. The ECC is then
Review Committee for transmitted to
PEIS/EIS-based concerned LGUs and
applications, or other GAs for
DENR/EMB internal integration into their
specialists, the decision-making
Technical Committee, process. The
for IEE-based regulated part of EIA
applications. EMB Review is limited to
evaluates the EIARC the processes within
recommendations EMB control. The
and the public’s timelines for the
inputs during public issuance of decision
consultations/hearing documents provided
s in the process of for in AO 42 and DAO
recommending a 2003-30 are
decision on the applicable only from
application. The EIARC the time the EIA
Chair signs EIARC Report is accepted for
recommendations substantive review to
including issues the time a decision is
outside the mandate issued on the
of the EMB. The application.
MONITORING.
entire EIA review and Monitoring,
6.0 VALIDATION, and
evaluation process is Validation and
EVALUATION/
summarized in the Evaluation/Audit
AUDIT
Review Process stage assesses
Report (RPR) of the performance of the
EMB, which includes a Proponent against the
draft decision ECC and its
document. commitments in the
Decision Making Environmental
involves evaluation of Management and

Monitoring Plans to
ensure actual impacts
of the project are
adequately prevented
or mitigated.
The signing of the Statement of Accountability takes place at the
Decision-Making Stage. After a favorable review of its ECC application,
the project proponent, through its authorized representative, is made to Because the Statement of Accountability says, “Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz,
sign a sworn statement of full responsibility on the implementation of its Director, representing Redondo Peninsula Energy with office address
commitments prior to the official release of the ECC.
The definition of the ECC in the Revised Manual highlights the
importance of the signing of the Statement of Accountability:
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) - a certificate of
Environmental Compliance Commitment to which the Proponent
conforms with, after DENR-EMB explains the ECC conditions, by signing
the sworn undertaking of full responsibility over implementation of
specified measures which are necessary to comply with existing
environmental regulations or to operate within best environmental
practices that are not currently covered by existing laws. It is a
document issued by the DENR/EMB after a positive review of an ECC
application, certifying that the Proponent has complied with all the
requirements of the EIS System and has committed to implement its
approved Environmental Management Plan. The ECC also provides
guidance to other agencies and to LGUs on EIA findings and
recommendations, which need to be considered in their respective
decision-making process.157 (Emphasis supplied)
As can be seen, the signing of the Statement of Accountability is an
integral and significant component of the EIA process and the ECC itself.
The evident intention is to bind the project proponent to the ECC
conditions, which will ensure that the project will not cause significant
negative environmental impacts by the “implementation of specified
measures which are necessary to comply with existing environmental
regulations or to operate within best environmental practices that are
not currently covered by existing laws.” Indeed, the EIA process would
be a meaningless exercise if the project proponent shall not be strictly
bound to faithfully comply with the conditions necessary to adequately
protect the right of the people to a healthful and balanced ecology.
Contrary to RP Energy’s position, we, thus, find that the signature of the
project proponent’s representative in the Statement of Accountability is
necessary for the validity of the ECC. It is not, as RP Energy would have
it, a mere formality and its absence a mere formal defect.
The question then is, was the absence of the signature of Mr. Aboitiz, as
representative of RP Energy, in the Statement of Accountability
sufficient ground to invalidate the ECC?
Viewed within the particular circumstances of this case, we answer in
the negative.
While it is clear that the signing of the Statement of Accountability is
necessary for the validity of the ECC, we cannot close our eyes to the
particular circumstances of this case. So often have we ruled that this
Court is not merely a court of law but a court of justice. We find that
there are several circumstances present in this case which militate
against the invalidation of the ECC on this ground.
We explain.
First, the reason for the lack of signature was not adequately taken into
consideration by the appellate court. To reiterate, the matter surfaced
during the hearing of this case on clarificatory questions by the appellate
court, viz:
J. LEAGOGO:
Please tell the Court why this was not signed by Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz,
the Statement of Accountability?
located at 110 Legaspi Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City, takes full
responsibility in complying with all conditions in this Environmental
Compliance Certificate [ECC][.]” Will you tell this Court why this was not
signed?
MS. MERCADO:
It was signed, Your Honor, but this copy wasn’t signed. My apologies, I
was the one who provided this, I believe, to the lawyers. This copy was
not signed because during…
J. LEAGOGO:
But this is your exhibit, this is your Exhibit “18” and this is not signed. Do
you agree with me that your Exhibit “18” is not signed by Mr. Aboitiz?
MS. MERCADO:
That’s correct, Your Honor.158 (Emphasis supplied)
Due to the inadequacy of the transcript and the apparent lack of
opportunity for the witness to explain the lack of signature, we find that
the witness’ testimony does not, by itself, indicate that there was a
deliberate or malicious intent not to sign the Statement of
Accountability.
Second, as previously discussed, the concerned parties to this case,
specifically, the DENR and RP Energy, were not properly apprised that
the issue relative to the lack of signature would be decisive in the
determination of the validity of the ECC. Consequently, the DENR and RP
Energy cannot be faulted for not presenting proof during the course of
the hearings to squarely tackle the issue of lack of signature.
Third, after the appellate court ruled in its January 30, 2013 Decision
that the lack of signature invalidated the ECC, RP Energy attached, to its
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, a certified true copy of the ECC,
issued by the DENR-EMB, which bore the signature of Mr. Aboitiz. The
certified true copy of the ECC showed that the Statement of
Accountability was signed by Mr. Aboitiz on December 24,
2008.159chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The authenticity and veracity of this certified true copy of the ECC was
not controverted by the Casiño Group in its comment on RP Energy’s
motion for partial reconsideration before the appellate court nor in their
petition before this Court. Thus, in accordance with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties, it remains
uncontroverted that the ECC on file with the DENR contains the
requisite signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the Statement of Accountability
portion.
As previously noted, the DENR and RP Energy were not properly
apprised that the issue relative to the lack of signature would be
decisive in the determination of the validity of the ECC. As a result, we
cannot fault RP Energy for submitting the certified true copy of the ECC
only after it learned that the appellate court had invalidated the ECC on
the ground of lack of signature in its January 30, 2013 Decision.

We note, however, that, as previously discussed, the certified true copy
of the Statement of Accountability was signed by Mr. Aboitiz on
December 24, 2008 or two days after the ECC’s official release on
December 22, 2008. The afore-discussed rules under the Revised
Manual, however, state that the proponent shall sign the sworn
statement of full responsibility on implementation of its commitments
prior to the release of the ECC. It would seem that the ECC was first
issued, then it was signed by Mr. Aboitiz, and thereafter, returned to the
DENR to serve as its file copy. Admittedly, there is lack of strict
compliance with the rules although the signature is present. Be that as it
may, we find nothing in the records to indicate that this was done with
bad faith or inexcusable negligence because of the inadequacy of the
evidence and arguments presented, relative to the issue of lack of
signature, in view of the manner this issue arose in this case, as
previously discussed. Absent such proof, we are not prepared to rule
that the procedure adopted by the DENR was done with bad faith or
inexcusable negligence but we remind the DENR to be more circumspect
in following the rules it provided in the Revised Manual. Thus, we rule
that the signature requirement was substantially complied with pro hac
vice.
Fourth, we partly agree with the DENR that the subsequent letter-
requests for amendments to the ECC, signed by Mr. Aboitiz on behalf of
RP Energy, indicate its implied conformity to the ECC conditions. In
practical terms, if future litigation should occur due to violations of the
ECC conditions, RP Energy would be estopped from denying its consent
and commitment to the ECC conditions even if there was no signature in
the Statement of Accountability. However, we note that the Statement
of Accountability precisely serves to obviate any doubt as to the consent
and commitment of the project proponent to the ECC conditions. At any
rate, the aforesaid letter-requests do additionally indicate RP Energy’s
conformity to the ECC conditions and, thus, negate a pattern to
maliciously evade accountability for the ECC conditions or to
intentionally create a “loophole” in the ECC to be exploited in a possible
future litigation over non-compliance with the ECC conditions.
In sum, we rule that the appellate court erred when it invalidated the
ECC on the ground of lack of signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the ECC’s
Statement of Accountability relative to the copy of the ECC submitted by
RP Energy to the appellate court. While the signature is necessary for
the validity of the ECC, the particular circumstances of this case show
that the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised of the issue of
lack of signature in order for them to present controverting evidence
and arguments on this point, as the matter only developed during the
course of the proceedings upon clarificatory questions from the
appellate court. Consequently, RP Energy cannot be faulted for
submitting the certified true copy of the ECC only after it learned that
the ECC had been invalidated on the ground of lack of signature in the
January 30, 2013 Decision of the appellate court.
The certified true copy of the ECC, bearing the signature of Mr. Aboitiz in
the Statement of Accountability portion, was issued by the DENR-EMB
and remains uncontroverted. It showed that the Statement of
Accountability was signed by Mr. Aboitiz on December 24, 2008.
Although the signing was done two days after the official release of the
ECC on December 22, 2008, absent sufficient proof, we are not prepared
to rule that the procedure adopted by the DENR was done with bad faith
or inexcusable negligence. Thus, we rule that the signature requirement
was substantially complied with pro hac vice.
III.
Whether the first and second amendments to the ECC are invalid for
failure to undergo a new environmental impact assessment (EIA)
because of the utilization of inappropriate EIA documents.
Upholding the arguments of the Casiño Group, the appellate court ruled
that the first and second amendments to the ECC were invalid because
the ECC contained an express restriction that any expansion of the
project beyond the project description shall be the subject of a new EIA.
It found that both amendments failed to comply with the appropriate
EIA documentary requirements under DAO 2003-30 and the Revised
Manual. In particular, it found that the Environmental Performance
Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) and Project Description Report
(PDR), which RP Energy submitted to the DENR, relative to the
application for the first and second amendments, respectively, were not
the proper EIA document type. Hence, the appellate court ruled that the
aforesaid amendments were invalid.
Preliminarily, we must state that executive actions carry presumptive
validity so that the burden of proof is on the Casiño Group to show that
the procedure adopted by the DENR in granting the amendments to the
ECC were done with grave abuse of discretion. More so here because
the administration of the EIA process involves special technical skill or
knowledge which the law has specifically vested in the DENR.
After our own examination of DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual as
well as the voluminous EIA documents of RP Energy appearing in the
records of this case, we find that the appellate court made an erroneous
interpretation and application of the pertinent rules.
We explain.
As a backgrounder, PD 1151 set the Philippine Environment Policy.
Notably, this law recognized the right of the people to a healthful
environment.160 Pursuant thereto, in every action, project or
undertaking, which significantly affects the quality of the environment,
all agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations, as well as private
corporations, firms, and entities were required to prepare, file and
include a statement (i.e., Environmental Impact Statement or EIS)
containing:
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or
undertaking;
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented;
(c) alternative to the proposed action;
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the
environment are consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of
the long-term productivity of the same; and
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or non-
renewable resources, a finding must be made that such use and
commitment are warranted.161chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To further strengthen and develop the EIS, PD 1586 was promulgated,
which established the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement
System (PEISS). The PEISS is “a systems-oriented and integrated
approach to the EIS system to ensure a rational balance between socio-
economic development and environmental protection for the benefit of
present and future generations.”162 The ECC requirement is mandated
under Section 4 thereof:
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas
and Projects. The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative
or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection
Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas
in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his
duly authorized representative. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The PEISS consists of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
process, which is mandatory for private or public projects that may
significantly affect the quality of the environment. It involves evaluating
and predicting the likely impacts of the project on the environment,
designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement
measures addressing these consequences to protect the environment
and the community’s welfare.163chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
PD 1586 was implemented by DAO 2003-30 which, in turn, set up a
system or procedure to determine when a project is required to secure
an ECC and when it is not. When an ECC is not required, the project
proponent procures a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC).164 As part of
the EIA process, the project proponent is required to submit certain
studies or reports (i.e., EIA document type) to the DENR-EMB, which will
be used in the review process in assessing the environmental impact of
the project and the adequacy of the corresponding environmental
management plan or program to address such environmental impact.
This will then be part of the bases to grant or deny the application for an
ECC or CNC, as the case may be.
Table 1-4 of the Revised Manual summarizes the required EIA document
type for each project category. It classifies a project as belonging to
group I, II, III, IV or V, where:
I- Environmentally Critical Projects (ECPs) in either Environmentally
Critical Area (ECA) or Non-Environmentally Critical Area (NECA),
II- Non-Environmentally Critical Projects (NECPs) in ECA,
III- NECPs in NECA,
IV- Co-located Projects, and
V- Unclassified Projects.
The aforesaid table then further classifies a project, as pertinent to this
case, as belonging to category A, B or C,
where:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A- new;
B- existing projects for modification or re-start up; and
C- operating projects without an ECC.
Finally, the aforesaid table considers whether the project is single or co-
located.165 After which, it states the appropriate EIA document type
needed for the application for an ECC or CNC, as the case may be.
The appropriate EIA document type vis-à-vis a particular project
depends on the potential significant environmental impact of the
project. At the highest level would be an ECP, such as the subject
project. The hierarchy of EIA document type, based on
comprehensiveness and detail of the study or report contained therein,
insofar as single projects are concerned, is as follows:
1. Environmental Impact Statement166 (EIS),
2. Initial Environmental Examination167 (IEE) Report,
3. Initial Environmental Examination168 (IEE) Checklist Report,
4. Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan169
(EPRMP), and
5. Project Description170 (PD) or Project Description Report (PDR).
Thus, in the course of RP Energy’s application for an ECC, it was required
by the DENR-EMB to submit an EIS because the subject project is: an
ECP, new and a single project.
The present controversy, however, revolves around, not an application
for an ECC, but amendments thereto.
RP Energy requested the subject first amendment to its ECC due to its
desire to modify the project design through the inclusion of a barge
wharf, seawater intake breakwater, subsea discharge pipeline, raw
water collection system, drainage channel improvement and a 230-kV
double transmission line. The DENR-EMB determined that this was a
major amendment and, thus, required RP Energy to submit an EPRMP.
The Casiño Group argued, and the appellate court sustained, that an
EPRMP is not the correct EIA document type based on the definition of
an EPRMP in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual.
In DAO 2003-30, an EPRMP is defined as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) —
documentation of the actual cumulative environmental impacts and
effectiveness of current measures for single projects that are already
operating but without ECC's, i.e., Category A-3. For Category B-3
projects, a checklist form of the EPRMP would suffice;171 (Emphasis
supplied)
Further, the table in Section 5 of DAO 2003-30 states that an EPRMP is
required for “A-2: Existing and to be expanded (including undertakings
that have stopped operations for more than 5 years and plan to re-start
with or without expansion) and A-3: Operating without ECC.”
On the other hand, the Revised Manual delineates when an EPRMP is
the proper EIA document type, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For operating projects with previous ECCs but planning or applying for
clearance to modify/expand or re-start operations, or for projects
operating without an ECC but applying to secure one to comply with PD
1586 regulations, the appropriate document is not an EIS but an EIA
Report incorporating the project’s environmental performance and its
current Environmental Management Plan. This report is x x x an x x x
Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP)
for single project applications x x x172 (Emphasis supplied)
In its “Glossary,” the Revised Manual defines an EPRMP
as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) -
documentation of the actual cumulative environmental impacts and
effectiveness of current measures for single projects that are already
operating but without ECCs.173 (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, Table 1-4, in the Revised Manual, states that an EPRMP is
required for “Item I-B: Existing Projects for Modification or Re-start up
(subject to conditions in Annex 2-1c) and I-C: Operating without ECC.”
From these definitions and tables, an EPRMP is, thus, the required EIA
document type for an ECP-single project which
is:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Existing and to be expanded (including undertakings that have
stopped operations for more than 5 years and plan to re-start with or
without expansion);
2. Operating but without ECCs;
Implementing the afore-quoted section, the Revised Manual pertinently
states in Section 2.2, paragraph 16:
16) Application Process for ECC Amendments
Figure 2-4 presents how Proponents may request for minor or major
changes in their ECCs. Annex 2-1c provides a decision chart for the
determination of requirements for project modifications, particularly for
delineating which application scenarios will require EPRMP (which will
be subject to Figure 2-1 process) or other support documentations
(which will be subject to Figure 2-4 process).

3. Operating projects with previous ECCs but planning or applying for

Figure 2-4, in turn, provides:
clearance to modify/expand or re-start operations; and
Figure 2-4. Flowchart on Request for ECC
4. Existing projects for modification or re-start up.
Amendments175chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It may be observed that, based from the above, DAO 2003-30 and the
Revised Manual appear to use the terms “operating” and “existing”
interchangeably. In the case at bar, the subject project has not yet been
constructed although there have been horizontal clearing operations at Scenario 1: Request for
the project site. Minor
Amendments
On its face, therefore, the theory of the Casiño Group, as sustained by
the appellate court — that the EPRMP is not the appropriate EIA 1. Typographical
document type— seems plausible because the subject project is not: (1) error
operating/existing with a previous ECC but planning or applying for 2. Extension of
modification or expansion, or (2) operating but without an ECC. Instead, deadlines for
the subject project is an unimplemented or a non-implemented, hence, submission of
non-operating project with a previous ECC but planning for modification post-ECC
or expansion. requirement/s
3. Extension of ECC
The error in the above theory lies in the failure to consider or trace the validity
applicable provisions of DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual on 4. Change in
amendments to an ECC. company
name/ownership
The proper starting point in determining the validity of the subject first 5. Decrease in
amendment, specifically, the propriety of the EIA document type (i.e., land/project area
EPRMP) which RP Energy submitted in relation to its application for the or production
aforesaid amendment, must of necessity be the rules on amendments to capacity
an ECC.174 This is principally found in Section 8.3, Article II of DAO 2003- 6. Other
03, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary amendments
deemed “minor”
8.3 Amending an ECC at the discretion
of the EMB
Requirements for processing ECC amendments shall depend on the CO/RO Director
nature of the request but shall be focused on the information
necessary to assess the environmental impact of such changes. 1[Start]
Scenario 2: Request for
Major Amendments
1. Expansion of project area
w/in catchment described in
EIA
2. Increase in production capacity
or auxiliary component of the
original project
3. Change/s in process flow or
technology
4. Addition of new product
5. Integration of ECCs for similar
or dissimilar but contiguous
projects (NOTE: ITEM#5 IS
PROPONENT’S OPTION, NOT
EMB’S)
6. Revision/Reformatting of ECC
Conditions
7. Other amendments deemed
“major” at the discretion of the
EMB CO/RO Director

8.3.1. Requests for minor changes to ECCs such as extension of Within three (3) years from ECC issuance
deadlines for submission of post-ECC requirements shall be decided (for projects not started) OR at any time
upon by the endorsing authority. during project implementation, the
Proponent prepares and submits to the
8.3.2. Requests for major changes to ECCs shall be decided upon by the 1 [Start] ECC-endorsing DENR-EMB office a
deciding authority. LETTER-REQUEST for ECC amendments,
including data/information, reports or
8.3.3. For ECCs issued pursuant to an IEE or IEE checklist, the processing documents to substantiate the
of the amendment application shall not exceed thirty (30) working days; requested revisions.
and for ECCs issued pursuant to an EIS, the processing shall not exceed 2
sixty (60) working days. Provisions on automatic approval related to
prescribed timeframes under AO 42 shall also apply for the processing of
applications to amend ECCs. (Emphasis supplied)
 DECISION CHART FOR DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS
Within three (3) years from For projects that have started
ECC issuance (for projects implementation, EMB evaluates request FOR PROJECT MODIFICATION178chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
not started) OR at any time based on Annex 2-1c for various
during project scenarios of project modification. Resulting Decision
implementation, the Documentary requirements may range Document/Type of
Proponent prepares and from a Letter-Request to an EPRMP to Proposed Analysis of Proposed EIA
submits to the ECC- the EMB CO/RO while for those with Modifications Modifications Report Required
endorsing DENR-EMB Programmatic ECC, a PEPRMP may need to the Current Project Operational projects,
office a LETTER-REQUEST to be submitted to the EMB CO to or
for ECC amendment, support the request. It is important to those which have
including data/information, note that for operating projects, the stopped
reports or documents to appropriate document is not an EIS but for ? 5 years and
substantiate the requested an EIA Report incorporating the project’s plan to re-start
revisions. historical environmental performance
and its current EMP, subject to specific For Groups I and II
documentary requirements detailed in EIS-based Projects
Annex 2-1c for every modification with an
scenario. ECC applying for
? modification
1. Expansion of Since the modification ECC Amendment
3? land/project area will be in an area /Letter Request with
w/in catchment already described and brief description of
or environment evaluated in the activities in the
For EPRMP/PEPRMP-based requests, described in the original EIA Report, additional area
EMB forms a Technical/Review original EIA incremental impacts
Committee to evaluate the request. For Report from additional land
other requests, a Case Handler may development will have
solely undertake the evaluation. EMB CO been addressed in the
and RO will process P/EPRMP for approved EMP
2 PECC/ECC under Groups I and II
respectively. (Go to Figure 2-1) 2. Expansion of It is assumed the ECC Amendment
land/project area modification proposal /Environmental
OUTSIDE may have significant Performance Report
The ECC-endorsing EMB catchment or potential impacts due and Management
office assigns a Case 4? environment to absence of prior Plan (EPRMP)
Handler to evaluate the described in the assessment as to how
request ECC-endorsing/issuing Authority (per original EIA the project may affect
Table 1-4) decides on Letter Report the proposed
Requests/EPRMP/PEPRMP/Other expansion area
documents based on EMB CH and/or 3. Increase in Non-exceedance of ECC Amendment
Tech/Review Committee capacity or PDR (non covered /Letter Request with
3? recommendations. auxiliary project) threshold is brief
Max Processing Time to Issuance of component of the assumed that impacts description of
Decision original project are not significant; additional
ECC-endorsing Authority
CO CO RO RO which will either capacity or
decides on the Letter-
PEPRMP EPRMP PEPRMP EPRMP not entail Modification scenario component
Request, based on CH
120 90 60 30 exceedance of and decision process
recommendation
workdays workdays workdays workdays PDR (non-covered are applicable to both
Maximum Processing Time
Other document applications: max 30 project) non-implemented and
to Issuance of Decision
workdays (EMB CO and RO) thresholds or EMP operating projects
EMB CO 7 workdays & ERA can still issued ECCs
EMB RO 7 workdays address impacts &
risks arising from
modification
Noteworthy in the above, which is pertinent to the issue at hand, is that 4. Increase in Exceedance of PDR ECC Amendment
the amendment process squarely applies to projects not started, such as capacity or (non-covered) /Environmental
the subject project, based on the phrase “[w]ithin three (3) years from auxiliary threshold is assumed Performance Report
ECC issuance (for projects not started) x x x”. component of the that impacts may be and Management
original project potentially significant, Plan (EPRMP)
Annex 2-1c, in turn, provides a “Decision Chart for Determination of which will either particularly if
Requirements For Project Modification.” We reproduce below the first exceed PDR (non- modification will
three columns of Annex 2-1c, as are pertinent to the issue at hand: covered project) result to a next higher
thresholds, or
ANNEX 2-1c EMP & ERA
 cannot address level of threshold accountabilities from
impacts and risks range the current project
arising from
9. Integration of No physical change in ECC Amendment
modification ECCs for similar orproject size/area; no /Letter Request with
contiguous change in consolidated Project
Modification scenario projects process/technology Description Report
and decision process but improved and integrated EMP
are applicable to both management of
non-implemented and continuous projects by
operating projects having an integrated
(Note: Integration
with or without issued planning document in
of ECCs is at the
ECCs the form or an
option of the
integrated ECC (ECC
5. Change/s in EMP and ERA can still ECC Amendment Proponent to
conditions will be
process flow or address impacts & /Letter Request with request/apply)
harmonized across
technology risks arising from brief process
projects; conditions
modification description
relating to
EMP and ERA cannot ECC Amendment requirements within
address impacts & /Environmental other agencies’
risks arising from Performance mandates will be
modification Report and deleted)
Management
10. Revision/ No physical change on ECC Amendment
Plan (EPRMP)
the project but ECC /Letter Request only
6. Additional Activity is directly ECC Amendment Reformatting of conditions relating to
component or lessening or mitigating /Letter Request with ECC Conditions requirements within
products which the project’s impacts consolidated Project other agencies’
will enhance the on the environment. Description Report mandates will be
environment (e.g. However, to ensure of new project deleted
due to compliance there is no component component and
to new stringent in the modification integrated EMP
requirements) or which fall under We now apply these provisions to the case at bar.
lessen impacts on covered project types,
the environment EMB will require To reiterate, the first amendment to the ECC was requested by RP
(e.g. thru disclosure of the Energy due to its planned change of project design involving the
utilization of description of the inclusion of a barge wharf, seawater intake breakwater, subsea
waste into new components and discharge pipeline, raw water collection system, drainage channel
products) process with which improvement and a 230-kV double transmission line. The DENR-EMB
the new product will determined179 that the proposed modifications involved a major
be developed. amendment because it will result in an increase in capacity or auxiliary
7. Downgrade No incremental From ECC component, as per Scenario 2, Item #2 of Figure 2-4:
project size or adverse impacts; may Amendment to Relief
area or other result to lower project of ECC Commitments Scenario 2: Request for Major
units of measure threshold or may (Conversion to CNC): Amendments
of thresholds result to non-coverage /Letter-Request only
limits
8. Conversion to Considered new New ECC 1. Expansion of project area w/in catchment described
new project type application but with /EIS in EIA
(e.g. bunker-fired lesser data 2. Increase in production capacity or auxiliary
plant to gas-fired) requirements since cmponent of the original project180
most facilities are 3. Change/s in process flow or technology
established; 4. Addition of new product
environmental 5. Integration of ECCs for similar or dissimilar but
performance in the contiguous projects (NOTE: ITEM#5 IS PROPONENT’S
past will serve as OPTION, NOT EMB’S)
baseline; However, for 6. Revision/Reformatting of ECC Conditions
operating projects, 7. Other amendments deemed “major at the discretion
there may be need to of the EMB CO/RO Director
request for Relief from
ECC Commitment The Casiño Group does not controvert this finding by the DENR-EMB and
prior to applying for we find the same reasonably supported by the evidence on record
new project type to considering that, among others, the construction of a 230-kV double
ensure no balance of transmission line would result in major activities outside the project site
environmental which could have significant environmental impacts.
 However, a holistic reading of DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual will
Consequently, the amendment was considered as falling under Item#4 show that such a legalistic approach in its interpretation and application
of Annex 2-1c, and, thus, the appropriate EIA document type is an is unwarranted. This is primarily because the EIA process is a system, not
EPRMP, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary a set of rigid rules and definitions. In the EIA process, there is much
room for flexibility in the determination and use of the appropriate EIA
4. Increase in capacity Exceedance of PDR ECC Amendment document type as the foregoing discussion has shown.184 To our mind,
or auxiliary (non-covered) / Environmental what should be controlling is the guiding principle set in DAO 2003-30 in
component of the thresholds is assumed Performance the evaluation of applications for amendments to ECCs, as stated in
original project which that impacts may be Report and Section 8.3 thereof: “[r]equirements for processing ECC amendments
will either exceed potentially significant, Management shall depend on the nature of the request but shall be focused on the
PDR (non-covered particularly if Plan (EPRMP)182 information necessary to assess the environmental impact of such
project) thresholds, modification will result changes.”185chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
or EMP & ERA cannot to a next higher level of
address impacts and threshold range This brings us to the next logical question, did the EPRMP provide the
risks arising from necessary information in order for the DENR-EMB to assess the
modification environmental impact of RP Energy’s request relative to the first
amendment?

Modification scenario We answer in the affirmative.

and decision process
are applicable to both In the first place, the Casiño Group never attempted to prove that the
non-implemented and subject EPRMP, submitted by RP Energy to the DENR-EMB, was
operating projects with insufficient for purposes of evaluating the environmental impact of the
or without issued ECCs proposed modifications to the original project design. There is no claim
that the data submitted were falsified or misrepresented. Neither was
Note that the Chart expressly states that, “[m]odification scenario and there an attempt to subpoena the review process documents of the
decision process are applicable to both non-implemented and operating DENR to establish that the grant of the amendment to the ECC was done
projects with or without ECCs.”183 To recall, the subject project has not with grave abuse of discretion or to the grave prejudice of the right to a
been constructed and is not yet operational, although horizontal healthful environment of those who will be affected by the project.
clearing activities have already been undertaken at the project site. Instead, the Casiño Group relied solely on the definition of terms in DAO
Thus, the subject project may be reasonably classified as a non- 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, which approach, as previously
implemented project with an issued ECC, which falls under Item#4 and, discussed, was erroneous.
hence, an EPRMP is the appropriate EIA document type.
At any rate, we have examined the contents of the voluminous EPRMP
This lengthy explanation brings us to a simple conclusion. The definitions submitted by RP Energy and we find therein substantial sections
in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, stating that the EPRMP is explaining the proposed changes as well as the adjustments that will be
applicable to (1) operating/existing projects with a previous ECC but made in the environmental management plan in order to address the
planning or applying for modification or expansion, or (2) operating potential environmental impacts of the proposed modifications to the
projects but without an ECC, were not an exclusive list. original project design. These are summarized in the “Project Fact
Sheet”186 of the EPRMP and extensively discussed in Section 4187
The afore-discussed provisions of Figure 2-4, in relation to Annex 2-1c, thereof. Absent any claim or proof to the contrary, we have no bases to
plainly show that the EPRMP can, likewise, be used as an appropriate conclude that these data were insufficient to assess the environmental
EIA document type for a single, non-implemented project applying for a impact of the proposed modifications. In accordance with the
major amendment to its ECC, involving an increase in capacity or presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, the
auxiliary component, which will exceed PDR (non-covered project) DENR-EMB must be deemed to have adequately assessed the
thresholds, or result in the inability of the EMP and ERA to address the environmental impact of the proposed changes, before granting the
impacts and risks arising from the modification, such as the subject request under the first amendment to the subject ECC.
project.
In sum, the Revised Manual permits the use of an EPRMP, as the
That the proposed modifications in the subject project fall under this appropriate EIA document type, for major amendments to an ECC, even
class or type of amendment was a determination made by the DENR- for an unimplemented or non-implemented project with a previous
EMB and, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, the DENR- ECC, such as the subject project. Consequently, we find that the
EMB’s findings are entitled to great respect because it is the procedure adopted by the DENR, in requiring RP Energy to submit an
administrative agency with the special competence or expertise to EPRMP in order to undertake the environmental impact assessment of
administer or implement the EIS System. the planned modifications to the original project design, relative to the
first amendment to the ECC, suffers from no infirmity.
The apparent confusion of the Casiño Group and the appellate court is
understandable. They had approached the issue with a legal training We apply the same framework of analysis in determining the propriety
mindset or background. As a general proposition, the definition of terms of a PDR, as the appropriate EIA document type, relative to the second
in a statute or rule is controlling as to its nature and scope within the amendment to the subject ECC.
context of legal or judicial proceedings. Thus, since the procedure
adopted by the DENR-EMB seemed to contradict or go beyond the Again, the Casiño Group, as sustained by the appellate court, relied on
definition of terms in the relevant issuances, the Casiño Group and the the definitions of a PDR in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised
appellate court concluded that the procedure was infirm. Manual:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Project Description (PD) — document, which may also be a chapter in an Scenario 1: Request for Minor
EIS, that describes the nature, configuration, use of raw materials and Amendments
natural resources, production system, waste or pollution generation and
control and the activities of a proposed project. It includes a description
of the use of human resources as well as activity timelines, during the 1. Typographical error
pre-construction, construction, operation and abandonment phases. It is 2. Extension of deadlines for submission of post-ECC
to be used for reviewing co-located and single projects under Category requirement/s
C, as well as for Category D projects.188chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 3. Extension of ECC validity
4. Change in company name/ownership
xxxx 5. Decrease in land/project area or production capacity
6. Other amendments deemed “minor” at the discretion of the
a) For new projects: x x x For non-covered projects in Groups II and III, a EMB CO/RO Director192
x x x Project Description Report (PDR) is the appropriate document to
secure a decision from DENR/EMB. The PDR is a “must” requirement for
environmental enhancement and mitigation projects in both ECAs
— because (1) there is no increase in capacity; (2) it does not constitute
(Group II) and NECAs (Group III) to allow EMB to confirm the benign
any significant impact; and (3) its EMP and ERA as specified in the
nature of proposed operations for eventual issuance of a Certificate of
submitted EPRMP remain the same.193 Relative to Annex 2-1c, the
Non-Coverage (CNC). All other Group III (non-covered) projects do not
requested amendment was, in turn, determined to fall under
need to submit PDRs – application is at the option of the Proponent
Item#3:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
should it need a CNC for its own purposes, e.g. financing pre-requisite.
For Group V projects, a PDR is required to ensure new
processes/technologies or any new unlisted project does not pose harm 3. Increase in capacity or Non-exceedance of ECC Amendment
to the environment. The Group V PDR is a basis for either issuance of a auxiliary component PDR (non covered / Letter Request
CNC or classification of the project into its proper project group. of the original project project) thresholds is with brief
which will either not assumed that impacts description of
b) For operating projects with previous ECCs but planning or applying for entail exceedance of are not significant; additional
clearance to modify/expand or re-start operations, or for projects PDR (non-covered capacity
operating without an ECC but applying to secure one to comply with PD project) thresholds or or component
1586 regulations, the appropriate document is not an EIS but an EIA EMP & ERA can still
Report incorporating the project’s environmental performance and its address impacts &
Modification scenario
current Environmental Management Plan. This report is either an (6) risks arising from
and decision process
Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) for modification
are applicable to both
single project applications or a (7) Programmatic EPRMP (PEPRMP) for
non-implemented and
co-located project applications. However, for small project
operating projects
modifications, an updating of the project description or the
issued ECCs
Environmental Management Plan with the use of the proponent’s
historical performance and monitoring records may suffice.
189chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary We make the same observation, as before, that the above applies to an
unimplemented or non-implemented project with a previous ECC, like
xxxx the subject project. Although it may be noted that the proposed
modification does not squarely fall under Item#3, considering that, as
Project Description (PD) - document, which may also be a chapter in an previously mentioned, there will be no increase in capacity relative to
EIS, that describes the nature, configuration, use of raw materials and the second amendment, still, we find nothing objectionable to this
natural resources, production system, waste or pollution generation and classification by the DENR-EMB, for it seems plain enough that this
control and the activities of a proposed project. It includes a description classification was used because the modification was deemed too minor
of the use of human resources as well as activity timelines, during the to require a detailed project study like an EIS or EPRMP. Since this is the
pre-construction, construction, operation and abandonment phases.190 classification most relevant and closely related to the intended
amendment, following the basic precept that the greater includes the
lesser, the DENR-EMB reasonably exercised its discretion in merely
We will no longer delve into the details of these definitions. Suffice it to requiring a letter request with a brief description of the modification.
state, similar to the discussion on the EPRMP, that if we go by the strict
limits of these definitions, the PDR relative to the subject second As earlier noted, the PDR is the EIA document type with the least detail,
amendment would not fall squarely under any of the above. and, thus, applicable to such minor modifications. Thus, the DENR-EMB
cannot be faulted for requiring RP Energy to submit a PDR relative to its
However, again, these are not the only provisions governing the PDR in application for the second amendment. Consequently, as before, we
the Revised Manual. find that the Revised Manual supports the procedure adopted by the
DENR-EMB in requiring RP Energy to submit a PDR in order to assess the
After the favorable grant of the first amendment, RP Energy applied for environmental impact of the planned modifications relative to the
another amendment to its ECC, this time in consideration of its plan to second amendment.
change the configuration of the project from 2 x 150 MW to 1 x 300
MW. In practical terms, this meant that the subject project will still In their Petition before this Court, the Casiño Group boldly asserts that
produce 300 MW of electricity but will now make use of only one boiler “[t]here is nothing in the Project Description Report that provides an
(instead of two) to achieve greater efficiency in the operations of the environmental impact assessment of the effects of constructing and
plant. The DENR-EMB determined191 this amendment to be minor, operating a single 300-MW generating unit.”196 However, to our dismay,
under Scenario 1, Item#6 of Figure 2-4: as in their other serious allegations in their Petition for Writ of kalikasan,
the same is, likewise, baseless. Apart from such a sweeping claim, the
Casiño Group has provided no evidence or argument to back up the
same.
An examination of the PDR readily reveals that it contains the details of
the proposed modifications197 and an express finding that no significant
environmental impact will be generated by such modifications, as in fact
it is expected that the operation of the power plant will become more
efficient as a result of the change from 2 x 150 MW to 1 x 300 MW
configuration.198 Consequently, the PDR merely reiterates the same
mitigating measures that will presumably address the minor
modifications to the project design. Again, no evidence was presented
to show substantial errors or misrepresentations in these data or their
inadequacy for providing the bases for the DENR-EMB to assess the
environmental impact of the proposed modifications under the second
amendment.
In fine, absent proof to the contrary, bearing in mind that allegations are
not proof, we sustain the procedure adopted by the DENR-EMB in
requiring RP Energy to submit a PDR and, on the basis thereof,
approving the request for the second amendment.
In another vein, we note that the appellate court proceeded from the
erroneous premise that the EIA is a document, when it repeatedly
stated that the amendments to the ECC require a new EIA, and not
merely an EPRMP or PDR. The appellate court relied on the proviso in
the ECC, which stated that “[a]ny expansion of the project beyond the
project description or any change in the activity or transfer of location
shall be subject to a new Environmental Impact
Assessment.”199chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
However, as correctly pointed out by the DENR and RP Energy, the EIA is government license or permit pursuant to Section 4 of PD 1586 which
not a document but a process:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) — process that involves
evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of a project (including
cumulative impacts) on the environment during construction,
commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes designing
appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures
addressing these consequences to protect the environment and the
community's welfare. The process is undertaken by, among others, the
project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee,
affected communities and other stakeholders.200 (Emphasis supplied)
When the proviso in the ECC, therefore, states that a new EIA shall be
conducted, this simply means that the project proponent shall be
required to submit such study or report, as warranted by the DENR
Rules and circumstances, which will sufficiently aid the DENR in making a
new EIA and, thus, determine whether to grant the proposed
amendment (or project modification). As we have seen, consistent with
DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, the DENR required RP Energy to
submit an EPRMP and a PDR relative to the latter’s request involving the
first and second amendments, respectively, which led to the new EIA of
the project in compliance with the proviso of the ECC.
Verily, the various EIA documents, such as the EPRMP and PDR, are
mere tools used by the DENR to assess the environmental impact of a
particular project. These documents are flexibly used by the DENR, as
the circumstances warrant, in order to adequately assess the impacts of with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a
a new project or modifications thereto. Being the administrative agency field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office
entrusted with the determination of which EIA document type applies to of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by
a particular application for an amendment to an ECC, falling as it does
within its particular technical expertise, we must accord great respect to ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government
its determination, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion or
patent illegality.
In sum, we find that the appellate court erred when it ruled that the first
and second amendments to the subject ECC were invalid for failure to
comply with a new EIA and for violating DAO 2003-30 and the Revised
Manual. The appellate court failed to properly consider the applicable
provisions in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual on amendments to
ECCs. Our examination of the provisions on amendments to ECCs, as
well as the EPRMP and PDR themselves, shows that the DENR
reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring an EPRMP and a PDR for
the first and second amendments, respectively. Through these
documents, which the DENR reviewed, a new EIA was conducted
relative to the proposed project modifications. Hence, absent sufficient
showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality, relative to both
the procedure and substance of the amendment process, we uphold the
validity of these amendments.cralawred
IV.
Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO), under Section 59 of the
IPRA Law, is a precondition to the issuance of an ECC and the lack of its
prior issuance rendered the ECC invalid.
The appellate court ruled that the ECC issued in favor of RP Energy on
December 22, 2008 is invalid because the CNO covering the subject
project was issued only on October 31, 2012 or almost four years from
the time of issuance of the ECC. Thus, the ECC was issued in violation of
Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules which require
that a CNO be obtained prior to the issuance of a government agency of,
among others, a license or permit. In so ruling, the appellate court
implicitly upheld the Casiño Group’s argument that the ECC is a form of
requires all entities to secure an ECC before (1) engaging in an
environmentally critical project or (2) implementing a project within an
environmentally critical area.
The DENR and RP Energy, however, argue that an ECC is not the license
or permit contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its
implementing rules as may be deduced from the definition, nature and
scope of an ECC under DAO 2003-03 and the Revised Manual. The DENR
explains that the issuance of an ECC does not exempt the project
proponent from securing other permits and clearances as required
under existing laws, including the CNO, and that the final decision on
whether a project will be implemented lies with the concerned local
government unit/s or the lead government agency which has sectoral
mandate to promote the government program where the project
belongs.
We agree with the DENR and RP Energy.
Section 59, Chapter VIII of the IPRA Law
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 59. Certification Precondition. All departments and other
governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from
issuing, renewing, or granting any concession, license or lease, or
entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior
certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap
the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of
agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new
concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there
is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs
shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any
project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation
process. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 9, Part II, Rule VIII of National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) Administrative Order No. 01-98201
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 9. Certification Precondition Prior to Issuance of any Permits or
Licenses. —
a. Need for Certification. No department of government or other
agencies shall issue, renew or grant any concession, license, lease,
permit, or enter into any production sharing agreement without a prior
certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap any
ancestral domain.
b. Procedure for Issuance of Certification by NCIP.
1) The certification, above mentioned, shall be issued by the Ancestral
Domain Office, only after a field based investigation that such areas are
not within any certified or claimed ancestral domains.
2) The certification shall be issued only upon the free, prior, informed
and written consent of the ICCs/IPs who will be affected by the
operation of such concessions, licenses or leases or production-sharing
agreements. A written consent for the issuance of such certification shall
be signed by at least a majority of the representatives of all the
households comprising the concerned ICCs/IPs. (Emphasis supplied)
and scope of an ECC in order to determine if it falls within the ambit of a
“license” or “permit” to which the CNO requirement, under Section 59
of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules, finds application.
Section 4 of PD 1586 provides, in part:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas
and Projects. — The President of the Philippines may, on his own
initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental
Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects,
undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No
person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such
declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing
an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his
duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said
critical project or area, the President may by his proclamation
reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations
or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government
personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities. (Emphasis
supplied)
While the above statutory provision reveals that the ECC is an
indispensable requirement before (1) the conduct of an environmentally
critical project or (2) the implementation of a project in an
environmentally critical area, it does not follow that the ECC is the
“license” or “permit” contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law
and its implementing rules.
Section 3(d), Article I of DAO 2003-03 defines an ECC in this
wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As may be deduced from its subtitle, Section 59 requires as a SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. —
precondition, relative to the issuance of any concession, license, lease or
agreement over natural resources, a certification issued by the NCIP that For the purpose of this Order, the following definitions shall be applied:
the area subject thereof does not lie within any ancestral domain. 202
This is in keeping with the State policy to protect the rights of xxxx
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their
ancestral domains in order to ensure their economic, social and cultural d. Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) — document issued by
well-being as well as to recognize the applicability of customary laws the DENR/EMB after a positive review of an ECC application, certifying
governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and that based on the representations of the proponent, the proposed
extent of such ancestral domain.203chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary project or undertaking will not cause significant negative environmental
impact. The ECC also certifies that the proponent has complied with all
The IPRA Law and its implementing rules do not define the terms the requirements of the EIS System and has committed to implement its
“license” and “permit” so that resort to their plain or ordinary meaning approved Environmental Management Plan. The ECC contains specific
in relation to the intendment of the law is appropriate. measures and conditions that the project proponent has to undertake
before and during the operation of a project, and in some cases, during
A “license” has been defined as “a governmental permission to perform the project's abandonment phase to mitigate identified environmental
a particular act (such as getting married), conduct a particular business impacts.
or occupation, operate machinery or vehicles after proving capacity and
ability to do so safely, or use property for a certain purpose”204 while a In turn, Section 1.0, paragraphs 3 and 6 of the Revised Manual provide,
“permit” has been defined as “a license or other document given by an in part:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
authorized public official or agency (building inspector, department of
motor vehicles) to allow a person or business to perform certain 3) Purpose of the EIA Process
acts.”205chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a basic principle, EIA is used to enhance planning and guide decision-
The evident intention of Section 59, in requiring the CNO prior to the making. In this Manual, EIA is primarily presented in the context of a
issuance of a license or permit, is to prevent the implementation of a requirement to integrate environmental concerns in the planning
project that may impair the right of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains.process of projects at the feasibility stage. Through the EIA Process,
The law seeks to ensure that a project will not overlap with any adverse environmental impacts of proposed actions are considerably
ancestral domain prior to its implementation and thereby pre-empt any reduced through a reiterative review process of project siting, design
potential encroachment of, and/or damage to the ancestral domains of and other alternatives, and the subsequent formulation of
ICCs/IPs without their prior and informed consent. environmental management and monitoring plans. A positive
determination by the DENR-EMB results to the issuance of an
With these considerations in mind, we now look at the definition, nature Environmental Compliance Commitment (ECC) document, to be
conformed to by the Proponent and represents the project’s
Environmental Compliance Certificate. The release of the ECC allows
the project to proceed to the next stage of project planning, which is
the acquisition of approvals from other government agencies and
LGUs, after which the project can start implementation.
xxxx
6) The EIA Process in Relation to Other Agencies’ Requirements
It is inherent upon the EIA Process to undertake a comprehensive and
integrated approach in the review and evaluation of environment-
related concerns of government agencies (GAs), local government units
(LGUs) and the general public. The subsequent EIA findings shall provide
guidance and recommendations to these entities as a basis for their
decision making process.
a) An Inter-agency MOA on EIS Streamlining was entered into in
1992 by 29 government agencies wherein ECC of covered
projects was agreed to be a pre-requisite of all other
subsequent government approvals;
b) DENR Memo Circular No. 2007-08 issued on 13 July 2007
reiterates in effect the intent of the MOA and reinforces the
role of the ECC/CNC as a guidance document to other agencies
and LGUs, as follows:
i) “No permits and/or clearances issued by other National
Government Agencies and Local Government Units shall be
required in the processing of ECC or CNC applications.
ii) The findings and recommendations of the EIA shall be
transmitted to relevant government agencies for them to
integrate in their decision making prior to the issuance of
clearances, permits and licenses under their mandates.
iii) The issuance of an ECC or CNC for a project under the EIS
System does not exempt the Proponent from securing
other government permits and clearances as required by
other laws. The current practice of requiring various
permits, clearances and licenses only constrains the EIA
evaluation process and negates the purpose and function of
the EIA.”
iv) Henceforth, all related previous instructions and other
issuances shall be made consistent with the Circular.
c) “Permits, licenses and clearances” are inclusive of other
national and local government approvals such as
endorsements, resolutions, certifications, plans and programs,
which have to be cleared/approved or other government
documents required within the respective mandates and
jurisdiction of these agencies/LGUs.
xxxx
f) The final decision whether a project will be implemented or
not lies either with the LGUs who have spatial jurisdiction
over the project or with the lead government agency who has
sectoral mandate to promote the government program where
the project belongs, e.g. DOE for energy projects; DENR-MGB
for mining projects. (Emphasis supplied)
As can be seen, the issuance of the ECC does not, by and of itself,
authorize the implementation of the project. Although it is
indispensable before the covered project can be commenced, as per
Section 4 of PD 1586, the issuance of the ECC does not, as of yet, result
in the implementation of the project. Rather, the ECC is intended to,
among others, provide guidance or act as a decision-making tool to
other government agencies and LGUs which have the final authority to
grant licenses or permits, such as building permits or licenses to operate,
that will ultimately result in, or authorize the implementation of the
project or the conduct of specific activities.
As a consequence, we find that the CNO requirement under Section 59
of the IPRA Law is not required to be obtained prior to the issuance of
an ECC. As previously discussed, Section 59 aims to forestall the
implementation of a project that may impair the right of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains, by ensuring or verifying that a project will not
overlap with any ancestral domain prior to its implementation.
However, because the issuance of an ECC does not result in the
implementation of the project, there is no necessity to secure a CNO
prior to an ECC’s issuance as the goal or purpose, which Section 59 seeks
to achieve, is, at the time of the issuance of an ECC, not yet applicable.
In sum, we find that the ECC is not the license or permit contemplated
under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules. Hence,
there is no necessity to secure the CNO under Section 59 before an ECC
may be issued and the issuance of the subject ECC without first securing
the aforesaid certification does not render it invalid.cralawred
V.
Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO), under Section 59 of the
IPRA Law, is a precondition to the consummation of the Lease and
Development Agreement (LDA) between SBMA and RP Energy and the
lack of its prior issuance rendered the LDA invalid.
We now turn to the applicability of Section 59 of the IPRA Law to the
LDA entered into between the SBMA and RP Energy on June 8, 2010.
Similar to the ECC, the LDA was entered into prior to the issuance of the
CNO on October 31, 2012.
Before this Court, SBMA and RP Energy reiterate their arguments on
why the CNO is no longer necessary in the instant case, to wit:
1. Prior to entering into the LDA with RP Energy, SBMA entered
into a lease agreement with HHIC206-Philippines, Inc. and a
CNO was already issued therefor which, for all intents and
purposes, is applicable to the area leased by RP Energy being
part of contiguous lots in Redondo Peninsula.
2. The site of the power plant project is very distant from the
boundaries of the lone area at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone
covered by an Aeta Community’s Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title (CADT).
3. There was no indigenous community within the vicinity of the
project area as stated in RP Energy’s EIS.
4. The land where the project is located was subsequently
classified as industrial by the SBMA.
5. The scoping/procedural screening checklist classified as “not
relevant” the issue of indigenous people.
6. Ms. Mercado, who was part of the team which prepared the
EIS, testified that she visited the project site ten or more times
and did not see any Aeta communities there.
7. Mr. Evangelista testified that the project site used to be a
firing range of the U.S. Armed Forces which would make it
impossible to be a settlement area of indigenous communities.
 8. Atty. Rodriguez stated that the project site is not covered by a
SEC. 59. Certification Precondition. All departments and other
CADT and that from the start of negotiations on the LDA, the governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from
SBMA Ecology Center verified with the NCIP that there was no issuing, renewing, or granting any concession, license or lease, or
application for said area to be covered by a CADT. entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior
certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap
with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a
RP Energy further argues that, in any case, as a matter of prudence, it field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office
secured a CNO from the NCIP. On October 31, 2012, the NCIP issued the of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by
subject CNO over the project site, which should erase any doubt as to the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of
whether it overlaps with an ancestral domain. ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government
agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new
Upholding the arguments of the Casiño Group, the appellate court ruled concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there
that SBMA failed to comply with the CNO requirement and, thus, the is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs
LDA entered into between SBMA and RP Energy is invalid. It rejected the shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any
reasons given by SBMA and RP Energy, to wit: project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation
process. (Emphasis supplied)
1. RP Energy’s reliance on its own field investigation that no
indigenous community was found within the vicinity is The law is clear but its actual operation or application should not be
unavailing because it was not the field investigation by the interpreted beyond the bounds of reason or practicality.
NCIP required by the IPRA Law.
We explain.
2. RP Energy acknowledged that Aetas were among the earliest
settlers in the municipality where the project will be built. Indeed, a CNO is required prior to the grant of a lease by all government
Hence, it was not clearly shown that in 2008, at the time the agencies, including the SBMA. Again, the evident intention is to prevent
LDA was entered into, there were no indigenous communities the impairment of the right of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains. A
in the project site. lease, such as the LDA under consideration, would result in, among
others, granting RP Energy the right to the use and enjoyment of the
3. SBMA’s representation that the project site is industrial relies project site to the exclusion of third parties.207 As such, the lease could
on a letter dated March 5, 2008 and the scoping checklist, conceivably encroach on an ancestral domain if the CNO is not first
which are hearsay evidence. obtained.

4. The statements of Atty. Rodriguez have no probative value
because he is not an officer of SBMA Ecology Center or an
officer of NCIP.
5. At the time the CNO was issued on October 31, 2012, and the
field investigation relative thereto was conducted by the NCIP,
the project site no longer reflected the actual condition on
December 22, 2008 when the LDA was entered into because
the households which occupied the site had already been
relocated by then.
6. SBMA, prior to entering into a lease agreement with HHIC,
secured a CNO, but oddly did not do the same with respect to
the lease agreement with RP Energy, considering that both
leases cover lands located within the same peninsula. RP
Energy appears to have been accorded a different treatment.
7. The CNO issued in favor of HHIC cannot justify the lack of a
CNO for the power plant project because the two projects are
situated in different locations: the HHIC project is located in
Sitio Agusuhin, while the power plant project is located in Sitio
Naglatore.
However, implicit in the operation of Section 59 is the practical reality
that the concerned government agency must make a preliminary
determination on whether or not to obtain the required certification in
the first place. To expound, a government agency, which wishes to lease
part of its property located near Padre Faura Street, Manila City could
not, and should not be reasonably expected to obtain the CNO, as it is
obviously inapplicable to its planned lease. In contrast, a government
agency, which intends to lease a property in a valley or mountainous
region, where indigenous communities are known to reside, conduct
hunting activities, perform rituals, or carry out some other activities,
should be reasonably expected to secure the CNO prior to
consummating the planned lease with third persons.
Even if the indigenous community does not actually reside on the
proposed lease site, the government agency would still be required to
obtain the CNO precisely to rule out the possibility that the proposed
lease site encroaches upon an ancestral domain. The reason for this is
that an ancestral domain does not only cover the lands actually
occupied by an indigenous community, but all areas where they have a
claim of ownership, through time immemorial use, such as hunting,
burial or worship grounds and to which they have traditional access for
their subsistence and other traditional
activities.208chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The wording of the law itself seems to presuppose that if the

While we agree with the appellate court that a CNO should have been
secured prior to the consummation of the LDA between SBMA and RP
Energy, and not after, as was done here, we find that, under the
particular circumstances of this case, the subsequent and belated
compliance with the CNO requirement does not invalidate the LDA.
For convenience, and as starting point of our analysis, we reproduce
Section 59 of the IPRA Law below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
concession, lease, license or production-sharing agreement is over
natural resources, then the CNO should be first obtained. This is because
the last term, “production-sharing agreement,” normally refers to
natural resources. But the problem arises as to what should be
considered “natural resources”; for a vacant lot, near Padre Faura
Street, or a forest land, in Mt. Banahaw, could both be considered as
“natural resources,” depending on the restrictive or expansive
understanding of that term.
After due consideration, we find that the proper rule of action, for
purposes of application of Section 59, is that all government offices
should undertake proper and reasonable diligence in making a
preliminary determination on whether to secure the CNO, bearing in
mind the primordial State interest in protecting the rights of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains. They should consider the nature and location of
the areas involved; the historical background of the aforesaid areas
relative to the occupation, use or claim of ownership by ICCs/IPs; the
present and actual condition of the aforesaid areas like the existence of
ICCs/IPs within the area itself or within nearby territories; and such
other considerations that would help determine whether a CNO should
be first obtained prior to granting a concession, lease, license or permit,
or entering into a production-sharing agreement.
If there are circumstances that indicate that a claim of ownership by
ICCs/IPs may be present or a claim of ownership may be asserted in the
future, no matter how remote, the proper and prudent course of action
is to obtain the CNO. In case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of securing the CNO and, thus, the government agency is under
obligation to secure the aforesaid certification in order to protect the
interests and rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains. This must be
so if we are to accord the proper respect due to, and adequately
safeguard the interests and rights of, our brothers and sisters belonging
to ICCs/IPs in consonance with the constitutional policy209 to promote
and protect the rights of ICCS/IPs as fleshed out in the IPRA Law and its
implementing rules.
In the case at bar, we find, applying this rule of action, that the SBMA
should have first secured a CNO before entering into the LDA with RP
Energy for the following reasons.
First, the Subic area is historically known to be the home of our brothers
and sisters belonging to the Aeta communities. In particular, the EIS210
itself of RP Energy noted that Aeta communities originally occupied the
proposed project site of the power plant. Thus, even if we assume that,
at the time of the ocular inspection of the proposed project site in 2008,
there were no Aeta communities seen thereat, as claimed by RP Energy,
the exercise of reasonable prudence should have moved SBMA and RP
Energy to secure a CNO in order to rule out the possibility that the
project site may overlap with an ancestral domain. This is especially so,
in view of the observation previously made, that lack of actual
occupation by an indigenous community of the area does not
necessarily mean that it is not a part of an ancestral domain because the
latter encompasses areas that are not actually occupied by indigenous
communities but are used for other purposes like hunting, worship or
burial grounds.
Second, SBMA and RP Energy claim that the SBMA Ecology Center
verified with the NCIP that the project site does not overlap with an
ancestral domain. However, the person, who allegedly did the
verification, and the officer from the NCIP, who was contacted in this
alleged verification, were not presented in court. Assuming that this
verification did take place and that the SBMA Ecology Center
determined that there is no pending application for a CADT covering the
project site and that the presently recognized CADT of Aeta
communities is too far away from the project site, it still does not follow
that the CNO under Section 59 should have been dispensed with.
The acts of individual members of a government agency, who allegedly
checked with the NCIP that the project site does not overlap with an
ancestral domain, cannot substitute for the CNO required by law. The
reason is obvious. Such posture would circumvent the noble and
laudable purposes of the law in providing the CNO as the appropriate
mechanism in order to validly and officially determine whether a
particular project site does not overlap with an ancestral domain. It
would open the doors to abuse because a government agency can easily
claim that it checked with the NCIP regarding any application for an
ancestral domain over a proposed project site while stopping short of
securing a CNO. To reiterate, the legally mandated manner to verify if a
project site overlaps with an ancestral domain is the CNO, and not
through personal verification by members of a government agency with
the NCIP.
Third, that the project site was formerly used as the firing range of the
U.S. Armed Forces does not preclude the possibility that a present or
future claim of ancestral domain may be made over the aforesaid site.
The concept of an ancestral domain indicates that, even if the use of an
area was interrupted by the occupation of foreign forces, it may still be
validly claimed to be an ancestral domain.211chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Fourth, that the project site was subsequently classified by the SBMA as
forming part of an industrial zone does not exempt it from the CNO
requirement. The change in the classification of the land is not an
exception to the CNO requirement under the IPRA Law. Otherwise,
government agencies can easily defeat the rights of ICCs/IPs through the
conversion of land use.
Fifth, SBMA argues that the CNO issued to HHIC should, for all intents
and purposes, be applicable to RP Energy. However, as correctly ruled by
the appellate court, the CNO issued to HHIC’s shipyard cannot be
extended to RP Energy’s project site because they involve two different
locations although found within the same land mass. The CNO issued in
favor of HHIC clearly states that the findings in the CNO are applicable
only to the shipyard location of HHIC.
Last, the steps taken by SBMA, in securing a CNO prior to its lease
agreement with HHIC, was the proper and prudent course of action that
should have been applied to the LDA with RP Energy. It does not matter
that HHIC itself asked for the CNO prior to entering into a lease
agreement with SBMA, as claimed by SBMA, while RP Energy did not
make such a request because, as we have discussed, SBMA had the
obligation, given the surrounding circumstances, to secure a CNO in
order to rule out the possibility that the project site overlapped with an
ancestral domain.
All in all, we find, applying the foregoing rule of action, that SBMA
should have secured a CNO before entering into the LDA with RP Energy.
Considering that Section 59 is a prohibitory statutory provision, a
violation thereof would ordinarily result in the nullification of the
contract.212 However, we rule that the harsh consequences of such a
ruling should not be applied to the case at bar.
The reason is that this is the first time that we lay down the foregoing
rule of action so much so that it would be inequitable to retroactively
apply its effects with respect to the LDA entered into between SBMA
and RP Energy. We also note that, under the particular circumstances of
this case, there is no showing that SBMA and RP Energy had a deliberate
or ill intent to escape, defeat or circumvent the mandate of Section 59
of the IPRA Law. On the contrary, they appear to have believed in good
faith, albeit erroneously, that a CNO was no longer needed because of
the afore-discussed defenses they raised herein. When the matter of
lack of a CNO relative to the LDA was brought to their attention, through
the subject Petition for Writ of kalikasan filed by the Casiño Group, RP
Energy, with the endorsement of SBMA, promptly undertook to secure
the CNO, which was issued on October 31, 2012 and stated that the
project site does not overlap with any ancestral
domain.213chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Thus, absent proof to the contrary, we are not prepared to rule that
SBMA and RP Energy acted in bad faith or with inexcusable negligence,
considering that the foregoing rule of action has not heretofore been SSEZ. Hence, RA 7227 should be deemed as carving out an exception to
laid down by this Court. As a result, we hold that the LDA should not be the prior approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement insofar as
invalidated due to equitable considerations present here. the SSEZ is concerned.

By so ruling, we clarify that we reject RP Energy’s claim that the belated We agree with the SBMA and RP Energy.
submission of the CNO is an “over compliance” on its part. Quite the
contrary, as we have discussed, the CNO should have been first secured Preliminarily, we note that Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC contemplate
given the surrounding circumstances of this case. two requirements: (1) prior consultations and (2) prior approval of the
concerned sanggunian, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the same vein, we reject SBMA’s argument that the belated
application for, and submission of the CNO cured whatever defect the SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance
LDA had. We have purposely avoided a ruling to the effect that a CNO of Ecological Balance. — It shall be the duty of every national agency or
secured subsequent to the concession, lease, license, permit or government-owned or -controlled corporation authorizing or involved in
production-sharing agreement will cure the defect. Such a ruling would the planning and implementation of any project or program that may
lead to abuse of the CNO requirement since the defect can be cured cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources,
anyway by a subsequent and belated application for a CNO. Government loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or
agencies and third parties, either through deliberate intent or plant species, to consult with the local government units,
negligence, may view it as an excuse not to timely and promptly secure nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and
the CNO, even when the circumstances warrant the application for a explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact
CNO under the afore-discussed rule of action, to the damage and upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or
prejudice of ICCs/IPs. Verily, once the concession, lease, license or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent
permit is issued, or the agreement is entered into without the requisite or minimize the adverse effects thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
CNO, consequent damages will have already occurred if it later turns out
that the site overlaps with an ancestral domain. This is so even if the SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. — No project or program
ICCs/IPs can have the project stopped upon discovery that it overlapped shall be implemented by government authorities unless the
with their ancestral domain under the last proviso214 of Section 59. To consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied
prevent this evil, compliance with the CNO requirement should be with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained:
followed through the afore-discussed rule of action. Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be
implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites
In sum, we rule that a CNO should have been secured prior to the have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the
consummation of the LDA between SBMA and RP Energy. However, Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
considering that this is the first time we lay down the rule of action
appropriate to the application of Section 59, we refrain from invalidating
In the case at bar, the Casiño Group only questions the alleged lack of
the LDA due to equitable considerations.cralawred
the prior approval of the concerned sanggunians under Section 27 of the
LGC. Thus, we shall limit our discussion to the resolution of this issue.
VI.
(Parenthetically, we note that prior consultations, as required by Section
26 of the LGC, appear to have been complied with. This may be gleaned
Whether compliance with Section 27, in relation to Section 26, of the
from the EIS of RP Energy which contains the documentation of the
LGC (i.e., approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement) is
extensive public consultations held, under the supervision of the DENR-
necessary prior to the implementation of the power plant project.
EMB, relative to the subject project, as required by the EIA process,215as
well as the social acceptability policy consultations conducted by the
Sustaining the arguments of the Casiño Group, the appellate court ruled
SBMA, which generated the document entitled “Final Report: Social
that the subject project cannot be constructed and operated until after
Acceptability Process for RP Energy, Inc.’s 600-MW Coal Plant Project,”
the prior approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement, under
as noted and discussed in an earlier subsection.216)
Section 27 of the LGC, is complied with. Hence, the ECC and LDA could
not be validly granted and entered into without first complying with the
We also note that the Casiño Group argues that the approval of the
aforesaid provision. It held that all the requisites for the application of
concerned sanggunian requirement was necessary prior to the issuance
the aforesaid provision are present. As to the pertinent provisions of RA
of the ECC and the consummation of the LDA; the absence of which
7227 or “The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,” which
invalidated the ECC and LDA.
grants broad powers of administration to the SBMA over the Subic
Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), the appellate court ruled that RA 7227
We shall no longer discuss at length whether the approval of the
contains a provision recognizing the basic autonomy of the LGUs which
concerned sanggunian requirement must be complied with prior to the
joined the SSEZ. Thus, the LGC and RA 7227 should be harmonized
issuance of an ECC. As discussed in an earlier subsection, the issuance of
whereby the concerned sanggunian’s power to approve under Section
an ECC does not, by itself, result in the implementation of the project.
27 must be respected.
Hence, the purpose or goal of Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC, like Section
59 of the IPRA Law, does not yet obtain and, thus, the ECC may be
The DENR impliedly agrees with the Casiño Group that compliance with
issued even without prior compliance with Sections 26 and 27 of the
Section 27 is still required but without clearly elaborating its reasons
LGC.
therefor.
We, thus, limit the discussion as to whether the approval of the
The SBMA and RP Energy, however, argue that the prior approval of the
concerned sanggunian requirement should have been complied with
concerned sanggunian requirement, under Section 27, is inapplicable to
prior to the consummation of the LDA, considering that the LDA is part
the subject project because it is located within the SSEZ. The LGC and RA
of the implementation of the subject project and already vests in RP
7227 cannot be harmonized because of the clear mandate of the SBMA
Energy the right to the use and enjoyment of the project site, as in fact
to govern and administer all investments and businesses within the
horizontal clearing activities were already undertaken by RP Energy at
the project site by virtue of the LDA.
The prior approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement is an
attribute and implementation of the local autonomy granted to, and
enjoyed by LGUs under the Constitution.217 The LGU has the duty to
protect its constituents and interests in the implementation of the
project. Hence, the approval of the concerned sanggunian is required by concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to the office of the
law to ensure that local communities partake in the fruits of their own
backyard.218chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For Section 27, in relation to Section 26, to apply, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the planning and implementation of the
project or program is vested in a national agency or government-owned
and-controlled corporation, i.e., national programs and/or projects
which are to be implemented in a particular local community; and (2)
the project or program may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion
of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover,
extinction of animal or plant species, or call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in the locality where the project will
be implemented.219chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the case at bar, the two requisites are evidently present: (1) the
planning and implementation of the subject project involves the
Department of Energy, DENR, and SBMA; and (2) the subject project
may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable
resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of
animal or plant species, or call for the eviction of a particular group of Senator Guingona. Mr. President, the special economic zone is
people residing in the locality where the project will be implemented.
Hence, Section 27 of the LGC should ordinarily apply.
It is not disputed that no approval was sought from the concerned
sanggunians relative to the subject project. What is more, the affected
LGUs have expressed their strong oppositions to the project through
various sanggunian resolutions.220 However, it is also undisputed that
the subject project is located within the SSEZ and, thus, under the
territorial jurisdiction of the SBMA pursuant to RA 7227.
Thus, we are tasked to determine the applicability of the prior approval
of the concerned sanggunian requirement, under Section 27 of the LGC,
relative to a project within the territorial jurisdiction of the SBMA under
RA 7227.
RA 7227 was passed on March 13, 1992 in the aftermath of the Mount
Pinatubo eruption and the closure of the Subic Naval Base of the U.S.
Armed Forces. It sought to revive the affected areas by creating and
developing the SSEZ into a “self-sustaining industrial, commercial,
financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities
in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign
investments.”221 The SSEZ covered the City of Olangapo and Municipality
of Subic in the Province of Zambales and the lands and its contiguous
extensions occupied by the former U.S. Naval Base, which traversed the
territories of the Municipalities of Hermosa and Morong in the Province
of Bataan. Under Section 12 of RA 7227, the creation of the SSEZ was
made subject to the concurrence by resolution of the respective
sanggunians of the City of Olongapo and the Municipalities of Subic,
Morong and Hermosa, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. — Subject to the concurrence
by resolution of the sangguniang panlungsod of the City of Olongapo
and the sangguniang bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and
Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port
Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic,
Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its
contiguous extensions as embraced, covered, and defined by the 1947
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States
of America as amended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter
referred to as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and
bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the
President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of
this Act, each local government unit shall submit its resolution of
President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a
proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the Zone as provided
herein.
Subsequently, the aforesaid sanggunians submitted their respective
resolutions of concurrence and the President issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 532, Series of 1995, defining the metes and bounds of
the SSEZ.
In Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,222 we
described the concept of SSEZ as a Freeport:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of goods
and capital within a portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract
investors to invest their capital in a business climate with the least
governmental intervention. The concept of this zone was explained by
Senator Guingona in this wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
successful in many places, particularly Hong Kong, which is a free port.
The difference between a special economic zone and an industrial estate
is simply expansive in the sense that the commercial activities, including
the establishment of banks, services, financial institutions, agro-
industrial activities, maybe agriculture to a certain extent.
This delineates the activities that would have the least of government
intervention, and the running of the affairs of the special economic
zone would be run principally by the investors themselves, similar to a
housing subdivision, where the subdivision owners elect their
representatives to run the affairs of the subdivision, to set the policies,
to set the guidelines.
We would like to see Subic area converted into a little Hong Kong, Mr.
President, where there is a hub of free port and free entry, free duties
and activities to a maximum spur generation of investment and jobs.
While the investor is reluctant to come in the Philippines, as a rule,
because of red tape and perceived delays, we envision this special
economic zone to be an area where there will be minimum government
interference.
The initial outlay may not only come from the Government or the
Authority as envisioned here, but from them themselves, because they
would be encouraged to invest not only for the land but also for the
buildings and factories. As long as they are convinced that in such an
area they can do business and reap reasonable profits, then many from
other parts, both local and foreign, would invest, Mr. President. 223
(Emphasis in the original)
To achieve the above-mentioned purposes, the law created SBMA to
administer the SSEZ. In the process, SBMA was granted broad and
enormous powers as provided for under Section 13(b) of RA
7227:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. –
xxxx environmental pollution control of all areas within its territory, including
but not limited to all bodies of water and to enforce the same. For which
(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority - The purpose the Subic Authority shall create an Ecology Center; and
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, otherwise known as the Subic
Authority, shall have the following powers and function: (11) To exercise such powers as may be essential, necessary or
incidental to the powers granted to it hereunder as well as to carry out
(1) To operate, administer, manage and develop the ship repair and ship the policies and objectives of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
building facility, container port, oil storage and refueling facility and Cubi
Air Base within the Subic Special Economic and Free-port Zone as a free
The Implementing Rules of RA 7227 further
market in accordance with the policies set forth in Section 12 of this Act;
provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(2) To accept any local or foreign investment, business or enterprise,
Sec. 11. Responsibilities of the SBMA. Other than the powers and
subject only to such rules and regulations to be promulgated by the
functions prescribed in Section 10 of these Rules, the SBMA shall have
Subic Authority in conformity with the policies of the Conversion
the following responsibilities:
Authority without prejudice to the nationalization requirements
provided for in the Constitution;
(a) The SBMA shall exercise authority and jurisdiction over all economic
activity within the SBF224chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(3) To undertake and regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of utilities, other services and infrastructure in the Subic
xxxx
Special Economic Zone including shipping and related business,
stevedoring and port terminal services or concessions, incidental thereto
(f) Consistent with the Constitution, the SBMA shall have the following
and airport operations in coordination with the Civil Aeronautics Board,
powers to enforce the law and these Rules in the SBF:
and to fix just and reasonable rates, fares charges and other prices
therefor;
xxxx
(4) To construct, acquire, own, lease, operate and maintain on its own
(8) to issue, alter, modify, suspend or revoke for cause, any permit,
or through contract, franchise, license permits bulk purchase from the
certificate, license, visa or privilege allowed under the Act or these
private sector and build-operate transfer scheme or joint-venture the
Rules;
required utilities and infrastructure in coordination with local
government units and appropriate government agencies concerned and
xxxx
in conformity with existing applicable laws therefor;
(11) to promulgate such other rules, regulations and circulars as may be
(5) To adopt, alter and use a corporate seal; to contract, lease, sell,
necessary, proper or incidental to carry out the policies and objectives of
dispose, acquire and own properties; to sue and be sued in order to
the Act, these Rules, as well as the powers and duties of the SBMA
carry out its duties and functions as provided for in this Act and to
thereunder.225
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use and public
purpose;
As can be seen, the SBMA was given broad administrative powers over
(6) Within the limitation provided by law, to raise and/or borrow the the SSEZ and these necessarily include the power to approve or
necessary funds from local and international financial institutions and to disapprove the subject project, which is within its territorial jurisdiction.
issue bonds, promissory notes and other securities for that purpose and But, as previously discussed, the LGC grants the concerned sanggunians
to secure the same by guarantee, pledge, mortgage deed of trust, or the power to approve and disapprove this same project. The SBMA
assignment of its properties held by the Subic Authority for the purpose asserts that its approval of the project prevails over the apparent
of financing its projects and programs within the framework and disapproval of the concerned sanggunians. There is, therefore, a real
limitation of this Act; clash between the powers granted under these two laws.

(7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism related activities
subject to priorities and standards set by the Subic Authority including
games and amusements, except horse racing, dog racing and casino
gambling which shall continue to be licensed by the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) upon recommendation
of the Conversion Authority; to maintain and preserve the forested
areas as a national park;
(8) To authorize the establishment of appropriate educational and
medical institutions;
(9) To protect, maintain and develop the virgin forests within the
baselands, which will be proclaimed as a national park and subject to a
permanent total log ban, and for this purpose, the rules and regulations
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and other
government agencies directly involved in the above functions shall be
implemented by the Subic Authority;
(10) To adopt and implement measures and standards for
Which shall prevail?
Section 12 of RA 7227 provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. x x x
The abovementioned zone shall be subjected to the following policies:
(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of
the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government
Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-
sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to
generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to
attract and promote productive foreign investments;
xxxx
(i) Except as herein provided, the local government units comprising the
Subic Special Economic Zone shall retain their basic autonomy and
identity. The cities shall be governed by their respective charters and
the municipalities shall operate and function in accordance with
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991. (Emphasis supplied)
This section sets out the basic policies underlying the creation of the
SSEZ. Indeed, as noted by the appellate court, Section 12(i) expressly
recognizes the basic autonomy and identity of the LGUs comprising the
SSEZ. However, the clause “[e]xcept as herein provided” unambiguously
provides that the LGUs do not retain their basic autonomy and identity
when it comes to matters specified by the law as falling under the
powers, functions and prerogatives of the SBMA.
In the case at bar, we find that the power to approve or disapprove
projects within the SSEZ is one such power over which the SBMA’s
authority prevails over the LGU’s autonomy. Hence, there is no need for
the SBMA to secure the approval of the concerned sanggunians prior to
the implementation of the subject project.
This interpretation is based on the broad grant of powers to the SBMA
over all administrative matters relating to the SSEZ under Section 13 of
RA 7227, as afore-discussed. Equally important, under Section 14, other
than those involving defense and security, the SBMA’s decision prevails
in case of conflict between the SBMA and the LGUs in all matters
concerning the SSEZ, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 14. Relationship with the Conversion Authority and the Local
Government Units.
(a) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the
contrary notwithstanding, the Subic Authority shall exercise
administrative powers, rule-making and disbursement of funds over
the Subic Special Economic Zone in conformity with the oversight
function of the Conversion Authority.
(b) In case of conflict between the Subic Authority and the local
government units concerned on matters affecting the Subic Special
Economic Zone other than defense and security, the decision of the
Subic Authority shall prevail. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the subject project does not involve defense or security, but
rather business and investment to further the development of the SSEZ.
Such is in line with the objective of RA 7227 to develop the SSEZ into a
self-sustaining industrial, commercial, financial and investment center.
Hence, the decision of the SBMA would prevail over the apparent
objections of the concerned sanggunians of the LGUs.
Significantly, the legislative deliberations on RA 7227, likewise, support
and confirm the foregoing interpretation. As earlier noted, Section 13
b(4) of RA 7227 provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. –
xxxx
(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority - The
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, otherwise known as the Subic
Authority, shall have the following powers and function:
xxxx
The President. Well, both sides have already been heard. There is the
Laurel amendment that would make the power of the Subic Bay
(4) To construct, acquire, own, lease, operate and maintain on its own or
Metropolitan Authority to construct, acquire, own, lease, operate and
through contract, franchise, license permits bulk purchase from the
maintain on its own or through contract, franchise, license, permits, bulk
private sector and build-operate transfer scheme or joint-venture the
purchases from private sector, build-operate-and-transfer scheme, or
required utilities and infrastructure in coordination with local
government units and appropriate government agencies concerned and
in conformity with existing applicable laws therefor;
In the Senate, during the period of amendments, when the provision
which would eventually become the afore-quoted Section 13 b(4) of RA
7227 was under consideration, the following exchanges took
place:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Senator Laurel. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Laurel is recognized.
Senator Laurel. Relative to line 27 up to line 31 of page 16, regarding the
provision to the effect that the Authority will have the following
functions: “to construct, acquire, own, etcetera,” that is all right.
My motion is that we amend this particular line, starting from the word
“structures”, by deleting the words that follow on line 31, which states:
“in coordination with local government units and”, and substitute the
following in place of those words: “SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE
SANGGUNIAN OF THE AFFECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND IN
COORDINATION WITH.”
So, this paragraph will read, as follows: “to construct, own, lease,
operate, and maintain on its own or through contract, franchise, license
permits, bulk purchase from the private sector and build-operate-
transfer scheme or joint venture the required utilities and infrastructure
SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE SANGGUNIAN OF THE AFFECTED
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND IN coordination with appropriate
government agencies concerned and in conformity with existing
applicable laws therefor.”
The President. What does the Sponsor say?
Senator Shahani. I believe this would cripple the Authority. I would like
to remind our Colleagues that in the Board of Directors, the
representatives of the local government units that agree to join with
the Subic Special Economic Zone will be members of the Board so that
they will have a say, Mr. President. But if we say “subject,” that is a
very strong word. It really means that they will be the ones to
determine the policy.
So, I am afraid that I cannot accept this amendment, Mr. President.
Senator Laurel. May I respond or react, Mr. President.
The President. Yes.
Senator Laurel. The Constitution is there, very categorical in the
promotion and encouragement of local autonomy, and mandating
Congress to enact the necessary Local Government Code with emphasis
on local autonomy.
We have now Section 27 of the new Local Government Code which
actually provides that for every project in any local government
territory, the conformity or concurrence of the Sanggunian of every such
local government unit shall be secured in the form of resolution—the
consent of the Sanggunian.
joint venture, the required utilities and infrastructure, subject to
approval by the appropriate Sanggunian of the local government
concerned.
This amendment to the amendment has been rejected by the Sponsor.
So, we are voting now on this amendment.
As many as are in favor of the Laurel amendment, say Aye. (Few
Senators: Aye.)
Those who are against the said amendment, say Nay. (Several Senators:
Nay.)
Senator Laurel. Mr. President, may I ask for a nominal voting.
The President. A nominal voting should be upon the request of one-fifth
of the Members of the House, but we can accommodate the Gentleman
by asking for a division of the House.
Therefore, those in favor of the Laurel amendment, please raise their
right hands. (Few Senators raised their right hands.)
Senator Laurel. I was asking, Mr. President, for a nominal voting.
The President. A nominal voting can be had only upon motion of one-
fifth of the Members of the Body.
Senator Laurel. That is correct, Mr. President. But this is such an
important issue being presented to us, because this question is related
to the other important issue, which is: May an elected public official of a
particular government unit, such as a town or municipality, participate
as a member of the Board of Directors of this particular zone.
The President. The ruling of the Chair stands. The division of the House
is hereby directed.
As many as are in favor of the Laurel amendment, please raised (sic)
their right hands. (Few Senators raised their right hands.)
As many as are against the said amendment, please do likewise. (Several
Senators raised their right hands.)
226
The amendment is lost. (Emphasis supplied)
Indubitably, the legislature rejected the attempts to engraft Section 27’s when the LDA was entered into between SBMA and RP Energy despite
prior approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement under the LGC the lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians.cralawred
into RA 7227. Hence, the clear intent was to do away with the approval
requirement of the concerned sanggunians relative to the power of the
SBMA to approve or disapprove a project within the SSEZ.
The power to create the SSEZ is expressly recognized in Section 117 of
the LGC, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
TITLE VIII.
Autonomous Special Economic Zones
SECTION 117. Establishment of Autonomous Special Economic Zones. — RP Energy counters that this issue cannot be resolved because it was
The establishment by law of autonomous special economic zones in
selected areas of the country shall be subject to concurrence by the local
government units included therein.
When the concerned sanggunians opted to join the SSEZ, they were,
thus, fully aware that this would lead to some diminution of their local
autonomy in order to gain the benefits and privileges of being a part of
the SSEZ.
Further, the point of Senator Shahani that the representation of the
concerned LGUs in the Board of Directors will compensate for the
diminution of their local autonomy and allow them to be represented in
the decision-making of the SBMA is not lost on us. This is expressly
provided for in Section 13(c) of RA 7227, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. —
xxxx
(c) Board of Directors. — The powers of the Subic Authority shall be
vested in and exercised by a Board of Directors, hereinafter referred to
as the Board, which shall be composed of fifteen (15) members, to wit:
(1) Representatives of the local government units that concur to join
the Subic Special Economic Zone;
(2) Two (2) representatives from the National Government;
(3) Five (5) representatives from the private sector coming from the
present naval stations, public works center, ship repair facility, naval
supply depot and naval air station; and
(4) The remaining balance to complete the Board shall be composed of
representatives from the business and investment sectors. (Emphasis
supplied)
SBMA’s undisputed claim is that, during the board meeting when the
subject project was approved, except for one, all the representatives of
the concerned LGUs were present and voted to approve the subject
project.227 Verily, the wisdom of the law creating the SSEZ; the wisdom
of the choice of the concerned LGUs to join the SSEZ; and the wisdom of
the mechanism of representation of the concerned LGUs in the decision-
making process of the SBMA are matters outside the scope of the power
of judicial review. We can only interpret and apply the law as we find it.
In sum, we find that the implementation of the project is not subject to
the prior approval of the concerned sanggunians, under Section 27 of
the LGC, and the SBMA’s decision to approve the project prevails over
the apparent objections of the concerned sanggunians of the LGUs, by
virtue of the clear provisions of RA 7227. Thus, there was no infirmity
VII.
Whether the validity of the third amendment to the ECC can be resolved
by the Court.
The Casiño Group argues that the validity of the third amendment
should have been resolved by the appellate court because it is covered
by the broad issues set during the preliminary conference.
expressly excluded during the preliminary conference.
The appellate court sustained the position of RP Energy and ruled that
this issue was not included in the preliminary conference so that it
cannot be resolved without violating the right to due process of RP
Energy.
We agree with the appellate court.
Indeed, the issue of the validity of the third amendment to the ECC was
not part of the issues set during the preliminary conference, as it
appears at that time that the application for the third amendment was
still ongoing. The following clarificatory questions during the aforesaid
conference confirm this, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
J. LEAGOGO:
So what are you questioning in your Petition?
ATTY. RIDON:
We are questioning the validity of the amendment, Your Honor.
J. LEAGOGO:
Which amendment?
(a) Environmental cases, such as a petition for a writ of kalikasan, should
not, in general, be litigated via a representative, citizen or class suit
because of the danger of misrepresenting the interests— and thus,
barring future action due to res judicata— of those not actually present
in the prosecution of the case, either because they do not yet exist, like
the unborn generations, or because the parties bringing suit do not
accurately represent the interests of the group they represent or the
class to which they belong. As an exception, such representative, citizen
or class suit may be allowed subject to certain conditions; and
(b) The amendments to the ECC, granted by the DENR in favor of RP
Energy, are void for failure to submit a new EIS in support of the
applications for these amendments to the subject ECC, and a petition for
writ of kalikasan is not the proper remedy to raise a defect in the ECC.
We disagree.cralawred

ATTY. RIDON: A.
From 2 x 150 to 1 x 300, Your Honor.
Justice Leonen’s proposition that environmental cases should not, in
J. LEAGOGO: general, be litigated via a representative, citizen or class suit is both
Your Petition does not involve the 2 x 300 which is still pending with the novel and ground-breaking. However, it is inappropriate to resolve such
DENR. Because you still have remedies there, you can make your noise an important issue in this case, in view of the requisites for the exercise
there, you can question it to your heart[’]s content because it is still of our power of judicial review, because the matter was not raised by
pending the parties so that the issue was not squarely tackled and fully
ventilated. The proposition will entail, as Justice Leonen explains, an
xxxx abandonment or, at least, a modification of our ruling in the landmark
case of Oposa v. Factoran.229 It will also require an amendment or a
J. LEAGOGO: modification of Section 5 (on citizen suits), Rule 2 of the Rules of
Atty. Ridon, I go back to my question. We’re not yet talking of the legal Procedure for Environmental Cases. Hence, it is more appropriate to
points here. I’m just talking of what are you questioning. You are await a case where such issues and arguments are properly raised by the
questioning the 1 x 300? parties for the consideration of the Court.cralawred

ATTY. RIDON: B.
Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Leonen reasons that the amendments to the subject ECC are void
J. LEAGOGO: because the applications therefor were unsupported by an EIS, as
Because it was 2 x 150 and then 1 x 300? required by PD 1151 and PD 1586. The claim is made that an EIS is
required by law, even if the amendment to the ECC is minor, because an
ATTY. RIDON: EIS is necessary to determine the environmental impact of the proposed
Yes, Your Honor. modifications to the original project design. The DENR rules, therefore,
which permit the modification of the original project design without the
J. LEAGOGO: requisite EIS, are void for violating PD 1151 and PD 1586.
Up to that point?
We disagree.
ATTY. RIDON:
Yes, Your Honor. Indeed, Section 4 of PD 1151 sets out the basic policy of requiring an EIS
in every action, project or undertaking that significantly affects the
J. LEAGOGO: quality of the environment, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Because there is no amended ECC yet for the 2 x 300 or 600. That’s clear
enough for all of us. SECTION 4. Environmental Impact Statements. — Pursuant to the above
enunciated policies and goals, all agencies and instrumentalities of the
ATTY. RIDON: national government, including government-owned or -controlled
Yes, Your Honor.228 corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities shall
prepare, file and include in every action, project or undertaking which
Given the invocation of the right to due process by RP Energy, we must significantly affects the quality of the environment a detailed
sustain the appellate court’s finding that the issue as to the validity of statement on —
the third amendment cannot be adjudicated in this case.
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or
Refutation of the Partial Dissent. undertaking;
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should
Justice Leonen partially dissents from the foregoing disposition on the the proposal be implemented;
following grounds: (c) alternative to the proposed action;
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the
environment are consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of
the long-term productivity of the same; and the ECC were void for failure to prepare and submit a new EIS relative to
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or non- these amendments, it is important to note that PD 1586 does not state
renewable resources, a finding must be made that such use and the procedure to be followed when there is an application for an
commitment are warranted. amendment to a previously issued ECC. There is nothing in PD 1586
which expressly requires an EIS for an amendment to an ECC.
Before an environmental impact statement is issued by a lead agency, all
agencies having jurisdiction over, or special expertise on, the subject In footnote 174 of the ponencia, it is stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
matter involved shall comment on the draft environmental impact
statement made by the lead agency within thirty (30) days from receipt Parenthetically, we must mention that the validity of the rules providing
of the same. (Emphasis supplied) for amendments to the ECC was challenged by the Casiño Group on the
ground that it is ultra vires before the appellate court. It argued that the
As earlier stated, the EIS was subsequently developed and strengthened laws governing the ECC do not expressly permit the amendment of an
through PD 1586 which established the Philippine Environmental Impact ECC. However, the appellate court correctly ruled that the validity of the
Statement System. Sections 4 and 5 of PD 1586 rules cannot be collaterally attacked. Besides, the power of the DENR to
provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary issue rules on amendments of an ECC is sanctioned under the doctrine
of necessary implication. Considering that the greater power to deny or
grant an ECC is vested by law in the President or his authorized
SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas
representative, the DENR, there is no obstacle to the exercise of the
and Projects. The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative
lesser or implied power to amend the ECC for justifiable reasons. This
or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection
issue was no longer raised before this Court and, thus, we no longer
Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas
tackle the same here.
in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Because PD 1586 did not expressly provide the procedure to be followed
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his in case of an application for an amendment to a previously issued ECC,
duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said the DENR exercised its discretion, pursuant to its delegated authority to
critical project or area, the President may by his proclamation implement this law, in issuing DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual.
reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations
or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government Justice Leonen’s argument effectively challenges the validity of the
personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities. provisions in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual relative to
amendments to an ECC for being contrary to PD 1151 and 1586.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements
shall: (a) prepare the proper land or water use pattern for said critical We disagree.
project(s) or area(s); (b) establish ambient environmental quality
standards; (c) develop a program of environmental enhancement or First, to repeat, there is nothing in PD 1586 which expressly requires an
protective measures against calamituous factors such as earthquake, EIS for an amendment to an ECC.
floods, water erosion and others, and (d) perform such other functions
as may be directed by the President from time to time. Second, as earlier noted, the proposition would constitute a collateral
attack on the validity of DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, which is
SECTION 5. Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. — All other projects, not allowed under the premises. The Casiño Group itself has abandoned
undertakings and areas not declared by the President as this claim before this Court so that the issue is not properly before this
environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall not Court for its resolution.
be required to submit an environmental impact statement. The National
Environmental Protection Council, thru the Ministry of Human Third, assuming that a collateral attack on the validity of DAO 2003-30
Settlements may however require non-critical projects and undertakings and the Revised Manual can be allowed in this case, the rules on
to provide additional environmental safeguards as it may deem amendments appear to be reasonable, absent a showing of grave abuse
necessary. (Emphasis supplied) of discretion or patent illegality.

Essentially, the rules take into consideration the nature of the

These laws were, in turn, implemented by DAO 2003-30 and the Revised
amendment in determining the proper Environmental Impact
Manual.
Assessment (EIA) document type that the project proponent will submit
in support of its application for an amendment to its previously issued
As correctly noted by Justice Leonen, Presidential Proclamation No.
ECC. A minor amendment will require a less detailed EIA document type,
2146 was subsequently issued which, among others, classified fossil-
like a Project Description Report (PDR), while a major amendment will
fueled power plants as environmentally critical projects.
require a more detailed EIA document type, like an Environmental
Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) or even an
In conformity with the above-quoted laws and their implementing
EIS.230chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
issuances, the subject project, a coal power plant, was classified by the
DENR as an environmentally critical project, new and single. Hence, RP
The rules appear to be based on the premise that it would be unduly
Energy was required to submit an EIS in support of its application for an
burdensome or impractical to require a project proponent to submit a
ECC. RP Energy thereafter complied with the EIS requirement and the
detailed EIA document type, like an EIS, for amendments that, upon
DENR, after review, evaluation and compliance with the other steps
preliminary evaluation by the DENR, will not cause significant
provided in its rules, issued an ECC in favor of RP Energy. As can be seen,
environmental impact. In particular, as applied to the subject project,
the EIS requirement was duly complied with.
the DENR effectively determined that it is impractical to require RP
Energy to, in a manner of speaking, start from scratch by submitting a
Anent Justice Leonen’s argument that the subsequent amendments to
new EIS in support of its application for the first amendment to its Conclusion
previously issued ECC, considering that the existing EIS may be
supplemented by an EPRMP to adequately evaluate the environmental We now summarize our findings:
impact of the proposed modifications under the first amendment. The
same reasoning may be applied to the PDR relative to the second 1. The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casiño Group failed to
amendment. substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the power
plant will cause environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated
As previously discussed, the Casiño Group failed to prove that the under the writ of kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy presented
EPRMP and PDR were inadequate to assess the environmental impact of evidence to establish that the subject project will not cause grave
the planned modifications under the first and second amendments, environmental damage, through its Environmental Management Plan,
respectively. On the contrary, the EPRMP and PDR appeared to contain which will ensure that the project will operate within the limits of
the details of the planned modifications and the corresponding existing environmental laws and standards;
adjustments to be made in the environmental management plan or
mitigating measures in order to address the potential impacts of these 2. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC on the ground
planned modifications. Hence, absent sufficient proof, there is no basis of lack of signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the ECC’s Statement of
to conclude that the procedure adopted by the DENR was done with Accountability relative to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to
grave abuse of discretion. the appellate court. While the signature is necessary for the validity of
the ECC, the particular circumstances of this case show that the DENR
Justice Leonen’s proposition would effectively impose a stringent and RP Energy were not properly apprised of the issue of lack of
requirement of an EIS for each and every proposed amendment to an signature in order for them to present controverting evidence and
ECC, no matter how minor the amendment may be. While this arguments on this point, as the issue only arose during the course of the
requirement would seem ideal, in order to ensure that the proceedings upon clarificatory questions from the appellate court.
environmental impact of the proposed amendment is fully taken into Consequently, RP Energy cannot be faulted for submitting the certified
consideration, the pertinent laws do not, however, expressly require true copy of the ECC only after it learned that the ECC had been
that such a procedure be followed. As already discussed, the DENR invalidated on the ground of lack of signature in the January 30, 2013
appear to have reasonably issued DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual Decision of the appellate court. The certified true copy of the ECC,
relative to the amendment process of an ECC, by balancing practicality bearing the signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the Statement of Accountability
vis-à-vis the need for sufficient information in determining the portion, was issued by the DENR-EMB, and remains uncontroverted. It
environmental impact of the proposed amendment to an ECC. In fine, showed that the Statement of Accountability was signed by Mr. Aboitiz
the Court cannot invalidate the rules which appear to be reasonable, on December 24, 2008. Because the signing was done after the official
absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality. release of the ECC on December 22, 2008, we note that the DENR did
not strictly follow its rules, which require that the signing of the
We next tackle Justice Leonen’s argument that a petition for certiorari, Statement of Accountability should be done before the official release of
and not a writ of kalikasan, is the proper remedy to question a defect in the ECC. However, considering that the issue was not adequately argued
an ECC. nor was evidence presented before the appellate court on the
circumstances at the time of signing, there is insufficient basis to
In general, the proper procedure to question a defect in an ECC is to conclude that the procedure adopted by the DENR was tainted with bad
follow the appeal process provided in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised faith or inexcusable negligence. We remind the DENR, however, to be
Manual. After complying with the proper administrative appeal process, more circumspect in following its rules. Thus, we rule that the signature
recourse may be made to the courts in accordance with the doctrine of requirement was substantially complied with pro hac vice.
exhaustion of administrative remedies. However, as earlier discussed, in
exceptional cases, a writ of kalikasan may be availed of to challenge 3. The appellate court erred when it ruled that the first and second
defects in the ECC provided that (1) the defects are causally linked or amendments to the ECC were invalid for failure to comply with a new
reasonably connected to an environmental damage of the nature and EIA and for violating DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. It failed to
magnitude contemplated under the Rules on Writ of kalikasan, and (2) properly consider the applicable provisions in DAO 2003-30 and the
the case does not violate, or falls under an exception to, the doctrine of Revised Manual for amendment to ECCs. Our own examination of the
exhaustion of administrative remedies and/or primary jurisdiction. provisions on amendments to ECCs in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised
Manual, as well as the EPRMP and PDR themselves, shows that the
As previously discussed, in the case at bar, only the allegation with DENR reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring an EPRMP and a
respect to the lack of an EIA relative to the first and second PDR for the first and second amendments, respectively. Through these
amendments to the subject ECC may be reasonably connected to such documents, which the DENR reviewed, a new EIA was conducted
an environmental damage. Further, given the extreme urgency of relative to the proposed project modifications. Hence, absent sufficient
resolving the issue due to the looming power crisis, this case may be showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality, relative to both
considered as falling under an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of the procedure and substance of the amendment process, we uphold the
administrative remedies. Thus, the aforesaid issue may be conceivably validity of these amendments;
resolved in a writ of kalikasan case.
4. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC for failure to
More importantly, we have expressly ruled that this case is an comply with Section 59 of the IPRA Law. The ECC is not the license or
exceptional case due to the looming power crisis, so that the rules of permit contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its
procedure may be suspended in order to address issues which, implementing rules. Hence, there is no necessity to secure the CNO
ordinarily, the Court would not consider proper in a writ of kalikasan under Section 59 before an ECC may be issued, and the issuance of the
case. Hence, all issues, including those not proper in a writ of kalikasan subject ECC without first securing the aforesaid certification does not
case, were resolved here in order to forestall another round of render it invalid;
protracted litigation relative to the implementation of the subject
project. 5. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the LDA between SBMA
and RP Energy for failure to comply with Section 59 of the IPRA Law.
While we find that a CNO should have been secured prior to the
consummation of the LDA between SBMA and RP Energy, considering
that this is the first time we lay down the rule of action appropriate to
the application of Section 59, we refrain from invalidating the LDA for
reasons of equity;

6. The appellate court erred when it ruled that compliance with Section
27, in relation to Section 26, of the LGC (i.e., approval of the concerned
sanggunian requirement) is necessary prior to issuance of the subject
ECC. The issuance of an ECC does not, by itself, result in the
implementation of the project. Hence, there is no necessity to secure
prior compliance with the approval of the concerned sanggunian
requirement, and the issuance of the subject ECC without first
complying with the aforesaid requirement does not render it invalid. The
appellate court also erred when it ruled that compliance with the
aforesaid requirement is necessary prior to the consummation of the
LDA. By virtue of the clear provisions of RA 7227, the project is not
subject to the aforesaid requirement and the SBMA’s decision to
approve the project prevails over the apparent objections of the
concerned sanggunians. Thus, the LDA entered into between SBMA and
RP Energy suffers from no infirmity despite the lack of approval of the
concerned sanggunians; and

7. The appellate court correctly ruled that the issue as to the validity of
the third amendment to the ECC cannot be resolved in this case because
it was not one of the issues set during the preliminary conference, and
would, thus, violate RP Energy’s right to due process.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

1. DENY the Petition in G.R. No. 207282; and

2. GRANT the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 207257, 207366 and 207276:

2.1. The January 30, 2013 Decision and May 22, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
00015 are reversed and set aside;
2.2. The Petition for Writ of kalikasan, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 00015, is denied for insufficiency of evidence;
2.3. The validity of the December 22, 2008 Environmental
Compliance Certificate, as well as the July 8, 2010 first
amendment and the May 26, 2011 second amendment
thereto, issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in favor of Redondo Peninsula Energy,
Inc., are upheld; and
2.4. The validity of the June 8, 2010 Lease and Development
Agreement between Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
and Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. is upheld.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary
Arigo vs. Swift 735 SCRA 102 , September 16, 2014
G.R. No. 206510. September 16, 2014.*
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, D.D., Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa,
MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S. IÑIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan,
FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA
CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, Bayan Muna Party--list,
ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VFA Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ,
PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ.
GONZALES, Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH.D., Agham, ELMER C.
LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE
ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN,
NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ, petitioners, vs. SCOTT
H. SWIFT, in his capacity as Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, MARK A.
RICE, in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian,
PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL
ROSARIO, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, HON. PAQUITO
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, Office of the President, HON. VOLTAIRE
T. GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of National Defense, HON. RAMON
JESUS P. PAJE, Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, VICE ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag
Officer in Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, ADMIRAL
RODOLFO D. ISORENA, Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard,
COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast Guard-
Palawan, MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed
Forces of the Philippines Command and LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US
Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-Director,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus
standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.”—Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on
a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial
interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a
generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural
matter which this Court has relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.
Constitutional Law; Balance and Healthful Ecology; In the landmark case
of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993), the Supreme Court (SC)
recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law.”—In the landmark case of Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993), we recognized the “public right” of
citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need
not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception
of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. Same; Same; Same; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea;
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives to
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Class Suit; On the novel element in the the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different
class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3)
not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of
their own and future generations.—On the novel element in the class suit
filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do
ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and
future generations. Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the
created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say,
every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
Constitutional Law; State Immunity from Suit; This traditional rule of State
immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without the former’s consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive
doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).—
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being
sued in the courts of another State without the former’s consent or
waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial
and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State
immunity, State immunity extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive
application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs.
Same; International Law; International Law of the Sea; Words and
Phrases; The international law of the sea is generally defined as “a body
of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the
exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over
maritime regimes.—The international law of the sea is generally defined
as “a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the
sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over
maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating the
relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans.” The UNCLOS is
a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10,
1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984
but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the
60th ratification.
contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also
gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels
depending on where the vessel is located.—The UNCLOS is a product of
international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare
clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum).
The freedom to use the world’s marine waters is one of the oldest
customary principles of international law. The UNCLOS gives to the
coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones
of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous
zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives
coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on
where the vessel is located.
Same; Same; State Immunity from Suit; Visiting Forces Agreement; Writ
of Kalikasan; The waiver of State immunity under the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special
civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan.—The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of
United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote
“common security interests” between the US and the Philippines in the
region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military
personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the
Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement
of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment,
materials and supplies.
The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus
improper considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving
US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of
the objectives of the agreement. As it is, the waiver of State immunity
under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil
actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In
fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal
case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is
to be filed separately: SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.—The filing
of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude
the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A ruling on the application or non-
application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) to US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the
province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.—In any case, it is our
considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be
found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be
premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such
waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot
grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental
laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection
of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that
deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of
an environmental law.
Same; Same; Foreign Relations; It is settled that “the conduct of the
foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to
the executive and legislative — ‘the political’ — departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of
this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”—A VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of
the violator is also a major relief that may be obtained under a judgment
rendered in a citizens’ suit under the Rules, viz.: RULE 5 SECTION 1. Reliefs
in a citizen suit.—If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper
reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation
of the environment and the payment of attorney’s fees, costs of suit and
other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a
program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of
which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust
fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court. In the light of
the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of
compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels.
Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in
the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that
“[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed
by the Constitution to the executive and legislative — ‘the political’ —
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done
in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision.” Arigo vs. Swift, 735 SCRA 102, G.R. No. 206510 September 16,
2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.;
MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan,
FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE,
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, Bayan Muna
Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VF A Movement,
TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, Kabataan
Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG,
PH. D., Agham, ELMER C. LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E.
SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A.
CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A.
EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet,
MARK A. RICE in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS
Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, HON.
ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, Secretary, pepartment of Foreign Affair.s,
HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the
President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of
National Defense, HON. RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary, Department
of Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M.
ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO RENA, Commandant, Philippine
Coast Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA, Philippine
Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO,
Commandant of Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and LT.
GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US Marine Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan
2013 Exercise Co-Director, Respondents.
DECISION
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer
for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of
environmental laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the
US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of
southern Philippines) language which means "long reef exposed at low
tide." Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll
and the south atoll - and the Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral
structure about 20 kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha
and Jessie Beazley are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island
municipality of Palawan.1
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of
Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August
11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers
southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the
Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site.
It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems,
containing excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of
marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an
important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered marine
species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an
important and significant natural habitat for in situ conservation of
biological diversity; an example representing significant on-going
ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural
beauty and aesthetic importance.2
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3
otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of
2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally
significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific
values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of
present and future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into
the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are
prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering,
destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law
likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board
(TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting body
of the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the
US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines
requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the
territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay
for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew
liberty."4 On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay,
arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa,
Japan.1âwphi1
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next
port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m.
while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest
side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-
southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there
have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott
Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a press statement.5 Likewise,
US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his
regrets over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs
Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will provide
appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship."6
By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing
the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in
representation of their respective sector/organization and others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition
agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet,
Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian
and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and
Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"); President
Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert F. Del
Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T.
Gazmin (Department of National Defense), Secretary Jesus P. Paje
(Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose
Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, AFP), Admiral
Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore
Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major
General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the
"Philippine respondents."
The Petition
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging
operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of
Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which
events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of
civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding
incident.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US
respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19);
non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law
enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and
destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore,
petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer
of the petition, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Petitioners
respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1. Immediately issue upon
the filing of this petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to
cease and desist all operations over the Guardian grounding
incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged
area as well as an additional buffer zone;
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games
under 'Balikatan' because of the absence of clear guidelines,
duties, and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and
require Respondents to assume responsibility for prior and
future environmental damage in general, and environmental
damage under the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of
ecotourism, diving, recreation, and limited commercial
activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or
around the TRNP but away from the damaged site and an
additional buffer zone;
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the
TEPO until further orders of the Court;
3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall
include, without limitation:
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following
the dispositive portion of Nicolas v. Romulo, "to forthwith
negotiate with the United States representatives for the
appropriate agreement on [environmental guidelines and
environmental accountability] under Philippine authorities as
provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... "
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence
administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings against erring
officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to
make such proceedings public;
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over erring U.S. personnel under
the circumstances of this case;
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable
compensation in the settlement of all meritorious claims for
damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and
conditions no less severe than those applicable to other
States, and damages for personal injury or death, if such had
been the case;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the
attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production
of evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects
connected with the offenses related to the grounding of the
Guardian;
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United
States to notify each other of the disposition of all cases,
wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported
restoration, repair, salvage or post salvage plan or plans,
including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the
Tubbataha Reef absent a just settlement approved by the
Honorable Court;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU
consultations in accordance with the Local Government Code
and R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to
place a deposit to the TRNP Trust Fund defined under Section
17 of RA 10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full
reparations;
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate
the areas affected by the grounding of the Guardian in light of
Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009,
among other similar grounding incidents;
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly
basis and in the name of transparency and accountability such
environmental damage assessment, valuation, and valuation
methods, in all stages of negotiation;
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide
scientific and technical support to the TPAMB;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of
National Defense, and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement
and the Mutual Defense Treaty to consider whether their
provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and for damages which follow
from any violation of those rights;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces
Agreement for purposes of protecting the damaged areas of
TRNP;
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal
Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the Visiting Forces Agreement
unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for
violating the preemptory norm of nondiscrimination
incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section 2,
Article II, of the Philippine Constitution;
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha
Reefs in all other respects; and
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation
measures and such other reliefs as are just and equitable
under the premises.7 (Underscoring supplied.)
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment8 to the
petition, petitioners also filed a motion for early resolution and motion
to proceed ex parte against the US respondents.9
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a
TEPO and ocular inspection and production orders, respondents assert
that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of
Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the
USS Guardian were already completed; (2) the petition is defective in
form and substance; (3) the petition improperly raises issues involving
the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States
of America; and ( 4) the determination of the extent of responsibility of
the US Government as regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests
exdusively with the executive branch.
 The Court's Ruling respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this
case.
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of
petitioners to file the present petition. The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of
sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State,17 is expressly
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
question."10 Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest
in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized
grievance."11 However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the
which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary principle of state immunity from suit, as follows:
citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now ·
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of
public interest.12
the generally accepted principles of international law that we have
adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the
"public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally
the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in
accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of
the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and
incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states,
healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is
such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized
assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of
state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of
Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1
obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other
Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
states.
the environment.14

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in
the justification given by Justice Holmes that ''there can be no legal right
Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal
against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends."
standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can
[Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons
do so in representation of their own and future generations. Thus:
for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state
sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
satisfy the same,. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end
pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as
that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded.
accessible to the present a:: well as future generations. Needless to say,
[Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state may
every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
move to dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed
and harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a balanced and healthful
without its consent.19 (Emphasis supplied.)
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of
their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the
to come.15 (Emphasis supplied.) Eleventh Amendment which reads:

The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it
refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the
Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The
provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on
personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards
of nature."16
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more
fundamental question of whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,20 we further expounded on
the immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of local courts, as
follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state
is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely
identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit
and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just
to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also
distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise
to a suit arc those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent,
although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official
capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign
sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state
is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not
accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose
service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet imperium -that
all states are soverr~ign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against
an official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act
to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as
being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic
immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the
law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, of his authority or jurisdiction.26 (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the
an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,23 one of the consolidated
cases therein involved a Filipino employed at Clark Air Base who was
arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers of the while they we:re performing official military duties. Considering that the
US Air Force, and was eventually dismissed from his employment when
he was charged in court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is
damages filed by the said employee against the military officers, the
latter moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the suit was against therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons
the US Government which had not given its consent. The RTC denied the of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
motion but on a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed before this
Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint. We held that
petitioners US military officers were acting in the exercise of their
official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against
the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It
follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States,
they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal,
which has not given its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being
sued in the courts of another State without the former's consent or
waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil") from private,
commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive
rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.24
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State
immunity principle, thus:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his
capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of
plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in Director of the
Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch
as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts
of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been
invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a
suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.
In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity
against a State officer or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades
the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does
not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional
provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The
rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
xxxx
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the
doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the
officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are
sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the
public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable
in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope
US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS
Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial
deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took
the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship
entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused
damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of
Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign
immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to
comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding
passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the
UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself
bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses of the
oceans" as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous
declarations by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US
judiciary in the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines,
Ltd.27
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty
rules arid customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the
exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over
maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating
the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans."28 The
UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on
December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the
Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the
submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to
balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom
of the high seas (mare liberum).29 The freedom to use the world's
marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international
law.30 The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying
degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters,
2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5)
the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over
foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located.31
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the
Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other
rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over
the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.32
In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they
continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following
exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and
disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the
coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or
damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a
warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial
purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this
Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non- following statement posted on its official website:
commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 establishes stable maritime zones, including a maximum outer limit for
and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships
and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.
(Emphasis supplied.) A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our
internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one
situation in which the above provisions may apply. But what if the
offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now
members of UNCLOS, but despite this the US, the world's leading
maritime power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS'
negotiation and drafting, the U.S. delegation ultimately voted against
and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed mining
technology transfer provisions contained in Part XI. In a remarkable,
multilateral effort to induce U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS
member states cooperated over the succeeding decade to revise the
objection.able provisions. The revisions satisfied the Clinton
administration, which signed the revised Part XI implementing
agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton transmitted
UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate
requesting its advice and consent. Despite consistent support from
President Clinton, each of his successors, and an ideologically diverse
array of stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent
required for the President to internationally bind the United States to
UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC)
during the 108th and 110th Congresses, its progress continues to be
hamstrung by significant pockets of political ambivalence over U.S.
participation in international institutions. Most recently, 111 th Congress
SFRC Chairman Senator John Kerry included "voting out" UNCLOS for full
Senate consideration among his highest priorities. This did not occur,
and no Senate action has been taken on UNCLOS by the 112th
Congress.34
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by
President Reagan on March 10, 1983 that the US will "recognize the
rights of the other , states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in
the convention [UNCLOS], so long as the rights and freedom of the
United States and others under international law are recognized by such
coastal states", and President Clinton's reiteration of the US policy "to
act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to
traditional uses of the oceans and to encourage other countries to do
likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the "traditional uses of the oceans,"
and "if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the rights of the other states
in the waters off their coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that "there is
more reason to expect it to recognize the rights of other states in their
internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the
US' refusal to join the UN CLOS was centered on its disagreement with
UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the
oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind," pointing out
that such "has nothing to do with its [the US'] acceptance of customary
international rules on navigation."
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's
Corps publicly endorses the ratification of the UNCLOS, as shown by the
The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it
territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage, and
archipelagic sea lanes passage rights; works against "jurisdictiomtl
creep" by preventing coastal nations from expanding their own
maritime zones; and reaffirms sovereign immunity of warships,
auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
xxxx
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national
interests by enhancing the ability of the US to assert its sovereign rights
over the resources of one of the largest continental shelves in the world.
Further, it is the Law of the Sea Convention that first established the
concept of a maritime Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical
miles, and recognized the rights of coastal states to conserve and
manage the natural resources in this Zone.35
We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the
Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea.
We thus expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art.
31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely
affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our
long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting
the country's efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk
from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship
while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a
Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to
comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the
global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided
in Article 197, viz:
Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a
regional basis, directly or through competent international
organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules,
standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with
this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is
beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of
warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating
the.latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the
territorial '::;ea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the
Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their
warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in
the VFA. Likewise, they invoke federal statutes in the US under which
agencies of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to any action.
Even under the common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the
US respondents are liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States
troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote "common
security interests" between the US and the Philippines in the region. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel,
and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel
and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and
supplies.36 The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law
is thus improper considering that it is the VF A which governs disputes
involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in
pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs
petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian
from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the fact that the US and
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the
issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate
civil, criminal or administrative actions.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or
non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VF A to US
personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS
Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for
a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to
determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In
the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the
violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of
damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No.
10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal
action charging the same violation of an environmental law.37
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a
petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or
denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from
committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in
violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental
destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment
agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance
with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports on
the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment,
except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this
petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage operation
sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished
when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as the
directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral
reef stn icture and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding
Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and
discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused by the USS
Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely coordinating
with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage
and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not
proscribed by the Rules. As can be gleaned from the following
provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration
of the parties, and which dispute resolution methods are encouraged by
the court, to wit:
RULE3
xxxx
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference,
the court shall inquire from the parties if they have settled the dispute;
otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties or their counsel,
if authorized by their clients, to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC)
unit for purposes of mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the
case to the clerk of court or legal researcher for mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty
(30) days from receipt of notice of referral to mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the
expiration of the 30-day period.
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule
the continuance of the pre-trial. Before the scheduled date of
continuance, the court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court
for a preliminary conference for the following purposes:
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the
parties and their counsels under oath, and they shall remain under oath
in all pre-trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a
settlement of the dispute. The judge may issue a consent decree
approving the agreement between the parties in accordance with law,
morals, public order and public policy to protect the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties
to agree to compromise or settle in accordance with law at any stage of
the proceedings before rendition of judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a
guided-missile cruiser, the USS Port Royal, ran aground about half a mile
off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four days.
After spending $6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the US government
was reported to have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement
over coral reef damage caused by the grounding.38
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate
compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian grounding,
the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the formation of a US
interdisciplinary scientific team which will "initiate discussions with the
Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation
options in Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-based marine
scientists." The US team intends to "help assess damage and
remediation options, in coordination with the Tubbataha Management
Office, appropriate Philippine government entities, non-governmental
organizations, and scientific experts from Philippine universities."39
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of
the violator is also a major relief that may be obtained under a judgment
rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to
the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection,
preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of
attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also
require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration
of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or
to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the
control of the court.1âwphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on
the matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures through
diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our
relations with another State in the context of common security interests
under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of
our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative-"the political" --departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is
not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in
the petition to order a review of the VFA and to nullify certain immunity
provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec.
Zamora,41 the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and
has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States
government. The VF A being a valid and binding agreement, the parties
are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and
provisions.42 The present petition under the Rules is not the proper
remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the
petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is
hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait vs. simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental
Reyes 756 SCRA 513 , April 21, 2015 cases. Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any
G.R. No. 180771. April 21, 2015.* Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON environmental laws.
STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER
CETACEAN SPECIES, joined in and represented herein by Human Beings
Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, in their capacity as
Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards of
God’s Creations, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his
capacity as Secretary
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait vs.
Reyes
of the Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-
Region VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected
Seascape Management Board, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director
for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO.,
LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD
SERVICES, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 181527. April 21, 2015.*
CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), CERILO D.
ENGARCIAL, RAMON YANONG, FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal
capacity and as representatives of the SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN, CEBU, AND
THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF
FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE SIMILARLY AFFECTED, petitioners, vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Energy (DOE), JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO
R. SIBBALUCA, in his capacity as DENR Regional Director-Region VII and as
Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board,
ALAN ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as Director, Environmental
Management Bureau-Region VII, DOE Regional Director for Region VIII1
ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX),
as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC.,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Locus Standi; Citizen Suits; Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases; The Court passed the landmark
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a “citizen
suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violations of our environmental laws.—It had been suggested by animal
rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and juridical
persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for
persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-
interests, to bring actions in representation of these animals or inanimate
objects. For this reason, many environmental cases have been dismissed
for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly injured
or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus
standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized
approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and
jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas’s paradigm of
legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Environmental Cases; Even before the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the
Supreme Court (SC) had already taken a permissive position on the issue
of locus standi in environmental cases.—Even before the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had
already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993), we
allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn
“based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.” Furthermore, we
said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does
not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. In light of the foregoing, the
need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of
nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth
noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and
not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards,
Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may
be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident
Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to
file this petition.
Same; Same; Same; Unwilling Co-petitioners; Impleading the former
President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the
performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy
against embroiling the President in suits, “to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office holders time, also demands
undivided attention.”—Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff.—If the consent of any party who should be
joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and
the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint. Under the foregoing
rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff
cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant to the case.
This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which
can properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling
party’s name cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her
knowledge and consent, as such would be a denial of due process.
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including
former President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to
implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former
President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the
performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy
against embroiling the President in suits, “to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office holder’s time, also demands
undivided attention.” Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo
cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name
is stricken off the title of this case.
Service Contracts; In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 445
SCRA 1 (2004), the Supreme Court (SC) held that the deletion of the words
“service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on
them per se.—This Court has previously settled the issue of whether
service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La
Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1 (2004), we held
that the deletion of the words “service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution
did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that decision, we
quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on
paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service
contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety
measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the
martial law regime.
Natural Resources; Oil Explorations; Oil Exploration and Development Act
of 1972; The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and
utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development
Act of 1972.—The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation,
and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed
by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act
of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to
promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through
the utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources to
yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the
Philippine Government. Contrary to the petitioners’ argument,
Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless
otherwise repealed.
Statutory Construction; In cases where the statute seems to be in conflict
with the Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the
Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred.—In
cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but
a construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible,
that construction should be preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v.
Commission on Elections, 319 SCRA 283 (1999), expounding on this point,
pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute
should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the
spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for
that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. x x
x. (Citation omitted) Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners’
contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the ground that there is no general
law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and
requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and
extraction.
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Oil Explorations; Natural Resources;
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that
the President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration
of petroleum.—Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
requires that the President himself enter into any service contract for the
exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and
signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr.,
contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public
respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was
subsequently notified of the execution of such contract. Public
respondents’ implied argument that based on the “alter ego principle,”
their acts are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo’s, cannot
apply in this case. In Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279 (1998), we explained
the concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political
agency and its limit in this wise: Under this doctrine, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Same; Balanced and Healthful Ecology; National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992; Natural Resources; True to the constitutional
policy that the “State shall protect and advance the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature,” Congress enacted the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act) to secure the perpetual existence of all
native plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive
system of integrated protected areas.—True to the constitutional policy
that the “State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature,” Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual
existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a
comprehensive system of integrated protected areas. These areas
possess common ecological values that were incorporated into a holistic
plan representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses
outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands
that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals,
biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial,
wetland, or marine. It classifies and administers all the designated
protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-
support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use
of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to
the greatest extent possible. The following categories of protected areas
were established under the NIPAS Act: a. Strict nature reserve; b. Natural
park; c. Natural monument; d. Wildlife sanctuary; e. Protected landscapes
and seascapes; f. Resource reserve; g. Natural biotic areas; and h. Other
categories established by law, conventions or international agreements
which the Philippine Government is a signatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 4 of the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), a protected area refers
to portions of land and water, set aside due to their unique physical and
biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and
protected against human exploitation.—Under Section 4 of the NIPAS
Act, a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due
to their unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance
biological diversity and protected against human exploitation. The Tañon
Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a
protected area under the category of Protected Seascape. The NIPAS Act
defines a Protected Seascape to be an area of national significance
characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land while
providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and
tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of this areas;
thus a management plan for each area must be designed to protect and
enhance the permanent preservation of its natural conditions. Consistent
with this endeavor is the requirement that an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any activity outside the
scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and
obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only
implemented. through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.
Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or
Same; Same; Same; Same; Environmentally Critical Area; Environmental extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and
Impact Statement System; The Environmental Impact Statement System utilization may be done in said protected seascape. Resident Marine
(EISS) prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from undertaking Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait vs. Reyes, 756 SCRA
or operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas 513, G.R. No. 181527 April 21, 2015
without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.—The
Republic of the Philippines
Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978
SUPREME COURT
under Presidential Decree No. 1586. It prohibits any person, partnership Baguio City
or corporation from undertaking or operating any declared
environmentally critical project or areas without first securing an ECC
EN BANC
issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. Pursuant to
the EISS, which called for the proper management of environmentally
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015
critical areas, Proclamation No. 2146 was enacted, identifying the areas
and types of projects to be considered as environmentally critical and
within the scope of the EISS, while DENR Administrative Order No. 2003- RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON
STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER
30 provided for its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
CETACEAN SPECIES, Joined in and Represented herein by Human
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Department of Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. Capacity as Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as
2003-30 defines an environmentally critical area as “an area delineated Responsible Stewards of God's Creations, Petitioners,
vs.
as environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental impacts
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
are expected if certain types of proposed projects or programs are
Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his
located, developed, or implemented in it”; thus, before a project, which capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
is “any activity, regardless of scale or magnitude, which may have Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-
significant impact on the environment,” is undertaken in it, such project Region VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait
must undergo an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to evaluate and Protected Seascape Management Board, Bureau of Fisheries and
predict the likely impacts of all its stages on the environment.—DENR Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR.,
Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally critical area BFAR Regional Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN
as “an area delineated as environmentally sensitive such that significant PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its
environmental impacts are expected if certain types of proposed projects Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. Respondents.
or programs are located, developed, or implemented in it”; thus, before
a project, which is “any activity, regardless of scale or magnitude, which x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
may have significant impact on the environment,” is undertaken in it, such
project must undergo an EIA to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of G.R. No. 181527
all its stages on the environment. An EIA is described in detail as follows:
h. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) — process that involves CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), CERILO
evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of a project (including D. ENGARCIAL, RAMON YANONG, FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal
cumulative impacts) on the environment during construction, capacity and as representatives of the SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF
commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes designing THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN, CEBU,
appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS
addressing these consequences to protect the environment and the OF FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE SIMILARLY AFFECTED, Petitioners,
community’s welfare. The process is undertaken by, among others, the vs.
project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee, SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Energy (DOE), JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as
affected communities and other stakeholders.
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Same; Same; Same; Natural Resources; Service Contracts; Oil (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in his capacity as DENR Regional
Explorations; While Presidential Decree (PD) No. 87 may serve as the Director-Region VII and as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected
Seascape Management Board, ALAN ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as
general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and
Director - Environmental Management Bureau-Region VII, DOE
extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this
Regional Director for Region VIII1 ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its
passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a National Integrated Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
Protected Areas System (NIPAS) area.—SC-46 was not executed for the
mere purpose of gathering information on the possible energy resources
CONCURRING OPINION
in the Tañon Strait as it also provides for the parties’ rights and obligations
relating to extraction and petroleum production should oil in commercial
"Until one has loved an animal,
quantities be found to exist in the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87
a part of one 's soul remains unawakened."
may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
 Anatole France environmental rights. When standing becomes too liberal, this can be
the occasion for abuse.
LEONEN, J.:
II
I concur in the result, with the following additional reasons.
Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:
I
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural
In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
bring their case in their personal capacity, alleging that they stand to action.
benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human
petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or
guardians of the lesser life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's entities that may be authorized by statute to be parties in a civil action.
Creations."1 They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.2 as basis for their claim,
asserting their right to enforce international and domestic Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code:
environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of
stipulation pour autrui.3 As the representatives of Resident Marine
ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of
Mammals, the human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to
legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only
build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait as well as
through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
to protect the environment, especially in light of the government's
effect, is acquired and may be lost.
failure, as primary steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public
trust.4
Article 40 further defines natural persons in the following manner:
Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that
through this case, this court will have the opportunity to lower the ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall
threshold for locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction."5 be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it
be born later with the conditions specified 'in the following article.
The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the
environment and to continue to define environmental rights in the Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept of a juridical
context of actual cases is commendable. However, the space for legal person:
creativity usually required for advocacy of issues of the public interest is
not so unlimited that it should be allowed to undermine the other ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:
values protected by current substantive and procedural laws. Even rules
of procedure as currently formulated set the balance between (1) The State and its political subdivisions;
competing interests. We cannot abandon these rules when the necessity
is not clearly and convincingly presented.
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as
The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create soon as they have been constituted according to law;
substantive and procedural rights for animals through their allegation
that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are asked to accept the
premises that (a) they were chosen by the Resident Marine Mammals of (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private
Tañon Strait; (b) they were chosen by a representative group of all the interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
species of the Resident Marine Mammals; (c) they were able to personality, separate and distinct from that of each
communicate with them; and (d) they received clear consent from their shareholder, partner or member.
animal principals that they would wish to use human legal institutions to
pursue their interests. Alternatively, they ask us to acknowledge through Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather
judicial notice that the interests that they, the human petitioners, assert than simply construe, the provisions of the Rules of Court as well as
are identical to what the Resident Marine Mammals would assert had substantive law to accommodate Resident Marine Mammals or animals.
they been humans and the legal strategies that they invoked are the This we cannot do.
strategies that they agree with.
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines real
In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that party in interest:
there is a relationship of guardianship between them and all the
resident mammals in the affected ecology. SEC. 2. Parties in interest.-A real party in interest is the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
Fundamental judicial doctrines that may significantly change substantive entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
and procedural law cannot be founded on feigned representation. these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest. (2a)6
Instead, I agree that the human petitioners should only speak for
themselves and already have legal standing to sue with respect to the A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment
issue raised in their pleading. The rules on standing have already been of a case is a real party in interest.7 When a case is brought to the
liberalized to take into consideration the difficulties in the assertion of courts, the real party in interest must show that another party's act or
omission has caused a direct injury, making his or her interest both
material and based on an enforceable legal right.8
Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in
representation of the real party in interest, as defined in Rule 3, Section
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a
fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A
representative may be a trustee of an express rust, a guardian, an
executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules.
An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed
principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when
the contract involves things belonging to the principal.(3a)9
The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines .a representative as a party who
is not bound to directly or actually benefit or suffer from the judgment,
but instead brings a case in favor of an identified real party in interest.10
The representative is an outsider to the cause of action. Second, the rule
provides a list of who may be considered as "representatives." It is not
an exhaustive list, but the rule limits the coverage only to those
authorized by law or the Rules of Court.11
These requirements should apply even in cases involving the
environment, which means that for the Petition of the human
petitioners to prosper, they must show that (a) the Resident Marine
Mammals are real parties in interest; and (b) that the human petitioners
are authorized by law or the Rules to act in a representative capacity.
The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales,
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species inhabiting Tañon
Strait."12 While relatively new in Philippine jurisdiction, the issue of
whether animals have legal standing before courts has been the subject
of academic discourse in light of the emergence of animal and
environmental rights.
In the United States, anim4l rights advocates have managed to establish
a system which Hogan explains as the "guardianship model for
nonhuman animals":13
Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by which
nonhuman animals may obtain judicial review to enforce their statutory provisions are evidence of legislative intent to encourage civic
rights and protections: guardianships. With court approval, animal
advocacy organizations may bring suit on behalf of nonhuman animals in should reflect this intent and its implication that humans are suitable
the same way court-appointed guardians bring suit on behalf of
mentally-challenged humans who possess an enforceable right but lack animals.14 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
the ability to enforce it themselves.
In the controversial but pivotal Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward
Legal Rights for Natural Objects, Christopher D. Stone asserts that the
environment should possess the right to seek judicial redress even
though it is incapable of representing itself. While asserting the rights of very nature are incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g., corporations,
speechless entities such as the environment or nonhuman animals
certainly poses legitimate challenges - such as identifying the proper
spokesman -the American legal system is already well-equipped with a
reliable mechanism by which nonhumans may obtain standing via a
judicially established guardianship. Stone notes that other speechless -
and nonhuman - entities such as corporations, states, estates, and
municipalities have standing to bring suit on their own behalf. There is
little reason to fear abuses under this regime as procedures for removal
and substitution, avoiding conflicts of interest, and termination of a
guardianship are well established.
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement
is indeed possible. The court indicated that AL VA might have obtained
standing in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to
the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund
for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known
advocacy organization might have had standing as well. The court
further concluded that an organization's standing is more than a
derivative of its history, but history is a relevant consideration where
organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.
ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous
activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to
the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The court's
analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated
commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the
speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.
This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to
empower non-profit organizations with an established history of
dedication to the cause and relevant expertise to serve as official
guardians ad !item on behalf of nonhuman animals interests. The
American legal system has numerous mechanisms for representing the
rights and interests of nonhumans; any challenges inherent in extending
these pre-existing mechanisms to nonhuman animals are minimal
compared to an interest in the proper administration of justice. To
adequately protect the statutory rights of nonhuman animals, the legal
system must recognize those statutory rights independent of humans
and provide a viable means of enforcement. Moreover, the idea of a
guardianship for speechless plaintiffs is not new and has been urged on
behalf of the natural environment. 'Such a model is even more
compelling as applied to nonhuman animals, because they are sentient
beings with the ability to feel pain and exercise rational thought. Thus,
animals are qualitatively different from other legally protected
nonhumans and therefore have interests deserving direct legal
protection.
Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of
nonhuman animals threatens the integrity of the federal statutes
designed to protect them, essentially rendering them meaningless.
Sensing that laws protecting nonhuman animals would be difficult to
enforce, Congress provided for citizen suit provisions: the most well-
known example is found in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Such
participation on behalf of nonhuman animals. Our law of standing
representatives of the natural environment, which includes nonhuman
When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals
are considered as similarly situated as individuals who have enforceable
rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive disability), are unable
to bring suit for themselves. They are also similar to entities that by their
states, and others).
In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and
the Rules of Court as having standing to sue and, therefore, may be
properly represented as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said
about animals.
Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the
environment. While we, as humans, may feel the need to nurture and
protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent their best
interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the courts. As
humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the
suffering of animals and that we know what remedy they need in the
face of an injury.
Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a case before the
United States District Court for the Central District of California, Animal
Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger,15 the court held that an
emotional response to what humans perceive to be an injury inflicted on
an animal is not within the "zone-of-interest" protected by law.16 Such
sympathy cannot stand independent of or as a substitute for an actual
injury suffered by the claimant.17 The ability to represent animals was
further limited in that case by the need to prove "genuine dedication" to
asserting and protecting animal rights:
What ultimately proved fatal to ALVA 's claim, however, was the court's
assertion that standing doctrine further required ALVA to differentiate
its genuine dedication to the humane treatment of animals from the
general disdain for animal cruelty shared by the public at large. In doing
so, the court found ALVA 's asserted organizational injury to be abstract
and thus relegated ALVA to the ranks of the "concerned bystander. "
....
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement
is indeed possible. The court indicated that ALVA might have obtained
standing in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to
the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund
for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known
advocacy organization might have had standing as well. The court
further concluded that an organization's standing is more than a
derivative of its history, but history is a relevant consideration where
organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.
ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous
activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to
the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The court's
analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated
commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the
speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.18 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)
What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of guardianship is
the principle of human stewardship over the environment in a citizen
suit under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. A citizen suit
allows any Filipino to act as a representative of a party who has
enforceable rights under environmental laws before Philippine courts,
and is defined in Section 5: .
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to
enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing
of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all
interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case
within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish
the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines
or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case
to implead and feign representation on behalf of animals. To have done
so betrays a very anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy.
There is no way that we, humans, can claim to speak for animals let
alone present that they would wish to use our court system, which is
designed to ensure that humans seriously carry their responsibility
including ensuring a viable ecology for themselves, which of course
includes compassion for all living things.
Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be further relaxed.
In Arigo v. Swift,19 I posed the possibility of further reviewing the broad
interpretation we have given to the rule on standing. While
representatives are not required to establish direct injury on their part,
they should only be allowed to represent after complying with the
following: [I]t is imperative for them to indicate with certainty the
injured parties on whose behalf they bring the suit. Furthermore, the
interest of those they represent must be based upon concrete legal
rights. It is not sufficient to draw out a perceived interest from a general,
nebulous idea of a potential "injury."20
I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v. Casiño21 regarding
this rule alongside the appreciation of legal standing in Oposa v.
Factoran22 for environmental cases. In Arigo, I opined that procedural
liberality, especially in cases brought by representatives, should be used
with great caution:
Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.
That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call
attention to environmental concerns in light of emerging international
legal principles. While "intergenerational responsibility" is a noble
principle, it should not be used to obtain judgments that would preclude
future generations from making their own assessment based on their
actual concerns. The present generation must restrain itself from
assuming that it can speak best for those who will exist at a different
time, under a different set of circumstances. In essence, the unbridled
resort to representative suit will inevitably result in preventing future
generations from protecting their own rights and pursuing their own
interests and decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our children and our
children 's children. Even before they are born, we again restricted their
ability to make their own arguments.
It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in
environmental cases should be allowed only when a) there is a clear
legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based
squarely upon an existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of any
countervailing interests existing within the population represented or
those that are yet to be born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for
such standing because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent that
an immediate protective measure is necessary. Better still, in the light of
its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together.23 (Emphasis
in the original)
Similarly, in Paje:
A person cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction if he or she has no right
or interest to protect. He or she who invokes the court's jurisdiction
must be the "owner of the right sought to be enforced." In other words,
he or she must have a cause of action. An action may be dismissed on
the ground of lack of cause of action if the person who instituted it is not
the real party in interest.24 The term "interest" under the Rules of Court
must refer to a material interest that is not merely a curiosity about or
an "interest in the question involved." The interest must be present and
substantial. It is not a mere expectancy or a future, contingent interest.
A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he
or she is suing as representative of a .real party in interest. When an
action is prosecuted or defended by a representative, that
representative is not and does not become the real party in interest. The
person represented is deemed the real party in interest. The
representative remains to be a third party to the action instituted on
behalf of another.
....
To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit is
brought on behalf of an identified party whose right has been violated,
resulting in some form of damage, and (b) the representative authorized Pinamungahan, Cebu, and their families, and the present and future
by law or the Rules of Court to represent the victim."
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a
citizen's suit. A citizen's suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to
file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on behalf of
minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit
that allows persons who are not real parties in interest to institute
actions on behalf of the real party in interest.
The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include
minors and generations yet unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling
in Oposa v. Factoran. This court recognized the capacity of minors
(represented by their parents) to file a class suit on behalf of succeeding
generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to
ensure the future generation's access to and enjoyment of [the]
country's natural resources.
To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others,
including future generations, is dangerous for three reasons:
First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are
unable to take part in the suit, putting into. question its
representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in
arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions of
which do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class or
citizen's suit on behalf of minors and generations yet unborn may result
in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in
light of the impossibility of determining future generation's true
interests on the matter.
In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file
suits for others. Uninterested persons will argue for the persons they
represent, and the court will decide based on their evidence and
arguments. Any decision by the court will be binding upon the
beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors and the future
generations. The court's decision will be res judicata upon them and
conclusive upon the issues presented.25
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of
environmental claims lies in its potential to diminish the value of
legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real party
in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general,
through a judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing
petitions based on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a
right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are.
At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there
be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this
court cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives have the
responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational,
scientific, well-founded arguments"26 on behalf of those they represent.
Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome.
However, they should be considered carefully so that no unintended or
unwarranted consequences should follow. I concur with the approach of
Madame Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant ponencia
as it carefully narrows down the doctrine in terms of standing. Resident
Marine Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal standing to
file any kind of petition.
However, I agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central
Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center,. Engarcial, Yanong, and Labid,
have standing both as real parties in interest and as representatives of
subsistence fisherfolks of the Municipalities of Aloguinsan and
generations of Filipinos whose rights are similarly affected. The activities
undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-46) directly affected their
source of livelihood, primarily felt through the significant reduction of
their fish harvest.27 The actual, direct, and material damage they
suffered, which has potential long-term effects transcending
generations, is a proper subject of a legal suit.
III
In our jurisdiction, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the
concept of implied petitioners, most especially when the implied
petitioner was a sitting President of the Republic of the Philippines. In
G.R. No. 180771, apart from adjudicating unto themselves the status of
"legal guardians" of whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, human petitioners also impleaded Former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as "unwilling co-petitioner" for "her express
declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Tañon
Strait."28
No person may implead any other person as a co-plaintiff or co-
petitioner without his or her consent. In our jurisdiction, only when
there is a party that should have been a necessary party but was
unwilling to join would there be an allegation as to why that party has
been omitted. In Rule 3, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. -Whenever in
any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined,
the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is
omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission
unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party
if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable
cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from
proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be
without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.29
A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose
consent cannot be obtained should be impleaded as a defendant in the
nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule 3, Section 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should
be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant
and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.30
The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who
should be part of the action but who do not consent should be put
within the jurisdiction of the court through summons or other court
processes. Petitioners. should not take it upon themselves to simply imp
lead any party who does not consent as a petitioner. This places the
unwilling co-petitioner at the risk of being denied due process.
Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to and lagoons.
this suit. As a co-equal constitutional department, we cannot assume
that the President needs to enforce policy directions by suing his or her The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
alter-egos. The procedural situation caused by petitioners may have
gained public attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the
contemptuous. The Former President's name should be stricken out of
the title of this case.
IV
I also concur with the conclusion that SC-46 is both. illegal and
unconstitutional.
SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No. ·7586 or the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, and Presidential Decree
No. 1234,31 which declared Tañon Strait as a protected seascape. It is
unconstitutional because it violates the fourth paragraph of Article XII,
Section 2 of the Constitution.
V agreements." This is also
Petitioner Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center asserts that
SC-46 violated Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 1 of the .1987
Constitution because Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) is
100% Japanese-owned.32 It further asserts that SC-46 cannot be validly
classified as a technical and financial assistance agreement executed
under Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 4 of the 1987 Constitution.33
Public respondents counter that SC-46 does not fall under the coverage
of paragraph 1, but is a validly executed contract under paragraph 4.34·
Public respondents further aver that SC-46 neither granted exclusive
fishing rights to JAPEX nor violated Central Visayas Fisherfolk
Development Center's right to preferential use of communal marine and
fishing resources.35
VI
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception. of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake
such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such
terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights
for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays,
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth
and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
(Emphasis supplied)
I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may participate in the
exploration, development, and use of natural resources, but only
through either financial agreements or technical ones. This is the clear
import of the words "either financial or technical assistance
the clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the
versions in the 1973 and 1935 Constitution:
1973 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIV
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, of exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources of the Philippines shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or association at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.
The Batasang Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such
citizens, corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for
financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any
foreign person or entity for the exploitation, development, exploitation,
or utilization of any of the natural resources. Existing valid and binding
service contracts for financial, the technical, management, or other
forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such. (Emphasis supplied)
1935 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIII
CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral. lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history prevails over any
attempt to infer interpretation from the Constitutional Commission
deliberations. The constitutional texts are the product of a full sovereign
act: deliberations in a constituent assembly and ratification. Reliance on
recorded discussion of Constitutional Commissions, on the other hand,
may result in dependence on incomplete authorship; Besides, it opens
judicial review to further subjectivity from those who spoke during the
Constitutional Commission deliberations who may not have predicted
how their words will be used. It is safer that we use the words already in
the Constitution. The Constitution was their product. Its words were
read by those who ratified it. The Constitution is what society relies
upon even at present.
SC-46 is neither a financial assistance nor a technical assistance
agreement.
Even supposing for the sake of argument that it is, it could not be
declared valid in light of the standards set forth in La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos:36
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject
to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted m accordance with a
general law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such
and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas.
provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government
because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to the
President for signature, it will have been vetted several times
over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and
can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the
President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and
interpose timely objections, if any.37 (Emphasis in the original,
citation omitted)
Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal, SC-46' S validity must
be tested against three important points: (a) whether SC-46 was crafted
in accordance with a general law that provides standards, terms, and
conditions; (b) whether SC-46 was signed by the President for and on
behalf of the government; and (c) whether it was reported by the
President to Congress within 30 days of execution.
VII
The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46's validity is
Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act
of 1972.1âwphi1 It is my opinion that this law is unconstitutional in that
it allows service contracts, contrary to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth
and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources. (Emphasis supplied)
The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of
agreements the President may enter into with foreign-owned
corporations for exploration and utilization of resources means that
service contracts are no longer allowed by the Constitution. Pursuant to
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution,38 this inconsistency
renders the law invalid and ineffective.
SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The
Main Opinion emphasizes an important point, which is that SC-46 did
not merely involve exploratory activities, but also provided the rights
and obligations of the parties should it be discovered that there is oil in
commercial quantities in the area. The Tañon Strait being a protected
seascape under Presidential Decree No. 123439 requires that the
exploitation and utilization of energy resources from that area are
explicitly covered by a law passed by Congress specifically for that
purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy R6'sources. - Consistent with the policies
declared in Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except strict nature
reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the
Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program approved
by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available to
the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to
Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found
within NIP AS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress.40 (Emphasis supplied)
No law was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards,
terms, and conditions of an oil exploration, extraction, and/or utilization
for Tañon Strait and, therefore, no such activities could have been
validly undertaken under SC-46. The National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992 is clear that exploitation and utilization of
energy resources in a protected seascape such as Tañon Strait shall only
be allowed through a specific law.
VIII
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the signatory to SC-
46, contrary to the requirement set by paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section
2 for service contracts involving the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 was
entered into by then Department of Energy Secretary Vicente S. Perez,
Jr., on behalf of the government. I agree with the Main Opinion that in
cases where the Constitution or law requires the President to act
personally on the matter, the duty cannot be delegated to another
public official.41 La Bugal highlights the importance of the President's
involvement, being one of the constitutional safeguards against abuse
and corruption, as not mere formality:
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features,
reading of the ConCom deliberations, as follows: possess common ecological values that may be incorporated into a
holistic plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective
• In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, administration of these areas is possible only through cooperation
the framers used the term service contracts in referring to among national government, local and concerned private organizations;
agreements x x x involving either technical or financial that the use and enjoyment of these protected areas must be consistent
assistance. • They spoke of service contracts as the concept with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable development.
was understood in the 1973 Constitution.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected
• It was obvious from their discussions that they were not Areas System (NIPAS), which shall encompass outstanding remarkable
about to ban or eradicate service contracts. areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare
and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and
related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which
• Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to. put in place
shall be designated as "protected areas."44 (Emphasis supplied)
safeguards that would eliminate or m minimize the abuses
prevalent during the marital law regime.42 (Emphasis in the
original) Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Tañon Strait must undergo
an Environmental Impact Assessment:
Public respondents failed to show that. Former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was involved in the signing or execution of SC-46. The SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities
failure to comply with this constitutional requirement renders SC-46 null which are outside the scope of the management plan for protected
and void. areas shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as
required by law before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall
be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.45 (Emphasis
IX
supplied)

Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was subsequently

The same provision further requires that an Environmental Compliance
informed of the execution and existence of SC-46. The reporting
Certificate be secured under the Philippine Environmental Impact
requirement is an equally important requisite to the validity of any
Assessment System before arty project is implemented:
service contract involving the exploration, development, and utilization
of Philippine petroleum. Public respondents' failure to report to
Congress about SC-46 effectively took away any opportunity for the No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the
legislative branch to scrutinize its terms and conditions. required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the
Philippine Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances
where such activities are allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall
In sum, SC-46 was executed and implemented absent all the
plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse
requirements provided under paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2. It is,
effects and take preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The
therefore, null and void.
proponent shall be liable for any damage due to lack of caution or
indiscretion.46 (Emphasis supplied)
X
In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources,
I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 additionally
1987 Constitution, is also null and void for being violative of requires that a program be approved by the Department of Environment
environmental laws protecting Tañon Strait. In particular, SC-46 was and Natural Resources, which shall be publicly accessible. The program
implemented despite falling short of the requirements of the National shall also be submitted to the President, who in turn will recommend
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992. the program to Congress. Furthermore, Congress must enact a law
specifically allowing the exploitation of energy resources found within a
As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234,43 Tañon protected area such as Tañon Strait:
Strait is covered by the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act
of 1992. This law declares as a matter of policy: SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies
declared in Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except strict nature
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. Cognizant of the profound impact of man's reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the
activities on all components of the natural environment particularly the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such
effect of increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas.
advancement and recognizing the critical importance of protecting and Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program approved
maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available to
environment notably on areas with biologically unique features to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to
sustain human life and development, as well as plant and animal life, it is Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found
hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for the Filipino people within NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through a taw passed by
of present and future generations the perpetual existence of all native Congress.47 (Emphasis supplied)
plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive
system of integrated protected areas within the classification of national Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the procedural
park as provided for in the Constitution. requirements of obtaining an Environmental Compliance Certificate.48
At any rate, they assert that the activities covered by SC-46 fell under
Section 14 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of
1992, which they interpret to be an exception to Section 12. They argue
that the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not a strict
requirement for the validity of SC-46 since (a) the Tañon Strait is not a
nature' reserve or natural park; (b) the exploration was merely for
gathering information; and ( c) measures were in place to ensure that
the exploration caused the least possible damage to the area.49

Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but instead provides

additional requirements for cases involving Philippine energy resources.
The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 was
enacted to recognize the importance of protecting the environment in
light of resource exploitation, among others.50 Systems are put in place
to secure for Filipinos local resources under the most favorable
conditions. With the status of Tañon Strait as a protected seascape, the
institution of additional legal safeguards is even more significant.

Public respondents did not validly obtain an Environmental Compliance

Certificate for SC-46. Based on the records, JAPEX commissioned an
environmental impact evaluation only in the second subphase of its
project, with the Environmental Management .Bureau of Region

VII granting the project an Environmental Compliance Certificate on

March 6, 2007.51

Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May 9 to 18, 2005 were
conducted without any environmental assessment contrary to Section
12 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.

XI

Finally, we honor every living creature when we take care of our

environment. As sentient species, we do not lack in the wisdom or
sensitivity to realize that we only borrow the resources that we use to
survive and to thrive. We are not incapable of mitigating the greed that
is slowly causing the demise of our planet. Thus, there is no need for us
to feign representation of any other species or some imagined unborn
generation in filing any action in our courts of law to claim any of our
fundamental rights to a healthful ecology. In this way and with candor
and courage, we fully shoulder the responsibility deserving of the grace
and power endowed on our species.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote:

(a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing and STRIKE
OUT the name of Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
from the title of this case;

(b) to GRANT G.R. No. 181527; and

(c) to DECLARE SERVICE CONTRACT 46 NULL AND VOID for

violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and
Presidential Decree No. 1234.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 194239. June 16, 2015.*
WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, on behalf of the Residents
of West Tower Condominium and in representation of Barangay Bangkal,
and others, including minors and generations yet unborn, petitioners, vs.
FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, FIRST GEN CORPORATION
and their RESPECTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS, JOHN DOES,
and RICHARD DOES, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Real Party-in-Interest; Words and
Phrases; As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.—As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Generally, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest. In
other words, the action must be brought by the person who, by
substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced. Alternatively,
one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest. In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil
leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium unit owners and
residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the
wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium’s
electrical power was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and residents
of West Tower could still not return to their condominium units. Thus,
there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-
in-interest. There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp.
represents the common interest of its unit owners and residents, and has
the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a
condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise
known as The Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions in
behalf of its members. In the instant case, the condominium corporation
is the management body of West Tower and deals with everything that
may affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or users.
Constitutional Law; Writ of Kalikasan; The filing of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be
directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows
juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation.—Anent the propriety of including the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang
Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior
Chambers International Philippines, Inc.-San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of
Makati Ayala Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium
Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their
intervention in the present controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013
Resolution. This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be
directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows
juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation. Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled
to be furnished copies of all the submissions to the Court, including the
periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests
conducted on the WOPL.
Department of Energy; Jurisdiction; The Department of Energy (DOE) is
empowered by Sec. 12(b)(1), Republic Act (RA) No. 7638 to formulate and
implement policies for the efficient and economical “distribution,
transportation, and storage of petroleum, coal, natural gas.”—The DOE is
specially equipped to consider FPIC’s proper implementation and
compliance with its PIMS and to evaluate the result of the various tests
conducted on the pipeline. The DOE is empowered by Sec. 12(b)(1), RA
7638 to formulate and implement policies for the efficient and
economical “distribution, transportation, and storage of petroleum, coal,
natural gas.” Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the DOE possesses technical
knowledge and special expertise with respect to practices in the
transportation of oil through pipelines.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; In a host of cases, this Court held that
when the adjudication of a controversy requires the resolution of issues
within the expertise of an administrative body, such issues must be
investigated and resolved by the administrative body equipped with the
specialized knowledge and the technical expertise.—It is notable that the
DOE did not only limit itself to the knowledge and proficiency available
within its offices, it has also rallied around the assistance of pertinent
bureaus of the other administrative agencies: the ITDI of the DOST, which
is mandated to undertake technical services including standards,
analytical and calibration services; the MIRDC, also of the DOST, which is
the sole government entity directly supporting the metals and
engineering industry; the EMB of the DENR, the agency mandated to
implement, among others, RA 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and
Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990) and RA 9275 (Philippine Clean Water
Act of 2004); and the BOD of the DPWH, which is mandated to conduct,
supervise, and review the technical design aspects of projects of
government agencies. The specialized knowledge and expertise of the
foregoing agencies must, therefore, be availed of to arrive at a judicious
decision on the propriety of allowing the immediate resumption of the
WOPL’s operation. In a host of cases, this Court held that when the
adjudication of a controversy requires the resolution of issues within the
expertise of an administrative body, such issues must be investigated and
resolved by the administrative body equipped with the specialized
knowledge and the technical expertise. Hence, the courts, although they
may have jurisdiction and power to decide cases, can utilize the findings
and recommendations of the administrative agency on questions that
demand “the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.”
Same; Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases; Precautionary
Principle; Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary Principle,
provides that “[w]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental
effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the
case before it.”—Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary Principle,
provides that “[w]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental
effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the
case before it.” According to the dissent, the directive for the repetition
of the tests is based on speculations, justified by the application of said
principle. This, however, is not the case. Nowhere did We apply the
precautionary principle in deciding the issue on the WOPL’s structural
integrity. The precautionary principle only applies when the link between
the cause, that is the human activity sought to be inhibited, and the
effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established with
full scientific certainty. Here, however, such absence of a link is not an
issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in the
WOPL, which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from determining
whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the surroundings will
cause environmental damage or will harm human health or that of other
organisms. As a matter of fact, the petroleum leak and the harm that it
caused to the environment and to the residents of the affected areas is
not even questioned by FPIC.
Same; Any delay in the reopening of the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL)
System, if said delay is for the purpose of making sure that the pipeline is
commercially viable, is better than hastily allowing its reopening without
an extensive check on its structural integrity when experience shows that
there were and may still be flaws in the pipeline.—Any delay in the
reopening of the WOPL, if said delay is for the purpose of making sure
that the pipeline is commercially viable, is better than hastily allowing its
reopening without an extensive check on its structural integrity when
experience shows that there were and may still be flaws in the pipeline.
Even the DOE, the agency tasked to oversee the supply and distribution
of petroleum in the country, is well aware of this and even recommended
the checking of the patched portions of the pipeline, among others. In this
regard, the Court deems it best to take the necessary safeguards, which
are not similar to applying the precautionary principle as previously
explained, in order to prevent a similar incident from happening in the
future. Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases; Special Trust Fund; A
reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily
reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future
contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust
fund under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to
rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably already
suffered.—A reading of the petition and the motion for partial
reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a trust
fund for similar future contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited
purpose of a special trust fund under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment
that has presumably already suffered. Hence, the Court affirms with
concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but
a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the considered view that the
creation of a special trust fund is misplaced. The present ruling on
petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in the instant
recourse, however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be
rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners arising from
the same incident if the payment of damages is found warranted.
Same; Damages; Writ of Kalikasan; In a petition for a writ of kalikasan, the
Supreme Court (SC) cannot grant the award of damages to individual
petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases.—On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and
their respective directors and officers, the CA found FGC not liable under
the TEPO and, without prejudice to the outcome of the civil case (Civil
Case No. 11-256, RTC, Branch 58 in Makati City) and criminal complaint
(Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Makati City) filed against them, the individual directors and
officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable in their individual capacities. The
Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual
directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit
rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition
for a writ of kalikasan, the Court cannot grant the award of damages to
individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the civil case and
criminal complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are the proper
proceedings to ventilate and determine the individual liability of
respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and the
management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the
dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in
Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. Hence, the Court will not rule on the
alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and FGC officials which can,
however, be properly resolved in the civil and criminal cases now pending
against them.
Department of Environment and Natural Resources; Jurisdiction;
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is the
government agency tasked to implement the state policy of “maintaining
a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of
the environment” and to “promulgate rules and regulations for the
control of water, air, and land pollution.”—The CA’s resolution on
petitioners’ September 9, 2011 Manifestation (Re: Current
Developments) with Omnibus Motion on the remediation plan in
Barangay Bangkal by directing the Inter-Agency Committee on
Environmental Health to submit its evaluation of the said plan prepared
by CH2M Philippines, Inc., for FPIC to strictly comply with the stipulations
embodied in the permits issued by the DENR, and to get a certification
from the DENR of its compliance thereto is well-taken. DENR is the
government agency tasked to implement the state policy of “maintaining
a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of
the environment” and to “promulgate rules and regulations for the
control of water, air, and land pollution.” It is indubitable that the DENR
has jurisdiction in overseeing and supervising the environmental
remediation of Barangay Bangkal, which is adversely affected by the leak
in the WOPL in 2010. West Tower Condominium Corporation vs. First
Philippine Industrial Corporation, 758 SCRA 292, G.R. No. 194239 June 16,
2015
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 194239 June 16, 2015
WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, on behalf of the
Residents of West Tower Condominium and in representation of
Barangay Bangkal, and others, including minors and generations yet
unborn, Petitioners,
vs.
FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, FIRST GEN
CORPORATION and their RESPECTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS, JOHN DOES, and RICHARD DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
Before the Court is the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan
filed following the leak in the oil pipeline owned by First Philippine
Industrial Corporation (FPIC) in Makati City. The Facts
Respondent FPI C operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: ( 1) the White
Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, which covers a 117-kilometer stretch from
Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports diesel,
gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene; and (b) the Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL)
System which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker fuel from
Batangas to a depot in Sucat, Parañaque. These systems transport nearly
60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and parts of the
provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.
The two pipelines were supposedly designed to provide more than
double the standard safety allowance against leakage, considering that
they are made out of heavy duty steel that can withstand more than
twice the current operating pressure and are buried at a minimum
depth of 1.5 meters, which is deeper than the US Department of
Transportation standard of 0.9 meters. In May 2010, however, a leakage
from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West
Tower Condominium (West Tower) started to smell gas within the
condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within the condominium
premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its Basement
2. Owing to its inability to control the flow, West Tower's management
reported the matter to the Police Department of Makati City, which in
turn called the city's Bureau of Fire Protection.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20
drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the condominium was
ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of
contaminated water into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal.
Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of West Tower to
abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo's power
was shut down.
Petitioner FPIC initially disowned any leak from its oil pipeline. Thus, the
residents of West Tower shouldered the expenses of hauling the waste
water from its basement, which eventually required the setting up of a
treatment plant in the area to separate fuel from the waste water. On
October 28, 2010, the University of the Philippines-National Institute of
Geological Sciences (UP-NIGS), which the City of Makati invited to
determine the source of the fuel, found a leak in FPIC's WOPL about 86
meters from West Tower.
A day after, or on October 29, 2010, FPIC admitted that indeed the
source of the fuel leak is the WOPL, which was already closed since
October 24, 2010, but denied liability by placing blame on the
construction activities on the roads surrounding West Tower.
On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West
Tower Corp.) interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in
representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal,
Makati City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil
society and several people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and public interest groups who have expressed their
intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the environmental
issues involved.1
In their petition, petitioners prayed that respondents FPIC and its board
of directors and officers, and First Gen Corporation (FGC) and its board
of directors and officers be directed to: (1) permanently cease and desist
from committing acts of negligence in the performance of their
functions as a common carrier; (2) continue to check the structural
integrity of the whole 117-kilometer pipeline and to replace the same;
(3) make periodic reports on their findings with regard to the 117-
kilometer pipeline and their replacement of the same; (4) rehabilitate
and restore the environment, especially Barangay Bangkal and West
Tower, at least to what it was before the signs of the leak became
manifest; and (5) to open a special trust fund to answer for similar and
future contingencies in the future. Furthermore, petitioners pray that
respondents be prohibited from opening the pipeline and allowing the
use thereof until the same has been thoroughly checked and replaced,
and be temporarily restrained from operating the pipeline until the final
resolution of the case.
To bolster their petition, petitioners argued that FPIC's omission or
failure to timely replace. its pipelines and to observe extraordinary
diligence caused the petroleum spill in the City of Makati. Thus, for
petitioners, the continued use of the now 4 7-year old pipeline would
not only be a hazard or a threat to the lives, health, and property of
those who live or sojourn in all the municipalities in which the pipeline is
laid, but would also affect the rights of the generations yet unborn to
live in a balanced and "healthful ecology," guaranteed under Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan2 with a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) requiring
respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members of their Boards of Directors to
file their respective verified returns. The TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to:
(a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further orders; (b)
check the structural integrity of the whole span of the 11 7-kilometer
WOPL while implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any
untoward incident that may result from any leak of the pipeline; and ( c)
make a report thereon within 60 days from receipt thereof.
In compliance with the writ, FPIC directors Edgar Chua, Dennis Javier,
Dennis Gamab and Willie Sarmiento submitted a Joint Return3 praying
for the dismissal of the petition and the denial of the privilege of the
Writ of Kalikasan. They alleged that: petitioners had no legal capacity to
institute the petition; there is no allegation that the environmental
damage affected the inhabitants of two (2) or more cities or provinces;
and the continued operation of the pipeline should be allowed in the
interest of maintaining adequate petroleum supply to the public.
Respondents FPIC and its directors and officers, other than the
aforementioned four ( 4) directors, also filed a Verified Return4 claiming
that not all requirements for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan are
present and there is no showing that West Tower Corp. was authorized
by all those it claimed to represent. They further averred that the
petition contains no allegation that respondents FPIC directors and
officers acted in such a manner as to allow the piercing of the corporate
veil.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 201-1, FGC and the members of its Board of
Directors and Officers filed a Joint Compliance5 submitting the report
required by the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO. They contended that they
neither own nor operate the pipelines, adding that it is impossible for
them to report on the structural integrity of the pipelines, much less to
cease and desist from operating them as they have no capability, power,
control or responsibility over the pipelines. They, thus, prayed that the
directives of the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO be considered as sufficiently
performed, as to them.
On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-
page "Report on Pipeline Integrity Check and Preventive Maintenance
Program."6 In gist, FPIC reported the following: (I) For the structural
integrity of the 117-kilometer pipeline, (a) the DOE engaged the services
of UP-NIGS to do borehole testing on 81 pre-identified critical areas of
the WQPL in eight cities and municipalities-all the boreholes showed
negative presence of petroleum vapors; (b) pressure tests were
conducted after the repair of the leak and results showed negative leaks
and the DOE's pipeline expert, Societe General de Surveillance, New
Zealand, has developed a pressure test protocol requiring a 24-hour
operation of running a scraper pig through the pipeline to eliminate air
gap; (c) In-Line Inspection Test, was conducted by NDT through MFL and
ultrasonic. The NDT later cleared the WOPL from any damage or
corrosion.
(II) For preventive maintenance measures, (a) Cathodic Protection
Systems are installed involving the use of anode materials and the
introduction of electric current in the pipeline to enhance prevention of
corrosion; (b) Regular Scraper Runs through the pipeline to maintain
cleanliness and integrity of the pipelines' internal surface; (c) Daily
Patrols every two hours of the pipeline route to deter unauthorized
diggings in the vicinity of the pipeline segments; ( d) Regular
coordination meetings with DPWH, MMDA and utility companies to
monitor projects that might involve digging or excavation in the vicinity
of the pipeline segments; (e) Installation of Security Warning Signs along
the pipeline route with toll free number which can be called in the event
of an accident or emergency; (f) Emergency Response Procedure of the
ERT is activated by a call-out procedure; (g) Maintenance of Emergency
Equipment and Repair Kit which are always on standby; and, (h)
Remotely controlled Isolation Valves are in place to shut the pipeline
when necessary.
On February 9, 2011, petitioners filed, and the Court eventually granted,
their Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference and Hearing7
pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases.
On April 15, 2011, the Court conducted an ocular inspection of the
WOPL in the vicinity of West Tower to determine the veracity of the
claim that there were two (2) additional leaks on FPIC's pipeline. Results
of the ocular inspection belied the claim.
In the meantime, petitioners also filed civil and criminal complaints
against respondents arising from the same incident or leakage from the
WOPL.8
Since after the Court's issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on
November 19, 2010, FPIC has ceased operations on both the WOPL and
the BOPL. On May 31, 2011, however, the Court, answering a query of
the DOE, clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the Writ of
Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL System of FPIC; thus, FPIC can
resume operation of its BOPL System.9
On July 7, 2011, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion10 assailing the
Court's May 31, 2011 Resolution, praying for the conduct of oral
argument on the issue of reopening the BOPL System. This was
followed, on September 9, 2011, by a Manifestation (Re: Current
Developments) with Omnibus Motion11 wherein petitioners invoked
the precautionary principle12 and asserted that the possibility of a leak
in the BOPL System leading to catastrophic environmental damage is
enough reason to order the closure of its operation. They likewise
alleged that the entities contracted by FPIC to clean and remediate the
environment are illegally discharging waste water, which had not
undergone proper treatment, into the Parañaque River. Petitioners,
thus, prayed that respondents be directed to comply with
environmental laws in rehabilitating the surroundings affected by the oil
leak and to submit a copy of their work plan and monthly reports on the
progress thereof. To these omnibus motions, respondents were directed
to file their respective comments.
On September 28, 2011, respondent FPIC filed an Urgent Motion for
Leave (To Undertake "Bangkal Realignment" Project)13 in order to
reduce stress on the WOPL System. FPIC sought to construct a new
realigned segment to replace the old pipe segment under the
Magallanes Interchange, which covers the portion that leaked.
Petitioners were directed to file their comment on FPIC's motion.
Report and Recommendation of the Court of Appeals
To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals (CA). By this Court's Resolution dated
November 22, 2011,14 the appellate court was required to conduct
hearings and, thereafter, submit a report and recommendation within
30 days after the receipt of the parties' memoranda.
On March 21, 2012, the preliminary conference was continued before
the CA wherein the parties made admissions and stipulations of facts
and defined the issues for resolution. In view of the technical nature of
the case, the CA also appointed15 several amici curiae,16 but only four
(4) filed their reports.17
On December 26, 2012, the CA Former 11th Division submitted to the
Court its well-crafted and exhaustive 156-page Report and
Recommendation18 dated December 21, 2012 (CA Report). Some
highlights of the Report:
1. Anent petitioners' June 28, 2011 Omnibus Motion assailing
the reopening of the BOPL System, the CA directed
respondent FPIC to submit the appropriate certification from
the DOE as to the safe commercial operation of the BOPL;
otherwise, the operation of the BOPL must also be enjoined.
2. On petitioners' September 9, 2011 Manifestation (Re:
Current Developments) with Omnibus Motion, the CA directed
the Inter-Agency Committee on Health to submit its evaluation
of the remediation plan prepared by CH2M Hill Philippines,
Inc. for FPIC. Further, the appellate court directed FPIC to
strictly comply with the stipulations contained in the permits
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) for its remediation activities in Barangay
Bangkal, Makati City. The DENR was in turn directed by the CA
to:
(a) monitor compliance by respondent FPIC with
applicable environmental laws and regulations and
conditions set forth in the permits issued;
(b) conduct independent analysis of end-products of
the Multi-Phase Extraction System;
(c) conduct regular consultative meetings with the
City of Makati, residents of Barangay Bangkal and
other stakeholders concerning the remediation
activities; and,
(d) evaluate the viability of the recommendation of
amicus Dr. Benjamin R. De Jesus, Jr. to include the
use of surfactants and oxygen-releasing compounds
(ORCs) in the middle and terminal portions of the
remediation plan.
 3. Respondent's September 27, 2011 Urgent Motion for Leave
(To Undertake "Bangkal Realignment" Project) was denied.
4. With regard to the March 29, 2012 Supplemental
Manifestation (Re: List of Amici Curiae and Recent Possible
Leak in the Pipeline) filed by petitioners, the CA found that the
existence of another possible leak alleged by petitioners was
not established. Nonetheless, to prevent such event, the CA
ordered FPIC to: (i) review, adopt and strictly observe
appropriate safety and precautionary measures; (ii) closely
monitor the conduct of its maintenance and repair works; and
(iii) submit to the DOE regular monthly reports on the
structural integrity and safe commercial operation of the
pipeline.
5. As to the merits of the case, the CA submitted the following
recommendations:
(a) That the people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and public interest
groups that indicated their intention to join the
petition and submitted proof of juridical personality
(namely: the Catholic Bishop's Conference of the
Philippines; Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc.;
Women's Business Council of the Philippines, Inc.;
Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc. - San
Juan Chapter; Zonta Club of Makati Ayala
Foundations; and the Consolidated Mansions
Condominium Corporation) be allowed to be
formally impleaded as petitioners.
(b) That respondent FPIC be ordered to submit a
certification from the DOE Secretary that the WOPL
is already safe for commercial operation. The
certification should take into consideration the
adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak detection
system to be used in monitoring the entire pipeline's
mass input versus mass output. The certification
must also consider the necessity of replacing the
pipes with existing patches and sleeves. In case of
failure of respondent FPIC to submit the required
certification from the DOE Secretary within sixty (60)
days from notice of the Honorable Supreme Court's
approval of this recommendation, the TEPO must be
made permanent.
(c) That petitioners' prayer for the creation of a
special trust fund to answer for similar contingencies
in the future be denied for lack of sufficient basis.
d) That respondent FGC be not held solidarily liable
under the TEPO.
(e) That without prejudice to the outcome of the civil
and criminal cases filed against respondents, the
individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC be
not held liable in their individual capacities.
On January 11, 2013, petitioners filed their Motion for Partial
Reconsideration19 of the CA's Report praying that (a) instead of the
DOE, the required certification should be issued by the DOST-Metal
Industry Research and Development Center; (b) a trust fund be created
to answer for future contingencies; and ( c) the directors and officers of
FPIC and FGC be held accountable.
On January 25, 2013, FPIC filed its Compliance (Re: Department of
Energy Certification on the Black Oil Pipeline)20 and submitted the
required DOE Certification21 issued on January 22, 2013 by DOE
Secretary Carlos Jericho L. Petilla (Secretary Petilla). On March 14, 2013,
petitioners countered with a Manifestation with Motion22 asserting
that FPIC's certification is not compliant with the CA's requirement.
Hence, petitioners moved that the certification should be disregarded,
the 30-day period be deemed to have lapsed, and FPIC be permanently
enjoined from operating the BOPL.
On July 30, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution adopting the
recommendation of the CA in its Report and Recommendation that FPIC
be ordered to secure a certification from the DOE Secretary before the
WOPL may resume its operations. The pertinent portion of said
Resolution reads:
[FPIC] is hereby ORDERED to submit a certification from the DOE
Secretary that the pipeline is already safe for commercial operation. The
certification should take into consideration the adoption by FPIC of the
appropriate leak detection system to be used in monitoring the entire
pipeline's mass input versus mass output. The certification must also
consider the necessity of replacing the pipes with existing patches and
sleeves x x x.23
The DOE Secretary is DIRECTED to consult the [DOST] regarding the
adoption of the appropriate leak detection system and the necessity of
replacing the pipes with existing patches and sleeves.
On October 2, 2013, petitioners, in a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion for Clarification, emphasized that the CA found FPIC's tests and
maintenance program to be insufficient and inconclusive to establish the
WOPL' s structural integrity for continued commercial operation.24
Furthermore, petitioners point out that the DOE is biased and incapable
of determining the WOPL's structural integrity.
Respondents, for their part, maintain that the DOE has the technical
competence and expertise to assess the structural integrity of the WOPL
and to certify the system's safety for commercial operation.25
Respondents further allege that the DOE is the agency empowered to
regulate the transportation and distribution of petroleum products, and
to regulate and monitor downstream oil industry activities, including
"product distribution" through pipelines.26
In compliance with the Court's July 30, 2013 Resolution, the DOE
Secretary issued on October 25, 2013 a Certification,27 attesting that
the WOPL is safe to resume commercial operations, subject to
monitoring or inspection requirements, and imposing several conditions
that FPIC must comply with. The Certification, in its entirety, reads:
This is to certify that based on the Pipeline Integrity Management
Systems (PIMS) being implemented by [FPIC] for its [WOPL] facility, the
same is safe to resume commercial operations. This certification is being
issued after consultation with the [DOST] and on the basis of the
following considerations, to wit:
1. DOE noted the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak
detection system to be used in monitoring the pipeline's mass
input versus mass output, as well as the other measures of
leak detection and prevention adopted by the latter;
 2. DOE further noted that FPIC has already undertaken
realignment and reinforcement works on the current pipeline
to remove majority of the patches. FPIC has likewise presented
substantial and adequate documentation showing that the
remaining patches and sleeves are safe, and that the use of
such is recognized by the industry and complies with existing
standards;
3. DOE finally noted the results of various tests and inspections of a number of reported dents in the WOPL, conduct of successful leak
done on the pipeline as indicated in the Manifestation
submitted by ,the DOE on March 31, 2012, in the civil case
docketed as CA GR SP No. 00008 and entitled West Tower
Condominium, et al. [v.] First Philippine Industrial Corporation,
et al.
This certification is being issued subject to the condition that FPIC will
submit itself to regular monitoring and validation by the Oil Industry
Management Bureau (OIMB) of the implementation of its PIMS,
particularly on the following: (a) mass or volume input versus mass or
volume output loss/gain accounting; (b) results of borehole monitoring,
(c) inspection of the pipeline cathodic protection and (d) pressure test.
Further, FPIC shall submit itself to any test or inspection that the DOE
and DOST may deem appropriate for purposes of monitoring the
operations of the WOPL facility.
The Court is fully cognizant of the WOPL' s value in commerce and the
adverse effects of a prolonged closure thereof. Nevertheless, there is a
need to balance the necessity of the immediate reopening of the WOPL
with the more important need to ensure that it is sound for continued
operation, since the substances it carries pose a significant hazard to the
surrounding population and to the environment.28 A cursory review of
the most recent oil pipeline tragedies around the world will readily show
that extreme caution should be exercised in the monitoring and
operation of these common carriers:
(1) On August 1, 2014, a series of powerful explosions from
underground pipeline systems ripped up the streets of
Kaohsiung, Taiwan, killing at least 28 people and injuring 299
more. Further, 23 ,600, 2,268 and 6,000 households were left
without gas, power and water, respectively, in the 2-3 square
kilometer blast area.29
(2) On November 22, 2013, an oil pipeline leaked, caught fire,
and exploded in Qingdao, Shangdao Province in China, killing
55 people and injuring more than a hundred more.30
(3) On September 14, 2011, a fuel pipeline exploded in Kenya's
capital city, Nairobi, reducing bodies to dust and flattening
homes. At least 7 5 people died in the explosion, while more
than a hundred people were injured.31
(4) In September 2010, a natural gas pipeline ruptured and set
off a fireball, killing eight (8) people and leveling 3 8 homes in
San Bruno, California in the United States.32
(5) On July 30, 2004, a rupture of an underground natural gas
pipeline buried six (6) meters in Ghislenghien, Belgium
resulted in 24 deaths and over 120 injuries.33
On April 29 and 30, 2014, the DOE organized a dialogue between said
government agencies and the FPIC. There it was stated that during the
dialogue, "the division heads and a high profile team from FPIC, both
from operation and management made presentations and answered
questions on pipeline pumping operation and product delivery, and a
detailed explanation of the FPIC PIMS' control measures, condition
monitoring measures, and emergency measures, as well as its various
activities and projects implemented since 2010 such as pipeline
replacement and realignment in Pandacan and Bangkal, inspection and
reinforcement of all patches in the WOPL, inspection and reinforcement
tests, and installation of boreholes that are gas-tested on a weekly basis,
and the safety systems that go with the daily pipeline operation and
maintenance and project execution."34
On August 5, 2014, Secretary Carlos Jericho L. Petilla of the DOE
submitted a letter35 recommending activities and timetable for the
resumption of the WOPL operations, to wit:
A. Preparatory to the Test Run
I. FPIC Tasks:
a. Continue submission of monitoring charts, data/reading,
accomplishment reports, and project status for all related
activities/works. Respond to comments and prepare for site
inspection.
b. Continue gas testing along the right-of-way using the
monitoring wells or boreholes. Prepare for inspection of right-
of-way and observation of gas testing activities on monitoring
wells and boreholes.
c. Expound on the selection of borehole location. For example,
identify those located in pipeline bends, bodies of water,
residential areas, repaired portions of the pipelines, dents and
welded joints.
d. Continue submitting status report relating to "Project
Mojica" (an ongoing pipeline segment realignment activity
undertaken by FPIC to give way to a flood control project of
MMDA in the vicinity of Mojica St. and Pres. Osmeña Highway
in Makati City). Prepare for site inspection.
II. Inter-agency undertaking:
a. Conduct onsite inspection of right-of-way
b. Review/check remaining 22 patches that were already
inspected and reinforced with Clockspring sleeves.
i. Determine location of sleeves.
ii. Review of procedures on repair of sleeves.
iii. Random visual inspection of areas easily
accessible.
c. Cathodic protection's onsite inspection on rectifier to check
readings
i. Old readings
 ii. Current Readings
iii. Segment covered
iv. Criteria for prioritization for corrective action
d. Observe and witness the running/operation of the cleaning
pig.
e. Check and validate all calibration certificate of instruments
i. Instrument verification and calibration.
B. Actual Test Run (to be undertaken both by FPIC and inter-agency)
a. Perform Cleaning Pig Run
i. Witness launching and receiving of the cleaning
pig.
ii. Handling of the residuals after cleaning.
b. Demonstrate Various Pressure Tests (already being
conducted by FPIC)
i. Blocked-in pressure test (Leak Test, not in
operation)
ii. In-operation (hourly reading)
c. Continue Current Gas Monitoring (boreholes)
i. Ocular inspection of selected areas
d. Demonstrate mass or volume balance computation during
WOPL test run (already being implemented in the BOPL)
i. 30 days baseline data generation
ii. 30 days computational analysis and monitoring
C. Commissioning or Return to Commercial Operation
I. FPIC Tasks:
a. Continue implementation of the PIMS. Review
recommendations from DOE.
b. Continue monthly reporting of operations and maintenance
activities with DOE.
c. Continue reporting and coordination with DOE and other
government agencies for implementation of projects.36
Secretary Petilla also recounted to the Court in his August 5, 2014 letter
that the DOE, together with the DPWH and the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), observed the different milestones of
the realignment project being undertaken by FPIC in support of the
MMDA Flood Control Project and stated that the new line segment as
laid was coated with corrosion protection prior to the backfilling of the
excavated portion.
On February 3, 2015, the Court required the parties to submit their
comment on Sec. Petilla's letter within ten (10) days from receipt of the
Resolution. On various dates, respondents First Gen Corporation, FPIC,
and petitioner West Tower filed their respective comments37 in
compliance with the Court's resolution. The intervenors were unable to
comply with the Court's directive; hence, they are deemed to have
waived their right to file their respective comments. The Issues
Having received the October 25, 2013 Certification and the August 5,
2014 Letter from the DOE on the state of the WOPL, as well as the
parties' comments thereon, the following issues defined by the parties
during the March 21, 2012 preliminary conference are now ripe for
adjudication:
1. Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity
to represent the other petitioners and whether the other
petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and
Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;
2. Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order
should be issued to direct the respondents to perform or to
desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and
rehabilitate the affected environment;
3. Whether a special trust fund should be opened by
respondents to answer for future similar contingencies; and
4. Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents
FPIC and FGC may be held liable under the environmental
protection order.38
The Court's Ruling
We adopt, with modifications, the recommendations of the CA and
discuss the foregoing issues in seriatim.
I.
Petitioners as Real Parties-in-Interest
On the procedural aspect, We agree with the CA that petitioners who
are affected residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal have the
requisite concern to be real parties-in-interest to pursue the instant
petition.
Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.39 Generally, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest.40 In other words,
the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law,
possesses the right sought to be enforced.41 Alternatively, one who has
no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court
as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.42
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the
WOPL affected all the condominium unit owners and residents of West
Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the
morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium's electrical power was
shut down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower
could still not return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no
gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of
contention in the pending motions. Suffice it to state in the outset that
as regards the substantive issues presented, the Court, likewise, concurs
with the other recommendations of the CA, with a few modifications.
II.
Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the

There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the DOE Certification of the WOPL's Commercial Viability
common interest of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal
standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a condominium
To recall, petitioners' persistent plea is for the conversion of the
corporation has limited powers under RA 4 726, otherwise known as The
November 19, 2010 TEPO into a Permanent Environmental Protection
Condominium Act,43 it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its
Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3,46 Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for
members. In the instant case, the condominium corporation .is the
Environmental Cases. For its part, respondent FPIC asserts that regular
management body of West Tower and deals with everything that may
testing, as well as the measures that are already in place, will sufficiently
affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or users.
address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.

It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their

With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the
acquiescence to the filing of the petition for the issuance of the Writ of
following systems: (a) regular cleaning scraper runs, which are done
Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly put by the CA, not
quarterly; (b) pipeline integrity gauge (PIG) tests/Intelligent PIG, now
measured by the number of persons who signified their assent thereto,
known as in-line inspections (ILI), which is done every five years; (c)
but on the existence of a prima facie case of a massive environmental
pressure monitoring valves; and ( d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC
disaster.
asserted that it also undertook the following: (a) monitoring of wells and
borehole testing/vapor tests; (b) leak tightness test, also known as
Moreover, the fact that no board resolution was submitted by West segment pressure test; (c) pressure-controlled test; (d) inspection and
Tower Corp. authorizing Manuel Dy Chuaunsu, Jr. to sign the Verification reinforcement of patches; (e) inspection and reinforcement of dents;
and Certification of Non-forum Shopping is irrelevant. The records show and (f) Pandacan segment replacement.47 Furthermore, in August 2010,
that petitioners submitted a notarized Secretary's Certificate44 attesting with the oil leak hogging the headlines, FPIC hired NDT Middle East FZE
that the authority of Chuaunsu to represent the condominium (NDT) to conduct ILI inspections through magnetic flux leakage (MFL)
corporation in filing the petition is from the resolution of the total and ultrasonic tests to, respectively, detect wall thinning of the pipeline
membership of West Tower Corp. issued during their November 9, 2010 and check it for cracks.
meeting with the requisite quorum. It is, thus, clear that it was not the
Board of West Tower Corp. which granted Chuaunsu the authority but
The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are
the full membership of the condominium corporation itself.
inconclusive and insufficient for purposes of leak detection and pipeline
integrity maintenance. Hence, considering the necessary caution and
As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly situated with level of assurance required to ensure that the WOPL system is free from
the unit owners and residents of West Tower and are real parties-in- leaks and is safe for commercial operation, the CA recommended that
interest to the instant case, i.e., if they so wish to join the petitioners. FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL is already safe
for commercial operation. This certification, according to the CA, was to
Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition be issued with due consideration of the adoption by FPIC of the
appropriate leak detection systems to monitor sufficiently the entire
and submitted proof of juridical personality WOPL and the need to replace portions of the pipes with existing
patches and sleeves. Sans the required certification, use of the WOPL
shall remain abated.
Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the
Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women's Business
Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper.
Philippines, Inc. - San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Hence, We required FPIC to obtain the adverted DOE Certification in Our
Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said
Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their certification from the DOE considering that the core issue of this case
intervention in the present controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013 requires the specialized knowledge and special expertise of the DOE and
Resolution. various other administrative agencies. On October 25, 2013, the DOE
submitted the certification pursuant to the July 30, 2013 Resolution of
the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE Secretary Carlos
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a
Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and
writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 745 of the Rules of Procedure for
the timetable for the resumption of the WOPL operations after
Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly
conducting a dialogue between the concerned government agencies and
affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical
FPIC.
persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation. After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions
of the parties, the Court adopts the activities and measures prescribed
in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as
Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of
conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations of the
all the submissions to the Court, including the periodic reports of FPIC
WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed with the implementation of
and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.
the tests proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is
satisfied that the results warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL,
the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the operation of
the WOPL. On the other hand, should the probe result in a finding that
the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its condition is
irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among
others, the closure of the WOPL may be ordered.
The DOE is specially equipped to consider FPIC's proper implementation
and compliance with its PIMS and to evaluate the result of the various
tests conducted on the pipeline. The DOE is empowered by Sec. 12(b)(l),
RA 7638 to formulate and implement policies for the efficient and
economical "distribution, transportation, and storage of petroleum,
coal, natural gas."48 Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the DOE possesses
technical knowledge and special expertise with respect to practices in
the transportation of oil through pipelines.
Moreover, it is notable that the DOE did not only limit itself to the
knowledge and proficiency available within its offices, it has also rallied
around the assistance of pertinent bureaus of the other administrative
agencies: the ITDI49 of the DOST, which is mandated to undertake
technical services including standards, analytical and calibration
services; the MIRDC,50 also of the DOST, which is the sole government
entity directly supporting the metals and engineering industry;51 the
EMB52 of the DENR, the agency mandated to implement, among others,
RA 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control
Act of 1990) and RA 9275 (Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004); and the Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for
BOD of the DPWH, which is mandated to conduct, supervise, and review Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary Principle, provides that "[ w
the technical design aspects of projects of government agencies.53
The specialized knowledge and expertise of the foregoing agencies
must, therefore, be availed of to arrive at a judicious decision on the
propriety of allowing the immediate resumption of the WOPL's
operation. In a host of cases, this Court held that when the adjudication based on speculations, justified by the application of said principle. This,
of a controversy requires the resolution of issues within the expertise of however, is not the case. Nowhere did We apply the precautionary
an administrative body, such issues must be investigated and resolved
by the administrative body equipped with the specialized knowledge
and the technical expertise.54 Hence, the courts, although they may
have jurisdiction and power to decide cases, can utilize the findings and cause, that is the human activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect,
recommendations of the administrative agency on questions that
demand "the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact."55
Justice Leonen, in his dissent, is of the view that the petition should be
denied and the TEPO immediately lifted in light of the DOE's issuance of
a certification attesting to the safety of the WOPL for continued
commercial operations, thereby rendering the instant petition moot and
academic, seeking, as it does, the checking of the pipeline's structural
integrity. According to his dissent, the writ of kalikasan issued by the
Court has already served its functions and, therefore, is functus officio.
Moreover, he argues that directing the DOE and FPIC to repeat their
previous procedures is tantamount to doubting the agency's
performance of its statutorily-mandated tasks, over which they have the
necessary expertise, and implies that said DOE certification is improper,
a breach, allegedly, of the principle of separation of powers.
He also contends that the majority ordered the repetition of the
procedures and tests already conducted on the WOPL because of the
fear and uncertainty on its safeness despite the finding of the DOE in
favor of its reopening, taking into consideration the occurrence of
numerous pipeline incidents worldwide. The dissent argues that the
precautionary principle should not be so strictly applied as to
unjustifiably deprive the public of the benefits of the activity to be
inhibited, and to unduly create other risks.
The dissent's contentions that the case is already moot and academic,
that the writ of kalikasan has already served its function, and that the
delay in the lifting of the TEPO may do more harm than good are
anchored on the mistaken premise that the precautionary principle was
applied in order to justify the order to the DOE and the FPIC for the
conduct of the various tests anew. The following reasons easily debunk
these arguments:
1. The precautionary principle is not applicable to the instant
case;
2. The DOE certification is not an absolute attestation as to the
WOPL's structural integrity and in fact imposes several
conditions for FPIC's compliance;
3. The DOE itself, in consultation with FPIC and the other
concerned agencies, proposed the activities to be conducted
preparatory to the reopening of the pipeline; and
4 . There are no conclusive findings yet on the WOPL's
structural integrity.
]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link
between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply
the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it."
According to the dissent, the directive for the repetition of the tests is
principle in deciding the issue on the WOPL's structural integrity.
The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the
that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established with full
scientific certainty. Here, however, such absence of a link is not an issue.
Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in the
WOPL, which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from determining
whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the surroundings will
cause environmental damage or will harm human health or that of other
organisms. As a matter of fact, the petroleum leak and the harm that it
caused to the environment and to the residents of the affected areas is
not even questioned by FPIC.
It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the
WOPL's compliance with pipeline structure standards so as to make it fit
for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be determined on the basis
of the evidence presented by the parties on the WOPL's actual state.
Hence, Our consideration of the numerous findings and
recommendations of the CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the
WOPL' s present structure, and not the cited pipeline incidents as the
dissent propounds.
Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several
conditions upon FPIC for the resumption of the operations of the WOPL.
This, coupled with the submission by the DOE of its proposed activities
and timetable, is a clear and unequivocal message coming from the DOE
that the WOPL's soundness for resumption of and continued commercial
operations is not yet fully determined. And it is only after an extensive
determination by the DOE of the pipeline's actual physical state through
its proposed activities, and not merely through a short-form integrity
audit,56 that the factual issue on the WOPL's viability can be settled.
The issue, therefore, on the pipeline's structural integrity has not yet
been rendered moot and remains to be subject to this Court's
resolution. Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE's issuance of the
certification adverted to equates to the writ of kalikasan being functus
officio at this point.
The dissent is correct in emphasizing that We defer to the findings of
fact of administrative agencies considering their specialized knowledge
in their field. And We, as a matter of fact, acceded to the DOE' s
conclusions on the necessity of the conduct of the various activities and
tests enumerated in Sec. Petilla's letter to this Court dated August 5,
2014. Hence, Our directive for the DOE to immediately commence the
activities enumerated in said Letter, to determine the pipeline's
reliability, and to order its reopening should the DOE find that such is
proper.
The dissent also loses sight of the fact that the petition not only seeks
the checking of the WOPL's structural integrity, but also prays for the
rehabilitation of the areas affected by the leak, the creation of a special
trust fund, the imposition of liability upon the directors of FPIC, among
others. These issues, undoubtedly, are matters that are not addressed
by the DOE certification alone. Furthermore, these are issues that no
longer relate to the WOPL' s structure but to its maintenance and
operations, as well as to the residues of the incident. It will, thus, be
improper for Us to simply dismiss the petition on the basis solely of the
alleged resolution of only one of several issues, which purportedly
renders the issue on the WOPL' s soundness moot, without disposing of
the other issues presented.
Lastly, any delay in the reopening of the WOPL, if said delay is for the
purpose of making sure that the pipeline is commercially viable, is better
than hastily allowing its reopening without an extensive check on its
structural integrity when experience shows that there were and may still
be flaws in the pipeline. Even the DOE, the agency tasked to oversee the
supply and distribution of petroleum in the country, is well aware of this
and even recommended the checking of the patched portions of the
pipeline, among others. In this regard, the Court deems it best to take
the necessary safeguards, which are not similar to applying the
precautionary principle as previously explained, in order to prevent a
similar incident from happening in the future.
III.
Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund
Anent petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We
note that under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of
rehabilitating or restoring the environment. Said proviso pertinently
provides:
SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. - If warranted, the court may grant to the
plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation
or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees,
costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the
violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to
contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control
of the court. (emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Sec. 15( e ), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases expressly prohibits the grant of damages to
petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition
is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or
denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
xxxx
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation,
rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of
damages to individual petitioners.
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration
readily reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for
similar future contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited purpose
of a special trust fund under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has
presumably already suffered. Hence, the Court affirms with concurrence
the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim for
damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the considered view that
the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced. The present ruling on
petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in the instant
recourse, however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be
rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners arising
from the same incident if the payment of damages is found warranted.
IV.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective
directors and officers, the CA found FGC not liable under the TEPO and,
without prejudice to the outcome of the civil case (Civil Case No. 11-256,
RTC, Branch 58 in Makati City) and criminal complaint (Complaint-
Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Makati City) filed against them, the individual directors and officers of
FPIC and FGC are not liable in their individual capacities.
The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the
individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the
explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a
petition for a writ of kalikasan, the Court cannot grant the award of
damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the civil
case and criminal complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are
the proper proceedings to ventilate and determine the individual
liability of respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and
the management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of
the dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the
WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.
Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the
FPIC and FGC officials which can, however, be properly resolved in the
civil and criminal cases now pending against them.
Other Matters
The CA's resolution on petitioners' September 9, 2011 Manifestation
(Re: Current Developments) with Omnibus Motion on the remediation
plan in Barangay Bangkal by directing the Inter-Agency Committee on
Environmental Health to submit its evaluation of the said plan prepared
by CH2M Philippines, Inc., for FPIC to strictly comply with the
stipulations embodied in the permits issued by the DENR, and to get a
certification from the DENR of its compliance thereto is well taken.
DENR is the government agency tasked to implement the state policy of
"maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing
the quality of the environment"57 and to "promulgate rules and
regulations for the control of water, air, and land pollution."58 It is
indubitable that the DENR has jurisdiction in overseeing and supervising
the environmental remediation of Barangay Bangkal, which is adversely
affected by the leak in the WOPL in 2010.
With regard to petitioners' March 29, 2012 Supplemental Manifestation
about a recent possible leak in the pipeline, the CA appropriately found
no additional leak. However, due to the devastating effect on the
environs in Barangay Bangkal due to the 2010 leak, the Court finds it
fitting that the pipeline be closely and regularly monitored to obviate
another catastrophic event which will prejudice the health of the
affected people, and to preserve and protect the environment not only
for the present but also for the future generations to come.
c. Explain the process of the selection of
borehole location and identify those
located in pipeline bends, bodies of water,
highways, residential areas, repaired
portions of the pipelines, dents and
welded joints, as well other notable
factors, circumstances, or exposure to
stresses. d. Set up additional boreholes
and monitoring wells sufficient to cover
the entire stretch of the WOPL, the
number and location of which shall be
determined by the DOE.
e. Continue submitting status report to the
concerned government agency/ies relating
to "Project Mojica," or the on-going
pipeline segment realignment activity
being undertaken by FPIC to give way to a
flood control project of the MMDA in the
vicinity of Mojica St. and Pres. Osmeña
Highway, and prepare for site inspection.
2) The DOE shall perform the following undertakings:

Petitioner's January 10, 2013 Motion for Partial Recommendation of the a. Conduct onsite inspection of the
CA' s Report need not be discussed and given consideration. As the CA' s pipeline right-of-way, the area around the
Report contains but the appellate court's recommendation on how the WOPL and the equipment installed
issues should be resolved, and not the adjudication by this Court, there underground or aboveground.
is nothing for the appellate court to reconsider.
b. Review and check the condition of the
As to petitioner's October 2, 2013 Motion for Reconsideration with 22 patches reinforced with Clockspring
Motion for Clarification, the matters contained therein have been sleeves by performing the following:
considered in the foregoing discussion of the primary issues of this case.
With all these, We need not belabor the other arguments raised by the
i. Determine the location of the
parties.
sleeves

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is

ii. Review the procedure for the
hereby DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for
repair of the sleeves
Clarification is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals'
recommendations, embodied in its December 21, 2012 Report and
Recommendation, are hereby ADOPTED with the following iii. Inspect the areas where the
MODIFICATIONS: affected portions of the WOPL
are located and which are easily
accessible.
I. The Department of Energy (DOE) is hereby ORDERED to oversee the
strict implementation of the following activities:
c. Inspect onsite the cathodic protection
rectifier to check the following:
A. Preparatory to the Test Run of the entire stretch of the
WOPL:
i. old and current readings
1) FPIC shall perform the following:
ii. the segment/s covered by the
cathodic protection system
a. Continue submission of monitoring
charts, data/reading, accomplishment
reports, and project status for all related iii. review the criteria for
activities/works. Respond to comments prioritization of corrective
and prepare for site inspection. action.

b. Continue gas testing along the right-of- d. Observe and witness the
way using the monitoring wells or running/operation of the intelligent and
boreholes. Prepare for inspection of right- cleaning pigs.
of-way and observation of gas testing
activities on monitoring wells and
boreholes.
 e. Check and calibrate the instruments that
will be used for the actual tests on the
pipeline, and validate the calibration
certificates of these instruments.
B. During the Actual Test Run:
1) FPIC shall perform the following:
a. Perform Cleaning Pig run and witness
the launching and receiving of the
intelligent and cleaning pigs.
b. Demonstrate and observe the various
pressure and leakage tests, including the
following:
i. "Blocked-in pressure test" or
the pressure test conducted
while all the WOPL's openings
are blocked or closed off; and
ii. "In-operation test" or the
hourly monitoring of pressure
rating after the pipeline is filled
with dyed water and pressurized
at a specified rate.
c. Continue, inspect, and oversee the
current gas monitoring system, or the
monitoring of gas flow from the boreholes
and monitoring wells of the WOPL.
d. Check the mass or volume balance
computation during WOPL test run by
conducting:
i. 30 days baseline data
generation
ii. Computational analysis and
monitoring of the data
generated.
II. After FPIC has undertaken the activities prescribed in the preceding
paragraph 1, the DOE shall determine if the activities and the results of
the test run warrant the re-opening of the WOPL. In the event that the
DOE is satisfied that the WOPL is safe for continued commercial
operations, it shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the
operations of the pipeline.
III. Once the WOPL is re-opened, the DOE shall see to it that FPIC strictly
complies with the following directives:
a. Continue implementation of its Pipeline Integrity
Management System (PIMS), as reviewed by the DOE, which
shall include, but shall not be limited to:
1. the conduct of daily patrols on the entire stretch
of the WOPL, every two hours;
2. continued close monitoring of all the boreholes
and monitoring wells of the WOPL pipeline;
3. regular periodic testing and maintenance based
on its PIMS; and
4. the auditing of the pipeline's mass input versus
mass output;
b. submit to the DOE, within ten (10) days of each succeeding
month, monthly reports on its compliance with the above
directives and any other conditions that the DOE may impose,
the results of the monitoring, tests, and audit, as well as any
and all activities undertaken on the WOPL or in connection
with its operation. The concerned government agencies,
namely: the Industrial Technology Development Institute
(ITDI) and the Metals Industry Research and Development
Center (MIRDC), both under the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST), the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), the Bureau of Design (BOD) of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the
University of the Philippines - National Institute of Geological
Science (UP-NI GS) and University of the Philippines - Institute
of Civil Engineering (UP-ICE), the petitioners, intervenors and
this Court shall likewise be furnished by FPIC with the monthly
reports. This shall include, but shall not be limited to:
realignment, repairs, and maintenance works; and
c. continue coordination with the concerned government
agencies for the implementation of its projects.1âwphi1
IV. Respondent FPIC is also DIRECTED to undertake and continue the
remediation, rehabilitation and restoration of the affected Barangay
Bangkal environment until full restoration of the affected area to its
condition prior to the leakage is achieved. For this purpose, respondent
FPIC must strictly comply with the measures, directives and permits
issued by the DENR for its remediation activities in Barangay Bangkal,
including but not limited to, the Wastewater Discharge Permit and
Permit to Operate. The DENR has the authority to oversee and supervise
the aforesaid activities on said affected barangay.
V. The Inter-Agency Committee on Environmental Health under the City
Government of Makati shall SUBMIT to the DENR its evaluation of the
Remediation Plan prepared by CH2M Hill Philippines, Inc. within thirty
(30) days from receipt hereof.
VI. Petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund to answer
for similar contingencies in the future is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice