CASE DIGEST

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. DONATO BINDOY

G.R. No. L-34665 August 28, 1931

FACTS:

In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop. Donato Bindoy offered some tuba
to Faustino Paca's wife Tibay. She refused because she already has one, but Bindoy threatened to injure
her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo
he carried. Emigdio Omamdam who came to the wine shop to see what’s happening, instead got stabbed in
the chest by Bindoy. This happened when Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching
the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused and with such violence that the point of
the bolo reached Omamdam's chest who was then behind Bindoy, which produced Emigdio Omamdam's
death. But the defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent.

Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having seen the accused stab Omamdam
with his bolo.

Gaudencio Cenas, the witness for Bindoy, supports the defendant on his statement that Pacas and Bindoy
were struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the Pacas let go, Bindoy pulled with so much
force that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was
therefore hit in the chest. Cenas adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later, and Omamdam said
to him that the incident was a mishap.

The CFI of Occidental Misamis convicted Bindoy for the crime of Homicide. The accused appealed from the
judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable?

HELD:

The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of
ascertaining and proving, when possible, the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under
investigation.

In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the
crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the
guilty person to indulge the criminal act.

In view of the evidence, the Court held that the appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8, No. 8,
Penal Code. The judgment of CFI is reversed.

CASE DIGEST
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. INOCENTES MOLDES
G.R. No. L-42122 December 1, 1934

PEOPLE v. MOLDES

Facts:

Inocente Moldes was convicted of homicide by the CFI of Leyte. On the night of April 3 in a barrio, there was
a dance in a private house, and the deceased was the master of ceremonies. Moldes insisted on dancing
out of turn and was reproved by the deceased. Moldes went to the porch and began cutting down the
decorations with his bolo. He went into the yard and challenged everyone to a fight. Not attracting enough
attention, he began chopping bamboo trees. The deceased, unarmed, spoke to him in a friendly manner as
he descended into the yard. But Moldes struck him with his bolo, inflicting a wound on his left arm (long
incised wound on the lower portion directed downwards). As the deceased fell, Moldes inflicted a slight
wound on his back and ran away. The wound was treated the next morning. However, it failed to stop the
hemorrhage and the deceased died after 12 days. Moldes’s defense was that he was behaving at the
dance, and it was the deceased who struck him on the dance floor with a cane. He attempted to run away
but the deceased followed him with a cane and a bolo. He succeeded in wrenching the bolo away and
inflicted the wounds in self-defense. The CFI convicted him. The attorney urged that Moldes did not intend
to commit as serious a wound as was inflicted but struck only in the dark and in selfdefense.

It is also contended that had the deceased secured proper surgical treatment, the wound would not have
been fatal (but such was not available in that barrio).

Issue:

W/N he is guilty of homicide – YES

Ratio:

The SC ruled that there was no element of self defense. When one resorts to the use of a lethal weapon
and strikes another with the force that must have been used in this case, it is presumed that he realizes the
natural consequences of his act. The GR is that he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of responsibility if
the wound inflicted is dangerous, even though the immediate cause of the death was erroneous or unskillful
medical treatment. This rule is founded on the principle that every person is to be held to contemplate and to
be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly
weapon in such manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows, it does not alter nor diminish its
criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result.

CASE DIGEST
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DIEGO OPERO Y COSIPAG
G.R. No. L-48796June 11, 1981
Laws Applicable: Art. 4

FACTS:

 April 27, 1978 4 am: Salvador Oliver, a GSIS security guard assigned to the House International Hotel at
Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila, was informed by Demetrio Barcing, another security guard, that he picked up
a 3-year-old girl loitering at the second floor of the building. Rafael Ordona, a janitor, told Oliver that the girl is
from Room 314 so Oliver called up Room 314 and when nobody answered, he and Barcing brought the girl to
Room 314. When nobody answered Oliver’s knock, he pushed the door open and smelled foul odor from the
room. He covered his nose with a handkerchief and they entered the room where they saw Liew Soon Ping
dead faced down on the bed with both feet tied, her body is bloated, and a towel covered her mouth. Oliver
called up the homicide division of the Manila Police. They saw a small baby crying and trying to get out of a
crib near the bed of the dead person.

 They called her wife, Dr. Hong, who was in Cebu. He came back immediately and found their personal effects
worth P30,221 to be missing.

 Diego Opero, Asteria Avila and, Milagros Villegas were picked up by the Samar P.C. and some of the missing
articles. Diego Opero said that he and Lacsinto subdued the victim by assaulting her, tying up her hands and
feet stabbing her and stuffing her mouth with a piece of pandesal.

 Milagros Villegas: Identified the stolen clothes which were given to her by Opero

 Asteria Avila pleaded taht she was not a party

 Dr. Angelo Singian’s finding attested that the cause of death of Liew Soon Ping is the pandesal.

 RTC covicted Diego Opero for robbery with homicide together with Reynaldo Lacsinto and Milagros Villegas
(accessory). Asteria Avila was acquitted.

 Only Diego Opero appealed. He stated that he never intended to kill the deceased, his intention being merely
to rob her, for if indeed he had the intention to kill her, he could have easily done so with the knife, and
therefore, his liability should be only for robbery

ISSUE: W/N Diego Opero should only be liable for robbery and not for homicide.

HELD: The penalty of death as imposed by the lower court was affirmed.

It may not avail appellant to contend that the death was by mere accident for even if it were so, which is not even
beyond doubt for the sliding of the pandesal into the neckline to produce asphyxiation could reasonably have been
anticipated, it is a settled doctrine that when death supervenes by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, it is
immaterial that the occurrence of death was by mere accident. 3 What is important and decisive is that death results by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery.

Article 49, paragraph I of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied to Opero. The provision has been
applied only to cases when the crime committed befalls a different person from the one intended to be the
victim. In the instant case, the intended victim, not any other person, was the one killed, as a result of an
intention to rob, as in fact appellant and his co-accused, did rob the deceased. As stated earlier, what may
be appreciated in appellant's favor is only the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed, under paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, an entirely
different situation from that contemplated under paragraph 1, Article 49 of the same Code.

Notwithstanding the presence of the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so
grave a wrong as that comitted, there still remains one aggravating circumstance to consider, after
either one of the two aggravating circumstances present, that of superior strength and dwelling, is
offset by the mitigating circumstance aforesaid. The higher of the imposable penalty for the crime
committed, which is reclusion perpetua to death, should therefore be the proper penalty to be
imposed on appellant. 'This is the penalty of death as imposed by the lower court.

CASE DIGEST
THE UNITED STATES vs. CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI
G.R. No. L-16486 March 22, 1921

FACTS:
Sometime in November 1919, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew of this boat consisted
of the accused, Calixto Valdez and six others among who was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. During
their work, the accused began to abuse the men with offensive words. Gargantel complained, saying that it
would be better if he would not insult them. The accused took this as a display of insubordination, thus, he
moved towards Gargantel, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the accused
had attained to within a few feet of Gargantel, the latter, evidently believing himself in great and immediate
peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more.

As alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died by drowning, as a consequence of having thrown
himself into the water and upon seeing himself threatened and attacked by the accused. The Judgment
rendered against the accused. Having been convicted as the author of the homicide, the accused alleged
on appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated
homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of Venancio Gargantel.

HELD:

The Supreme Court dismmised the appeal of the accused, enunciated the following doctrine:

“ That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the exclusive and necessary
effect of the very grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery , occasioning a
hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless
as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in order to escape the attack,
to leap into the river, an act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do after having
inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a
determined resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and putting
him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from, the trial court, in qualifying the act
prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit any error of law, as the death of the injured person
was due to the act of the accused.”

The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio Gargantel, and
he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating
circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed.
(Par.3, Art 9 Penal Code)

CASE DIGEST
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CELERINO CASTROMERO
G.R. No. 118992 October 9, 1997

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On February 26, 1993 at about 2am in the province of Batangas, Philippines, the accused armed with a
balisong wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge w/ the offended party Josephine Baon
against her will and consent and, as a consequence, she suffered serious physical injuries, by jumping
down through the 2nd floor window of her house.

Castromero and Baon are relatives. Josephine Baon's husband is the second-cousin of Castromero. They
were neighbors wherein their houses are located a mere 50 meters apart. During the incident Castromero's
penis due to their movement sideways was able to touch Baon's private parts. When Baon, noticed that
Castromero was no longer holding the knife she tried to escape by pushing him off and jumping through the
2nd flr window. Upon falling down she yelled for help wherein her inlaws came out to help her and bring her
to the hospital, as she was experiencing intense pain.

The accused Celerino Castromero was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Serious Physical Injuries sentencing him to reclusion perpetua by the trial court. Castromero appealed this
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not rape was consummated in this case.

RULING:

To consummate rape, perfect or complete penetration of the complainants private organ is not essential.
Even the slightest penetration by the male organ of the lips of the female organ, or labia of the pudendum, is
sufficient.[30] In People vs. Dela Pena,[31] this Court held that the mere touching of the external genitalia by
a penis capable of consummating the sexual act constitutes carnal knowledge. Josephines testimony that
appellants organ touched the opening of her vagina can lead to no other conclusion than that the appellants
manhood legally invaded, however slightly, the lips of her private organ. Clearly, rape was consummated in
this case. Because the sexual assault was perpetrated by force and intimidation, Appellant Castromero is
thus guilty of rape pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, we stress the
settled principle that a person who creates in anothers mind an immediate sense of danger that causes the
latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever the other person may consequently suffer.[32] In this case,
Josephine jumped from a window of her house to escape from Appellant Castromero; as a result, she
suffered serious physical injuries, specifically a broken vertebra which required medical attention and
surgery for more than ninety days. This being the case, the court a quo correctly convicted Appellant
Castromero of the complex crime of rape with serious physical injuries.

The judgement of the lower court was affirmed that appelant castromero is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of rape with serious physical injuries.
CASE DIGEST
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. JUAN QUIANZON
G.R. No. 42607 September 28, 1935

FACTS:

A novena for the suffrage of the soul of the deceased person was being held in the house of Victoria Cacpal
in a barrio in Ilocos Norte. Andres Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went to ask for food to Juan
Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who had the foods in his care. It was the second or third time that Aribuabo
approached Quianzon with the same purpose where Quianzon, greatly peeved, took hold of a firebrand and
applied to the neck of Aribuabo. Aribuabo ran to the place where the people were gathered exclaiming that
he is wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those present a wound in his abdomen below
the navel. Aribuabo died as the result of the wound on the tenth day after the incident. There is no conflict
between the prosecution and the defense as regards the foregoing facts. However, there is a question as to
who wounded Aribuabo. The prosecution claims that it was Quianzon. According to its witnesses, Quianzon
confessed that he had wounded Aribuabo with a bamboo spit. On the other hand, it is contended by the
defense that granting that it was Quianzon who inflicted the wound which resulted in Aribuabo’s death, he
should not be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical injuries because said wound was not
necessarily fatal and the deceased would have survived it had he not twice removed the drainage which Dr.
Mendoza had placed to control or isolate the infection.

The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte charged and convicted Quainzon of the crime of homicide and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from six years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen
years, seven months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Juan Quianzon appeal to this court
for the review of the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the removal of the drainage is the real cause of death of Aribuabo?

HELD:

It was a wound in the abdomen which occasionally results in traumatic peritonitis. The infection was caused
by the fecal matter from the large intestine which has been perforated. The possibility, admitted by said
physician that the patient might have survived said wound had he not removed the drainage, does not mean
that the act of the patient was the real cause of his death. Even without said act the fatal consequence could
have followed, and the fact that the patient had so acted in a paroxysm of pain does not alter the juridical
consequences of the punishable act of the accused.

One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributes
mediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that the other causes contribute to the death
does not relieve the actor of responsibility. . . . (13 R. C.L., 748.)

Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient, in removing the drainage, had acted voluntarily and with
the knowledge that he was performing an act prejudicial to his health, inasmuch as self-preservation is the
strongest instinct in living beings. It much be assumed, therefore, that he unconsciously did so due to his
pathological condition and to his state of nervousness and restlessness on account of the horrible physical
pain caused by the wound, aggravated by the contract of the drainage tube with the inflammed peritoneum.

The question herein raised by Quianzon has already been finally settled by jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court of Spain, in a decision of April 3, 1879, said in the case similar to the present, the following:
"Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act — and in this case the physical
condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be
judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the wound
which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which determined his death, without his
being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc."
CASE DIGEST
SULPICIO INTOD vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992

FACTS:

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with
firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location
of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It
turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-
in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun
fire.

RTC: Convicted Intod of ATTEMPTED MURDER, The RTC decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible
crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed is impossible crime.

HELD:

Under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense
against person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus:

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his
hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be,
although, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and
made the punishable. In the Philippines, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of
accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the
phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction
between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.

The situation in the case at bar present a factual or physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime
impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is
sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of
Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in
Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances
which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's
will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. The court hereby hold
Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the
Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by
Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with
the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.

CASE DIGEST
GEMMA T. JACINTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009

FACTS:

In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner, Gemma Jacinto, collector of Mega Foam, a post dated check
worth P10,000 as payment for Baby’s purchases from Mega Foam International, Inc. The said check was
deposited to the account of Jacqueline Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena Recablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was looking for
Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited had been dishonored. Thereafter, Joseph
Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell that the BDO Check bounced. However, Baby said that she had already paid
Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.

Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment
operation with its agents. Thereafter, Jacinto and Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed a criminal case for
qualified theft against the two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.

RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of the sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five (5) months
and Eleven (11) days to Six (6) years, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible Crime and not Qualified Theft.

HELD:

In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was
apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the
crime of qualified theft was actually produced.

The Court must resolve the issue in the negative. The crime committed does not produce Qualified Theft.

The case of Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the
accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim
was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted
murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and
penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the
factual impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:

Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to
ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the
aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the
acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that
the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by
such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the
social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of
arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.

Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the
inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was
further explained by the Court in Intod10 in this wise:

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal
impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an
impossible crime.

There can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega
Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of
accomplishment in this case.

Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an impossible
crime and suffer the penalty of Six (6) months of arresto mayor and pay courts.

NOTES:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means. (Revised Penal Code)

What is an impossible crime?

An impossible crime is one where the acts performed would have been a crime against person or property
but which is not accomplished because of its inherent impossibility or because of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.
What are the requisites of impossible crime?

The requisites of an impossible crime are:

That the act performed would be an offense against persons or property;

That the act was done with evil intent; and

That its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual. (Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009)

That the act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision of the RPC.

What are the 2 kinds of inherent impossibility?

1.) Legal impossibility - occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. It
would apply to those circumstances where

the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;

there is intention to perform the physical act;

there is a performance of the intended physical act; and

the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. (Intod vs. CA)

Examples:

A. Killing a person already dead. A dead person cannot be injured or killed again. (People vs. Balmores, 85
Phil. 493 (1950) Of the offender knew that the victim is already dead when he stabbed him, he will not be
liable for an impossible crime because his mind was not criminal.

B. X stole a watch from the possession of C which turned out to be the watch he owns but lost 2 weeks
earlier. X cannot be the thief of his own property. In theft, it is essential that the offender take a personal
property belonging to another.

2.) Factual impossibility - occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.

Examples:

A. A man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and
finds the pocket empty.

B. X shoots the place where he thought his victim Z would be, although in reality, Z was not present in said
place.

Four culprits, all armed with firearms and with intent to kill, went to the intended victim’s house and after
having pinpointed the latter’s bedroom, all four fired at and riddled the said room with bullets, thinking that
the intended victim was already there as it was about 10:00 in the evening. It so happened that the intended
victim did not come home that evening and so was not in her bedroom at that time. Eventually the culprits
were prosecuted and convicted by the trial court for attempted murder. CA affirmed the judgment but the SC
modified the same and held the petitioner liable only for the so-called impossible crime. (Intod vs. CA, G.R.
No. 103119, October 21, 1992)

C. Accused was a collector for a company called Mega Foam Int’l Inc. and received a P10,000 check as
payment from a Mega Foam customer. However, instead of turning over the check to Mega Foam, the
accused took the check and had it deposited into her brother-in-law’s bank account. It turns out the the
check was not funded.

In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime
against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check
meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the
check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it
was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at
the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out
to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received
the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check. (Jacinto vs. People)

What will be the liability of the offender if the crime is not produced although there is adequate or effectual
means employed?

If the crime is not produced although there is adequate or effectual means employed, it cannot be
impossible crime but a frustrated felony. So, if a sufficient quantity of poison was administered to the victim
but he did not die, the felony was not produced due to his possible impunity to the poison, which is an act
independent of the will of the offender. (Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review)

The act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision of the RPC

● A administered abortive drugs upon his girlfriend B whom he believed to be pregnant which turned out not
to be true. B became ill for more than 30 days. B will not be liable for impossible crime of abortion but for for
serious physical injuries.

● A, with intent to take the watch of B who was then leaning on a tree, stabbed the latter and then took his
watch. It turned out that B had been dead hours before. What crime/s were committed?

If B were alive before he was stabbed, A would have been liable for robbery with homicide. Seemingly, A is
liable for impossible crime of homicide because there is an inherent impossibility of killing B because the
latter was already dead before the assault. But A could not be liable for impossible crime of homicide
because also committed another crime which is theft. Thus, A is liable for theft.

● A was driving his car around Roxas Boulevard when a person hitched a ride. Because this person was
exquisitely dressed, A readily welcomed the fellow inside his car and he continued driving. When he
reached a motel, A suddenly swerved his car inside. A started kissing his passenger, but he found out that
his passenger was not a woman but a man, and so he pushed him out of the car, and gave him fist blows. Is
an impossible crime committed? If not, is there any crime committed at all?

It cannot be an impossible crime, because the act would have been a crime against chastity. The crime is
physical injuries or acts of lasciviousness, if this was done against the will of the passenger. There are two
ways of committing acts of lasciviousness. Under Article 336, where the acts of lasciviousness were
committed under circumstances of rape, meaning to say, there is employment of violence or intimidation or
the victim is deprived of reason. Even if the victim is a man, the crime of acts of lasciviousness is
committed. This is a crime that is not limited to a victim who is a woman. Acts of lasciviousness require a
victim to be a woman only when it is committed under circumstances of seduction. If it is committed under
the circumstances of rape, the victim may be a man or a woman.

Is there an impossible crime of rape?

Yes, because rape now is a crime against persons. Ex. A raped the corpse of Z. (Boado, Notes and Cases
on the Revised Penal Code)

Why is impossible crime punished?

● The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. (Intod vs. CA)

● The purpose of punishing impossible crime is to suppress criminal propensity or criminal tendencies.
Objectively, the offender has not committed a felony, but subjectively, he is a criminal.

What is the penalty for impossible crime?

When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the
same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its
nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially
inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree
of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200
to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, RPC)
CASE DIGEST
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELITON BUYCO
G.R. No. L-539 January 27, 1948

FACTS:

 During a dance on a feast in barrio Trapiche, municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo, there was a
verbal brawl followed by a fist fight between Cornelio Soliman and an unknown individual who later
resulted to be a resident of Iloilo City.
 Eusebio Davila, Chief of Police of Oton, and Juanito Espera, a municipal policeman, intervened to
pacify the fighters but the incident was hardly pacified when a third party intervened attacking
Cornelio Soliman and knocked him to the ground;
 Eusebio Davila attempted to help Cornelio Soliman to his feet, at that moment, the accused Meliton
Buyco, now appellant, who was on patrol with his six companions, fired in the air two discharges
from his Thompson submachine gun;
 Buyco is a first class private of the Military Police in said province.
 Eusebio Davila, who saw Meliton Buyco fire, approached the latter and prohibited him from firing
again to avoid personal injury among those present;
 Meliton Buyco replied that Davila leave him alone because he was an agent of the law;
 minutes later Meliton Buyco got hold of Apolonio Ikoy and pushed him forward, firing at him with a
discharge from his Thompson submachine gun which killed him right then and there.
 Another bullet of the same discharge by Meliton Buyco found its mark in the body of Irineo
Gellangala, who was in almost a straight line from the spot from which Apolonio Ikoy was; that Irineo
Gellangala fell and died instantaneously;
 The accused appellant Meliton Buyco fired another shot aimed at a group of persons, among them
Pedro Zambales and his son Napoleon Zambales, and a bullet of this last shot hit Napoleon
Zambales, who died after six days in St. Paul's Hospital, City of Iloilo;
 Eusebio Davila tried to place Meliton Buyco under arrest, but the latter threatened him with his
Thompson submachine gun, and when Eusebio Davila attempted to help the three wounded
persons, Meliton Buyco warned him to withdraw from the spot, and Eusebio Davila stopped from his
purpose through fear that he might be another victim of Meliton Buyco.
 The defense delivered a different story. The defense stated that they arrived at barrio Trapiche from
their station in Guimbal, near the auditorium where a dance was being held; they heard that a fight
was going on inside the auditorium causing public disorder which the municipal policemen under
the command of Chief Eusebio Davila could not pacify; their group intervened in the fight to pacify
the combatants, but were unsuccessful; that one of the combatants hurled himself against their
companion, took his rifle and aimed the same at him, who had fallen on the ground; that the
appellant, upon seeing this, fired a shot from his Thompson submachine gun at the individual who
afterwards resulted to be Apolonio Ikoy, the latter falling dead; that after these events, and for fear of
reprisal which might come from the relatives of Apolonio Ikoy, the group fled from the place and
finally reached their detachment station in Guimbal, where they reported the incident to their chief,
Lt. Belo.
 The trial judge did not believe the version given by the defense and held that the defendant was
guilty of the crime charged; namely, triple murder.
 Buyco appealed the judgement.

RULING:

Apolonio Ikoy and Irineo Gellangala died from bullets discharged by the same shot which was aimed at the
former. It will be remembered that the shot was fired from a submachine gun and, as already stated, it
appears that the appellant to fixed the mechanism of his submachine gun that a single pull at the trigger
would fire several bullets automatically in succession. Viada (Vol. II, 5th ed., p. 529), commenting on article
90 of the Spanish Penal Code, corresponding to article 48 of our Revised Penal Code, gives an example of
the first case mentioned therein of a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies as
follows: A person fire a gun against another with intention to kill the latter, and not only kills him but also a
third person who was beside the victim: here, he says we have a single act, a single shot, which produces
two homicides. In the instant case, as regards Apolonio Ikoy, the evidence discloses that, while Apolonio
Ikoy had his back towards Meliton Buyco, the defendant-appellant, the latter got hold of the former's right
shoulder, pushed him forward and while Ikoy's body was moving in the direction of the push, Buyco fired at
this back (t.s.n., p. 14). It, therefore, appears that the aggressor employed means, methods or froms in the
execution of the crime which tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself from
the defense which the offended party might make — that the act was committed with treachery. This
qualified the killing of Apolonio Ikoy as murder (Rev. Penal Code, art. 248).

The killing of Irineo Gellangala under the evidence must be classified as homicide, because the wrongful act
done consisting in the killing of Ireneo Gellangala constituted a felony (delito) for which said agent is
criminally liable, pursuant to article 4, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.

As to the death of Napoleon Zambales, the evidence reveals that it resulted from another and different shot
by the same defendant-appellant from the same gun. The evidence discloses that after discharging the shot
which killed Apolonio Ikoy and Irineo Gellangala, the accused holding his gun with the barrel pointing the
direction where he was facing, changed his position to face toward one side and fired another burst from the
gun, which shot hit Napoleon Zambales (t.s.n. p. 5). Six days later this third victim died in St. Paul's
Hospital. Under art. 249, in relation to article 4, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, the instant
defendant must be held to have thereby committed the crime of homicide.

The penalty corresponding to the killing of Napoleon Zambales, there being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, is reclusion temporal in its medium period (Revised Penal Code. art. 249).

The judgment appealed from is hereby modified so that appellant Meliton Buyco, as he is hereby, convicted
of the crime of murder complexed with homicide for the deaths of Apolonio Ikoy and Irineo Gellangala, for
which, pursuant to article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, in the opinion of a majority of this Court the penalty
of death should be imposed upon him, but there being no unanimity in this respect, said penalty is hereby
lowered to reclusion perpetua; and he is hereby convicted of the crime of homicide, without any modifying
circumstance, for the death of Napoleon Zambales, for which the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor to 14 year, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal is hereby imposed on him, pursuant
to article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation with section 1 of Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence
Law), as amended by section 1 of Act No. 4225. In all other respects, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed. So ordered.
CASE DIGEST
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIRILO MAGALONA y ONOON alias "WILLIAM”
G.R. No. 143294 July 17, 2003

On May 25, 1994, at around 3:30 a.m. of said date, while the spouses Rosendo and Rosario Arimbuyutan
and their children were sleeping in their hut, there was an explosion beneath the floor. The explosion killed
Resty and injured Rosario, Roldan, Rosemarie and Rosalie. It also caused a small crater on the ground and
damage to the hut up to the roof.

The victims were first brought to the medical center of the neighboring town of La Paz, Tarlac, and then to
the Tarlac Provincial Hospital.

At around 8 a.m. of May 25, 1994, Police Officer Rodolfo Gutierrez of the Philippine National Police of
Zaragoza, together with two police officers and a photographer, investigated the grenade-throwing incident.
According to Gutierrez, based on the sworn statements of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., Bienvenido Sabater
and Adelina Mendoza, the suspect was appellant Cirilo Magalona alias William. They did not search for
appellant anymore because Barangay Captain Florentino Almeda of Sta. Lucia, Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija,
brought him to the police station in the morning of May 25, 1994. Almeda told Gutierrez that since appellant
became a suspect of a rape case, appellant had already been in his (Almeda) custody up to the time he was
surrendered to the police authorities. The rape incident was reported to the police authorities on May 24,
1994 at 2 p.m.

Bienvenido Sabater, immediate neighbor or the Arimbuyutans, narrated that at around 3:30 a.m. of May 25,
1994, he saw a person, named William, pass by in front of his hut and the hut of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr.
He also saw William hiding behind the acacia tree in front of his hut, which was about five (5) to six (6)
meters away. Said acacia tree was between his hut and the hut of Arimbuyutan. Then he saw an explosion
under the floor of the hut of Arimbuyutan and saw William running towards the direction of the "flood
control."

Upon hearing the explosion, he saw William run away, and when he noticed that William was not with
somebody, he stood up. He heard the family of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. crying.

Adelina Mendoza, 71 years old, a housekeeper, testified that she knew appellant because he was her
neighbor. At midnight of May 22, 1994, while she was drinking coffee in her house at Sitio Ablang, appellant
knocked at her door and conversed with her. He told her that he was very angry at Rosendo Arimbuyutan,
Sr. and that he would return and kill him.

In the hearing scheduled on July 18, 1997, appellant did not appear in court. The trial court ordered the
Provincial Warden of Nueva Ecija to explain why he should not be held in contempt for the non-appearance
of appellant during the said hearing. In his letter, the Provincial Warden explained that pursuant to a
COMELEC Resolution, the Provincial Jail was under the control of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
starting April 23, 1995. He stated that the policemen assigned to the Provincial Jail ordered appellant to
guard a co-detainee who was confined in the hospital and who died on July 8, 1997. After the detainee's
death, appellant did not return to the Provincial Jail.

The Court issued an Order dated August 21, 1997 directing the PNP Provincial Director of Nueva Ecija to
investigate the escape of appellant, The Court order deemed the appellant to have waived his right to
present evidence. Consequently, the case was considered submitted for decision.

The trial court pronounced judgment that it finds the accused CIRILO MAGALONA guilty of the crime of
MURDER with Multiple Frustrated Murder and Multiple Attempted Murder, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, and to pay the Spouses Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. and Rosario
Arimbuyutan FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnity for the death of their son Resty
Arimbuyutan, moral damages of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and actual damages
of TWENTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P21,400.00).

On May 21, 1999, the Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail of Nueva Ecija informed the trial court that
appellant had been arrested and was detained at the Provincial Jail.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Avelina Mendoza and Bienvenido Sabater.

Appellant asserts that the trial court should not have given any probative value to Avelina Mendoza's
testimony in determining the motive behind the incident for two reasons: First, the witness and appellant are
not long-time acquaintances, having talked to each other only once. The alleged revelation to kill Rosendo
Arimbuyutan, Sr. to a stranger during a visit at midnight is contrary to ordinary human experience. Second,
Mendoza is the aunt of complainant Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr.

RULING:

Even if appellant, in detonating a hand grenade under the hut of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., intended to kill
Rosendo, but instead killed his son, Resty, and seriously injured other family members, appellant is liable for
all the consequences of his unlawful act. Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity
of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. Where malice or intention to cause
injury exists, the act should be qualified by the felony it has produced.

The trial court, however, incorrectly stated that the killing was also attended by the qualifying circumstance
of treachery. Absent any particulars on the manner in which the aggression was commenced, treachery
cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved
with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. Nevertheless, the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of explosion, which was alleged in the Information, is sufficient to qualify the killing to murder.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Cirilo Magalona GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder and double attempted
murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is hereby AFFIRMED with modification. Appellant
is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Resty Arimbuyutan, civil indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000); temperate damages in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) and moral
damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000). Appellant is also ordered to pay the spouses
Rosendo and Rosario Arimbuyutan actual damages in the amount of Six Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos
and Five Centavos (P6,900.05).

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code,
upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of the pardoning power.

G.R. No. L-10470 October 1, 1915

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FILEMON BAYUTAS, defendant-appellant.