Greek Jewry and Nazi Germany:

The Holocaust and its Antecendents

Hagen Fleischer*

The Jewish presence in Greece has been longer and - until the Holocaust - also more varied than in any other
European country. This variety was not only a consequence of diverse cultural origins - Greek speaking Romaniotes
settling there from antiquity, Ashkenazim and Hispanophone Sephardim who had found refuge in Greece escaping
from pogroms in various parts of the continent - but likewise reflected different degrees of social and cultural
integration into the general population. This was not unrelated to the differing ability of the various groups of Greek
Jewry to cope with the most terrible threat in their age-long history. Thus, when exposed to the totalitarian
persecution by the Nazi authorities, the remarkable regional differences in the survival percentages - e.g. between
Thessaloniki and the Thessalian communities - can not be seen as accidental.
From the Nazi viewpoint, their goal required that they drive a wedge between their potential victims and the
Orthodox Greeks. One of their favourite methods was using historic arguments provided to them by compliant
collaborators. The daily New Europe, created in Thessaloniki as a mouthpiece for the occupiers, indulged in stories
which were supposed to prove the Un-Greekness of the Greek Jews and their intrigues with the enemy camps, every
time the national cause was at stake. 1 The preferred cases were incidents when current enemies of the German Reich
could be accused at the same time; such was the case with the British blockade of the Piraeus in 1849, in support of
the exorbitant claims of the famous Don Pacifico (who anyhow was not a Greek but a Portuguese Jew with British
citizenship). Although this clearly was an incident of great Power's gunboat-diplomacy in favour of her subjects, it
served perfectly Nazi propaganda, almost a century later, as an illustration of the denounced complicity between
British imperialism and Jewish plutocracy. It was, however, easier to find plausible seeming examples from the
centuries of Turkish rule. The otherwise ominous year of 1453, the fall of Constantinople, had never been anathema to
the Jews, rather the contrary. The Ottoman conquest of the last Byzantine strongholds had only effected the Christian
population, meaning a painful encroachment upon their traditional liberties and privileges. This was not the case for
the Romaniote Jews. Although they had previously enjoyed relatively comfortable conditions of life 2 - compared with
their Ashkenazim brethren in Northern and Eastern Europe and due to their higher degree of social integration - the
millet system of the new Muslim masters put them virtually on the same footing with the Christian majority. Often, in
concrete application, the Jews even fared better, since the Ottoman authorities valued their economic and organizing
abilities, considering them also as a potential counterweight against the Orthodox population. For these reasons, the
Turks rarely, if ever, hesitated to invite Jewish refugees to settle within the confines of their Empire whenever a new
wave of anti-Judaism shook Christian Europe. 3
* This is an updated version of the author's contribution to: Association pour l'Étude des Juifs de Grèce (ed.), Les Juifs en Grèce: Questions
d'Histoire dans la longue durée (Athens: Gavriilidis, 1995), pp. 185-208. The second part of this article includes information from extensive
research on this subject, which has been presented in an extended fashion, including a more detailed bibliography: Hagen Fleischer,
“Griechenland”, in: Wolfgang Benz (ed.): Dimension des Völkermords. Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus. (München:
Oldenbourg, 1991), pp. 241-274. For the general context see: Hagen Fleischer, Im Kreuzschatten der Mächte. Griechenland 1941-1944
(Okkupation, Resistance, Kollaboration), (Frankfurt, Berne, New York 1986), 2 vol., and its enlarged Greek version: Stemma kai Swastika. I
Ellada tis Katochis kai tis Antistasis, 1941-1944 (Athens: Papazisis, 1988, 1995). There (vol. II) see also the relevant chapter “Shoah”, pp.
296-348. -
The first part of this article, referring to the relations between Germany and Greek Jewry before World War II, was rendered possible thanks to
repeated travel grants by the Gerda Henkel Foundation, Düsseldorf, supporting various projects of his.
The whole study relies - apart from a variety of published material, including newspapers from the period in question - primarily on the
unpublished records from the following archives: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (hereafter: PAAA): Bundesarchiv, Berlin
(hereafter: BArch); Public Record Office, London (hereafter: PRO); Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives Diplomatiques, Paris
(hereafter: AD); National Archives and Records Administration, Washington (hereafter: NARA); Archives of Greek Foreign Ministry, Athens
(hereafter: AYE).
1Nea Evropi, 1941-1944, passim. The first great anti-Jewish campaign began rather appropriately on the Führer's birthday (20.4.41).
2 There were some notable exceptions to that rule, namely the destruction of 230 communities by the Emperor Basil II, at the beginning of our
milennium, an assault which, however was rapidly overcome thanks to the vitality of Greek Jewry (and the infrequency of such pogroms). In
general, it can be concluded: "Although the Jew was restricted, he was in a much better position than Christian heretics." ( Encyclopaedia
Judaica, vol. 7, Greece, c. 873).
3 Already before the final collapse of Byzantium, the Turks welcomed Ashkenazim refugees from Bavaria into newly conquered Thessaloniki.
But it was sultan Bayezid II who set the classical example for his successors when he invited the Iberian Jews who had been expelled by the
Edict of Grenada by the self-styled Catholic Majesties Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, in 1492. Many of those Sephardim preferred to settle
 Under such auspices, it was understandable that the Jewish element felt safe(r) under Turkish rule. The Jews
reacted adversely to the Greek revolution in 18214 and with mixed feelings to the doubling of Greece's territory,
including Thessaloniki, subsequent to the victorious Balkan wars. Later, the champions of Nazi and collaborationist
propaganda would make the utmost out of this, without referring to the fact that, at least in the early phases, the
Jewish forebodings repeatedly proved to be true. Moreover, they failed to mention that at the beginning of our century
the detested "non-Greek-like" attitude of great parts of Greek Jewry consisted in being, to some extent, pro-German.
The reasons were rather obvious. Although following the emancipation of the German Jews a century before, in
1812, social discrimination remained traceable, just as did anti-Semitism, in broad segments of the (pre-Nazi) German
society the German Jews lived with the Christian majority of the country in "a highly developed symbiosis". In
consequence, even Jewish scholars agree that "probably nowhere in the world of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was there such a notable collaboration between the majority and the Jewish minority as in Germany". 5
Particularly in Berlin, the relatively young capital of the young state Prussia and, by 1871, of the newly created
German Reich, the rudimentary "bourgeois patriciate (...) essentially came forth from Jewry"; the admired salons of
the long-established and respected aristocratic Jewish families (e. g. Herz, Varnhagen, Beer/Meyerbeer,
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Liebermann) attracted also non Jewish exponents of cultural life from all of Germany. 6
Already during the positioning phase before World War I, Jewish sympathies in neutral places (including Thessaloniki)
usually sided with the Central Powers, Germany and Austria, which were considered the natural opponents of Russia,
the country in which, at that point, Anti-Semitism had been the most institutionalized. Reciprocally not only did the
public opinion in metropolitan Germany have a relatively positive attitude towards the Sephardic bastion in
Macedonia7 but also the small German-speaking colony in Thessaloniki itself lived in harmony with the Jewish
majority. It was possible to trace down social contacts and, at least, one joint German-Jewish enterprise (von
Pfister-Assael8), and it is even of greater interest that, both with language and with religious criteria, the Sephardic
element was by far the strongest at the German school in the town. 9 After the sudden collapse of the Ottoman position
in the Balkans, the majority of the small German colony in the Macedonian capital reacted in a similar way to the
majority of the Jews: with a "certain reserve towards the new Greek administration". 10
Given all these circumstances, it is not odd that influential Jewish circles in Thessaloniki and otherwere called then
for a "compromise" solution of establishing an international status of the town under Austrian aegis. 11 Yet when this
project proved to be unfeasible, the community soon came to terms with the new Greek masters, particularly since
down in the recently depopulated seaport at the Thermaic Gulf with its geographically advantageous position, transforming it soon into Little
Jerusalem. (Compare Joseph Nehama's important seven volume work Histoire des Israélites de Salonique. Significant is the title of the third
volume: L'âge d'or du Séfaradisme Salonicien (1536-1593); see likewise: M. Franco, Essai sur I'Histoire des Israélites de I'Empire Ottoman
depuis les Origines jusqu'à nos jours, Constantinople 1897 (re-edited, Paris 1981). Valuable information on a particular aspect is to be found
in: Paul Dumont, "The Social Structure of the Jewish Community of Salonica at the End of the Nineteenth Century", Southeastern Europe /
L'Europe du Sud-Est, 5 Pt. 2 (1979), pp. 33-72. Soon Thessaloniki developped into a safehaven for Jewish refugees from all over Europe, the
last big wave following the Russian pogroms of 1881 and 1903, when a new neighbourhood was erected for them by Baron Hirsch, carrying
henceforth his name. It was a macabrious decision to transform the Baron Hirsch quarters, in early 1943, from an asylum into a closed ghetto
and transit camp on the way to the crematoria of Auschwitz.
4 Because of their support of Ottoman rule, thousands of Jews were massacred along with the Turks in Tripolitsa and other towns captured by
Greek insurgents. Even now, no Greek textbook refers to this black page in the Greek war of independence from Ottoman rule.
5 Kurt Schwerin, “German Compensation for Victims of Nazi Persecutions”, Northwestern University Law Review, 67 (Sept. - Oct. 1972), p.
482, and literature listed there. In smaller towns, however, progress towards emancipation often was, although steady, clearly slower. In this
context, compare, e.g., the excellent case study on the Bavarian town of Würzburg by Ursula Gehring-Münzel, Vom Schutzjuden zum
Staatsbürger. Die gesellschaftliche Integration der Würzburger Juden 1803-1871 (Würzburg: Schöningh, 1992), especially pp. 379-540.
6Karl Scheffler, Berlin. Ein Stadtschicksal (Berlin-Westend, 1910), pp. 124 ff.
7 One source, which was not otherwise free from anti-Semitic stereotypes, noted expressly that the Sephardim were "among the races of Salonica
perhaps the most vital one, a people composed of the strongest porters and harbour workers. That's why there is a nearly total absence of that
physical degeneration which is so often to be found in Jews of other places". Dr. A. Petermanns Mitteilungen aus Justus Perthes'
Geographischer Anstalt, XXXIV/162 (1908), p. 358.
8 Max Brunau, Das Deutschtum in Mazedonien (Stuttgart, 1925), p. 19. See also Rena Molho, " 'Le Cercle de Salonique' 1873-1958. Λέσχη
Θεσσαλovικέωv: Συμβoλή στη μελέτη της αστικής τάξης της Θεσσαλovίκης", in: Les Juifs en Grèce, pp. 103-127.
9 See the statistics in Jahresbericht der Deutschen Schule und der Kaufmännischen Fortbildungsschule in Saloniki, ed. by the (probably
Jewish) school director August Sigmund (Thessaloniki, 1911), p. 35. In addition, by 1910, director Sigmund and his staff organized evening
classes in German for adults - again with a remarkably high participation of the Sephardic element (Brunau, op. cit., p. 67). In comparison, at
the German school in Athens, about 5% of the pupils were of Jewish faith - all of them Ashkenazim, as shown by their names (Deutsche
Schule in Athen, Bericht über das XII. Schuljahr. Athens, Dec. 1908, pp. 18-20). However, the French schools naturally attracted the bulk of
Jewish children. It is interesting that André Havard, director of the Lycée Français in 1935-1940 would complain subsequently: "A mon arrivée
à Salonique, toute l'influence intellectuelle française était concentrée entre les mains des dirigeants de I'association exclusivement israélite des
'Anciens élèves de la Mission Laique Française', qui depuis de longues années organisaient des conférences en son local particulier. Il n'est
nullement exaggéré d'affirmer que l'élément français n'avait pas de relations avec l'élite grecque de la ville. Le Lycée, comme je vous l'ai exposé
plus haut, était considéré comme un établissement juif.” Therefore, Havard tried hard to “supprimer le monopole israélite de l'influence
intellectuelle française" (AD, Guerre 1939-1945, Vichy-Oeuvres, vol. 42: A. Havard, Compte-Rendu de gestion du Lycée de Salonique, 1941).
- Compare also: Hagen Fleischer, "Zwischen Goebbels und Goethe. 100 Jahre deutsche kulturelle Präsenz in Thessaloniki und Mazedonien",
Thetis 5/6 (1999), pp. 321 ff.
0 10 Brunau, op. cit., p. 40. Compare also: Bernard Pierron, Juifs et chrétiens de la Grèce moderne. Histoire des relations
intercommunitaires de 1821 à 1945 (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1996), pp. 60f., 77ff.
11 Rena Molho, “I evraiki koinotita kai i entaxi tis sto elliniko kratos (1912-1919)”, in: I Thessaloniki meta to 1912 (Thessaloniki, 1986).
prime minister Venizelos initiated a rather philo-Semitic policy.12 Nevertheless, during the inner-Greek schism with
regard to the participation of the country in the war, the overwhelming majority of the Jews sided against him, with
the (neutralist or Germanophile) Gounaris faction. At this stage, the pro-Entente propaganda, exerted primarily by the
French troops and by L'Indépendent, a francophone newspaper edited by a local Jew with French subsidies, had only
limited success.13 After the Great War, "the Zionist organisations of germanophile tendency" 14 could not longer expect
any support from the truncated German and Austrian states; in consequence, the autonomist faction in local Jewry
found its bearings, in particular, from the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Paris which - referring to the right of
self-determination - attempted to obtain French patronage for their aspiration of turning Thessaloniki into a Free City
(using the bait of offering a French port!). In spite of certain French sympathies for this project 15, there was never a
real chance for its realization, at least not with the pro-Entente Venizelos as prime minister and leader of the Greek
delegation at the Peace Conference. However, even in 1922, the German consul in Thessaloniki, Dr. Fabricius,
reported to Berlin that "the local Israelite element" still would consider autonomy as the best solution for the town,
particularly as it would thereby remain connected with its economic hinterland: yet the community, "by its nature, was
not capable of taking independent political action and would never dare to act in a conspiratorial way". 16 At the same
time, the German-Jewish relations in the Macedonian capital continued to be cordial, as they had been before the War.
For instance, at the Feast of Tabernacles (Soucoth) of 1921, Fabricius attended the reception organized by the new
Chief Rabbi Bension Uziel who had already advised his community twice to follow the example of energy and
diligence shown by heavily afflicted Germany. The consul, who was clearly impressed by the personality of the Rabbi,
informed Berlin that he intended to cultivate further the relations with him, taking into consideration also the social
and political importance of Jewry in Thessaloniki.17 The German attitude was clearly influenced by economic interests
expressly recognizing the good reputation enjoyed by the Jewish firms in the Macedonian capital. At the same time,
the German consul was criticizing certain anti-Jewish measures established by the government which obviously
corresponded to similar tendencies in the Orthodox population, especially among the refugees from Asia Minor.18
For more than a decade, the representatives of the Weimar republic obviously stuck to this line; beyond that, it
should be mentioned that one of the most prominent members of the German colony in Greece, the director of the
Archaeological Institute in Athens, professor Georg Karo, was Jewish himself, although baptized.19
Relations deteriorated almost immediately after Hitler came to power in late January 1933. The flourishing
Sephardic newspapers had publicly attacked the racist attitudes and encroachments of the new regime, 20 and the
German minister in Athens reported that - contrary to the general opinion in Greece which had allegedly reacted
positively to the inner-German developments - Thessaloniki constituted an exception due to the efforts of its
influential Jewish community.21 Indeed the latter had even passed a sharply worded resolution, denouncing the
"medieval terror exerted by Hitler's government", and submitted it to the highest authorities of the Greek state and to

2 12 Molho, “Venizelos and the Jewish Community of Salonica, 1912-1919", Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, XIII: 3 & 4 (Fall-Winter
1986), pp. 113-123. - Subsequently, there has been some criticism accusing Venizelos of anti-Semitism. (e. g.: The American Jewish
Committee, Governments-in-Exile on Jewish Rights. New York 1942, p. 28). This was both unjust and simplifying. Venizelos personally
almost always demonstrated good will towards the Jewish element so that, occasionally, he was even accused by Nazi propaganda of being a
Jew himself (e.g. "Griechenland ohne Romantik", Brüxer Zeitung, 20.11.40). The same good will was certainly not applied by all of his
followers, especially those among the refugees from Asia Minor, although the Jews of Salonica had collected an extraordinary high amount in
their benefit (PAAA, R 72687: Deutsches Konsulat Salonik, 1769/30.10.1922). See also: George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic.
Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1936, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 257f.
3 13 Molho, Venizelos, p. 119; Brunau, op. cit., pp. 46, 67; AD, Europe 1918-1940, Allemagne, vol. 756: M. de Billy, ministre de France en
Grèce, note 17.9.19.
414 Note de M. de Billy, 17.9.19 (see previous reference).
5 15 See e. g. the letter written by the head of the Service de la Propagande to Foreign Minister Pichon, 8.2.19; compare also: Alliance
Israélite Universelle to Pichon, 12.2.19 (AD, Europe 1918-1940, vol. Grèce 69).
616 PAAA, R 72687: Deutsches Konsulat Salonik, 1624/28.9.1922.
717 PAAA, R 72683: Deutsches Konsulat Salonik, 316/18.10.21.
8 18 PAAA, R 72612: Deutsches Konsulat Salonik, 464/12.8.25. - Even in the early stage of the occupation, economic relations with some
enterprises in the Reich were going on, a fact which caused some concerns in the related quarters of German administration.
9 19 Given his personal reputation, the Nazis did not dare to replace him in 1933, as they originally intended, and allowed him to stay until he
reached the age of retirement.
0 20 Remarkably enough, since the francophone newspapers had a considerable number of non-Jewish (foreign or not) readers, the German
consul felt the necessity to respond to articles about “les atrocités hitlériennes” with a “démenti formel et catégorique”. He would not repeat this
"test case" (using the English term in his own wording), since he gave the Jewish press the desired opportunity of commenting sarcastically the
mendacity of the "national socialist language" and the intense "blackness" of the Nazi dictatorship, darker even in comparison with other
regimes of terror (e. g. L'Indépendent, 19.3.33: PAAA, R 72615: Deutsches Konsulat Salonik 134/Pol. 1, 29.3.33). On the contrary,
international reaction to the Nazi persecution of German Jewry was "extremely weak" (See e.g. Schwerin, op. cit., p. 484). Although, in October
1933, the League of Nations appointed James G. McDonald as its High Commissioner for refugees from Germany, the latter never obtained real
authority to act, since the League did not want to antagonize the Reich. In consequence, McDonald, who had worked extremely hard, resigned
in disappointment two years later (ibid., p. 485).
121 PAAA, R 72614: Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen, II D (S.A.)., 21.4.33.
the German legation.22 The German consul in Volos, Scheffel, having lived there for a long time and apparently critical
towards Nazi methods, warned his superiors against the psychological and practical consequences of the anti-Jewish
measures in the Reich, predicting a detrimental impact on German trade in Greece. 23
However, when the Jews initiated counter-measures such as demonstrations and boycotts of German goods, the
Tsaldaris government prohibited these actions, which allegedly intended to intervene in internal German affairs while
also refusing to take the above protests, as demanded, to the League of Nations. It should be noted here that
Tsaldaris' obvious decision to appease the Reich, as being Greece's top trade partner, was primarily due to heavy
pressure not only by the anti-Semitic EEE24 and other extreme right-wing groups but also by the influential local
newspaper Makedonia and, particularly, the powerful tobacco lobby.25 In other aspects, however, the government of
the Populist party took clearly a more friendly attitude towards the Jewish minority than the previous - Venizelist -
regime had had. This was a normal reaction, as the bulk of the Sephardic electorate in Thessaloniki had been voting
constantly for the anti-Venizelists since 1915/16, when it, for the first time, participated in Greek elections. 26 Since
during the same time a solid minority consistently sided with the extreme Left, 27 the prospects for the Liberals
remained weak. This constellation did not change substantially in spite of occasional Venizelist as well as Jewish
attempts to bridge the gap.
It is of interest, however, that - after 1933 - the German diplomats in Athens as well as the decision makers in the
Wilhelmstrasse of Berlin were profoundly irritated by this unforeseen and "wrong" affiliation on the Greek scene.
Quite confusingly alliances had turned upside down: the traditional allies of Germany in the Populist, i.e. the anti-
Venizelist camp were associated with a minority population which was considered the Reich's principal enemy on a
world-wide scale, while the latter were at loggerheads with the Venizelists - which for two decades were considered
by the Germans to be the tools of French policy, having led their country into the Great War against the Central
Powers. Among those incidents which puzzled the vigilant German observers was the governmental decision to
recognize the Jewish Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement) as an official holiday, putting it on a par with the Orthodox
ones. The Germans considered this an "odd blunder" on the part of the Government, hoping that it would be
cancelled. In this they were exactly in tune with most of the Liberal press which heavily criticized that decision as
courting the Jews.28 So it was almost a logical conclusion that Velidis, the director of the Makedonia - leading
Venizelist (and traditionally anti-German but, at the same time, rabidly anti-Jewish) newspaper of Thessaloniki -
secretly approached the new consul Dietl and other representatives of the Nazi regime, asking them for a printing
press of one of the great (Jewish or Leftist) newspapers which had been closed down in Germany, offering them in
return a discreet gradual reorientation and a positive reporting on the "Third Reich".29
In addition, Berlin and the Greek Liberals also matched each other - unexpectedly - in the arena of foreign policy.
Both sides equally disliked the decision of the Tsaldaris government, in 1933-34, to push the Balkan Treaty project,
which, ever since Versailles, had been considered a key in the antirevisionist strategy of the Quai d'Orsay and
therefore was anathema to any German Foreign Ministry regardless of its political colour. Conversely, the reason for
Venizelos' opposition was that the new scheme overthrew his complicated system of bilateral treaties and "friendship
with everyone".30 Only this context makes comprehensible the fact that during the attempted Venizelist coup in March
1935, Berlin maintained a strictly neutral stand, contrary to most western governments which openly sided with

22 PAAA, R. 72615: Communauté Israélite Salonique, 161/19.4.33.

323 PAAA, R 72615: Deutsches Konsulat Volo, 31.3.33.
4 24 AYE, 1933 A/11 1: Head of Press Office, Thessaloniki, 745/31.3.33. The fascistic National Union Hellas (EEE) and Makedonia were
behind the notorius Campbell riots in 1931, named after the Jewish shanty-town devastated by "angry nationalists". These disturbances were
the climax of an incendiary campain - both literally and metaphorically - that accused the Maccabee Sport Club in particular and the entire
Sephardic community of Thessaloniki in general of conspireing with Bulgarians to have Macedonia break off from Greece. (NARA, Rg
868.4016/58-62, AYE, Archives of the History of the Greek Jews, 1931, passim; Pierron, pp. 173ff.).
5 25 PAAA, R 72615: Deutsches Konsulat Salonik, 136/Pol. 1, 1.4.33: Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen, 11 D (S.A.), 3.4.33; see also: "Une
interdiction", Le Progrès, 1.4.33; Messager d'Athènes, 3.4.33. Compare also the pertinent exchange of telegrams in AYE, 1933 A 11/1.
Finally, great tobacco firms approached the German foreign ministry, denouncing the fact that still Christian German enterprises were trading
and cooperating with Jewish partners in Thessaloniki, offering instead their own good services (E. g.: BArch, 09.01/4263 1: A. Ch.
Sterghiades, 19.1.34).
626 Molho, Venizelos, pp. 118f.; Compare e.g. PAAA, R 72652: Deutsches Konsulat Salonik, 1871/31.10.23; Mavrogordatos, pp. 237ff.
727 PAAA, R 72686: Deutsches Konsulat Salonik, 333/4.12.26; and others.
828 PAAA, R 72655: Deutsches Konsulat Salonik, 487/J., 10. 11.33.
9 29 PAAA, Presse-Abt., Griechenland 3: Deutsches Konsulat Salonik 54/Pol. II, 30.1.34; 153/Pol. II, 19.4.34;235/Pol. II, 13.5.34; and
others. With regard to the Makedonia, the local US representative had complained much earlier that "this yellow journal of the worst sort had
always been noted for its violent attacks against Jews and foreigners" (E.g. NARA, Rg 59: American Consulate General Thessaloniki,
19.12.23, 868.4016/47).
0 30 As for the whole intricate issue of German relations with Venizelos see Hagen Fleischer, "Post bellum. Das deutsche Venizelos-Bild
nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg”, in: Gunnar Hering (ed.), Dimensionen griechischer Literatur und Geschichte. Festschrift für Pavlos Tzermias
zum 65. Geburtstag (Frankfurt a. M., Bern, New York: Peter Lang, 1992), pp. 209-249.
Tsaldaris against the "criminal adventure" of their former ally Venizelos!31 In order to put things straight, it should be
mentioned however that potential German sympathies for the Greek Liberals and their leader waned abruptly, when
Venizelos, a few months before his death, pleaded for the necessity of Greek unity in face of an imminent new World
War which would be provoked once more by the German Reich.32
In consequence, at the elections of January 1936, the Germans even considered intervening in case the Venizelists
would form the government;33 at the same time, they were puzzled when they realized that the Jewish electorate not
only persisted in their voting against the Liberals but even "quite overwhelmingly" hardened their opposition within
the anti-Venizelist camp by deserting Tsaldaris' more moderate Populist party in favour of his radical rival Kondylis.34
The big strikes in spring 1936 disturbed the Germans only insofar as they were afraid their considerable stockpile
of tobacco stored in Macedonian warehouses could get spoiled due to neglect or careless handling.35 Berlin never felt
alarmed about the possibility of a Communist bid for power in Greece but the fact that the center of strikers’ activities
was Thessaloniki with its high Jewish population made it rather easy for the German newspapers to lump the principal
enemies of the "Third Reich" together, on the usual Nazi propaganda lines.36 They adopted also the bogey of the
Communist danger which after August 4, 1936, served Metaxas and his royal sponsor for justifying their coup d' état
and the subsequent dictatorship. In consequence, the Nazi press unanimously praised the "reconstruction" if not
"renaissance" of Greece which was allegedly established by the fact that there was, at last, just as in so many other
countries of Europe, an authoritarian regime which had taken over. Accordingly, in taking power, Metaxas had put an
end to the period of "decadence" which was put down to the supposed Greek mimicking of the "bankrupt" pattern of
Western democracy.37
It should be noted here that, in contrast with the rather simplistic picture, prevailing in Greek public opinion and
even scholarly publications, Metaxas had not always been Germany's favourite choice for the political scene in Athens.
Under the auspices of Weimar, the general's affiliation with imperial Germany was not considered necessarily as an
asset, and especially after the events of 1922-23, in the Wilhelmstrasse the negative estimations about his "ambitious"
and "opportunistic" behaviour, his "political myopia" and, even, his "fascist allures" clearly prevailed for over a
decade.38 A thorough scholarly study of the relations between Nazi Germany and Metaxas' "fatherly dictatorship" 39
still remains a desideratum40 particularly since the existing literature mostly reduces the subject to the obvious mutual
ideological sympathies or superficial analogies. As for foreign policy orientation, Berlin, however, had no illusions that
the Reich's political and economic interests would be served better by the new authoritarian regime - given Metaxas'
loyalty to an anglophile king - than had been done by the previous clearly germanophile governments led by Tsaldaris
and Demertzis.41 In addition, the otherwise sympathetic German observers doubtless disapproved of the fact that the
supposedly akin regime displayed a remarkable amount of tolerance, if not more, towards the "Israelite element"
under its rule. Metaxas and his leading collaborators (Maniadakis, Kotzias, Louvaris etc.) publicly assured the Jews
that they were to enjoy equal rights with all other citizens, being considered likewise "children of the new Greek state"
just as they themselves considered this state as their fatherland. The quality of the propagated new cordial secular
relations is documented by a frequent exchange of friendly telegrams and other messages between the leading
exponents of the regime and the Jewish communities, in particular those of Thessaloniki and Athens. The dictator
expressed his thanks for his inscription into the Livre d'or du Fond National Juif; the Jewish press rendered homage,
even in the form of poems, to the founder of the regime and its youth organization; the chief rabbi Dr. Zvi Koretz

131 Ibid.
232 Eleftheron Vima, 17.11.35; PAAA, R 72614, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen, tel. 103/18.11.35.
33 PAAA, R 72664: Deutsche Gesandtschaft, II GJ 1/28.1.36.
4 34 PAAA, R 72656: Deutsches Konsulat Salonik, 78 Pol V, 11.2.36. The German diplomats were also concerned about the fact that the
second wife of the - otherwise quite germanophile - new foreign minister Theotokis was Jewish. (PAAA, R 72656: Deutsche Gesandtschaft
Athen, 12.10.35; PAAA, Geheimakten Griechenland, Pol 2, 94/5.11.35).
535 PAAA, Ha-Pol. Wiehl 14/2, Griechenland 2: AA 49/12.5.36.
6 36 See already Franz Baron von Weyssenhoff, “Griechenland und Deutschland”, Europäische Revue X:8 (August 1934), p. 513; compare
also Hagen Fleischer, "Griechenland. Das bestrittene Phänomen", in: Hermann Graml, Angelika Königseder and Juliane Wetzel (eds.),
Vorurteil und Rassenhaß. Antisemitismus in den faschistischen Bewegungen Europas, (Berlin: Metropol, 2001), pp. 207-226, here: pp. 214,
222.
7 37 There is a plethora of pertinent articles, most of them clearly betraying the German approach in their titles. Compare e. g.:
“Griechenlands innere Gefahren”, Münchener Neueste Nachrichten (6.8.36); “Kopf hoch, wir marschieren! Der Neubau Griechenlands”,
Völkischer Beobachter (5.9.36); “Wiedergeburt: Regierung und Volk im Neuen Griechenland”, Berliner Börsenzeitung (5.11.36); “Sechs
Monate autoritärer Aufbau in Griechenland”, Völkischer Beobachter (9.2.37); “Autoritäres Griechenland”, Germania (9.6.38).
838 Fleischer, Post bellum, pp. 219f.
939 See: “Vier Jahre Väterliche Diktatur”, National-Zeitung (4.8.40).
0 40 A useful survey is given in the article of Renate Meissner,” I ethnikososialistiki Germania kai i Ellada kata ti diarkeia tis metaxikis
diktatorias,” in: Hagen Fleischer and Nikos Svoronos (eds.), I Ellada 1936-1944: Diktatoria -Katochi - Antistasi, (Athens: ATE, 1989), pp.
50-58.
141 Compare e.g. PAAA, R 72664: Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen II GJ 1, Politischer Bericht (18.3.36).
gave public lectures on The Jews and the 4th of August. The Jewish journalists almost exceeded their gentile
colleagues in displaying their patriotic and nationalist feelings: The various name-days of Metaxas, the King, the
Diadoch etc. were celebrated with ostentation, and much publicity was given to anniversaries of victorious battles in
the Balkan wars and especially to the liberation of Thessaloniki and the armistice respectively the German surrender,
ending World War I. 42 In return, the regime outlawed the rabidly anti-Semitic EEE with its undisputed links to Nazi
agencies. The latter, however, will refrain from open criticism as long as diplomatic considerations had to be kept in
mind. Only later will they denounce that fact that the Greek "Jews enjoyed full liberties and led a peaceful life".43
In fact, Metaxas had clearly curtailed the acrid commentaries of Jewish (as well as of non-Jewish) newspapers on
Nazi Germany's racial policy. Still critical reports appeared, even in a camouflaged way, and the Nazi authorities
would not forget this.44 Since the censorship would not allow open negative comments, the Jewish press had recourse
to reprinting relevant information from foreign news agencies and dailies. Although this strategy necessarily included
also occasional printing of reports of German manufacturing, the predominance of British and especially of French
sources is obvious. In this way, there were frequent references to the plight of the Jews (but also of other disparate
populations) in the Reich as well as in the various newly-occupied countries (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland etc.) -
including physical violence and public humiliation, economic deprivation, expulsion and even homicide. Those reports
on racial persecution were contrasted by references to the relief work done on the part of private or state authorities in
most West European countries to Jewish refugees and, in particular, to children. 45 Moreover, in the international
arena, the selection of the news and, even more, their placing clearly revealed the side Jewish sympathies were on.
There were frequent articles/reprints with regard to the Nazi racial theories (even including references to lectures
given by Goebbels and cohorts) as well as reports concerning nazi activities in most parts of Europe and about Hitler's
geostrategic ambitions. Finally, the Jewish press gave conspicuous publicity to assorted major or minor events which
for some reason were offensive to Greater Germany and the belief system prevailing there. Such cases were the
activities of anti-Nazi Germans inside or outside the Reich; the (pre-war) desertion of two German soldiers to France;
the instantaneous defeat of the boxing champion Max Schmeling, the great white (Aryan) hope, by the black Joe
Louis in front of a fanaticised mostly Jewish audience in New York; and, last but not least, the conversion to Judaism
of a German girl in order to marry a Thessalonikian Jew she had fallen in love with!46
However, there was a noteworthy absence of reporting on the active contribution of Greek Jewry itself. The
Metaxas regime obviously had asked for discretion on this point, while it tolerated the ongoing activities of the Jewish
communities which rendered, ever since 1933, moral and material support of their persecuted brethren from Germany
and other countries which successively had fallen under German rule or influence. Hundreds of emigrés took refuge in
Greece, thousands were aided in going on to Cyprus, 47 Palestine or to other places still free. The notorious
"Sonderkommando Rosenberg", a Nazi task force for the hunting of all ideological foes, would summarize later: "The

2 42 L'Indépendent, e. g. 27.8., 27.9., 10.11., 13.11.1937; 4.8., 5.8., 5.9., 26.10., 27.10.1938; 30.1.39; Nikolaos Louvaris, “Katochi, o
Golgothas enos ethnous”, Ethnikos Kiryx (8.4.50); and many others. - This shows the absurdity of the allegation (in an other-wise useful survey
article) that "Metaxas suspended all Jewish French language newspapers". (Steven Bowman, “Jews in Wartime Greece”, in: Michael R.
Marrus (ed.), The "Final Solution" Outside Germany, vol. 1 (London, 1989), p. 300.
3 43 F. Bachmann, “Der Einfluss des Judentums in Griechenland”, Volk im Osten, 4 (1943), pp. 60f.; compare also: Die Judenfrage
(15.11.1940), pp. 179ff.; Messager d'Athènes (9.9.1936).
44 See infra, ref. 54.
5 45 I'Indépendent, passim. - Very rarely the newspaper named, in this context, its own correspondents as its sources. One such case was the
report on the all Germany pogrom, the notorious Crystal Night (ibid., 11.11.38).
646 E. g. L'Indépendent (30.9.37, 13.11.39, 5.9.38, 18.8.38, 14.1.38).
7 47 Already in autumn 1933, Arabian and Greek newspapers had reported on rumours that the British Government allegedly contemplated
settling 50,000 German Jews on Cyprus. The Colonial Office made clear that this was a canard which was possibly based on enquiries made by
Jewish circles with regard to the private acquisition of land in Cyprus. (PRO, London, F.O. 371/16773: C 9759; C 10261). Since the rumours
alleged that this settlement of Jews, (to be followed by the settlement of Assyrians), denoted British intention to alter the ethnological status of
Cyprus to the detriment of the Greek inhabitants (ibd.), the possibility of a deliberate German plant cannot be excluded. Among the actual
emigrés, only a limited number decided (or were allowed) to stay any length of time on the island. A month after the German invasion of
Greece, the community authorities of Nicosia reported to the Colonial Secretary the presence of a total of 460 foreign Jews on Cyprus. Most of
them came from Nazi-controlled countries: 163 from Austria, 92 from Germany herself, 40 from Romania, 31 from Poland, etc. Remarkably
enough, there was not a single one from Greece. (Dimosio Archeio Kyprou: SAI/670/ 1941, report 6.5.41. I am indebted to my former student,
Mr. Ch. Pittas, for this information.) It is interesting in this context that the Estia polemized against any acceptance of Jewish refugees from
Germany in Greece and therefore was eagerly quoted by the central organ of the Nazi party (e. g. Völkischer Beobachter [22.8.34]). It should be
added that, during the Twenties, the Estia, alternately subsidized by French and British agencies, had taken the most rabidly anti-German stand
among the Venizelist press; accordingly, after the Second World War, it was the only paper of the Rightist spectre of the political landscape, to
which it meanwhile belonged, that constantly agitated against the Federal Republic. (Compare e.g.: Fleischer, Post bellum, p. 221).
Remarkably, the only longer period when this newspaper applauded Germany, by a degree which indeed raised suspicions, was that of Hitler's
Third Reich. Estia was therefore praized by the Nazi press and diplomats as an excellent paper which worthily represented Greek fascism and
consequently often expressed its vivid sympathies for the new Germany [Dr. Max Fischer, “Griechenlands Faschismus”, Berliner Tageblatt
(21.4.34); PAAA, Presse-Abt. Griechenland I.: Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen II P2/19.6.36; compare also: Giorgos Sepheris, Politiko
Imerologio, I, 1935-1944 (Athens: Ikaros, 1979), pp. 18f, 24 (27.10.40, 25.3.41)].
Greek Jews rendered valuable help to world Jewry by transferring great numbers of Jewish refugees from Central
Europe, by legal or illegal means, to Palestine".48
In fact, after having reached Greece, the tidal wave of refugees split into two main streams. With the assistance of
the Jewish emigration agencies in Thessaloniki and Athens/Piraeus respectively, they continued - according to their
preferences and/or the given opportunities - to the Middle East or, via Portugal, to America. 49 In both cases, a
considerable percentage of the men liable to military service would sooner or later return to Europe in order to fight
back.
Although the bulk of those refugees considered Greece only as an interim stop in their search for a final safehaven,
hundreds of them remained there. According to the Greek census of Octobre 1940, out of 536 Germanophone
Israelites 434 still had in daily use their mother tongue. Most of them must have been recent refugees, the same was
certainly true for the 406 Ashkenazim who daily communicated in languages other than the listed ones and which
obviously were those of German-occupied Eastern Central Europe. 50 Yet their peaceful life, begrudged them by the
Nazi spies, was short and deceptive. A few days after the census had been completed, the Italian assault involved
Greece in the war. The Jews fulfilled their duty, fighting just as any other Greeks. Mordechai Frizis, a Jewish colonel
from Chalkis, was one of the first officers - and reportedly the highest ranking one - to fall at the Albanian front, and a
considerable number of Greek Jews were killed, wounded or decorated. 51 Inspite of the vigilance of the Metaxas
regime which tried hard not to irritate Mussolini's teutonic partners who apparently still remained neutral, the Jewish
newspapers repeatedly succeeded in delivering their message: Apart from general patriotic appeals, "to defend our
dear Fatherland, the independence and territorial integrity of eternal Greece" (Koretz), there were frequent
proclamations to rally against defeatists and unspecified "friends of the enemy" who were quite obviously to be
indentified with Germans and local Germanophiles. The Jewish Community of Athens applied to the great
communities abroad, also in neutral countries, to assist valiant Greece, "where the barbarian racial doctrines have not
met with any response".52
When the Greek army defeated the Italian invaders, this humiliation of the Axis partner virtually obliged Germany
to intervene, and the Wehrmacht was far too powerful for the exhausted Greek defenders and the weak British
expeditionary force to stop. Soon the victors discovered, with a malicious delight, among the prisoners taken by them,
a number of German and Austrian Jews who had volunteered for British army service.53
In May 1941, the conquered country was divided up into three zones of occupation. Since Hitler had, at least in
theory, recognized the preponderanza, the Italian hegemony in Greece, the latter became entitled to take the lion's
share of the spoils; the Bulgarians received Thrace and Eastern Macedonia, whereas the Germans retained only a few
key positions: Piraeus, Central Macedonia with Thessaloniki and some islands of strategic importance including the
greater part of Crete.
Due to this tripartite division of the country, the Nazis hesitated to apply the notorious Nuremberg racial laws even
in their own zone, because they found it hard to persuade their Bulgarian and Italian partners in that direction. On the
other hand, the SD (Sicherheitsdienst) and other Nazi agencies, which had undertaken the extermination of Jewry,
preferred a coordinated action of all occupation powers. That's why in the meantime, they resentfully contented
themselves with measures which rarely exceeded the level of individual disruption, such as confiscation and billeting,
closing of Jewish-held bookstores (Molho in Thessaloniki and Kaufman in Athens), suspension of the last Sephardic
newspaper, Messagero, and several arrests of persons of political importance - among them former deputies and
journalists who had been the sharpest critics of Nazi methods during the past years 54 - and, particularly, of refugees of

848 BArch, NS 30/75: Abschlußbericht über die Tätigkeit des Sonderkommandos Rosenberg in Griechenland, 15.11.41.
949 Compare, e.g., PAAA, Inland II A/B, 295/2: Chef SiPo/SD VI D4 AZ, 8.8.1940; and PAAA, Inland IIg/391: Chef SiPo/SD D Il 419g,
11.6.1940.
0 50 This conclusion was confirmed in several interviews conducted by the author, e.g. with Dr. Joseph Löwinger, the late president of the
Central Jewish Council in Greece (who had escaped from Hungary while his wife came from Austria), and with Mrs. Hella Cougno-Löwi
whose parents had left Czechoslovakia, immediately prior to its occupation by the Wehrmacht. - Because of the war events and other
difficulties, the final results of the census had been published more than twenty years later, as matter of comparison with the census of 1951:
“Royaume de Grèce, Office National de Statistique”, Résultats du Recensement de la Population effectué le 7 Avril 1951, I. (Athens, 1961),
pp. CXV f., CXVIII.
1 51 Concerning the Jewish soldiers killed in action, see the lists compiled from the files of the Greek general staff, in: Chronika (ed. KIS,
Athens) 128 (1993), pp. 9ff. During occupation, the collaborationist press accused the Jews of having obtained their decorations under false
pretences. (E. g. Nea Evropi, 3.3.43). As for M. Frizis, see the exchange of telegrams between his widow Victoria and Metaxas: L'Indépendent,
16.12.40. Compare also Koretz' telegram to her: “Son sacrifice pour la victoire de la Patrie rehausse le prestige du judaisme de Grèce. [...] Le
souvenir de sa mort héroique sera une source d'inspiration patriotique pour notre jeunesse et pour tous les israélites de Grèce” (ibid., 17.12.40).
252 L'Indépendent (2.11., 11.11., 14.11.40); and many others.
353 Frankfurter Zeitung (25.5.41).
454 Michael Molho, In Memoriam. Hommage aux victimes juives des Nazis en Grèce (Thessaloniki, 1948), vol. I, p. 52.
German origin who were considered potential (and potent) spies because of their knowledge of German language and
mentality.55
The ostensible lack of collective repression during the first year of occupation produced a false sense of security. 56
However, a vigilant observer could have perceived preparatory measures indicating more sinister schemes: The
foundation of a fascist organ, the newspaper New Europe which tried - largely in vain - to arouse anti-Semitic
sentiments among the Greek population;57 the establishment of a compliant presidency in the Thessaloniki community;
and, in particular, the appearance of a so-called Jewish Affairs Commission (Rosenberg Commando) which not only
confiscated priceless elements of Jewish culture and religion but - much more dangerously - they tried to get hold of
the exact numeric strength and other data of all the communities, thus creating the statistical preconditions for a
wholesale round up.
It is time to briefly discuss the issue of what was the actual number of Jews living in Greece, in 1941. The statistics
which are given in the existing literature usually refer to the survivors who had been counted in 1945 and compare
them to a number "prior to the Holocaust" - unspecified as to its exact date and not naming any sources; then the first
number is subtracted from the second, and the difference is quoted as being precisely the toll of lives which was taken
away by the Nazi Moloch. The main problem of this approach lies in the vague initial data. The most frequent
estimations amount to a pre-Holocaust population of 73,000, 75,477 or 77,317 Greek Jews, without specifying if
those of the then Italian-held Dodecanese were included. Some other numbers are even considerably higher. 58 They all
can be found already in publications of 1945-46, at a time when the 1940 census had not yet been accessible or, at
least, had not been evaluated, so they were founded either on rather arbitrary estimates, in uncomplete community
records or on the previous census of 1928, with a higher share of Jewish population and anyhow not particularly
reliable. At least in the first phase of reconnaissance the German experts faced similar problems. The perhaps most
prominent of them, J. Pohl, even considered the first and already too high estimates of his agency (amounting to
78,500) as too low, suspecting deliberate deception attempted by several Jewish communities. 59 Obviously he did not
know that the earlier trend toward Jewish emigration had been enhanced, for a number of mostly economic reasons,
during the 1920s and early 1930s.60 In fact, the results of the October 1940 census, although not yet known, gave only
67,591 "Israelites" (including foreigners and listed according to faith given in identity cards) living inside Greece. 61 To
this number approximately 2,000 Jews living under Italian rule in the Dodecanese must be added, as well as a small
number of Jews who were not counted for various reasons, such as the wish by refugees not to be registered in any
way. As a result, the most likely total number of Jews living in Greece when the Wehrmacht invaded was
approximately 72,000.62 As has been stressed earlier, the involved German authorities initially expected a rather higher
number.

5 5 Reichssicherheitshauptamt IV B 4b - 247/42 (1148), 11.7.42, published in: Daniel Carpi, Nuovi Documenti per la Storia dell'Olocausto
in Grecia - L'Attegiamento degli Italiani (1941-1943), Michael, VII (1981), Tel Aviv, p. 173. At the same time, unfortunately the
germanophone refugees from Germany and other occupied countries were often suspected to be German spies (e.g. Yomtov Yakoel,
Apomnimonevmata 1941-1943 [ed. by Frankiski Ambatzopoulou], Thessaloniki 1993, pp. 38, 54). Under the given circumstances of the
German terror regime, in the twilight of dubiety and horror, such mistrust would hardly appear unreasonable; nevertheless, these charges were
entirely unjustified with regard to the huge majority of the emigrés, as clearly shown by the extant German records.
656 L. S. Stavrianos, “The Jews of Greece”, Journal of Central European Affairs, 8 (1948), p. 260; likewise: Molho, op. cit., I, p. 42.
7 57 The first such campaign was started on Hitler's birthday (see ref. 1). It was obviously not very successful, because seven months later,
when the Sonderkommando Rosenberg left Greece, their leader still complained: "Up to now, the average Greek scarcely comprehends that
there exists a Jewish problem. He does not see the political danger emanating from world Jewry and he believes himself to be safe from a
cultural and economic dominance by the Jews because of their relatively small numbers." (BArch, NS 30/ 75: Abschlußbericht, 15.11.41). With
regard to the isssue of antisemitism in Greece, see also Fleischer, Das bestrittene Phänomen, passim.
858 See the quotations in: Fleischer, Griechenland, p. 247.
9 59 After some personal inquiries, he estimated a number of about 100,000! (J. Pohl, “Die Zahl der Juden in Griechenland”, Weltkampf, 3
[1942], pp. 221f.)
0 60 More than 20,000 Greek Jews (almost exclusively Sephardim) emigrated in the twenties and thirties - in particular to the Middle East,
France, Italy and South America. Many of them stayed in Paris where, in November 1942, at least 5,000 fell prey to the German occupiers who
deported them to Auschwitz. (Israilitiki Koinotis Thessalonikis, In Memoriam [= Greek version of the augmented edition by Molho and
Nehama], [Thessaloniki, 1976], p. 253). Concerning Jewish emigration to France see already the report of the French consul in Thessaloniki to
prime minister Millerand, 78/18.8.20, AD, Europe 1918-1940, Grèce, vol. 69). - A different case were the about 10,000 semi-Islamized
Donmehs who had been evacuated to Turkey, subsequent to the exchange of populations, decreed by the Lausanne treaty. Taking into
consideration the fact that the Germans in practice did not deport the bulk of baptised Jews from Greece, and given Berlin's diplomatic courtesy
towards Ankara, the Donmehs probably would have survived anyhow.
1 61 Recensement, p. CXVII - When classified according to language, 53,125 declared they spoke Spanish or Judeo-Spanish, 52,731 of
whom were of Jewish faith. From the difference, the 327 Greek Orthodoxs obviously were converted Sephardim, while the few Catholics must
have been largely employees of the Spanish or Latin American legation or businessmen of "Aryan" origin.
2 62 The German term was Glaubensjuden (people of Jewish faith or belief), in contrast to Rassejuden, i.e. people of Jewish race. In the
Reich itself, as well as in many other countries, the Nazis made almost no distinction between these categories, since Hitler and his doctrine had
labelled "the Jewish race" and not their religion as "world enemy". In Greece, however, the baptized Jews were almost always married to
orthodox partners and so, although the pertinent German orders did not exempt them, they were usually not deported and did not suffer a
harsher fate than the average Greek. (Compare Fleischer, Griechenland, p. 249). Anyhow, it would have been difficult for the SD to track down
particularly the converted Romaniote Jews, since they could not be identified either by religious or language criteria and were largely intgrated
into the mainstream population.
 The first visible incident of racial persecution on a mass scale was the public registration - under humiliating
conditions - of thousands of male Jews.63 Subsequently, about 3,500 men without permanent employment were sent
off to forced labour battalions employed especially in the construction of roads and airfields. By October, at least 12%
of the conscripted men had died because of malaria, pneumonia or the cruel working conditions.64 Then, the exhausted
survivors were allowed to return since the community had offered, after long bargaining, a ransom of two and
one-half billion drachmas, equivalent to about 8,000 gold sovereigns. In addition, the community was compelled to
agree to the expropriation of the 450 year old cemetery, containing almost half a million graves. Without hesitation,
the cemetery was systematically pillaged as a quarry for the whole city, historical tombstones being used as paving
stones or as building material.65
Yet, the respite for the distressed community, acquired at such a high price, was all too short. At the end of 1942,
the main plotters of the so-called "Final solution" in Berlin had lost their patience. Himmler and Eichmann sent some
of their most proven collaborators to Athens. The chief of this commando, Dieter Wisliceny, informed the leading
German agencies in Greece that the Jewish colony must be considered a fifth column in case of an Allied invasion and
therefore had to be evacuated into a "compact settling area" in order to work there for the German war industry. The
exclusive responsibility for the deportation should rest with the SD, seconded by the Wehrmacht department for
military administration in Thessaloniki, whereas no intervention was to be allowed from the German embassy - which
until then had tacitly tried to restrain the action by taking advantage from the Italian delaying tactics. 66
Then, authorized by Hitler himself, the SD started in Thessaloniki the countdown for Auschwitz. 67 After a few
preliminaries, an order was issued, on the 6th of February, 1943, that all Jews, as well as their shops and offices, were
to be marked by a yellow Star and they had to concentrate in special ghetto quarters which were fenced and guarded.
A supplementary order defined precisely the term of Jewish identity and, by successive regulations, within a few days,
all Jews were forbidden to belong to any professional or corporate organization, to use the telephone, the tramway or
any other kind of conveyance. After nightfall, the Jews were forbidden to circulate, not even by foot, and they were
not allowed to change their domicile without permission. Trespassers were shot outright.
To enforce the German orders, a Jewish police was recruited from among the lowest elements. These bandit-like
auxiliaries collaborated unreservedly with their masters and even exceeded them in cruelty - with the false hope that,
in this way, they would be able to save their skin.
On the 1st of March, every Jewish family was required to list all their belongings, using forms, so detailed that they
even included furniture and domestic animals. For the "administration" of this property, a week later a new agency
YDIP (Υπηρεσία Διαχειρήσεως Iσραηλιτικής Περιoυσίας) was constituted and, by a subsequent rush of new
regulations, virtually any sort of Jewish property was expropriated and ostentatiously transferred to the Greek State -
to be passed on often to informers and collaborators.
On Sunday, March 14th, the Jews were assembled to listen to their chief rabbi Koretz. The rabbi, an Ashkenazim
from Poland who, 20 years before, had received a Ph.D. in Vienna - which by a macabre coincidence was based on a
comparative analysis about traditional descriptions of hell68 - had a huge share of responsibility by continuously
persuading his flock not to provoke the Germans by flight or disobedience. Now, once more, he tried to soothe his
audience by telling them in the brightest colours that they were going to be evacuated to Poland, where they would
find a new and better home.69

363 See the order for this in Nea Evropi (9.7.42).

464 See references in: Fleischer, Griechenland, pp. 250 f.
565 See references in: Fleischer, Griechenland, p. 251. In addition: Yakoel, op. cit., pp. 84ff.; Pierron, op. cit., pp. 199ff.
6 6 Archives of Generalstaatsanwaltschaft beim Landgericht Berlin, case against Max Merten et al., 3P(K) Js 10/60, passim, in particular:
vol. V, folios 193 ff.; vol. VI, 26ff, vol. VII, 42, vol. XIV, 14, 41, 85f.; Georg Vogel, Diplomat unter Hitler und Adenauer (Düsseldorf: Econ,
1969), pp. 94 ff. After the war, veterans of the Wehrmacht usually asserted that regular army units had not been implicated at all in deportations
which were handled exclusively by the SS and SD. Moreover, they hardly knew anything about the anti-Jewish measures and especially nothing
about their final fate. (Compare, e. g., the repeated claims of the former Austrian president Kurt Waldheim that he had been "unaware of the
deportations of Jews from Saloniki until recently" [ 1986!].) These allegations do not hold up under critical examination, since we have ample
documentary evidence to the contrary with regard to virtually all occupied countries. As for Greece, the instrumental role of the military
administration (Merten) closely cooperating with the SD commando in Thessaloniki is well-established. The heavy involvement of the
Wehrmacht in deportations becomes even more obvious in the racial cleansing of Crete, Rhodes and other islands where no SS or SD units
were deployed. Likewise, there is evidence from testimonies that not only "the fact of deportations of Jews was generally known" but that "it
was also generally known among us that the deported Jews were to be sent to concentration camps for physical liquidation. Despite all attempts
to maintain secrecy, this had leaked through nevertheless." International Commission of Historians, The Waldheim Report (Copenhagen:
Museum Tusculanum Press, 1993), pp. 100 ff.
7 67 As for the subsequent orders, issued by the Befehlshaber Saloniki-Ägäis, Abt. Militärverwaltung (Dr. Merten), see Nea Evropi, 6.2.43
ff, as well as Molho, In Memoriam, vol. 1, pp. 59ff. and 135 ff.
8 68 Hirsch S. Koretz, "Die Schilderung der Hölle im Koran und ihre Vorbilder in der jüdischen Literatur", type-written dissertation, Univ. of
Vienna 1925.
9 69 GStA. Berlin, 3P(K) Js 10/60, vol. III, 22 ff; I.A. Matarasso, Ki'omos oloi tous den pethanan (Athens, 1948), pp. 37ff. - Although
Koretz' share of responsibility for the gruesome fate of his flock cannot be denied, this is however mainly confined to his lack of decisiveness
and his illusionary naivety, combined with a certain amount of personal ambitiousness. In consequence, the accusations against him - including
 The next morning, about 2,400 ghetto inmates were herded into 40 freight cars overloaded to twice their capacity.
Five days later, the sealed train arrived at Auschwitz. There, after an initial selection, 1,791 Jews were sent
immediately into the gas chamber - especially those who were considered unfit for hard work: women, children and
elderly people.70
Another fifteen convoys left Salonica from then until the middle of May, when military requirements for slave
labour within Greece caused a brief interlude. However, by August the last Jews were deported from the formerly
Sephardic metropolis. In total, their number amounted to almost 45,200, including also the members of the other
communities under German rule.71
The Jews within the Bulgarian occupation zone met an even harder fate, if such a thing is possible. It should be
noted here that Sofia clearly differentiated between their Jews on nationalist considerations. The Regime, after
considerable internal pressure from the Church and even the Sobranje, successfully tried to protect those Jews within
the old confines of the country. Yet an entirely opposite stand was taken in the Greek regions of Eastern Macedonia
and Thrace, where the Bulgarian annexation plans presupposed the riddance of other ethnic groups - Orthodox
Greeks and Jews alike - in order to create ample living space for Bulgarian settlers. In consequence, the Bulgarian
authorities readily agreed with a pertinent German proposal and in a lightning action, on the night of March 3rd, all
communities in their zone were rounded up. Almost 4,200 Jews were transported to the harbour of Lom and were
loaded into frail river-boats. According to conflicting reports, at least one of the vessels capsized, drowning some of
the captive Jews in the Danube. The others were handed over to the SD at the Austrian border. From here they were
transported to the crematoria of Treblinka and, obviously without exception, exterminated. The virtually total absence
of any surviving witnesses makes their fate one of the least known chapters of the Holocaust. 72
At the same time, the Italians had successfully blocked all Nazi attempts to introduce their model of applied "racial
superiority" into central and southern Greece. In fact, their diplomatic and military representatives in Thessaloniki had
helped many Jews to escape to Athens, even by attestation of Italian citizenship, often granted on the most flimsy
evidence. The German records testify to the intense anger of the SD because of the "uncooperative" and "stubborn"
behaviour of their Axis partner.73
Yet in September 1943, subsequent to the surrender of the Badoglio government, the Wehrmacht gained control
of all the Italian-held territories and Greek Jews lost their last asylum. Their only chance for survival depended on
their having learned their lessons from the atrocious fate of their co-religionists in Thessaloniki. Indeed, prudent
officials of several communities destroyed existing lists of names and addresses. Many Jews went into hiding,
supported usually by the general Greek population, and many followed the chief Rabbis of Athens (Elias Barzilai) and
of Volos (Moshe Pesah) who took refuge in the mountains where the predominant guerrilla movement of EAM-ELAS
had created a kind of free state which could be invaded only temporarily and only by strong units of the German
Wehrmacht. This help was ascertained in a letter by Barzilai to the Allied Military Mission in Greece, written on July
13th, 1944.74 Until the end of the occupation, two thousand Jews or more were assisted in their escape to the Middle
East.
Unfortunately, there were several Jewish leaders who still preferred to imitate the fatal appeasement policy of
Koretz. The disastrous results can be seen at best in the colony of Jannina75 and the (Italian-speaking) Jewry of Corfu
which both paid a heavy tribute of over 90% dead to the Nazi moloch. In addition to this pernicious strategy, both

even the charge of conscious treason - in most of the relevant publications (and in personal communication) are grossly oversimplified. It should
be added that in 1933, when the Greek authorities discussed the designated new arch-rabbi's application for Greek citizenship, the German
Foreign Ministry warned them confidentially against Koretz: The latter were an ardent and most active Zionist, and particularly dangerous due
to his administrative skill and his outstanding eloquence. While reporting this, the Greek ambassador, however, considered it only fair to add
that the anti-Jewish (and anti-Polish) bias prevailing among the new German rulers had "possibly affected, in some way, their opinion on Dr.
Koretz". (AYE, 1933 A/2 I/IV: Greek Legation Berlin, 561/11.3.33, Confid.).
070 Danuta Czech, “Deportation und Vernichtung der griechischen Juden im KL Auschwitz”, Hefte von Auschwitz, 11 (1970), p. 24a.
1 71 Fleischer, Griechenland, p. 269. See also the author's detailed table with regard to the deportations, discussing at the same time the often
contradictory data (ibidem, pp. 273f. and Fleischer, Stemma kai Swastika, II, pp. 344ff.).
2 72 Compare references and conclusions in: Fleischer, Griechenland, pp. 255ff, Hans Joachim Hoppe, “BuIgarien”, in: Dimension des
VöIkermords, op. cit., pp. 275-310. See also the recent study, with much new material although somewhat too enthusiastic about the Bulgarian
role: Michael Bar-Zohar, Beyond Hitler's Grasp: The heroic rescue of Bulgaria's Jews (Holbrook, Mass. 1999).
3 73 PAAA, Inland IIg/191: Inland II, 1588/4.6.1943; Carpi, op. cit., p. 157; Léon Poliakov and Jacques Sabille, Gli Ebrei sotto
l'occupazione Italiana (Milano, 1956), pp. 159ff; Molho, In Memoriam, I, pp. 123ff. - In fact, the Italian consul general G. Zamboni had full
backing from his superiors, since they had advised him ad agire con criteri larghezza (see telegrams in Carpi, pp. 178 ff.). See also the
“Excerpts from the Salonika Diary of Lucillo Merci” (February - August 1943), compiled by Joseph Rochlitz, in: Yad Vashem Studies, XVIII
(1987), pp. 293-323. (Merci was sent to the Italian consulate in Thessaloniki in the capacity of a translator and liaison officer with the German
authorities.)
4 74 PRO, F.O. 371/43690: R 11387. Elsewhere, particularly in Thessaloniki, EAM provided the Jewish community only with little
assistance. On the overall issue of Greek Gentile assistance to the Jews, see: Barbara Spengler-Axiopoulos, " 'Wenn ihr den Juden helft, kämpft
ihr gegen die Besatzer.' Der Untergang der griechischen Juden.", in: Wolfgang Benz and Juliane Wetzel (eds.), Solidarität und Hilfe für Juden
während der NS-Zeit. Regionalstudien I (Berlin, 1996), pp. 135-186.
575 Rachel Dalven, “The Holocaust in Janina”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, II: 1 (May 1984), pp. 97-103.
communities displayed other similarities with Thessaloniki. They likewise differed either in language or, at least, in
habits from their fellow citizens, and this distinction was underlined by the circumstance that they continued living in
their centuries old Jewish Quarters (Ta Ovraika). This striking lack of integration (combined with a strong economic
position) and a consequential shortage of applied solidarity from their social environment, made the job for the Nazi
head-hunters rather easy.76
In contrast, the Jews of Athens were largely hellenised and had clearly Greek conscience, lived scattered
throughout the city, so that the Germans never managed to obtain accurate information about their numbers and
where-abouts. Therefore the SD resolved to wait for more than half a year, attempting to entice the hidden Jews to
register by a combined strategy of threats, promises and even distribution of food. Nevertheless, when in March 1944
it was finally decided to strike at all remaining communities on the mainland in a concerted action, less than half of the
Athenian Jews were caught in the trap. In the large cities of Thessaly, even more than 80% managed to escape to the
guerrilla controlled areas which were in convenient proximity. In general, survival was only possible thanks to the
assistance rendered by Greeks of all political colours, organized or not. The Orthodox church - from the lower clergy
to Archbishop Damaskinos, who also submitted strong worded protests to the occupation and collaboration
authorities77 - saved many Jews by means of (mostly faked) baptismal credentials. So did the police under Angelos
Evert, by issuing false identity cards, under the very noses of the occupation authorities". 78 Even the collaborationist
governments expressed some solidarity with their proscribed Jewish subjects.
Yet it should be remembered that the greatest or, at least, the most effective contribution was made by the
resistance groups and mainly by EAM-ELAS. Since this organization, in contrast to its rank and file, had a
predominantly Communist leadership, its connection with the still wealthy Jewish factor annoyed the always vigilant
British Government, which even considered intervening in order to prevent Jewish money from falling into the hands
of the Leftist movement. Churchill himself stopped such schemes, which anyhow could hardly have been realized,
using however a rather macabrious logic.79
Helping the Jews more were the diplomats of several neutral and Axis-satellite missions in Athens, in particular
those of Turkey, Spain,80 Argentina and Hungary. It should be mentioned here that the Hungarian ambassador Velics
was an outspoken anti-Nazi, certainly influenced by his Jewish wife and the Greek wife (a sister of Elias Tsirimokos)
of his first councillor. When the SD got onto their tracks, they fled with the help of EAM to the Middle East. Among
those who escaped in this way was Joseph Löwinger, who, after the war, became President of the Central Jewish
Council in Athens.81
Finally, it is the moment to discuss the number of casualties. From the roughly 72,000 Jews in Greece in 1941 only
about 17% would survive until liberation: about 8,500 managed to hide within Greece, another 2,000 fled to the
Middle East and other countries, whereas about the same number survived the hell of the Nazi concentration camps.
The latter group consisted of survivors from Auschwitz, and of the majority out of 600 so-called privileged Jews who
had been deported to Bergen-Belsen, a camp which originally was not intended for extermination. These were Jews
with neutral, especially Spanish, citizenship or members of the Judenrat council, of the entourage of Rabbi Koretz.

6 76 On Corfu, the SD succeeded in mobilizing the urban mob for anti-semitic outrages, an event which is considered by a local historian as
one of the most disgraceful pages in the history of the island (Konst. Daphnis, Chronia polemou kai katochis: Kerkyra 1940-1944 [Kerkyra,
1966], pp. 292f.). Compare also the trial against the Jewish renegade Rekanatis who served as an interpreter for the SD ( Evraiki Estia,
4.7.1947), as well as his subsequent deposition (Staatsanwaltschaft Bremen, 29 Js 1/70, vol. III, 474ff). Very few people know that Rekanatis,
like a few other prominent collaborators of Nazi Germany, such as the notorious Jew-hunter and expropriator of Jewish property L. Papanaoum,
received West German citizenship and pensions after the war. Although this striking generosity was supposed to have been for humanitarian
reasons and not "for services rendered", it nonetheless remains painfully embarrassing, for the usual attitude taken by the Federal Republic of
Germany concerning citizenship applications was quite restrictive.
7 7 Ilias Venezis, Archiepiskopos Damaskinos. 2nd ed. (Athens, 1981), pp. 259ff; Miriam Novitch, Le Passage des Barbares (Nice, 1973),
pp. 115ff, Joshua D. Kreindler, “Greece and the Jews”, Journal of Modern Hellenism, 2 (Oct. 1995), pp. 113 ff.; Fleischer, Stemma kai
Swastika, II, p. 328.
8 78 Nikos Stavroulakis, “Introduction”, p. XXI, in: Errikos Sevillias, Athens - Auschwitz (Athens, 1983); Nehama, Israilitiki Koinotis (see
ref. 60), p. 210; Alexandos Kitroeff, “Greek Wartime Attitudes towards the Jews in Athens”, Forum on the Jewish People, Zionism and Israel
60 (1987), pp. 49f.
9 79 On 14 July 1944, the Prime Minister warned his foreign minister Eden: “This requires careful handling. It is quite possible that rich Jews
will pay large sums of money to escape being murdered by the Huns. It is tiresome that this money should get into the hands of E.L.A.S. but
[... ] we should take a great responsibility if we prevented the escape of Jews, even if they should be rich Jews. I know it is the modern view that
all rich people should be put to death wherever found, but it is a pity that we should take up that attitude at the present time. After all, they have
no doubt paid for their liberation so high that in future they will only be poor Jews, and therefore have the ordinary rights of human beings.”
(PRO, F.O. 371/43689: R 10779) In his draft, Churchill originally had started this letter with an even more astonishing sentence, subsequently
stricken out, almost certainly by one of his secretaries: "I suppose it would be much better for us to keep all the Greek Jews, whether rich or
poor, in the grip of the Germans." (PRO, PREM 4/19/9).
0 80 Haim Avni, “Spanish Nationals in Greece and their Fate during the Holocaust”, in: Yad Vashem Studies VIII (1970), pp. 31-68. See
also: NARA, Rg 84: US Embassy Madrid, 4090/18.7.1947 Confid., 800.515/7-1847.
1 81 Author's interview with J. Löwinger. - It is of interest that subsequently the German authorities searched for Löwinger, since the
remaining Hungarian diplomats also tried to investigate his whereabouts (in order to throw off the scent?). (PAAA, R 27318: Royal Hungarian
Consulate, 6/biz/7.7.44; HSSPF, Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Griechenland, IV 4, 3271/3.8.44, and others.)
 On the other hand, almost 60,000 Jews had been savagely murdered in the most calculated manner. 82 After
liberation, thousands of these survivors settled in Palestine/Israel and due to their determination, today there is even a
chair at the university dedicated to the 450 year old Sephardic history and culture of the Macedonian capital.
However, within Greece itself, at most only 6,000 Jews have remained, i. e. about 8% of the pre-war population. Very
few communities managed to survive. Remnants of the other communities settled in Thessaloniki and especially in
Athens. The process of assimilation has accelerated. Certainly, Greece has not been cleansed of Jews ("Entjudung", "
judenrein"), as the nazi myrmidons had endeavoured, but the oldest and most remarkable pre-war Jewish colony in
Europe had suffered a blow from which it would never recover - not only due to its heavy quantitative losses, but also
because it had lost its unique variety.83

2 82 See data in H. Fleischer, Griechenland, pp. 271 ff. - Later, the present author found his calculations confirmed by an unpublished
memorandum prepared by the British Embassy in Athens after an interview with A. L. Easterman (the Political Secretary of the World Jewish
Congress, European Division) estimating virtually the same numbers (60,000 losses out of a pre-war Jewish population of 72,000). (287/4/48,
22.4.1948, Confidential in: NARA, Rg 84: Athens Embassy Classified, 804.4 Heirless Jewish Property).
3 83 In this presentation, we have been able to look only briefly at the pros and cons of the issue of variety - in this concrete case including
Romaniote, Sephardim and Ashkenazim Jewry. This variety, besides its undisputed merits from a viewpoint of a fascinating cultural tradition,
also had its heavy effect on the degree of assimilation and social integration, and thus evidently on the chances of survival under the conditions
of the most brutal racial persecution that the world had ever experienced. The problems of balancing this double phenomenon of
variety/assimilation requires much more thought and study, particularly since they cannot be reduced to practical aspects.