I.

MARRIAGE

A. The concept of and nature of marriage

Abasta, Benazir Faye V.

Goitia v. Campos-Rueda

Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by
virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long
as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none other.

FACTS:

The parties were legally married in the City of Manila and immediately thereafter
established a residence therein. It was after a month of cohabiting together as husband and
wife, the latter decided to return to the home of her parents. The reason thereto was that
her husband allegedly demanded from her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genitals. The wife, petitioner herein continued to refuse on the request of her husband. As a
result to the wife’s continued refusal against the repugnant desires of her husband, the
latter started to maltreat her by word and deed and inflicted injuries on different parts of
her body. Consequently, the petitioner-wife decided to leave the conjugal abode.

The petitioner now filed an action for support against her husband.

The husband maintained however, that he cannot be compelled to support the petitioner,
except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or
separation from the defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether the husband can be compelled for support to his wife outside their conjugal
home?

RULING:

Yes.

The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his
wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract
of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement
of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to
terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental
home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as
a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling
for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done
from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as
where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of
assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not
an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and
inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except
in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and
morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage
contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.

Allorde, Channelle Anne B.

Silverio v. Republic (2007)

Marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female postoperative transsexual).

FACTS:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in
his birth certificate. Petitioner alleged that his name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual; had always identified himself with
girls since childhood; underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast
augmentation and sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on,
petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. RTC of Manila ruled in
favor of petitioner, in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. The trial court
also believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community
in granting the petition. OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, alleging that there is no
law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. CA
ruled in favor of OSG. On appeal to SC, petitioner Silverio contended that the change of his
name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code,
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

ISSUE:

Whether the entries in Silverio’s birth certificate be changed and thus alter his status and
capacity to legally marry a person of same sex?

RULING:
NO. Sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither
is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly. "Status" refers to
the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. A
person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status. There is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction
or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Aranas, Janine Karla A.

People v. Dela Cruz

The best evidence of marital relationship is the marriage certificate

FACTS:

Victoriano dela Cruz (Victoriano), was charged with parricide. Victoriano, stabbed his wife
Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz (Anna) on her trunk and on the different parts of her body.
Joel Song (Joel) testified that he saw Victoriano punching and kicking his wife in front of
their house. Victoriano then dragged Anna inside the house by pulling the latter's hair then
slammed the door. Joel overheard the couple shouting while they were already inside.
Victoriano and Anna came out, together with their daughter. Victoriano asked for Joel’s
help and he noticed blood spurting out of Anna’s mouth. He took the couple’s daughter and
gave her to Victoriano's aunt. He then went with them to the hospital where Anna died of
hemorrhagic shock as a result of a stab wound.

Victoriano on the other hand testified that he came home very drunk from a friend's house.
Before he could enter their house, Anna, started nagging him. Victoriano pushed her aside
and she fell on a jalousie window and broke it. When he helped her stand up, Victoriano
noticed that her back was punctured by a piece of shattered glass of the jalousie. He
brought her outside and asked the help of Joel who was playing tong-its nearby.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Victoriano committed the crime of parricide

RULING:

Yes, Victoriano committed parricide. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines
parricide as any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

It is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.
The key element in Parricide, other than the killing, is the relationship of the offender to the
victim. In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of
the accused that he was married to the victim, is ample proof of such relationship as the
testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest. Clearly, then, it was
established that Victoriano and Anna were husband and wife.

Arriesgado, Mark Reynold M.

Espinosa v. Omana (2011)

The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses.

FACTS:

On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omana’s legal
advice on whether they could dissolve their marriage and live separately. Omana prepared
a document entitled “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Espinosa and Marantal started
implanting the conditions of the said contract. However, Marantal took custody of all their
children and took possession of most of the conjugal property. Espinosa sought the advice
of Glindo, his fellow employee who is a law graduate, who informed him that the contract
executed by Omana was not valid. They hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint
against Omana before the IBP-CBD. Omana denied that she prepared the contract. She
admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract
but she told him that it was illegal. Omana alleged that Espinosa returned the next day
while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to
notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract.

ISSUE:

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaa violated the Canon of Professional
Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosas Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.

RULING:

This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without
judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate
the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership.

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza, the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was
sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing
a document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and
allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other; ratifying a
document entitled Legal Separation where the couple agreed to be separated from each
other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each
other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have against each
other; preparing a document authorizing a married couple who had been separated for
nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may have against the
other; and preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved.

Bassig, Ma. Karina A.

Avenido v. Avenido (2014)

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.

FACTS:

Respondent Tecla instituted a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against

Petitioner on the ground that she is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido.
Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to Peregrina, which she claims must
be declared null and void for being bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of
her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio. Petitioner Peregrina averred that
she is the legal spouse of Eustaquio and that Tecla is only a common law wife. Tecla
presented testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and herself to substantiate the celebration of
marriage and also documentary evidences such as the Certifications of Submission of a
copy of Certificate of Marriage and Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage issued by LCR
and NSO, birth certificates of Tecla and Eustaquio’s 4 children and the certifications of
marriage issued by the parish priest. That it was due to WWII that record of Marriage
Certificate was destroyed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the
marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.

RULING:

YES. While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the
fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
The Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption: The basis of human
society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio –
Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the
testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted fact of the birth within the
cohabitation of Tecla and Eustaquio of four (4) children coupled with the certificates of the
children’s birth and baptism; and the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest
of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol. PETITION DENIED.

Jairus Vincent Z. Bernardez

Tambuyat v. Tambuyat (2015)

The marriage contract is the primary evidence of marital union.

FACTS:

Adriano Tambuyat was married to Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat (respondent). During

their marriage, Adriano bought a property located in Bulacan. The deed of sale was signed
by Adriano as vendee and Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat (petitioner) as witness. However,
when the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued, it was made under the name of “ADRIANO
M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS.”

When Adriano died, respondent filed a Petition to cancel the TCT and prayed that a new
one be issued indicating her to be Adriano’s spouse. She presented in evidence contract of
marriage evidencing her marriage with Adriano. She also presented another contract of
marriage evidencing petitioner’s marriage with Eduardo Nolasco. In her defense, Rosario
contended that she co-owned the property with Adriano since the same was bought using
her own funds and during her cohabitation with Adriano.

ISSUE:

Whether a new TCT stating Wenifreda as Adriano’s spouse should be issued.

RULING:

Yes. The preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate
spouse of Adriano. The marriage contracts, considered the primary evidence of marital
union - indicate that Adriano was married to Wenifreda while Rosario was married to
Nolasco – and both marriages were subsisting at the time of the acquisition of the property.
Thus it cannot be said that Adriano and Rosario were husband and wife to each other.
Consequently, Rosario cannot be included or named in the TCT as Adriano’s spouse since
such right and privilege belonged to Winifreda alone.

Moreover, Rosario’s allegation of co-ownership shall fail. She cannot claim co-ownership
and at the same time assert that the property was acquired using only her own money.
Such contradicting assertions cast serious doubts on her claim. If she really were the owner
of the property, it would be logical that her name be include as co-vendee and not as
witness.

Brito, John Patrick T.

Calimag v. Heirs of Macapaz

FACTS:

Virginia Calimag (Petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with
Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra). Annotated in the Certificate of title is an Adverse Claim of
Fidela over a portion of the said property. Fidela is the wife of Silvestra’s brother, Anastacio
Sr. When Silvestra died a new TCT was issued in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a
Deed of Sale whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her portion to the petitioner. On September
2005, Fidela passed away. The respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra,
instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT with Damages.
The petitioner averred that the respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil
action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. (Silvestra’s
brother) As such, they have no right over Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of the
Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting intestate from the
legitimate children and relatives of their father and mother. RTC ruled in favor of the
respondents. CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether respondents are without legal personality to institute the civil action on the basis
of their claimed status as legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr., the brother and sole heir of
the deceased, Silvestra.

CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONER:

That the marriage contract presented is not admissible under the Best Evidence Rule for
being a mere fax copy or photocopy of an alleged marriage contract, and which is not even
authenticated by the concerned Local Civil Registrar. That the certificates of live birth of
the respondents do not conclusively prove that they are legitimate children of Anastacio,
Sr.

RULING:

The petition is bereft of merit. A canonical certificate of marriage is no longer considered a

public document. And, since there is no showing that the authenticity and due execution of
the canonical certificate of marriage was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.
However, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a
solemnized marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than
the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts
of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer (Civil Registrar)." Thus, being public documents, the respondents' certificates of live
birth are presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in
them.”

The Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly executed
consistent with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of legitimate
children.

Nonetheless, the certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had
openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years. Verily, such fact is admissible
proof to establish the validity of marriage. In Trinidad vs CA:
This Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be presented:
a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony;
b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged
wedlock;
c) the birth and baptismal certificate of children born during such union; and
d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
Moreover, there is presumption “that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio : Always presume marriage."

Note:
Under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the declaration of either parent of the new-born legitimate
child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the
registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth certificate be
signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father
refuses to acknowledge the child.

Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every
intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the
authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression.

B. Requisites

1. Essential Requisites
2. Formal Requisites

DISCUSSION:

A. Difference in Sex

Calimlim, Jeninah A.
 Silverio v. Republic (2007)

The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician
or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

FACTS:

Always having identified himself as female rather than male, Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio underwent a series of medical procedures intended to transform him into a woman
including a sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, Silverio lived as
a female and was in fact engaged to be married. As his outward physiology finally
corresponded to his own conception of identity, Silverio filed a petition in the RTC of
Manila, seeking to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to
"Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." The trial court ruled in Silverio’s favor,
ordering the Civil Registrar to change the corresponding entries in the birth certificate. In
turn, the Republic filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, arguing that no law allows the
change of entries in a birth certificate by reason of a sex alteration. The CA upheld this
argument, setting aside the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether the entry in the birth certificate as to sex may be changed on the ground of sex re-
assignment.

RULING:

No. There is no law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done
by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of
a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

The words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as
used in the Civil Register Law is something alterable through surgery or something that
allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."

B. Some Form of Ceremony

Chua Cheng, Ma. Lawreine Francesca C.

 Martinez v. Tan (1909)

No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in
the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband
and wife.

FACTS:

On September 25, 1907, Martinez and Tan appeared before the justice of the peace
submitting a petition, signed by them, directing the latter to solemnize their marriage.
Thereafter, a document was signed by the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the
defendant, and by Esmero and Ballori, the witnesses to their marriage. Following this is a
certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the witnesses which stated
that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the peace in the
presence of the witnesses on that day. Plaintiff commenced the action for the cancellation
of the certificate of marriage and for damages. She claims that she never appeared before
the justice of the peace and never married the defendant; that she signed the documents
without reading it. Court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the
parties were legally married.

ISSUE:

Whether or not plaintiff Martinez and defendant Tan were legally married

RULING:

YES. Evidences strongly preponderate that a legal marriage took place between the plaintiff
and the defendant. The plaintiff and the defendant were legally married since there was an
expression of mutual consent and both of them appeared before the justice of the peace as
shown in the petition and documents submitted in court.

Plaintiff’s claim that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that
the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage is untenable.
The Court ruled that under General orders, No. 68, section 6, it states that:

No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare
in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as
husband and wife.

Dioquino, Apriljo Frances B.

Morigo v. People (2004)

The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable
for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a
subsequent marriage.

FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while
but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became
sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991
she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo
married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on
the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy
and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial
question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with
Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good
faith.

ISSUE:

Whether Morigo first marriage is considered void ab initio?

RULING:

YES. Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just
merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the
nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he
did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.

C. Legal Capacity

1. Age
2. Relationship
3. Prior Marriage

Dizon, April Anne A.

Republic v. Nolasco (1993)

Four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code: 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to
remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4.
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee.
FACTS:

Gregorio Nolasco (Nolasco) was a seaman and first met Janet Monica Parker, British, in a
bar in England. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica lived with respondent
Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to Nolasco’s hometown of San
Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January
1982, they got married. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent
received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his
son and that Janet Monica had left Antique. He was able to return only in November 1983.
He went also went back to England to look for her but to no avail.

On 5 August 1988, Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique, a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed
that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the
marriage be declared null and void.

RTC granted Nolasco's petition. The Republic appealed to the CA contending that RTC erred
in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because Nolasco had failed to show
that there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. The CA affirmed the trial
court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a
belief that his absent spouse had already died. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

RULING:

The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.

The investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain his wife’s
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she
was already dead. When he arrived in Antique, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to
London, to look for her there. Nolasco’s claim that Janet Monica declined to give any
information as to her personal background is too convenient an excuse to justify his failure
to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to
his wife. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters.

There are serious doubts to respondent's credibility.Respondent testified that he cut short
his employment contract to return to Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of
nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to
November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent failed to explain why he did
not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his
effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's
subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica
was dead a well-founded one.

In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law
that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.

Dy, Czara Loraine F.

Garcia v. Recio

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
according to our law on evidence.

FACTS:

In 1998, Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy against Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her in 1994. She claimed that she learned of
Recio’s marriage to Editha Samson, an Australia citizen, only in 1997.

Recio contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved
by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994. In 1998, Recio was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court
in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.

RTC declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was
valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended based on the divorce
decree obtained by respondent. Thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

ISSUES:

Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and
Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

RULING:

The Petition is partly meritorious.

1ST ISSUE:
No, the divorce between Recio and Samson was not proven.

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of
respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree
between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

2ND ISSUE:

No, Recio was not able to prove that he is legally capacitated to marry Garcia.

Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.[45]There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or

provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board,
although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.

Australian divorce decree obtained by Recio contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have
been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law. Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity
to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence. The Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to
marry.

Enriquez, Ephraim T.

Te v. Choa (2001)
A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise
in a judicial proceeding.

FACTS:

Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were sweethearts and engaged in pre-marital sexual relations
which resulted in Liliant's pregnancy. In 1988, they were married in civil rites. Although
they did not live together after marriage, they would usually see each other. In 1989,
Liliana gave birth to their daughter. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her and refused to
perform his obligations to his family. Shortly thereafter, Liliana received rumors about
Arthurs' affair with another woman which turn out to be true. In 1990, Arthur contracted
another marriage while still married to Liliana. Hence, Liliana filed a bigamy case against
Arthur and administrative case for the revocation of his and his mistress’ engineering
license. Arthur filed a petition for nullity of marriage. RTC rendered a decision on the
bigamy case even the petition for annulment was pending.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the annulment case be resolved first before the criminal and administrative
cases be decided upon.

RULING:

No, the annulment case need not be resolved first before the criminal and administrative
cases are decided upon .The outcome of annulment case had no bearing on the
determination of Arthur‘s innocence or guilt in bigamy case. It because all that is required
for bigamy to prosper is that the 1st marriage be subsisting at the time the 2nd marriage is
contracted. Even a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would NOT
necessarily absolve him from criminal liability. Art. 40 of Family Code is already in effect at
the time of their marriage which states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.

Espinosa, Frederick V.

Nollora v. People

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this
Code, the Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of
the Philippines shall apply."

FACTS:

Jesusa Pinat Nollora testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi
Arabia and got married in a church in Bulacan. While working in Saudi, Jesusa heard
rumors that her husband. She left Saudi and returned to the Philippines. Jesusa learned that
indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P.
Geraldino. When confronted by Jesusa Geraldino allegedly affirmed that she knew of
Atilano’s first marriage.

Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages. He, however, claimed
that he was a Muslim convert before he contracted the first marriage with the private
complainant. He alleges that as a Muslim, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as
allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.

Later an information for the crime of bigamy against Antilano Nollora and Rowena
Geraldino was filed. The trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino and the CA
affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether Atilano Nollora Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.

RULING:

Yes, Nollora is guilty of the crime of bigamy.

The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is
legally married to Pinat;(2) Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved
prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second
marriage to Geraldino;and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.

Even assuming that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages, Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in
accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083.

The Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "in case of a marriage between a Muslim and
a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Family
Code, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply." Nollora’s religious affiliation is
not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according
to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption
from liability for the crime of bigamy.

Garcia, Charlotte Yris C.

SSS v. Jarque Vda. De Bailon (2006)

Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of
the validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of
the second marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved.
FACTS:

Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted a marriage. 15 years later Bailon filed a
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death to declare Alice presumptively dead which
the CFI granted. 13 years after the declaration Bailon contracted marriage with respondent
Teresita Jarque. Bailon died in 1994 so respondent filed a claim for funeral benefits which
was granted by the SSS.

Cecilia, who claimed to be the daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona, contested the
release of the death and funeral benefits, claiming that Bailon contracted three marriages in
his lifetime: with Alice, Elisa and with respondent. Cecilia alleges that Bailon and Elisa
cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958 with 9 children. Cecilia also contests the
marriage of Bailon and respondent because Alice is still alive.

SSS ordered respondent to reimburse what had been granted to her and to return the same
to Cecilia who shouldered the burial expenses. SSS ruled that the benefits should to Alice
and that her reappearance terminated Bailon and respondent’s marriage. Respondent
claims that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as
bigamous or unlawful, thus it remains valid and subsisting.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Bailon and respondent may be terminated by
the mere reappearance of the absent spouse Alice.

RULING:

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either
by affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to
the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.

Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former
spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouses physical reappearance,
and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the
subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a

direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. In the case at bar, as no step
was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to
the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of
Bailon.
Gonzalez, Jed Nathaniel M.

Republic of the Philippines v. Sareñogon (2016)

The “well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with only
upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.

FACTS:

Jose Sareñogon and Netchie Polistico first met in Clarin, Misamis Occidental. They became
sweethearts, and got married in Manila City Hall in 1996. They lived together as husband
and wife for only one month because both of them had to work abroad. During their time
overseas, the spouses did not have any communication with each other. After the
expiration of Jose’s contract as a seaman, he went home and asked about his wife’s
whereabouts from her friends and relatives, however, to no avail.

Jose filed a petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his wife, Netchie, so that he
would be able to contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged efforts of Jose in locating his wife sufficiently supports a “well-
founded belief” that she is probably dead.

RULING:

NO.

The “well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with
only upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to
ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.

Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites for the declaration
of presumptive death:

That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and,
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.

The law did not define what is meant by “well-founded belief.” It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-
case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a
mere passive one).

Here, the acts of Jose did not live up to the standard required by the law. He merely asked
for help from his wife’s friends and relatives, but did not secure the aid of government
agencies to locate his wife.

Hernandez, Katrina Ysobelle A.

Republic v. Tampus (2016)

The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and
that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one.

FACTS:

Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante. Three days after their marriage, Dante, a member of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he
was assigned on a combat mission. Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried
to locate him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his
whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. She filed before
the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage,
alleging that after the lapse of 33 years without any kind of communication from him, she
firmly believes that he is already dead. She averred that she intends to remarry and move
on with her life. The RTC granted Nilda's petition and declared Dante as presumptively
dead for all legal purposes, without prejudice to the effect of his reappearance. The OSG
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the RTC Decision. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision declaring Dante as
presumptively dead.

RULING:

Yes. In this case, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported
earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy
the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of his
death”. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information
about her husband or inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the
members of the AFP who were assigned thereto but failed to do so.

There are 4 essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the
absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the
present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present
spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.

The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,
the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one.

Jacinto, Christine

Matias v. Republic (2018)

The sole purpose of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code
is to contract a valid subsequent marriage.
FACTS:

Estrellita Tadeo-Matias was the wife of Wilfredo Matias, a member of the Philippine
Constabulary. In 1979, Wilfredo set out to serve as a member of the Philippine
Constabulary but he never came back from his tour of duty. The service record of Wilfredo
issued by the National Police Commission showed that Wilfredo was already declared
missing since 1979. After three decades from his disappearance, Estrellita filed a claim for
Wilfredo’s death benefits. Since one of the requirements to claim said benefits is a proof of
death or at least a declaration of presumptive death by the Court, Estrellita filed a petition
for declaration of presumptive death for the sole purpose of claiming benefits under PD No.
1638 (Retirement and Separation of Military Personnel). The RTC of Tarlac granted said
petition and declared Wilfredo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41was correctly applied in this
case.

RULING:

No, Article 41 is not applicable in this case. The RTC decision erred in using Article 41 of the
Family Code since it explicitly states that the declaration of presumptive death made under
said provision is only for the purpose of securing a valid subsequent marriage. Estrellita
made it clear that her sole purpose for seeking the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo is to allow her to claim the benefits she ought to receive under PD No. 1638. The
Supreme Court also stated that since the purpose of her petition is not remarriage, what
should apply are Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which provides for the rules on
presumption of death for any civil purpose.

Joaquin, Marione

Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy

There no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of
such fact and for all legal intents.

FACTS:

Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with
petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one
Eduardo A. Maxion. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage
claimed that said marriage was null and void, since her first husband Eduardo A. Maxion
having been allegedly forced her to enter said marital union.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said prior marriage is void or merely voidable

RULING:

It is voidable.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be
void but merely voidable, and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID.

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would
be regarded VOID under the law.

Jore, Ma. Jovi Patricio

Terre v. Terre (1992)

An action for judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage is necessary before entering
a subsequent marriage.

FACTS:

Jordan Terre pursued Dorothy Terre despite knowing that she was already married. He
convinced her to marry him and that the first marriage was void because the woman
married her first cousin, and was thus void ab initio. Since it was void, according to the
lawyer, it was no longer necessary to go to court to declare it as such. She agreed to marry
him. After the birth of the first child, the lawyer disappeared and contracted a second
marriage while claiming that his marriage to the woman was void from the beginning since
she had already married her first cousin. Hence, Dorothy B. Terre charged Jordan Terre, a
member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a
second marriage and living with another woman other than Dorothy, while his prior
marriage with Dorothy remained subsisting.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an action for judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage is
necessary before entering a subsequent marriage

RULING:

Yes, action for judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage is necessary before
entering a subsequent marriage. The first marriage of Dorothy is indeed void ab initio
considering that she married her first cousin thereby against public policy. However, she
did not file any declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she contracted her
marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void. Article 40 states that the
absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Even if the first
mistake was contracted in good faith, the lawyer would still be liable for bigamy after he
contracted his second marriage. It was deemed that the moral character of the respondent
was deeply flawed and thus, should be disbarred and struck out from the Roll of Attorneys.

Ko, Nikki Mei Q.

Bobis v. Bobis (2000)

Article 40 of the Family Code, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage before a party may remarry.

FACTS:

Isagani Bobis (Isagani) contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without
said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same Isagani contracted a
second marriage with Imelda Marbella-Bobis (Imelda) on and allegedly a third marriage
with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.

Based on Imelda’s complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against Isagani.
Sometime thereafter, Isagani initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.

Isagani then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to
the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case.

Imelda filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

RULING:

NO. It should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a
prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court,
therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when the
respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies
appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by Imelda for bigamy that he thought
of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second
marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a
party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly
the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first
marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no
judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should
be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements
concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have
been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.

Lazaro, Aprille Keith M.

Mercado v. Tan

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one

can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as void.
FACTS:

In April 1976, Dr. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But in June 1991, Mercado
married a second time. He married a certain Consuelo Tan.

In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case against Mercado.

In November 1992, Mercado filed an action to have his first marriage with Oliva be
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity).

In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for bigamy against Mercado.

In May 1993, Mercado’s marriage with Oliva was declared void ab initio. Mercado now
sought the dismissal of the bigamy case filed against him. He contended that since his first
marriage was declared void ab initio, there was no first marriage to speak of, hence, his
“second” marriage with Tan was actually his first marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mercado is correct.

RULING:

No. The elements of bigamy are as follows:

1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity

All the elements are present when Mercado married Tan. When he married Tan, his first
marriage was still subsisting and was not declared void. In fact, Mercado only filed an
action to declare his first marriage void after Tan filed the bigamy case. By then, the crime
of bigamy had already been consummated.

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous
marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time. Absent that
declaration a person who marries a second time shall be guilty of bigamy

Lucero, Mark Joey S.

Morigo v. People
 GR. No. 145226 (2004)

“The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable
for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a
subsequent marriage”

FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for four years. The lost contacts
when the school year ended. When Lucio received a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore, constant communication took place between them. They later became
sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work
there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back
to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to
get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 in Bohol. Lucia reported back to
her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with
the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted on January 17,
1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo
married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage on the ground that no
marriage ceremony actually took place.

ISSUE:

Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete
before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court upheld the trial courts finding that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of
a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, this simply means that there was no marriage to
begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In
other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the
first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the
accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. The records show that no appeal
was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had
long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning.
The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

In the instant case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on
their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a
valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner
might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity
before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute
in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we
held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry
on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is
now moot and academic.

Macuha, Ana Regine B.

Tenebro v. CA (2004)

Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second
marriage as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

FACTS:

Veronico Tenebro (petitioner) contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas (private

complainant) on April 10, 1990. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and
without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he
had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro
showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking
this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared
with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988,
with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly
married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their
union. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the
allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. He further testified that
he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any
marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite clear
proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been declared
null and void ab initio and without legal force and effect.

RULING:

The Court is correct in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid

marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of
this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second
or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during
the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal
laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of
this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of
the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified
by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their
consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties
personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence
of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age
of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles
37 and 38 may contract marriage.

Magaoay, Rhose Azcelle L.

Montanez v. Cipriano (2012)

The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact
that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage.

FACTS:

On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Cipriano married Socrates Flores. On January 24, 1983, during
the subsistence of the said marriage, Lourdes married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001,
respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage
with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under Article
36 of the Family Code. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of
respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and executory on
October 13, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s
daughter from the first marriage, filed with the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for
Bigamy against respondent. Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first marriage was already
declared void ab initio in 2003. Thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her
marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. The prosecution argued that the crime of bigamy
had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for declaration of
nullity. RTC ruled in favor of respondent on the ground that both wedding were governed
by the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, hence, no judicial declaration of absolute nullity
as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage in 2003 justifies the
dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.

RULING:

NO. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. In the case at bar, the respondent’s
clear intent was to obtain judicial declaration of nullity to escape from the bigamy charges
against her.

Merrera, Raisa Victoria

Capili v. People (2013)

The accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

FACTS:

On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig
City. Petitioner then filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a
pending case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo
City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and
void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil
case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in
the instant criminal case.

In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo rendered a decision declaring the voidness or invalidity
of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a
subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void
ab initio.

Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed a Motion (to Dismiss) for the criminal case for
bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private
respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.

The RTC of Pasig granted petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion. Aggrieved, private
respondent filed an appeal before the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

RULING:

No. It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second
marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the
crime of bigamy. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be
charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second
marriage was celebrated.

Palafox. Danielle Michelle L.

Abbas v. Abbas (2013)

The certification of the LCR that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate
to prove the non-issuance of said license; Art. 35(3) FC, also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Art. 27 to 34, Chapter 2 Title 1 FC.

FACTS:

Syed Abbas seeks annulment of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas, alleging the absence of a
Marriage License (ML), as provided for in Art. 4, FC. In their Marriage Contract (MC), it is
stated that ML 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite, was presented to the solemnizing
officer. At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria in Taiwan and
married her there, and arrived in the Philippines, where his mother-in-law entered him
into a ceremony which he claimed that he did not know was a marriage until Gloria told
him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a ML, and
that he had never resided in that area. The record in the Municipal Civil Registrar (MCR) of
Carmona certifies that ML 9969967 was the number of another ML issued to another
couple. No ML appears to have been issued to Syed Gloria on Jan. 8, 1993. Syed Further
testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him. This was corroborated by Gloria’s
mother, Felicitas Goo, when she testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against
Syed at RTC Manila.

Gloria attested that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage. She also stated that
she and Syed had already been married on Aug. 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not
know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.

RTC Pasay held that no valid ML was issued by MCR Carmona in favor of Gloria and Syed, as
ML 9969967, and the same MCR had certified that no ML had been issued for Gloria and
Syed. It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, the
place where ML 9969967 was issued, in violation of Art. 9 FC. As the marriage was not one
of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid ML is an absence
of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on Jan. 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

Gloria appealed to CA, which granted her appeal and declared her marriage to Syed valid
and subsisting. Syed filed a MR, which CA denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo is void ab initio.

RULING:

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on Jan. 9, 1993, the FC (EO 209), is the
applicable law. Provisions on Arts. 3, 4 and 35(3) would apply, which read as follows: Art.
3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A
valid ML except in the cases provided for in Chap. 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage
ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than 2 witnesses of legal age. Art. 4. The absence of any of
the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated
in Art. 35(2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable
as provided in Art. 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of
the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning: x x x x (3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
preceding Chapter.

In Carino vs. Carino, following the case of Republic, it was held that the certification of the
LCR that their office had no record of a ML was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license. It further held that the presumed validity of marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove
that the marriage was valid, and that the required ML had been secured. Gloria has failed to
discharge that burden, and the conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage
license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the ML that
would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No ML was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the MCR Carmona and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged ML.
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid ML. Art. 4 FC
is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Art. 35(2).” Art. 35(3) FC, also provides that
a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt
from the license requirement under Art. 27 to 34, Chap. 2 Title 1 FC.

Pascual, Aizen Paula DS.

People v. Odtuhan (2013)

Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.

FACTS:

Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina in 1980. Then, he remarried Alagon in 1993. He filed a
petition for annulment of his marriage to Modina in 1994. 1999, RTC granted petition and
declared marriage void for lack of a marriage license. Evelyn Alagon – private complainant
–learned of Odtuhan’s previous marriage to Modina and was charged with bigamy. RTC
ruled in favor of Alagon and was indicted in an Information for Bigamy. Upon filing an
Omnibus Motion praying for presentation of evidence to support his motion and his motion
to quash be granted, RTC denied the petitions. Respondent went the CA where the petition
was granted through applying the Morigo v. People case, and RTC was ordered to give due
course to receive evidence on petitioner’s motion to quash. CA denied motion for
reconsideration before the CA and thus it went to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Odtuhan committed the crime of bigamy, considering that his marriage to
Modina was void ab inito for lack of a valid marriage license.

RULING:

Yes. It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption
is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy. If we allow respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s ratiocination, a person who
commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered
therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.

Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against
him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the
complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention, Settled is the
rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and
that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for
determining prescription.

Perez, Carla Patricia S.

Iwasawa v. Gangan (2013)

A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be

contracted; or else what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning
as provided in Art. 35(4) of the Family Code (FC).

FACTS:

Yasuo Iwasawa, a Japanese national, and Felisa Gangan met sometime in 2002 in one of
Iwasawa’s visits to the Philippines. Gangan introduced herself as “single” and “has never
married before”. They got married in November of the same year in Pasay City and
thereafter resided in Japan.

Iwasawa noticed that Gangan became depressed so he confronted his wife about it. Gangan
confessed that it was because she received news that her previous husband, Raymond
Arambulo who she married in 1994, had passed away (July 14, 2009). This prompted
Iwasawa to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to Gangan as null and void on
the ground that the same is a bigamous one, based on Art. 35(4) in relation to Art. 41 of the
FC. RTC denied the petition due to insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether Iwasawa and Gangan’s marriage is bigamous, hence, null and void.

RULING:

Yes. The pieces of evidence Iwasawa presented, Certificate of Marriage (CM) between him
and Gangan; CM between Gangan and Arambulo; Certificate of Death of Arambulo;
Certification from NSO that there are 2 entries of marriage pertaining to Gangan, directly
prove: (1) that Gangan married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that
Gangan contracted a second marriage this time with Iwasawa on November 28, 2002 in
Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of Gangan
with Arambulo at the time she married Iwasawa; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009
and that it was only on said date that Gangan’s marriage with Arambulo was deemed to
have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of Gangan to Iwasawa is bigamous,
hence null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second
marriage was contracted.

Perez, Mark Josep R.

Republic v. Cantor (2013)

The law did not define what is meant by “well-founded belief.” It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-
case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a
mere passive one).

FACTS:

The respondent and Jerry were married and lived together as husband and wife. Sometime
in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by the respondent’s
inability to reach “sexual climax” and Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the
respondent’s father. After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the
last time that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated
nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.

More than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent filed
before the RTC a petition for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death claiming that
she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired
from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors
and friends, but to no avail. She also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’
directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent
claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court. The RTC issued an order
granting respondent’s petition and declaring Jerry presumptively dead.

The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) but the same was
denied as the latter found no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.

RULING:

No, the respondent did not have a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
The law did not define what is meant by “well-founded belief.” It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to
case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a
mere passive one).

The Court found that the diligence exerted by respondent fell short of the “stringent
standard” and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence. First, the respondent did not
actively look for her missing husband. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search
for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for
him. Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the
authorities to look for him. Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their
neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these
persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. Lastly, there was
no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she conducted a
diligent search.

In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a “passive search”
where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She
failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a
well-founded belief that her husband was already dead.

Prudente, Maica A.

Lasanas v. People

Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial declaration of the
nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and in existent for lack of a marriage
license, is guilty of bigamy as defined and penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS:

In 1968, accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo contracted marriage without the
benefit of a marriage license solemnized by Judge Salazar. The records show that Lasanas
and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the
marriage license. They reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony. They
submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose. In 1982, both
separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences. In 1993, accused Lasanas
contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status
of accused as single. Lasanas filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages
against Socorro alleging that the latter employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in
securing his consent to their marriage and that subsequent marital breaches, psychological
incompatibilities. Socorro charged Lasanas with bigamy. RTC rendered its judgment in civil
case dismissing the accused’s complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring the
marriage between him and Socorro valid and legal and finding Lasanas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of bigamy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused Lasanas shall be held liable for bigamy

RULING:

YES. The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The
requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a
subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code. In fact, the requirement for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible
and immoral. The crime of bigamy was consummated from the moment he contracted the
second marriage without his marriage to Socorro being first judicially declared null and
void, because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, his marriage to Socorro
was still deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage not being yet declared null and
void by a court of competent jurisdiction

Racadio, Marie Bernadette M.

SSS v. Azote (2015)

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void. In claiming benefits, the settled rule from Signey v. SSS is that "whoever claims
entitlement benefits provided by law should establish his or her right by substantial evidence."

FACTS:

In 1992, Edna and Edgardo were married. Two years thereafter, Edgardo submitted Form
E-4 to the Social Security System (SSS) with Edna and their children as designated
beneficiaries. When Edgardo passed away, Edna filed her claim for death benefits with the
SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. However, Edna’s claim was denied because it
appeared from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 in
1982 with a different set of beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote, as his spouse; and
Elmer Azote, as dependent.
Edna filed a petition with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump sum and monthly
pension of Edgardo, insisting that she was the legitimate wife of Edgardo. SSC dismissed
Edna’s petition for lack of merit. The SSC further wrote that the National Statistics Office
records revealed that the marriage of Edgardo to one Rosemarie Sino was registered in
1982. It opined that Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as there was no showing
that his first marriage had been annulled or dissolved. The SSC stated that there must be a
judicial determination of nullity of a previous marriage before a party could enter into a
second marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edna is entitled to the SSS benefit of Edgardo

RULING: No. Edna cannot be considered the legal spouse of Edgardo as their marriage took
place during the existence of a previously contracted marriage. The law in force at the time
of Edgardo's death was RA 8282. Sec 8 (e) and (k) expressly provide that it is the legal
spouse who would be entitled to receive benefits from an SSS deceased-member. In this
case, there is concrete proof of Edgardo's earlier contracted marriage with Rosemarie,
making her the first and legal wife.

At the time of the celebration of the marriage of Edgardo and Edna, the Family Code was
already in force. Article 41 states "a marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void..." In claiming benefits, the settled
rule from Signey v. SSS is that "whoever claims entitlement benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right by substantial evidence". In the case, Edna failed to establish that
there was no impediment at the time of the celebration of their marriage.

Riguerra, Paolo Miguel

Republic v. Estrada (2015)

FACTS:

On October 14 2008, Teresita J. Olemberio filed a Petition for Declaration of Absence and
Presumption of Death of her husband Diego before the RTC of Malaybalay. Teresita alleged
she married Diego of November 25 1973. Sometime in December 1976, Diego left their
residence and never came back. He failed to communicate with her for the past 32 years
and never made contact with any of their children or immediate relatives. She alleged that
she exerted all efforts to reach her husband but failed. She filed the present petition to
declare her husband presumptively dead so that she could contract another marriage
without any impediment.

The RTC granted her petition and declared Diego for all legal intents and purposes
presumptively dead in accordance with Art. 41 of the Family Code. The OSG contested the
grant of the petition. The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of
the RTC.

ISSUE:

W/N the appellate court erred in their appreciation of facts and circumstances of the death
of Diego as well as to the sufficiency of efforts of Teresita in locating Diego’s whereabouts

RULING:

No. Diego’s absence for more than 30years, which far exceeded the law-required four years
of absence, is more than enough to declare him presumptively dead for all legal intents and
purposes. Further, it can be clearly gleaned from the totality of evidence that Diego had
already died due to the orevalence of the NPA in Malaybalay. The fact that Diego would be
75 years old by now was reason enough to support the presumption.

The acts of Teresita of going to SSS to inquire on Diego’s remittances and of going to the
house of his parents to inquire as to his whereabouts, constitute diligent efforts to support
her belief that Diego is dead.

Sarangay, Jossa M.

Republic v. Villanueva (2015)

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death may be granted, the present spouse must
prove that he/she has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead.

FACTS:

Edna, a domestic helper based in Singapore, was married to Romeo on December 21, 1978,
in Iligan City. 15 years after their marriage, she heard the news from her children that
Romeo had left their conjugal home without reason or information as to his whereabouts.
Thereafter, she returned to the country to look for Romeo by inquiring from her parents-
in-law and common friends in Iligan City. She also went to his birthplace in Escalante,
Negros Oriental, and inquired from his relatives.

She then filed before the RTC a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead under Art.
41 of the FC, to which the court granted on the basis of her well-founded belief of Romeo’s
death. However, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that the evidence presented
by Edna merely consisted of bare and uncorroborated assertions, and it never amounted to
a diligent and serious search required under the prevailing jurisprudence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edna had sufficiently established a well-founded belief to warrant the
decree of presumptive death of her absent spouse.
RULING:

NO. The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove
that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort
(not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required by
law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate,
or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.

Edna's efforts failed to satisfy the required well-founded belief of her absent husband's
death. Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it merely
consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on record. She also failed
to present any person from whom she inquired about the whereabouts of her husband. She
did not even present her children from whom she learned the disappearance of her
husband. In fact, she was the lone witness.

Senique, Alyssa Paulina R.

Santiago v. Philippines (2015)

Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused
could she be included in the information as a co-accused.

FACTS:

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang
since June 1974, asked petitioner-Santiago to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old
widow then, married Santosin 1997. Petitioner asserted her defense that she could not be
included as an accused in the crime of bigamy because she had been under the belief that
Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the
prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a
marriage license.

11 years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified that
she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the former
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos.

ISSUE:

Whether Santiago should also be liable for Bigamy.

RULING:
YES.

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without
being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the
previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a
co-accused. Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the
ruling that she was validly charged with bigamy. However, she should only be liable only as
an accomplice.

On the issue of marriage license, the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in
their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under the
exception of 5 year cohabitation. However, they only knew each other for less than four
years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years
prior to their marriage. Thus, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing
officer. Consequently, she cannot be innocent to the crime.

Sobrepena, Kim Angeli P.

Redante Sarto y Misalucha v. People (2018)

The fact that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce and that it was validly
acquired prior to the celebration of the second marriage still subsists.

FACTS:

Redante Sarto and Maria Socorro were married. Sometime thereafter, Maria Socorro left
for Canada to work as a nurse. While in Canada, she applied for Canadian citizenship. The
application was eventually granted. She then filed for divorce to sever her marital ties with
Redante.

Maria Socorro then returned to the Philippines, and upon gave their marriage a second
chance. Their attempt to rekindle their romance resulted in the birth of their daughter. In
spite of this, efforts to save their marriage was futile.

Redante then met Fe, to whom he admitted that he was previously married to Maria
Socorro, who divorced him. Despite this admission, their romance blossomed and
culminated in their marriage. Their relationship, however, turned sour when Maria Socorro
returned to the Philippines and met with Redante to persuade him to their daughter to
apply for Canadian citizenship. Believing they had reconciled, Fe left the conjugal home and
filed a complaint for Bigamy against Redante.

During Pre-trial, Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages but interposed
the defense that his first marriage was legally dissolved by divorce obtained in a foreign
country.
RTC found Redante guilty of Bigamy. CA affirmed RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether Redante is guilty of bigamy.

RULING:

YES. Redante failed to prove his capacity to contract a subsequent marriage.

Since the divorce was a defense raised by Redante, it is incumbent upon him to show that it
was validly obtained in accordance with Maria Socorro’s country’s national law. Redante
has the burden of proving the termination of the first marriage prior to the celebration of
the second.

A divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in the Philippines. The fact that Redante
failed to prove the existence of the divorce and that it was validly acquired prior to the
celebration of the second marriage still subsists.

4. Crime
5. Physical Incapacity

Socrates, Tomas Iñigo P.

Jimenez v. Cañizares (1960)

Marriage cannot be annulled on the ground of impotency of one spouse based on the sole
testimony of the other spouse who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at
securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks [before the courts].

FACTS:

Joel Jimenez was married to Remedios Cañizares in 1950. In 1955, Jimenez filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga praying for a decree annulling his
marriage to the defendant Cañizares. The basis thereof is that according to Jimenez, the
orifice of Cañizares’ reproductive organ is too small for a male reproductive organ to
penetrate, making it impossible for copulation. Jimenez said it existed at the time of the
marriage and continues to exist. Summons were sent to Cañizares but she did not answer.
The court directed the city attorney to inquire whether there is collusion between the
parties and to intervene for the state to see that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. The court issued an order requiring Cañizares to undergo physical
examination with a lady doctor to confirm whether she is really physically incapable of
consummating the marriage. Cañizares failed to undergo the physical examination. Because
of such failure of Cañizares , CFI entered a decree annulling the marriage on the basis of the
evidence presented by Jimenez. The city attorney appealed the case, saying that the
consequence of non-compliance by Cañizares should be contempt of court and not a
favorable judgment for the complainant.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.

RULING:

No. Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested,
and the State safeguards its continuity and permanence. The incidents of the status are
governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal
grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the
present case, the annulment was decreed on the sole basis of Jimenez’ testimony, who
himself seeks the annulment of the marriage. Whether Cañizares was really impotent was
not established because she refused to answer and refused to undergo physical
examination. Her refusal cannot create the presumption arising from suppression of
evidence because in this country, women are coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to
physical examination unless compelled by a competent authority. The court may compel
Cañizares to undergo physical examination, it does not fall under the right against self-
incrimination. Impotency is an abnormal condition and should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is
physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have
bound them together as husband and wife. The case is remanded to the lower court.

Surla, Kristine

Veronica Alcazar v. Rey Alcazar (2009)

Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to
perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.

FACTS:

Veronica Alcazar and Rey Alcazar were married on 11 October 2000. Rey then left for
Riyahd to work. While working in Riyadh, Rey did not communicate with Veronica. About a
year and a half, Veronica was informed that Rey is coming home but she was surprised that
he did not go directly to her in Tondo but to his house in Occidental Mindoro instead.
Veronica asserted that from the time Rey arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted
her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating
his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant
to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Is Rey physically incapable to consummate his marriage with Veronica?

RULING:

NO. Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the
complete act of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of
the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the
anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears
arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by
psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result of making the
spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.

No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way
physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted
during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their
wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical
incapacity on respondents part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioners marriage
to respondent. Petitioners Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.

6. Psychological Incapacity

Tec, Natasha Kim. R.

Santos v. Court of Appeals (1995)

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

FACTS:

Leouel and Julia were married on September 20, 1986. before the MTC in Iloilo. Shortly,
they married again in a church and thereafter they lived with Julia’s parent and Julia gave
birth to the couple’s first child. The couple had disagreements. One of which was the issue
of living independently from Julia’s parents. On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for USA to
work as a nurse. Julia, via phone call, promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States,
where he underwent a training program of AFP, he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Having failed to get
Julia to come home, Leouel filed with the RTC a complaint for voiding their marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or
at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that
clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. RTC
dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Julia’s failure to return home or at the very least to communicate with him,
for more than five years circumstances constitutes psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No. Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition
since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. However authors have somehow
delimited its definition. According to Justice Sempio-Diy Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved. The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. Thus since the her acts does not constitute psychological incapacity, the
same may not be used as a ground to nullify their marriage.

Vitug, Loisse Danielle D.

Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA (1997)

One of the essential marital obligation is to procreate children through sexual cooperation. A
refusal of one party to consummate the marriage is considered a psychological incapacity.

FACTS:

Petitioner was married to private respondent (Gina Lao-Tsoi) and during their 10 months
as a married couple, they never had sexual intercourse. The wife claimed that her husband
was impotent and filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of their marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. To refute his wife’s claim,
Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself for medical examination and it was discovered therein
that he was not impotent (the size of his “little friend” was smaller than usual but it is still
capable of erection)

ISSUE:

Whether or not refusal to consummate the marriage is a ground for nullity of marriage.

RULING:

YES. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is ‘to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage.’ Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Yu, Karl Alen G.

Republic v. Molina (1997)

Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code

The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision.

The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.

The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

FACTS:

Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married in 1985 and they had a son, Andre. After a year
of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and
father. He spent more time with peers, squandered money, lost his job and depended from
parents. The couple had an intense argument and Roridel feeling abandoned decided to
leave her job and live with her parents with her son. Thus, the action for annulment of
marriage based on psychological incapacity was filed with the court. RTC ruled for the
annulment and was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether Reynaldo suffered from psychological incapacity warranting the annulment of

their marriage

RULING:

No. There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough
to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons;
it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness. There is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. Lastly,
The SC stated the guidelines in interpreting and applying Art. 36.

Abasta, Benazir Faye V.

Antonio v. Reyes

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.

FACTS:
On March 8, 1993 petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage against his wife as
respondent herein on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code for psychological
incapacity. As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner
claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. RTC rendered
decision declaring the marriage null and void. CA reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of
a marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code?

RULING:

Article 36 of the Family Code states that A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

The following are the guidelines set under the Molina Case which is to be applied in the
case at bar:

The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision.

The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children.

The case at bar sufficiently satisfies Molina guidelines to wit:

First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the
trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that
her psychological incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage was annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the
judicial trier of facts, and not of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant
recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her
but her behavior remains unchanged.

Allorde, Channelle Anne B.

Te v. Te (2009)

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

FACTS:

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te (Edward) met respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te
(Rowena) in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college.
Edward, who was then a sophomore student decided to court Rowena, a freshman. The two
developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. Around three months after
their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused but her
persistence made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu. Having a hard time
in sustaining their daily needs, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her
uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept
on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay
with Rowena at her uncle’s place.

On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. Edward was
then 25 years old, and Rowena, 20. The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place
where Edward was treated like a prisoner and warned not to leave Rowena. When Edward
was able to call home, his brother suggested that they should stay at their parents’ home
and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he
should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father
about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and
insisted that Edward must go home. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of
Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena. In June
1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live
with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. Edward then
filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. The OSG deputized OCP to conduct investigation and
recommended trial on the merits.

RTC declared the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The
Republic, thru the OSG posed its appeal. CA reversed trial court’s ruling. The CA ruled that
petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical
psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information
provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended
by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Hence, this instant petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between parties is null and
void.

RULING:

YES. Both parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat, dependent
personality disorder for petitioner (Edward), and narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder for respondent (Rowena). In this case, Edward followed everything dictated to
him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his
identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in
life. Meanwhile, Rowena is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in
this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and,
thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties’
psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand
view of the witnesses’ deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Aranas, Janine Karla A.

Azcueta v. Republic

In a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, the totality of evidence presented should be considered and each should be decided on a
case-to case basis.

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code. Rodolfo, the respondent was never employed and depended on his
mother for financial help. He pretended to have a job but was only getting money from his
mother to cover as his salary. Every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically
violent towards her. They also had sexual problems. A psychiatrist was presented in court.
She stated that Rodolfo was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder, the root cause
of which is a cross-identification with the mother who was the dominant figure in the
family. This began early in his life but manifested only after the celebration of his marriage.
This was incurable and severe as he will not be able to carry on the responsibilities
expected of a married person.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage is proper

RULING:

The declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is proper.

In Molina, the court imposed the following guidelines in applying Art. 36, The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision; The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage;
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable;
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage; The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code; Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church should be given great
respect by our courts. In Santos, the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

Although there was a lack of personal examination of Rodolfo, in Marcos v. Marcos, it was
held that the respondent spouse being personally examined by a physician or psychologist
is not a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented and
with the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that
respondent totally failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondent’s
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and has no showing of improvement. He
failed to have sexual intercourse because of the unconscious guilt of having sexual relations
since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife. The marital obligations to
live together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to
comply with his marital obligations, their marriage should be declared null and void on the
account of respondent’s severe and incurable psychological incapacity.

Arriesgado, Mark
 Halili v. Halili (2009)

FACTS:

Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona Santos-
Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was
a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife. However, they
started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing
respondent and started dating other women. It was only upon making an inquiry that he
found out that the marriage was not "fake."

ISSUE:

Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis
of his psychological incapacity.

RULING:

In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this Court reiterated
that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity on a case-to-case
basis - guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.

In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder characterized by a pattern of

dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others'
comments.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have
this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance
from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to
live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty
starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in
order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are
often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.

It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was
grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has been
shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively
renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage and thus the Court
declared the marriage null and void.

Bassig, Ma. Karina A.

Najera v. Najera (2009)

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for
Legal Separation. Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage,
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage.
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological
incapacity of respondent which is his dysfunctional family background. Petitioner testified
in court and presented as witnesses her mother, psychologist Cristina R. Gates, who
testified that the chances of curability of respondent's psychological disorder were nil.; and
SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, who testified that he received a complaint from petitioner that
respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner
without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of petitioner's evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated

RULING:

NO. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. CA: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. What is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence
submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

The Court agrees with the CA that the evidence presented by petitioner are grounds for
legal separation only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. PETITION DENIED.

Jairus Vincent Z. Bernardez

 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes (2010)

The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate testimonies of the doctors.

FACTS:

Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes (petitioner) and Ramon Reyes (respondent) got married in
1976. Years into their marriage, respondent exhibited conducts unbecoming of a husband
and father. He was irresponsible, unfaithful, insensitive to the sufferings of his wife; he
failed to support his family financially; he is so focused with his failing businesses that he
became indifferent to his family. Petitioner then filed a petition to declare the marriage null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity. She presented the findings of two
clinical psychologists and one psychiatrist. These experts unanimously diagnosed both
petitioner and respondent of psychological incapacity which disabled them to perform
their marital obligations.

RTC granted the petition. CA reversed RTC’s decision on the ground, among others, that the
assessment of the experts is hearsay since they never personally examined the respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage is void ab initio

RULING:

Yes. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate testimonies of the doctors.
Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in the
exclusion as evidence. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation
and marriage is generallly and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other spouse which in
this case is the petitioner. Certainly, petitioner had occasion to interact with, and
experience, respondent’s pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the
clinical pathologists and psychiatrist. Also, the experts’ assessment was not based solely on
the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as
respondent’s son, siblings and in laws were also considered.

Brito, John Patrick T.

Kalaw v. Fernandez

A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the

plaintiff’s burden to convince the court of the existence of these facts.

FACTS:
Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez got married in 1976. After the birth of their 4th child,
Tyrone had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano. In 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home.
Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him 4 children.
9 years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity:
She left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and
all night;
She left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the
following day; and
She committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto
Tyrone presented 2 experts to prove that Malyn has NPD
RTC ruled that both parties are psychologically incapacitated. “That they entered into a
marriage without as much as understanding what it entails. They failed to commit
themselves to its essential obligations.”
CA reversed the decision. “The parties faults tend only to picture their immaturity and
irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most, there may be
sufficient grounds for a legal separation”

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological
incapacity.

RULING:

The petition has no merit. No factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume the basic marital obligations. It must be grave, must have existed at the time of
marriage, and must be incurable.

Petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the

conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary
evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.

Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself,
be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a
ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

Calimlim, Jeninah A.

Viñas v. Viñas (2015)

Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and

irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some
psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.

FACTS:

In 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married. Mary
Grace was already pregnant then. Thereafter, Mary Grace’s undesirable traits started
coming out. She was drinking and smoking heavily such that when she gave birth, the
infant died due to weakness and malnourishment. Mary Grace then lived as if she were
single and was unmindful of her husband’s needs. She was self-centered, selfish and
immature. She eventually left their home without informing Glenn. Glenn later found out
that she left to work in Dubai and was having an affair with another. A psychologist
assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his
cousin Rodelito who knew Glenda way back in college. The doctor found Glenda to be
suffering from a “Narcissistic Personality Disorder” with anti-social traits and concluded
that their relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and
fidelity to each other. Thus, she recommended that the couple’s marriage be declared a
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of Mary Grace which was already in her
system even prior to the solemnization of their marriage. Glenn filed before the RTC a
Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. After trial, the RTC
granted Greg’s petition. But the CA, on appeal by the Solicitor General, reversed and set
aside the RTC decision and declared the marriage valid and subsisting.

ISSUE:

Was the CA correct?

RULING:

Yes. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some
psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule (Navales v. Navales). It is worth
noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years from
1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses under
one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace’s departure from their home indicates either a
refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live
with her husband.

Chua Cheng, Ma. Lawreine Francesca C.

 Mallilin v. Jamesolamin (2015)

Sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for
declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity. The petitioner must be able to
establish that the respondent’s unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality,
which made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

FACTS:

Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before RTC Cagayan De Oro
disclosing that Luz was already living in California and had married an American.
Moreover, he revealed that Luz had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a
mother, disclosing that it was he who did the cleaning because Luz did not know how to
keep order, it was her sister who took care of their children, she dated different men when
she resumed her schooling, when he was not home she would receive male visitors, among
others. On the other hand, Luz claimed that is was Robert who manifested psychological
incapacity. RTC declared the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of Luz. The State, through the OSG, interposed an appeal with the CA
which, later on, reversed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code

RULING:

NO. The Court ruled that Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient and convincing
evidence to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz. The alleged failure of Luz to
assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that
justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court stressed that psychological
incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect on the part of the
errant spouse. Moreover, other than Robert’s self-serving testimony, no other convincing
evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as
nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of
psychological incapacity embodied in Article 36.

Dioquino, Apriljo Frances B.

Republic v. Romero (2016)

Marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State. Accordingly, it cannot be dissolved
at the whim of the parties, especially where the pieces of evidence presented are grossly
deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the
party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital
duties.

FACTS:

Reghis and Olivia were married on May 11, 1972. They first met in Baguio City in 1971
when Reghis helped Olivia and her family who were stranded along Kennon Road. Reghis
became close with Olivia’s family and in the desire to please Olivia’s parents, Reghis
courted Olivia and and they became sweethearts.

Reghis, tried to break-up with Olivia because he felt that her demanding attitude would
prevent him from reaching his goals. Olivia refused and insisted to stay overnight at Reghis'
dormitory. Reghis declined and, made arrangements so that Olivia could sleep in a female
dormitory. The next day, Reghis brought Olivia home and while nothing happened between
them, Olivia’s parents believed that they had eloped and planned for them to get married.
Reghis initially objected. However, Olivia’s parents assured him that they would shoulder
all expenses and would support them until they are financially able. Reghis, agreed.

The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage as Reghis could not forgive
Olivia for dragging him into marriage and resented her condescending attitude towards
him. In 1986, the couple parted ways.

On June 16, 1998, Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, citing his
psychological incapacity. In support of his petition, Reghis testified that he married Olivia
not out of love but out of the desire to please the latter’s parents.

Reghis also presented Dr. Valentina Nicdao-Basilio (Dr. Basilio), a clinical psychologist, who
submitted a Psychological Evaluation Report dated April 28, 1998 and testified that Reghis
suffered from Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD). According to Dr. Basilio,
Reghis’ behavioral disorder gave him a strong obsession for whatever endeavour he
chooses, such as his work, to the exclusion of other responsibilities and duties such as
those pertaining to his roles as father and husband. Dr. Basilio surmised that Reghis’ OCPD
was the root of the couple’s disagreements and that the same is incurable, explaining too
that Reghis was an unwilling groom as marriage was farthest from his mind at the time
and, as such, felt cheated into marriage.

For her part, Olivia maintained that she and Reghis were capacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations before, at the time, and after the celebration of their marriage.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between Reghis and Olivia null
and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and
testimony of Dr. Basilio, holding that Reghis suffered from a disorder that rendered him
unable to perform the obligations of love, respect and fidelity towards Olivia as it gave him
a strong obsession to succeed in his career, to the exclusion of his responsibilities as a
father and husband. The CA affirmed thd RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

RULING:

YES. As aptly pointed out by the petitioners, Reghis’ testimony shows that he was able to
comply with his marital obligations which, therefore, negates the existence of a grave and
serious psychological incapacity on his part. Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived
together as husband and wife under one roof for fourteen (14) years and both of them
contributed in purchasing their own house in Parañaque City. Reghis also fulfilled his duty
to support and take care of his family, as he categorically stated that he loves their children
and that he was a good provider to them. That he married Olivia not out of love, but out of
reverence for the latter’s parents, does not mean that Reghis is psychologically
incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Indeed, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological
evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle
that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital tie. After all, marriage is an inviolable institution protected by
the State. Accordingly, it cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where
the pieces of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties.

Dizon, April Anne A.

Castillo v. Castillo (2016)

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law
in effect at the time of its celebration.

FACTS:

On 25 May 1972 - Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6
January 1979 - Lea married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage
to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA
states in its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity
in the RTC. The reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.
Lea contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any
license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged. On 3 January 2002, Lea filed an action to declare her first
marriage to Bautista void. On 22 January 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision declaring that
Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio.

In 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between Lea and Renato null and void ab initio on
the ground that it was a bigamous marriage. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage
to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato makes her marriage to Renato
bigamous. Even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the
fact remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage
was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to
Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato.

In 2009, CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and upheld the validity of the parties'
marriage. CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979 (prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988), the Civil Code is the applicable law
since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family
Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Lea and Renato is void

RULING:

NO.

The law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children
of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect. Hence, the Court must
resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Code. Under the Civil Code, a void
marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: xxx “(5) in a void
marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable
marriage there must be a judicial decree.” This Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code contains
no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.

The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of
the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license.
That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the
second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil
Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the
nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent
marriage to Renato is valid.
Dy, Czara Loraine F.

Castillo v. Republic

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
according to our law on evidence.

FACTS:

Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts. During their
courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. The
couple's relationship turned tumultuous after the revelation. With the intervention of their
parents, they reconciled. They got married in Pangasinan in 1984 and were blessed with
two (2) children born in 1992 and in 2001.

In 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC.
Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was harmonious prompting her to believe
that the same was made in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, Felipe
resumed philandering. Tired of her husband's infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and
stopped any communication with him. Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with
another woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting their children for a
period of not less than ten (10) years without any reason, constitute a severe psychological
disorder.

In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie

Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who, in her Psychological Evaluation Report, concluded that
Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations.

It also speaks of gravity as he was not able to carry out the normative and ordinary duties
of marriage and family, shouldered by any married man, existing in ordinary
circumstances. He just cannot perform his duties and obligations as a husband, as he
entered into marriage for his own self-satisfaction and gratification, manipulate and
denigrate the petitioner for his own pleasures and satisfaction. In the process, respondent
was unable to assume his marital duties and responsibilities to his wife. He failed to render
mutual help and support (Article 68, FC).

Additionally, it also speaks of incurability, as respondent has no psychological insight that

he has a character problem. He would not acknowledge the pain he caused to people
around him. People suffering from this personality disorder are unmotivated to treatment
and impervious to recovery. There are no medications and laboratory examinations to be
taken for maladaptive behavior such as the NPD (Narcissistic Personality Disorder).
Otherwise stated, his personality disorder is chronic and pervasive affecting many aspects
of his life, such as social functioning and close relationships.1âwphi1 Apparently, he has
failed to develop appropriate adjustment methods. He lacks the intrapersonal and
interpersonal integration that caused him the failure to understand the very nature of that
sharing of life that is directed toward the solidarity and formation of family.

RTC declared the marriage between Mirasol and Felipe null and void. In 2012, the Republic
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the RTC denied. However, CA reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was
suffering from psychological incapacity, thus, incapable of performing marital obligations
due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC determined, the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter's
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:

It was held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability,
i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.

The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the

psychological incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would have automatically
ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It bears repeating
that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not
solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of their proceedings.

The Court finds that there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Felipe's
sexual infidelity and irresponsibility can be equated with psychological incapacity as
contemplated by law. Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did not present other
witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Felipe's infidelity notwithstanding the fact that
she claimed that their relatives saw him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is
considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.

Enriquez, Ephraim T.
 Del Rosario v. Del Rosario (2017)

A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. Absence of
sufficient evidence establishing psychological incapacity within the context of Article 36, the
Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

FACTS:

Rachel and Jose were teenagers when they first met each other. Very soon, they became
romantically involved. Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on in a civil rites
ceremony and were blessed with a son. Rachel went to Hongkong to work as domestic
helper/caregiver and has been working there ever since, only returning to the Philippines
every year for a vacation. In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the RTC, alleginga that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill his essential marital obligations. Rachel claimed that: during their marriage, Jose
conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband and father. Rachel added
that Jose would represent himself as single, would flirt openly, and had an extra-marital
affair. She claimed that Jose would refuse any chance of sexual intimacy between them as
they slowly drifted apart. Rachel presented the testimonies of their son and her
sisters which corroborated her allegations, as well as the testimony of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag
(Dr. Tayag), who prepared the Psychological Report on Rachel. The remarks section of Dr.
Tayag's Report, which was primarily based on her interview with Rachel and her son,
stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) characterized by: (a)
his lack of empathy and concern for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his pleasure-
seeking attitude that catered only to his own fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness
marked by his lack of depth when it comes to his marital commitments; and (d) his lack of
remorse for his shortcomings. RTC declared the marriage between Jose and Rachel void on
the ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Tayag.
The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, holding that the totality of the evidence Rachel
presented was not enough to sustain a finding that Jose is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's finding of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No. There exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose's immaturity,
irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity. The assessment of Dr.
Tayag, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose's
immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity that
would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital
obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet the
responsibility and duty of a married person. There must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with the manifestations of the
psychological incapacity.

Espinosa, Frederick V.

De La Fuente v. De La Fuente

Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or

comprehend essential marital obligations.

FACTS:

While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an
introvert and was prone to jealousy. Maria Teresa and Rodolfo would go on to get married
and had two children. Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life.
He was jealous of everyone who talked to Maria Teresa. In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria
Teresa like a sex slave and whenever Maria Teresa refused Rodolfo's advances, he would
get angry and they would quarrel.

Due to an argument with Maria, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria’s head. Maria and their
children, left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the gunpoking incident. Maria never
saw Rodolfo again after that, and she supported their children by herself. Maria filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Quezon City.

ISSUE:

Whether Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.

RULING:

Yes, Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated.

The case of Santos v. Court of Appeals laid down the standards for determining
psychological incapacity and declared that "psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." Furthermore, the incapacity
"should refer to no less than a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, provided the guidelines to be followed when
interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code: (1) The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2)
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court
must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state.

However, Molina does not require a physician to examine a person and declare him/her to
be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence presented
establishes the party's psychological condition.

The examining doctor’s testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that

respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. Rodolfo's paranoid personality
disorder made him distrustful and prone to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity,
incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the essential obligations of marriage.

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, must give due regard to expert opinion on the
psychological and mental disposition of the parties. The juridical antecedence of
respondent's psychological incapacity was also sufficiently proven during trial. Maria
attested that she noticed Rodolfo's jealousy even before their marriage, and that he would
often follow her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him.

Rodolfo's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating

his, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter
lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail.

Garcia, Charlotte Yris C.

Bakunawa v. Bakunawa (2017)

While the Court has declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician, much less be
subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.

FACTS:

Manuel and Nora met in 1974 when they were still students in UP. Nora became pregnant.
They got married on July 26, 1975. Since they were still in college, they lived with Manuel’s
parents. Manuel stopped his studies to help with his father’s business. He was assigned to
provincial projects and came home only on weekends. When he came home, he only spent
his limited timed with friends and girlfriends. Manuel and Nora quarreled about his
behavior and Manuel depended on his father for his family’s needs.

In 1976 they lived separately from Manuel’s parents. Manuel observed Nora’s passiveness
and laziness; she was moody and mercurial. Their quarrels became violent. Manuel had an
extramarital affair and eventually left Nora and their children in 1980 to cohabit with his
girlfriend.

Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Nora’s
psychological incapacity. His psychiatrist witness testified that he had Intermittent
Explosive Disorder characterized by irritability and aggressive behavior that is not
proportionate to the cause. She also diagnosed Nora with Passive Aggressive Personality
Disorder.

RTC granted the petition which was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage of the parties should be declared null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

The totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of Dr.
Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological evaluation report, is insufficient to prove that
he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang, the Court held that "[i]f the incapacity can be
proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be
admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a
psychologist's examination and report." In Toring v. Toring, et al., the Court stated that:
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to
them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on
the allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the time of marriage, or to
subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the
time of marriage.
The only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the spouses'
psychological evaluation was Moncho (their eldest son), who could not be considered as a
reliable witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to Article
36 of the Family Code, since he could not have been there at the time his parents were
married.

While the Court has declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician, much less be
subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.

In this case, the supposed personality disorder of Manuel could have been established by
means of psychometric and neurological tests which are objective means designed to
measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.

Gonzalez, Jed Nathaniel M.

Garlet v. Garlet (2017)

In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity
of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation
where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of
a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

FACTS:

Yolanda and Vencidor met sometime in 1988. At one party, they both got drunk and had
sexual intercourse, resulting into Yolanda getting pregnant. During her pregnancy,
Vencidor would not visit Yolanda nor would he offer to give her support. After their son
was born, Yolanda worked in Japan as a cultural dancer, and was able to purchase several
properties in the Philippines. Vencidor then proposed to her, they got married and had
another child. In all those times, Vencidor was jobless. Yolanda returned to Japan to earn
money for the family. She was able to set up a mini-grocery for extra income, however, it
closed down because Vencidor mismanaged it. He also squander the money intended for
the business and pawned all of Yolanda’s jewelry.

The clinical psychologist, Ms. De Guzman, declared that Vencidor as psychologically

incapacitated because of his narcissistic behaviour despite not being able to personally
interview him. The RTC granted Yolanda’s petition for annulment. CA reversed because
there was bias in the findings of Ms. De Guzman, and the same were insufficient to establish
psychological incapacity on the part of Vencidor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC’s Decision

RULING:

NO. While the Court previously held that "there is no requirement that the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician," yet, this is
qualified by the phrase, "if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity."The psychologist's findings must still be subjected to a careful
and serious scrutiny as to the bases of the same, particularly, the source/s of information,
as well as the methodology employed. Ms. De Guzman is saying that respondent was a
spoiled child, and while it can be said that respondent has grown up to be a self-centered
and self-indulgent adult, it still falls short of establishing respondent's psychological
incapacity characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, so as to render
respondent's marriage to petitioner void ab initio.

In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the
nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a
situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage
by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated,
we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

Hernandez, Katrina Ysobelle A.

Republic v. Tionglico (2018)

Psychological incapacity has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.

FACTS:

Katrina and Lawrence after a brief courtship entered into a relationship. When she got
pregnant, Lawrence did not receive the news well as he was worried how it would affect
his image and how his parents would take the situation. Nevertheless, they got married.
Their marriage was marred by bickering and quarrels. Katrina noticed that Lawrence was
alarmingly dependent on his mother, immature and distant. Due to their incessant fighting,
Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his parents' home and never to come back. They have
been separated in fact since then.

Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Arellano, who based on the narrations of Katrina,
diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The RTC granted the petition
and declared the marriage of Katrina and Lawrence as void ab initio. The CA affirmed the
RTC decision. The OSG points out that psychological assessment based solely on the
information coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case, the psychiatrist obtained his
data, in concluding that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated, exclusively from
Katrina.
ISSUE:

Whether the totality of evidence presented by Katrina supports the findings of both the
RTC and the CA that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential
marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Katrina?

RULING:

No. The SC finds the totality of evidence clearly wanting. First, Lawrence, despite notice, did
not participate in the proceedings, nor was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being
invited to do so. There was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude that
Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations
apart from Katrina's self-serving statements. Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards
the behavior of Lawrence hardly depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated
husband. Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can
hardly be said to be a psychological illness. These acts do not rise to the level of the
"psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations.

Psychological incapacity has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, ( b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved. Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated
to discharge the duties expected of a husband.

Jacinto, Christine

Singson v. Singson (2018)

The psychological incapacity of the other spouse must be 1) grave, 2) incurable or permanent,
and 3) must be existing at the time the marriage was celebrated (judicial antecedence) to
warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage. The 3 aforementioned characteristics are
known as the Molina guidelines. Also, mere difficulty in complying with the marital
obligations does not automatically equate to psychological incapacity.

FACTS:

Concepcion Singson and Benjamin Singson were married sometime in 1974. In 2007,
Concepcion filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. Concepcion averred that at the time they started living together, Benjamin
showed signs of dishonesty and of being a compulsive gambler, and that he was unable to
perform his paternal duties. She further alleged that at the time she filed said petition,
Benjamin was confined at Metro Psych Facility, a rehabilitation institution, for being a
pathological gambler and having personality disorder and is being attended to by Dr. Ponio.
Furthermore, she said that the gambling addiction of Benjamin already existed during his
high school where he was already betting on jai alai.

In his answer, Benjamin refuted that psychological incapacity must be characterized by

gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability, all of which are not present in the petition.
He also averred that contrary to Concepcion’s claims, he rendered support to their family
through his job and that the land where their family home is located actually belongs to
him.

ISSUE:

Whether Benjamin is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital

obligations.

RULING:

Benjamin is not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

The Supreme Court sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage since the facts showed that Benjamin had a job,
provided money from the sale of his property, provided the land where the family home
was constituted, and lived together with them except during his confinement at the
rehabilitation institution. Even petitioner admitted that Benjamin’s share of the proceeds
from the sale of his parents’ property was used to pay for the sustenance of the family and
that the land where their family home is located is actually owned by him.

The totality of evidence presented by Concepcion has failed to sufficiently and substantially
prove that Benjamin’s gambling addiction, behavior and inability to find a job made him
psychologically incapable of performing his essential marital duties. The Court reiterated
that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code means incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely
the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.
Further, Dr. Ponio’s testimony also failed to prove that Benjamin’s inability to perform his
marital obligations are caused by psychological abnormality which is already present or
existing at the time the marriage was celebrated.

D. Consent

a. Insanity
b. Fraud

Joaquin, Marione
 Buccat v. Buccat

Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage.

FACTS:

Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat got married and eighty nine (89) days
after getting married, Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After
knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her. Godofredo
later filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to
married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the annulment of the marriage may be granted on the ground that Luida
concealed her pregnancy before the marriage

RULING:

No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution
in which the State is interested and where society rests. In this case, the court did not find
any proof that there was concealment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a law student, did
not suspect anything about Luida’s condition considering that she was in an advanced stage
of pregnancy when they got married.

Jore, Ma. Jovi Patricio

Anaya v. Palaroan (1970)

Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one

enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment.

FACTS:

In 1953, Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married. In 1954, Fernando filed an
action for annulment of their marriage on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation. The petition was dismissed. Hence, their marriage is
subsisting. Fernando allegedly divulged that several months prior to the marriage, he had
pre-marital relationships with a close relative of his. Anaya filed suit to annul the marriage
and to recover moral damages. Aurora claimed that the non-disclosure of such pre-marital
relationship constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for annulment of their
marriage on such ground. Fernando denied having had pre-marital relationship with a
close relative and having committed any fraud against Aurora. He did not pray for the
dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral
damages." Aurora replied stating that Fernando had no intention of performing his marital
duties and obligations since the marriage was contracted as a means for him to escape
marrying the close relative that was intimated above. The trial court dismissed the
complaint, holding that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate
her marriage. Hence, Aurora appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the non-disclosure of a husband to her wife of his pre-marital relationship
is a ground for annulment of marriage.

RULING:

No. The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman was not
one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is
further excluded by the last paragraph providing that “no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to… chastity” shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case
at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment of
marriage.

Ko, Nikki Mei Q.

Villanueva v. CA (2006)

Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. The failure to cohabit
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for
annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or
undue influence x x x.

FACTS:

Orlando Villanueva (Orlando) and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva (Lilia) got
married. After a few years, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his
marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who
was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never
cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's
child died during delivery.

In her answer with compulsory counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition,
arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her
in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her
after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and
that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being
born prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

ISSUE:
Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent.

RULING:

NO. The court is not convinced that he married under duress.

The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It
is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a
security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep
himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear
upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security
personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were
threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to
solemnizing their marriage.

Orlando cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of
cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to
annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the
spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to
cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to
cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be
upheld.

Lazaro, Aprille Keith M.

Almelor v. RTC (2008)

Marriage, in its totality, involves the spouse’s right to the community of their whole lives. It
likewise involves a true intertwining of personalities.

FACTS:

Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor and respondent Leonida Trinidad were married on January
29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral. Their union bore three children. After eleven (11) years
of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage
on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations.

Leonida averred that Manuel’s kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public
eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in
his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably
meticulous, easily angered. Manuel’s unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their
children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple. Leonida complained that this
was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuel’s
deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making were
incomprehensible to Leonida.

Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her
suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuel’s peculiar closeness to his male
companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation
manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic homosexual
materials in his possession. Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed
another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel,
he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal
abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children.

Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove
Leonida’s claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and
a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel
and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child). She concluded that
Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it
existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.

Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. Manuel pointed
out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very
jealous and possessive nature. This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel
to avoid the company of female friends.

The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the
Family Code.

ISSUE:

The Honourable Court of Appeals erred in not treating the petition for annulment of
judgment as a petition for review in view of the importance of the issues involved and in
the interest of justice;

The Honourable Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the trial court as
regards the order declaring the marriage as null and void on the ground of Petitioner’s
psychological incapacity;

The Honourable Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the trial court as
regards the order to forfeit the share of petitioner in his share of the conjugal assets.

RULING:
The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial
justice and in the Court’s exercise of equity jurisdiction. For reasons of justice and equity,
this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals. It has, in the
past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.

Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not

homosexuality per se. Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual,
the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The
law is clear – a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven
by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage
and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality,
and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such
concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent
to the marriage. Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be
freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by
preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of
circumstances constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its
concealment.

In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or
conjugal property. In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and
enjoyment of the property regime, jointly. In the case under review, the RTC decreed
dissolution of the community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, the trial
court forfeited Manuel’s share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is
upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel’s share in the property
regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community property.

c. Duress – force, intimidation or undue influence

Lucero, Mark Joey S.

Villanueva v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 132955 (2006)

“…a period of four years and eight months from the time of “the alleged coerced consent
which supposedly characterized his marriage” reflects “prolonged inaction.” Article 45 (4)
and Article 47 (4) expressly state the prescription period of five years to begin “from the time
the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or cease,” not from the time the
marriage took place.”

FACTS:

In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva before a trial court
judge in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orlando filed before the trial court a petition
for annulment of his marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to
marry Lilia who was then pregnant. Orlando anchored his prayer for the annulment of his
marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to Lilia. He cited
several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from
Lilia and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the
University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka
Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been
hired by Lilia and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to
marry her. On the other hand Lilia denied Orlando’s allegations and she said that Orlando
freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows
Orlando’s affection and care towards her.

ISSUE:

Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent under
Article 45 (4) and Article 47 (4) of the Family Code.

RULING:

No. The SC ruled that Orlando’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its
face, it is obvious that Orlando is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have
the pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed.

On the merits of the case, Orlando’s allegation of fear was not concretely established. The
Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It
is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a
security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep
himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear
upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security
personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were
threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to
solemnizing their marriage. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that
he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie.
His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship
with Lilia.

d. Mistake as to Identity
e. Disease
f. No Consent

Republic v. Albios (2013)

A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no
real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding
that the parties would not be bound…void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent
consent, but for a complete absence of consent.

FACTS:

In 2004, Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen, and Liberty Albios got married to each
other. In 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Fringer. The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio because the parties failed to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it
and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking and stated that their case was similar to a marriage in jest.

ISSUE:

Is the marriage void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

RULING:

NO. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in
the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense
that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45
and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent
must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their
act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.

Consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.

A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no
real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding
that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not
for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent
intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a
limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

E. Authority of the Solemnizing Officer

Magaoay, Rhose Azcelle L.

Aranes v. Occiano (2002)

…However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official
to administrative liability.

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross ignorance
of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, he
solemnized the marriage of Aranes and Dominador Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the
couple’s residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and
without the requisite of marriage license.

It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of marriage
license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on January 17, 2000 but
neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also appeared with the Office of the Civil
Registrar General for the alleged marriage.

Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and first
refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset the date considering the
absence of the marriage license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx
of visitors and fear that the postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the
assurance of the couple that they will provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano
denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage
license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction.

RULING:

The court held that “the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot
avoid liability for violating the law on marriage”.

Merrera, Raisa Victoria

Navarro v. Domagtoy (1996)

A judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

FACTS:

The complainant is Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo Navarro who contends that
MCTC Judge Hernando Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law.

It is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent
judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-
Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge’s
residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of
the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Judge Domagtoy was clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

RULING:

No. Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his
having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
outside of his court’s jurisdiction. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario
was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented
addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.

More importantly, under Art. 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the “authority of
the solemnizing officer.” Under Art. 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, “any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.” Art. 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter
or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision.
Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official
to administrative liability.

Palafox, Danielle Michelle L.

Beso v. Daguman (2000)

Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested.

A marriage can be held outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom only (1) at the point of
death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or (3) upon the request of both
parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.

FACTS:

Respondent Juan Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan_Pagsanjan, Samar,

solemnized the marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso to Bernardito Yman, on August 28,
1987, at the Judge’s residence in Calbayog City, Samar, or outside his jurisdiction, because
complainant was to leave for abroad the same day as she was an OFW, among other
reasons. After the wedding, Yman abandoned Beso for no clear reason. She then went to
check the marriage contract with the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog, from which she
learned that said marriage was not registered. Responding to Beso’s letter about the
matter, Daguman told her that all copies of the marriage contract were taken by Yman, and
none was retained by the judge.

ISSUES:

Whether respondent Judge is liable for solemnizing the marriage outside of his court’s
jurisdiction; whether respondent Judge is liable for negligently not retaining a copy and not
registering the marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registry.

RULING:

Yes. As the above quotes provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge’s
chambers or courtroom only (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places in accordance
with Article 29; or (3) upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to
this effect. None of these instances was present in this case.

Considering that Judge Daguman’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Margarita,
Tarangan and Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize
marriages in Calbayog City. Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the
mandate that a judge should exert extra care in the exercise of his duties in its
solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the
event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 FC which states in no
uncertain terms that – It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish
either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Art. 6
and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificates not later than 15 days after
the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing
officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain
in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate.

There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. However, the records
show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge’s part.

Pascual, Aizen Paula DS.

Ronulo v. People (2014)

The Supreme Court explained that what made the petitioner's act a marriage ceremony and
not just a mere blessing was that while there is no prescribed form or religious rite, all that
was required was “for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing
officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take
each other as husband and wife.

FACTS:

On March 29, 2003, Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry one
another. On the day of the wedding, at the Roman Catholic Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, the priest refused to marry them when he learned that the couple did not have a
marriage license. Instead, the couple, already dressed in their wedding attire and with their
parents and friends, proceeded to the Aglipayan church and requested Petitioner, an
Aglipayan Priest to marry them to which he proceeded to marry the couple.

An information for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, was filed against the petitioner
before the MTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage
ceremony.

The petitioner pleaded “not guilty” and while he admitted that he conducted a ceremony,
denied that his act of “blessing” the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the
marriage as contemplated by law.

The MTC found petitioner guilty of violating Art. 352 of the Revised Penal Code for
conducting an illegal marriage ceremony. The RTC affirmed as did the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner conducted a “blessing” and not an [illegal] marriage ceremony.
RULING:

Petitioner conducted an illegal marriage ceremony. The crime as provided for in Art 352 of
the RPC refers to the performance of marriages under Articles 3 and 6 of the Family Code
which reads:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

xxx

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

xxx

Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained
in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their
witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.

...

The Supreme Court explained that what made the petitioner's act a marriage ceremony
and not just a mere blessing was that while there is no prescribed form or religious rite, all
that was required was “for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age that they take each other as husband and wife.”

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him
and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that,
contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony
of witnesses that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as
husband and wife. Thus, it is clear that petitioner conducted a marriage ceremony and not
a mere blessing.

The marriage ceremony was also illegal. The Supreme Court stated that:

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the
presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he
knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the “blessing” of their
relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage
ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these
requirements negates his defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his
criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony
has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by
Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal
liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an
element of the crime.

Perez, Carla Patricia S.

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) v. Former Judge Tormis (2016)

A marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.

FACTS:

On July 3, 2007, a judicial audit team created by the OCA investigated Branches 2, 3, 4, and
8 of MTC Cebu City for alleged misdeeds in the solemnization of marriages.

Judge Rosabella Tormis solemnized a total of 181 marriages from 2003-2007 based on the
marriage certificates actually examined. However, the monthly report of cases showed that
she solemnized 305 marriages instead from 2004-2007. The OCA report also noted that it
was only in July 2007 that her court started to use a logbook to keep track of marriages.
Tormis solemnized 37 marriages with incomplete or missing documents such as the
marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of
cohabitation. Judge Tormis solemnized 13 marriages despite the questionable character of
the validity of the required documents particularly the marriage license. The judge
solemnized a total of 47 marriages under Art. 34 of the FC wherein the marriage
requirements' authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the cohabitation of the
parties and their given address.

The Court found Tormis guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross ignorance
of the law and dismissed her from service. She was later disbarred.

ISSUE:

Whether Tormis’ actions were becoming of a solemnizing officer.

RULING:

No. Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the
contracting parties and examine the requirements they submitted. The parties must have
complied with all the essential and formal requisites of marriage, which includes a
marriage license. A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have
all the qualifications and none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage.

If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least 5 years and have
no legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths, which the judge must personally examine. In cases
where one or both of the contracting parties are foreigners, Art. 21 of the FC provides that a
certificate of legal capacity to marry is necessary before the acquisition of a marriage
license. Tormis used her authority as a judge to make a mockery of marriage. As a judicial
officer, she is expected to know the law on solemnization of marriages.

F. Marriage License

Perez, Mark Josep R.

Niñal v. Bayadog (2000)

The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of
the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity - meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity - that is unbroken.

FACTS:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones and out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death and 1 year and 8 months
thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license after executing an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

Subsequently, Pepito died and after his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack
of a marriage license. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have
no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

The lower court dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioners should have filed the
action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death,
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.

ISSUES:

Whether the marriage between Pepito and Norma was valid.

Whether petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father’s marriage
void after his death.

RULING:

No, the marriage was void.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void
ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58.

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day
of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity -
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity - that is
unbroken.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living
with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year
period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the
nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one
as "husband and wife". Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio.
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable
and void marriages are not identical. Void marriages can be questioned even after the
death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it
but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Jurisprudence under the Civil
Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.

Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place.
And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any
civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or
both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts. Other than for
purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.

Prudente, Maica A.

De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro (2008)

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites
of marriage.

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage license. When the couple went back to the Office
of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push
through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13
March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe. Nevertheless,
after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did
not live together as husband and wife. Respondent gave birth to a child. Since the child’s
birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out. Respondent filed a complaint for
support against petitioner. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to
petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially
support her as his wife and to his child. Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent,
claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake
affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage
contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to
her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before
he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that
he has never seen nor acknowledged the child. RTC ruled their marriage not valid because
it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the
natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.

ISSUE:

Whether or not marriage is valid between petitioner and respondent

RULING:

NO. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented
that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for
more than five years. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity
in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
marriage license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in
fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent
executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a
mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their
failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Racadio, Marie Bernadette M.

Republic v. Dayot (2008)

The falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short
of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack
of marriage license.

FACTS:

In 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. In lieu of a marriage license,
Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, attesting that both of them had attained the age
of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years. In 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage
ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit
stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have
actually fallen short of minimum 5-year requirement, renders marriage void ab initio.

RULING:

Yes. Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. For the exception in Article 76
to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the
age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the
time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted
that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before
the celebration of their marriage.

The falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen
short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio
for lack of marriage license. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void
ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The
right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

Riguerra, Paolo Miguel

Abbas v. Abbas (2013)

FACTS:

Petitioner met respondent in Taiwan and they were married at the Taipei Mosque. He
arrived in the Philippines and came to his mother in law’s residence. He was told he was
going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements to stay in the Philippines.
Petitioner and respondent signed a document, and did not know the ceremony was a
marriage until respondent told him. He testified that he did not went to Carmona, Cavite to
apply for a marriage license and that he never resided in that area. He went to the office of
the Civil Registrar of Carmona to check on their marriage license. he Municipal Civil
Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification to the effect that the marriage
license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan.
The Pasay RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued in favor of Gloria and Syed It
also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the
Family Code. As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement,
and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite. The CA
reversed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE:

W/N there is a valid marriage license issued in favor of Syed and Gloria.

RULING:

No. Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such
license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona
which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no
such license was issued. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the
license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.

Sarangay, Jossa M.

Sy v. Court of Appeals (2000)

A marriage celebrated without a valid marriage license is null and void, unless the
contracting parties are exempt from this requisite (Articles 4 and 35(3), Family Code of the
Philippines).

FACTS:

Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 in Quezon City.
They had two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left the conjugal dwelling, and
since then, they lived separately with the children in the custody of their mother. Four
years thereafter, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San
Fernando, Pampanga which was later amended to a petition for separation of property.

In 1988, she filed a case of attempted parricide against Fernando. However, the case was
lowered to slight physical injuries. Petitioner later filed for a declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity which was denied. On appeal, she
raised the issue of their marriage being void ab initio for the lack of marriage license. Their
marriage license was obtained on September 17, 1972 while their marriage was celebrated
on November 15, 1973. Hence, the marriage license was expired already.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony.

RULING:

YES.

The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is
contained in their marriage contract. The date of celebration of their marriage however, is
November 15, 1973. Thus, on the day of their marriage ceremony, there was no marriage.

Senique, Alyssa Paulina R.

Alcantara v. Alcatara

An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.

FACTS:

Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita
A. Alcantara alleging that he and respondent, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could
arrange a marriage for them (fixer). The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall
and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage
belongs. Also, the marriage license was issued in Carmona, Cavite but both of them did not
go to Carmona, Cavite nor any of them was a resident therein.

Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of
Carmona, Cavite.

Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the
annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage is valid.

RULING:

YES.
The marriage took place in 1982, thus, the Civil Code must be followed. A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio. Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be
considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner
and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also
issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise
in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification
enjoys the presumption that official duty. Issuance of a marriage license where none of the
parties is resident, is just an irregularity. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of
marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Sobrepena, Kim Angeli

Kho v. Republic (2016)

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.

FACTS:

Petitioner Kho’s parents summoned a clerk in the office of the Municipal Treasure,
instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare the necessary papers were required for the
intended marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around
midnight.

Petitioner avers that he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for
marriage license and had not seem documents in connection with the procurement of a
marriage license.

Respondent filed her Answer praying that the petition be dismissed because there is no
evidence to prove petitioner’s allegation,

RTC found that the absence of the said marriage license rendered the marriage null and
void ab initio.

CA reversed and set aside.

ISSUE:

Whether there was a valid marriage between petitioner and respondent.

RULING:

No, there was no valid marriage between the petitioner and respondent. Art 58 of the Civil
Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registry of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code.

Art 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void. The character of a marriage license is that it is the
authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government
official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.

The fact that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage certificate was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.

II. EFFECT OF DEFECTIVE MARRIAGES ON THE STATUS OF CHILDREN

A. If marriage is voidable
B. If marriage is terminated
C. If marriage is void
(i) Exceptions

III. MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE

IV. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ANNULMENT OR DECLARATION OF

NULLITY

Socrates, Tomas Iñigo P.

Enrico v. Medinaceli (2007)

For marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Family Code, a petition for annulment of
marriage or declaration of nullity of a void marriage can only be filed solely by the husband
or the wife, not the heirs. The heirs have no standing in such petition. The recourse of the heirs
is to question the validity of the marriage in the settlement of the estate of the decedent
spouse.

FACTS:

Eulogio Medinacely (Eulogio) married Trinidad Medinaceli (Trinidad) in 1962. On May 1,

2004, Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married Lolita Enrico (Lolita). On
February 10, 2005, (barely 6 months from the 2nd marriage), Eulogio died. On March 17,
2005, the heirs of Eulogio and Trinidad (the heirs) filed in the RTC an action for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of Eulogio and Lolita for lack of marriage license. Lolita argued
that they have been living already openly and publicly for 21 years, hence, the 5-year
cohabitation exempts them from the requirement of marriage license before marriage. The
heirs contended that the 5-year cohabitation rule cannot apply to Eulogio and Lolita
because their 21-year cohabitation was not in accordance with what the law required to be
exempted, moreover, that the celebration of marriage of Eulogio and Lolito could not have
been impossible because Eulogio was already sick at that time. Lolita filed a motion to
dismiss stating that only the spouses can file an action for declaration of nullity of their
marriage. The trial court dismissed the case. But, the heirs moved for reconsideration citing
Nial v. Badayog giving the heirs, whose substantive right on the inheritance is affected, the
standing to question the validity of the marriage of their predecessor. The trial court
granted the motion for reconsideration. Lolita filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65
before this court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs may file an action for the declaration of nullity of the marriage of
the deceased predecessor.

RULING:

No. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, which took effect in 2003, and expressly covers marriage celebrated
during the effectivity of the Family Code, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The case of Nial v. Bayadog
does not apply because that case applies to marriages celebrated before the effectivity of
the Family Code. In the present case, the marriage of Eulogio and Lolita was in 2004,
governed by the Family Code. Hence, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages applies to their marriage. In order to assail its validity thru a direct action, only
the husband or the wife can file such action. The heirs have no legal right to file such action.
The RTC must dismiss the case, the heirs have no cause of action in the court a quo.
However, the heirs may question the validity of the marriage of Eulogio and Lolita in the
proceedings of the settlement of estate of Eulogio.

Surla, Kristine

Carlos v. Sandoval (2008)

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife.

FACTS:

Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three
parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Thereafter, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived
by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son.
Carlos commenced an action against respondents and asserted that the marriage between
his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the
sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

Respondents submitted their answer then moved for summary judgment. Petitioner
opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract
evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for
summary judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or
a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial?

Who may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage?

RULING:

NO. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed. By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its
lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not
terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the
parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting
evidence before the judgment was rendered.

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be
filed by any party outside of the marriage. The new Rule recognizes that the husband and
the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only
ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses
alone are the engineers of their marital life. They alone can and should decide when to take
a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective
in its application.

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage
void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of
marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be
construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person
must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Tec, Natasha Kim R.

Ablaza v. Republic (2010)

The plaintiff must be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the
action.

FACTS:

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9,
1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a
marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had
died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any
person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void
ab initio. On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that petition is
filed out of time and that petitioner is not a party to marriage. Motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal order of the
RTC on the ground that the action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case
should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother?

RULING:

Yes. The applicable law when marriage was contracted between Cresenciano and Leonila
on December 26, 1949, is the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. Hence, Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or wife does not apply. The case was reinstated and its
records returned to RTC for further proceedings. The abovecited rule specifically extends
only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but,
being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.

Vitug, Loisse Danielle D.

Aurelio v. Aurelio (2011)

Failure to comply with the obligations under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that
the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support, is a ground for the declaration of nullity of
marriage.

FACTS:

Respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code. It alleged that they are both psychologically incapacitated and this was
manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity
to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and
distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He
refused to assist in the maintenance of the family.

On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and
freely. Her feelings change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending
on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was
emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to
gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts
her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their
incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to
the breakdown of their marriage.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations in the petition are sufficient to declare the marriage null and
void.

RULING:

Yes. The petition alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to
bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive
Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform
their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondent’s allegations fall under
Article 68 of the Family Code which states that “the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.”

Yu, Karl Alen G.

Republic v. CA
G.R. No. 159594 (2012)

The incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making
it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological
incapacity. The expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity. There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic
marital obligations.

FACTS:

Eduardo and Catalina De Quintos were married in 1977 but were not blessed with a child
due to Catalina’s hysterectomy following her 2nd miscarriage. In 1998, Eduardo filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house w/o his consent, that she engaged in
petty arguments, that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs, that she spent
most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing household chores and caring for
their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas
worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with
her paramour. Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation. Dr. Reyes
opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer
treatable. Catalina admitted her psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal
home without Eduardo’s consent and flirting with different men. RTC granted the petition
and the CA affirmed it.

ISSUE:

Whether psychological incapacity was sufficiently proven

RULING:

No. Catalina’s supposed behaviour was not established. No other witnesses were presented
to corroborate his allegations. Also, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the
results of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity of factual
foundation to support the claim of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. The findings of the
expert witness were not lacking and unsupported as there was only one interview and no
other tests were done to support the findings. Lastly, proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor, an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that
effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be
shown, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

Abasta, Benazir Faye V.

Mendoza v. Republic

To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality
of the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was
grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent got married after which, they moved to the place of the wife
although remaining dependent on their parents for support.

It was petitioner who supported for the family’s financial needs because Dominic’s job has
unstable salary. It was alleged by the petitioner that her husband, Dominic had an affair
with his co-worker. Also, Dominic incurred debts and criminal charges which foced
petitioner to end their relationship and move away from Dominic. Subsequently, a petition
for declaration of nullity was filed by herein petitoner before the RTC on the ground of
article 36, psychological incapacity presenting as evidence the testimony of a psychiatrist.
OSG opposed the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimony of the psychiatrist is sufficient to establish psychological

incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage?
RULING:

No. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals: “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to.

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding
the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such
opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but
not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The
trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not
solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of the proceedings.

Accordingly, the RTCs findings that Dominic’s psychological incapacity was characterized
by gravity, antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed
to show that his actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or serious
nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and
lack of remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel remorse
over his misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of
immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that was
incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with psychological
incapacity. Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses manifestations of
psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground only for an action for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.

V. FOREIGN MARRIAGES AND FOREIGN DIVORCES

(a) As to form
(b) As to substantive requirements

Allorde, Channelle Anne B.

Republic v. Orbecido (2005)

The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

FACTS:

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III (Orbecido) married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at
the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with two children, namely, Kristoffer and Lady Kimberly. In 1986, Orbecido’s wife
left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000,
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married
a certain Innocent Stanley in California. Orbecido thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the OSG, sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, this petition raising a pure question of law. The OSG contended that the questioned
provision applies only to valid mixed marriages between Filipinos and aliens; that the
remedy is annulment or legal separation; and that there is no law that governs
Orbecido‘s situation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not paragraph. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code applies in this case, hence,
capacitating Orbecido to remarry.

RULING:

YES. Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, the
Court hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. The twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.

Aranas, Janine Karla A.

Arca v. Javier
One of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may be acquired, the plaintiff
must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted.

FACTS:

Plaintiff Salud R. Arca (Arca) and defendant Alfredo Javier were married in the MTC of
Manila. The defendant, enlisted as a US Navy man left for the United States. Due to Arca
leaving the home of the defendant’s parents, defendant brought an action for divorce
against Arca for desertion before the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA.
After securing a divorce decree, defendant married Thelma Francis, an American citizen.
After some years, the defendant's American wife obtained a divorce from him for reasons
not disclosed by the evidence. Later on, having retired, defendant returned to the
Philippines, armed with two decrees of divorce, one against his first wife and the other
against him by his second wife issued by the Circuit Court of Mobile County. Defendant
thereafter married Maria Odvina in the Municipal Court of Manila. A case of Bigamy was
then filed against the defendant by Arca. However, defendant acquitted on the basis that
the marriage of the defendant with Odvina was made in all good faith and in the honest
belief that his marriage with Arca had been legally dissolved by the decree of divorce and
that there was no criminal intent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the foreign divorce decree has a valid effect in this jurisdiction.

RULING:

No, it does not. One of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that
the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; The plaintiff must be domiciled in
good faith in the State in which it is granted. The court of a country in which neither of the
spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status. It cannot
be said that the Mobile County acquired jurisdiction because at the time the action was
filed, the defendant’s legal residence was in the Philippines. He could not have acquired
legal residence or domicile there when he moved there because at that time, he was still in
the service of the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room where he used to stay during his
occasional shore leave for shift duty. He never intended to live there permanently as shown
by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma Francis he moved to New York and after
retiring, came back to the Philippines.

The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of "adultery on the
part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided for under section 1
of Act No. 2710. The divorce decree in question was granted on the ground of desertion,
clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws. This is in keeping with the well-known
principle of Private International Law which prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment,
or the law affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental policy of the State
of the forum. It is also in keeping with our concept or moral values which have always
looked upon marriage as an institution.

Arriesgado, Mark

Tenchavez v. Escaño (1965)

FACTS:

Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24,
1948, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil
registrar. However, the two were unable to live together after the marriage and as of June
1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same
year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on
the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final
and absolute” was issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived
with him in California, had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American
Citizenship.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of
the Philippines.

RULING:

No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and undissolved under
the Philippine Law. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under
the Philippine Law to which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree was
issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not
complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable cause,
leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally
getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the
husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus
entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery.

Bassig, Ma. Karina A.

Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985)

Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law.

FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong and established
their residence in the Philippines. The parties divorced in Nevada, US and the petitioner
has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that petitioner's business, the
Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of that business. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property". Respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada
Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the foreign divorce decree obtained by the parties is valid and binding in
the Philippines

RULING:

YES. The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. It is true
that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as he is bound by the Decision of
his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. PETITION DENIED.

Jairus Vincent Z. Bernardez

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera (1989)

The status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the
filing of the complaint.

FACTS:

On September 7, 1979, Filipina Imelda Pilapil (petitioner), and German Erich Geiling
(Geiling) were marrried in Germany. After about three and a half years, connubial
disharmony eventuated Geiling to initiate a divorce proceeding in a German local court. On
January 1986, the divorce decree was promulgated on the ground of failure of marriage of
spouses. On June of the same year, Geiling filed two complaints of adultery against
petitioner before the City Fiscal of Manila which were eventually filed in court.

ISSUE:

Whether Geiling has legal capacity to prosecute petitioner for adultery after obtaining
divorce

RULING:

No. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of adultery cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary
to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the
filing of the criminal action. In the case at bar, Geiling lost his legal capacity as a husband of
petitioner when he obtained the divorce decree in Germany.

Under the law, divorce decree may be acknowledged in our jurisdiction if such is valid
according to the national law of the alien spouse who obtained it. At the time of the filing
therefore, Geiling is not anymore qualified to prosecute petitioner. The allegation that he
could not have brought the case before the divorce decree for lack of knowledge is of no
legal consequence for at the time the divorce proceeding was initiated, Geiling obviously
knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage to protect once it is dissolved. In
view of the foregoing, SC ordered the dismissal of the adultery cases.

Brito, John Patrick T.

Quita v. CA

FACTS:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines in
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Fe obtained a final judgment of
divorce in 1954. Her subsequent marriage to one Felix Tupaz also resulted in a divorce. She
married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
When Arturo died intestate a petition for administration of his property was filed in favor
of Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina
Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo and 6 children, all surnamed Padlan
opposed the petition.

The oppositors submitted certified photocopies of the private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be
the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.

On the scheduled hearing, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and
Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the court required the
records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue would be considered submitted for
resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
RTC ruled that petitioner’s marriage with Arturo subsisted until his death since foreign
divorce between Filipino citizens is not entitled to recognition in this jurisdiction. And that
the latter marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner (1947).

CA directed the case to be remanded to the trial for further proceedings.

ISSUES:

Whether the case should be remanded to the lower court.

Who between petitioner and respondent is the proper heir of the decedent.

RULING:

1. Yes. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the
law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

2. As to Respondent, They were married on 1947 while the prior marriage of

petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered
void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a
surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate
relationship.

As to the petitioner, the question of whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the
decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice
remarried is a matter for the trial court to determine.

Note:
Doubt persisted as to whether petitioner was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
decreed. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to
inherit from Arturo.

Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Calimlim, Jeninah A.

Llorente v. CA (2000)

FACTS:

Lorenzo and Paula were husband and wife. During the marriage, Lorenzo, who was then an
enlisted serviceman of the US Navy, left for the US while his wife Paula stayed in their
conjugal home in Camarines Sur. Thereafter, Lorenzo became an American citizen. When
Lorenzo came back to the Philippines for vacation, he discovered that Paula was pregnant
and was having an affair with his brother. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce,
which was granted and already became final.

Lorenzo later returned to the Philippines and married Alicia. The couple had three
children.

Lorenzo executed his last will and testament wherein he left all his property to Alicia and
their children. Lorenzo filed with the RTC a petition for the probate and allowance of his
will and to have Alicia as the administratrix of his property. Before the probate proceeding
could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration
over Lorenzo’s estate.

Paula was appointed administrator of Lorenzo’s estate. The trial court ruled that Lorenzo’s
marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce he obtained abroad is void. The trial court
held that Lorenzo is a Filipino hence divorce is not applicable to him. The CA affirmed the
trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether the divorce decree is valid.

RULING:

Yes. The fact that Lorenzo became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1)
his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is
duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these
incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

In accordance with the Nationality Principle under Article 15 of the NCC, Philippine laws
relating to family rights, duties, or status no longer apply to Lorenzo. He was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce. Therefore, the divorce obtained by Lorenzo
from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
However, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are
matters best left to the determination of the trial court.

Chua Cheng, Ma. Lawreine Francesca C.

Garcia v. Recio (2001)

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.

FACTS:

Recio was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. However, a decree of divorce
purportedly dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian family court. Recio
became an Australian citizen and was married again to Garcia, a Filipina. Garcia filed a
complaint to nullify the marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she was unaware
of Recio’s prior marriage at the time of their marriage. Recio contended that his first
marriage was validly dissolved, making him legally capacitated to marry Garcia. While the
suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney because the “marriage had irretrievably broken
down.” Court a quo declared their marriage dissolved on the ground that the
Australian divorce was valid and recognized in the Philippines, that it had ended the
marriage of the couple, thus there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
(2) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

RULING:

(1) The Court ruled that before a foreign judgment is given the presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. The party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appeared to be an authentic one issued. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance
with the rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for respondent’s cause,
when the divorce decree was submitted in evidence, its admissibility was not objected to,
but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the LCR. Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight. Petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
(2) The Australian divorce decree obtained by the respondent was subject to a restriction
(“party to a marriage who marries again before decree becomes absolute commits the
offense of bigamy”). Thus, it did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, there was no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

Dioquino, Apriljo Frances B.

Corpuz v. Tomas (2010)

The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.

FACTS:

Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married Daisylyn
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work
commitments. He returned to Philippines on April 2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an
affair with another man. Gerbert returned to Canada to file a divorce that took effect on
January 2006.

Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the Philippines. He
went to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree but was denied
considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that the
foregin divorce must be recognized judicially by the Philippine court.

Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign
divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to
Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the foreign
divorce decree?

RULING:

NO. The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of Filipino
spouses. The legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the
marital status of the Filipino spouse.

However, aliens are not stripped of the legal interest to file a petition to the RTC for the
recognition of foreign divorce decree as it is a conclusive presumption of evidence of the
authenticity of foreign divorce decree with confirmity to the alien's national law.
The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign divorce
decree without judicial order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be
void.

Dizon, April Anne A.

Llave v. Republic (2011)

The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was
never invalidated by PD 1083. The Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this
law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the
marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.

FACTS:

Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition and
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge (both in 1993). 11 months
later, Sen. Tamano died.

Private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda et al. filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity
of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged
that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage
remained subsisting. Furthermore, Sen. Tamano cannot be deemed divorced since he and
Zorayda did not marry under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (P.D. 1083).

Estrellita contended that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married
under the Muslim rites and that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
because under PD 1083, questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts.

RTC rendered Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio. CA affirmed
reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code,
which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration
was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial.

Estrellita’s contention: marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter was already
divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law
automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of
registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage
was solemnized under Muslim law.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

RULING:
YES.

Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under
the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage
provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 3941 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed
by way of divorce under PD 1083. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly,
Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But
we already ruled that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the
marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states: A
marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance
with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the
spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be
considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent
between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose
marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.

Dy, Czara Loraine F.

Fujiki v. Marinay

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts,

1
AN ACT AUTHORIZING FOR A PERIOD OF TWENTY YEARS DIVORCE AMONG MOSLEMS RESIDING IN NON-CHRISTIAN
PROVINCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH MOSLEM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
according to our law on evidence.

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon
City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family
Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.

RULING:

1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M.
No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.” While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.

2. Yes. “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”
Rule
108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file
a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

Enriquez, Ephraim T.

Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna (2014)

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by
Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage
involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who
contracts a subsequent marriage.

FACTS:

Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer, married Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot seven
children. After two decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his wife agreed to live separately as
husband and wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement”
whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal property. On January
2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the
Dominican Republic. On the same day, he married Soledad. In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a
new law firm with several other lawyers. The new law office thru Atty. Luna obtained a
condominium unit which they bought on an installment basis. After full payment, the
condominium title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio shares.
When the law office was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in the names
of the owners, with Atty.Luna’s share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a new law
firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty.Luna’s death in 1997, his share in the condominium
unit, his law books and furniture were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage.
His 25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out to Atty. Dela Cruz. Soledad, the
second wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to her, the
properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, and because they
had no children, 3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and
the other half bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna. The RTC ruled
against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage,
except for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her. Both parties
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by
awarding all the properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first
marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will
decide who among the contending parties were entitled to the properties left behind by
Atty. Luna.

RULING:

No, divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void and ineffectual under the nationality
rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of
the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a
foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

Given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the
presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and
effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litis legally
pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently,
the sole ownership of the 25/100pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit,
and of the law books pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

Espinosa, Frederick V.

Noveras v. Noveras

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.
FACTS:

David and Leticia were Filipinos but later became US citizens who own properties in
the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from a court in
California in wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With
respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation
of conjugal properties. The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the
laws that cover their legal and personal status are those of the USA. Under their law, the
parties’ marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition
filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with
the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead of an action
for judicial separation of conjugal property.
CA. modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division of the
Philippine properties between the spouses. David insists that the CA should have
recognized the California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him.

ISSUE:

Whether the properties in the USA be included in the liquidation.

RULING:

NO.

The SC ruled that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California
properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. This means that
the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. The requirements of presenting
the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must comply with our
Rules of Evidence. In the present case, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence.
The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on
divorce were not presented.

Garcia, Charlotte Yris C.

Ando v. DFA (2014)

Any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete
submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in
an action instituted in the proper forum.

FACTS:

Petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi in a civil wedding solemnized in Pampanga. In 2004,

Kobayashi sought and was granted divorce in Japan. Believing in good faith that she was
capacitated to remarry, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando. Kobayashi married Ryo
Miken on 2005. Petitioner applied for renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her
surname of ‘Ando’ but was told by DFA that the same cannot be issued until she can prove
by competent court decision that her marriage with Masatomi Ando is valid.

Petitioner filed with RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief and impleaded DFA as
respondent which was dismissed. Though a divorce was granted in Japan, there is no
showing that petitioner complied with requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code,
which requires judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country.

ISSUE:

Whether or not he second marriage is valid.

RULING:

No. In Garcia v. Recio, we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of
the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must
be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our
law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven and like any other fact.

While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court
actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief, we are still unable to grant the prayer
of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence
presented on record of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the
validity of the divorce decree under that national law. Hence, any declaration as to the
validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete submission of evidence proving
the divorce decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the
proper forum.

Gonzalez, Jed Nathaniel M.

Medina v. Koike (2016)

In order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction,
it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.

FACTS:

Doreen Parilla and Michiyuki Koike were married in Quezon City in 2005. Years later, the
spouses secured a divorce pursuant to the laws of Japan. Doreen filed a petition for
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. No one opposed the
petition.

The RTC denied her petition since she failed to prove the national law of her husband, more
specifically the Japanese law on divorce.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in denying Petitioner’s petition.

RULING:

NO. In order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our
jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well
as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for
a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the R TC, the issue raised in the instant
appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for
review. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals.

Hernandez, Katrina Ysobelle A.

Misalucha v. People (2018)

Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. For the purpose of
establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself must be presented and
admitted in evidence.

FACTS:

Redante and Maria Socorro were married. Sometime thereafter, Maria Socorro left for
Canada to work as a nurse. She applied for and was granted Canadian citizenship and then
filed for divorce. The divorce was eventually granted. Redante met Fe and got married.
Their relationship, however, turned sour when Ma. Socorro returned to the Philippines and
met with Redante. After learning of Redante and Maria Socorro's meeting and believing
that they had reconciled, Fe decided to leave their conjugal home and filed a complaint for
bigamy against Redante. Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages but
interposed the defense that his first marriage had been legally dissolved by divorce
obtained in a foreign country. The defense presented a Certificate of Divorce, to prove the
fact of divorce.
The RTC found Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. The CA
affirmed the RTC's Judgment. The appellate court ratiocinated that since the order of
divorce or the divorce decree was not presented, it could not ascertain whether said
divorce capacitated Maria Socorro, and consequently Redante, to remarry. The OSG filed its
Manifestation advocating Redante's acquittal.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial and appellate courts erred when they found petitioner Redante Sarto y
Misalucha guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

RULING:

No. To prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking them must
present copies thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Pursuant to these rules, the divorce decree and foreign law may be proven
through (1) an official publication or (2) or copies thereof attested to by the officer having
legal custody of said documents. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country, the
copies of said documents must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The certificate of divorce presented by the defense, is utterly insufficient to rebut the
charge against Redante. First, the certificate of divorce is not the divorce decree required
by the rules and jurisprudence. The divorce decree required to prove the fact of divorce is
the judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere certification. Second,
assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce decree, it was not
accompanied by a certification issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular
officer stationed in Canada. Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law was presented by
the defense. Thus, it could not be reasonably determined whether the subject divorce
decree was in accord with Maria Socorro's national law. The type of divorce supposedly
secured by Maria Socorro - whether an absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or
a limited divorce which merely suspends it and whether such divorce capacitated her to
remarry could not also be ascertained. As such, Redante failed to prove his defense that he
had the capacity to remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe.

Jacinto, Christine

Republic v. Manalo (2018)

A divorce decree initiated and secured abroad by the Filipino spouse against his or her alien
spouse is valid and enforceable in the Philippines provided that the Filipino spouse is able to
prove the fact of the divorce and that the same is allowed under the foreign law where it was
secured.
FACTS:

Marelyn Manalo is a Filipino married to Yoshino Minoro, a Japanese. Manalo secured a

divorce decree from a Japanese court and as a consequence thereof, she filed a petition for
the cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan.

The OSG entered its appearance and filed a motion questioning the title of the petition,
stating that considering the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment. Subsequently, Manalo amended her
petition and captioned that the same is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgment. Thereafter, Manalo presented her documentary evidence however the
trial court denied the petition for lack of merit, stating that under Article 15 of the New
Civil Code, the Philippine law does not allow Filipinos the right to file for a divorce
wherever they are situated and regardless of the nationality of their spouse. The Court of
Appeals overturned the RTC decision and said that Article 26 is still applicable despite the
fact that it was Manalo who obtained the divorce decree since the effect of said decree
capacitates her Japanese spouse to remarry.

ISSUE:

Whether the divorce decree obtained by the Filipino spouse abroad against her alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines.

RULING:

Yes, the divorce decree obtained by the Filipino spouse abroad against her alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effects of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse.
Under the principle of comity, the Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce decree
obtained by a spouse of a foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof must still be
determined by our courts.

According to Judge Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the intent
of Article 26, paragraph 2 is to prevent the absurd situation where the alien spouse is no
longer married to his Filipino spouse but the Filipino spouse remains to be married to her
alien spouse. The Court also stated that aforementioned provision does not demand that
the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. Regardless who initiated and obtained the valid divorce decree, the
same legal effects will still flow through it, specifically the dissolution of the marriage bond
and the termination of their consequent marital obligations. However, the party who seeks
for the recognition and enforcement of the divorce decree in the Philippine court must still
prove the fact of the divorce and that the foreign law under which it was secured allows the
same.

VI. EFFECTS OF DEFECTIVE MARRIAGE ON PROPERTY RELATIONS

Joaquin, Marione

Ocampo v. Ocampo

The rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages.

FACTS:

Petitioner Virginia filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio
on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The trial court rendered a Decision declaring the marriage as null and void and as to the
couple's property relations, their conjugal partnership of gains shall necessarily be
dissolved and liquidated but since the petitioner has not submitted any detailed and formal
listing or inventory of such property, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project
of partition of their inventoried properties. The trial court ordered that the properties
belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of
gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.

RULING:

No, respondent cannot be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership. Under the
Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that
they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not
conjugal. For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void, as in the instant case. Any
impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the part of either Virginia or
Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their
marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
should, therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. The rules which are set
up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant
to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses or spouses
of void marriages.
Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will share on
equal shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that the properties were acquired
solely on her own efforts.

VII. RULES ON FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE

Jore, Ma. Jovi Patricio

Quiao v. Quiao (2012)

Share of the guilty party from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

FACTS:

Brigido Quiao and Rita Quiao contracted marriage in 1977. They had no separate
properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced four
children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting
with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the
legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal
age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to
the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par.
9 of Article 129 of the FC. A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which
was granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier
decision; the writ was partially executed. After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a
motion for clarification asking the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court
held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting
the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”Upon a motion for
reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET PROFIT EARNED
shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later
reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the share of the guilty spouse in net conjugal partnership is forfeited as a
result of the issuance of the decree of legal separation.

RULING:

Yes, the share of the guilty spouse in net conjugal partnership is forfeited as a result of the
issuance of the decree of legal separation. It was established by the trial court that the
spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. Properties
should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However,
since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of
the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article
63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community
regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime,
because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s
favor.

VIII. WHEN THERE IS DELIVERY OF PRESUMPTIVE LEGITIMES

Ko, Nikki Mei Q.

Diño v. Diño (2011)

The property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation are
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.

FACTS:

Alain M. Diño (Alain) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (Caridad) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together. On 14 January 1998, they were married.

On 30 May 2001, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Caridad,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Alain alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to
him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on
shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful and would at times become
violent and hurt him.

Despite receipt of the summons, Caridad did not file an answer. Alain later learned that
Caridad filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with Alain, which was
granted by the Superior Court of California. Alain also learned that on 5 October 2001,
respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.

Prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and
the case was set for trial on the merits.

Dr. Tayag, a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that

Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Dr. Tayag found that
Caridad’s disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.

The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. It further ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall
be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:

Whether a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

RULING:

NO. Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the FC.
In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during
the period of cohabitation are governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496
of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Lazaro, Aprille Keith M.

Yu v. Reyes-Carpio (2011)

It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each
party’s psychological incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court
eventually finds that the parties’ respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is
indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties’ psychological incapacity, then
the parties shall proceed to comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final
decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage, the Court finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with
the reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody and property relations, since these
are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties’ marriage.

FACTS:

Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the
RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial offer
of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits
have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the
marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case
for resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage.

Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be
resolved without presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations. Eric added that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of
nullity can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Eric’s
opposition.

Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to another
branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-
Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said judge of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, and that the case on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution
ahead of the incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.

Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary
incidents thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-
Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of
the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first before
the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues).

RULING:

NO. It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been
exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is
one which “does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric
Yu to prove that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that
those were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify certiorari
as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the
proper recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of
the trial court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
orders.

It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on
the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders
that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody,
support, and property relations. And the trial judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge
Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence
on custody, support, and property relations after the trial court renders a decision granting
the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by
the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children
and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment granting the
petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court
granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody,
support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.

Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this
Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final
decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall
proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common
children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the
petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code,
contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:

Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved,
had already provided for such matters.

Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence
on the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of
nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to
comply with in issuing the assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s
assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents
would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and,
hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise
the evidence submitted by the parties.

Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and
whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she
issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations. To reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal
soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately
finding an absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.

IX. LEGAL SEPARATION

1. Grounds for legal separation

Villanueva, Manuel Jejomar M.

Kalaw v. Fernandez (2011)

The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and
must be incurable.

FACTS:

In 1973 Kalaw and Fernandez were married in Hong Kong. The said marriage produced 4
children. In 1983 Kalaw had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano which resulted in a
child, and ended with three more. In 1985 Fernandez finally left the conjugal dwelling. The
said separation led to a confusing series of others. On July 6 1984 Kalaw sued for
annulment stating Fernandez’s excessive mahjong-playing, sexual infidelity, and total
inability to perform other marital obligations. Based on Kalaw’s narration; Dr. Healy, and
Dr. Gates concurred in the diagnosis that Fernandez suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Syndrome (NPD) which leaves her unable to perform essential marital obligations.
Fernandez denied the same, and claimed that she left because Kalaw was a an abusive
womanizer. She left when she found out that his extramarital affairs finally produced a
child with Quejano. The RTC ruled that both were unable to comply with their marital
obligations, their psychological incapacity were pervasive, grave, and incurable. Therefore,
their marriage was declared void ab initio. The CA reverses, both parties allegations and
incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity; at
most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.

ISSUE:

Does the aforementioned conditions of both parties amount to psychological incapacity?

RULING:

The court says no. After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis
for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but
it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties
as a mother and a wife. Also, there was no solid evidence that she committed adultery.
The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and
must be incurable.

Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. The said experts experts heavily relied on petitioner's allegations of respondents
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and
neglect of their children.

Villanueva, Manuel Jejomar M.

BBB v. AAA (2015)

Provisions of R.A. 9262 are not subject to compromise agreements.

FACTS:

In 2002, AAA, and BBB were married in a civil wedding. Before the said union AAA already
bore 2 of BBB’s children, it must be noted that AAA already had a child from a previous
relationship which BBB promised to treat as his own.

The said marriage didn’t last long. AAA accused BBB of womanizing, while BBB claims the
former often flew to fits of jealous rage. The facts further provide that their time produced
nothing but misery for all parties involved.

AAA claims that the final straw was when one of BBB’s mistress confronted her, compelling
her to leave the conjugal dwelling. Also that he treats his stepchild indifferently compared
to the other two.

AAA further claims that BBB stopped providing financial support forcing her to sue BBB
for economic, psychological, and emotional abuse abuse under RA 9262.

The court issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) for AAA, and on August 14, 2007 the
same was made permanent, through a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) along with other
provisions for support for AAA, and the children plus full custody.

BBB appealed the lower court’s decision denying AAA’s accusations for economic,
psychological, and emotional abuse. The CA affirms the RTC’s decision.

Unsatisfied with the previous judgements, BBB directs his cause to the SC. However,
pending the said appeal BBB manifested that he already has custody of two of their
children on the basis that AAA could not support them due to the lack of money under a
Memorandum of Agreement.

ISSUE:
Can the Protection Order issued by the court under RA 9262 be subjected to a compromise
agreement between parties?

RULING:

The court says no. Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her
application for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A. No.
9262. In the instant petition, what is essentially being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC
and which was affirmed by the CA.

Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly prohibits compromise on any act
constituting the crime of violence against women

In Garcia v. Drilon the court declared that violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that
the victim is somehow at fault.

While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent action and not as an
incidental relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken outside
the ambit of cases falling under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. However; an amicable
settlement as regards the issues of custody, exercise of parental authority over the
children, and support of can be lawful subjects of compromise.