G.R. Nos.

L-32202-04 July 25, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ONTING BIRUAR, EUGENE RUSLIN, ABRAHAM
LIM alias Titing Lim, ANGEL DY alias Baba Isa, CEFERINO CATURAN alias Fred, EDGARDO
SEÑERES alias Broke, ROMUALDO RABOY alias Romy, and SATURNINO GALLIANO,
defendants, ABRAHAM LIM alias Titing Lim, CEFERINO CATURAN alias Fred, ROMUALDO
RABOY alias Romy, and SATURNINO GALLIANO

Facts: Accused Abraham “Titing” Lim, Angel “Baba Isa” Dy, Ceferino “Fred” Caturan, Edgardo
“Broke” Señeres, Romualdo “Romy” Raboy, and Saturnino Galliano were charged with and
found guilty of the crimes of Robbery in Band, Arson, and Robbery with Homicide and Physical
Injuries. The charge stem from the information that aout 10 pm of July 02, 1966, accused Raboy
and Señeres robbed the house of spouses Gorgonio and Fausta Mosende and took away P170
cash and a shotgun valued at P550. After the robbers left, spouses Mosende heard gunshots
from the house of George Kalitas about 25 meters away and a few minutes later, saw a blaze
start. The other accused started robbing the house of Kalitas and fired gunshots. The maid
Babbadon Odal was hit by a bullet in the left wrist while George Kalitas’s 11-year-old
granddaughter Jessie Renopal was grazed by a bullet in the head. The robbers entered the
house of Kalitas by breaking the door with an axe, and George Kalitas, a paraplegic fired at
them, hitting one of the accused but he was also shot. The robbers then went to the master’s
bedroom, they ransacked the trunk which contain the cash amounting to P40,000 and some old
coins, then left. The family of Kalitas then went outside as the house is already on fire and
because they have to bring the wounded to the hospital but George died before reaching the
hospital. The house, bodega and truck owned by Kalitas were destroyed. The incident was
reported to the authorities and the authorities later on learned the whereabouts of the vehicle
used by the accused. After several chasing of the wanted car, they apprehended Angel Dy who
pointed to Onting Biruar as the owner of the car. Thereafter, other accused were located and
apprehended with the help of Dy. As a consequence, Onting Biruar, Abraham Lim alias Titing
Lim, Angel Dy alias Fred, Edgardo Señeres alias Broke, Romualdo Raboy alias Romy, Eugene
Ruslin, and Saturnino Galliano were charged with Robbery in Band, Arson, and Robbery with
Homicide and Physical Injuries before the Court of First Instance of Davao, in three (3) separate
informations. The accused interposed their defenses but the trial court rejected all of them
except for that of Biruar and Eugene Ruslin, who was found sleeping with Abraham Lim in Toril,
Davao City, when the said Lim was arrested by a police team. The trial court held that the alibis
of the accused were unavailing to the positive identifications of the victims. Defense argued that
there was no robbery committed because the prosecution failed to show positive evidence of
the money taken, and if there was, there is only one crime because the robbery in the houses of
Gorgonio Mosende and George Kalitas is one continuing offense, committed at the same time
and on one occasion, and arising out of one criminal resolution, and the burning of the house of
George Kalitas was the means to commit the crime of robbery.

Issue: 1)Whether or not in the absence of evidence of the thing taken, there is still robbery?
2)Whether or not the robbery in the houses of Mosende and Kalitas is one continuing
offense therefore only one crime?

Held: 1) Yes, there is still robbery. The argument of counsel that the amount stolen, or a portion
thereof, should have been presented in evidence in order to make the transportation credible, is
untenable. Where the property stolen was not recovered, it would be impossible to present it in
evidence. Besides, there is no law nor jurisprudence which requires the presentation of the thing
stolen in order to prove that it had been taken away. The failure of the prosecution to present in
evidence the money stolen does not give rise to a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused. It has been established during the trial that the trunk where Kalitas kept the money
was closed before the incident and was just forcibly opened by the accused. It is clear from the
testimony of the wife of George Kalitas that the accused opened the trunk and took the money
before it was burned. Moreso, the accused were not apprehended immediately, they could have
disposed the same.

2) No, it is not one crime. In this case, the accused, after committing the crime of robbery in
band in the house of Gorgonio Mosende, went to the neighboring house of George Kalitas
where they committed the crimes of Arson and Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries.
accused performed different acts with distinct purposes which resulted in juridically independent
crimes. The burning of the house of George Kalitas was not the means in committing the
robbery. The evidence shows that the accused gained entry into the house of George Kalitas by
breaking down the door with an axe and not by burning the same. The trial court, therefore, did
not err in finding the defendants Abraham Lim alias Titing Lim, Ceferino Caturan alias Fred,
Romualdo Raboy alias Romy, and Saturnino Galliano guilty of the crimes of Robbery in Band,
Arson, and Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries. the commission of the offenses
charged was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, use of motor
vehicle, use of unlicensed firearm, and with the aid of armed men to ensure or afford impunity.
The use of unlicensed firearm, however, cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
in Crim. Case Nos. 9988 (Arson) and 9989 (Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries) since
the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm is solely applicable to robbery
in band under Art. 295 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty should be death but because of
lack of affirmative votes, it was reduced to reclusion perpetua.

G.R. No. 77429 January 29, 1990

LAURO SANTOS, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: In Nov. 1980 one Encarnacion Peñalosa entrusted her Ford Escort car to herein
petitioner Lauro Santos for repair of the carburetor amounting to a cost of P300. A week later,
Santos persuaded her to have the car repainted by him for P6,500 within a period of two
months. After two months Peñalosa returned after two months but Santos refused to return the
vehicle unless she paid an additional P634 for the repair. As she has no money that time, she
left the shop to get money but upon her return Santos can no longer be found as well as her car,
and despite waiting and repeatedly returning, it was to no avail. Unable to retrieve her car, she
filed a case for carnapping against Santos but the case was dismissed when Santos convinced
the authorities that Peñalosa sold the car to him and showed a purported Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase. An information for estafa was commenced by complainant and the RTC
convicted him as charged. On appeal, conviction was affirmed but Santos was held guilty of
qualified theft and estafa.

Held: The purported Deed of Sale was spurious as there were alterations and deletions and it is
not even notarized. The original Deed of Sale which petitioner altered is supposedly between
Peñalosa and a certain Domingo Corciga, but the former later on changed her mind and left the
document inside the car which Santos chanced upon and decided to modify to suit his purpose.
Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime committed was theft. It is
settled that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the description thereof as
alleged in the information. And as described therein, the offense imputed to Santos contains all
the essential elements of theft, to wit: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that
said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the
taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. Theft should not
be confused with estafa because in the former, the thing is taken while in estafa, the thing is
received by the accused then he converted it for his own use or benefit but there may be theft if
he has possession of the property such as in this case. It is still considered theft when he
misappropriate the thing which was entrusted to him by de facto possession or material/
physical/natural possession but when the conversion takes place when he has juridical
possession of the thing, it constitutes embezzlement or estafa. Subsequent misappropriation of
the thing delivered to him manifest intent to gain. The fact that the object of the crime is a car
should not be considered a qualifying circumstance because it is not alleged in the information
but it is still considered aggravating because the cost of the car exceeded P22,000 and thus,
applying Article 309 of RPC, the penalty imposed should be the maximum period.

GR No 91041 December 10, 1990

JOSE A. SADDUL, JR. vs. CA and People of the Philippines

Facts: In 1973, petitioner Jose Saddul Jr. became a VP and director of Amalgamated Motors
Phils. Inc. (AMPI), the sole distributor in the country of British and Japanese heavy equipments,
trucks, farm implements, spare parts and other automotive products and machines
manufactured by Leyland International, Land Rover Ltd, Avelyn Barfourd, Mitsubishi and
Rurokawa. Saddul was made a director, executive vp and general manager at the time Felimo
Cuevas, a dealer for govt sales of AMPI bought into the company and became its majority
stockholder and president. In 1985, Land Rover Ltd supplied P1.5million worth of spare parts to
AFP through AMPI but AFP returned the merchandise because they were not the correct items
needed. Few weeks thereafter, Erwin Lyndsay, the area manager for Southeast Asia of Land
Rover Ltd, wrote to Saddul and informed him that he may dispose the merchandise on their
behalf at the best possible prices available in the market and that a sum amounting to 20% of
the sale value will be retained by AMPI as handling charge and balance is placed into a
separate client account. Saddul sold some of the spare parts worth P143,085 to Rover Motors
evidenced by AMPI Sales Invoices and summarized in Statemen of Account sent by AMPI to
Rover Motor Parts. AMPI’s commission on the sale amounted to P28,617 but Saddul did not
remit to AMPI the 20% handling charge and instead held them in trust. Saddul was later on
terminated or left as according to a prosecution witness and started his own company where
Lyndsay, in another letter, authorized the newly built company of Saddul to be the distributor.
Meanwhile, Lyndsay asked AMPI’s president Cuevas for an accounting of the stocks and
Cuevas replied that Saddul sold some of the spare parts but did not remit to AMPI the
commission so he filed a criminal case for estafa to recover the money and remit it. On June 03,
1987, an information for estafa in the amount of P143,085 was filed against Saddul in the RTC
of Manila. On August 06, 1987, Lyndsay wrote to Cuevas advising the latter to deliever and turn
over all British Leyland parts in the possession of AMPI to Saddul’s Multipart Motors Phil. Inc.
who is their new parts distributor in the Philippines. The letter further advised Cuevas that in
view of the change in distributorship, they will no longer hold AMPI liable for the proceeds worth
P143,085. Despite the advice, AMPI prosecuted the criminal case against Saddul and on
August 29, 2988, the trial court found Saddul guilty of estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence. Saddul appealed to the CA who affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not Saddul committed estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence

Held: No, petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged. One of the ways of committing the crime
of estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence is: "(b) By misappropriating or converting to
the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.”
The appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner
thereof, is the essence of estafa through misappropriation (Ramirez, 9 Phil. 67). The words
"convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it
were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To
misappropriate to one's own use includes, not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but
also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. (Webber vs. Court of
Appeals, 57 OG 2937; People vs. Panes, 37 Phil. 118.) Conversion is an unauthorized
assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to
another, resulting in the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights. It
takes place when a person actually appropriates the property of another to his own benefit, use,
and enjoyment (Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 53 OG 731 citing Bouvier's Law Dictionary).
The elements of the crime of embezzlement or estafa with abuse of confidence are:
(a) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any
other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the
obligation is guaranteed by a bond;
(b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or
a denial on his part that he received it;
(c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another, and
(d) that there be demand for the return of the property,
The first element of the crime does not exist in this case because Saddul did not receive the
Leyland Automotive spare parts from Cuevas or AMPI in trust, on commission, for
administration, or under a duty to make delivery of, or return the same. Saddul received the
Leyland spare parts from the AFP in trust for LAND ROVER which authorized him to sell them.
Since Saddul did not convert or divert the property (he sold them in accordance with the
authority given to him by Land Rover) nor did he deny that he received them, the second
element of the crime was also not present. Saddul simply complied with the directives in Land
Rover’s letter. By obeying the instructions, Saddul did not become liable for embezzlement.
AMPI also did not incur any lodd or suffered any injury because they are not the owners of the
things sold.

G.R. No. 80544 July 5, 1989

ROSEMARIE M. LEE, vs. HON. JOSEFINA CRUZ RODIL, Judge of Regional Trial Court,
Branch X, Manila and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: Petitioner Rosemarie Lee was charged with estafa in an information which alleged that
on or about July 26, 1982, Lee, being a representative of CS Lee Enterprises Inc. opened a
letter of credit with Philippine Bank of Communications for the amount of P154,711, coveting the
purchase price of a certain merchandise consisting of 23 ctns LAb. Culture Media. Lee obligated
herself to hold said merchandise in trust with liberty to sell the same in cash for the account of
PBC and to account for the proceeds of the sale, and to remit the accounting or return the same
if not sold on or before October 24, 1982. The accused, however, failed to comply with her
obligations and despite repeated demands and lapses of a long period of time, she
misappropriated and converted said merchandise or the value thereof to her own personal use
and benefit to the prejudice of said bank. Petitioner moved to quash the information alleging that
the violation of trust receipt agreement does not constitute estafa although there is an express
provision in Trust Receipts Law (PD 115) characterizing such violation as estafa because she
alleged that the said law is unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion and upheld the
constitutionality of the law and denied also the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this appeal.

Issue: whether or not violation of trust receipt agreement constitute the crime of estafa

Held: Yes. It is provided under Section 13 of PD No 115 that failure of an entrustee to turn over
the proceeds or return said goods in accordance with the terms of agreement shall constitute
the crime of estafa punishable under Article 315 par.1 of RPC. The contentions of petitioner
citing the cases of Cuevo and Sia were unmeritorious because the two decisions show
attendant facts different from those in the instant case. Also, the Cuevo and Sia cases
happened in the 1960’s way before the promulgation of PD 115 in 1973 but the two cases were
decided after the promulgation of the said law. However, the court did not apply th decree
because the offenses were committed before its effectivity. In the present case, the accused
was charged in 1985 for an act committed in 1982. Acts involving the violation of trust receipt
agreements occurring after 29 January 1973 would make the accused criminally liable for estafa
under paragraph 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the explicit provision
in Sec. 13 of P.D. 115. The criminal liability springs from the violation of the trust receipt. The
person who is prejudiced through the misappropriation or conversion of the goods need not be
the owner, thereof; if such had been the intention of the authors of the Code, the phrase "to the
prejudice of another" would have read "to the prejudice of the owner.”

GR Nos. 48535-36 December 21, 1990

Koh Tieck Heng v. People of the Philippines and CA

Facts: Accused Koh Tieck Heng alias Tomas Flores opened a Savings Account with the Security
Bank and Trust Company with an initial deposit of P500 made on Feb.21, 1973. He made a
second deposit of P400 then a withdrawal of P500 then a deposit of P775, and then a
withdrawal of P1000. On August 13,1973, accused went to SBTC and deposited P18,060 in
check, signed and issues by one F. Dycaico , who was then maintaining with the Philippine
Bank of Communications a checking account. The check was signed and indorsed by the
accused. On August 16, 1973, accused withdrew the sum of P10,000 and upon receipt of the
amount withdrawn, teller cause the accused to sign at the back of the withdrawal slip. The next
day, he then again withdrew P5,500. The following day, he went again to SBTC to deposit
another PBC check dated August 11, 1972 for P18,060 signed by F. Dycaico then deposited the
same. Sometime in that month, Dycaico saw his Statement of Account and came upon the
amount of P18,060 debited agianst his account. He complained to the PBC that he never issued
a check for that much so PBC informed SBTC that the first check was spurious. Officials of
SBTC instructed the tellers to watch for Tomas Flores while the NBI assigned agent Mamerto
Espartero to crack down on check forgers or passes in company with an informer at the
premises of SBTC. On Aug.22, 1973, accused went to SBTC to withdraw P15,500 and after
accomplishing the slip, he submitted his passbook to the teller who asked the accused to sign.
HE did so upon request and signed his name as Koh Tieck Heng. Later on, he was
apprehended by Espartero. Accused was charged before CFI of MAnila the crime of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document. On the same date, he was also charged for attempted
estafa thru falsification of a commercial document for the transaction he was supposed to make
on Agust 22. On November 26, 1973, the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in both cases. Petitioner appealed to the
CA and CA affirmed the judgment of conviction of the lower court but modified the penalties.

Issue: 1) Whether or not respondent court erred in holding the accused guilty of the crimes of
attempted estafa through falsification of commercial documents
2) Whether or not respondent court errer in finding accused guilty estafa through
falsification of commercial documents on the basis merely of a presumption of law, despite the
absence of evidence showing that appellant committed, or had knowledge of, the crimes
charged, in violation of the constitutional presumption of innocence and doctrinal jurisprudence
on proof beyond reasonable doubt in favor of appellant.

Held: As to attempted estafa, no. the two essential requisites of fraud or deceit and damage or
injury must be established by sufficient and competent evidence in order that the crime of estafa
may be established. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact (whether by words or
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his
legal injury. The fact that appellant was the possessor and utterer of the checks in question and
having benefited from the subsequent withdrawals, as well as having attempted to gain by trying
to withdraw an amount thereon, the inevitable conclusion would be that he was the one who
falsified said documents. Ineluctably, the use of the spurious checks is by itself fraud or deceit.
Although one of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party, in
the absence of proof thereof the offender would at least be guilty of attempted estafa. Appellant
commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but he failed to perform all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of his own spontaneous desistance but
because of his apprehension by the authorities before he could obtain the amount. Since only
the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself has been shown, respondent court
correctly convicted appellant of attempted estafa.

As to second issue, no. While it may appear that the prosecution failed to directly contradict the
claim of appellant as to how he came into possession of the two checks, it is understandable
that the prosecution would not always have the means for obtaining such direct evidence to
confute acts contrived clandestinely. Undoubtedly, too, as a general rule, positive testimony as
to a particular fact, uncontradicted by anyone, should control the decision of the court. Where,
however, there is such an inherent improbability in the testimony or theory of the witness, the
court may properly disregard such evidence, even in the absence of any direct conflicting
testimony. evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a credible source but
must, in addition, be credible in itself. And by this is meant that it shall be natural, reasonable
and probable as to make it easy to believe. No better test has yet been found to determine the
value of the testimony of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common
experience of mankind. The checks in questions were undeniably spurious, or were forgeries in
toto. Dycaico categorically testified that he did not issue said checks but only those checks in
the amount of P225 and P2030. The disclaimer by Dycaico of his alleged signatures on the
aforesaid checks is prima facie evidence of falsification and consequently shifts the burden of
evidence to appellant to prove otherwise, but which burden appellant has not discharged. both
courts did not err in relying upon the presumption that the possessor of a falsified document is
presumed to be the author thereof. It is an established rule that when it is proved that a person
has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or
inference is justified that such person is the forger. The petitioner has been shown to have been
the possessor and utterer of the two checks (Exhibits "A" and "H") when he made use of and
benefited therefrom by his withdrawals of and attempt to withdraw funds through said checks.
The circumstance, therefore, that appellant made use of and benefited from the falsified
document is a strong evidence that he either himself falsified it or caused the same to be
falsified, 21 he being criminally responsible in either case. 22 Since appellant is the only person
who stood to be benefited by the falsification of the document that was found in his possession,
it is presumed that he is the material author of such falsification.