Reply to Zylan

Author(s): Nancy Fraser

Source: Signs, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Winter, 1996), pp. 531-536
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Replyto Zylan

Nancy Fraser

5Y TVONNE
in
ZYLAN CLAIMS
and Linda Gordon's
to identifysome weaknesses
my (1994) essayon dependencyand to
trace themto our genealogicalmethod.Her commentraises
both theoreticalissues and issues of historicalinterpretation,
while proposinga relationbetweenthem.In what follows,I shall focus
on the theoreticalissues. I hope to show thatour approach is conceptu-
ally sound, productiveof insight,and politicallyuseful.
Two of Zylan's theoreticalclaims are of particularinterest:first,that
our approach obscuresagencyand, second, thatwe do not adequately
specifyhow discoursesrelateto institutions. The firstof theseclaims I
considermistakenand confused.The second, in contrast,raises serious
issues, but these are not satisfactorilyresolvedby the approach Zylan
recommends.In bothcases, I shallsuggest,she failsto givedue weightto
the discursivelymediatedcharacterof social life.
Let me begin with the question of agency.Accordingto Zylan, our
analysisis "pervadedby genealogy'sskepticismabout prediscursive sub-
and purposiveaction."We are said to "displaya Foucaul-
jects,interests,
dian cynicismabout the power of individualactors" and to underplay
"intentionaldeployments"and "conscious deliberatearticulations"of
keywords,as well as the "strategicchoices of actors."
Such complaintsare found in many discussionsof genealogy,post-
structuralism,and Foucault.Buttheyare nevertheless misplaced.To ana-
lyze culturalcomplexesof meaning,such as those surroundingthe term
dependencyin theUnitedStates,is not to denythatindividualsact con-
sciously,deliberately,and strategically,nor that theysometimesdeploy
such termsinstrumentally to promotetheirown interestsand goals. It is,
rather,to make available forpoliticalcritiquethenetworkof meanings,
assumptions,and imagesthatconstitutethebackgroundand the stuffof
intentionalaction. Far fromrepresenting a threatto agency,then,an
analysissuch as ours helpsexplainhow it is possiblewhileextendingthe
reach of critique.
To understandwhy,recall that human actions,as opposed to mere
behaviors,always occur under descriptions.The goals, intentions,and
[Signs:Journalof Womenin Cultureand Society1996, vol. 21, no. 2]
? 1996 byNancyFraser.All rightsreserved.

Winter 1996 SIGNS 531

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 Fraser REPLY

intereststhatare constitutive of social actionare discursively structured,

evenwhenthesignifications remaintacit.The same is trueof everyother
elementand conditionof social action, includingthe actor's personal
identityand collectiveidentifications, her (and others') implicitdefini-
tion(s) of theaction situation,thenormsgoverningthesocial practice(s)
thatmake heractionwhat it is, and thejustificatory rationalesshe might
advance if and when it is challenged.No action, indeed no essential
elementof action, is simplygiven prediscursively. All are irreducibly
interpretative,shot throughwithsignification.
Yet agentsdo not createthesemeaningsex nihilo.Theydraw,rather,
on a historicallyspecificstock of culturallyavailable significations.The
latterdo not,however,come in discreteatomisticbits,but in structured
"webs of significance," "interpretative horizons,"or "discursiveframes,"
to use the lingo of Quineans, hermeneuticists, and poststructuralists,
respectively. These framesare historicallysedimented,oftenmutually
contradictory, and unevenlyentrenched acrosssocial space. The Foucaul-
dian insight-sharedby Raymond Williams-is to view themas power-
laden, provisional stabilizations of previous contests and negotiations,
which in turnpresupposedpriordiscursiveframes.'Qua interpretative
gridsand logics of possibility, such framesare a necessaryconditionof
human agency.Far fromrenderingit impossible,then,theyprovidethe
indispensablesignifying stuffout of which intentionalsocial action is
made.
ContraZylan,moreover,social actionis usuallybothunreflective and
intentional.Actorsgenerallystandin an unreflective relationto the dis-
cursive framesthat enable theiragency.Althoughtheyknow how to
draw on theseframesin practice,theytypicallylack reflective awareness
of the networkof tacitassumptions,connotations,and imagestheirac-
tionsmobilize.As a result,theirintentionalactionsoccuragainsta doxic,
commonsensebackgroundof taken-for-granted beliefthatescapes criti-
cal scrutiny.When such beliefworks,as it generallydoes, in theinterests
of the powerful,it can subvertthe intentionsof less powerfulactors.
My and Gordon's articlecited several cases where intentionalbut
unreflective action yieldedunintendedconsequencesin contextsof in-
equality.One was thefailedattemptof late nineteenth-century reformers
to destigmatizerecipientsof aid by designatingthemas dependentsin-
stead of paupers. Anotherwas the successfulattemptof radical white
workingmento claim civil and politicalrightsby recastingthe meaning
of wage labor as conferringindependence.Zylan's discussionof this

1ForreasonsI havearguedelsewhere,
thisquasi-Foucauldian
conceptionis superior
to somealternatives, theLacanianviewof"thesymbolic
including order."See Fraser
1992,1994b.

532 SIGNS Winter 1996

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 REPLY Fraser

second case muddiesthe waters.She arrivesby a circuitousrouteat the

view statedstraightforwardly in our essay: througha seriesof struggles
radicalworkingmenthemselvesconstructedtheideal of thefamilywage.
We in no way deniedtheiragencywhen we noted its unintendedconse-
quence: the "independence"theyachievedthroughthismeanseffectively
veiled theireconomic subordinationas wage laborers.The analogy we
drew to the povertyline concernedthe result,not the agency,of the
redefinition:in both cases inequalitywas coveredover. Finally,yet an-
otherexample invokedby Zylan has also been discussedelsewhereby
me: namely,the effortsof twentieth-century social workersto enhance
theirown professionalstatusby stressingthe "dependency"of theircli-
ents (Fraser 1996). In all thesecases, actors' lack of reflectivenesscon-
cerningthe ideological baggage carriedby theirdiscourseled to unin-
tendedconsequencesof intentionalaction in contextsof unequal power.
The pointis crucialforunderstanding thepoliticalintentof our essay.
As Zylan herselfnotes,we soughtto demystify theideologysurrounding
today's discourseof welfaredependency.Our aim was not to deny or
downplayagencybut,rather,to interrogate the discursivematerialsout
of whichit is made. By promotingincreasedreflectiveness on thedoxa of
welfare,we hoped preciselyto enhancethe potentialforefficacious,in-
tentional,oppositionalagency.
Our strategy, once again, was to reconstruct the genealogyof depen-
dency. We sought to make explicit-and hence criticizable-the current
hegemonic postindustrial discursive frame by contrasting it to two
distinct-preindustrial and of
industrial-systems understandings that
informedpriorhistoricalusages of dependency.The core of our project
was to identifythe threeframesand to analyze theirrespectiveconcep-
tual structures.Althoughwe took pains to situatethediscursiveshiftsin
relationto large-scaleinstitutionaland social-structuralshifts,we did not
seek to account forthemcausally.Zylan insinuatesthat,absent causal
explanations,our approach is underdevelopedand flawed. What she
presentsas a missing"required"componentof our project,however,is
actuallyanotherlevel of analysis-a complement,not a rival,to ours.
Zylan misses,moreover,thecontribution our workcan make to more
traditionalscholarship.Because we identifieda hegemoniccomplex of
significationsthatare in play even when not explicitlynoticedby social
actors,our analysisshould be usefulto scholars,like her,who seek to
explain particularhistoricaloccurrences.It makes available forcritical
analysisand explanatoryuse a dimensionthatis too oftenneglected:the
cultural framesthat mediate actors' experienceof, and responses to,
social problems.Far frominhibitingmore familiarmodes of historical
and social-scientific
inquiry,then,we offerthema valuable resource,one
thatcan deepen the criticaldimensionof theirwork.

Winter 1996 SIGNS 533

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 Fraser REPLY

Zylan, unfortunately, seemsunwillingto make use of thisresource.To

be sure, she claims to accept a "conceptionof the constructionof dis-
course [that]is notradicallydifferent fromthatofferedby [us]." And she
says, in addition, that she is indebted to myworkon thepoliticsof need
interpretation. Yet the model she proposes is objectivistic.It treatsdis-
cursiveconstructions as effects to be explainedbyreference to "structures
of politicalopportunity," themselvesconceivedas extradiscursive. "Cre-
ated at theintersection of institutional development, demographicshifts,
and strategicpoliticalaction,"these"structures" are said to explainwhen
and whycertainkeywordsemergeand become salient.In fact,the "ex-
planation" closes offmanyof the criticalquestionsthatwere painstak-
inglyopened up by our genealogyof dependency.
ConsiderZylan's account of the emergenceof the discourseof "wel-
faredependency":"demographicchanges,fiscalburdens,and racial and
gender politics combined to create a structureof opportunitywithin
whichpolicymakers'and social workers'rhetorics... could be deployed
and take root." The claim here is that ADC, previouslya respectable,
unstigmatizing programof incomesupportforsinglemothersand their
children,suddenlycame underattackin the 1950s because of "changing
demographicsof theprogram'srecipients"-namely, a risein thepropor-
tion of black claimants-and "rapidlyexpanding"ADC expenditures
that were "in many cases eatingup a largerand largerportionof a state's
totalexpenditures."Also contributing to thisoutcomewerethe"strategic
interests"of whiteSouthernpoliticiansseekingto ensurean "adequate
supply"of domesticand agriculturallabor and the failureof organized
labor,middle-classwomen'sorganizations,and social workersto mount
a defenseof theprogram.As a resultof this"politicalopportunity struc-
a
ture,"Zylan claims, stigmatizing new discourse of welfare dependency
emergedto justifythe impositionby the statesof new,punitiverulesin
the implementation of the program.
What is strikingabout this account is the absence of any cultural
contextthatcould explain why and how social actorsshould construct
these"changingdemographics"and "institutional developments"as war-
ranting attacks on "welfare dependency." Zylan writes as ifsuch attacks
wereself-evidently appropriateresponsesto increasedblackparticipation
and increasedstateexpendituresforADC. This, however,begs the cru-
cial questions.The same period from1935 to the 1950s also saw big
increasesin black participationin social insuranceprograms;yetthere
was no comparable stigmatizationof theserecipientsas "dependents."
Likewise,the same periodwitnessedsteeprisesin stateexpendituresfor
programsto subsidizefarmersand businesses,but thesedid not provoke
outcriesagainstdependency,nor calls forsexual monitoringof the ben-
eficiaries.

534 SIGNS Winter 1996

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 REPLY Fraser

The point,then,is thatchangingdemographicsand institutional de-

velopments do not of themselves explain anything. In order to have any
historicaleffects,these conditionsmust firstbe noticed,experienced,
interpreted, and respondedto by social actors,both individualand col-
lective.Theymust,in otherwords,be culturallymediatedand appropri-
ated. In the same way,actors' strategicinterests, identities,and identifi-
cations are not objectivelygiven but must be culturallyconstructed.
"Explanations"thatfailto unpackthediscursiveprocessesbywhichthis
occurs serveto naturalizehegemonicinterpretations. By lendingthose
interpretations an aura of self-evidence, theysimultaneouslyimmunize
themagainstcritique.
In fact,industrial-era understandings of dependency, as detailedin our
essay,help supplythe missingmediations.Not only was that category
alreadyfeminized,racialized,and individualizedin the cultureat large
but itsmeaningswere also encoded in a two-tiersocial-welfarestructure
thatleftADC claimants,butnot social insuranceclaimants,vulnerableto
the discretionof caseworkers,administrators, and state legislatures.I
leave it to the historiansto determineexactly when and where such
discretionwas exercisedin itsmostpunitiveand racistforms.Butthefact
remainsthat the 1935 Social SecurityAct createdADC as a program
whose implementation was subjectto considerablelocal discretionand
latitude.It therebyincorporatedthe long-standing view,traceableback
through mothers' pensions and to
beyond friendlyvisiting,that solo
mothersdid not have an unconditionalentitlement to aid, that their
deservingness had to be vetted on a case-by-casebasis, that careful
screening and close personalsupervisionwerenot in principleincompat-
ible with theirrightsas citizens,that-in short-they were dependents
walkinga fineline between"good" and "bad" dependency.2
The imperativeof policingthatlinewas builtintothedesignof ADC.
But withthe gradual emergenceof a postindustrialsocioculturalorder,
"good" dependencybecame harderto find.Withthe decenteringof the
family-wageideal, women's economic dependencywithinmarriagebe-
came contestedand could no longerserveas a positivecounterweight to
thenegativeconnotationsofpublicaid. Atthesame time,moreover,with
the dismantlingof racistand sexist sociolegal dependency,the already
tenuousU.S. sense of dependencyas a structuralrelationof subordina-
tionwas further obscuredand theterm'svictim-blaming, individualizing
connotationswere heightened.The upshot was a socioculturalconstel-
lationin which"welfaredependency"could appear as a problem.The set
of overlappingunderstandings surrounding this"problem"mediatedac-
tors' constructionsof theiridentities,interests, and politicalstrategies.
2 For historical
evidence,see Gordon 1994.

Winter 1996 SIGNS 535

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 Fraser REPLY

This analysisopens thepossibilityof a deeper,morecriticaltakeon the

eventsdiscussedbyZylan,includingthedeclineofmaternalist politicsand
theabsenceof supportforADC. Had Zylan beenless intenton distancing
herselffromour genealogicalmethod,she could have availedherselfof its
fruitsto understandtheculturallensesthroughwhichactorsrespondedto
thedevelopments she describesbydemonizing"welfaredependency." Fail-
ingto do so, sheleavesunscrutinized a setofassumptionsand understand-
ingsthatoughtnot to be allowed to go withoutsaying.
Thereis an urgentneedto keepsightof thispointtoday.Once again,a
panic about "welfaredependency"appearsas theself-evidently appropri-
ate responseto a social crisisconstructedin termsof "thebudgetdeficit,"
"runaway expenditureson entitlements," "skyrocketing caseloads," "a
teen pregnancyepidemic,""changingracial demographics,""the under-
class," and the "declineof familyvalues." In thissituation,criticalintel-
lectualswho wantto join thestruggle fora justand humanesocietycan do
any numberof politicallyusefulthings.One thingtheycan do is to de-
mystify thecurrentcommonsenseabout dependency. In thisway,we can
a
beginto clear space forenvisioning emancipatory alternatives.3

Department of Political Science

Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research

References
Fraser,Nancy. 1992. "The Uses and Abuses of FrenchDiscourse Theories for
FeministPolitics."In RevaluingFrenchFeminism,ed. Nancy Fraserand San-
dra Bartky,177-94. Bloomington:Indiana University Press.
. 1993. "Clintonism,Welfare,and theAntisocialWage:The Emergenceof
a Neoliberal PoliticalImaginary."RethinkingMarxism6(1):9-23.
. 1994a. "Afterthe FamilyWage: Gender Equity and Social Welfare."
Political Theory22(4):591-618.
. 1994b. "Pragmatism,Feminism,and the LinguisticTurn." In Feminist
Contentions:A PhilosophicalExchange,ed. Seyla Benhabibet al. New York:
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. 1996. "Constructing'Clients': On Stigma,Status,and SubjectPosition
in theU.S. WelfareState."In herJusticeInterruptus:
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of a "Postsocialist"Age. In press.
Fraser,Nancy,and Linda Gordon. 1994. "A Genealogyof Dependency:Tracing
a Keywordof theU.S. WelfareState."Signs:Journalof Womenin Cultureand
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Gordon,Linda. 1994. PitiedbutNot Entitled:SingleMothersand theHistoryof
Welfare,1890-1935. New York: Free Press.
3 For moredemystification, see Fraser1993. For a considerationof some alternative
feministmodels of social welfare,see Fraser1994a.

536 SIGNS Winter 1996

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