Who Makes Our Laws?

(The Legislative Department)

● MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEGISLATURE
a. Residence Qualification

Romualdez-Marcos vs. FACTS:

COMELEC 248 SCRA ● Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her COC for the position of
300 (1995) Representative of Leyte First District (stating her residency as 7 months - her
being a resident of Tacloban City and she has only been residing in Leyte for 7
GONZALES mos).

● Private respondent Montejo, the incumbent representative of the same

position, filed a petition for disqualification against petitioner alleging that she
did not meet the 1 year constitutional requirement for residency.

● Petitioner filed an Amended COC to “since childhood”, and that her entry of the
word “7” was the result of an honest misinterpretation, and that she always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

● COMELEC did not accept her amended COC and upheld her disqualification
to be a candidate for the position.
○ She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual
and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or
domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have
responded "since childhood."
○ she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and
which she has never abandoned.
○ she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of
Tolosa for seven months.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner satisfied the 1 yr residency requirement - YES

HELD:
● There seems to be a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts
of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law.

● This court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent

home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one
intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that
they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and
animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently. (Ong vs.
Republic)

● Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an

individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given
area, community or country.

● The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that

residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident
has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as
pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence.

● It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in

various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for
 various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another
domicile of choice.

● It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which

ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied
the constitution's residency qualification requirement.

● This court decides that petitioner did, indeed, do an honest mistake of writing
the word “seven” in the residency requirement.

● An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places.
○ The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession,
to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence.

● COMELEC erred in referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual)

residence, not her domicile:
○ Evidence established petitioner’s domicile to be Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City) - In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8
years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban
City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938
to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her
college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in
Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she
taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she
went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z.
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When
her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and
her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered
as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace
and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

● Found that petitioner had established different residences but none pointed her
intention of abandoning her domicile origin of Tacloban, Leyte
○ Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she
naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in
Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even
during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos
Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of
origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home
province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her
province and hometown, and establishing a political power base
where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either
through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence
or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part
of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our
country.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained
until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
 one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all
three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a
change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time.

Abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile

with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).

Cannot also be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of
law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For
there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile"
and "residence." The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's
domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term
"residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where
the two concepts are well delineated.

Petition granted. Petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for
a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte.

Domino vs. COMELEC FACTS:

310 SCRA 546 (1999) ● On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani
DE MESA indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the
constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months
immediately preceding the election.
● On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java,
Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., filed with the
COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy
● Private respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the
certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the
province of Sarangani where he seeks election
● For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year
residence requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since
January 1997
● On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution
declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of representative
of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement
and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
● On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental
Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be
counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the
Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and
executory.
● The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of
the Provincial Board of Canvassers, shows that DOMINO garnered the
highest number of votes over his opponents for the position of Congressman of
the Province of Sarangani.
● On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution
dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its decision
dated 29 May 1998. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
 when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement

ISSUE:
WON Domino is qualified to run [No. He did not abide by the residency
requirement]

Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year
immediately preceding the 11 May 1998 election as stated in his certificate of
candidacy? [NO]

HELD:

● It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing
the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as
"domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
● "Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of
circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must
have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it
remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one
residence or domicile at a time.
● Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur 24
and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24
Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his
certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd District of
Quezon City in the May 1995 election.
● Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in
Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of
Sarangani.
● A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not
be deemed lost until a new one is established.
● To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.
● It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel,
Sarangani since December 1996 was sufficiently established by the lease of a
house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and
certifications under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen
petitioner and his family residing in their locality.
● While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that
from said date he had transferred his residence in that place. To establish a
new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of that intention.
● While "residence" simply requires bodily presence in a given place, "domicile"
requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and
probable intent to make it one’'s fixed and permanent place of abode, one's
home.
● As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the
locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to
establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these
elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in
the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of
physical presence without intention.
● The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not
 adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative
of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind
of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile.
● The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how
long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile. 30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in
the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the
absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year
residence requirement.
● Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is
further strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in
Quezon City.
● While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong
presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in
his former barangay.
● Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the
fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in a doubtful
case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence.
● The fact that a party continuously voted in a particular locality is a strong
factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile.
● While, Domino's intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned
from the fact that be bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997,
that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Quezon City on 22
October 1997, and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City
to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August 1997, DOMINO
still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the Constitution.
● In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual
presence in the district one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time
prescribed by the fundamental law. Domino's failure to do so rendered him
ineligible and his election to office null and void.

Jalosjos vs. COMELEC FACTS:

GR No. 191970 April ● Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He
24, 2012 migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old and there acquired
Australian citizenship.
BERNARDO ● On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and
lived with his brother, Romeo, Jr., Zamboanga Sibugay.
● Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September 1, 2009, he
renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the
same in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225.
● From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the
same village where he lived and a fishpond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga
Sibugay.
● On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos
COC on the ground that the latter made material misrepresentation in the
same since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2)
the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code.
● COMELEC ruled that, while Jalosjos had regained Philippine citizenship by
complying with the requirements of R.A. 9225, he failed to prove the residency
requirement for a gubernatorial candidate.”He failed to present ample proof
of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.” and on MoR they said that “Jalosjos had been a mere guest or
transient visitor in his brothers house and, for this reason, he cannot
claim Ipil as his domicile”.
● Jalosjos got a Temporary Restraining Order regarding the prior decision and in
 the meanwhile, won the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay.

ISSUE: W/N COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. [Y]

HELD:
Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga
Sibugay.

RATIO:
● The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of
provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before
the election.
● For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to
reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention
● There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate's compliance with
residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of
intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:
○ every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;
○ where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a
new one; and
○ a person can have but one domicile at a time.
● Jalosjos was born in Quezon City and it can be taken for granted that he
moved his domicile to Australia when he migrated there at age 8.
● Then he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his
domicile for good.
● He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his
allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his Filipino citizenship.
● To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay
despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of
choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that
a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
● The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in
Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brothers house, but this
circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has
repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a
community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It
is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the
house of a friend or relative
● To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make
property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has
proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it
his domicile.

Ongsiako Reyes vs. FACTS:

COMELEC GR No. ● Private respondent filed a petition before the COMELEC to cancel the COC of
207264 June 25, 2013 petitioner on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations:
(Motions for ○ that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I.
Reconsideration denied Mandanas of Batangas
with finality on ○ that she is a resident of Marinduque when she is a resident of
December 3, 2013) Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and at the same
time, when she is also a resident of Quezon City as admitted in the
ABASTILLAS Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;
○ that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that
her birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;
○ that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a
permanent resident or an immigrant of the United States of America
 ○ that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen
● Petitioner countered that
○ there is no valid and binding marriage between Cong. Mandanas and
her, that although her marriage him was solemnized in a religious rite,
it did not comply with certain formal requirements prescribed by the
Family Code, rendering it void ab initio.
○ Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not duty-bound to live
with Cong. Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to her.
○ As to her date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964.
○ Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanent
resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not
supported by evidence.
● Private respondent filed
○ Copy of an article published on the internet on 8 January 2013
entitled "Seeking and Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes" with
an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of Document executed by
its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a database record of
the Bureau of Immigration indicating that petitioner is an
American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport
○ Certification of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by Simeon
Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of the
Bureau of Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a U.S.
Passport in her various travels abroad.
● COMELEC cancelled COC of petitioner because she is not a citizen of the
Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003
○ to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
○ to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
○ In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have
the one year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution
● Petitioner filed MR saying she has not lost natural-born citizenship by simply
obtaining American passport, her marriage does not conclude her naturalized
American citizenship, and that that marriage resulted only into dual citizenship
thus no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements under RA 9225
● COMELEC denied MR
● Petitioner alleged COMELEC for GADALEJ when by enforcing the provisions
of Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the
qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives as enumerated in
Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
● W/N COMELEC acted with GADALEJ by imposing additional requirements
on candidates for House of Rep

HELD:
● No.
● The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the
House of Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely
applied the qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and must have one-year residency prior to the date of
elections.
● Such being the case, the COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the
compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if
she reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply applied
the constitutional provision and nothing more.
 b. Term and Tenure

Dimaporo vs. Miltra FACTS:

2020 SCRA 779 (1991)
VILLAVIRAY
Article VI)
ISSUE: W/N petitioner renounced his seat in the Congress when he filed his certificate
of candidacy
● Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected as the representative for the
second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional
elections.
● On Jan. 15, 1990, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
regional governor of ARMM
● COMELEC informed respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Representatives about the filing of certificate of candidacy of the petitioner.
They then excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House
of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election
Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than
the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and
Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
● Petitioner lost in the autonomous region elections. He then sent a letter on
June 28 1990 addressed to the Speaker, expressing his intention "to resume
performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress." He did
not receive any reply and failed to regain his seat.
● Petitioner was excluded from all proceedings of the House of Representatives;
he was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff was dismissed and
disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by other persons. In effect, he
was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and from
exercising his rights and privileges as the duly elected and qualified
congressman from his district.
● Petitioner contends that he did not lose his seat as congressman because
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present
Constitution, being contrary to, and therefore not applicable to the present
members of Congress. To support his claim, he points out that the term of
office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by
which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in
the Constitution. He maintains that the only grounds,according to the
Constitution, by which such term may be shortened are through the following:
a) Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Section 13,
b) Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behaviour (Section 16 (3))
c) Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an
election contest (Section 17)
d) Voluntary renunciation of office (Section 7, par. 2)
● He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that
it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not
provided for in the Constitution

HELD: YES
● An advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881), Manuel M. Garcis, explains that “a Batasan Member who hold (sic)
himself out with the people and seek (sic) their support and mandate should
 not be allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for any other position unless
he relinquishes or abandons his office. Because his mandate to the people is
to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who
was mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he
was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he has not (sic) intention to
service the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore
he should be considered ipso facto resigned.”
● “The mere fact therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt
act of abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and that he
should therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he feels he
could be of better service”
● Petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer
operative does not hold water. The basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881 remains written in the 1987 Constitution, Section 1 of Article XI on
"Accountability of Public Officers". This provision states that:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their
entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and
thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their
candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. All public officials must serve
the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received
from their constituents.
● Difference of term and tenure:
Term- period of time in office prescribed by the Constitution; may not be
extended or shortened by the legislature
Tenure- period during which an officer actually holds the office; may be
affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer.
Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not
change the duration of the term of office.
● When an elective official files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is
deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains
and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
● That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned
in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of
members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of
Congress.
● “All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment” (Section 2 of Article XI ). Such
constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in
Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be
shortened are not exclusive. It does not preclude the legislature from
prescribing other grounds.
● Monroy vs. Court of Appeals: "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently
effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only
the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the
seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can
restore the ousted official.

Fariñas, et al. v. FACTS:

Executive Secretary, Petitions is seeking to declare Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election
417 SCRA 503 (2003) Act) as unconstitutional, insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
GONZALES “SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or
local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”

Legislative History of RA 9006

1. Consolidated from 2 house bills (“allowing the use of mass media for election
propaganda” and “enhancing the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections through fair election practices”) that came from House of
Representative (HoR) and Senate.
2. A Bicameral Conference Committee (composed of 8 Senate and 16 HoR) was
formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the bills from the 2 groups.
3. Upon votation after taking up pending matters, the house approved the bill with
125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstain. The 3 negative votes
are herein petitioners. The negative votes expressed their belief that Sec 14 is
a rider and doubted the constitutionality of Sec 14.
4. Thereafter, RA 9006 was signed by into law by then FPGMA on Feb. 12,
2001.

Petitioners Arguments:
1. Violates one title-one subject rule and is a proscribed rider (In legislative
procedure, a rider is an additional provision added to a bill or other
measure under the consideration by a legislature, having little
connection with the subject matter of the bill. Riders are usually created
as a tactic to pass a controversial provision that would not pass as its
own bill.)
a. Act. 9006 lifts ban on the use of media for election propaganda and
the elimination of unfair election practices
b. while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation
on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are
holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto
resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy
2. Violates equal protection clause:
a. In Sec 17 of Act 9006, an elective official who runs for office other
than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto
resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective
officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection
or election for another elective position.
b. While Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive
officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from
their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. (SEC. 66.
Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.)
3. Null and void for not following the publication rule set in the Constitution
a. Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect
upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the
law before it becomes effective
4. Sec. 67 is a good law and should not have been repealed
5. Respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion

Respondents arguments:
1. No legal standing to institute suit, have not shown they have suffered
harm as a result of the passage of Act. 9006, do not have any interest as
taxpayers
2. Does not violate the one title-one subject rule:
a. Title is so broad that it encompasses all the processes involved in an
 election exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by
elective officials.
b. Repeal is expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of
prematurely terminating the term of an elective official by his filing of a
certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one which he is
permanently holding, such that he is no longer considered ipso facto
resigned therefrom.
c. Legislature has deemed it fit to remove the unfairness of considering
an elective official ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for another elective office.
d. Elective officials are now placed at equal footing (as they are allowed
to finish their respective terms even if they run for any office, whether
the presidency, vice-presidency or other elective positions, other than
the one they are holding in a permanent capacity.)
3. Does not violate equal protection clause:
a. A substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials;
elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based
upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected by
popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as the
former.
b. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.
4. Does not violate due process:
a. does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property.

ISSUES:
[Procedural]
WON petitioners have legal standing - YES

[Substantive]
WON Act No. 9006 is constitutional - YES

HELD:
[Procedural]
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which this Court had declared in Dimaporo as deriving its
existence from the constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has been
validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of overarching significance
that justifies this Courts adoption of a liberal stance vis--vis the procedural matter on
standing.

[Substantive]
1. Section 14 is not a rider, and fits the constitutional requirement of the one
subject-one title rule.
a. Court’s basis/previously explained: “Constitutional provisions relating
to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include
the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing
each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The
title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.”
b. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act
No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require
that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title
is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
c. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
 Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an
office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of
the contested law, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda, doesn’t violate the “one subject- one
title rule”.
d. The Court has held that an act having a single general subject,
indicated in its title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and they may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject.
e. The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away
with and repealed. The executive department found cause with
Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure
into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may
believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would
encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the
concern of the Court.
f. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political
branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the
wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic
theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results,
whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits
should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the
judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does
not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.
Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of
the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision
and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a
laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to
repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby
enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws the fair,
honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress
is achieved.
g. Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the
subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions,
and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not
received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.
In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not
apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as
the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the
members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the
House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its
validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were
aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

2. Section 14 does not violate the equal protection clause

a. Overturned Dimapporo
b. Court’s basis/previously explained: “The equal protection of the law
clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does
not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
 only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.”
c. The repeal of Section 67 is not violative of the equal protection
clause. Equal protection is not absolute especially if the classification
is reasonable. There is reasonable classification between an elective
official and an appointive one. The former occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another
substantial distinction is that by law, appointed officials are
prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity or take part
in any election except to vote, while elected officials are the
complete opposite.
i. If the legislative kept the provision that elected officials,
when they run for another position, they would be ipso
facto resigned from their current position, it would be an
infringement on the right of suffrage of those who
elected those officials because it can be just that easy to
resign them
d. By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any
position other than those occupied by them.

3. Enrolled Bill Doctrine is Applicable in this Case

a. The contention that irregularities attended the creation of RA 9006 is
overridden by the enrolled bill doctrine. Under this doctrine, the
signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The
Supreme Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the
internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have
no concern. Whatever irregularities there may have been in the
Bicameral Conference Committee involve internal rules which cannot
be inquired into by the Court.
4. Effectivity Clause in RA 9006 is Defective
a. “it shall take effect immediately upon its approval, is defective.”
However, the same does not render the entire law invalid.
b. Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect
fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper
of general circulation.

Petition dismissed. RA 9006 is constitutional.

i. Election

Codilla vs. De Venecia FACTS:

393 SCRA 639 (2002)
Fast Facts (if ever you get overwhelmed reading the detailed portion haha)
TAONGAN Disqualification case filed against Codilla -> Initial Count showed Codilla won. -> Locsin
(opponent) intervened and filed Motion to Suspend Proclamation -> Comelec granted ->
Locsin proclaimed having 2nd highest votes -> Codilla filed MR -> Comelec reversed
decision -> Codilla sent Letter to De Venecia (House Speaker) to accord him his rights
are duly proclaimed winner -> De Venecia told him Locsin will not follow COMELEC
ruling and will not give up her position and that issue is already under the jurisdiction of
HRET, not bound to recognize COMELEC -> Case brought to SC

● Petitioner Eufrocino Codilla and respondent Ma. Victoria Locsin were

candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time, Codilla was the Mayor of
Ormoc City while respondent Locsin was the sitting Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte.

● May 8, 2001 - Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed

directly with the COMELEC against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes
from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of
Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code (the petitioner allegedly used the
equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract,
haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob,
Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for
him)

● Before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined as intervenor

and filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Codilla` with the
COMELEC Second Division.

● May 18, 2001 - the COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order to
suspend the proclamation of Codilla in case he obtains the highest number of
votes by reason of the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for
disqualification.

● At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending
his proclamation, the petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the petition
for disqualification. Neither has said petition been set for hearing.It was only on
May 24, 2001 that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the petition for his
disqualification with the Regional Election Director, alleging that: (a) he has
not received the summons together with the copy of the petition; (b) he
became aware of the matter only by virtue of the telegram sent by the
COMELEC Second Division

● On June 14, 2001 - the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its

Resolution which found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and
ordered his disqualification.

● By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350,
were declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. On June
15, 2001, respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte.

● On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a
Motion for Reconsideration and a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Proclamation, assailing the validity of the proclamation of respondent Locsin
who garnered only the second highest number of votes.

● On August 29, 2001, - an order by the Comelec was issued reversing the
resolution of the Second Division and declaring the proclamation of respondent
Locsin as null and void.

● Locsin requested and was issued an opinion by House of Representatives

Executive Director and Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III declaring
that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of respondent
Locsin after she had taken her oath and assumed office since it is the HRET
 which is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of Members of the
House. Relying on this opinion, respondent Locsin submitted a written
privileged speech to the House during its regular session on September 4,
2001, where she declared that she will not only disregard but will openly defy
and disobey the COMELEC en banc resolution ordering her to vacate her
position.

● Petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as

the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, having
obtained a total of 71,350 votes representing the highest number of votes cast
in the district.

● Petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De

Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en banc
resolution annulling the proclamation of respondent Locsin, and proclaiming
him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
● In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter dated October 30, 2001, stating
that:

○ “We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are

inclined to sustain it. However, Rep. Locsin has officially notified the
HOUSE in her privilege speech, inserted in the HOUSE Journal dated
September 4, 2001, that she shall openly defy and disobey the
COMELEC ruling. This ultimately means that implementing the
decision would result in the spectacle of having two (2) legislators
occupying the same congressional seat, a legal situation, the only
consideration, that effectively deters the HOUSEs liberty to take
action.

○ In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the

COMELEC decision is a matter that can be best, and with finality,
adjudicated by the Supreme Court, which, hopefully, shall act on it
most expeditiously.”

ISSUE:
(a) Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC Second Division
is valid; - NO.
(b) Whether said proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review
its validity; - NO.
(c) Assuming the invalidity of said proclamation, whether it is the ministerial duty of the
public respondents to recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte - YES.

HELD:
(1) The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and respondent
cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis. The disqualification of the petitioner is null
and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis.
Even assuming, however, that the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper
for the COMELEC Second Division to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for
the petitioner as stray because order of disqualification was not final, and on this basis,
proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest number of votes.

● In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when
the elections were conducted on May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director
has yet to conduct hearing on the petition for his disqualification. After the
elections, petitioner was voted in office by a wide margin of 17,903. Records
likewise reveal there was no proof of service and notice regarding the Motion
for suspension of his proclamation.

● COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 which sets the procedure for disqualification
cases pursuant to Section 68 of Omnibus Election Code clearly requires the
 COMELEC, through the Regional Election Director, to issue summons to the
respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if
any, within three (3) days from the filing of the petition for disqualification.
Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the opportunity to
answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side.

● The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the
petitioner. They do not contain a copy of the summons allegedly served on the
petitioner and its corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private
respondent never rebutted petitioners repeated assertion that he was not
properly notified of the petition for his disqualification because he never
received summons.

● Moreover, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation

of section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:

● Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- The Commission

and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of
violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later
than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.

○ Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be

disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections
shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.

● More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the

settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of
votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified.

● In Domino v. COMELEC - It would be extremely repugnant to the basic

concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and
imposed as representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.

(2) It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no

jurisdiction in the instant case. At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the
validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged
by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot
assume jurisdiction over the matter.

● The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the
COMELEC en banc is of no moment. Even without said Petition, the
COMELEC en banc could still rule on the nullity of respondents proclamation
because it was properly raised in the Motion for Reconsideration.

● Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC

en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions
decided by a division.

● Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
of suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc
was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the
Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable
as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration
 suspends its execution.

(3) In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative
district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents.
The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against
respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The
COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on
Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second
Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC
en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said
Decision has become final and executory.

● The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well

delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes
a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The
duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion or judgment.

● The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land.
There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and
confusion.

ii. Special Election

Tolentino vs. FACTS:

COMELEC 420 SCRA ● This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated
438 (2004) 5 June 2001 ("Resolution No. 01-005") and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated
20 July 2001 ("Resolution No. 01-006") of respondent Commission on
SAYUNO Elections ("COMELEC"). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates
elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006
declared "official and final" the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in
Resolution No. 01-005.
● President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. ("Senator Guingona") as Vice-President. Congress confirmed
the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9
February 2001.
● 8 February 2001 the Senate passed Resolution No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84")
certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called
on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators,
with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election.
● Resolution No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the
13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004.
● 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the
provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005
provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators.
● Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that "the first twelve (12) Senators shall
serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve
the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who
was appointed Vice-President.
● Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") and Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan")
ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.
● 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica ("petitioners"), as
voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, impleading only
 COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from
proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest
number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-year
term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No.
01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect.
● Petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election
must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of
their results. To support their claim, petitioners cite the special elections
simultaneously held with the regular elections of 13 November 1951 and 8
November 1955 to fill the seats vacated by Senators Fernando Lopez and
Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their
tenures in the Senate. Petitioners point out that in those elections, COMELEC
separately canvassed the votes cast for the senatorial candidates running
under the regular elections from the votes cast for the candidates running
under the special elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the winners
in each of those elections.
● Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the
pendency of their petition.
● 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the
provinces, it issued Resolution No. 01-006 declaring "official and final" the
ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. The 13
Senators took their oaths of office on 23 July 2001.
● COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special election to fill the seat
vacated by Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May 2001. COMELEC
and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition
and on petitioners’ standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition,
which seeks the nullity of his proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo
warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction.
For his part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper
party to this case because the petition only involves the validity of the
proclamation of the 13th placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.
ISSUE:
1) Procedurally –
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the
Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge. (NO)
(b) whether the petition is moot. (YES)
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate. (YES)
(2) Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly
held on 14 May 2001. (YES)

HELD:
● The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters
● The Nature of the Petition and the Court’s Jurisdiction
○ A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the
right of a public officer in the exercise of his office and to oust him
from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded. Under Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the members of
the Senate.
○ A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows,
however, that what petitioners are questioning is the validity of the
special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected.
Petitioners’ various prayers are, namely: (1) a "declaration" that no
special election was held simultaneously with the general elections on
14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as
having won in the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos.
01-005 and 01-006 in so far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan
as the winner in the special election. Petitioners anchor their prayers
on COMELEC’s alleged failure to comply with certain requirements
pertaining to the conduct of that special election. Clearly then, the
 petition does not seek to determine Honasan’s right in the exercise of
his office as Senator. Petitioners’ prayer for the annulment of
Honasan’s proclamation and, ultimately, election is merely incidental
to petitioners’ cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly
exercise jurisdiction over the instant petition.
● On the Mootness of the Petition
○ COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13
Senators and its subsequent confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the
ranking of the 13 Senators render the instant petition to set aside
Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and academic.
○ Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a
tribunal or board to desist from committing an act threatened to be
done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, the writ will not lie to
enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on
mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable
of repetition yet evading review.
14
○ In Alunan III v. Mirasol, we took cognizance of a petition to set
aside an order canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang
Kabataan ("SK") on 4 December 1992 despite that at the time the
petition was filed, the SK election had already taken place. We noted
in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the order sought to
be annulled "is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the
question may not be decided before the date of such elections," the
mootness of the petition is no bar to its resolution. This observation
squarely applies to the instant case. The question of the validity of a
special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to
COMELEC’s failure to comply with requirements on the conduct of
such special election is likely to arise in every such election. Such
question, however, may not be decided before the date of the
election.
● On Petitioners’ Standing
○ "Legal standing" or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. The
requirement of standing, which necessarily "sharpens the
presentation of issues," relates to the constitutional mandate that this
Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, generally, a
party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
○ Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the
instant petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity
of the special election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm
classified as a "generalized grievance." This generalized grievance is
shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not
all the voters, who voted in that election.
○ Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that
the Court should give due course to the petition because in the
special election held on 14 May 2001 "tax money [was] ‘x x x
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections
against abuses of legislative power’ or that there [was] misapplication
of such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to
any improper purpose."
○ In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, we gave
the same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines ("IBP"). The IBP questioned the validity of a
Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine National
 Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols
even though the IBP presented "too general an interest." We held:
○ The IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to
uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this
declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its
locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve
the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an
interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
○ This Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does
not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest
is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude
on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft
an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court
may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
○ We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in
their capacity as voters since they raise important issues involving
their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition
is likely to arise again.
● Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat
was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
○ Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may
be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of
Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law," thus:
○ In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives,
a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner
prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
(Emphasis supplied)
○ SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen
(18) months or in the House of Representatives at least one (1) year
before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the
existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold
a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an
official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a
special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient
for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
○ SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the
special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor
later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or
communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be
voted for: Provided, however, that if within the said period a general
election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
○ Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2
of R.A. No. 6645, as follows:
○ Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. – x x x In
case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the
term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the
vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90)
days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such
vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. (Emphasis
supplied)
○ Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before
 the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended,
requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of
the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor
later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case
of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to
give notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to
be voted for.
○ A survey of COMELEC’s resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14
May 2001 elections reveals that they contain nothing which would
amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial, with the
requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus,
nowhere in its resolutions or even in its press releases did COMELEC
state that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term
Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May
2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as
winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of
votes in the special election.
○ COMELEC’s Failure to Give Noticeof the Time of the Special Election
Did Not Negate the Calling of such Election.
○ In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that
expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at
the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election
is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently,
an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the
fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election
failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election
emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by
some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the
time and place of the election.
○ The special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from
Senator Guingona’s appointment as Vice-President in February 2001
could not be held at any other time but must be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law
charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and
COMELEC’s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the
calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
○ Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a
special election to fill a vacancy in the House of Representatives. In
such a case, the holding of the special election is subject to a
condition precedent, that is, the vacancy should take place at least
one year before the expiration of the term. The time of the election is
left to the discretion of COMELEC subject only to the limitation that it
holds the special election within the range of time provided in Section
2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended.
○ No Proof that COMELEC’s failure to give notice of the office to be
filled and the manner of determining the winner in the Special Election
misled voters
○ The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special
senatorial election covers two matters. First, that COMELEC will hold
a special election to fill a vacant single three-year term Senate seat
simultaneously with the regular elections scheduled on the same
date. Second, that COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial
candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special
election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that
COMELEC’s failure to give this required notice misled a sufficient
number of voters as would change the result of the special senatorial
election or led them to believe that there was no such special
election.
○ Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed
to give such notice, no special election took place. This bare assertion
 carries no value. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, charged
those who voted in the elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge
that the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingona’s
appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 was to be filled in
the next succeeding regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the
absence of formal notice from COMELEC does not preclude the
possibility that the voters had actual notice of the special election, the
office to be voted in that election, and the manner by which
COMELEC would determine the winner. Such actual notice could
come from many sources, such as media reports of the enactment of
R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during the campaign.
○ More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the
party who stands most prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply
cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the absence
of proof that COMELEC’s omission prejudiced voters in the exercise
of their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special
election.
○ COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and
methods to conduct the special election within the confines of R.A.
No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senate’s proposal, as embodied
in Resolution No. 84. This Court has consistently acknowledged and
affirmed COMELEC’s wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to
carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections
subject only to the limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal
or do not constitute grave abuse of discretion. COMELEC’s decision
to abandon the means it employed in the 13 November 1951 and 8
November 1955 special elections and adopt the method embodied in
Resolution No. 84 is but a legitimate exercise of its discretion.
Conversely, this Court will not interfere should COMELEC, in
subsequent special senatorial elections, choose to revert to the
means it followed in the 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955
elections. That COMELEC adopts means that are novel or even
disagreeable is no reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of
discretion. As we have earlier noted:
○ The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to
play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the
discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions
that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It
should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for
which it was created — free, orderly and honest elections. We may
not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly
illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not
interfere.
○ The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice
to the electorate of necessary information regarding a special
election, are central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage.
While the circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to
conclude that COMELEC’s failure to so call and give notice did not
invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001,
COMELEC should not take chances in future elections. We remind
COMELEC to comply strictly with all the requirements under
applicable laws relative to the conduct of regular elections in general
and special elections in particular.

iii. Party List System

Veterans Federation FACTS:

Party vs. COMELEC
342 SCRA 224 (2000) BACKGROUND
● The Constitution and RA No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters
SANTOS to determine winners in a PH-style party-list election:
a. Twenty percent allocation - combined number of ALL party-list
congressmen shall not exceed 20% of total membership of the House
of Representatives (HOR) inc. those elected under the party-list
b. Two percent threshold - only parties garnering a min of 2% of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are QUALIFIED to have
a seat in the HOR
c. Three-seat limit - each qualified party regardless of no. of vote it
actually obtained, is entitled to a max of 3 seats; that is one
“qualifying” and two additional seats
d. Proportional representation - additional seats w/c a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed IN PROPORTION TO THEIR TOTAL
NO. OF VOTES

● Under the party-list system, any national, regional or sectoral party or

organization registered with the COMELEC may participate in the election of
party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in
the HOR as regular members.
● In effect, a voter is given two votes for the HOR - one for a district
congressman and another for a party-list representative.
● This system is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.
● May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. A total 123 parties, organizations
and coalitions participated.
● On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed 13 party-list
representatives from 12 parties and organizations, which had obtained at least
2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system.

ON THE 2% THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT

● COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters’ Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one
party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, equivalent to 2.04 percent of
the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee was
declared 14th representative.

ON THE 20% ALLOCATION REQUIREMENT

● On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and
Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement)
filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution."
● It alleged that the filling up of the 20% membership of party-list
representatives in the HOR was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal
application of the 2% vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees
would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who
should actually sit.
● Nine other party-list organizations filed their Motions for Intervention seeking
same relief as sought by PAGASA.

● On October 15, 1998, COMELEC 2nd division promulgated assailed resolution

granting PAGASA’s petition. It therefore proclaimed 38 other respondents, in
addition to the earlier proclaimed 14, to fill the 52 seats of party-list
representatives.
● It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional 9 seats must be
filled up by 80% percent district representatives and 20% percent party-list
representatives.

● Above resolution was inconsistent with the 2nd requirement of the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the
Party List System: only parties garnering a min of 2% of the total valid votes
 cast for the party-list system are QUALIFIED to have a seat in the HOR.
● As such, the 12 parties and organizations which had earlier been proclaimed
winners objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties contending that:
a. Under Section 11(b) of RA 7941, only parties garnering at least 2% of
the total votes were entitled to the seats of the HOR
b. Additional seats, not exceeding 2 for each, should be allocated to
those who garnered at least 2%, the already proclaimed winning
parties

COMELEC RULING:
● Noting that all parties had agreed that the 20% membership of party-list
representatives in the HOR should be filled up, issue now should only be the
allocation of the remaining seats.
● The Poll body ruled that the strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not
serve the essence and object of the Constitution - to develop and guarantee a
full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the HOR.
● Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the 2% percent vote
requirement imposed by RA 7941, the COMELEC REJECTED and
circumvented its application, holding that there were more important
considerations than this statutory threshold.

ISSUE:
1. W/N 20% allocation for party-list representatives is mandatory or merely a
ceiling - CEILING
2. W/N the 2% threshold requirement and 3-seat limit are constitutional - YES
and YES
3. If yes to 2, how should the additional seats be allocated?

HELD:

ON ISSUE 1, THE 20% ALLOCATION IS MERELY A CEILING.

● The Constitution merely states that the party list representatives shall
constitute 20% of representatives. It explicitly sets down only the percentage of
total membership reserved for party-list representatives.
● Congress declared the policy to promote “proportional representation” and to
enable the marginalized and underrepresented to contribute legislations that
would benefit them. HOWEVER, it is necessary to obtain at least 2% of total
votes for a party to be entitled to a seat.
● The function of the SC, as well as all judiciary, is to apply the law as we find it,
not to intervene or second-guess it.
● Thus, the 20% allocation is NOT MANDATORY BUT MERELY A CEILING.

ON ISSUE 3, THE 2% THRESHOLD AND 3-SEAT LIMIT ARE BOTH

CONSTITUTIONAL
● 2% THRESHOLD
○ In imposing the 2% threshold, the Congress wanted to ensure that
only parties w/ sufficient number of constituents deserving are
actually represented in the Congress.
○ This is consistent with the very essence of “representation” and the
intent of the framers.
● 3-SEAT LIMIT
○ In adopting the party-list system, an important consideration is go
encourage a multiparty system of representation.
○ Thus, the Congress set a seat limit to three QUALIFIED parties.
Qualified meaning having hurdled the 2% threshold.
○ This endures the entry of various interest-representation into the
legislature.

ON ISSUE 3:
● The PH party-list system is a unique paradigm w/c semans a unique formula.
 Step by step formula below:
○ Rank all participating parties from highest to lowest based on number
of votes received. Ratio is computed by dividing its votes to the total
votes cast for all parties participating. All parties with at least 2% are
guaranteed 1 seat. ONLY THESE PARTIES SHALL BE
CONSIDERED IN COMPUTING ADDITIONAL SEATS
ALLOCATION.
○ Determine number of seats the first party is entitled to. Depending on
the proportion of its votes relative to the first, the second should
receive less.
○ The other qualified will always be be alloted less than the first
because (1) ratio between them will always be less than 1:1, and (2)
there is no fraction of a seat so rounding off is not applicable.
○ Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
■ Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
————————— = first party relative to
Total votes for. total votes for party-list system
party-list system

○ Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

■ No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party. No. of additional
for concerned = ———————— x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)

● The COMELEC cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within

the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the
wisdom of the act.
● The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should
not be interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this
new system of representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive
indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the
implementation of the system.

Ang Bagong Bayani vs. FACTS:

COMELEC 359 SCRA
698 (2001) 1. On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a
Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be
RIGOR deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the
May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It
also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents
not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed
a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of
herein respondents.
2. On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also
set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, but subsequently reset it to May 3,
2001. During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
3. Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party filed a Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. This
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed
respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five
days from notice.
 4. On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, the Court ordered
the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named
in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of
May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It
added that the COMELEC may proceed with the counting and canvassing of
votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any
winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
SolGen Arguments:
Party-list need not represent marginalized and underrepresented. Any organization can
run for party-list representative. The Court ruled that this is desecration of the party-list
system and of the Constitution.

ISSUE/s:
1. W/N political parties may participate in the party-list elections (yes)
2. W/N the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented'
sectors and organizations. (yes)
3. W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. (no)

RULING: SC REMANDED the case to the COMELEC and DIRECTED to immediately

conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants
in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. The COMELEC is directed to
begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such
number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representative. The Court also
released a Resolution directing the Comelec to refrain from proclaiming any winner
during the last party-list election.

RATIO:
The Court held the following:
I. Political parties may participate in the party-list elections
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be
disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they
are political parties. Section 5 Article VI of the Constitution, provides that
members of the House of Representatives may “be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.”

Section 7 and 8, Article IX of the Constitution, political parties may be

registered under the party-list system.

Section 7. No votes in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition

shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution.

Section 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalition registered under

the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voter’s registration
boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law.

The court cited Commissioner Monsod in this point by reiterating that the
point of these provisions is to open up the system. In this mechanism,
certain groups or parties would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts.

Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides “a party-list system of registered

national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof. Sec 3, on the other hand, expressly states that a “party” is either
“political party or a sectoral party or a coalition parties.”
 Moreover, Section 11 of the same law leaves no doubt as to the
participation of political parties in the party-list system. As it states:
“for purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.”

II. Marginalized and Underrepresented

The requisites character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
provides as follows:

1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than

two hundred and fifty members, unless other fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percentum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filed, as provided by law, by selection or election form the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.

From these provisions, it is then clear that the purpose of the party-list was to
give genuine power to our people in Congress. However, these provisions are
not self-executory. Hence, RA 9471 was enacted with its statutory policy
stated:

SEC 2. Declaration of Policy- The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

The keywords in this policy are “proportional representation,” “marginalized

and underrepresented,” and lack [of] well-defined constituencies.”
Proportional representation- it refers to the representation of the
“marginalized and underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in
Section 5 of the law; namely “labor, peasant, fisherfold, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.” However, the Court ruled that it is important that
party-list and their nominees must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.
“lack of well-defined constituency” refers to the absence of a traditionally
identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial
 unit of government. It points again to those with disparate interests identified
with the “marginalized or underrepresented.”

The intent is still consonant to the principle “to give genuine power to the
people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so
by enabling them to become veritable lawmaker themselves.” The intent of the
policy of the implementing law is likewise clear; it is “to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and
parties…to become members of the House of Representatives.” The
marginalized and underrepresented were enumerated in the law:

Sec 5 of RA 7941
Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a
party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing
with the COMELEC not later than ninety days before the election a petition
verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-
list system as a national, regional, or sectoral party or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC
may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasants, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women
,youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals”
The Court ruled that while the enumeration is not exclusive, the intent of the law that not
all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. A fundamental law of
statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and
the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a
term in statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate
association.

The Court also included in the decision excerpts from the separation opinions of
Justices Vitug and Mendoza. The fundamental principle in constitutional construction is
that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the
language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained;
meaning verba legis prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear
and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of constructions and
interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of
the provision being construed.
Justice Mendoza on his opinion cited the Court’s opinion in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary said that “the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention [may be consulted] I order to arrive at the reason and purpose
of the resulting Constitution…only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in
the constitutional convention ‘are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the construction from what appears upon its face. The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than in the framers’ understanding thereof.

Case at bar, since Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution relative to the party-list
system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by
law. Congress’ enactment of RA 7941 enforces this provision. Therefore, in
understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should look at the
law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of
extraneous aids of construction be resorted to. In the case at bar, the intent and
words are clear, thus there’s no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not
even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, framers’ deliberations merely
 express their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the
meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute. Since the law’s constitutionality is
not questioned here, they must be applied plainly and simply.
Ang Bagong Bayani- FACTS:
OFW Labor party vs.
COMELEC June 2,
2003
PINEDA
*LONG digest and the
case has a lot of data
(numbers & list of party-
lists), so for reference,
you can check the
tables here:
https://cdasiaonline.com
/jurisprudences/3697 &
III. Grave Abuse of Discretion
In its Memorandum, Bayan Muna pleads for the outright disqualification of
the major political parties-Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and
PMP- on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have
been accredited as the five major political parties in the May 14, 2001
elections. The Court, however, rules that this accreditation does not refer
to the party-list election, but to the election of district representatives for
the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers
under Section 26 of RA 7166. Basic rudiments of due process require that
respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify
under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be
deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list
system.
Guidelines for Screening Part-list Participants
1. Political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of
RA 7941.
2. While even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941
and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must
comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling “Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors…to be
elected to the House of Representatives.
3. No religious sect, however, this is limited to religious organization
running as an institution but not to individual running for a position.
What is prohibited is a religious sect running as a political party, but
not a member of a religious sect running for a position.
4. A party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of
RA 7941 which enumerates the grounds for disqualification.
5. The party of organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government.
6. The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 sets the
qualifications of Party-list nominees
7. Not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees.
8. While, party-list has no defined constituency, the nominee must
likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. As what
Senator Jose Lina mentioned, the party nominee, whether national or
regional, is not going to represent a particular district.
● COMELEC’s First Partial Compliance Report
● June 26, 2001, the Court promulgated in these consolidated cases its Decision requiring
COMELEC to do the following:
○ ". . . Immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications
of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this
Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the
last party-list elections, the COMELEC is directed to begin its hearings for the
parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes
as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The COMELEC is
further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days
from notice hereof.
● "The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the COMELEC 'to refrain from
proclaiming any winner' during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after
the COMELEC itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing
disposition.”
the case is confusing
Synopsis (to serve as
a guide for the case)
Bayan Muna filed the
present petitions under
Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, challenging
Omnibus Resolution
No. 37851 issued by the
Commission on
Elections (Comelec) on
March 26, 2001. This
Resolution approved
the participation of 154
organizations and
parties, including those
herein impleaded, in the
2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners seek the
disqualification of
private respondents,
arguing mainly that the
party-list system was
intended to benefit the
marginalized and
underrepresented; not
the mainstream political
parties, the non-
marginalized or
overrepresented.
● July 27, 2001 - COMELEC recommended in its First Partial Compliance Report that:
○ the following party-list participants be deemed to have hurdled the eight-point
guideline referred to in the aforementioned Court Decision:
○ 1. BAYAN MUNA (BAYAN MUNA), 2. AKBAYAN! CITIZENS ACTION PARTY
(AKBAYAN!), 3. LUZON FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL), 4. ANAK MINDANAO
(AMIN), 5. ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,
MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA (ABA), 6. PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA (PM), 7. SANLAKAS
● recommended the disqualification of the following party-list participants for their failure to
pass the guidelines:
○ ….BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG (BUHAY)… COCOFED-PHILIPPINE
COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED)
● In response to this Report, the Court issued 2 resolutions:
○ August 14, 2001 - Partially lifted its May 9, 2001 (TRO). The Court did so to
enable COMELEC to proclaim BAYAN MUNA as the First "winner in the last
party-list election, with the caveat that all proclamations should be made in
accordance not only with the Decision of the Court in the instant case but also
with Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 136781, 136786, and
136795, October 6, 2000, on how to determine and compute the winning
parties and nominees in the party-list elections.”
○ August 24, 2001 - the Court again partially lifted its TRO to enable the
COMELEC to proclaim AKBAYAN and BUTIL "as winning party-list groups…”
● In its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001 - the (OSG), on behalf of the
COMELEC, recommended that — "except for the modification that the APEC, BUHAY,
COCOFED and CIBAC be declared as having complied with the guidelines set forth in
the June 26, 2001 Decision in the instant cases [—] the Partial Compliance Report dated
July 27, 2001 be AFFIRMED."
● But because of (1) the conflicting COMELEC reports regarding the qualifications of
APEC and CIBAC and (2) the disparity in the percentage of votes obtained by AMIN, the
Court in a Resolution dated November 13, 2001, required the parties to file within 20
days from notice their respective final position papers on why APEC, CIBAC, and/or
AMIN should or should not be proclaimed winners in the last party-list elections

The Supreme Court ● January 29, 2002 - the Court agreed to qualify APEC and CIBAC, which had previously
found the petition partly been disqualifIed by COMELEC in its First Compliance Report and lifted once more its
TOR to proclaim the party-lists as winners
meritorious. The Court
remanded the case to ● COMELEC’s Second Partial Compliance Report
the Comelec and
directed the ● August 22, 2001 (received by the Court on the 28th) - COMELEC recommended that
Commission to conduct the following party-list participants be deemed qualified under the Court's guidelines; In
summary evidentiary the same Compliance Report, the poll body classified party-list groups as unqualified:
hearings on the ○ September 27, 2001 - Comelec recommended that the following be
qualifications of the considered as qualifIed party-list participants:
○ Further, the Comelec recommended the disqualification of the following party-
party-list participants.
list groups:
The Court rejected the
submissions of the ● All these Compliance Reports have already been affirmed by this Court except that, in
Comelec and the other regard to the First Compliance Report, it agreed — as earlier stated — to add APEC and
respondents that the CIBAC to the list of qualified groups.
party-list system is,
without any ● Other Significant Orders and Pleadings
qualification, open to all.
● COMELEC motu proprio amended its Compliance Reports by adding four more party-list
According to the Court,
participants (BUHAY, COCOFED, NCIA and BAGONG BAYANI) to the list of qualified
such position does not candidates for the May 14, 2001 elections.
only weaken the
electoral chances of the ● November 15, 2002 - the OSG opined that "Comelec acted correctly in revising its Party-
marginalized and List Canvass Report No. 26, so as to reflect the correct number of votes cast in favor of
underrepresented; it qualifIed party-list parties and organizations."
also prejudices them. It
would gut the substance ● Consequently, it moved to lift our TRO with respect to COCOFED, BUHAY, SANLAKAS
and PM, because "[a]s shown in the revised COMELEC Party-list Canvass Report No.
of the party-list system.
26, movants BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS and PM received 4.25%, 3.35%, 2.21%
Instead of generating and 3.17%, respectively, of the total votes cast in the May 14, 2001 party-list election."
hope, it would create a
mirage. Instead of
enabling the
marginalized, it would
further weaken them
and aggravate their
marginalization. The
Court stressed that the
very reason for the
establishment of the
party-list system is the
fundamental social
justice principle that
those who have less in
life should have more in
law. It was for them that
the party-list system
was enacted — to give
them not only genuine
hope, but genuine
power; to give them the
opportunity to be
elected and to represent
the specific concerns of
their constituencies; and
simply to give them a
direct voice in Congress
and in the larger affairs
of the State. The State
cannot now disappoint
and frustrate them by
disabling and
desecrating this social
justice vehicle. The
Court also laid down
some guidelines to
assist the Comelec in its
work of conducting
summary evidentiary
hearings on the
qualifications of the
party-list participants.
● It added that "the proclamation by the COMELEC of BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS
and PM (as well as all other qualifIed parties and organizations which received at least
2% of the total votes cast in the same party-list election) as winners in the said party-list
is in order."
● However, in its November 25, 2002 Comment, the OSG contended that NCIA, "which is
not a qualifIed party or organization per the Comelec [First] Partial Compliance Report
dated July 27, 2001, cannot be proclaimed as winner in the last party-list elections.” It
also recommended that ABA's Motion to lift the TRO with respect to its proclamation
should be likewise granted, because it is a "qualifIed party or organization that hurdled
the 2% threshold in the last party-list elections. For, ABA received 3.54% of the votes
cast in the said party-list elections, as shown in COMELEC Resolution No. NBC-02-001.
ABA’s proclamation as winner is therefore in order.”
ISSUE:
● 1) Whether Labo v. Comelec, Grego v. Comelec and related cases should be deemed
applicable to the determination of winners in party-list elections [N]
● 2) Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were subsequently disqualifIed
for having failed to meet the eight-point guideline contained in our June 26, 2001
Decision should be deducted from the "total votes cast for the party-list system" during
the said elections [Y]
HELD:
● At the outset, the Court needs to pass upon the claims of the OSG that the initial
recommendation contained in COMELEC’s First Compliance Report (July 27, 2001),
regarding BUHAY and COCOFED should be reconsidered, and that these two party-list
groups should be deemed qualified.
● COMELEC recommended the disqualification of BUHAY for being "most probably merely
an extension of the El Shaddai," a religious group, and COCEFED because it was
allegedly an "adjunct of the government.
● October 15, 2001 - the OSG argued that the above findings of the COMELEC in regard,
inter alia, to BUHAY and COCOFED are "not supported by substantial evidence" and,
thus, “should be modified accordingly." stressed that the Comelec report on BUHAY was
"merely anchored on conjectures or speculations." On COCOFED, the OSG explained
that the bylaws making the chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority an automatic
member of the COCOFED National Board "has already been deleted as early as May,
1988."
● It added that while the primary purposes of COCOFED's Articles of Incorporation
authorize the organization "to help explore and obtain possible technical and financial
assistance for industry development from private or governmental sources . . .," this
statement does not “by itself constitute such substantial evidence to support a
conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded or assisted by the government.”
● This court accept the OSG's position that indeed COMELEC erred in disqualifying
BUHAY and COCOFED. Therefore, adding the two groups to the list of qualified group.
● Legal Effect of the Disqualifications on the “Total Votes Cast”
● The instant Motions for proclamation contend that the disqualifIcation of many party-list
organizations has reduced the "total number of votes cast for the party-list elections."
Because of this reduction, the two-percent benchmark required by law has now been
allegedly attained by movants. Hence, they now pray for their proclamation as winners in
the last party-list elections.
○ Section 11(b) 21 of RA 7941 (the Party-List Act), only those parties garnering a minimum
of two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system are entitled to have a seat in
the House of Representatives.
● The critical question now is this: To determine the "total votes cast for the party-list
system," should the votes tallied for the disqualified candidates be deducted? Otherwise
stated, does the clause “total votes cast for the party-list system" include only those
ballots cast for qualified party-list candidates? To answer this, we need to review related
jurisprudence on the matter.
● Labo and Grego Not Applicable

● In Labo, the Court declared that "the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office.”

● However, "this rule would be different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualifIcation so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety,
would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the
votes cast for a “notoriously disqualified" candidate may be considered "stray" and
excluded from the canvass.
● The foregoing pronouncement was reiterated in Grego, which held that the exception
mentioned in Labo v. Comelec "is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions:
○ (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualifIed; and
○ (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's
disqualifIcation so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but
would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.”

● Note, however, that the foregoing pronouncements were not meant to cover party-list
elections, which are specifIcally governed by RA 7941. Section 10 of this law clearly
provides that the votes cast for a party, a sectoral organization or a coalition “not entitled
to be voted for shall not be counted”, Hence, The language of the law is clear; hence,
there is room, not for interpretation, but merely for application

● Another reason why we cannot apply Labo / Grego is that the present controversy
pertains to the acquisition of a number of congressional seats depending on the total
election results — such that even those garnering second, third, fourth or lesser places
could be proclaimed winners depending on their compliance with other requirements.

● Subtracting the votes garnered by these disqualifIed party-list groups from the total votes
cast under the party-list system will reduce the base figure to 6,523,185. This means that
the two percent threshold can be more easily attained by the qualified marginalized and
underrepresented groups. Hence, disregarding the votes of disqualifIed party-list
participants will increase and broaden the number of representatives from these sectors.
Doing so will further concretize and give flesh to the policy declaration in RA 7941 (Sec.
2)

● Need for Patience and Perseverance

● BAYAN MUNA contends that the deduction of votes obtained by party-list candidates
disqualified after the holding of the party-list elections will result in the instability of the
system.

● For the reason that qualified party-list candidates would be encouraged to seek the
disqualification of the other candidates for the sole purpose of attaining the needed
percentage of the votes cast.

● Court believes that the perceived "instability" can be alleviated because,

○ (1) unlike in the past elections, COMELEC now has the herein qualified and
disqualified participants' list, which can be used for future elections; and
○ (2) in the light of recent jurisprudential developments, COMELEC will now be
guided accordingly when accrediting new candidates for the next party-list
elections and will be able to set the period for accreditation in such time and
manner as to enable it to determine their qualifications long before the
elections are held.

● The formulas devised in Veterans v. COMELEC for computing the number of nominees
that the party-list winners are entitled to cannot be disregarded by the concerned
agencies of government, especially the Commission on Elections.These formulas ensure
that the number of seats allocated to the winning party-list candidates conform to the
principle of proportional representation mandated by the law.

● The Party-List Winners

● In the present cases, the votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of
the total number of votes cast during the May 14, 2001 elections. Consequently,
following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified party-list candidates
is now in order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with the
 total valid votes cast nationwide.

● The votes for these disqualified groups total 8,595,630. Subtracting this figure from
15,118,815 (the total votes cast as reported in the Compliance Reports) will result in a
new total of 6,523,185 valid votes cast for the May 14, 2001 party-list elections.

● This new figure representing the votes cast for the 46 qualified party-list participants will
now be the basis for computing the two-percent threshold for victory and the number of
seats the winners are entitled to

● Remember that the Commission recommended for qualification only 42 party-list

candidates in its three Compliance Reports. To this figure should be added the two
participants we approved in our January 29, 2002 Resolution, plus another two (BUHAY
and COCOFED) Total of 46 qualified candidates

● The Winners and Their Nominees

● Only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at least 2% of the 6,523,185 total valid votes
cast. 2% of this number is 130,464.

● Hence, only those qualified parties that obtained at least 130,464 votes may be declared
winners:
○ BAYAN MUNA, APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL, CIBAC, BUHAY, AMIN, ABA,
COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS, & ABANSE! PINAY

● To determine the number of nominees each winning party is entitled to, in accordance
with the formula in Veterans. For purposes of determining the number of its nominees,
BAYAN MUNA (the party that obtained the highest number of votes) is considered the
first party.

● Formula:
○ Number of votes of first party / Total votes for party list system = Proportion of
votes for party-list system
○ "If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at
least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party
shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of
votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six
percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the
proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any
additional seat.”
○ Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number
of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine
the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties for it would
contravene the proportional representation parameter.

● WHEREFORE, we HOLD that, having obtained at least two percent of the total valid
votes cast in the last party-list elections, the following qualified participants are
DECLARED elected with one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM,
SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY. To enable the Commission on Elections to proclaim
— upon finality of this Resolution — these winners and their respective nominees, we
hereby partially LIFT our Temporary Restraining Order dated May 9, 2001, in regard to
them only. It is made permanent in regard to the rest that did not qualify and win.

Barangay Association FACTS:

for National ● The May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
Advancement and representatives. COMELEC counted 15.9M votes cast for 93 parties under the
Transparency (BANAT) party-list system. On June 2007, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full
vs. COMELEC GR No. Number of Party-List Representatives before the National Board of
179271 April 21, 2009 Canvassers (COMELEC is sitting as the NBC). While the petition was pending,
the NBC issued its first resolution, Reso. No. 07-60, proclaiming 13 parties as
MARASIGAN winners for garnering at least 2% of the total number of votes. Subsequently,
NBC promulgated Reso. No. 07-72 distributing additional seats pursuant to the
Veterans formula granting BUHAY 2 additional seats. BAYAN MUNA, CIBAC,
GABRIELA and APEC receiving 1 additional seat each.
● The NBC finally acted on BANAT’s petition only to dismiss it for being moot
 and academic because COMELEC already ascertained how many seats are to
be allocated to the party-members. After this, COMELEC further proclaimed
AGAP, AMIN and An Waray as those entitled to one seat each. (So by the time
the SC had to decide the case, there were 21 seats already distributed to
party-lists).
● BANAT filed a petition for certiorari as to the dismissal of its petition before
COMELEC. Another petition before the SC was filed by Bayan Muna, et al.
assailing the use of the Veteran’s formula for being violative of the Constitution
and RA 7941.
ISSUES:
● [Issue 1] WoN the 20% allocation for party-list representatives under the
Constitution must be mandatorily filled. — NO.
● [Issue 2] WoN the three-seat limit in RA 7941 constitutional. — YES.
● [Issue 3] WoN the Veteran’s formula in determining how additional seats are
allocated constitutional. — NO.
● [Issue 4] WoN the Constitution prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party list system. — NO.

HELD: WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the

Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as
the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the
two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of
additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure
used… Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections.

[Issue 1 and 2]
● The 20% allocation under the Constitution and RA 7941 is merely a ceiling.
● Following the provisions of the Constitution and RA 79414, it does state that
the ratio of the seats allocated to party-list representatives is 20% of all
members of the HOR including in the total those under the party-list. The Court
did not depart from the first part of the Veteran’s formula, which is dividing the
number of seats available to legislative districts by 0.8 (representing 80% of
HOR) and multiplying the quotient by 0.2 (representing 20% of the HOR) to get
the number of seats available for the party-list representatives. For purposes of
the 14th Congress, there are 55 seats available.
● The Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list
representatives to the legislature. The legislature imposed the cap as to
prevent any party from dominating the elections and this remains valid.
● While it is true that the Constitution and RA 7941 did not mandate that all seats
for the seats allocated for party-list representatives to be filled, the Court
refused to allow the continued existence of a provision of law that will
systematically prevent the any possibility that the 20% cap will be filled.
Therefore, while recognizing that the three-seat is constitutional and valid as to
preventing any party from dominating the elections, the 2% threshold and the
way of allocating additional seats are deemed unconstitutional.

[Issue 3]
● The formula systematically prevents the seats allocated for party-list
representatives from ever being filled.
● At this point of the decision, petitioners never questioned the formula in
determining how many seats are to be allocated for party-list representatives
nor do they question the formula to determine the number of guaranteed seats
to party-lists garnering 2% of the total party-list votes (the formula being, if you
get 2% of the total party- list votes). What they took as an issue was how the
additional seats are to be allocated. BANAT proposed two interpretations:
○ The first interpretation is that the additional seats are to be distributed
by:
Deduct the seats already guaranteed to the total number of seats.
The remainder is to be distributed to those party-lists who reached the
2% threshold and have not secured the maximum number of seats.
This will result to 44 party-list seats occupied.
 ○ The second interpretation assumes that the 2% threshold and the
method of distributing additional seats (pretty much Sec. 11(b) are
declared unconstitutional and just allocate the seats proportionately
as against to the number of seats that the first (place) party already
secured. Under this interpretation, 34 party-list seats become
occupied.

[Issue 4]
● Veterans v. COMELEC insofar as this issue is concerned remains valid.
● The SC lifted a portion of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
concerning Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. In substance, the purpose
of which is to initially provide for sectoral party candidates representation in
Congress. While major parties are allowed to run, they must do so under the
sectoral representatives clause of Sec. 5(2) of Article VI. 
 In light of this issue,
CARPIO’s ponencia states that neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941
prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. In
defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party
or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political
parties will participate in the party-list elections. Too bad for him, he wasn’t
joined by other justices in this opinion.
● However, to further clarify its position, by an 8-7 vote, those in favor of
prohibiting major political parties from running under the party-list system
joined Chief Justice Puno in his separate opinion.

[IMPORTANT!] How is RA 7941 properly applied?

First: determine who are the parties who meet the 2% threshold. If any party receives
2% of the total number of votes in the party-list elections, they are entitled to one seat.
In reference to the PREVIOUS second step, note that the Court categorically stated that
in computing for additional seats, the continued operation of the 2% threshold for the
distribution of additional seats (under the 2nd clause of Sec. 11b) is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL as it will be impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party-list seats if the available number of seats exceeds 50.

In proceeding to the second step, the Court provides the following procedure to be
observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.

This means that in computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer
be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing
for a rounding off of fractional seats.

(IN SHORT: the grant of additional seats is not limited to those who secured the
2% threshold.)
SO WHAT IS CURRENT STEP TWO?
[nakakalito guys]
● Determine how many seats are available. Since 17 parties garnered at least
2% of the votes, therefore 17 seats (1 seat each) are guaranteed to these 17
parties.

Atong Paglaum vs.
COMELEC GR No.
203766 April 2, 2013
MAGSAYSAY
(Guys I put some of the
ConCon’s discussion
because Martin might
ask abt it to test if it was
read in the originals.
You don’t have to print
this naman since he
allows screens in class.)
● Subtract 17 from 55. You get 38. You now have 38 seats to distribute.
● The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining
available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats.
● Assign one seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed.
● Apply the 3-seat cap if necessary in using this formula, the Court arrived at all
55 seats distributed to the parties.
FACTS:
● This involves 54 Petitions for Certiorari & Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by 52 party-list groups & organizations assailing COMELEC resolutions
disqualifying them from from participating in the May 13, 2013 partylist
elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations; Court consolidated these petitions
● Pursuant to RA 7941 (AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM,
AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR) and COMELEC Resolutions
9366 and 9531, around 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their intent to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections
● COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to
grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in the Nat’l Capital Region, but PBB does not represent any
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector; PBB failed to apply for
registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as
an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the “marginalized and
underrepresented”
● These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB,
AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able
to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court
● COMELEC excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the
official ballot for the May 13, 2013 party-list elections
● Pursuant to Res. No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine W/N the grps and orgs that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections have
continually complied with the requirements of RA 7941 & Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani); COMELEC disqualified
39 groups & orgs
● These 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this
Court, directing the COMELEC to include their names (party-list’) in the printing
of the official ballot
● Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
write of preliminary injunction; This Court issues Status Quo Ante Orders in all
petitions
ISSUE:
1. W/N COMELEC committed GADALEJ in disqualifying petitioners from participating in
the May 13, 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new registration under the
party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as
party-list organizations? [No.]
2. W/N the criteria for participating in the part-list system laid down in Banat Ruling
should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming May 13, 2013 party-list elections? [
3. W/N R.A. No. 7941 requires national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" [No.]
HELD: Petitions remanded to COMELEC.
[1 & 2]SC held that COMELEC did not commit GADALEJ in following the prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying the petitioners from participating in the said
elections. HOWEVER, since the Court adopts in this Decision NEW PARAMETERS
in the qualification of nat’l, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list
system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners.
● The party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win
seats in the House of Representatives
● Th voter elects (2) representatives in the HR: one for his/her legislative district,
and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice

[see Sec. 5, Art.VI, Secs. 7 & 8, Art. IX-C]

● Commissioner Christian Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,

stressed that “the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation.” He further explains,
“x x x the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of
the sectors. In making the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited
by Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the
Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves
who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice
in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business,
military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as
"sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach
sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors. And
we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which went up to 14 sectors. And
as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become because when we make
an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise
the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called
“hyphenated citizens.” A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion
of the person to say “I am a farmer” so he would be included in that sector.

The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the Assembly, we
are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by
presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say,
laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then register and present
candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two
votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one
vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented
in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been
registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party,
a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he
wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the
day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization —
one does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a party — and count the votes and
from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the party list
system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out of
these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have to submit these
names because these nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications x x x

At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10
percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women’s party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who
has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who
get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote. It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative
districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that
has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the
National Assembly.It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party
or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any
representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band together,
form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the
dynamics of a party list system.”
-------------------

[3]
● Framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not
only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the
sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.
As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can
participate in the party-list system “For as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.”
● Dissent of Justice Vitug in Ang Bagong Bayani:
+ Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that
 needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats
for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt
their development into full-pledged parties equipped with
electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral
interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other
hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-
moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing
babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more
established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. –– R.A. 7941
recognized this concern when it banned the first five major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first
party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting
with the 2001 elections)
● The framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to
sectoral parties in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve
the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. Thus, in the end, the
proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted
● The party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are
different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not
represent any particular sector.
● Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) defines a “party” as
“either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.” Clearly, a
political party is different from a sectoral party.
● Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a “political party refers to an
organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government.” On the other hand, Section
3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a “sectoral party refers to an organized
group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector.”
● R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other
● R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system
to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” is to deprive and
exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the
party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties,
who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral
process if they are excluded from the party-list system?

Cocofed - Philippine FACTS:

Coconut Producers
Federation Inc. vs. ● Cocofed (Petitioner) an organization whose membership represents an
COMELEC GR No. agricultural sector particularly Coconut farmers.
207026 August 6, 2013 ● May 29, 2012 Cocofed manifested their intent to join the 2013 election as a
partylist candidate before the COMELEC. Thus, Cocofed registered in the
MAGARZO comelec and submitted two names as their nominees.
● November 7, 2012 COMELEC cancelled Cocofed’s registration in this ground:
○ Section 8 of R.A. 79417
■ Partylist group must submit to COMELEC a list of not less
than 5 nominees.
● Cocofed argued that:
○ First, the COMELEC's issuance of the assailed resolution violated its
right to due process because the COMELEC did not even conduct a
summary hearing, as ordered by the Court in Atong Paglaum, to give
it an opportunity to explain and comply with the requirement.
 COCOFED submits that the requirement of submitting the names of
at least five nominees should not be strictly applied "in light of the
nature of party-list representation" which "looks to the party, and not
to the nominees per se."
○ Second, its failure to submit the required number of nominees was
based on the good faith belief that its submission was sufficient for
purposes of the elections and that it could still be remedied since
COCOFED could simply submit the names of its additional two
nominees. COCOFED adds that the number of nominees becomes
significant only "when a party-list organization is able to attain a
sufficient number of votes which would qualify it for a seat in the
House of Representatives."
● Cocofed went to court and prayed for the following:
○ Annulling and setting aside the Comelec’s assailed desicion;
○ Declaring Cocofed to be eligible to participate in the Party list system
representation in the 2013 election;
○ Ordering the Comelec to count and tally the votes garnered by
Cocofed.
● Election took place, Cocofed was included in the ballot since the ballots are
printed already long time ago.
● Comelec argued that it is Moot since Cocofed only garnered 0.36% of the
Votes (2% is needed to win a seat)

ISSUE:

● W/N the case is moot. - NO

● W/N the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it cancelled Cocofed’s
registration. - NO

HELD:

● The court held that it is not moot:

○ Under Section 4 of RA No. 7941, a party-list group already registered
"need not register anew" for purposes of every subsequent election,
but only needs to file a manifestation of intent to participate with the
COMELEC. These two acts are different from each other.
If it happens that the court sided with Cocofed, even though the lost
the 2013 election, their registration may be valid for the upcoming for
the upcoming elections after 2013

● The Comelec didn’t commit grave abuse of discretion:

○ The law expressly requires the submission of a list containing at least
five qualified nominees. Section 8 of RA No. 7941 reads:

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered

party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later
than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in
case it obtains the required number of votes.

The language of the law is clear. Comelec just interpreted the

law.

● The case of Atong Paglaum is not applicable

In Atong (Nominee), the court ruled that a disqualification of a

nominee doesn’t mean a disqualification of the whole partylist,
provided that at least one nominee is qualified.

Cocofed’s issue is its failure to comply with the registration

requirements.
Abang Lingkod Party Facts:
List vs. Comelec GR ● ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of
No. 206952 October 22, peasant fanners and fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system
2013 on December 22, 2009. It participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to
obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in the House of Representatives.
JIZ ● On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its
intent to participate in the May 2013 elections. On August 2, 2012, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513,2 which, inter alia required previously
registered party-list groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of
Intent to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining
their continuing compliance with the requirements under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 79413 and the guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. COMELEC.4
● Accordingly, on August 9 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution, which set
the summary evidentiary hearing of previously registered party-list groups. The
COMELEC scheduled three (3) dates -August 17, 31 and September 3, 2012 -
for the summary hearing of ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent to
enable it to show proof of its continuing qualification under the party-list
system.
● On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC's
August 9, 2012 Resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to
prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.
● After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Bane in a Resolution dated
November 7 2012, cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a partylist
group. The COMELEC En Bane pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to
establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and
underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged activities
it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bane further
opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves
marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in
activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
● ABANG LINGKOD then filed with this Court a petition5 for certiorari alleging
that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration
under the party-list system. The said petition was consolidated with the
separate petitions filed by fifty-one (51) other party-list groups whose
registration were cancelled or who were denied registration under the party-list
system. The said party-list groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to
obtain status quo ante orders from this Court.
● On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v. Commission on
Elections,6 laid down new parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in
screening parties, organizations or associations seeking registration and/or
accreditation under the party-list system, viz:
● 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
○ xxx 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized
and underrepresented or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth.
○ 5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the ''marginalized and underrepresented must belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.
 Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties
or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record or advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
○ 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
● Thus, the Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered
party-list groups, including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether
they are qualified under the party-list system pursuant to the new parameters
laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed to participate in the
May 2013 party-list elections.
● On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution,7
which, inter alia affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration
under the party-list system. The COMELEC issued the Resolution dated May
10, 2013 sans any summary evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the
May 13 2013 elections as the reason therefor.
● In maintaining the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration, the
COMELEC held that:
● The Commission maintains its position in the previous en bane ruling
cancelling the registration of ABANG LINGKOD. To reiterate, it is not enough
that the party-list organization claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented because representation is easy to claim and to feign. It is
but reasonable to require from groups and organizations consistent
participation and advocacy in the sector it seeks to represent, and not just
seasonal and sporadic programs which are unrelated to its sector.
● ABANG LINGKOD submitted pictures showing a seminar held on 10 July
2010, Medical Mission on 11 November 2010, Disaster Management Training
on 21 October 2011, Book-giving on 28 June 2011, and Medical Mission on 1
December 2011.
● And as if to insult the Commission, the photographs submitted appear to have
been edited to show in the banners that ABANG LINGKOD participated in the
activities. ABANG LINGKOD's name and logo was superimposed on some
banners to feign participation in the activities (Joint Medical Mission, Book-
giving).
● Under the party-list System Act, a group’s registration may be cancelled for
declaring unlawful statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to
establish a fact that did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful
statements. It is on this ground that the Commission cancels ABANG
LINGKOD s registration.8
● On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the
COMELEC s Resolution dated May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013,
ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion for reconsideration it filed with the
COMELEC and, instead, instituted the instant petition9 with this Court, alleging
that there may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon the merits
of its motion for reconsideration considering that the election returns were
already being canvassed and consolidated by the COMELEC.
● In support of the instant petition, ABANG LINGKOD claims that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the cancellation of its registration
sans a summary evidentiary hearing for that purpose, asserting that the
COMELEC should have allowed it to present evidence to prove its qualification
as a party-list group pursuant to Atong Paglaum. It claims that there was no
valid justification for the COMELEC to cancel its registration considering that it
complied with the six-point parameters m screening party-list groups laid down
in Atong Paglaum.
 ● On the other hand, the COMELEC avers that the instant petition should be
dismissed for utter lack of merit. It asserts that ABANG LINGKOD was not
denied due process when the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of its
registration since it was given every reasonable opportunity to be heard. The
COMELEC further claims that it did not abuse its discretion when it cancelled
ABANG LINGKOD’s registration on the ground that it failed to establish a track
record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Further, the
COMELEC alleges that its finding of facts may not be passed upon by this
Court as the same is supported by substantial evidence.

Issue:
● WON ABANG LINGKOD fulfilled all the requirements for registration as a
sectoral party-list group (YES)

Held:
● Representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only required of
sectoral organizations that represent the sectors stated under Section 5 of R.A.
No. 7941 that are, by their nature, economically marginalized and
underrepresented. However, was no mention that sectoral organizations
intending to participate in the party-list elections are still required to present a
track record.
● Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies'' include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
● Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as
ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing
their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to
further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that
their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented
by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent.
● If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do
not factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization.
● The digitally altered photographs of activities submitted by ABANG
LINGKOD to prove its continuing qualification under R.A. No. 7941 only
pertain to its track record, which, as already discussed, is no longer a
requirement under the new parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum.
Simply put, they do not affect the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD as a
party-list group and, hence, could not be used as a ground to cancel its
registration under the party-list system. Further, the Court notes that the
COMELEC, in its Resolution dated November 7 2012, asserted that ABANG
LINGKOD failed to adduce evidence that would show the track record of
its five nominees, composed of a non-government organization worker,
an employee and three farmers, in uplifting the cause of the sector that
the group represents. The COMELEC opined that the failure of ABANG
LINGKOD to present a track record of its nominees justified the
cancellation of its registration as a party-list group.
● The nominee of a party-list groups may either be: first one who actually
belongs to the sector which the party-list group represents, in which
case the track record requirement does not apply; or second one who does
not actually belong to the sector which the party-list group represents but has a
track record showing the nominee's active participation in activities aimed at
uplifting the cause of the sector which the group represents."
 ● Three of the five nominees of ABANG LINGKOD are farmers and, thus,
are not required to present a track record showing their active
participation in activities aimed to promote the sector which ABANG
LINGKOD represents, i.e. peasant farmers and fisherfolk. That two of
ABANG LINGKOD's nominees do not actually belong to the sector it
represents is immaterial and would not result in the cancellation of
ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. This is clear from
the sixth parameter laid down by the Court in tong Paglaum which states
that "national, regional and sectoral organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified." At the very least,
ABANG LINGKOD has three (3) qualified nominees, being farmers by
occupation.

c. Privilege from Arrest

People v. Jalosjos, 324 FACTS:

SCRA 689 (2000) Accused Jalosjos, a full fledged member of Congress, has a pending appeal on his two
counts of rape and 6 counts of acts of lasciviousness. He is appealing to be allowed to
fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
GONZALES
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense, while confined in the national penitentiary.
Filed/convicted in 1996.
Won as legislator in Filed on the grounds that:
1997. He won while in 1. Accused-appellants reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be
detention because the rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest not even the police
crime he was alleged of power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without
committing, is a non
representation.
bailable crime. Thus, his 3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his
petition of him asking suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to him by the people.
the Court to allow him to 4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be
attend the sessions of heard.
the House. He invokes 5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of
privilege of arrest and the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-
argues on the basis of
equal branch of government to respect its mandate.
popular sovereignty and 7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-
the need for his appellant to discharge his mandate.
constituents to be 8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed
represented. to leave jail.

Primary argument: Mandate of sovereign will

○ the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte
chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-
elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions
of a Congressman
○ He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the
intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by
insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

ISSUE:
WON membership in Congress exempts an accused from statues and rules which apply
to validly incarcerated persons in general - NO

HELD:
Court’s basis/legal background:
● all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to
the majesty of law.
a. misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high
 government office, by itself, frees the official from the common
restraints of general law.
b. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a
position.
c. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of
obedience rather than exemption.
● immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises
from a provision of the Constitution.
a. privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
b. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms.
c. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.

● 1935 Constitution (Sec. 15) provided that Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
Congress, and in going to and returning from the same.
a. exemption applied only to civil arrests
b. Any Congressman being convicted under Title 11 of the RPC, could
not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the
same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose
convictions were pending appeal.
● 1973 Constitution (Article 8, Sec. 9) provided that A Member of the Batasang
Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions
and in going to and returning from the same.
● 1987 Constitution, adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of
Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has
also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is
in session.

● On accused’s argument that a member of Congress function to attend

sessions
a. has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution
b. members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations.

● The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. (Aguinaldo v. Santos)
a. Case at bar, does not apply to imprisonment arising from the
enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal from position. He was still a
Congressman.

● One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final

conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as
an example and warning to others.
a. it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to
redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the
Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus
subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding. (United
States v. Gustilo)

● Accused argues that he plea of the electorate which voted him into office
 cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual
punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular
place of confinement
a. Should be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants arrest
was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his
colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the
sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities.
b. can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being
contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a
mockery of the aims of the States penal system.

● Accused argues that he was allowed to temporarily leave his cell on several
occasions for official or medical reasons
i. To attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the
Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to
expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;
ii. to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his
dentist in Makati City;
iii. to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical
Center, Makati City;
iv. to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case,
accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and private
vehicle.
v. to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program"
vi. to continue with his dental treatment
vii. to be confined at the Makati Medical Center
b. However his reasons do not show that they are related to him as a
member of Congress.
c. What he seeks is not of an emergency nature
i. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week
will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position.
ii. elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class,
it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system
● Accused argues that his detention did not stop him from rendering his duty as
Congressman
a. He had still been discharging his mandate as Congressman with the
restrains upon one who is presently under detention
i. He was also provided an office in the New Bilibid Prison where he
attend to his constituents
ii. While under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions
iii. He had been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits
b. As a detainee, he should not even have been allowed by the
prison authorities to perform these acts.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
● There are 250 members in the HOR and 24 members in the Senate
● Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of
its members.
● The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Imprisonment - restraint of a man’s personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person

to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion, it is restraint by judgment of a
court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused. detention of another against his
 will depriving him of his power of locomotion and it "[is] something more than mere loss
of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior
barrier."

a. Privilege of Speech

Jimenez v. FACTS:
Cabangbang, G.R. No. ● An ordinary civil action for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez,
L-15905,, August 3, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of
damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant
1966
Bartolome Cabangbang.
● Cabangbang moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in
DE MESA question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication.
● At the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that
pursuant to the Constitution:.

"The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not
be questioned in any other place."

● Letter in Question : "In the light of recent developments which however

unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the unfair attacks against the duly elected Members of Congress of engaging
in intriguing and rumor mongering, allow me. Your Excellency, to address this
open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the
present circumstances, feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose.

"It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational
plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of
some civilian political strategists.

It is reported that the 'Planners' have under their control the following: (1) Col.
Nicanor Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI. (3) Capt. Carlos
Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS, (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala
of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the
Public Information Office, DND. To insure this control, the 'Planners'
purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS. to Europe to study and while
Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also seat Lt.
Col. Deogracias Caballero, chief of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to
USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col.
Jose Regala. The 'Planners' wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Gelvezon. Chief
of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Gelvezon, is considered a missing link in the
intelligence Network. It is, of course, possible that the officers mentioned
above are unwittingly tools of the Plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge."

ISSUE:
(1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication[NO];
and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.[NO]
HELD:
● The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the
aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or
debate therein" — that is to say in Congress — used in this provision.
● Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements
made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as

Antonino v. Valencia, FACTS:
G.R. No. L-26526, May
27, 1974
BERNARDO (Also a bit
long. I can’t remove any
more content without
losing the context.)
Summary:
Plaintiff said Defendant
“double crossed” the LP
and sabotaged the
well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and
other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as
members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in
question.
● The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category.
According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the
Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in
session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date.
● It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he
was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as
officer of any Committee thereof.
● [Libel not sure if important putting it for safety]We are satisfied that the letter in
question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the
letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein
alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary
Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano
clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course
possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge".
● In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based
explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged
operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners.
● We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs to the point of
entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our
Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary
of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question
seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these
two (2) high ranking officers.
● It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written
by the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach
plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and
ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are
mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and
cannot prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint.
● Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is
false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged
plan to stage a coup d'état or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners".
● Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that
plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d'état, for, otherwise,
they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said
"planners".
● This case arose as an aftermath of the November 1963 local elections when
the official candidate of the Liberal Party (Lorenzo Sarmiento) for governor in
Davao lost to the Nacionalista Party standard bearer (Vicente Duterte), and
plaintiff Gaudencio E. Antonino then a senator of the Republic and LP head
in that province attributed the loss of the LP candidate to the support given by
defendant Brigido R. Valencia then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications to the independent LP candidate (Constancio Maglana)
which divided the LP votes.
● In public statements widely quoted in the metropolitan newspapers, plaintiff
stated that had not defendant "sabotaged" and "double-crossed" the LP,
its official candidate would have won the election.
● The cordial relations between the two LP leaders which had begun since their
student days in the U.P. College of Engineering became strained. In the
Taliba issue of December 21, 1963, it was reported that plaintiff would file
unrevealed administrative charges against defendant with the Senate Blue
election of one of the
main candidates by
supporting another
independent LP
candidate.
Plaintiff said he would
file charges against
Defendant for
suspicious transactions
while head of Public
Works and
Communications
(DPWH today) at the
Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee
Defendant released a
really (savage) strongly-
worded press release
stating that Plaintiff was
abusing his power as a
Senator (as stated in (a
to f)
Plaintiff filed for
damages against
Defendant for that and
won.
The reasoning was the
press release was not
covered by privilege of
speech or
communications
because it was really
just in retaliation against
the Plaintiff and he
could have filed the
complaints in the
Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee instead of
airing it out to the public
to attack Plaintiff’s
character. (It was front
page news in multiple
newspapers)
Also, the accusation of
“sabotage” and “double-
crossing” was not
considered libelous by
the Supreme Court
Ribbon Committee.
● On February 28, 1964, while plaintiff was still convalescing in the hospital
from a heart attack on January 27, 1964 while attending a Senate session, he
filed a formal request with the said Senate committee to investigate the
actions of defendant as Secretary of Public Works and Communications in
connection with certain specified alleged anomalous acquisitions of public
works supplies and equipment.
● March 5, 1964, a two-page press release was issued by the office of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications (defendant), Exhibit A,
and the contents thereof were published or reported on the front pages of the
six metropolitan papers. (I’ll put the actual things he said for context, really
heated stuff)
a. Since Senator Antonino has stubbornly continued telling lies about
me, I have no recourse but start telling the truth about him
b. This is no play of words and in due time I will file charges against the
Senator before the Blue Ribbon Committee for reportedly anomalous
acts that can make him a disgrace to his Senate position;
c. ...for personal selfish reasons, Antonino had taken advantage of his
position as a member of the Monetary Board and even as a Senator
d. Antonino `had suspicious connections with no less than 22
corporations when he became a member of the Monetary Board
e. Is it not the height of abuse of power to threaten an American with
deportation and make him cover from getting a concession because
you are a Senator of the Philippines and in the end you get the
concession yourself? and
f. I cannot avoid unmasking certain alleged high anomalous activities of
the Senator as a member of the Monetary Board and as a member of
the Philippine Senate."
● Plaintiff then filed on March 23, 1964 the present civil action in the Manila
court of first instance for the recovery against defendant of P1 million as moral
damages, P100,000 as exemplary or corrective damages and P50,000 as
litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
● Defendant claimed in his answer that he did not issue or cause the
publication of the press release; that at any rate, they were made in good
faith and in self-defense and that they were qualifiedly privileged in
character.
● After due trial, the lower court ruled against defendant, holding that
defendant caused and was liable for the issuance of the libelous press release
and its publication in the papers and rejected his defenses of qualified privilege
and defensive libel.
● Hence this direct appeal to this Court under the provisions of the Judiciary Act
then in force as the amount involved was more than P200,000.4 During the
course of the appeal, plaintiff died in a plane crash on November 13, 1967 on
the eve of the 1967 elections.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in finding that the press release was issued by the defendant
[N]
W/N the trial court erred in finding the press release libelous and not protected as
a qualified privilege communication [N]
HELD:
Issue #1
● On the question of fact, the Court finds that no error was committed by the trial
court in finding that the press release, Exhibit A, issued by the office of
defendant as Secretary of Public Works and Communications was issued or
caused to be issued by him and the contents thereof to be published in the
metropolitan press.
● The preponderance of the evidence of record, documentary and circumstantial,
because according to
them the terms don’t
carry stigma (because
politicians do it all the
time) and because
Manuel Quezon also Issue #2
said “his loyalty to the
party ends where his
loyalty to the country
begins” which they
considered as
condoning that.
as marshalled by the trial court in its decision clearly supports its finding of
liability on defendant's part for the issuance and publication of the offending
press release. (There were a lot of evidence implicating him and showing that
it it came from him: answering plaintiff’s accusations point by point, referring to
himself, etc.)
● There can be no serious question as to the defamatory and libelous
nature of the statements in defendant's press release which depicted
plaintiff as a consistent liar; that he prostituted his high public offices as
monetary board member and senator for personal ends and pecuniary gains;
and imputed to him the commission of certain serious offenses in violation of
the Constitution and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
● As defendant's imputations against plaintiff were not made privately nor
officially as to be qualifiedly privilege under Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code, the trial court correctly held that by virtue of their defamatory and
libelous nature against the honor, integrity and reputation of plaintiff, malice in
law was presumed.
● It further correctly ruled that defendant had not overcome such
presumption of malice, not having shown the truth thereof, or that they were
published with good intentions and with justifiable motive or even from the
most liberal standpoint that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair
comment on the character, good faith, ability and sincerity of public officials.
● The trial court aptly observed that "(A)t the time of the publication of the
defamatory imputation, the plaintiff was not a candidate for any public
office there being no election to be held and his term of office as Senator
would not expire until several years more. As a member of the Senate of
the Philippines, he was answerable to said body for any misconduct committed
as a Senator because it had the authority to take disciplinary action against
any member thereof.
● Had the defendant been prompted by a sense of duty, and not because of
malice, the charge at least with respect to the alleged threat made against an
American, should have been filed with the Senate or any of its
Committees.
● The defendant did not do so but instead made the accusations publicly
by causing them to be given widest publication by all the metropolitan
newspapers, obviously in retaliation to the charge filed against him by the
plaintiff with the Blue Ribbon. Committee of the Senate.
● The trial court likewise properly rejected defendant-appellant's claim of
defensive libel thus: "(S)tress had also been laid by the defendant on the
argument that he had been libeled by the plaintiff and accordingly the former
was justified to hit back with another libel.
● The emphasis laid had been misplaced and based upon a wrong premise. The
defendant was charged with the commission of certain anomalous
transactions in his capacity as Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and the same were filed with the Investigation Committee
(Blue Ribbon) of the Senate of the Philippines and the Commission on
Appointments.
● Accordingly, the said charges, even assuming that they contain defamatory
imputation, would not be libelous because the letter sent by the plaintiff
was a privileged communication.
● As to defendant's counterclaim, the Court finds that the record amply
supports the trial court's finding that there was no evidence, direct or
circumstantial, to hold plaintiff liable for the publication in the metropolitan
press of his charges against defendant with the Blue Ribbon Committee and
the Commission on Appointments, — which were at any rate qualifiedly
privileged.
● Furthermore, the trial court had aptly observed that it was doubtful whether
 plaintiff's charges against defendant of political "sabotage" and "double-
crossing" could be held to be defamatory or libelous, since "(A) review of
contemporary politics in our country tends to show that no stigma of disgrace
or disrepute befalls one who changes political parties.

Pobre v. Defensor- FACTS:

Santiago, A.C. ● Antero Pobre (PET) wrote a sworn letter/complaint against the speech of Sen.
Miriam Santiago’s (RESP) speech. To PET, statements reflected a total
disrespect to Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the
No. 7399, 25 August
Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
2009. ○ . . . I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I
ABASTILLAS am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in
a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I
am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not
in the Supreme Court of idiots . . .
● PET asks for RESP’s disbarment or other disciplinary actions to be taken
against her
● RESP replied, she did not deny the statements but explained that those
statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary
immunity, and it’s part of her duty as member of Congress or its committee,
that the purpose of her speech was to bring out open controversial anomalies
in governance with a view to future remedial legislation; she wanted to expose
unjust act of the JBC
● ART VI Sec 11 of the CONST
○ "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof"

ISSUE:
● W/N RESP should be disbarred or should take disciplinary actions

HELD:
● No, her speech is in conformity to Art VI, Sec 11 of the CONST
● Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would
degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to
the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge's speculation as to
the motives.
● Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner
they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee
rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of
the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege
● No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts
should be allowed to erode the people's faith in the judiciary. In this case,
the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
■ Canon 8, Rule 8.01. –– A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
■ Canon 11. –– A lawyer shall observe and maintain
 the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
○ She alleges delivered her privilege speech as a prelude
to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This
allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the
insulting tenor of what she said.
○ Her remarks were outside the pale of her official
parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity
must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule,
demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its
magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.
Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is
not an individual privilege accorded the individual
members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal
benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people
and the institution that represents them.
● The Court should re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to
respect courts of justice, and remind her anew that the parliamentary
non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not
to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to
enable them, as the people's representatives, to perform the
functions of their office without fear of being made responsible
before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall
● RESP was not called to order by the Senate President on her
unparliamentary remarks; her peers bent backwards and avoided
imposing their own rules on her
● Court agrees to RESP when she said that disciplinary proceedings
must be undertaken solely for the public welfare; that PET failed to
prove that she in fact made the statements, that although she has
not categorically denied making such statements, she has
unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech.
Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.

b. Prohibitions

Puyat v. De Guzman, FACTS:

113 SCRA 31 (1982) · On May 14, 1979, eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries
Corporation (IPI) were elected. These are:
VILLAVIRAY
Eugenio Puyat
Erwin Chiongbian
Edgardo Reyes
Antonio Puyat
Jaime Blanco
Rafael Recto

Eustaquio Acero
R.G. Vildzius
Enrique Belo
Servillano Dolina
Juanito Mercado

The first group may be called the Puyat group while the following group is the Acero
group. Because of their number, the Puyat group will be in control of the Board and of
the management of IPI.
· On May 25, 1979, the Acero group filed a quo warranto case at the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), questioning the election on May 14, 1979
· The Puyat group claims that in a conference with SEC Commissioner de
Guzman, Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, entered his appearance as the counsel of respondent Acero to which
 the Puyat group objected on Constitutional grounds.
· Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no
Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and
SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did nit continue his
appearance for Mr. Acero.
· On May 31, 1979, Assemblyman Fernandez filed an Urgent Motion for
Intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest, a
day after his purchase of such shares
· On July 17, 1979, SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez's
ownership of 10 shares. It is this order which is the subject of certiorari and
prohibition.
· On July 3, 1979, Edgardo Reyes instituted a case before the CFI Rizal against
N.V. Verenigde Excelsior. Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for
Excelsior. The Court ruled that Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a case
originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the Court would be
one "without appellate jurisdiction."
· On Sept. 4, 1979, the Court En Banc issued a TRO enjoining SEC Associate
Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor of respondent
Fernandez at the SEC case

ISSUE: W/N in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect,
appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of
the Constitution.

HELD: YES. the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls
within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution
· Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Consti provides that " No Member of the Batasang
Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction;
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party; or in any criminal case
wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office; or before any administrative body; Neither
shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, during his term of office; He shall not accept employment to intervene
in any cause or matter where he may be called to act on account of his office."
· He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares
out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that, on May
30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo
warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the
scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And before he
moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for
respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero,but which was objected to by petitioners.
Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene"
on the ground of legal interest. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the
Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant
Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
· The Court found that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before
... an administrative body" and that is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively
in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose to
enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an
unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear
as counsel indirectly.
· A ruling upholding the intervention would make the constitutional provision
ineffective. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by
indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the
objects specifically or impliedly prohibited
Liban v. Gordon, G.R. FACTS:
No. 175352, July 15,
2009 ● Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari filed
with the Supreme Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having
Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of
TAONGAN Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman
of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.

● During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,

he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting
of the PNRC Board of Governors.

● Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of

Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided
in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:

○ SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives

may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected.

● Camporedondo v. NLRC - cited by Petitioners, Court held that PNRC is a

government-owned or controlled corporation.'

● Flores v. Drilon - held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective
posts upon their appointment to another government office.

● Respondent Gordon asserts that:

○ petitioners have no standing to file this petition which appears to be
an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent
committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for
forfeiture of his public office.
○ Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only a
person claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully
held by another may bring an action for quo warranto in his own
name.
○ Petitioners already barred by prescription since the action should be
commenced within one year after the cause of the public officers
forfeiture of office; Petitioner has already been working as Red Cross
Volunteer for 40 years, Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors
since he was elected Senator in May 2004
○ PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation and that
the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does
not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is
neither an office nor an employment.
ISSUE:
Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section
13, Article VI of the Constitution. - NO

HELD:

(1) Petitioners have no legal standing in this Quo Warranto action.

● Under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court;

○ Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the

usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced
 by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines against:

■ (a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or

exercises a public office, position or franchise;

■ (b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by

provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his
office; or

■ (c) An association which acts as a corporation within the

Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)

● Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party

plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual
may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office
allegedly usurped by another. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to
be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no
standing to file the present petition.

(2) PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions.

● Republic Act No. 95 otherwise known as the PNRC Charter was signed by
Pres. Manuel Roxas on March 22, 1947. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-
funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely,
effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable
without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or
political affiliation.

● The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions,

established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose
contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929.

● The Movement is united and guided by its seven Fundamental Principles: (3 &
4 emphasized)

○ 3. NEUTRALITY In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all,

the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time
in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

○ 4. INDEPENDENCE The Movement is independent. The National

Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their
governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries,
must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all
times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.

● The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to
uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be
recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must
operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.

● The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring

belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts,
the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed
conflict. In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a
Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned
or controlled, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as
government personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the
insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the
volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in
 conflict areas.

● The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency that implements

government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot
effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross Society. It is
imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in
relation to the State.

● The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any
appropriation from the Philippine Congress.

● The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and

private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board
of Governors, as provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter:

○ SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine

National Red Cross shall be financed primarily by contributions
obtained through solicitation campaigns throughout the year which
shall be organized by the Board of Governors and conducted by the
Chapters in their respective jurisdictions. These fund raising
campaigns shall be conducted independently of other fund drives by
other organizations.

● The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as
amended, only six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors are
appointed by the President of the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four members, or
four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors are not appointed by the
President. Section 6 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, provides:

○ SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a

Board of Governors composed of thirty members, six of whom shall
be appointed by the President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be
elected by chapter delegates in biennial conventions and the
remaining six shall be selected by the twenty-four members of the
Board already chosen. x x x.

● The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate powers of the
PNRC, elects the PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC. The
incumbent Chairman of PNRC, respondent Senator Gordon, was elected, as
all PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled PNRC Board
four-fifths of whom are private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC
Chairman is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government
official.

● The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the
head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC
Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious
conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the
PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.

● Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises
control over all government offices in the Executive branch. If an office is
legally not under the control of the President, then such office is not part of the
Executive branch.

● An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector

individuals elected to the PNRC Board by the private sector members of the
 PNRC. The President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the
PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or
actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse
or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again
that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a government
office.

● The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of
the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students.
Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of
the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one
between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon
contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year.

● Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run
charitable organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation.

● The Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a government-

owned or controlled corporation as provided under Section 2(13) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987:

● SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x

○ (13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any

agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary
in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of
stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its
capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled
corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the
Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit
for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers,
functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.
(PNRC does not fall under this definition)

(3) The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the
Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law.

● The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created
by special charter. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as amended,
reads:

○ SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for
the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations,
unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government
or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.

● The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar provisions

prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by general law.
Section 1 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, creates the PNRC as a body
corporate and politic, thus:

○ SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the

Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the voluntary
organization officially designated to assist the Republic of the
Philippines in discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva
Conventions and to perform such other duties as are inherent upon a
National Red Cross Society. The national headquarters of this
Corporation shall be located in Metropolitan Manila.
Feliciano v. Commission on Audit - the Court explained the constitutional provision
prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations in this wise:

Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the
common good and subject to the test of economic viability."

The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by

general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to
ban private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain
individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.

Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such
legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a
general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law.

In Feliciano, the Court held that the Local Water Districts are government-owned or
controlled corporations since they exist by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198, which
constitutes their special charter. The seed capital assets of the Local Water Districts,
such as waterworks and sewerage facilities, were public property which were managed,
operated by or under the control of the city, municipality or province before the assets
were transferred to the Local Water Districts.There is no private capital invested in the
Local Water Districts. The capital assets and operating funds of the Local Water
Districts all come from the government, either through transfer of assets, loans,
subsidies or the income from such assets or funds. The government also controls the
Local Water Districts because the municipal or city mayor, or the provincial governor,
appoints all the board directors of the Local Water Districts.

Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created through a special charter.
However, unlike the Local Water Districts, the elements of government ownership and
control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the PNRC is created by a
special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation
in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In
creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private
corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private
corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable
corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a
private corporation and grants it corporate powers, is void for being unconstitutional.
Thus, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the PNRC Charter, as
amended, are void.

The other provisions of the PNRC Charter remain valid as they can be considered as a
recognition by the State that the unincorporated PNRC is the local National Society of
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and thus entitled to the
benefits, exemptions and privileges set forth in the PNRC Charter.

The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a

government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section
13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar
as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the
Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants
to be a private corporation.
ORGANIZATION OF THE LEGISLATURE
A. Composition

Chavez v. Judicial and FACTS:

Bar Council, G.R. No. ● This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor
202242, 17 July 2012. General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed by
the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).
SAYUNO ● July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing
the same in the following manner:
○ WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical
composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance
with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition
is immediately executory.
● July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and with due
regard to Senate Resolution Nos. 111, 112, 113, and 114, the Court set the
subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012. On August 3, 2012, the
Court discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to
suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the
July 17, 2012 Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory. The
decretal portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution reads:
○ WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their
respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from notice. Until
further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Court’s July 17, 2012
Decision, which reads: "This disposition is immediately executory.
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their
respective memoranda.
● In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine
Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always
been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the
government.
● Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos Constitution and the
1935 Constitution vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in
the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
● It was during these times that the country became witness to the deplorable
practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary
to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body.
● Then, under the 1973 Constitution, with the fusion of the executive and
legislative powers in one body, the appointment of judges and justices ceased
to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power became exclusive and
absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that the appointees
must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
● The members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the
President.
● It conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The
Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this
wise:
○ Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as
ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
 Court, and a representative of the private sector.
● From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1)
representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1)
representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but
alternately or by rotation.
● In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.
An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half
(1/2) of a vote.
● In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the
Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. It has been the
situation since then.
● Respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the
petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from
Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature;
2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there
was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two
representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers
to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the
Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide a solution
should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.
ISSUE:
● Whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC. (NO)
● Whether the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of
Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution. (NO)
HELD:
● The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex (the safety
of the people should be the supreme law) to be the ultimate expression of the
principles and the framework upon which government and society were to
operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court
firmly relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The
language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately
chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must
be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate
against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says,
according to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the
branch tasked to interpret it.
● For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in
order to justify constitutional construction.
● As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a"
to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the
Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC.
Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain
terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
● A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were
indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is
Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election shall
be broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately." Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to
replace the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately." Similarly, under Section 18,
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting
separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members." In all these
provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the
corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled
and voted upon by its two Houses.
● Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by
sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the
 legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain
oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the
Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional
representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary
function – to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to
appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a
contributory non-legislative function.
● “To allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote
each, is to negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.” - Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, from the Second District of Maguindanao
● “Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation
of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of politics in Congress in the
appointment of judges, and the understanding is that seven (7) persons will
compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two votes for Congress runs
counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives
Congress more influence in the appointment of judges. Also, two votes for
Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could
lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear
violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution.” (Emphases and
underscoring supplied) - then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing
● No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the
JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI
and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in
relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is
constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its
representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of legislative and
constituent powers requires the Senate and the House of Representatives to
coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress’ role under our
constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the
separateness of the two Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such
dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal
branches of government.
● It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental
branches to assign the same weight to considerations that any of its
representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The
representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as such
for one branch and should not have any more quantitative influence as the
other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the
three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three branches
support this conclusion.
● The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of
Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any
member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of
Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an
absurdity.
● This score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is
entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme
of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives of
Congress.
● It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has
more influence over the JBC simply because all of the regular members of the
JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and balances is still
safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members of the JBC is
subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, which is composed of members of Congress.
● It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of
 operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair
play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil
Corporation:
● The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies
as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality
will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done
by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
● Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case
and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current
composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
● Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was
ratified by the direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what
respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in
the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into the
law something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as
correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the
Court action of making amendment to the Constitution through a judicial
pronouncement.
● The Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of
casus omissus "a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted." "The
principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object
or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration." Pursuant to this,
"the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the omission even
though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case
in question was not foreseen or contemplated." "The Court cannot supply what
it thinks the legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the
omission, as that would be judicial legislation."
● The Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction

Social Justice Society v. FACTS:

Dangerous Drugs ● Challenged section of RA 9165: Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
Board, G.R. No. requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
157870, 3
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain
November 2008. offenses.

SANTOS ○ SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be
done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test
which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening
test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary

and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and
regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or
 overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as
contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt
with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or
termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code
and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxx xxx xxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than
six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both
in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug
test.

● This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R. No.

158633) and Pimentel vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658).

Pimentel vs COMELEC
● December 2003 - COMELEC issued Resolution prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
● Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election, filed a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. According to him:
○ The Constitution only prescribes a maximum of 5 qualifications to be
a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate.
○ By requiring a senatorial a mandatory drug test creates an additional
qualification that all candidates must be certified drug free.
○ There is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or
COMELEC to expand the qualifications for requirements of
candidates of senator.

SJS vs Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency

● SJS, registered political party, seeks to prohibit act from enforcing paragraphs
(c ), (d), (f), and (g) on the grounds that they are constitutionally infirm.
○ They constitute undue delegation to schools and employers.
○ Provisions trench in the equal protection clause as they can be used
to harass a student or an employee
○ Person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches is
breached

Laserna v DDB PDEA

● Atty Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks same as above.

● SJS and Laserna failed to establish standing given that they failed to allege
any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in
their petitions. However, rule on locus standi is ruled to be relaxed in the case
for transcendental importance and public interest.

ISSUE:
1. W/N Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 imposes an additional qualification for senator
making it unconstitutional - YES
a. W/N Congress can enact a law prescribing qualifications for
candidates in addition to those by the Constitution - NO
2. W/N paragraphs (c ), (d), and (f) are unconstitutional - C and D NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, F UNCONSTITUTIONAL

HELD:
 ON ISSUE 1, PIMENTEL PETITION
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
● A candidate for senator only needs to meet qualifications on Sec. 3, Art Vi of
the Constitution: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and
(5) residency.
● The Congress CANNOT valiy amend or modify qualification standards as it
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate.
● The Constitution is the basic law to which laws must conform and no act shall
be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.

ON ISSUE 2, SJS PETITION.

Sec. 36(c) of RA 91625 is CONSTITUTIONAL. - secondary and tertiary schools

● Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al.
v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied the following principles:
○ (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect
to their students
○ (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and
are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians,
and schools
○ (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the
health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures
as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty
○ (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
● It is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition
for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and
policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable requirements.

Sec. 36(d) of RA 91625 is CONSTITUTIONAL. - public and private employees

● As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and
as has been held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion.
● While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test,
nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing.
● The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and
who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself
prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient.

Sec. 36(f) of RA 91625 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. - persons charged before the

public prosecutor’s office
● The Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons
accused of crimes. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
“randomness” and “suspicionless.”
● In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint.
● When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled
out and are impleaded against their will thus becomes a violation of right to
privacy.

Sema v. COMELEC, SUMMARY: Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created under RA
G.R. No. 177597, 16 6734, as amended by Republic Act No. 9054. The Province of Maguindanao is part of
July 2008. ARMM. Cotabato City, on the other hand, voted against inclusion in the ARMM during
 the plebiscite in November 1989.
RIGOR
In summary, the court ruled that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, granting the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary
Sorry…. This is the
to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as
longest digest I’ve ever
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create
submitted.
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes
the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Sec 5, Art
But its complicated.
VI of the Consti and Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM
Regional Assembly can’t create a province without a legislative district because the
There’s a summary for
Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the
panic mode. :(
ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of
a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM
Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section
20, Article X of the Constitution.
The, SC ruled that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
DOCTRINE: Under the present Constitution specifically Art. Vi Sec. 5, the power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion
legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.

FACTS:
1. The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative
districts for the Province of Maguindanao.
2. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.
Maguindanao forms part of ARMM, created under its Organic Act, R.A. 6734,
as amended by R.A. 9054.
3. Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao's first
legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted
against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite.
4. ARMM's legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to
create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao.
5. 3 new municipalities were carved out of Shariff Kabunsuan so after, there were
11. Maguindanaons ratified Shariff Kabunsuan's creation in a plebiscite.
6. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under
MMA Act 201.
7. In answer, the COMELEC was "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City
as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao".
8. However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, COMELEC stated that
Maguindanao's first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City
because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.
9. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by
renaming the legis. district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City)."
10. In Court, Sema a candidate in the 2007 elections for Rep. of "Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City", prayed for the nullification of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in
Cotabato City for that office.
11. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to 1 representative in
Congress under Sec 5 (3), Art VI of the Constitution and Sec 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
12. Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing
the Resolution despite the COMELEC's earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845
designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanao's
reapportioned first legislative district. Sema further claimed that, the
COMELEC usurped Congress' power to create or reapportion legislative
districts.
13. In its Comment, the COMELEC merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly
availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative,
not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Sema's prayer for the writ of prohibition in
G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen
P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the
legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
14. In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from
questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of
candidacy, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of
"Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City".
15. Dilangalen added that COMELEC Reso. is constitutional because it did not
apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the
legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanao's first
legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC
could not reapportion Maguindanao's first legislative district to make Cotabato
City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies
exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the
minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city.
16. The Court heard the parties on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19,
Article VI of R.A. 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a
province created under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such new province.
17. (1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is constitutional
(a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create
provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the
autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over "other
matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
of the people of the region" and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of R.A.
7160. However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19,
Article VI of R.A. 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
"prescribe standards lower than those mandated" in R.A. 7160 in the creation
of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, Sema
proposed that Section 19 "should be construed as prohibiting the Regional
Assembly from prescribing standards . . . that do not comply with the minimum
criteria " under R.A. 7160. (2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section
19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
a. the power to create provinces was not among those granted to the
autonomous regions under Sec 20, Art X of the Constitution
b. the grant under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than
 those mandated in Section 461 of R.A. 7160 on the creation of
provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and
the Equal Protection Clause; and
(3) The COMELEC joined causes with respondent Dilangalen and contended
that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is unconstitutional because
1. it contravenes Section 10 and Sec 6, Art X of the Constitution
2. the power to create provinces was withheld from the autonomous
regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional; NO (2) whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly
under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such province. NO
RULING: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare
VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

HELD:
1. RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is
governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
2. the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the
creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the
Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with
any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected.
3. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no
conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create
Shariff Kabunsuan province.
4. Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it
will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative
district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of
250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even
 the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power
to create a legislative district because once the city's population reaches
250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city
inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
5. For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must
also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district.
The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of
Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
6. Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of
Congress - Under the present Constitution, as well as in past
Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is
vested exclusively in Congress.
7. Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to
increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises
these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law
that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the
House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of
Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.
8. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable
membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative
districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a
law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or
reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An
inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change
the membership of the superior legislative body.
9. The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional
Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive
authority to create legislative districts. Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create
or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
10. Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a
national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is
a national official. 31 It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like
the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative
powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district
representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is
paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the
legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only
create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national
office.
11. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its
legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction. This
violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the
coverage of the Regional Assembly's legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction.” However, a province cannot legally be created without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that "each province shall
 have at least one representative." Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional.
Tinga J., dissenting and concurring opinion: Our Constitution, in reflection of the
sovereign wisdom of the people, has prescribed local government rule as a tool for
national development and welfare. The majority is unfortunately unmindful of these
considerations. The Regional Assembly and the government of the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao exercised constituent functions in establishing the province of
Shariff Kabunsuan and providing for its local government. The majority did not bother to
hear their side in these petitions, which after all, never put in issue the constitutionality
of the creation of the province. The people of Shariff Kabunsuan, by sovereign desire
and constitutional design, ratified through a plebiscite the province named in honor of
the revered figure who introduced Islam to Central Mindanao. The majority has
annihilated the province with nary a word of comfort or concern for its citizens. Sadly,
there will be no shelter for the Court from the impact of this decision, which unduly
stretches the Constitution to deny the will of the duly elected members of the Regional
Assembly, that of the constituents they represent, and most of all, that of the people of
Shariff Kabunsuan.

Aquino v. COMELEC, FACTS:

G.R. No. 189793, 7
April 2010. ● R.A. No. 9716 was signed into law by President Arroyo on October 2009, took
effect on 31 October, or (15) days following its publication in the Manila
Standard.
PINEDA ● Prior to R.A. No. 9716, Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of
1,693,821, distributed among four (4) legislative districts
● Following its enactment, the 1st and 2nd districts of CamSur were reconfigured
in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the
first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and
San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor
and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
● R.A. No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. From the filing of House Bill No. 4264
until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2)
against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on
the sentiments and position of the local officials of CamSur on the creation of a
new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue,
now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a
population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new
district
● Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval
of the Bill by the Senate. Co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City,
which was a part of the former second district from which the municipalities of
Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other
local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former
third and fourth districts of the province
● PETs. contend that the reapportionment introduced by R.A. No. 9716, is in
conflict with the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
● PETs. claim that the reconfiguration by the act of the 1st and 2nd districts is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383
● Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for
the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.
○ Section 5.
○ (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
 shall have at least one representative.
● PETs. point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution. They argue that when the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM)
fixed the original number of district seats in the House of Representatives to
(200), they took into account the projected national population of (55,000,000)
in 1986. According to the PETs., 55M people represented by 200 district
representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every (1)
representative.
● Thus, the population requirement found in Section 5(3) is actually based on the
population constant used by the CONCOM in distributing the initial 200
legislative seats.
● Thus did the PETs. claim that in reapportioning legislative districts
independently from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a
250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the CONCOM did in
the original apportionment.
● The RESP., through the OSG, seek the dismissal of the present petition based
on procedural and substantive grounds.
● On procedural matters:
○ RESP. argue that the PETs. are guilty of (2) fatal technical defects:
○ PET. committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of
RA 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court; and
○ PET. have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9716.
● On substantive matters:
○ RESP. call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and
provinces drawn by Section 5(3). The RESP. concede the existence
of a population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of
the questioned provision will show that the same has no application
with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces. Rather,
the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the
creation of a legislative district in a city.
● Therefore, RA No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district
within the province, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment
law

ISSUE:
● WON a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement
for the creation of a new legislative district in a province. [N]

HELD:
● Court denies the petition.

● Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of

constitutionality. Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court,
there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law
has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a
specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a
violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be
upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

● For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing

mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

● The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrases, point to
no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required
for a city, but not for a province

● In Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.

 ○ RA 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at
that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that
the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3),
because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of
less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of
only 450,000.
○ Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a
minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it
does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be
entitled to an additional district. neither should such be needed for an
additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province
is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.

● Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the
creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at
least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code
notes that the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement,
but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

● The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least
two hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the CONCOM
which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to
form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document.

● Records will show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the
1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities
and Metropolitan Manila, it was used to determine how many districts a
province, city, or Metro Manila should have. For the purpose, population had to
be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not
taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the
point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the
province to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many
districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole,
though it was among, several determinants.

● CONCOM originally divided the entire country into (200) districts, which
corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The 200 seats
were distributed by the CONCOM in this manner:
○ first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces
and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000;
○ second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the
number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio."

● Commissioner Davide: “…Taking into account the mandate that each city with
at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one
representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each
one for all cities with a population of at least 250,000, which are the Cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro,
Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase
whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in
accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio.”

● Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city.
Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within the province
had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the
records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already
mentioned.
 ● Reference points:
○ The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure.
It was decided by the importance of the towns and the city that
eventually composed the districts.
○ “… perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the
summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from
Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and
Tuba could be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon.
However, the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
○ the Body approved the apportionment and districting; population was
explicitly removed as a factor.
○ Also used as reference points in the case were the provinces of
Cavite, Maguindanao, Laguna & Cebu but it was briefly discussed,
basically, the apportionment and districting in these provinces
disregarded population as a sole factor

● In Bagabuyo v. COMELEC:
○ Court ruled that “…The Constitution, however, does not require
mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging
equality of representation.”
○ To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests
and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that
the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory.

● Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an

additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for
in Republic Act No. 9786;

● Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
can, the petition find support.

● The court does not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second
legislative districts of CamSur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting
additional district should not be considered. The court’s ruling is that population
is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition
of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the
Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the
Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.

● Republic Act No. 9716 is a VALID LAW.

c. Officers (Section 16)

Avelino v. Cuenco, FACTS:

March 4, 1949 ● During the Senate session of Feb. 21, 1949, Senate President Avelino walked
out of the session hall followed by nine other senators. Twelve were left inside
(one of the 24 was confined in a local hospital, and the other was in the US).
MARASIGAN
The Senate President Pro-Tempore took over and, by a resolution approved
by the twelve remaining senators, the position of Senate President was
declared vacant, and Senator Cuenco was designated Acting Senate
President. Avelino brought the case to court asking whether the twelve
senators who have designated Cuenco as Senate President constituted a
quorum. By a vote of 6-4, the Court declared the controversy political in nature,
and refused to assume jurisdiction.
● Feb. 18 1949 – Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada requested his right to speak on
the floor on the next session day, to be reserved in order to formulate charges
 against then Senate President Jose Avelino. This request was approved.
● Feb. 21 1949 – Hours before the session, Sens. Tañada and Sanidad filed a
resolution enumerating charges against Avelino and ordering the investigation
thereof.
● A quorum was already present at the Senate session hall at 10am, and Avelino
was said to
● already be in his office, but delayed his appearance at the session hall until
11:35am. Avelino arrives, (did not open the session immediately), slowly read
the resolution submitted by Tañada and Sanidad, called on and conferred with
Senators Francisco and Tirona
● Sanidad and Cuenco insistently requests to open the session
● (SESSION PART 1) The session was finally opened. All Senators were
present except for Sotto (confined) and Confesor (in US).
○ Sanidad: Let’s not go through the roll call anymore
○ Tirona: No, let’s roll call. (opposition seemingly a plan to prevent
Tañada from delivering his speech)
○ Roll was called
○ Sanidad: Let’s not read the minutes anymore
○ Tirona and David: No, let’s read the minutes! (again seemingly in
pursuance of the plan above)
○ Minutes was read (Accdg. to Avelino, the crowd of 1000+ people
were being unruly at this time;
○ fights ensued in the audience so Senators could not be heard;
“pandemonium reigned” so it was
○ impossible to continue free from pressure and without grave danger.)
○ During the roll call and the minutes-reading, Tañada repeatedly stood
up to claim his hour-long privilege speech, but then-presiding Avelino
continually ignored him.
○ Tañada: I insist to be recognized by the Chair
○ Avelino: I’ll order the arrest of any senator who would speak out of
order (while constantly ignoring Tirona’s shouts of “Out of order!” at
Sanidad in his oppositions earlier)
○ A disorderly commotion then broke out in the Senate gallery
○ David: I move for adjourning the session to Feb 24! (was recognized
by Avelino)
○ Sanidad: I oppose!
○ Cuenco: I second Sanidad’s opposition! Pagbotohan nalang natin!
○ Another commotion ensued
○ David: I move for adjourning the session to Feb 24!
○ Sanidad: I oppose!
○ Avelino: /bangs gavel/
● Avelino walks out of the session hall followed by David, Tirona, Francisco,
Torres, Magalona, and Clarin. The Assistant Secretary (the Acting Secretary
during the session) followed. The rest remained inside.
● (SESSION PART 2) Senator Melecio Arranz (Senate President Pro-Tempore)
took the Chair and proceeded with the rump session
● Cabili: Please put in record that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair made
it incumbent upon Arranz to continue the session to not paralyze the functions
of the Senate.
● Arranz: Sen. Cuenco, please preside over the session. (Cuenco takes over the
Chair.)
● Arranz: Mr. Gregorio Abad, please take over as Acting Secretary.
● Tañada finally delivers his speech (became a two-hour long speech in the end)
on the charges
● against Avelino contained in Resolution 68. Sanidad reiterated this motion and
it was unanimously approved.
● Cuenco yielded Chair to Arranz again. Then, Sanidad introduced Resolution
No. 67, declaring the position of Senate President vacant, and designating
Mariano Cuenco as Acting President of the Senate. Resolution 67 was
unanimously approved, with Cuenco abstaining from voting. Cuenco then
takes his oath. The next day, the Chief Executive recognized Cuenco as the
 acting Senate President.
● Avelino alleges that respondent is illegally exercising office of Senate
Presidency on grounds that:
○ Adjournment is properly and favorably acted upon
○ Avelino had full power to adjourn the session without motion under
Chapter II Section 8 of Rules of Senate
○ If ordinary session is adjourned, no other session can be called in the
same day
○ Senate President Pro-Tempore had no authority to assume
presidency except in cases specified in Chapter I section 4 of Rules
of Senate
○ Twelve senators did not constitute a quorum
● Cuenco’s response:
○ David’s motion for adjournment was objected to and not submitted to
a vote
○ No, Avelino does not have power to adjourn the session without
motion
○ The session was orderly, no senator had been threatened or
intimidated by anybody
○ Only one session was held
○ Abandonment of the Chair in the face of an impending ouster is a
temporary incapacity so Pro-Tempore is entitled to take over
○ There was a quorum
○ Despite Avelino claiming that he adjourned to Feb. 24, he deliberately
didn’t attend on said date
○ Cuenco was recognized by the Chief Executive as acting President of
the Senate; Executive
○ recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts
● Cuenco’s defense:
○ SC lacks jurisdiction since case is not justiciable
○ There is no cause of action since there are only 9 senators who
recognized petitioner’s claim
○ The object of action is to make the SC a tool of a minority group of 10
senators to impose Avelino’s will over the 12 other members of the
Senate, to entrench Avelino in power

ISSUE:
[Issue 1] W/N Court has jurisdiction over the matter -- NO.
[Issue 2] W/N Resolutions 67 and 68 were validly approved
○ A. W/N session of the so-called rump Senate was a continuation of
the session validly assembled with 22 senators in the morning of Feb.
21, 1949 -- YES.
○ B. W/N 12 senators who designated Cuenco Senate President
constituted a quorum -- YES.
[Issue 3] W/N Avelino’s petition for quo warranto, asking the Court to declare him the
rightful Senate President and ousting Cuenco, can be granted. -- NOT IN COURT’S
JURISDICTION.

HELD:
[Issue 1]
● NO. The Supreme Court has NO JURISDICTION over the Senate controversy
for the selection of the presiding officer, in view of the separation of powers,
and the political nature of the controversy. Senate was granted power by the
Constitution to elect its own President, to which the judiciary must not interfere.
○ Vera vs Avelino case does not apply
■ Even if rights of the electors of the suspended senators were
affected without any immediate remedy, the selection of the
presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who
are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or
reinstate them. Not the court’s problem :)
○ Even if the Court’s refusal to intercede would lead to a crisis or
 revolution, it would still not take up this case. There was no state that
may lead to such an event occurring, and the Court must not allow
itself to be stampeded into rash actions
● Werts vs. Rogers case does not apply
○ In Werts, there are two senates functioning as such. In this, there is
only one Philippine Senate. Petitioners (Avelino et al) did not create
another one & were claiming that Cuenco is elected in that same one
Senate.
● Recognition of the Chief Executive makes the Court exercise its “hands-off”
policy.

[Issue 2]
● “Court has no jurisdiction, so it’s useless to decide on this” - Montemayor,
Reyes; “Suppose Court has jurisdiction, yes it was validly constituted” - Paras,
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon;
○ A. YES, it was a continuation of the AM session. The minority of ten
senators may not prevent the other twelve from passing a resolution
met with their unanimous endorsement. If resolution was approved by
ten or less, the answer might’ve been different.
○ B. YES, Validly constituted = the majority/quorum required to transact
the Senate’s business is present. Why?
■ The minutes say so
■ At the beginning of the session, there were at least fourteen
senators including Pendatun and Lopez
■ In light of the absence from the country of Sen. Confesor, 12
senators constitute the majority of Senate’s 23 senators.
1. Each “House” as stated in the Consti does not
necessarily mean “all” the members, but can also
mean “the majority”.
2. J. Pablo: Even if 12 was not the quorum, they
could’ve arrested one and become quorum;
regardless, Cuenco will still be elected (11y, 1ab,
1no)
3. Of all 23 Senators, 12 will support Cuenco, at most
11 will side with Avelino, and Cuenco will still be the
rightful Senate President. Tenure of Senate
4. President is amenable at any time by the majority
5. RULE: At any session held with 13 or more
senators, the 12 involved who approved the
resolutions could ratify all their acts and place them
beyond doubt. [Base # used was 23 because 24th
senator was abroad & beyond the coercive power
of the Senate.]
● Vote: 4 “yes there was quorum” to 4 “no there was none” to 2 “we don’t have
jurisdiction”
● Legality of Cuenco’s election is doubtful under the present conditions.

[Issue 3]
● See Issue 1. Not in Court’s jurisdiction.

Santiago v. Guingona, FACTS:

supra ● Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted a quo
warranto seeking the ouster of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority
leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful
MAGSAYSAY
minority leader
-----
● On July 27, 1998 Senate of the PH w/ Sen. John Osmeña as presiding officer,
held its first regular session for the 11th Congress
● The agenda for that day was the election of officers; by a vote of 20 to 2,8
Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate
● Senator Ople was elected as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M.
 Drilon as majority leader
● Senator Tatad thereafter manifested, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, that he was assuming the
position of minority leader
● Tatad explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the
“majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the “minority”
● During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate “minority,” Sen.
Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP Party—numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority—had chosen
Senator Guingona as the minority leader
● The following session, the debate on the topic continued with Sens. Santiago
and Tarad delivering privilege speeches. On the 3rd session day, the Senate
still failed to resolve the issue
● Majority leader informed the body that he received a letter signed by the (7)
Lakas-NUCD-UMPD senators, stating that they had elected Sen. Guingona as
the minority leader of the Senate

ISSUE:
1.W/N the Court has jurisdiction over the petition -Yes
2.W/N in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the
Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or
the laws -No
3.W/N Respondent Guingona was usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader -No
4. W/N Respondent Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader -No

HELD:
1. Petitioners submit that the definitions of “majority and “minority” involve an
interpretation of the Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI, stating
that “the Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its
Speaker, by a majority vote of its respective Members”

Respondents and SolGen contend that the issue of who is the lawful Senate
Minority Leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of the
legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers; that no constitutional issue
is involved, as the Constitution does not provide for the office of Minority
Leader; that the legislature alone has the full discretion to provide for such
office and to determine the procedure of selecting its occupant; that there is
not even any legislative practice to support the petitioners’ theory that a
senator who votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from
becoming the minority leader

● This Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or
its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused
their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

2. Petitioners claim there was a violation of the Constitution in recognizing Sen.

Guingona as the Senate Minority Leader. They contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the election of the Senate President “by majority vote of all its
members” carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of “majority” and
“minority,” as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue that “majority” in
the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of senators who
(1) voted for the winning Senate President and; (2) accepted committee
chairmanships.

Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such
chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the minority
 leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the
legitimate minority leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Sen. Pres, and
that the members of the Lakas- NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader,
because they did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted
committee chairmanships
● SC believes, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners
finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the
Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
● The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times.
When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it
simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any
total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must
obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any
construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much
less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that
the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual
meanings of these terms.
● In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the
Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half
of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members
who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
“minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no
law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
● During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R.
Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a member of the
minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada.38 During the ninth regular
session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate
presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to assign
committee chairmanships to all senators, including those
belonging to the minority. This practice continued during the tenth
Congress, where even the minority leader was allowed to chair a
committee.
● History would also show that the “majority” in either house of
Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number
of lawmakers belonged, while the “minority” normally referred to a
party with a lesser number of members.
● Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically
for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of
choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition
and long practice, are actually extant.
● In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the
legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto
3. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show
that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions
of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,
petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of
the Senate minority leader.
● As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in
determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid
down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power
has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that
illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption and
exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader.
4. Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter
belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
 unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he
was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by
Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus,
wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Arroyo, et al. v. De FACTS:

Venecia, 277 SCRA ● Rep. Joker Arroyo, petitioner is challenging the validity of R.A. No. 8240 which
268 (1997) amends certain provisions National Internal Revenue Code, R.A. 8240
imposes sin taxes to manufacturers and sale of cigarettes and beer.
● November 21, 1996 The bicameral conference committee submitted its report
MAGARZO to the House at 8am. At 11:48am, after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier,
chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his
sponsorship speech.
● Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn due to lack of quorum.
● Rep. Arroyo’s motion was defeated after a roll-call, the chair declared a
presence of a quorum.
● Majority Leader Albano, moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report.
● The chair called out objections for the motion, then the chair declared: “there
being none, the motion is approved” -- Even Rep. Joker Arroyo was heard
objecting.
● November 21, 1996 The chair also moved to adjourn the session as early as
3:40pm, and Speaker De Venecia deliberately certified the bill to prevent Rep.
Joker Arroyo to further object.
● November 21, 1996 The Senate passed the same bill.
● November 22, 1996 The bill was signed in to law by President Ramos.
● Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these
rules embody the constitutional mandate in Art. VI, 16(3) that each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings and that, consequently,
violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They
contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was
properly passed is false and spurious.
○ Rep. Arroyo argued that he was ignored when he was objecting, and
Arroyo argued that the correct procedure is to call for yeas and nays,
but the chair instead ask for the its approval.
○ Rep Arroyo also argued that the session was hastily adjourned
without sufficient reason.
● Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker
of the House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Courts
power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the
other departments of the government.
ISSUE:
● W/N R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House. - NO

HELD:
● SC held that the rules allegedly violated being merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of laws. It is well settled that a legislative act will not be declared
invalid for non-compliance with internal rules.
● It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in
the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department
itself.
 d. Internal Discipline

Osmeña v. Pendatun,
109 Phil. 863 (1960)
JIZ
● On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a
verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created
by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on
the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked,
principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from
proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to
require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the
admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House
should not punish him.
● The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent
portions of which reads as follows:
○ WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio
Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives from the
Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber
on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to
Garcia;
○ WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the
Second District of Cebu stated the following:.
○ xxx xxx xxx
○ The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that
under your unpopular administration the free things they used to get
from the government are now for sale at premium prices. They say
that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or
seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out
forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome
dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on
the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .
○ WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of
Cebu, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth and
in fact, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity and
prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is the one visible
symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose
said office to contempt and disrepute; . . . .
● Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen
Members to be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created
to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines
made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 223,
1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio
Osmeña, jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to issue
subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of
witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable
Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so to require him to show cause why he should
not be punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the
House a report of its findings and recommendations before the adjournment of
the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.
● In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution
violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct;
and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took
up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that
if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious
words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to
censure by the House.
● Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of
action and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter
further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary
 injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its implications, and
pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session,
the special committee continued to perform its talk, and after giving
Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself, submitted its reports on
July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour;
and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day—before
closing its session—House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as
recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
● Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of
Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)
filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the
petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with
suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to
the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the
Committee—whose members are the sole respondents—had thereby ceased
to exist.

Issue:
● WON House Resolution 59 violated Osmeña’s constitutional absolute
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House (NO)

Held:
● Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or
debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative
"shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a
copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that
country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress,
the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.
Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.
● Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked
(Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member
responsible "for words spoken in debate."
● Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As
old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every
one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion
offense." Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of
Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States.
Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the
question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions
before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is
does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member thereof.
● There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech
delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against
the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to
produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to
substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that for having made
the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was,
by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen
months for serious disorderly behaviour.

Paredes, Jr. v. FACTS:

Sandiganbayan, G.R. This is a petition seeking to set aside the resolution dated December 9 1992 of the
Office of the Ombudsman, denying petitioner’s motion for the reinvestigation of three
No. 118364, August 8, cases of falsification of public documents which had been filed against petitioners.
1995
In January 1990, complainant Gelacio filed a case alleging Paredes (who was then the
governor of Agusan del Sur but is now a member of Congress), Sansaet, Honrada, all 3
GONZALES
conspiring to falsify Notice of Arraignment dated July 1, 1985, showing that an
arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 (against Gelacio) and issued a
certification to Gelacio, when in truth no arraignment had been held in that case. He has
also presented that the Criminal Case had never reached the arraignment stage before
it was dismissed on motion of the prosecution.

Herein petitioners, as respondents in the case, denied the charges, however, when the
Prosecutor went to submit his resolution, Atty. Sansaet, one of the respondents,
retracted his earlier statement and claimed that there was really no arraignment held in
Criminal Case No. 1393 and that Clerk of Court Honrada made false certifications which
were used to support the dismissal (on the ground of double jeopardy) of Criminal Case
13800 which was then pending against Paredes Jr. in the Sandiganbayan.

Because of this Paredes commented that his change of answer was due to their political
estrangement and Honrada commented that there had indeed been an arraignment and
he attested the truth in making the certifications.

The Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with

Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners moved for a reinvestigation of the cases, complaining that:

1. The filing of cases was not prepared by Public Prosecutor Axalan who had
conducted the preliminary investigation, but by GIO II Gay Maggie Violan, who
allegedly had no hand in the investigation
2. That Violan relied solely on the retraction of Sansaet and the Certification of
Galecio, and disregarded the evidence in favor of Galecio
3. The Prosecutor did not act fairly as he was already the prosecutor in Crim
Case 13800

ISSUE:
WON Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the
Sandiganbayan. - YES

HELD:

I. First set of arguments of herein petitioners

A. No basis on the first ground. It is clear that no action had been taken
on his recommendation in view of Sansaet’s retraction. Due to his
retraction, it reopened the case for investigation, reevaluation of
evidence and the preparation of a new resolution. Violan was
designated to conduct investigation, which she did. Violan’s
recommendation was referred to Querubin for review and he
suggested that 3 separate informations be filed instead. Thus, no
basis for petitioner’s claim that the resolution was prepared by one
who did not take any part in investigation.
1. Analogous to a judge trying a case but wasn’t able to finish
the hearing, steps down or ceases from office, and another
judge takes over the conduct of the case. Such an
arrangement has never been thought to raise any question
of due process. For what is important is that the judge who
decides does so on the basis of the evidence in record. It
does not matter that he did not conduct the hearing of that
case from the beginning.
B. Violan giving credence to the Certification of Galecio stating that the
Judge attested that no arraignment had been held is not proof that
Violan was biased against petitioners.
 1. Even Judge in said case gave a follow up affidavit stating
that he issued said certificate without expectation that the
same would be used as evidence in any case, he never in
the same affidavit, repudiated, retracted or denied what he
had earlier stated.
2. The fact that the Judge in that case did not expect for his
certificate to be used in as evidence is not a reason to
disregard it, and does not diminish a whit the value of the
certificate
C. Also nothing in the resolution of Violan which shows that she based
her conclusion on Sansaet’s retraction.
1. She only stated that “the confession of Sansaet has
important bearing in this case”, but she did not cite the
confession as proof of the falsification of public documents.
II. Petitioners argue that Gelacio is guilty of forum shopping and that he is
politically harassing petitioner.
A. Factual antecedents:
1. In 1984, Gelacio charged Paredes with perjury on the
ground that he made false statements in an affidavit in
support of his application for a free patent, but was
dismissed.
2. In 1986, Gelacio filed another complaint for violating the anti
Graft and Corrupt practices act when he unduly, persuaded,
induced and influence the Public Land Inspector to approve
his application for a free patent (which is the
a) This case involved the same application for a free
patent of petitioner Paredes which as the subject of
Criminal Case 1393 (wherein the complaint for
conspiracy of falsification started)
3. Present 3 criminal cases are for falsification of court records
B. The filing of several cases based on the same incident does not
necessarily constitute forum shopping.
1. (Test is whether the several actions filed involve the same
transactions, essential facts and circumstances)
2. Case at bar, even if filed by same complainant, same
defendant and same incident (application for free patent),
the several cases involve essentially different facts,
circumstances, and causes of action
C. The filing of petitioner was not politically motivated
1. Unpersuasive. Political motivation cannot justify the
prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is otherwise
evidence to support them
2. A preliminary investigation is not a trial, the determination of
the existence of probable cause is done during preliminary
investigation
3. To warrant justification of political harrassment, it must be
shown that the complainant possesses the power and the
influence to control the prosecution of cases

Petition dismissed.

Defensor-Santiago v. FACTS:
Sandiganbayan, G.R. ● The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, in
No. 128055, 18 April ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending in criminal cases filed
2001.
against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019 known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
● Complaints were filed by a group of employees of the Commission of
DE MESA Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID
Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act
● In a Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed the
OSP to file the appropriate informations against petitioner.
● On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for
clearance; approved, forthwith, three informations were filed on even
date
● In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was
indicted thusly:

"That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,

in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the
Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
legalization for the stay of the following aliens: x x x(names of aliens), who
arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order
No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby
giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was
unlawfully legalized by said accused."
● Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897
● Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner
● Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.
● On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with
prohibition and Preliminary Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No.
99289-90, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer
her arraignment.
● The Court taking cognizance of the petition issued a temporary restraining
order.
● The Sandiganbayan, thus informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's
arraignment and the consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until
further advice from the Court.
● On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition
and lifting the temporary restraining order.
● On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding
Justice Garchitorena from the case and to defer her arraignment pending
action on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her motion was denied
by the Sandiganbayan.
● The following day, she filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R. No.
99289-90.
● The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan
to reset petitioner's arraignment not later than five days from receipt of notice
thereof.
● On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-two amended informations. Petitioner
moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations.
● The court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the
said informations and directed her to post bail on the criminal cases, docketed
Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against her.
● Petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed
G.R. No. 109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the
Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well
as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended Informations, and
seeking the nullification thereof.
● On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed
the OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate the 32 amended informations.
 Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were consolidated into
one information under Criminal Case No. 16698.
● Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine
Probable Cause" and to dismiss or quash said information. Pending the
resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
● On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one
Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled on 15
September 1995. In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file
her opposition to the 31st July 1995 motion of the prosecution within fifteen
(15) days from receipt thereof.
● On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for
reconsideration of its 03rd August 1995 order which would allow the testimony
of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the Sandiganbayan, was elevated
to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled "Miriam Defensor-
Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan," docketed G.R. No. 123792.
● On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the
prosecution to suspend her. On 25 January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved
to suspend her for 90 days

ISSUE:
WON Sandiganbayan had the authority to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of
Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for
the implementation of the suspension order

HELD:
● The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the
statute provides:

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public

officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode
of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office… “
● In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court
reiterated:

"The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended — treating of the

suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer — may no longer be put
at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
● "The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon
a valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective
officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or
non-career service."
● It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order
of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before
it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the
court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there
seems to be "no ifs and buts about it."
● Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of
Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

". . . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial

proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension."
● In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely
 adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld
Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officials and
employees indicted before it.
● Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held
that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused.
● While the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the
validity of the information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing,
there is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct thereof. It has been said that —

". . . No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing.
Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
against him e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a
violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the
Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from
office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the
information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court . . .'
● The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a
presuspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of
culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or
not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court
could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial
of the case.
● The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against
petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to
forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
● The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from
the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which
provides that each —

". . . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days."
● The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus,
in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,
18 the Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the
Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on
the prerogatives of Congress. The Court ruled:

". . . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution —

which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its
Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote
of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of
suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it
appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives."
● The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have
 effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor
from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal
and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one
branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
● Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the
1987 Constitution, empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of
"actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also in the determination of "whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
● The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of
discretion committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been
couched in general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation
in the light of any emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been
said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
● When the question, however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress
or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view 19 that unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the
Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other
two branches of government.
● It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or
provision that can unbolt the steel door for Judicial intervention. If any part of
the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is
the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed
by the Charter itself.
● Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing
the assailed preventive suspension order.

● Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been
decided by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999,
acquitting herein petitioner Santiago.

● Journals

US v. Pons, 34 Phil. FACTS:

729 (1916) ● On or about the 10th day of April, 1915, Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto
Lasarte conspired and imported 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium
worth P62,400 from Spain, into the city of Manila.
BERNARDO
● Juan Pons appealed and in the motion counsel alleged and offered to prove
that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914
(From how I understand was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be
it) punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of
February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null
The journals are given and void.
more weight than ● The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the
last day of the special session was, under the Governor-General's
extraneous evidence
proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having
(e.g. witnesses) violated the provisions of Act No. 2381. the vital question is the date of
because they are “acts adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely:
of the Government or a. how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or
sovereign itself. extraneous evidence
b. whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals. These
questions will be considered in the reversed order.
The court may also take
judicial notice of them in ISSUE:
resolving issues (like W/N to prove through legislative journals or extraneous evidence [Legislative
Journals]
this case regarding the
W/N the court can take judicial notice of the journals [Y]
issue of what date did
the law get actually HELD:
passed) ● While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact
question whether the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals,
it is well settled in the United States that such journals may be noticed by
the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill became a
law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited
therein.)
● The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to take
judicial notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine
Legislature of 1914.
● These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the
adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature
adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
● Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must
necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses
(extraneous evidence), while the legislative journals are the acts of the
Government or sovereign itself.
● From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as
important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws
by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere
with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
● the court cited numerous decisions of the various states in the American Union
in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a
single case of a later date where the rule has been in the least changed or
modified when the legislative journals cover the point.
● The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on
February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in
declining to go behind these journals.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Casco Phil. Chemical FACTS:

Co. v. Gimenez, 7 ● Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, Circular No. 95 fixing a
SCRA 347 (1963) uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions
○ In accordance to Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the
Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law
ABASTILLAS ● PET is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding
lumber and veneer by plywood and hardboard producers
● PET bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde —
which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid
therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42
● PET had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November
3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde
is exempt from said fee; PET also requested for refund of last importation of
these products
● Auditor of Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the
ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's
separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the
provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609
● Auditor General affirmed the action by the Auditor of the Bank
 ISSUE:
● W/N “urea” and formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the
aforesaid margin fee

HELD:
● No.
● Section 2 of RA 2609 states “urea formaldehyde” (not urea and
formaldehyde)
● “urea formaldehyde" is a finished product, which is patently distinct and
different from "urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde" |
● Petitioner contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and, "formaldehyde", and that the
members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde"
separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue
called "urea formaldehyde", not the latter a finished product; but this does not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate
● It is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea
formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the
courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved
by the President
● Court ruled that:
○ If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive —
on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle
of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of
our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.

Astorga v. Villegas, 56 FACTS:

SCRA 714 (1974) · House Bill 9266 passed the third reading in the House of Representatives
without amendments. The bill was then sent to the Senate. It was referred to the
Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by
VILLAVIRAY
Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with
a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City
Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should
succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
· When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on
May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1were introduced by Senator
Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in totoby the Senate. The
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the
Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
· On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of
Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May
20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the
amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the
Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The
House of Representatives then signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent
back to it, and copies were printed. The printed copies were then certified and
attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President.
On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the
bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of
approval on June 18, 1964. The bill then became Republic Act No. 4065.
· Senator Tolentino, issued a press statement on July 5, 1964 that the enrolled
copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was
a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody
the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a
consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate,
addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President, explaining that the enrolled
 copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by
the presiding officers was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he
considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A
subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the
invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his
signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact
that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid
enactment.
· On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in view of the
circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 9266
(which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would
be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually
approved by the two Houses of Congress."
· The Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department
heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners,
operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the
provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police
to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-
Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
· Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with
this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of
Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila
Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board
to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.

ISSUE: W/N RA 4065 can still be considered valid without the signatures of the
presiding officers of the Congress and the President?

HELD: NO, RA 4065 is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did
not become law.
· The Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by
both Houses, by the signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries
on the printed copy of the approved bill.It has been held that this procedure is
merely a mode of authentication,to signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being
presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his
approval or rejection.The function of an attestation is not of approval, because a bill
is considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where such
attestation is provided for in the Constitution, authorities are divided as to whether
the signatures are mandatory such that their absence would render the statute
invalid.There is less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a
bill where the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should
sign the bill before it is submitted to the President
· The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." In other
cases, if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a
statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for
proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of
decisions,although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to
if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.
· The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due
enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify to the same.
But the said Constitution does contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the
yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal."

Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed
 and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days
prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its
immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be
allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
· Petitioner argues that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment. However, the Senate President declared
his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the
invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even
greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
· The attestation is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in
Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does
not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its
passage. In other words, it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of
the presiding officers that is essential.
· Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there
being no enrolled bill to speak of, there will be no evidence to determine whether or
not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case the entries in the journal should
be consulted.
· The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary
record. The Constitution requires it.
· The Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the Court can
do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by
the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and
signed by him. The Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law,but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become law.

a. Electoral Tribunals

Angara v. Electoral FACTS:

Commission, 63 Phil. ● Jose A. Angara filed for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain
139 (1936) and prohibit the Electoral Commission (ElecCom), one of the
respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by
TAONGAN Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner
as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of
the Province of Tayabas.

● In the elections of September 17, 1935, Jose A. Angara, Pedro Ynsua,

Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of
the Province of Tayaba

● On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the

petitioner as member--‐ elect of the National Assembly for the said
district, for having received the most number of vote.

● On November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office

● On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution

regarding the presentation of protests and disputes and the period
within which to file the same – set on December 1935.

● On December 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the ElecCom a "Motion of

Protest" against the election of Angara, being the only protest filed after
 the passage of Resolutions and praying that the latter be declared
elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.

● On December 9, 1935, the ElecCom accepted the protest.

● On December 20, 1935, Angara, one of the respondents in the

aforesaid protest, filed before the ElecCom a "Motion to Dismiss
the Protest", , alleging
○ (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was
adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against
the election of its members should be presented;
○ (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the
accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and
○ (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period.

● • ElecCom denied Angara’s Motion To Dismiss the Protest.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the
election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly - NO

HELD:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in
our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government.

Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between
the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where
the one leaves off and the other begins.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to

be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.

The location of the provision (section 4) creating the ElecCom under

Artcle VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very
indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a
majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.

The grant of power to the ElecCom to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally
in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the ElecCom is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this
is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition
in the Constitution.
The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural
matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
proceedings of the ElecCom, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation
of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

The creation of the ElecCom carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its
cognizance should be filed.

In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to

be followed in filing protests before the ElecCom, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the ElecCom.

However, it is possible that the ElecCom may abuse its regulative

authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance
of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly.
But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the
power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second
place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an ElecCom
and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the
remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary
processes of democracy.

Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of

members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage
on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for
the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason
for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of
the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests
was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature
cannot be construed as depriving the ElecCom of the authority incidental to
its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly",
to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against

whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes,
unnecessary. As contended by the ElecCom in its resolution of January
23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest
filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any
member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his
duties as such member. Certification by the proper provincial board of
canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member--‐ elect to a seat in the national
Assembly and to render him eligible to any office.

IN SUMMARY, THE SUPREME COURT EMPHASIZED:

● That the government established by the Constitution follows

fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the legislative, the
executive and the judicial.

● That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of

functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers
granted.
●
That in cases of conflict between the several departments and
 among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally
to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

● That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in

actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and
duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

● That the ElecCom is an independent constitutional creation with specific

powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes
of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the governments.

● That the ElecCom is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly.

● That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution
went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.
● That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the ElecCom.

● That such transfer of power from the legislature to the ElecCom was
full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the
implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to
the time and manner of filing protests.

● That the avowed purpose in creating the ElecCom was to have an

independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object
would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the
power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of
conducting said contests.

● That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section

18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine
Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No.
3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and
manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time
and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be
required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

● That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested

or not, is not essential before such member--‐ elect may discharge
the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.

● That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any

member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said
confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the ElecCom of its
incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against
the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
 FACTS:
Abbas, et al. v. Senate,
166 SCRA 651 (1988)
SAYUNO
ISSUE:
HELD:
● October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an
election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of
the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the Commission on Elections.
● The respondent Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the
Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro
L. Yap (Chairman). Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto
T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.
● November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but
including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of the
Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal
Party and resigned as the Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed with
the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the
Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No.
002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as
respondents therein.
● Before that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same
case, had filed a Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to
Recuse the same Senators-Members of the Tribunal on essentially the same
ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in the same contest,
thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the motion for
disqualification or inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral
arguments were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards
issuing the Resolutions now complained of.
● Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself
from participating in the hearings and deliberations of the respondent tribunal
in both SET Case No. 00287 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being
another contest filed by Augusto's Sanchez against him and Senator
Santanina T. Rasul as alternative respondents, citing his personal involvement
as a party in the two cases.
● The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the
norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to
be the foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a
solution both practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the
amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit
the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
● The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)—requiring the
concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever
nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3)
including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for
disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution
of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this
Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
● W/N the proposed amendment of the Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to
permit the contest being decided by only three Members left, of the Tribunal, is
constitutional. (NO)
● We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither
unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most
fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself.
● Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its
composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
○ Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
 contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal hall be its
Chairman.
● It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by
both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the
Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Senators.
● Said intent is even more clearly signaled by the fact that the proportion of
Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component"
cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial
election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the
Constitution.
● As here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator
sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without
inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no
alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
● To our mind, this is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the
performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
● It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election
contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably
have to sit in judgment thereon.
● Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on
any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where
he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way
of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in
the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally
function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
● The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its
disposition of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances,
it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for
disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for
certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Lazatin v. COMELEC, FACTS:

157 SCRA 337 (1988) ● Petitioner Carmelo Lazatin questions jurisdiction of COMELEC to:
○ (1) annul his proclamation after he took his oath and assumed office
SANTOS ○ (2) discharged the duties of Congressman of the First District of
Pampanga
● He claims that the House of Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC is the
sole judge of all election protests. (Sec. 17, Art. 6 of the Constitution)
● In the Comments of candidates Buan, Jr. and Timbol allege that the petition
has become moot because COMELEC resolution has become final and
 executory when SC issued temporary restraining order.
● The two also allege that the COMELEC hastily proclaimed Lazatin w/o first
resolving their written protests.
● In the comment of the OSG, he alleges that Lazatin’s petition should be given
merit because proclamation was valid.
● On a Separate comment by the COMELEC, they claim the proclamation was
illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested bu
the petitioner w/o waiting for the final resolutions of candidates Buan, Jr. and
Lazatin against election returns.
● The consolidated reply filed by Lazatin reiterates previous arguments.

ISSUE:
● W/N Lazatin’s petition has merit - YES
● W/N COMELEC has jurisdiction to invalidate the proclamation - NO

HELD:
● The SC resolved to give due course to the petition.
● Petitioner has been proclaimed winner and has taken his oath of office. He has
assumed his duty as Congressman.
● The alleged invalidity of the proclamation, despite irregularities and pendency
of protests of rival candidates, is a matter also addressed to the judgement of
the Electoral Tribunal.

Lazatin v. COMELEC, FACTS:

168 SCRA 391 (1988) Pre-trial facts (the case above):
1. (P)Lazatin and (R)Timbol were running for Pampanga 1st district rep. in the 1987 elections.
RIGOR 2. Timbol objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. the Municipal Board ignored him.
COMELEC on May 19 ordered for the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate.
*Paula’s case was
3. May 26. COMELEC ordered prov. canvassers to proclaim a winner and pet. Won. MAY 27
about COMELEC 4. Timbol filed in COMELEC to: 1) declare the proc. void, and 2) prohibit pet. from assuming
revoking Lazatin’s seat office. 2nd petition was not acted upon and Lazatin took office. June 30
in Congress while this 5. Sept. 15. COMELEC declared Lazatin’s proc. Void ab initio.
case is about the case 6. Pet. challenged the resolution in the case above. Court set aside the COMELEC ruling.
Timblol filed against Main facts:
Lazatin. 1. Pet. moves to dismiss Timbol’s protest on the ground that it was filed late,
citing Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Lazatin argues that Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city
Timbol’s petition is late offices. - A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
based on the Omnibus Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official shall be filed with the Commission
Election code (10 after by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for
results) but the court the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
ruled that HRET rules
apply. (15 days after 2. HRET ruled that the protest was filed in accordance to Sec. 6 of HRET rules.
effectivity of HRET (“Election contests… 15 days from the effectivity of these rules on November 2...
rules) otherwise... 15 days from the date of the proclamation.” )
IN THE HRET RULES: 3. Lazatin filed a case in the SC to: 1) set aside the HRET ruling that Timbol’s
Election contests arising complaint was on time and 2) the HRET ruling denying Lazatin’s MR
from the 1987 4. Petitioner:assuming the period to file election protest was suspended by the
Congressional elections pendency of the 1st case, considering he was proclaimed on May 27, Timbol
shall be filed with the filed a case on May 28, and the resp. was served a copy of the ruling on Jan.
Office of the Secretary 28, 1988, Timbol deadline to file would've been Feb 6. His complaint was filed
of the Tribunal or mailed Feb 8. (the count resumed the day after January 28)
at the post office as 5. HRET: the count started Jan 28 based on HRET rules. HRET rules that the
registered matter protest should’ve been filed 15 days from Nov. 22 1987 but the pendency of
addressed to the the the 1st case made it so that the 15 day count began Jan. 28 1988. Timbol
Secretary of the filed his complaint 11 days after Jan 28. He filed within HRET’s 15 day rule.
Tribunal, together with
twelve (12) legible ISSUE: WoN the HRET acted within its power to accept Timbol’s complaint. (YES)
copies thereof plus one the provisions of the HRET Rules are applicable.
(1) copy for each WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Private respondent’s
protestee, within fifteen Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED. SO ORDERED
(15) days from the HELD:
effectivity of these 1. SC rules that the protest was filed on time and within HRET’s jurisdiction
Rules on November 22, 2. Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election code applies only to petitions filed before the
1987 where the COMELEC contesting the election of any member of the Batasang Pambansa
proclamation has been or any regional, provincial, or city official.
made prior to the 3. Sec. 250 as far as contests regarding the election, returns and qualifications of
effectivity of these Members of the Batasan is concerned has ceased to be effective under the
Rules, otherwise, the 1987 Constitution.
same may be filed 4. There is no more Batasan, it is now the bicameral Congress. The Constitution
within fifteen (15) days vests EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION over all contests relating to the election,
from the date of the returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of
proclamation. Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI. S. 17]
5. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional
fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional, provincial and city
offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay
offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].

Vinzons-Chato v. House FACTS:

of Representatives ● Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) renewed her bid in the May 10, 2010 elections as
Electoral Tribunal representative of the 2nd Legislative District of Camarines Norte, composed of the (7)
(HRET) Municipalities of Daet, Vinzons, Basud, Mercedes, Talisay, San Vicente, and San
Lorenzo, with a total of 205 clustered precincts.
and Panotes G.R. No.
199149; GR No. ● Chato lost to Elmer E. Panotes (Panotes) who was proclaimed the winner having
201350, January 22, garnered a total of 51,707 votes as against Chato's 47,822 votes
2013
● May 24, 2010 - Chato filed an electoral protest before the House of Representatives
PINEDA Electoral Tribunal (HRET), assailing the results in all the 160 clustered precincts in four
(4) municipalities: Daet, Vinzons, Basud and Mercedes. No counter-protest was
interposed by Panotes.
Before us are
● Pursuant to Rule 37 of the 2011 Rules of the HRET, Chato designated (40) pilot
consolidated cases clustered precincts, equivalent to 25% of the total number of protested clustered
involving the use of precincts, in which revision of ballots shall be conducted.
the picture images of
ballots as the ● March 21-24, 2011 - The initial revision of ballots showed a substantial discrepancy
equivalent of the between the votes of the parties per physical count vis-a-vis their votes per election
original paper ballots returns in the precincts of Basud and Daet; as soon as this finished, Chato moved for
for purposes of the revision of ballots in all of the protested clustered precincts arguing that the results of
the revision of twenty-five percent (25%) of said precincts indicate a reasonable recovery
determining the true
of votes in her favor; denied by HRET and the subsequent MRs
will of the electorate
in the Second ● March 24, 2011 - Panotes prayed that a preliminary hearing be set in order to determine
Legislative District of first the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes used in the elections.
Camarines Norte in ● Panotes further urged that, should it be shown during such hearing that the ballots and
the May 10, 2010 ballot boxes were not preserved, the HRET should direct the printing of the picture
elections, which was images of the ballots of the questioned precincts stored in the data storage device for
"the maiden run for said precincts.
full automation,"1 as
● Panotes described the condition of the ballot boxes subject of revision:
authorized by
Republic Act (R.A.) ● Outer condition
No. 93692 amending ● a. The top cover of the ballot box is loose and can be lifted, so the election documents
R.A. No. 8436 that can be taken out.
called for the adoption ● b. In some ballot boxes, when the key was inserted into the padlock, the upper portion of
of an automated the lock disconnected from its body, which means that the lock had been previously
election system in tampered with.
● c. In the municipalities where (Panotes) was able to seal the ballot boxes with packing
national and local
tape, this tape seal was broken/cut/sliced, which means that the ballot boxes had been
elections. opened prior to the initial revision.
● d. Some of the self-locking security seal was not properly attached.

● Inner condition:
● a. The contents of the ballot box e.g. ballots and the documents were in total disarray,
which means that it was tampered with.
● b. Some of the Minutes of Voting and Election Returns were MISSING and only the
ballots were found inside the ballot box.
 ● c. The ballots were unnecessarily folded and/or crumpled in the clustered precincts
where the votes of (Panotes) were substantially reduced.

● In its Resolution, the HRET directed the copying of the picture image files of ballots
relative to the protest

● Chato filed an Urgent Motion to Prohibit the Use by Protestee of the Decrypted and
Copied Ballot Images in the Instant Case reiterating the lack of legal basis for the
decryption and copying of ballot images inasmuch as no preliminary hearing had been
conducted showing that the integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes was not preserved.

● Chato also alleged that the ballot images were taken from polluted Compact Flash (CF)
cards. Atty. Cortez, the Camarines Norte Provincial Elections Supervisor, was said to
have admitted during canvassing proceedings that the CF cards for the Municipalities of
Labo, Vinzons and Basud were defective and had to be replaced.

● Panotes, opposed the foregoing motion that the decryption and copying of the ballot
images was at the behest of the HRET itself, acting through Atty. Javier-Ibay, who
formally requested on February 10, 2011 the copying of the picture image files of ballots
and election returns in 13 election protests pending before it. Should he then decide to
use the decrypted and copied ballot images, there is nothing in the HRET rules that
prohibit the same.

● Panotes argued that it was during the election day, May 10, 2010, that the CF cards
were found to be not working so they had to be re-configured. Consequently, the voting
in some precincts in Labo, Vinzons and Basud started late, but the voting period was
extended. For this reason, the canvassing before the Provincial Board of Canvassers
was halted in order to wait for the transmission of the results from the Municipal Board of
Canvassers, which could not be done until each and every clustered precinct was duly
accounted for.

● June 8, 2011 - HRET issued the assailed Resolution No. 11-321 denying Chato's Urgent
Motion to Prohibit the Use by Protestee of the Decrypted and Copied Ballot Images in
the Instant Case on the ground that she failed to show proof that the CF cards used in
the (20) precincts in Basud and Daet with substantial variances were not preserved or
were violated. The Tribunal stressed that, since Atty. Cortez was not presented in court
to clarify the matter of the alleged replacement of CF cards, it remained unclear whether
the replacement was done before or after the elections, and which precincts were
involved. Moreover, the testimonies of the witnesses that were actually presented were
found to be irrelevant and immaterial.

● HRET declared that, although the actual ballots used in the May 10, 2010 elections are
the best evidence of the will of the voters, the picture images of the ballots are regarded
as the equivalent of the original
○ Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to
the same extent as the original if:
■ (a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original;
or
■ (b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit
the copy in lieu of the original.

● The votes determined after the revision in the 20 precincts in Basud and Daet, which
yielded reversal of votes, cannot be relied upon, as they do not reflect the true will of the
electorate. Hence, the Tribunal has to rely on what is reflected in the election returns
and/or statement of votes by precinct the same being the best evidence of the results of
the election in said precincts in lieu of the altered ballots.

● March 22, 2012 - HRET issued the assailed Resolution No. 12-079 directing the
continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining seventy-five percent (75%)
protested clustered precincts, or a total of 120 precincts.

● The HRET further warned that any attempt on the part of the revisors to delay the
revision proceedings or to destroy the integrity of the ballots and other election
documents involved, including but not limited to, marking or tearing of ballots shall be
sufficient ground(s) for immediate disqualification.
ISSUE:
● WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 11-321 dated June 8, 2011 and Resolution No. 11-
487 (Chato’s MR was denied) dated September 15, 2011 [G.R. No. 199149] {CRUCIAL
 ISSUE: whether or not the picture images of the ballots may be considered as the
"official ballots" or the equivalent of the original paper ballots which the voters
filled out.}

● WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 12-079 and Order dated April 10, 2012 [G.R. No.
201350]

HELD:
● The SC’s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised
only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal;" otherwise, we
shall not interfere with the electoral tribunals exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction.

● The acts complained of in these cases pertain to the HRETs exercise of its discretion, an
exercise which we find to be well within the bounds of its authority and, therefore,
beyond our power to restrict or curtail.

● G.R. No. 199149

● The crucial issue posed by Chato is whether or not the picture images of the ballots may
be considered as the "official ballots" or the equivalent of the original paper ballots which
the voters filled out.

● CHATO maintains that, since the automated election system (AES) used during the May
10, 2010 elections was paper-based, the "official ballot" is only the paper ballot that was
printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas pursuant to
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A. No. 9369

● The May 10, 2010 elections used a paper-based technology that allowed voters to fill out
an official paper ballot by shading the oval opposite the names of their chosen
candidates. Each voter was then required to personally feed his ballot into the Precinct
Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine which scanned both sides of the ballots
simultaneously. As established during the required demo tests, the system captured the
images of the ballots in encrypted format which, when decrypted for verification, were
found to be digitized representations of the ballots cast.

● The SC AGREE, therefore, with both the HRET and Panotes that the picture images of
the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise "official ballots" that
faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2
(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts are the functional equivalent of the paper
ballots filled out by the voters and, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an
electoral protest.

● The digital images of the ballots captured by the PCOS machine are stored in an
encrypted format in the CF cards, in a way to prevent hackers from reading the
information stored within and only authorized parties can (using a high security feature)

● Despite this security feature, however, the possibility of tampering or substitution of the
CF cards did not escape the HRET. HRET set the instant case for preliminary hearing on
May 27, 2011, and directed Chato, the protestant, to present testimonial and/or
documentary evidence to show proof that the integrity of the CF cards used in the May
10, 2010 elections was not preserved or was violated

● However, in the assailed Resolution No. 11-321, the HRET found Chato's evidence
insufficient. The testimonies of the witnesses [Vice-Chairman of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Camarines Norte, a media practitioner, & an Information Technology (IT)
expert] she presented were declared irrelevant and immaterial as they did not refer to
the CF cards used in the 20 precincts in the Municipalities of Basud and Daet with
substantial variances.

● Thus, for failure of Chato to discharge her burden of proving that the integrity of the
questioned CF cards had not been preserved, no further protestations to the use of the
picture images of the ballots as stored in the CF cards should be entertained

● The investigation revealed that the main CF Card for CP No. 44 of the Municipality of
Daet could possibly be located inside the ballot box of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBOC) of Daet; the case of the alleged missing CF Card for Clustered
Precinct No. 44 is no mystery at all.
 ● G.R. No. 201350

● There can be no challenge, therefore, to such exclusive control absent any clear
showing, as in this case, of arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power
that constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to
be a remedy therefor

● Contrary to Panotes' posturing, there existed legal and factual bases for the revision of
the remaining 75% of the protested clustered precincts. Rule 37 of the 2011 HRET Rules
clearly provides that, after post-revision determination of the merit or legitimacy of the
protest, the Tribunal may proceed with the revision of the ballots in the remaining
contested precincts,

● It should be pointed out, however, that the provision in question is couched in the
permissive term "may" instead of the mandatory word "shall." Therefore, it is merely
directory, and the HRET is not without authority to opt to proceed with the revision of
ballots in the remaining contested precincts even if there was no reasonable recovery
made by the protestant in the initial revision.

● In the assailed Resolution49 No. 12-079, the HRET justified its action by its need "to re-
examine what appears to be a peculiar design to impede the will of the electorate," and
that a revision of all the protested clustered precincts will allow it "to see the whole
picture of the controversy."

● In any case, as pointed out by the HRET, the revision proceedings for the remaining
75% protested clustered precincts had already been conducted from May 2-9, 2012
thereby rendering the issue moot and academic.

● PETITIONS ARE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT

Tagolino v. HRET and FACTS:

Torres-Gomez, G.R. ● November 30, 2009: Richard Gomez filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC)
No. 202202, March 19, with COMELEC, seeking congressional office as the Representative for the 4th
2013. Legislative District of Leyte under the Liberal Party (LP).
● December 6, 2009: Buenaventura Juntilla, one of the opposing candidates,
MARASIGAN filed a Verified Petition alleging that Richard misrepresented in his CoC that he
resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City, when in fact he lives in
Greenhills, San Juan.
○ He asserted that Richard failed to meet the 1 year residency
requirement under Sec. 6, Art. 4 of the Constitution and should thus
be disqualified to run for office.
○ Juntilla also prayed that Richard’s CoC be cancelled.
● COMELEC First Division: Richard Gomez was disqualified because of a lack of
qualification.
● Richard then filed for a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the
COMELEC En Banc. He then accepted the said resolution with finality “in order
to enable his substitute to facilitate filing of necessary documents for
substitution.”
● Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC together with a
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the LP endorsing her as the
party’s official substitute for Richard.
● However, Juntilla still opposed the CoC of Lucy, stating that because Richard
is disqualified, there was no candidate to be substituted. However,
COMELEC stated that the disqualification of a candidate does not
automatically cancel one’s certificate of candidacy, especially when it is
nominated by a political party. The political party is still allowed to substitute
the candidate whose candidacy was declared disqualified. The right to
substitute is a privilege given to a political party to exercise and not depend
totally to a candidate.
○ COMELEC approved the recommendation and allowed the
substitution of Lucy.
● Juntillia filed for an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. Pending the resolution
 of Juntilla’s motion, the national and local elections were conducted as
scheduled. Richard, whose name was still on the ballot garnered 101,250
votes, while herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino obtained 493 votes (uhm, omg).
His other opponent Eufrocino Codilla got 76, 594 voets.
● Meanwhile, the motion of Juntilla still remained unacted.
● May 24, 2010: Tagolino filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET to
oust Lucy from her sear because she failed to comply with the 1 year
residency requirement under the Constitution, she did not validly substitute
Richard because his CoC is void ab initio, and Lucy’s CoC was void for non-
compliance with notarial requirements.
○ Lucy denied these allegations, claiming that she validly substituted
her husband in the electoral process. She said that she personally
knew Atty. Cordeno (notary), so she didn’t need to present competent
proof of identity. She asserted that despite her marriage with Richard
and her work in Manila, she continued to reside in Ormoc City.
● Ruling of HRET: Lucy is a qualified candidate for the position of Leyte Rep. It
decided that the disqualification of Richard did not mean that his CoC was
cancelled. This made the substitution valid. Lucy also continued to retain her
residency in Ormoc and her absence there was only temporary.
● Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: WoN HRET abused its discretion in finding that Richard was validly substituted
by Lucy as Leyte Rep. in view of the latter’s failure to meet 1 year residency
requirement provided by Sec. 6, Art. 6, of the Constitution. — YES.

HELD:
[Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course
to/cancel a CoC]
● The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a
candidate’s bid for public office: 1. Petition for disqualification under Sec. 68; 2.
Petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Sec. 78.
● Disqualification under Sec. 68: The one disqualified under this is still
technically considered to have been a candidate, although forbidden to
continue as such only because of supervening infractions, which do not deny
his/her statutory eligibility.
○ The person disqualified here is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate.
● A denial of due course and cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Sec. 78 is
premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications
required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks
these requirements, but he or she made a false misrepresentation of the
same in CoC.
○ There is an intent to defraud.
○ A person whose CoC had been denied due course under this Section
is deemed to not have been a candidate at all, the CoC being void
ab initio.

[Valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution]

● Sec. 77 of OEC: If an official candidate of a registered political party dies,
withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified
by the same political party pay file a CoC to replace the candidate.
● Sec. 79 of OEC: “Candidate” refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office who has filed a CoC by himself or through and
accredited political party. The law requires that one much have validly filed a
CoC in order to be considered a candidate. The CoC is evidence of his/her
statutory eligibility to be elected for the said post.
● Considering that Sec. 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for
substitution to take place and that a person without a valid CoC is not
considered as a candidate at all; it necessarily follows that if a person’s CoC
had been denied due course, he/she cannot be validly substituted in the
 electoral process. Valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for candidate
substitution.

——————————

● In this case, Richard was disqualified to run because of his one year residency
requirement. It was ruled by the COMELEC that he was merely disqualified —
and not that his CoC was denied due course — would mean that he could
have been validly substituted by Lucy.
● However, COMELEC First Division did not explicitly decree the denial of due
course to/and or cancellation of Richard’s CoC should not have obviated the
COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondent’s
substitution.
● The Court stated that the clear and unequivocal basis for richard’s
disqualification is his failure to comply with the residency requirement, which is
a ground for denial of due course to/and or cancellation of CoC under Sec.
78.
○ Case law dictates that if a petition prays for a denial of due course
to/and or cancellation of CoC and the same is granted by the
COMELEC without any qualification, cancellation of candidate’s
CoC is in order.
● The Court thus stated that COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the
COMELEC First Division’s Resolution when it adopted the Law Department’s
finding that Richard was only “disqualified” and was not denied of his CoC. It
overlooked the fact that it cancelled Richard’s CoC and in consequence,
disallowed substitution of Lucy. This is grave and serious error on the part
of COMELEC En Banc.
● Moreover, the Court stated that HRET is not bound by COMELEC’s
pronouncements. Being the sole judge of all contests relating to election,
returns, and qualification of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied
down by COMELEC Resolutions.
○ The Court thus ruled that HRET disregarded the law by deliberately
adopting COMELEC En Banc’s flawed findings regarding eligibility of
Lucy which stemmed from her substitution. HRET abused its
discretion.
● It is thus found that Lucy is not a bona fide candidate for the position of Rep.
for Leyte, which means that she could not have been elected.
● Petition granted.

Barbers v. COMELEC, FACTS:

G.R. No. 165691, 22 ● Robert Z. Barbers and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate in
June 2005. the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections
● COMELEC sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) for the
MAGSAYSAY elections of Senators, proclaimed the first 11 duly elected Senators
● COMELEC proclaimed Biazon as the 12th ranking duly elected 12th Senator
● According to COMELEC Biazon obtained 10,635.270 votes, while Barbers was
behind by 10,685 votes
● COMELEC stated that this difference will not materially be affected by the
votes in certain precincts where there was failure of elections
● Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon as Senator,
claiming that Biazon’s proclamation was void because it was illegal and
premature being based on an incomplete canvass
● Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and the
results of the special elections, which were still to be conducted, would
undoubtedly affect the results of the elections
● Biazon asserted that:
+ the First Division of the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to review,
modify, or set aside what the COMELEC sitting en banc as the NBC
for Senators has officially performed
+ since the COMELEC has proclaimed Biazon
+ as the duly elected 12th Senator and Biazon has taken his oath of
 office, the Senate Electoral Tribunal, not the COMELEC, has
jurisdiction to entertain the present petition
+ with Biazon’s admitted and established margin of 10,685 votes, the
votes from the alleged uncanvassed COCs and the votes still to be
cast in the special elections which were still to be conducted, would
not substantially affect the results of the election for the 12th and last
slot for Senator
+ the NBC committed a manifest error in crediting to Barbers a total of
34,711 votes from the province of Lanao del Sur while crediting to
Biazon only 1,428 votes from the supplemental Provincial COCs for
Lanao del Sur despite the existence and availability of the Municipal
COCs for Balabagan and Tagoloan, Lanao del Sur
● COMELEC denied the petition to annul the proclamation of respondent
Rodolfo Biazon for lack of merit
+ not a pre-proclamation case, either is it a protest case because the
ground cited in the petition is not proper for protest although a
proclamation has already been made. It is a petition, as entitled, to
annul proclamation based on alleged incomplete canvass.
+ the power to annul proclamation is an exclusive power of the
Commission vested upon it by the Constitution, which states that the
Commission shall exercise the power to “Decide except those
involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x x x”
(Article IX-C, Section 2 [3]).
+ Aguam v. COMELEC: COMELEC shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law. The Constitution enjoins the COMELEC to
decide, saving those involving the right to vote, all administrative
questions, affecting elections. Corollary thereto, the court has given
its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to
annul any canvass and proclamation illegally made.
● COMELEC en banc denied Barber’s MR and maintained that respondent’s
proclamation was valid and operative; that based on official COMELEC
records respondent’s lead over petitioner was insurmountable regardless of
the results from the delayed certificates of canvass and from the uncanvassed
votes for the special elections

ISSUE:
1. W/N COMELEC committed GADALEJ when it deliberately insisted in resorting
to and in using for purposes of tallying of the still uncanavassed election
results, improvises Municipal COCs?
2. W/N COMELEC committed GADALEJ when it first correctly recognized the
undisputed fact that there was an incomplete canvass at the time that
respondent Biazon was initially proclaimed but refused to rectify its VOID
proclamation?
HELD: SC dismissed the instant petition, and said that the basic issue for resolution is
W/N SC can take cognizance of the case at bar. Since Barbers contests Biazon’s
proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive
jurisdiction to act on Barbers’ complaint
● Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organization registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice
in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
● Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal provides:
RULE 12. Jurisdiction.—The Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the Senate.
● Pangilinan v. COMELEC: The Senate and the House of Representatives now
have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the “sole judge of all
 contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members,” thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction
under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of
the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress)
● Javier v. COMELEC: The phrase “election, returns and qualifications” should
be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the
contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that “election”
referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of
the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; “returns” to
the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including
questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and “qualifications” to matters that could be
raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as
his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
● The word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12
of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (“SET”) underscores the
exclusivity of the SET’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to members
of the Senate
● The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is
therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition

Pimentel v. HRET, G.R. FACTS:

No. 141489, 29 ● March 3, 1995 The partylist act took effect.
November 2002. ● In May 1998, 14 partylist representatives were elected from 13 partylist groups,
due to the number of votes garnered by APEC partylist it won 2 seats.
MAGARZO ● Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingents by electing
its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the
procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members
who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA)
● From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections
the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the
HRET or the CA.
● January 18 2000 Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed
to then-Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as
Chairman of the HRET.
○ The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to
cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to
include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
○ Sec 17 and Sec 18:
■ That the House of Representatives will choose its
contingents to HRET and CA respectively on the basis of
proportional representation from political parties and partly
list.
● February 2 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against
the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution
and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at
least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET,
CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on
the letter of Senator Pimentel.

ISSUE:
● W/N the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no
party-list representatives in the HRET. - NO
● W/N the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include
party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion. - NO
 HELD:
● Petition dismissed. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of
Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits to
choose from among its members those who may occupy the seats
allotted to the House in Electoral Tribunal.
● Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and
on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill
the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission
on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each
chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within
constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy
the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.
● There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the
CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18
of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET
and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. Facts:

No. 97710, 26 ● In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M.
September 1991. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A.
Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of
JIZ Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga.
● On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time,
Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal
● After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission
of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.
● By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over
Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members
in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in
some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of
the decision in the case.
● The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing
Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with
the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the
winner of the contest.
● Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4,
1991, to his 'Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary
General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for
Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect," and to honor a
"gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would
"abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot1 Congressman
Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a
flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the
Tribunal.
● On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on
March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was
received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.
● On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision,
Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura by letter2 that on
February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del
Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and Congressman
Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the
Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having
invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as
those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a
complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a
meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee unanimously
confirmed the expulsions.3
● At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra
 about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House
of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in
matters where party membership is a prerequisite.4
● At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme.
Justice Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13,
1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the
LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13,
1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal.

Issue:
● WON the Resolution of the House of Representatives violated the
independence of the HRET (YES)

Held:
● The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by
the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings
a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may
shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial)
component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
● The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because
he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a
clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and
Bondoc.
● To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of
the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the
aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the
Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A
minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the
tribunal.
● Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the
HRET. —
● As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must
discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and
independence even independence from the political party to which they
belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not
valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in
favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the
House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice,
and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.