Noreen Patricia V.

Nombre
Legal Technique and Logic

1. As a Senator I will take cognizance of the impeachment complaint

filed Atty. Janjalani Marzapan due to the following grounds:
A. The Justices who concurred with the ouster of Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes Sereno committed culpable violation of the Constitution because:

(a) it is has been provided that impeachment is exclusive in character as a

process of removing impeachable officers as illustrated in the cases decided
by the Supreme Court and pertinent Constitutional provisions.

(b) of their palpable mistake in the construction of the word “may” as merely
directory suggesting the availability of other options of ousting impeachable
officers, in this case using Quo warranto.

The following grounds are explained below:

(a) Upon the concurrence of the aforementioned Justices in the Supreme

Court Decision ousting Chief Justice Sereno, they committed culpable
violation of the Constitution particularly the provision provided under
Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which states that
impeachment is the sole remedy to remove an impeachable officer. Section
2, Article XI of the Constitution provides that impeachment is the only mode
of removing certain constitutional officers such as the Chief Justice from
office.

Such exclusive nature of the impeachment process as the sole process to

remove impeachable officers from office can be inferred from the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission and the cases decided
by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has decided in numerous cases that impeachment is the
sole remedy to remove impeachable officers from office:

1). In Cuenco vs. Hon. Feman, the SC said: “To grant a complaint for
disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency,
would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional
mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by
impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2)
of the Constitution.”

2). In re First Indorsement from Hon. Gonzales (1988), initiating disbarment

proceedings which will have the effect of disqualifying a sitting Justice was
rejected by the SC because the sitting Justice “may be removed from office
only by impeachment.” The Court further held in that case that the rule rests
on judicial independence and separation of powers. Without judicial
independence, Members of the Supreme Court may be charged by many
parties for any reason, who may seek to affect the exercise of judicial
authority by the Court. The court also ruled that “It follows from the
foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu
proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The
Noreen Patricia V. Nombre
Legal Technique and Logic

remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment

proceedings.”

3) In Jarque vs. Desierto, a disbarment case against then Ombudsman

Aniano Desierto, on the above ruling, adding that:

. . . The court is not here saying that the Ombudsman and other
constitutional officers who are required by the Constitution to be members
of the Philippine Bar and are removable only by impeachment, are
immunized from liability possibly for criminal acts or for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility or other claimed misbehavior. What the
Court is saying is that there is here a fundamental procedural requirement
which must be observed before such liability may be determined and
enforced. The Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from office
via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Ombudsman be
thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either
criminally or administratively e.g., in disbarment proceedings for any wrong
or misbehavior which may be proven against him in appropriate
proceedings”.

4). In Marcoleta vs. Barra, the Supreme Court stated:

“At the outset, the Court, guided by its pronouncements in Jarque vs

Ombudsman, In Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Cuenco y. Feman, has laid down
the rule that an impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be
disbarred without first being impeached. Complainant’s availment of Section
1 (1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution to skirt this rule is specious.”

Based from the aforementioned jurisprudence, it can be deemed that

impeachment is the sole remedy to remove an impeachable officer, such as
the Chief Justice, from office.

(B) The petition for Quo Warranto shall not prosper as another option for
removal of impeachable officers other than impeachment. The word “may”
in the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution shall be construed in a mandatory manner as it is it the
only process considered to remove impeachable officers.

The Supreme Court has decided in a certain case that the word “may”
denotes a mandatory character and not merely supervisory:

The court ruled in Diokno vs Rehabilitation Finance Corporation that

“Presumption is that word "shall" in ordinance, is mandatory; but, where it is
necessary to give effect to legislative intent, the word will be construed as
"may." The word "shall" does not necessarily indicate a mandatory behest.
Words like "may," "must," "shall" etc., are constantly used in statutes
without intending that they shall be taken literally, and in their construction
the object evidently designed to be reached limits and controls the literal
Noreen Patricia V. Nombre
Legal Technique and Logic

import of the terms and phrases employed”. The rule that “may” is
permissive, while “shall” is mandatory is an established rule in statutory
construction. Not every use of either of these words should automatically be
interpreted as a permissive or mandatory directive, especially when statutory
intent shows otherwise. The mentioned case clearly depicts the exclusive
nature of impeachment since the word “ought to be construed in a
mandatory manner. It simply means that the power to impeach is vested
only to the House of Representative and the Senate. Hence, the Quo
Warranto Petition cannot be used to remove the Chief Justice.

B). The Justice who concurred to the ouster of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
Sereno committed Culpable Violation of the Constitution as they knowingly
allowed the Executive Department to usurp the constitutionally vested power
of the Judicial and Bar Council to determine the qualifications of any
appointed Judge or Justice.

The legal basis and jurisprudence are discussed below:

One of the functions of the Judicial and Bar Council is to recommend the
appointees to the Judiciary. In case of vacancy, a list of at least three
nominees shall be submitted to the President and the latter may appoint the
respective Judicial Officers as provided in the Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution. Judicial and Bar Council was created to properly
determine if the applicants possess the requirements provided under the
Constitution.

The Supreme Court decided in some cases that the Constitution vested
powers of the JBC to vet and nominate applicants to judicial positions:

1). In Villanueva vs. JBC, the Supreme Court explained important role of the
Judicial and Bar Council:

“The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and

Incidental to the JBCs principal function of choosing and recommending
nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President.
However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that
the JBC shall follow in determining applicants’ qualifications. In carrying
out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria
in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to
the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every
position.”

2). In Jardeleza v. Sereno, the Court declared that: “the purpose of the JBC's
existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical constitutional declaration
that “a) member of the judiciary must be a person of prove competence,
integrity, probity, and independence.” Also, Section 8 (5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution mandates that “the Judicial and Bar Council shall have the
principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary”.
Noreen Patricia V. Nombre
Legal Technique and Logic

3. In Aguinaldo v. Aquino Ill, the court declared that “the JBC, as a

constitutional body, enjoys independence, and as such, it may change its
practice from time to time in accordance with its wisdom.”

In order to fulfill its constitutional mandate, “the JBC had to establish a set
of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets the
minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected
of him and his office.” Thus, the JBC has to concretize these qualifications
into operable standards, through demandable submissions and institutional
checks.

The Office of Solicitor General, independent and autonomous body attached

to the Department of Justice, failed to consider that the qualification being
assailed is a subjective qualification that has been previously determined
based on certain criteria set by the JBC. As may be gathered throughout this
discourse - it could not have been intended that the subjective qualifications
of any judge or justice be directly assailed before a court of law; otherwise,
that court would be basically supplanting the Council's determination
thereof, and in so doing, effectively assume the latter's role and disrupts the
current structure of the Constitution.

Hence, in allowing the petition of Quo Warranto to prosper, the

aforementioned Justices allowed the Executive Department to usurp the
power vested to the Judicial and Bar Council. The concurrence of the
Justices to the Supreme Court decision placed the determination of the
prospective and current members of the Judiciary at the disposal of the
Executive Department which violates the supposedly Independence of the
Judiciary and is a clear circumvention of the principle of Separation of
Powers.

2. As the lawyer of Jobaks and Jobert, I will invoke that the said
ordinance is unconstitutional based on the following jurisprudence:

A. By applying the test of validity of ordinance as provided in the case of

City of Manila vs Laguio, the said ordinance is unconstitutional due to the
following reasons: Firstly, the Ordinance was unfair and oppressive.
Majority of the Filipinos use motorcycle as a mode of their transportation by
reason that it is cheaper than other vehicles and convenience of usage in the
road. Despite, the “riding in tandem” being utilized as a means to
accomplish a crime, it does not mean that all who are “riding in tandem” will
tend to carry out such notorious acts. Such ordinance forced the people to
use other mode of transportation despite the fact that using motorcycle with
another was much more convenient and will lessen the travel expense. Also,
the ordinance could affect not only those who reside in Mandaluyong but
also to those who passes to it.
Secondly, the ordinance is discriminatory. The ordinance was not able to
establish that there is absolute necessity in banning only males from riding
in tandem. It is considered as an arbitrary ban or the male drivers while on
the other hand, females are free to ride together. There is vagueness with
Noreen Patricia V. Nombre
Legal Technique and Logic

regard to the reason on why the male riders are pressed in this ordinance.
The need for the requirement of the degree of consanguinity was not clearly
explained.
Lastly, the ordinance was unreasonable, although the crimes related to
riding-in-tandem could be lessened, this would not result into a huge drop in
crime rate because the criminals would only rule out such mode of
transportation and still continue to commit the notorious acts. It is also
possible that the criminals would recruit the female drivers to assist them in
executing their criminal intents. The ordinance also violates the principle of
presumption of innocence since the male riders who ride in tandem who are
not relatives by consanguinity are presumed to be in the process of
committing a crime and are immediately fined.
B). In the case of Romualdez vs Sandiganbayan The court ruled that he
inquiry into whether a criminal statute is “meaningfully precise” requires the
affirmative satisfaction of two criteria. First, does the statute fairly give
notice to those it seeks to bind of its structures? Second, is the statute precise
enough that it does not invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by
law enforcement authorities? Unless both criteria are satisfied, the statute is
void for vagueness. The second requisite is lacking in the Riding and
Tandem Law. It invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by law
enforcement officers as there is vagueness in relation to the reason why only
male drivers are pressed on the matter and the need for the requirement of
consanguinity for those male riders who are riding in tandem. The manner of
execution would create an absurd and inconvenient situation if each and
every riders will be questioned as to whether fall under the exceptions or
otherwise. Therefore, City Ordinance No. 595 also known as “Anti-
Motorcycle Riding-In-Tandem” is unconstitutional.