G.R. No.
206004, February 24, 2015
JOSEPH B. TIMBOL, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
The power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
restrict a citizen's right of suffrage should not be arbitrarily
exercised. The COMELEC cannot motu proprio deny due
course to or cancel an alleged nuisance candidate's
certificate of candidacy without providing the candidate his
opportunity to be heard.
This is a Petition1 for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the following
issuances of the COMELEC: first, Resolution No. 96102 dated
January 11, 2013, declaring petitioner Joseph B. Timbol
(Timbol) a nuisance candidate and ordering the removal of
his name from the certified list of candidates;3 and second,
Minute Resolution4 dated February 5, 2013, denying his
Petition to have his name listed in the certified list of
candidates and printed on the ballots for the May 13, 2013
elections.5cralawred
On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a Certificate of
Candidacy6 for the position of Member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. On
January 15, 2013, he received a Subpoena7 from COMELEC
Election Officer Dinah A. Valencia (Election Officer
Valencia), ordering him to appear before her office on
January 17, 2013 for a clarificatory hearing in connection
with his Certificate of Candidacy.8cralawred
Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election
Officer Valencia. During the clarificatory hearing, Timbol
argued that he was not a nuisance candidate. He contended
that in the 2010 elections, he ranked eighth among all the
candidates who ran for Member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. He
allegedly had sufficient resources to sustain his
campaign.9cralawred
He pointed out before the clarificatory hearing panel that his
name already appeared in the list of nuisance candidates
posted in the COMELEC website pursuant to Resolution No.
9610 dated January 11, 2013. The clarificatory hearing
panel allegedly assured him that his name would be deleted
from the list and that his Certificate of Candidacy would be
given due course.10cralawred
In the Resolution26 dated August 6, 2013, this court ordered
In the Memorandum11 dated January 17, 2013, Election
Officer Valencia recommended that Timbol's Certificate of
Candidacy be given due course.12cralawred
Despite Election Officer Valencia's favorable
recommendation, Timbol's name was not removed from the
list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC's
website. With the printing of ballots for the automated
elections set on February 4, 2013, Timbol filed on February
2, 2013 a Petition13 praying that his name be included in the
certified list of candidates for the May 13, 2013
elections.14cralawred
In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, the
COMELEC denied the Petition for being moot, considering
that the printing of ballots had already begun.15cralawred
On March 15, 2013,16 Timbol filed his Petition for Certiorari
with this court, arguing that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in declaring him a nuisance
candidate.17 According to Timbol, the COMELEC deprived
him of due process of law when he was declared a nuisance
candidate even before Election Officer Valencia conducted
the clarificatory hearing.18 He prayed for a preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering the COMELEC to include his
name in the certified list of candidates for the position of
Member of Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District
of Caloocan City.19cralawred
In the Resolution20 dated April 16, 2013, this court ordered
the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on behalf of
the COMELEC.
In its Comment,21 the COMELEC argued that the Petition was
already moot and academic, considering that the May 13,
2013 elections had already been conducted.22cralawred
Even assuming that the Petition was not moot and academic,
the COMELEC maintained that it did not gravely abuse its
discretion. Contrary to Timbol's argument, he was given an
opportunity to be heard when Election Officer Valencia
heard him during the clarificatory hearing. He even
admitted that he attended the clarificatory hearing with his
counsel.23cralawred
Moreover, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion
in denying Timbol's Petition to be included in the certified
list of candidates, considering that the printing of ballots had
already started.24cralawred
With these arguments, the COMELEC prayed that this court
deny the Petition for lack of merit.25cralawred
Timbol to file a reply. When Timbol failed to file his reply
despite receipt of the order,27 we required Atty. Jose
Ventura Aspiras (Atty. Aspiras), counsel for Timbol, to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for
failing to file a reply on behalf of his client in the
Resolution28 dated September 2, 2014. We likewise
reiterated our order for Atty. Aspiras to file a reply for
Timbol.29 Still, Atty. Aspiras failed to comply with our show
cause resolution.
We dispense with the filing of the reply and resolve to decide
this case based on the Petition and the Comment.
The issues for this court's resolution are the following:
First, whether this case is moot and academic; and
Second, whether respondent COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in denying petitioner Timbol's Petition for
inclusion in the certified list of candidates.
We deny the Petition.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I
This case is moot and academic.
A case is moot and academic if it "ceases to present a
justiciable controversy because of supervening events so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value."30 When a case is moot and academic, this court
generally declines jurisdiction over it.31cralawred
There are recognized exceptions to this rule. This court has
taken cognizance of moot and academic cases
when:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the
case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of
paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the
Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of
repetition yet evading review.32 (Citation
omitted)cralawlawlibrary
We may no longer act on petitioner's prayer that his name
be included in the certified list of candidates and be printed
on the ballots as a candidate for Member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Petitioner filed with this court his Petition for
Certiorari on March 15, 2013, 39 days after respondent
began printing the ballots on February 4, 2013. Also, the
May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded, with the
1
winners already proclaimed.
That this case is moot and academic, however, does not
preclude us from setting forth "controlling and authoritative
doctrines"33 to be observed by respondent in motu
proprio denying due course to or cancelling certificates of
candidacy of alleged nuisance candidates. This motu
proprio authority is always subject to the alleged nuisance
candidate's opportunity to be heard34 � an essential
element of procedural due process.35cralawred
II
Respondent's power to motu proprio deny
due course to a certificate of candidacy is
subject to the candidate's opportunity to
be heard.
Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "[t]he State
shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service[.]" This, however, does not guarantee "a
constitutional right to run for or hold public office[.]" 36 To
run for public office is a mere "privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law."37 Among these limitations is
the prohibition on nuisance candidates.
Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates
of candidacy "to put the election process in mockery or
disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by
other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that
the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office
for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate."38 In Pamatong v. Commission on Elections,39 this
court explained why nuisance candidates are prohibited
from running for public office:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
. . . The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the
greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the
increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for
the election. These practical difficulties should, of course,
never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated
electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should
be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever
necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is
not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that
erodes faith in our democratic institutions. . . .
. . . The organization of an election with bona fide candidates
standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This
is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body
would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step
of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance
of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless
sacrifice on the part of the State.40cralawlawlibrary
To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance
candidates, their certificates of candidacy may be denied
due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or
cancellation may be "motu proprio or upon a verified
petition of an interested party,"41 "subject to an opportunity
to be heard."42cralawred
The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of."43 In election cases, due
process requirements are satisfied "when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy at hand."44cralawred
In Cipriano v. Commission on Elections,45 this court
explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he determination whether a candidate is eligible for the
position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where
both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support
of their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may
result to a deprivation of one's right to run for public office,
or, as in this case, one's right to hold public office, it is only
proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of
the proceedings against him and that he be given the
opportunity to refute the allegations against him. It should
be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims,
that the candidate be notified of the Commission's inquiry
into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of
candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his own
evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the
office he seeks.46cralawlawlibrary
Respondent commits grave abuse of discretion if it denies
due course to or cancels a certificate of candidacy without
affording the candidate an opportunity to be
heard.47cralawred
Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate
without giving him a chance to explain his bona
fideintention to run for office. Respondent had already
issued Resolution No. 9610 on January 11, 2013 when
petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a
clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013. This was an
ineffective opportunity to be heard.
That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the
certified list of candidates did not cure the defect in the
issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to
file the Petition had been given an opportunity to be heard
in the first place.� Second, in the Minute Resolution dated
February 5, 2013, respondent denied petitioner's Petition
on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had already
begun on February 4, 2013.
We understand the "insurmountable and tremendous
operational constraints and costs implications"48 of
reprinting ballots had respondent ordered the inclusion of
petitioner's name in the certified list if candidates.� The
ballots already printed would have to be recalled, leading to
the waste of the ballots previously printed.� It should be
noted that these ballots are special as the have the capability
of being optically scanned by Precinct Count Optical Scan
machines.� Reprinting another batch of ballots would,
indeed, be costly.
Still, "automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral
process."49� Respondent should also balance its duty "to
ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly,
and peaceful"50 with the right of a candidate to explain his or
her bona fide intention to run for public office before he or
she is declared a nuisance
candidate.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
III
Counsel for petitioner must be fined for
failure to comply with the Show Cause
Resolution dated September 2, 2014.
Atty. Aspiras, counsel for petitioner, failed to obtain the
injunctive reliefs prayed for in time for the May 13, 2013
elections.� However, this was no reason for him to defy our
orders to file a reply on behalf of his client.� for such
contumacious acts, he should be ordered to show cause why
he should not be proceeded with administratively.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Certiorari is DENIED for
being moot and academic.
Moreover, Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras is ORDERED to show
cause within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt of this Resolution why he should not be the subject
of administrative actions for his contumacious attitude
2
towards repeated orders of this court, specifically, for his
failure to comply with the Resolutions dated August 6, 2013
and September 2, 2013.� The action against Atty. Jose
Ventura Aspiras will be docketed as a new and separate
administrative case.

Let a copy of this decision be given to the Office of the Bar

Confidant for the initiation of the proper disciplinary action
against Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

3
G.R. No. 207900 April 22, 2014
MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSTAPHA J.
OMAR, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition1 under Rule 65, which petitioner Gamal S.
Hayudini (Hayudini) filed to set aside and annul the assailed
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
dated June 20, 20132 and July 10, 2013,3 which cancelled his
Certificate of Candidacy for the mayoralty seat in the 2013
local elections in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction.
The antecedent facts are:
On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of
Candidacy4 (CoC) for the position of Municipal Mayor of
South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National and
Local Elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. Ten days after, or on October 15, 2012, Mustapha
J. Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel
Hayudini’s CoC, entitled Mustapha J. Omar v. Gamal S.
Hayudini, docketed as SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F).5Omar
basically asserted that Hayudini should be disqualified for
making false representation regarding his residence. He
claimed that Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a
resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he
resides in Zamboanga City.
Thereafter, on November 30, 2012, Hayudini filed a Petition
for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay
Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC). Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar
Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudini’s petition on January 31,
2013.6 On that same day, the COMELEC’s First Division
dismissed7 Omar’s earlier petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC
in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F) for lack of substantial evidence
that Hayudini committed false representation as to his
residency.
Oppositor Baki, subsequently, elevated the case to the
Bongao Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5. The RTC, on
March 8, 2013, Reversed8 the MCTC ruling and ordered the
deletion of Hayudini’s name in Barangay Bintawlan’s
permanent list of voters. In view of said decision, Omar filed
before the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Gamal S. Hayudini by Virtue of a Supervening
Event on March 26, 2013. The petition was docketed as SPA
No. 13-249(DC)(F).9 Hayudini appealed the March 8, 2013
RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), but on April 17,
2013, in CA-G.R. SP No. 05426,10 the same was denied.
On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was proclaimed and, consequently,
took his oath of office.
On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a
Resolution11 granting Omar’s second petition to cancel
Hayudini’s CoC. The dispositive portion of the COMELEC
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy
filed by Gamal S. Hayudini as Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-
Tawi, in the 13 May 2013 elections, is hereby CANCELLED.
The Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations
is hereby directed to constitute a Special Board of
Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the lawful winner
for mayoralty position in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi during the
13 May 2013 elections.
SO ORDERED.12
Hayudini, thus, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc, arguing that its Second Division
committed grave error when it gave due course to a
belatedly filed petition and treated the March 8, 2013 RTC
Decision as a supervening event.
On July 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc denied Hayudini’s
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The decretal
portion of the En Banc’s assailed Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY this Motion for
Reconsideration for LACK OF MERIT. Consequently, the June
20, 2013 Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) is
hereby affirmed.
Corollary thereto, the proclamation of respondent GAMAL S.
HAYUDINI is hereby declared null and void and without any
legal force and effect. SALMA A. OMAR is hereby proclaimed
as the duly-elected Mayor for South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, being
the qualified candidate obtaining the highest number of
votes, considering the doctrine laid down by the case Aratea
v. Comelec13 that a cancelled CoC cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less, to a valid vote, to wit:
"Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate
for the position of mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.
Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole
candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest
number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly-
elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled, because
he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether
his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after
elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such
ground means he was never a candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio.
There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May
2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the
highest number of votes."
The Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations
is hereby directed to constitute a Special Board of
Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming SALMA OMAR as
the winning candidate for mayoralty position in South
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi during the May 13, 2013 elections.
SO ORDERED.14
Thus, Hayudini filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
Hayudini mainly advances the following arguments:
A.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT FAILED TO OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS
THE INSTANT PETITION TO CANCEL CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY DUE TO SUPERVENING EVENT (SPA. NO. 13-
249(DC)(F), DESPITE THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENT
OMAR TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS 2 AND 4 OF THE COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 9532.
4
xxxx
C.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVISITED AND MODIFIED THE
FINAL AND EXECUTORY RESOLUTION ISSUED BY THE
FIRST DIVISION IN THE SPA NO. 13-106(DC)(F).
III.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED TO CANCEL
PETITIONER HAYUDINI’S CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
AND DECLARE HIS PROCLAMATION AS NULL AND VOID.
xxxx
L.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECREED THE PROCLAMATION
OF SALMA A. OMAR AS THE DULY-ELECTED MAYOR FOR
SOUTH UBIAN, TAWI-TAWI.15
The Court finds the petition to be without merit.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an
independent action based on thespecific grounds and
available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It will
only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and is
actually proved to exist. Grave abuse of discretion has been
defined as the arbitrary exercise of power due to passion,
prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary,
or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion
or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be
condemned as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, such an abuse must be patent and gross.16 Here,
Hayudini miserably failed to prove that the COMELEC
rendered its assailed Resolutions with grave abuse of
discretion.
Hayudini contends that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it admitted, and later granted,
Omar’s petition despite failure to comply with Sections 2
and 4 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended by Resolution No. 9523. The subject sections read:
Section 2. Period to File Petition. — The Petition must be
filed within five (5) days from the last day for filing of
certificate of candidacy; but not later than twenty five (25)
days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy
subject of the Petition. In case of a substitute candidate, the
Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the time the
substitute candidate filed his certificate of candidacy.
xxxx
Section 4. Procedure to be observed. — Both parties shall
observe the following procedure:
1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish a
copy of the Petition, through personal service to the
respondent. In cases where personal service is not feasible,
or the respondent refuses to receive the Petition, or the
respondents’ whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the
petitioner shall execute an affidavit stating the reason or
circumstances therefor and resort to registered mail as a
mode of service. The proof of service or the affidavit shall be
attached to the Petition to be filed;17
Here, Hayudini filed his CoC on October 5, 2012, which was
also the last day of filing of CoC for the May 13, 2013
elections. Omar, on the other hand, filed the subject petition
only on March 26, 2013. Under the COMELEC Rules, a
Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel CoC must be filed
within five days from the last day for filing a certificate of
candidacy, but not later than twenty-five days from the time
of filing of the CoC subject of the petition. Clearly, Omar’s
petition was filed way beyond the prescribed period.
Likewise, he failed to provide sufficient explanation as to
why his petition was not served personally to Hayudini.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural missteps,
the Court sustains the COMELEC’s liberal treatment of
Omar’s petition.
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are
to be liberally construed in order that the will of the people
in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere
technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to
keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it
is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his
claim be immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the
winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be
achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that
protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. This
principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections18 and De Castro v. Commission on
Elections,19 where the Court held that "in exercising its
powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect
the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be
straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election
disputes."20
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are
subject to liberal construction.1âwphi1 The COMELEC has
the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of
procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a
speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This
liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and
efficient implementation of its objectives − ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action
and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an
ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with
public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of
private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also
the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which
beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal
has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within
its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful
leader.21
Indeed, Omar had previously filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course or Cancel Hayudini’s CoC on October 15, 2012,
docketed as SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F). This was dismissed on
January 31, 2013, or the same day the MCTC granted
Hayudini’s petition to be included in the list of voters.
However, on March 8, 2013, the RTC reversed the MCTC
ruling and, consequently, ordered the deletion of Hayudini’s
name in Barangay Bintawlan’s permanent list of voters. Said
deletion was already final and executory under the
law.22 Hayudini, however, still appealed the case to the CA,
which was subsequently denied. Notably, thereafter, he
went to the CA again, this time to file a petition for certiorari,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 05499.23 In a Resolution dated
July 9, 2013, the CA also denied said petition primarily
because of Hayudini’s act of engaging in the pernicious
practice of forum shopping by filing two modes of appeal
before said court.24 Hence, by virtue of the finality of said
RTC decision deleting his name from the voters’ list,
Hayudini, who had been previously qualified under the
law25 to run for an elective position, was then rendered
ineligible.
5
Given the finality of the RTC decision, the same should be
considered a valid supervening event. A supervening event
refers to facts and events transpiring after the judgment or
order had become executory. These circumstances affect or
change the substance of the judgment and render its
execution inequitable.26 Here, the RTC’s March 8, 2013
decision, ordering the deletion of Hayudini’s name in the list
of voters, which came after the dismissal of Omar’s first
petition, is indubitably a supervening event which would
render the execution of the ruling in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F)
iniquitous and unjust. As the COMELEC aptly ruled, the
decision to exclude Hayudini was still non-existent when the
COMELEC first promulgated the Resolution in SPA No. 13-
106(DC)(F) on January 31, 2013, or when the issues
involved therein were passed upon.27 The First Division
even expressed that although the Election Registration
Board (ERB) denied Hayudini’s application for registration,
it could not adopt the same because it was not yet final as
Hayudini was still to file a Petition for Inclusion before the
MCTC.28 Thus, it is not far-fetched to say that had this final
RTC finding been existent before, the COMELEC First
Division could have taken judicial notice of it and issued a
substantially different ruling in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F).29
The same ruling adequately equipped Omar with the
necessary ground to successfully have Hayudini’s CoC
struck down. Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of
candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to run for
public office when in truth he is not, is a false material
representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
Sections 74 and 78 read:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate
of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and
that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs;
civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is
not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country;
that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxxx
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
The false representation mentioned in these provisions
must pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous
mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run;
if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or
she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective
office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. Similarly,
the candidate's status as a registered voter falls under this
classification as it is a legal requirement which must be
reflected in the CoC. The reason for this is obvious: the
candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the
local government under which he or she is running.30 Even
the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot,
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in the instant case, that the
candidate was qualified.31
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false
representation under Section 78 must consist of a
"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
Simply put, it must be made with a malicious intent to
deceive the electorate as to the potential candidate's
qualifications for public office.32
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his
CoC "that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible
if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is
not actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in
the municipality where he intends to be elected, but still he
states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is
eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly
makes a false material representation, a ground to support
a petition under Section 78.33 It is interesting to note that
Hayudini was, in fact, initially excluded by the ERB as a
voter. On November 30, 2012, the ERB issued a certificate
confirming the disapproval of Hayudini’s petition for
registration.34 This is precisely the reason why he needed to
file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters
in Barangay Bintawlan before the MCTC. Thus, when he
stated in his CoC that "he is eligible for said office," Hayudini
made a clear and material misrepresentation as to his
eligibility, because he was not, in fact, registered as a voter
in Barangay Bintawlan.
Had the COMELEC not given due course to Omar’s petition
solely based on procedural deficiencies, South Ubian would
have a mayor who is not even a registered voter in the
locality he is supposed to govern, thereby creating a
ridiculously absurd and outrageous situation. Hence, the
COMELEC was accurate in cancelling Hayudini’s certificate
of candidacy. Hayudini likewise protests that it was a grave
error on the part of the COMELEC to have declared his
proclamation null and void when no petition for annulment
of his proclamation was ever filed. What petitioner seems to
miss, however, is that the nullification of his proclamation as
a winning candidate is also a legitimate outcome − a
necessary legal consequence − of the cancellation of his CoC
pursuant to Section 78. A CoC cancellation proceeding
essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification
case.35 The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the
votes cast for the candidate whose certificate of candidacy
has been cancelled as stray votes.36 If the disqualification or
CoC cancellation or denial case is not resolved before the
election day, the proceedings shall continue even after the
election and the proclamation of the winner. Meanwhile, the
candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the
winner, but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course
and cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule likewise
applies even if the candidate facing disqualification has
already taken his oath of office.37 The only exception to this
rule is in the case of congressional and senatorial candidates
where the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favor of
either the Senate or the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal after the candidates have been proclaimed, taken
the proper oath, and also assumed office.38
It bears stressing that one of the requirements for a
mayoralty candidate is that he must be a resident of the city
or municipality where he intends to be elected. Thus, under
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is required that
a candidate must certify under oath that he is eligible for the
public office he seeks election. In this case, when petitioner
stated in his CoC that he is a resident of Barangay Bintawlan,
South Ubian, Tawi Tawi and eligible for a public office, but it
turned out that he was declared to be a non-resident thereof
in a petition for his inclusion in the list of registered voters,
he therefore committed a false representation in his CoC
which pertained to a material fact which is a ground for the
cancellation of his CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner's ineligibility for not being a
resident of the place he sought election is not a ground for a
petition for disqualification, since the grounds enumerated
6
under Section 6839 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically SO ORDERED.
refer to the commission of prohibited acts, and possession
of a permanent resident status in a foreign country.

As held in Aratea v. COMELEC,40 which is a case for

cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, a cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab
initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to
valid votes. Whether a certificate of candidacy is cancelled
before or after the elections is immaterial, because the
cancellation on such ground means he was never a
candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio. We then found that since the
winning mayoralty candidate's certificate of candidacy was
void ab initio, he was never a candidate at all and all his
votes were considered stray votes, and thus, proclaimed the
second placer, the only qualified candidate, who actually
garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of
Mayor.

We find the factual mileu of the Aratea case applicable in the

instant case, since this is also a case for a petition to deny
due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy. Since
Hayudini was never a valid candidate for the position of the
Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, the votes cast
for him should be considered stray votes, Consequently, the
COMELEC properly proclaimed Salma Omar, who garnered
the highest number of votes in the remaining qualified
candidates for the mayoralty post, as the duly-elected Mayor
of South Ubian, Tawi Tawi.

Codilla v. De Venecia case has no application in this case,

since it dealt with a petition for disqualification under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and not a petition
to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 which is the case at bar.

Finally, contrary to Hayudini's belief, the will of the

electorate is still actually respected even when the votes for
the ineligible candidate are disregarded. The votes cast in
favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election for these do not
constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign
voice. On the other hand, those votes for the eligible and
legitimate candidates form an integral part of said voice,
which must equally be given due respect , if not more.41

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The COMELEC

Resolutions dated June 20, 2013 and July 10, 2013 are
hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

7
G.R. No. 215995, January 19, 2016
VICE-MAYOR MARCELINA S.
ENGLE, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC AND WINSTON B. MENZON, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is the Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc dated January 20, 2015 which upheld
the Resolution2 of the COMELEC Second Division dated July
5, 2013, denying due course to and/or cancelling
petitioner's certificate of candidacy; annulling her
proclamation as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon,
Leyte; and proclaiming private respondent in her stead.
Petitioner and private respondent vied for the position of
Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Babatngon, Province of
Leyte in the May 13, 2013 Automated Synchronized
National, Local and ARMM Regional Elections (the May 13,
2013 Elections, for brevity). Petitioner's late husband, James
L. Engle, was originally a candidate for said contested
position; however, he died of cardiogenic shock on February
2, 2013.3 Due to this development, petitioner filed her
certificate of candidacy4 on February 22, 2013 as a
substitute candidate for her deceased spouse.
In response, private respondent filed, on February 25, 2013,
a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy5 (COC) of petitioner arguing in the main that
the latter misrepresented that she is qualified to substitute
her husband, who was declared an independent candidate
by the COMELEC. It would appear that James L. Engle's
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) was
signed by Lakas Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD)
Leyte Chapter President, Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez
(Romualdez). However, Lakas-CMD failed to submit to the
COMELEC Law Department the authorization of Romualdez
to sign the CONAs of Lakas-CMD candidates in Babatngon as
prescribed by Section 6(3) of COMELEC Resolution No.
9518. Thus, the COMELEC Law Department considered all
Lakas-CMD candidates whose CONAs were signed by
Romualdez as independent candidates.6 For this reason,
private respondent charged petitioner with violation of
Section 15, COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 which disallows
the substitution of an independent candidate. He argued
that petitioner's declaration that she was a member of the
political party, Lakas-CMD, was intended to deceive the
electorate that she was qualified to substitute her husband.
Additionally, private respondent claimed that "[t]he false
representation of the [petitioner] that she is qualified for
public office consisted of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible."7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In petitioner's Verified Answer,8 she countered that: (1) the
ground relied upon in private respondent's petition was not
the ground contemplated by Section 1, Rule 23 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523; (2) the COMELEC did not issue an
official declaration that petitioner's husband was an
independent candidate; and (3) James L. Engle's CONA was
signed by an authorized person acting on behalf of LAKAS-
CMD.
With regard to her first counter-argument, petitioner
posited that, under Section 1, Rule 23 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523, the exclusive ground for denial or
cancellation of a COC is the falsity of a material
representation contained therein that is required by law.
Private respondent's assertion that petitioner's statement in
her COC regarding her affiliation with a political party was
such a false representation is "absurd" considering that her
CONA was signed by Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. and
Mr. Raul L. Lambino, President and Senior Deputy Secretary-
General of Lakas-CMD, respectively. Assuming the veracity
of private respondent's allegations, his contention that
petitioner is disqualified to run as a substitute is not a
proper subject of a petition to deny due course or to cancel
a COC. The qualification or disqualification of a candidate is
allegedly covered by Sections 12, 68, 69 and 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. In petitioner's view, the petition to
cancel her COC is dismissible according to the second
paragraph of Section 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523
which provides that "[a] petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy invoking grounds other than
those stated above or grounds for disqualification, or
combining grounds for a separate remedy, shall be
summarily dismissed."
As for petitioner's counter-arguments on the substantive
issues, she contended that there was no official declaration
from the COMELEC that her deceased husband was an
independent candidate. Private respondent's reliance on a
mere print out of the COMELEC website listing her husband
as an independent candidate was misplaced as the same
cannot be considered authoritative as opposed to official
documents that showed James L. Engle's nomination by
Lakas-CMD and his acceptance of said nomination to run for
the position of Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte under the
banner of Lakas-CMD. Moreover, petitioner stressed that
Romualdez was authorized to sign James L. Engle's CONA.
She attached to her Verified Answer a copy of the Authority
to Sign Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance dated
September 11, 2012 which was signed by Ramon "Bong"
Revilla, Jr. (National President) and Jose S. Aquino II
(Secretary-General) of Lakas-CMD in favor of Romualdez.
The petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's COC
was still pending with the COMELEC Second Division when
the May 13, 2013 Elections were held. James L. Engle's name
remained on the ballot. On May 15, 2013, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers issued a certificate of canvass of votes
and proclamation of winning candidates for Babatngon
Mayor and Vice-Mayor9 wherein petitioner was declared as
the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte. Petitioner
was credited with the Six Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Seven
(6,657) votes cast for her husband as against private
respondent's Three Thousand Five Hundred Fifteen (3,515)
votes.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It was only on July 5, 2013 did the COMELEC Second Division
promulgate the assailed Resolution which denied due
course to and cancelled petitioner's COC resulting in the
annulment of petitioner's previous proclamation as duly-
elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte and the declaration
of private respondent as winner of the contested position.
The dispositive portion of the July 5, 2013 Resolution is
reproduced here:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission
hereby RESOLVES to DENY DUE COURSE to and/or
CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy filed by
Respondent MARCELINA S. ENGLE for the position of Vice-
Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte, for the 13 May 2013 National
and Local Elections. Moreover, Respondent MARCELINA S.
ENGLE's proclamation as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of
Babatngon, Leyte is hereby ANNULLED.
Accordingly:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. The Executive Director is ordered to constitute a Special
Municipal Board of Canvassers for the municipality of
Babatngon, Leyte; and
2. The Special Municipal Board of Canvassers is ordered to
immediately notify the parties, reconvene and proclaim
Petitioner WINSTON B. MENZON as the duly-elected Vice-
Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte.
Let the Executive Director implement this
Resolution.11chanrobleslaw
According to the COMELEC Second Division, the substitution
of petitioner as a candidate in place of her deceased husband
for the position of Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte was not
a material misrepresentation which may be a ground for
cancellation of her COC under Section 78, in relation to
8
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Citing
jurisprudence, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that the
false representation contemplated under the law refers to a
material fact affecting a candidate's qualification for office
such as citizenship or residence.
Despite the foregoing finding, the COMELEC Second Division
nonetheless found sufficient basis to cancel petitioner's COC
on the ground that she could not have validly substituted her
husband, who was deemed an independent candidate for
failure of Lakas-CMD to submit to the COMELEC Law
Department Romualdez's authority to sign CONAs for and
on behalf of the party on or before October 1, 2012 in
violation of Section 6 (3) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518.
The COMELEC Second Division noted that the purported
authorization of Romualdez to sign CONAs for Lakas-CMD
candidates in Leyte was belatedly submitted in connection
with the proceedings on the petition to deny due course to,
or cancel petitioner's COC.
Finally, on the point on who should be declared the winning
candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, the
COMELEC Second Division held that private respondent, the
second placer, should be declared the winner in line with
jurisprudence stating that if the COC of the winning
candidate is void ab initio then the votes of the disqualified
or ineligible candidate should be considered stray.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
aforementioned ruling of the COMELEC Second Division
with the COMELEC En Banc. However, the latter tribunal
denied petitioner's plea in the assailed January 20, 2015
Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED for LACK OF MERIT. The
Resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
is AFFIRMED.12chanrobleslaw
Appealing now to this Court for relief, petitioner offers the
following arguments in support of her petition:
I ALIOSACTA.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND
ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE PETITION FILED
BY MENZON DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT ENGLE DID NOT
COMMIT ANY MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION IN HER
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II
CANDIDATE FOR THE POSITION OF VICE-MAYOR OF
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND BABATNGON, LEYTE.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF VII
JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE PETITION FILED
BY MENZON EVEN THOUGH NO LEGAL GROUND EXISTS TO PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND
DENY DUE COURSE TO OR CANCEL ENGLE'S CERTIFICATE ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
OF CANDIDACY GIVEN THE ABSENCE OF MATERIAL DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
MISREPRESENTATION IN THIS JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISREGARDED AND BYPASSED
CASE.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary THE WILL OF THE ELECTORATE BY IGNORING THE
OVERWHELMING AND PROMINENT NUMBER OF VOTES
III OBTAINED BY ENGLE DURING THE RECENTLY
CONCLUDED MAY 13, 2013 NATIONAL AND LOCAL
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND ELECTIONS.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF VIII
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED DUE COURSE TO AND
CANCELLED PETITIONER'S CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND
EVEN THOUGH THE PETITION FILED BY MENZON IS ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
CLEARLY THE WRONG LEGAL REMEDY TO ASSAIL THE DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
SUPPOSED INVALIDITY OF PETITIONER'S SUBSTITUTION JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE PROCLAMATION
THUS VIOLATING ENGLE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO OF MENZON, THE CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES, FOR THE POSITION
OF VICE-MAYOR OF BABATNGON,
IV LEYTE.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND
During the pendency of this petition, the COMELEC En
ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
Banc issued on February 3, 2015 a Writ of Execution14 in
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
SPA Case No. 13-232 (DC) (F) in response to a motion filed
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECLARED THAT ROMUALDEZ
by private respondent which set the stage for the immediate
HAS NO AUTHORITY TO SIGN THE CON A OF LAKAS-CMD's
implementation of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions which
CANDIDATES IN LEYTE.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
are the subject matter of this case.
V On February 26, 2015, the COMELEC filed its
Comment15 wherein it raised the following counter-
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND arguments:
ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
I.
JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE PETITION FILED
BY MENZON AND PENALIZED THE PETITIONER FOR AN
THE NAME AND SPECIMEN SIGNATURES OF THE PARTY
OMISSION DONE BY ANOTHER PARTY AS THIS RUN
OFFICIAL AUTHORIZED TO SIGN THE CONA SHOULD BE
CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF RES INTER
TRANSMITTED TO THE COMELEC WITHIN THE PERIOD
PROVIDED IN RESOLUTION NO.
[9518].chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
VI
II.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC AND
ITS SECOND DIVISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE CANDIDATES THEMSELVES
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
KNEW OF RESOLUTION NO. 9518 AS IT WAS THE
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER
GUIDELINES PROMULGATED FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE
ENGLE CANNOT VALIDLY SUBSTITUTE HER DECEASED
MAY 2013 NATIONAL AND LOCAL
HUSBAND, JAMES L. ENGLE, AS THE LAKAS-CMD
ELECTIONS.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
9
III.
OTHER CANDIDATES WERE SIMILARLY DEEMED
INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH RESOLUTION NO. 9518.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
IV.
THE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST THE SUBSTITUTION OF AN
INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE WHO DIES PRIOR TO THE
ELECTION IS A LEGAL
PRINCIPLE.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
V.
PETITIONER COULD NOT BE VOTED FOR IN THE MAY 2013
NATIONAL AND LOCAL
ELECTIONS.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
VI.
PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN HER
COC WAS CANCELLED BY THE
COMELEC.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
VII.
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY
COMELEC IN CANCELLING PETITIONER'S
COC.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Private respondent likewise filed his
Comment/Opposition17 on March 17, 2015. In his pleading,
private respondent identified the following issues that
should be resolved in this case:
I. Whether or not petitioner Engle can
validly substitute for her late husband
James Engle who was an independent
candidate for Vice- Mayor of Babatngon,
Leyte;
II. Whether or not private respondent (sic)
the Commission En Bane erred in
ordering the proclamation of private
respondent Menzon as the candidate
who obtained the second highest
number of votes, for the position of
Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte;
III. Whether or not the Commission En
Bane erred in granting private
respondent's Petition in the absence of
a finding of material misrepresentation
of this case; [and]
IV. Whether or not petitioner's prayer for
issuance of temporary restraining order
and/or status quo ante order and/or
preliminary injunction is meritorious.18
From the parties' submissions, it is apparent that this case
rests upon the resolution of the following core issues:
I of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S COC WAS VALIDLY
CANCELLED BY THE
COMELECchanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CAN VALIDLY
SUBSTITUTE HER HUSBAND JAMES L. ENGLE AFTER HIS
UNEXPECTED DEMISEchanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
III
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CAN BE
VALIDLY PROCLAIMED AS VICE-MAYOR OF BABATNGON,
LEYTE DESPITE HAVING PLACED ONLY SECOND IN THE
MAY 13, 2013 ELECTIONS
We grant the petition.
Under Section 78 of the OEC, a petition to deny due course
to, or cancel a COC may be filed on the exclusive ground of
false material representation in said COC. For reference, we
quote the full provision here:
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at
any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
Section 74 of the OEC in turn enumerates the items that
should be stated in a COC, to wit:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The
certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and
that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs;
civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is
not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country;
that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through
a court approved proceeding, a [candidate] shall use in a
certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been
baptized, or if has not been baptized in any church or
religion, the name registered in the office of the local civil
registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of
existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name after
performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided,
That when there are two or more candidates for an office
with the same name and surname, each candidate, upon
being made aware or such fact, shall state his paternal and
maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue
to use the name and surname stated in his certificate of
candidacy when he was elected. He may also include one
nickname or stage name by which he is generally or
popularly known in the locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his
latest photograph, passport size; a statement in duplicate
containing his bio-data and program of government not
exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
Based on the letter of the foregoing provisions, we agree
with the COMELEC Second Division finding, implicitly
affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, that there was no false
material representation in petitioner's COC under Section
78, in relation to Section 74, of the OEC.
We quote with approval the following disquisition in the
COMELEC Second Division's Resolution dated July 5, 2013:
10
The false representation which is a ground for a denial of
due course to and/or cancellation of a candidate's COC
refers to a material fact relating to the candidate's
qualification for office such as one's citizenship or residence.
Thus, citing Salcedo II v. COMELEC and Lluz v. COMELEC, the
Supreme Court, in the case of [Ugdoracion], Jr. v. COMELEC,
et al, ruled as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In case there is a material misrepresentation in the
certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is authorized to deny
due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a
petition by any person pursuant to Section 78. x x x.
x x x x
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential
that the false representation mentioned therein pertain
[s] to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this
provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate
the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the
certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify
what would be considered as a material representation, the
court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions
applying Section 78 of [B.P. 881].
x x x x
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material
misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the
Code refer[s] to qualifications for elective office. This
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences
imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false
representation in [the] certificate of candidacy are grave to
prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from
serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election
laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to
deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political
right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous
mistake.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Undeniably, private respondent failed to demonstrate that
petitioner made a false statement regarding her
qualifications or concealed any disqualification for the office
to which she sought to be elected in her COC to warrant its
cancellation under Section 78.
The records also show that when petitioner's husband filed
his certificate of candidacy on October 4, 2012 with the
Office of the Election Officer in Babatngon, Leyte he clearly
indicated therein that he was a nominee of Lakas-CMD and
attached thereto not only the CONA signed by Romualdez
but also the Authority to Sign Certificates of Nomination and
Acceptance dated September 12, 2012 in favor of
Romualdez signed by Lakas-CMD President Revilla and invalidity of petitioner's substitution on July 5, 2013,
Lakas-CMD Secretary-General Aquino. In Sinaca v. months after the May 13, 2013 Elections.
Mula,20 we held:
Under these premises, the COMELEC correctly did not cancel
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal petitioner's COC on the ground of false material
manifestation to the whole world of the candidate's political representation as there was none.
creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person
seeking to run for a public office certifying that he This brings us to the second issue. Despite finding that there
announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that was no false material representation in petitioner's COC, the
he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to COMELEC nonetheless cancelled the same on the ground of
which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office invalidity of petitioner's substitution for her husband as
address for all election purposes being as well stated. candidate for Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte. The
COMELEC anchored its action on the fact that Romualdez's
authority to sign James L. Engle's CONA was belatedly
Verily, it was publicly known that James L. Engle was a submitted and thus, the latter should be considered an
member of Lakas-CMD. As far as the party and his wife were independent candidate who cannot be substituted under
concerned, James L. Engle, as a member of Lakas-CMD, may Section 7725 of the OEC and Section 15 of COMELEC
be substituted as a candidate upon his death. There was no Resolution No. 9518.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
evidence on record that the party or petitioner had notice or
knowledge of the COMELEC's classification of James L. Engle It is on this point that the Court sees fit to overturn the
as an independent candidate prior to February 22, 2013 COMELEC's disposition of the present case.
when petitioner filed her COC as a substitute for her
deceased husband. The only document in the record The COMELEC relies heavily on Section 6 of COMELEC
indicating that Lakas-CMD had been notified of James L. Resolution No. 9518, which reads:
Engle's designation as an independent candidate is the
Letter dated March 21, 2013 sent by the COMELEC Law
Section 6. Filing of Certificate of Nomination and
Department to Romualdez21 stating that James L. Engle was
Acceptance of Official Candidates of a Political Party /
declared an independent candidate due to the failure of
Coalition of Political Parties. - The Certificate of
Lakas-CMD to submit the authority of Romualdez to sign
Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) of the official
James L. Engle's CONA to the Law Department as required
candidates of the duly registered political party or coalition
under Section 6(3) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 and in
of political parties shall be, in five (5) legible copies, attached
view thereof petitioner's COC as her husband's substitute
to and filed simultaneously with the Certificate of
was denied due course.
Candidacy. The CONA shall also be stamped received in the
same manner as the Certificate of Candidacy.
First, the COMELEC Law Department's "ruling" was issued
only after the filing of petitioner's COC. Second, with respect
The CONA, sample form attached, shall be duly signed and
to the denial of due course to James L. Engle's COC as a
attested to under oath, either by the Party President,
nominee of Lakas-CMD and to petitioner's COC as his
Chairman, Secretary-General or any other duly
substitute, the COMELEC Law Department's letter is not
authorized officer of the nominating party and shall bear
binding and at most, recommendatory. It is settled in
the acceptance of the nominee as shown by his signature in
jurisprudence that the denial of due course or cancellation
the space provided therein.
of one's COC is not within the administrative powers of the
COMELEC, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-
For this purpose, all duly registered political parties or
judicial functions.22 We have also previously held that the
coalition of political parties shall, not later than October
COMELEC, in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
1, 2012, submit to the Law Department, the names and
judicial powers, is mandated by the Constitution to hear and
specimen signatures of the authorized signatories of
decide such cases first by Division and, upon motion for
their official party nominations.
reconsideration, by the En Banc.23 In resolving cases to deny
due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, the
No duly registered political party or coalition of political
COMELEC cannot merely rely on the recommendations of its
parties shall be allowed to nominate more than the number
Law Department but must conduct due proceedings through
of candidates required to be voted for in a particular elective
one of its divisions.24 Returning to the case at bar, the
position; otherwise, in such a situation, all of the
COMELEC Second Division only formally ruled on the status
of James L. Engle as an independent candidate and the
11
nominations shall be denied due course by the Commission.
(Emphases supplied.)
The Commission stressed that the belated filing of
Romualdez's authority to sign James L. Engle's COC only in
connection with the proceedings for cancellation of
petitioner's own COC is fatal to petitioner's cause in view of
the categorical directive in the above provision that said
authority must be submitted to its Law Department on or
before October 1, 2012.
This Court recognizes that the COMELEC is empowered by
law to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and
successful the conduct of elections.27 However, it is a long
standing principle in jurisprudence that rules and
regulations for the conduct of elections are mandatory
before the election, but when they are sought to be enforced
after the election they are held to be directory only, if that is
possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory,
innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any
fault on their part.28 Over time, we have qualified this
doctrine to refer only to matters of form and cannot be
applied to the substantial qualifications of candidates. This
was discussed at length in Mitra v. Commission on
Elections,29 thus:
We have applied in past cases the principle that the manifest
will of the people as expressed through the ballot must be
given fullest effect; in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate.
Thus, we have held that while provisions relating to
certificates of candidacy are in mandatory terms, it is an
established rule of interpretation as regards election laws,
that mandatory provisions, requiring certain steps before
elections, will be construed as directory after the elections,
to give effect to the will of the people.
Quite recently, however, we warned against a blanket and
unqualified reading and application of this ruling, as it may
carry dangerous significance to the rule of law and the
integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified
reading may provide a way around the law that effectively
negates election requirements aimed at providing the
electorate with the basic information for an informed choice
about a candidate's eligibility and fitness for office. Short of
adopting a clear cut standard, we thus made the following
clarification:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we
have made in the past by the clarification that COC
defects beyond matters of form and thatinvolve material
misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling
that COC mandatory requirements before elections are
considered merely directory after the people shall have
spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement
involves more than the will of the people in any given
locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under
oath is made, thereby violating both our election and
criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the
will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws.
In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of
elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the
electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and
so hold that we cannot choose the electorate will.
Earlier, Frivaldo v. COMELEC provided the following test:
[T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the
survival of our democracy. In any action involving the
possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this
Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a
manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for
it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be
filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate
that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent
will of the people would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and
juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote. (Citations omitted,
underscoring supplied.)
As may be recalled, petitioner's deceased husband's name
remained on the ballot notwithstanding his death even
before the campaign period for the local elections began on
March 29, 2013.30 Yet, he received almost twice the number
of votes as the second placer, private respondent, in a
decisive victory. Since the people of Babatngon, Leyte could
not have possibly meant to waste their votes on a deceased
candidate, we conclude that petitioner was the undisputed
choice of the electorate as Vice-Mayor on the apparent belief
that she may validly substitute her husband. That belief was
not contradicted by any official or formal ruling by the
COMELEC prior to the elections.
We held in Rulloda v. Commission on Elections31 that:
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases
should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the
electorate. Laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections.
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities
and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an
obstacle to the determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court
frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder
in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the
votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the
results.
We had the occasion to rule in Sinaca that "an election in
which the voters have fully, fairly, and honestly expressed
their will is not invalid even though an improper method is
followed in the nomination of candidates."32 In the same
case, we proceeded to enumerate examples of formal
defects in a COC that may be treated with liberality once the
electorate has spoken in an election, to wit:
It has been held that the provisions of the election law
regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and
swearing on the same, as well as the information required to
be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the
elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory.
With respect to election laws, it is an established rule of
interpretation that mandatory provisions requiring certain
steps before election will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate. Thus,
even if the certificate of candidacy was not duly signed or if
it does not contain the required data, the proclamation of the
candidate as winner may not be nullified on such ground.
The defects in the certificate should have been questioned
before the election; they may not be questioned after the
election without invalidating the will of the electorate,
which should not be done. In Guzman v. Board of
Canvassers, the Court held that the "will of the people cannot
be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal
provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith
before the election would be fatal to the status of the
candidate before the [election], but after the people have
expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be
defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his
certificate of candidacy."33chanrobleslaw
Applying these jurisprudential precedents, we find that the
late submission of Romualdez's authority to sign the CONA
of James L. Engle to the COMELEC was a mere technicality
that cannot be used to defeat the will of the electorate in a
fair and honest election.
The Court has likewise ruled in the past that non-compliance
with formal requirements laid down in election laws when
12
not used as a means for fraudulent practice will be
considered a harmless irregularity.34 Allowing the belated
submission of Romualdez's authority to sign CONAs will not
result in the situation proscribed by Section 77 of the OEC -
that an independent candidate will be invalidly substituted.
In the case at bar, neither the COMELEC nor private
respondent contended that James L. Engle was not in fact
a bona fide member of Lakas-CMD. The record is bereft of
any allegation that the authority in favor of Romualdez was
inexistent, forged or in any way defective. The only issue
was that it was not submitted within the prescribed
deadline. Nonetheless, said authority was submitted as early
as October 4, 2012 to the local election officer and
subsequently to the COMELEC itself in the course of the
proceedings on private respondent's petition to deny due
course to, or cancel petitioner's COC, thereby putting
election officials on notice that such authority exists even
before the conduct of the May 13, 2013 Elections.
We distinguish this case from Federico v. Commission on
Elections,35 wherein we strictly applied election rules on
substitution, particularly the deadline to file certificates of
candidacy for substitutes of candidates who voluntarily
withdraw from the electoral race. In Federico, a liberal
interpretation of the rule would have led to a violation of the
clear policy that no substitution for a voluntarily
withdrawing candidate can be made beyond the mandated
deadline. In the case at bar, the intention behind setting a
deadline for the filing by political parties of an authority to
sign CONAs was to give the COMELEC reasonable
opportunity to determine who are members of political
parties and who are independent candidates. This is so the
COMELEC may prevent a violation of Section 77 of the OEC
which reserves the right to field a substitute candidate to
duly registered political parties. A relaxation of the rules in
the present case would not result in the evil sought to be
prevented. On the contrary, it is the strict application of the
rules that would lead to the iniquitous situation that a
candidate who was in fact a member of a political party
would be considered an independent, thus infringing the
right of the nominating political party to replace him in the
event of death, withdrawal or disqualification pursuant to
election laws.
To be sure, we have held that a political party has the right
to identify who its members are.36 From the evidence it can
be concluded that James L. Engle was not an independent
candidate but indeed a nominee of Lakas-CMD and he may
be validly substituted by his wife, who was nominated by the
same political party, in light of his unexpected demise prior
to the elections.
The COMELEC En Banc in its Resolution dated January 20,
2015 asserted that it cannot ignore Lakas-CMD's non-
compliance with Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518
since the COMELEC En Bancissued Minute Resolution No.
12-1133 dated December 11, 2012 applying said provision
strictly against the Liberal Party in the case of its local
candidates for Camiguin who were similarly declared
independent candidates for failure to submit the authority
to sign CONAs before October 1, 2012. While we laud the
COMELEC's attempt to apply the rule equally among the
political parties, it has only itself to blame for the present
situation. It bears stressing here that election rules
regarding formal matters are deemed mandatory before the
elections and only directory after the elections. In the case
of the Liberal Party candidates in Camiguin, the
COMELEC En Banc rendered a formal ruling on their status
as independent candidates, months before the election, such
that the Liberal Party was officially notified that its
candidates in Camiguin can no longer be substituted in the
event of their death, withdrawal or disqualification. Thus,
the mandatory application of the rules was justified. In
petitioner's case, no official pronouncement was made by
the COMELEC regarding her husband's status as an
independent candidate and the validity of her filing a COC as
his substitute until July 5, 2013, long after the elections were
held. Indeed, it behooved the COMELEC to similarly resolve
petitioner's case prior to the elections had it wanted to treat
all political parties equally.
In light of the foregoing discussion that petitioner may
validly substitute her husband in the May 13, 2013
Elections, it is no longer necessary to resolve the third issue
on whether the COMELEC properly proclaimed private
respondent, the second-placer in the vice-mayoral race of
Babatngon, in place of petitioner, as well as the rest of the
issues raised in the pleadings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution dated July 5, 2013 of
the COMELEC Second Division and the Resolution dated
January 20, 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA 13-232
(DC) (F) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Marcelina S. Engle is declared the duly-elected Vice-Mayor
of Babatngon, Leyte during the May 13, 2013 Elections.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
13
[G.R. No. 133944. October 28, 1999]
MARCITA MAMBA PEREZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and RODOLFO E.
AGUINALDO, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution,
dated May 10, 1998, of the First Division of the Commission
on Elections, dismissing petitioner Marcita Mamba Perezs
petition for the disqualification of private respondent
Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo as a candidate for Representative of
the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections,
as well as the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, dated June
11, 1998, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are not in dispute.
On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his
certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Third
District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days
later, on March 30, 1998, petitioner, as a voter and citizen,
filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of
private respondent as a candidate on the ground that he had
not been a resident of the district for at least one (1) year
immediately before the day of the elections as required by
Art. VI, 6 of the Constitution.
In support of her claim, petitioner presented private
respondents certificates of candidacy[1] for governor of
Cagayan in the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections; his voters
affidavit[2] which he used in the 1987, 1988, 1992, 1995, and
1997 elections; and his voter registration record dated June
22, 1997,[3] in all of which it is stated that he is a resident of
Barangay Calaoagan Dackel, Municipality of Gattaran, which
is outside the Third District of Cagayan. Petitioner alleged
that private respondent filed an application[4] for the
transfer of his registration as voter from Gattaran, Cagayan
(First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (Third District) only
on December 17, 1997 and that said application was
approved only on January 7, 1998. Petitioner prayed that in
the event the case was not finally decided before the
elections and private respondent obtained the highest
number of votes, the latters proclamation be suspended.
In his answer, private respondent claimed that while
he had been a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan in 1990, he
transferred his residence to Tuguegarao, Cagayan by renting
an apartment at No. 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, in order to hide his mistress from public view
because, at that time, his marriage to his former wife was
still subsisting. In support of his claim, he presented the
affidavit[5] of the owner of the apartment, Engineer Alfredo
Ablaza, in which it is stated that private respondent had
been his lessee since July 1990. In addition, private
respondent presented the contract of lease[6] of another
residential apartment at Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996,
between him, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor; his
marriage license dated January 7, 1997;[7] the marriage
certificate between him and his present wife, Lerma
Dumaguit, dated January 18, 1998;[8] the birth
certificate[9] of their daughter, Geniah Laureen D. Aguinaldo;
and various letters,[10] all of which show that he had been a
resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one (1) year
before the May 11, 1998 elections.
On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC,
in a unanimous resolution,[11] dismissed the petition for
disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo
qualified to run as representative for the Third District of
Cagayan.
On May 11, 1998, private respondent was elected
Representative of the Third District of Cagayan, with 65,058
votes over his rival Manuel N. Mambas 58,507
votes.[12] Accordingly, on May 16, 1998, he was proclaimed
elected and, on May 17, 1998, he was sworn in office.
On May 22, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration reiterating her allegation that private
respondent lacked the requisite residency in the Third
District of Cagayan and arguing that the proclamation of
private respondent was not a legal impediment to the
continuation of the hearing on her motion in view of R.A. No.
6646, 6. Her motion was, however, denied by the COMELEC
en banc in its resolution of June 11, 1998. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding that private respondent
had been a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan since July 1990
when he rented an apartment there in order to hide his
mistress. Petitioner contends that transfer of residence to
the place where private respondent is keeping his mistress
cannot amount to a change of domicile because ones
domicile is the place where one and ones legitimate family
resides. She also argues that private respondent could not
have changed his residence to Tuguegarao in 1990
considering that his certificates of candidacy for governor of
Cagayan in the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections, as well as his
voter registration records, the latest of which was made on
June 22, 1997, indicate that he is a resident of Gattaran,
which is in the First District of Cagayan. Petitioner avers that
in the absence of clear and positive proof, ones domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue and that to successfully
effect a change of domicile, one must prove an actual change
of domicile, a bonafide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and of establishing a new one, and
unequivocal acts which correspond with the intention.
On the other hand, private respondent asks that the
instant petition be dismissed. He argues that after his
proclamation on May 16, 1998 and his assumption of office
on June 30, 1998, the COMELEC lost jurisdiction to pass
upon his qualifications for the office of Representative. He
argues further that this case should have been filed with the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal which has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
In a supplemental pleading,[13] petitioner replies that
the COMELEC retained jurisdiction over the case because
she filed the petition for disqualification on March 30, 1998,
before the elections on May 11, 1998, and that pursuant to
R.A. No. 6646, 6, the COMELEC could continue the
proceedings for the determination of the disqualification of
private respondent.
The threshold issue, therefore, is whether the Court
has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition
for certiorari and eventually pass upon private respondents
eligibility for the office of Representative of the Third
District of Cagayan. Petitioner, in sustaining the affirmative
side of the question, invokes the following provision of R.A.
No. 6646:
Sec. 6 Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.
As already stated, the petition for disqualification
against private respondent was decided by the First Division
of the COMELEC on May 10, 1998. The following day, May
11, 1998, the elections were held. Notwithstanding the fact
that private respondent had already been proclaimed on
May 16, 1998 and had taken his oath of office on May 17,
1998, petitioner still filed a motion for reconsideration on
May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en banc denied on June
11, 1998. Clearly, this could not be done. Sec. 6 of R.A. No.
14
6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for
disqualification even after the elections if the respondent
has not been proclaimed. The COMELEC en banc had no
jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the
proclamation of private respondent barred further
consideration of petitioners action. In the same vein,
considering that at the time of the filing of this petition on
June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a member of
the House of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction
over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI, 17 of the Constitution, the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the
exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the
declaration of private respondents ineligibility. As this
Court held in Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal:[14]
The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character
of the jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the power by
the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has
been described as intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as full, clear and complete.
Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. The
same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners remedies should have been (1) to reiterate
her prayer in the petition for disqualification, and move for
the issuance of an order by the COMELEC suspending the
proclamation of private respondent pending the hearing of
the said petition and, in the event the motion was denied
before the proclamation of private respondent, file a petition
for certiorari in this Court with a prayer for a restraining
order to enjoin the proclamation of private respondent; or
(2) to file a petition for quo warranto in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days
after the proclamation of private respondent as
Representative-elect on May 16, 1998.[15] Obviously, neither
of these remedies can be availed of now.
In any event, even assuming that the Court has
jurisdiction to resolve the instant petition for certiorari, we
find no merit in petitioners allegation that private
respondent is ineligible for the office of Representative of
the Third District of Cagayan.
Art. VI, 6 of the Constitution states:
No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-
five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election.
The meaning and purpose of the residency
requirement were explained recently in our decision
in Aquino v. COMELEC,[16] as follows:
. . . [T]he place where a party actually or constructively has
his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from
the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained
in Gallego vs. Vera is to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community
from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing
in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing
wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given
area for meeting election law requirements, this
nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is
to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant
and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a
candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by
law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best
met by individuals who have either had actual residence in
the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in
the same area either by origin or by choice.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that private
respondent changed his residence from Gattaran to
Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990 on the basis
of the following: (1) the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza,
the owner of the residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes
St., Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where private respondent had
lived in 1990; (2) the contract of lease between private
respondent, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a
residential apartment at Kamias St., Tanza, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996; (3) the
marriage certificate, dated January 18, 1998, between
private respondent and Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the certificate
of live birth of private respondents second daughter; and (5)
various letters addressed to private respondent and his
family, which all show that private respondent was a
resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the elections on May 11, 1998.
There is thus substantial evidence supporting the
finding that private respondent had been a resident of the
Third District of Cagayan and there is nothing in the record
to detract from the merit of this factual finding.
Petitioner contends that the fact that private
respondent was a resident of Gattaran, at least until June 22,
1997, is shown by the following documentary evidence in
the record, to wit: (1) his certificates of candidacy for
governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections;
(2) his voters registration records, the latest of which was
made on June 22, 1997; and (3) the fact that private
respondent voted in Gattaran, Cagayan, in the elections of
1987, 1988, 1992 and 1995.
The contention is without merit. The fact that a person
is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is
not domiciled in another district. Thus, in Faypon v.
Quirino,[17] this Court held that the registration of a voter in
a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to
consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.
Nor is it of much importance that in his certificates of
candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of 1988,
1992, and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a
resident of Gattaran. Under the law,[18] what is required for
the election of governor is residency in the province, not in
any district or municipality, one year before the election.
Moreover, as this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC:[19]
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions
residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
In this case, although private respondent declared in
his certificates of candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998
elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the
fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third District not
just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but
for more than seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that
he had been a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is
credible considering that he was governor from 1988 to
1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for him to
maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of
the province of Cagayan.
As always, the polestar of adjudication in cases of this
nature is Gallego v. Vera,[20] in which this Court held: [W]hen
15
the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is
weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears, as in the instant
case, that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by
upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate
should be respected. In this case, considering the purpose of
the residency requirement, i.e., to ensure that the person
elected is familiar with the needs and problems of his
constituency, there can be no doubt that private respondent
is qualified, having been governor of the entire province of
Cagayan for ten years immediately before his election as
Representative of that provinces Third District.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

16
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction
with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First
Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying
Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the
Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011
is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel
Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a
Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino
citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he
lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10
July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his
favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I
absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and
fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a
citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and
political rights and privileges of the United States of
America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which
contains, among others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino
citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign
country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. 8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua),
another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for
municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national
elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner,
attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality
of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim
of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated
03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using
his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing
the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the
country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and
again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the
Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
"Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available
Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file
as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel
records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an
Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his
answer and memorandum within three (3) days from
receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to
declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by
the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest
number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his
verified answer, submitting the following documents as
evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April
2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil
Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and
17
 Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting
that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan
and that he has been conspicuously and
continuously residing in his family’s ancestral
house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of
Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03
June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide
resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to
the United States in 1985 to work and returned to
the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the
Municipal Local Government Operations Office of
Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr.
served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January
1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to
15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer
of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a
registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April
2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division
considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention
that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed
upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence
to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still
could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year
residency requirement under the Local Government
Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First
Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino
citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s
act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his
US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong
indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his
US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn
a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s
unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that
he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his
US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case,
"a passport is defined as an official document of identity and
nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn
in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself
of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges
reserved solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the
COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for
disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C.
Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for
Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby
ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the
COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is
insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said
Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following
contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not
supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath
of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation,
which show that he has substantially complied
with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his
renunciation of his American citizenship is not
tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino
citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear
allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was
not informed of the issuance of his Philippine
passport, and that he used his Philippine passport
after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the
First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for
disqualification constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as
indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate
ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the
case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship
is through a petition for quo warranto, which
should have been filed within ten days from his
proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections,
intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En
Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an
Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First
Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code
is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that
the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification
of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate
who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be
proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his
Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration.
Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming
that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already
been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be
prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc
held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
18
action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the
candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also
cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in
proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no
final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say
that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the
dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division
allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the
Local Government Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the
First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and
ruled that the petition was filed well within the period
prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010,
which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of
proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the
ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for
Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No.
9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as
though he never became a citizen of another country. It was
at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a
pure Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back
his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there
is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US
passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has
earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the
case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the
said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as
a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the
conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire
their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original
citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of
allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the
present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a
natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by working
abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in
the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US
passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is
not on all fours with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the
use of his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine
passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009.
However, he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it
about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent
already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This
fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a certified
true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for
his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16,
2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and
June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport
was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was
not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs
might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is
within his control during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman
Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not
one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine
citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of
continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case.
Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either
by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to
continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he
voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in
the instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine
citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino
despite his use of his American passport in the absence of
clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation.
Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento
dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and
wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United
States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and
enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his
previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship
runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only
his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with
the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose
of complying with the requirements for running for the
mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010
Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a
candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he
lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is
disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that
respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty
post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification
requirements regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the
eyes of the law, his having received the highest number of
votes does not validate his election. It has been held that
where a petition for disqualification was filed before
election against a candidate but was adversely resolved
against him after election, his having obtained the highest
number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster
from office does not violate the principle of vox populi
suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional
and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter
of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign
will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the
Constitution and when they elected their representatives
who enacted the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the
propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public
office despite his continued use of a US passport, and
praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the
2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible
error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that
Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US
passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the
COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public
office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC
En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s disqualification of
Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability
of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that
19
the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is
disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this
Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent
questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed
in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether
or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public
office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession
in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage
when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En
Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest
in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering
that in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for
him should be considered stray and the second-placer
should be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before
the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First
Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the
petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section
6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case.
In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,
which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under
this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings
for disqualification even after election if there has yet been
no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case.
The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that
Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the
exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v.
COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive
Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the
original petitioner and respondents therein have not
appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be
sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor
prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court
has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that
the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against
Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it
does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall
meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to
run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that
after performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for
public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only
once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for
repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines
in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of
Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At
the time, however, he likewise possessed American
citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado
renounced his American citizenship by executing an
20
Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements
for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be
solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. 32
However, this legal presumption does not operate
permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing
the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship. 33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to
attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the
country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is
whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his
COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run
counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively
and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in
effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath
that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment
of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country
which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when
the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will
fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss
of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner
on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction
can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, 35 it is
nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is
also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a
local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just
eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s)
himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using
a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took
place the instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office,
as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for
an elective local position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which
foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of
applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not
required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere
filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an
implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens
by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not
only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order
to qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the
rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship.
He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification
under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, 40 he was
not qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen
only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until
14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American
passport after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment
or election or assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x. 41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of
the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously.
Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First
Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of
Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to
comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for
he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he
performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him
from running for an elective public office pursuant to
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying
dual citizens from running for any elective public office
would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has
earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who
subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold
any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with
the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of
his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which
he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3)
months later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu,
the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a
21
Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US
passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US
passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation
he took. It was still a positive act of representation as a US
citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as
soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three
months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his
Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he
would not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport
does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign
citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he
used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his
foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his
subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his
earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of
identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and
country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice
are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust.
Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance
to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport
after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the
same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even
from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v.
Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the
principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-
examined and its soundness once again put to the test to
address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who
loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of
Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal
president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the
respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for
that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad
contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio
was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the
office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without
the four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened. 46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the
basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-
election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is
the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere
obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a
decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because
of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that
produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an
office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of
a comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled
to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the
elections is quite different from that produced by declaring
a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case
the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that
some other person than the candidate declared to have
received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually
received the greater number of votes, in which case the
court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to
correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted
with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who
received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter
case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the
manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the
deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the
election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the
strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are
striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful
candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a
plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate
was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the
latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a
contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to
who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the
other, the question is confined to the personal character and
circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with
"In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest"
in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have
a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held
that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein
is that since the Court of First Instance is without
jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the
eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of
votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to
determine which of the contestants has been duly elected"
the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that
no one had been legally elected president of the municipality
of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 June
1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not
Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of
municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that
Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead.
The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold
that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected
municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last
general election; and that said order and all subsequent
proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no
effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless
respondents raised some new and additional issues, let
judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So
ordered.49
22
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of
decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was
a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process
with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an
independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the
ineligible candidate to another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops
the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who
received the next highest number of votes as the winner and
bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of
votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he
could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but
by virtue of the lack of material time or any other
intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have
been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he
may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility
does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but
necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number
of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to
qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility
to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory
requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to
be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not
possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public
officials, those qualifications must be met before one even
becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is
voted for and eventually garners the highest number of
votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent
asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off
our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy
elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in
Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon
does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of
this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in
the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty
to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in
Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling
in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without
qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic
formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the
election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor
of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue
involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy.
We said that while provisions relating to certificates of
candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule
of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory
provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to
the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and
Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and
opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with
the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and
application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous
significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our
elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may
provide a way around the law that effectively negates
election requirements aimed at providing the electorate
with the basic information to make an informed choice
about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified
reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the
basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally
susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the
OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78
may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution
of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can
render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false
COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk
falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an
election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may
have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to
bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from
filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification,
and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification
case filed against him so he can submit himself to the
electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a
disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign
voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise
respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken
through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral
anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to
matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation
for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the
winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v.
COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC
cannot produce any legal effect.
23
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are
not considered at all in determining the winner of an
election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are
disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and
even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of
the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also
be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that
determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those
who are allowed to participate as players. When there are
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who
does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of
the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.
COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the
realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still
cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible
candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be
deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further
complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who
placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification
to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a
disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible.
Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s
disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate
who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed
as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually
the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed
and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed
prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not
only the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during Government Code will not apply.
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
his guilt is strong. GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2
February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified
suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his from running for any local elective position. CASAN
answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected
only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010
elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner. elections.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s This Decision is immediately executory.
candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the
sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the parties and the Commission on Elections.
effect of which is to disqualify the individual from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected,
from holding the office. No pronouncement as to costs.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his SO ORDERED.
citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino
and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of
candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for
public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective local
position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the
individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from
participating as candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate,
his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect
except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted
already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the
prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification,
although made long after the elections, reaches back to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be
not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
24
CASES ON DISQUALIFICATION UNDER LOCAL GOV’T
CODE:
[G.R. No. 120905. March 7, 1996]
RENATO U. REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and ROGELIO DE
CASTRO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 120940. March 7, 1996]
JULIUS O. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and RENATO U.
REYES, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For resolution are special civil actions of
certiorari. The petition in G.R. No. 120905 seeks to annul
the resolution dated May 9, 1995 of the Second Division of
the Commission on Elections, declaring petitioner Renato U.
Reyes disqualified from running for local office
and cancelling his certificate of candidacy, and the
resolution dated July 3, 1995 of the Commission en banc,
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. On the
other hand, the petition in G.R. No. 120940, filed by Julius
O. Garcia, has for its purpose the annulment of the aforesaid
resolution of July 3, 1995 of the Commission en banc insofar
as it denies his motion to be proclaimed the elected mayor
of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, in view of the
disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.
On August 1, 1995, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order directing the Commission on Elections en
banc to cease and desist from implementing its resolution
of July 3, 1995. It also ordered the two cases to be
consolidated, inasmuch as they involved the same
resolutions of the COMELEC.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor
of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, having
been elected to that office on May 11, 1992. On October 26,
1994, an administrative complaint was filed against him
with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr.
Ernesto Manalo. It was alleged, among other things, that
petitioner exacted and collected P50,000.00 from each
market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market; that
certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation
and Development Program of the Department of Interior
and Local government were never received by the Municipal
Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same
officer; and that he took twenty-seven (27) heads of cattle
from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the
latter had reared and fattened the cattle for seven months.
In its decision, dated February 6, 1995,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the
charges and ordered his removal from office.
It appears that earlier, after learning that
the Sanggunian had terminated the proceedings in the case
and was about to render judgment, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Regional
Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, alleging that the
proceedings had been terminated without giving him a
chance to be heard. A temporary restraining order was
issued by the court on February 7, 1995, enjoining
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with the
case. As a result, the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not served upon
Reyes. But on March 3, 1995, following the expiration of the
temporary restraining order and without any injunction
being issued by the Regional Trial Court, an attempt was
made to serve the decision upon petitioners counsel
in Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the
decision. Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon
petitioner himself also failed, as he also refused to accept the
decision.
On March 23, 1995, the Presiding Officer of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Vice Governor Pedrito A.
Reyes, issued an order for petitioner to vacate the position
of mayor and peacefully turn over the office to the
incumbent vice mayor. But service of the order upon
petitioner was also refused.
Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a
certificate of candidacy with the Office of the Election Officer
of the COMELEC in Bongabong.
On March 24, 1995, private respondent Rogelio de
Castro, as registered voter of Bongabong, sought the
disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing
the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which
states:
40. Disqualification. - The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case.
Nonetheless, because of the absence of any contrary
order from the COMELEC, petitioner Reyes was voted for in
the elections held on May 8, 1995.
On May 9, 1995, the COMELECs Second Division
issued the questioned resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, respondent having been removed from office
by virtue of Administrative Case 006-94, he is hereby
DISQUALIFIED from running for public office, in conformity
with Section 40, paragraph (b) of the 1991 Local
Government Code. The respondents Certificate of Candidacy
is CANCELLED in conformity with this resolution. The
Election Officer of Bongabong, Oriental Mindorois ordered
to amend the official list of candidates in Bongabong to
reflect the respondents disqualification and to
IMMEDIATELY circulate the amendment to the different
Boards of Election Inspectors in Bongabong upon the
receipt of this decision.
On May 10, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Bongabong, apparently unaware of the disqualification of
Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed him the duly-elected
mayor.
On July 3, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELECs Second
Division, but his motion was denied. The COMELEC en banc
declared him to have been validly disqualified as candidate
and, consequently, set aside his proclamation as municipal
mayor of Bongabong. Hence the petition in G.R. No.
120905, which was filed on July 20, 1995, alleging grave
abuse of discretion by the COMELEC on the ground that the
decision in the administrative case against petitioner Reyes
was not yet final and executory and therefore could not be
used as basis for his disqualification. It is contended that the
charges against him were rendered moot and academic by
the expiration of the term during which the acts complained
of had allegedly been committed. Invoking the ruling in the
case of Aguinaldo v. Santos,[1] petitioner argues that his
election on May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.
On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Julius M.
Garcia, who obtained the second highest number of votes
next to petitioner Reyes in the same elections of May 8,
1995, intervened in the COMELEC on June 13, 1995 (after
the main decision disqualifying Renato Reyes was
promulgated), contending that because Reyes was
disqualified, he (Garcia) was entitled to be proclaimed
mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro.
In its resolution of July 3, 1995, the COMELEC en banc
denied Garcias prayer, citing the ruling in Republic v. De la
25
Rosa[2] that a candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes in an election cannot be declared
winner. Hence the petition in G.R. No. 120940. Petitioner
contends that (1) the COMELEC en banc should have
decided his petition at least 15 days before the May 8, 1995
elections as provided in 78 of the Omnibus Elections Code,
and that because it failed to do so, many votes were
invalidated which could have been for him had the voters
been told earlier who were qualified to be candidates; (2)
that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was final
and executory and resulted in the automatic disqualification
of petitioner, and the COMELEC did not need much time to
decide the case for disqualification against Reyes since the
latter did not appeal the decision in the administrative case
ordering his removal; (3) that the COMELEC should have
considered the votes cast for Reyes as stray votes.
After deliberating on the petitions filed in these cases,
the Court resolved to dismiss them for lack of showing that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the resolutions in question.
G.R. No. 120905
First. Petitioner Reyes claims that the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, ordering him removed
from office, is not yet final because he has not been served a
copy thereof.
It appears, however, that the failure of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its
decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel
to receive the decision.As the secretary to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Mario Manzo, stated in his
certification, repeated attempts had been made to serve the
decision on Reyes personally and by registered mail, but
Reyes refused to receive the decision. Manzos certification
states:
On March 3, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay went
to Manila to furnish a copy of the decision to the Counsel for
Respondent, Atty. Rogelio V. Garcia, which said counsel
refused to accept.
On March 23, 1995, Mr. Mario I. C. Manzo, Secretary to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with
Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay again went to the office of the
Mayor of Bongabong to serve the decision. Mayor Renato U.
Reyes, himself present, refused to accept the ORDER
enforcing the decision citing particularly the pending case
filed in the Sala of Judge Manuel A. Roman as the basis of his
refusal.
On [sic] 4:40 p.m., of the same date, the Secretary to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, unable to serve the ORDER,
mailed the same (registered mail receipt No. 432) on
the Bongabong Post Office to forward the ORDER to the
Office of Mayor Renato U. Reyes.
On March 28, 1995 said registered mail was returned
to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with the following
inscriptions on the back by the Postmaster:
1) 1st attempt - addressee out of town -
9:15 a.m., 3-23-95
2) 2nd attempt - addressee cannot be
contacted, out of town, 8:50
a.m., 3-24-95
3) 3rd attempt - addressee not contacted -
out of town, 8:15 a.m.,
3-24-95
4) 4th attempt - addressee refused to accept
8:15 a.m., 3-27-95
On March 24, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay,
again went to Bongabong to serve the same ORDER
enforcing the decision. Mayor Renato U. Reyes was not
present so the copy was left on the Mayors Office with
comments from the employees that they would not accept
the same.[3]
Rule 13, 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the
service of final orders and judgments either personally or by
mail. Personal service is completed upon actual or
constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a
copy personally to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it
in his office with a person having charge thereof, or at his
residence, if his office is not known.[4] Hence service was
completed when the decision was served upon petitioners
counsel in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995. In addition,
as the secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan certified,
service by registered mail was also made on petitioner
Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was not
claimed by him, service was deemed completed five days
after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995.[5]
If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for
reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed
and the judgment or decision will be considered validly
served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver
it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsels
refusal to receive it.
Indeed that petitioners counsel knew that a decision
in the administrative case had been rendered is evident in
his effort to bargain with the counsel for
the SangguniangPanlalawigan not to have the decision
served upon him and his client while their petition for
certiorari in the Regional Trial Court was pending. [6] His
refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed
as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.
The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure
that the party being served with the pleading, order or
judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take
steps to protect his interests, i.e., enable a party to file an
appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the
decision becomes final.
In practice, service means the delivery or
communication of a pleading, notice or other papers in a
case to the opposite party so as to charge him with receipt
of it, and subject him to its legal effect.[7]
In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient
notice of the decision. Prudence required that, rather than
resist the service, he should have received the decision and
taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance
with R.A. No. 7160, 67.[8] But petitioner did not do
so. Accordingly, the decision became final on April 2, 1995,
30 days after the first service upon petitioner.
The net result is that when the elections were held
on May 8, 1995, the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final
and executory. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court did not prevent the administrative
decision from attaining finality. An original action of
certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt
the course of the principal action nor the running of
the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.[9]
Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal
action during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings,
there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower
court.[10]
In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining
order was issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary
injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary
restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that
moment on, there was no more legal barrier to the service
of the decision upon petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the decision cannot be served
upon him because at the hearing held on February 15,
1995 of the case which he filed in the RTC, the counsel of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Atty. Nestor Atienza, agreed
not to effect service of the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan pending final resolution of
the petition for certiorari.
26
 The alleged agreement between the counsels of Reyes
and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot bind
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. It was illegal. And it would
have been no less illegal for
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to have carried it out
because R.A. No. 7160, 66(a) makes it mandatory that
[c]opies of the decision [of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan] shall immediately be
furnished to respondent and/or interested parties. It was
the Sangguniang Panlalawigans duty to serve it upon the
parties without unnecessary delay. To have delayed the
service of the decision would have resulted in
the Sangguniang Panlalawigans failure to perform a legal
duty. It, therefore, properly acted in having its decision
served upon petitioner Reyes.
Second. The next question is whether the reelection of
petitioner rendered the administrative charges against him
moot and academic. Petitioner invokes the ruling
in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC,[11] in which it was held that a
public official could not be removed for misconduct
committed during a prior term and that his reelection
operated as a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove
him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the
petition questioning the validity of the administrative
decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of
office during which the alleged misconduct was committed
expired.[12] Removal cannot extend beyond the term during
which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public
official is not removed before his term of office expires, he
can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for
another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the
two Aguinaldo cases.
The case at bar is the very opposite of those
cases. Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an action to
question the decision in the administrative case, the
temporary restraining order issued in the action he brought
lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on
petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995,
because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the
President. He was thus validly removed from office and,
pursuant to 40 (b) of the Local Government Code, he was
disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases
were decided there was no provision similar to 40 (b) which
disqualifies any person from running for any elective
position on the ground that he has been removed as a result
of an administrative case. The Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive
effect. Said the Court in the first Aguinaldo case:[13]
The COMELEC applied Section 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code (Republic Act 7160) which provides:
Sec. 40. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local positions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case.
Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1,
1992 x x x. There is no provision in the statute which would
clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively.
It, therefore, follows that 40(b) of the Local
Government Code is not applicable to the present case.
Furthermore, the decision has not yet attained
finality. As indicated earlier, the decision of the then
Secretary of Local Government was questioned by the
petitioner in this Court and that to date, the petition remains
unresolved x x x.
At any rate, petitioners claim that he was not given
time to present his evidence in the administrative case has
no basis, as the following portion of the decision of
the SangguniangPanlalawigan makes clear:
On November 28, 1994 the Sanggunian received from
respondents counsel a motion for extension of time to file a
verified answer within 15 days from November 23, 1994. In
the interest of justice another fifteen (15) day period was
granted the respondent.
On December 5, 1994 which is the last day for filing
his answer, respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss and
set the same for hearing on December 22, 1994.
xxx xxx xxx
On January 4, 1995, the motion to dismiss was denied
for lack of merit and the order of denial was received by
respondent on January 7, 1995. Considering the fact that the
last day within which to file his answer fell on December 5,
1994, respondent is obliged to file the verified answer
on January 7, 1995 when he received the order denying his
motion to dismiss.
In the hearing of the instant case on January 26, 1995,
the counsel for the complainant manifested that he be
allowed to present his evidence for failure of the respondent
to file his answer albeit the lapse of 19 days from January 7,
1995.
The manifestation of complainants counsel was
granted over the objection of the respondent, and
the Sanggunian in open session, in the presence of the
counsel for the respondent, issued an order dated January
26, 1995 quoted as follows:
As shown from the record of this case, Mayor Renato U.
Reyes of Bongabong failed to file his answer within the time
prescribed by law, after the motion to dismiss was denied by
this Sanggunian. The Sanggunian declares that respondent
Mayor Renato U. Reyes failed to file his answer to the
complaint filed against him within the reglementary period
of fifteen (15) days. Counsel for respondent requested for
reconsideration twice, which oral motions for
reconsideration were denied for lack of merit.
Art. 126 (a) (1) provides that failure of respondent to file his
verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
complaint shall be considered a waiver of his rights to
present evidence in his behalf.
It is important to note that this case should be heard in
accordance with what is provided for in the constitution that
all parties are entitled to speedy disposition of their cases. It
is pivotal to state that the Sanggunian Panlalawigan will lose
its authority to investigate this case come February 8,
1995 and therefore, in the interest of justice and truth
the Sanggunian must exercise that authority by pursuing the
hearing of this case.
Accordingly, the counsel for complainant Dr. Ernesto
L. Manalo, et al., will present his evidence on February 2, 3,
and 6, 1995, and the counsel for respondent will be given a
chance to cross-examine the witnesses that may be
presented thereat.
xxx xxx xxx
On February 2, 1995, the respondent through counsel
despite due notice in open session, and by registered mail
(registry receipt No. 1495) dated January 27, 1995, failed to
appear. No telegram was received by this body to the effect
that he will appear on any of the dates stated in the Order
of January 26, 1995. Indeed, such inaction is a waiver of the
respondent to whatever rights he may have under our laws.
All in all, herein respondent Mayor Reyes was given by
this Sanggunian a period of sixty one (61) days to file his
verified answer however, he resorted to dilatory motions
which in the end proved fatal to his cause. Veritably, he
neither filed nor furnished the complainant a copy of his
answer. Failure of the respondent to file his verified answer
27
within fifteen (15)days from receipt of the complaint shall
be considered a waiver of his rights to present evidence in
his behalf ((1). Art. 126 of Rules and Regulations
implementing the Local Government Code of 1991). All
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of the Contitution).
Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient
opportunity to file his answer. He failed to do
so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be
presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then
have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on
the date set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this
was because he had filed a motion for postponement and
was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern
of delay he employed to render the case against him moot by
his election.
case before the date of the election, suffice it to say that
under R.A. No. 6646, 6, the COMELEC can continue
proceedings for disqualification against a candidate even
after the election and order the suspension of his
proclamation whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. For the same reason, we find no merit in the
argument that the COMELEC should have seen right away
that Reyes had not exhausted administrative remedies by
appealing the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and, therefore, should have
disqualified him before the elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. NO. 120905 and
G.R. No. 120940 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120940

We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the

part of the COMELEC in denying petitioner Julius O. Garcias
petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the
disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.

That the candidate who obtains the second highest

number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified is now settled.[14] The
doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings[15] has
since been removed. In the latest ruling[16] on the question,
this Court said:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have

received the other votes would be to substitute our
judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just
that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was
repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate,
the conditions would have substantially changed. We are
not prepared to extrapolate the results under the
circumstances.

Garcias plea that the votes cast for Reyes be

invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for Reyes are
presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was
qualified and for that reason can not be treated as stray,
void, or meaningless.[17] The subsequent finding that he is
disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as
to invalidate the votes cast for him.

As for Garcias contention that the COMELEC

committed a grave abuse of discretion in not deciding the

28
G.R. No. 94115 August 21, 1992
RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of the Department of
Local Government, and MELVIN VARGAS, as Acting
Governor of Cagayan, respondents.
Victor I. Padilla for petitioner.
Doroteo B. Laguna and Manuel T. Molina for private
respondent.
NOCON, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order,
petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails the decision of
respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March
19,1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89 dismissing him as
Governor of Cagayan on the ground that the power of the
Secretary of Local Government to dismiss local government
official under Section 14, Article I, Chapter 3 and Sections 60
to 67, Chapter 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, was repealed by the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
The pertinent facts are as follows: Petitioner was the duly
elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having been
elected to said position during the local elections held on
January 17, 1988, to serve a term of four (4) years
therefrom. He took his oath sometimes around March 1988.
Shortly after December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed,
respondent Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram
and a letter, both dated December 4, 1989, to petitioner
requiring him to show cause why should not be suspended
or remove from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within
forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof.
On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to
the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was
filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep,
respectively the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran,
Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts
the latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was
required to file a verified answer to the complaint.
On January 5, 1990, the Department of Local Government
received a letter from petitioner dated December 29, 1989
in reply to respondent Secretary's December 4, 1989 letter
requiring him to explain why should not be suspended or
removed from office for disloyalty. In his letter, petitioner
denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively
participating in its execution, though he admitted that he
was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. 1
Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as
his answer to the complaint of Mayor Veronico Agatep and
others. 2 On the basis thereof, respondent Secretary
suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from
notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation into
the charges against him.
During the hearing conducted on the charges against
petitioner, complainants presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to prove the charges. Petitioner
neither presented evidence nor even cross-examined the
complainant's witnesses, choosing instead to move that
respondent Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case,
which motion was denied.
Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned
decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering
his removal from office. Installed as Governor of Cagayan in
the process was respondent Melvin Vargas, who was then
the Vice-Governor of Cagayan.
Petitioner relies on three grounds for the allowance of the
petition, namely: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary
to suspend or remove local government official under
Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the
1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no
longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the
former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as
Governor of Cagayan; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty
committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of
evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under
the Revised Penal Code.
While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor
of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections. Three separate
petitions for his disqualification were then filed against him,
all based on the ground that he had been removed from
office by virtue of the March 19, 1990 resolution of
respondent Secretary. The commission on Elections granted
the petitions by way of a resolution dated May 9, 1992. On
the same day, acting upon a "Motion to Clarify" filed by
petitioner, the Commission ruled that inasmuch as the
resolutions of the Commission becomes final and executory
only after five (5) days from promulgation, petitioner may
still be voted upon as a candidate for governor pending the
final outcome of the disqualification cases with his Court.
Consequently, on May 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court, G.R. Nos. 105128-30,
entitled Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections, et
al., seeking to nullify the resolution of the Commission
ordering his disqualification. The Court, in a resolution
dated May 14, 1992, issued a temporary restraining order
against the Commission to cease and desist from enforcing
its May 9, 1992 resolution pending the outcome of the
disqualification case, thereby allowing the canvassing of the
votes and returns in Cagayan to proceed. However, the
Commission was ordered not to proclaim a winner until this
Court has decided the case.
On June 9, 1992, a resolution was issued in the
aforementioned case granting petition and annulling the
May 9, 1992 resolution of the Commission on the ground
that the decision of respondent Secretary has not yet
attained finality and is still pending review with this Court.
As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the
resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as
Governor of Cagayan.
Under the environmental circumstances of the case, We find
the petition meritorious.
Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of
Cagayan has rendered the administration case pending
before Us moot and academic. It appears that after the
canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of
votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan
province. As held by this Court in Aguinaldo v. Comelec et al.,
supra,:
. . . [T]he certified true xerox copy of the "CERTITICATE OF
VOTES OF CANDIDATES", attached to the "VERY URGENT
MOTION FOR THE MODIFICATION OF THE RESOLUTION
DATED MAY 14, 1992["] filed by petitioner shows that he
received 170,382 votes while the other candidates for the
same position received the following total number of votes:
(1) Patricio T. Antonio — 54,412, (2) Paquito F. Castillo —
2,198; and (3) Florencio L. Vargas — 48,129.
xxx xxx xxx
29
Considering the fact narrated, the expiration of petitioner's
term of office during which the acts charged were allegedly
committed, and his subsequent reelection, the petitioner
must be dismissed for the reason that the issue has become
academic. In Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, L-
11959, October 31, 1959, this Court has ruled:
The weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the
ruled denying the right to remove from office because of
misconduct during a prior term to which we fully subscribe.
Offenses committed, or acts done,
during a previous term are generally
held not to furnish cause for removal
and this is especially true were the
Constitution provides that the penalty
in proceeding for removal shall not
extend beyond the removal from office,
and disqualification from holding office
for a term for which the officer was
elected or appointed. (6 C.J.S. p. 248,
citing Rice v. State, 161 S.W. 2nd 4011;
Montgomery v. Newell, 40 S.W. 23rd
418; People ex rel Bashaw v. Thompson,
130 P. 2nd 237; Board of Com'rs
Kingfisher County v. Shutler, 281 P. 222;
State v. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fedula,
147 A 67; State v. Wald, 43 S.W. 217)
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from
other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p.
45, citing Atty. Gen. v. Kasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 Sec. 599, 50
L.R.A. [NS] 553). As held in Comant v. Bregan [ 1887] 6
N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.L.R. 63 Sec. 559, 50 [NE] 553.
The Court should ever remove a public
officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be
to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers. When a people have
elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his
fault or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the court, by
reason of such fault or misconduct, to
practically overrule the will of the
people. (Lizares v. Hechanova, et al., 17
SCRA 58, 59-60 [1966]) (See also
Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163
[1974]) 3
Clear then, the rule is that a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a
prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application
to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may
have committed during the failed coup.
The other grounds raised by petitioner deserve scant
consideration. Petitioner contends that the power of
respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local
government officials as alter ego of the President, and as
embodied in B.P. Blg. 337 has been repealed by the 1987
Constitution and which is now vested in the courts.
We do not agree. The power of respondent Secretary to
remove local government officials is anchored on both the
Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative
branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII
(17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the
President the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general
supervision over local governments, and by the doctrine
that the acts of the department head are presumptively the
acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. 4 The
statutory grant found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional
roots, having been enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa
pursuant to Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2 of
which specifically provided as follows —
Sec. 2. The National Assembly shall
enact a local government code which
may not thereafter be amended except
by a majority vote of all its Members,
defining a more responsive and
accountable local government structure
with an effective system of recall,
allocating among the different local
government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and
providing for the qualifications, election
and removal, term, salaries, power,
functions, and duties of local
government officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units. However,
any change in the existing form of local
government shall not take effect until
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite called for the purpose. 5
A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provided
for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointmen
t, and removal, term and salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to
the organization and operation of the
local units. 6
Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to
enact a local government code, which provides for the
manner of removal of local government officials, is found in
the 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987 Constitution,
then it can not be said that BP Blg. 337 was repealed by the
effective of the present Constitution.
Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., 7 this court
had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force
despite the effectivity of the present Constitution, until such
time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is
approved.
The power of respondent Secretary of the Department of
Local Government to remove local elective government
officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of B.P. Blg. 337. 8
As to petitioner's argument of the want of authority of
respondent Secretary to appoint respondent Melvin Vargas
as Governor of Cagayan, We need but point to Section 48 (1)
of B.P. Blg 337 to show the fallacy of the same, to writ —
In case a permanent vacancy arises
when a governor . . . refuses to assume
office, fails to quality, dies or is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office, the
30
 vice-governor . . . shall assume the office
for the unexpired term of the former. 9

Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that before he

could be suspended or removed from office, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with
a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined
and penalized under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, but administratively
with the end in view of removing petitioner as the duly
elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty
to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only
substantial evidence. 10

WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby GRANTED and the

decision of public respondent Secretary of Local
Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No. P-
10437-89, dismissing petitioner as Governor of Cagayan, is
hereby REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

31