G.R. No.

L-32328 September 30, 1977

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO: ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR,
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, and ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners-appellants
vs.
FELINO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO, oppositors-appellees.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition to review the order dated April 13, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, in Special Proceeding No. 2176 dismissing the
petition for the probate of a will. 1

One Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence.

Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews, respectively, of Adriana Maloto, in the belief that
decedent died intestate, commenced on November 4, 1963 in the Court of First Instance of iloilo an intestate proceeding docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 1736. In the course of said intestate proceeding, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto executed
an extrajudicial Partition of the estate of Adriana Maloto on February 1, 1964 whereby they adjudicated said estate unto themselves in the proportion of
one-fourth (1/4) share for each. 2 The Court of First Instance of iloilo, then prescribed by Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, ed he diamond partition on March
approve extrajudicial on March 21, 1964. 3

On April 1, 1967, a document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be the last with and testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the Clerk of Art of
the Art of First Instant of Iloilo. 4 It appears that Aldina Maloto Casiano Consent Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto are named as heirs but Maloto
Casiano and Constancio Maloto allegedly have shares in said with which are bigger, different and more valuable than what they obtained in the
extrajudicial partition. The said will also allegedly made dispositions to certain devisees and/or legatees, among whom being the Asilo de Molo, the
Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

On May 24, 1967, Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion (1) for reconsideration; (2) annulment of
the proceedings; and (3) for the allowance of the last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 5 The Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and
Purificacion Miraflor also filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 petitions for the allowance of the will of Adriana Maloto. 6

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto opposed the motion of Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto.

The Court of First Instance of iloilo, through Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, issued an order dated November 16, 1968 denying the motion to reopen the
proceedings on the ground that the said motion had been filed out of time. A motion for reconsideration of said order was denied. Petitioners appealed
from the order of denial. On motion of Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto, the lower court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed late. A
motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied. A supplemental order dated April 1, 1969 stating as additional ground that the appeal is
improper was issued.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. L-30479. This Court dismissed the petition in a
resolution dated May 14, 1969 which reads:

L-010479 (Constancio Maloto, et al, vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc., et al.) — THE COURT RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for
certiorari and mandamus, without passing on the issue of whether or not the petitioners appeal from the order of November 16,
1968 of respondent Judge was made on time, it appearing that the more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the premises stated in
the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in question. 7

Acting on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and citation, fl Art issued a resolution dated July 15, 1969 which reads:

Acting on the motion for reconsideration and/or clarification filed by petitioner in G. R. No. L-30479, Constancio Maloto, et al., vs.
Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc. et al., dated June 11, 1969, the Court resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration, with the
clarification that the matter of whether or not the pertinent findings of facts of respondent Judge in his herein subject order of
November 16, 1968 constitute res adjudicata may be raised in the proceedings for probate of the alleged will in question indicated in
the resolution of this Court of May 14, 1969, wherein such matter will be more appropriately determined. 8

Thereupon, the herein petitioners commenced Special Proceeding No. 2176 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the probate of the alleged last will
and testament of Adriana Maloto. 9

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

I. THAT THE ALLEGED WILL SOUGHT TO BE PROBATED HAD BEEN DESTROYED AND REVOKED BY THE TESTATRIX.

II. THAT THE INSTANT PETITION FOR PROBATE IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT OR ORDER (OR RES JUDICATA).

III. THAT THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO HAD ALREADY PASSED OUT OF EXISTENCE AND TITLE THERETO
HAD ALREADY ARRESTED IN THE DISTRIBUTEES OF THEIR ASSIGNS.
 IV. THAT PETITIONERS ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO AND CONSTANCIO MALOTO ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING THE
REMEDY TENDER THIS PROCEEDING, THEY HAVING CEASED TO BE INTERESTED PARTIES. 10

In an order dated April 13, 1970, the probate court dismissed the petition for the probate of the with on the basis of the finding of said court in Special
Proceeding No. 1736 that the alleged win sought to be Probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. The probate court sustained the
oppositors' contention that the petition for probate is now barred by the order of November 16, 1968 in the intestate estate proceeding, Special
Proceeding No. 1736. 11

The herein petitioners allege that the probate court committed the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE .kl).NIITTEI)I,Y GENUINE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE
ADRIANA MALOTO (THE SUBJECT OF PETITION FOR PROBATE — SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 2176, CFI ILOILO) HAD
PREVIOUSLY BEEN REVOKED BY HER (ADRIANA MALOTO).

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAID PETITION (FOR PROBATE OF THE AFORESAID LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO) IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT. I. E., THAT THE MATTER
CONCERNED IS NOW RES ADJUDICATA

III

THE LOWER COURT, THEREFORE, ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AFORESAID PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL
AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO AND IN NOT, INSTEAD, GIVING IT (THE PETITION ABOVE-CITED DUE
COURSE.12

The instant petition for review is meritorious.

The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged with of Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736.
Indeed, the motion to reopen the was denied because the same was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate
proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of
November 16, 1968 that "Movants should have filed a separate action for the probate of the Will." 13 And this court stated in its resolution of May 14,
1969 that "The more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the
probate of the alleged with in question."

In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition for the probate of the
alleged will of Adriana Maloto.

WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto is hereby set aside and the
lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the petition in Special Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 190 October 18, 1977

RE: CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO, FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO, MARIO B. CHANLIONGCO II,
MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA and MARIO C. CHANLIONGCO, JR., claimants.ñé+.£ªwph!1

RESOLUTION

MAKASIAR, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£

This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by the heirs of the late ATTY. MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO an attorney in this Court, under the
provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as amended by R.A. No. 4986, which was approved by this Court in its resolution of August 19, 1976, effective on July 12,
1976 it a g from the records that at the time of his death on July 12, 1976, Atty. Chanliongco was more than 63 years of age, with more than 38 years of
service in the government. He did not have any pending criminal administrative or not case against him, neither did he have any money or property
accountability. The highest salary he received was P18,700.00 per annum.

The above named flied the appellants for benefits with the accruing and with the Government Service System.

Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only Intimate Mario it appears that there are other deceased to namely, Mrs. Angelina C. , Jr.,
both born out of wedlock to Angelina R Crespo, and duly recognized by the deceased. Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17 years of age, all the claimants
are of legal age.
According to law, the benefits accruing to the deceased consist of: (1) retirement benefits; (2) money value of terminal leave; (3) life insurance and (4)
refund of retirement premium.

From the records now before US, it appears that the GSIS had already the release the life insurance proceeds; and the refund of rent to the claimants.

What, therefore, to be settled are the retirement benefits and the money value of leave, both of which are to be paid by this court as the deceased's last
employer.

The record also shows that the late Atty. Chanliongco died ab intestato and that he filed or over to state in his application for membership with the GSIS
the beneficiary or benefits of his retirement benefits, should he die before retirement. Hence, the retirement benefits shall accrue to his estate and will be
distributed among his Legal heirs in with the benefits on intestate s , as in the caw of a fife if no benefit is named in the policy (Vda. de vs. GSIS, L-
28093, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315, 325).

Insofar therefore as the retirement benefits are WE adopt in toto, for being in accordance with law, the GSIS determination of the amount of the
retirement the kill heirs and their e shares as indicated in its letter to US, dated March 15, 1977, to wit: ñé+.£ªwph!1

(a) Amount of retirement grautity:

1
. Total 37.57169 years
creditable
service

2. Pl,558.33333/mo.
Highest
rate of
salary

3. 50.14338 months
Gratuity
in terms
of
months

4.
Amount
of
gratuity
(highest

salary) x P78,140,10
(No. of
grautity
months)

(b) Legal heirs:

1
. Fidela B. widow
Chanliongco.

2. Mario B. legitimate
Chanliongco son
II.

3. Ma. illegitimate
Angelina C. child
Buenaventura

4. Mario illegitimate
Chanliongco child
Jr.

(c)
Distribution

(1) 8/16 share P39,070.050

to Mario II

(2) 4/16 share 19,535.025

to the widow,
Fidela B.
Chanliongco
 (3) 2/16 19 535 25
share, or
P9,767.5125
each to the
two
illegitimate
children Ma.
Angelina C.
Buenaventura
and Mario
Chanliongco,
Jr.

TOTAL P78.140.100

Coming now to the money value of the terminal leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustment pursuant to Budget Circular
No. 240, dated July 22, 1974, this Court's Finance Officer, in a memorandum dated March 23, 1977, indicated the
breakdown of these items as follows:

Unpaid salary for July 8-12,

1976 @

P1,416.66/mo. P228.49

10% salary adj. for July 1-12, 54.84

1976

Money value of terminal leave

for the

period from July 13, 1976 to

September

14,1977 @ P1,558.33 21,962.54

Sub-Total P22,9245.87

Less:

Withholding Tax P1,400.00

Supreme Court

Savings & Loan

Association 7,340.42 8.740.42

NET P13,505.45
PROCEEDS

It further appears that at the time of his death the late Atty. Chanliongco had an outstanding account with the Supreme
Court Savings & Loans Association in the sum of P7,340.42. Deduction this amount plus another sum of P1,400.00,
representing withhold tax due from him, or a total of P8,740.42, from above sub-total sum of P22,245.87. WE have at the
net sum P13,505.45, available for distribute to the claimants as follows:

1
. Fidela B.
Chanliongco

a. As P 6,752.72
her
conjugal
share

b. As a P 1,688.18
legal
heir

2. Mario P 3,376.36
Chanliongco
II
 3. Ma. 844.10
Angelina C.
Buenaventura

4. Mario Jr. 844.09

T OTA P13,505.45
L

It will be seen from the f distribution that the money value of the unused vacation and sick leave, unpaid will and 10% adjustment due to the has been
treated as conjugal property. Accordingly, one-half (l/2) goes to the widow as her share in the conjugal hip and the other half P6,752.725 is to be
distributed to the deceased's kill him, using the same one WE used in distributing the retirement benefits. This is so because "Vacation with pay is not a
gratuity but is compensation for services rendered." (Ramey vs. State, 296 NW 323, 296 Mich. 449).

WHEREFORE, THE CLAIMS ARE HEREBY APPROVED. THE FINANCE AND/OR DISBURSING OFFICER OF THIS COURT IS
ORDERED To pay IMMEDIATELY TO EACH AND EVERY CLAIMANT HE VARIOUS SUMS HEREUNDER INDICATED OPPOSITE
THEIR NAMES, AS FOLLOWS:

1
. FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO

A. HER 4/16 SHARE OF P19,535.025

RETIREMENT GRATUITY

B. HER SHARE FROM

MONEY VALUE OF TEAL
LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY
AND 10% ADJUSTMENT:

(1) AS HER CONJUGAL 6,752.72

SHARE

(2) AS A LEGAL HEIR P1,688.18

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER P27,975.93

2. MARIO CHANLIONGCO II

A. HIS 8/16 SHARE OF P39,070.05

RETIREMENT GRATUITY

B. HIS SHARE FROM 3,376.36

MONEY VALUE OF
TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID
SALARY AND 10%
ADJUSTMENT

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM P42,446.41

3. MA. ANGELINA C.
BUENAVENTURA:

A. HER 2/16 SHARE OF P9,767.51

RETIREMENT GRATUITY

B. HER SHARE FROM 844.10

MONEY VALUE OF
TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID
SALARY AND 10%
ADJUSTMENT

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER P10,611.61

4. MARIO CHANLIONGCO
JR. TO BE PAID THROUGH
HIS MOTHER AND NATURAL
GUARDIAN, ANGELINA
CRESPO):

A. HIS 2/16 SHARE OF P9,767.51

RETIREMENT GRATUITY

B. HIS SHARE FROM 844.10

MONEY VALUE OF
TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID
SALARY AND 10%
 ADJUSTMENT

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM P10,611.61

SO ORDERED.

Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Muñ;oz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., Martin, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

Fernando, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. The provisions on legitime are found under the rubric of testamentary succession. That does not mean that the legitime is taken into account
only in testamentary succession. The legitime must also be taken into consideration in legal succession.

There may be instances, like the instant case, where in legal succession the estate is distributed according to the rules on legitime without applying the
rules on intestate ion. The reason is that sometimes the estate is not even sufficient to satisfy the legitimes. The legitimes of the primary compulsory
heirs, like a child or descendant, should first be satisfied.

In this case the decedent's legal heirs are his legitimate child, his widow and two intimate children. His estate is partitioned among those heirs by giving
them their respective time.

The legitimate child gets one-half of the estate as his legitime which is regarded as his share as a legal heir Art 888, Civil Code).

The widow's legitime is one-fourth of the estate. That represents also her share as a legal heir (Art. 892, 1st sentence, Civil Code).

The remaining one-fourth of the estate, which is the free portion, goes to the illegitimate children in equal shares, as their legitime, Pursuant to the
provision that 'the legitimate of the illegitimate children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at the free disposal of the testator, provoked that in
no case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse must first be fully
satisfied par., art. 895, Civil Code).

The rule in Santillon vs. Miranda, L-19281, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 563, that when the surviving spouse concurs with only one legitimate child, the
spouse is entitled to one-half of the estate and the gets the other half, t to article 996 of the Civil Code, does not apply to the case because here intimate
children concur with the surviving spouse and the intimate child.

In this case, to divide the estate between the surviving spouse and the ligitemate child that deprive the illegitimate children of their legitime.

So, the decendent's estate is distributed in the proportion of 1/2 for the legitimate child, 1/4 for the widow and 1/8 each for the two illegitimate children.

Also not of possible application to this case is the rule that the legal of an acknowledge natural child is 1/2 of the legitime of the legitimate child of that
the of the spurious child is 2/5 of that of the of the intimate child or 4/5 of that of that of the acknowledged natural child.

The rule be applied because the estate is not sufficient to cover legitimes of all compulsory heirs. That is one of the flaws of the law of succession.

A situation as in the instant case may arise where the illegitimate children get less than their legitime.

With respect to the decendant's unpaid salary and the money value of his leave, the same are conjugal properties because of the rule that property
"obtained by the or work, or as salary of the spouses, or either of them", is conjugal in character (Art. 153[2], Civil Code).

G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and
Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on
November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the
will annexed be issued to her.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their
opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased,
oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is
void.

On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute
preterition.

On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.1äwphï1.ñët

The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased
Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.

A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.

1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance
with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage
of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein. 1

A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the
meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. 2 But
petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And
for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before
us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. 3 After all,
there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study
of the disputed will and the applicable statute.

Reproduced hereunder is the will:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and
bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness
whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) Illegible

T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution
of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious. ...

Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein
copied, thus —

Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...

A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:

La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le
instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su
derecho a legitima.
 Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes
por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.

Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba
en el testamento.

It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the
word annul:

To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6

The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to
nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden
vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123
W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the
direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received
nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such
preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of
Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.9 The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies
or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:

En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se añade limitacion alguna, como en
el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe,
pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al
817. 10

The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: —

La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es
la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los
bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del
precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire
inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir — without any other testamentary
disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for
inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the
"Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:

... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna
favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa,
porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse
sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en
todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto
mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con
repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley
ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario
a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi
fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la
testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla
de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12

3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests
that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him,
the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from
the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution
of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que
no se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la
porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void.
And, intestate succession ensues.

4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition". 15From this, petitioner draws the
conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye
la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance
"es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be
supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled
ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil
Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the
form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs",
put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive
language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus:
"Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 23

5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not
invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24

This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:

But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage should be treated
as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete
abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and
betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution,
would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning
the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of
construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments,
and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must
be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are
separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are in themselves different.
Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular
or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of
heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the
same. The entire will is null.

Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C.
BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL
SAYSON, respondents.

At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners
deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.

The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and
Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of
Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful
descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and
Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12.
The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the same evidence.

Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,

1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9,
1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.

In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs
of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.

Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042
(CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from
the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the
evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.

The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967,
when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article
335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural
children by legal fiction."

Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita
Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. 6

The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro
and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the
couple.

On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory.
That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of
adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have
done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.

As the respondent court correctly observed:

When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners
could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have
filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the
revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and
EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded.

Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the
finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified.

A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for
partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.

The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a
collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary
jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:

Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
 An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it;
it cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a
judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may
be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the
jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in
accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until
reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted
children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might
be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been
valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth
certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The
affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never
offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11where we
ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be
questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.

The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental
purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period
limited by law.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)

In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as
their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:

Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from different marriages.

An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.

The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and
thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his
children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.

Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one who the person represented would have succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their
own right, and the latter by right of representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her
deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father
would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. 13

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the
adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The
relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either
party. 14

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and
Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was
correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private
respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976

BENITA SALAO, assisted by her husband, GREGORIO MARCELO; ALMARIO ALCURIZA, ARTURO ALCURIZA, OSCAR ALCURIZA and ANITA
ALCURIZA, the latter two being minors are represented by guardian ad litem, ARTURO ALCURIZA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JUAN S. SALAO, later substituted by PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator of the Intestate of JUAN S. SALAO; now MERCEDES P. VDA. DE
SALAO, ROBERTO P. SALAO, MARIA SALAO VDA. DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P. SALAO, ISABEL SALAO DE SANTOS, and PABLO P. SALAO, as
successors-in-interest of the late JUAN S. SALAO, together with PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator, defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:

This litigation regarding a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Hermosa, Bataan involves the law of trusts and prescription. The facts
are as follows:
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and
Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child, Valentin Salao.

There is no documentary evidence as to what properties formed part of Manuel Salao's estate, if any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death,
her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.

It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized on May 22, 1919 (Exh. 21). The deed was signed by her four legal
heirs, namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in representation of his deceased father, Patricio.

The lands left by Valentina Ignacio, all located at Barrio Dampalit, were as follows:

Nature of Land Area in square meters

(1) One-half interest in a fishpond which she had inherited from her parents, Feliciano Ignacio and
21,700
Damiana Mendoza, and the other half of which was owned by her co-owner, Josefa Sta. Ana

(2) Fishpond inherited from her parents 7,418

(3) Fishpond inherited from her parents 6,989

(4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt 50,469

(5) Fishpond with an area of one hectare, 12 ares and 5 centares purchased from Bernabe and
11,205
Honorata Ignacio by Valentina Ignacio on November 9, 1895 with a bodega for salt.

(6) Fishpond 8,000

(7) One-half interest in a fishpond with a total area of 10,424 square meters, the other half was
5,217
owned by A. Aguinaldo

(8) Riceland 50,454

(9) Riceland purchased by Valentina Ignacio from Eduardo Salao on January 27, 1890 with a house
8,065
and two camarins thereon

(10) Riceland in the name of Ambrosia Salao, with an area of 11,678 square meters, of which 2,173
9,505
square meters were sold to Justa Yongco

TOTAL 179,022
square meters
To each of the legal heirs of Valentina Ignacio was adjudicated a distributive share valued at P8,135.25. In satisfaction of his distributive share, Valentin
Salao (who was then already forty-eight years old) was given the biggest fishpond with an area of 50,469 square meters, a smaller fishpond with an area
of 6,989 square meters and the riceland with a net area of 9,905 square meters. Those parcels of land had an aggregate appraised value of P13,501
which exceeded Valentin's distributive share. So in the deed of partition he was directed to pay to his coheirs the sum of P5,365.75. That arrangement,
which was obviously intended to avoid the fragmentation of the lands, was beneficial to Valentin.

In that deed of partition (Exh. 21) it was noted that "desde la muerte de Valentina Ignacio y Mendoza, ha venido administrando sus bienes la referida
Ambrosia Salao" "cuya administracion lo ha sido a satisfaccion de todos los herederos y por designacion los mismos". It was expressly stipulated that
Ambrosia Salao was not obligated to render any accounting of her administration "en consideracion al resultado satisfactorio de sus gestiones,
mejoradas los bienes y pagadas por ella las contribuciones" (pages 2 and 11, Exh. 21).

By virtue of the partition the heirs became "dueños absolutos de sus respectivas propiedadas, y podran inmediatamente tomar posesion de sus bienes,
en la forma como se han distribuido y llevado a cabo las adjudicaciones" (page 20, Exh. 21).
The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao,
secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio
Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 14). It is also known as Lot No. 540 of the Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao later became a part of
Bataan.

The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.

Plaintiffs' theory is that Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital is not shown in
any documentary evidence. Plaintiffs' version is that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the funds used were the
earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond.
There is no documentary evidence to support that theory.

On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of lands purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao in 1905,
1906, 1907 and 1908 as shown in their Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 13. But this point is disputed by the plaintiffs.

However, there can be no controversy as to the fact that after Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond
in 1911 they exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao.

Thus, on December 1, 1911 Ambrosia Salao sold under pacto de retro for P800 the Calunuran fishpond to Vicente Villongco. The period of redemption
was one year. In the deed of sale (Exh. 19) Ambrosia confirmed that she and her brother Juan were the dueños proindivisos of the said pesqueria. On
December 7, 1911 Villongco, the vendee a retro, conveyed the same fishpond to Ambrosia by way of lease for an anual canon of P128 (Exh. 19-a).

After the fishpond was redeemed from Villongco or on June 8, 1914 Ambrosia and Juan sold it under pacto de retro to Eligio Naval for the sum of
P3,360. The period of redemption was also one year (Exh. 20). The fishpond was later redeemed and Naval reconveyed it to the vendors a retro in a
document dated October 5, 1916 (Exh. 20-a).

The 1930 survey shown in the computation sheets of the Bureau of Lands reveals that the Calunuran fishpond has an area of 479,205 square meters
and that it was claimed by Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao, while the Pinañganacan fishpond (subsequently acquired by Juan and Ambrosia) has an
area of 975,952 square meters (Exh. 22).

Likewise, there is no controversy as to the fact that on May 27, 1911 Ambrosia Salao bought for four thousand pesos from the heirs of Engracio Santiago
a parcel of swampland planted to bakawan and nipa with an area of 96 hectares, 57 ares and 73 centares located at Sitio Lewa, Barrio Pinañganacan,
Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 17-d).

The record of Civil Case No. 136, General Land Registration Office Record No. 12144, Court of First Instance of Pampanga shows that Ambrosia Salao
and Juan Salao filed an application for the registration of that land in their names on January 15, 1916. They alleged in their petition that "han adquirido
dicho terreno por partes iguales y por la compra a los herederos del finado, Don Engracio Santiago" (Exh. 17-a).

At the hearing on October 26, 1916 before Judge Percy M. Moir, Ambrosia testified for the applicants. On that same day Judge Moir rendered a
decision, stating inter alia, that the heirs of Engracio Santiago had sold the land to Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao. Judge Moir "ordena la adjudicacion
y registro del terreno solicitado a nombre de Juan Salao, mayor de edad y de estado casado y de su esposa Diega Santiago y Ambrosia Salao, de
estado soltera y mayor de edad, en participaciones iguales" (Exh. 17-e).

On November 28, 1916 Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for the said land. The decree was issued on February 21, 1917. On March 12,
1917 Original Certificate of Title No. 472 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga was issued in the names of Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao.

That Pinañganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the Hermosa cadastre (Exh. 23). It adjoins the Calunuran fishpond (See
sketch, Exh. 1).

Juan Y. Salao, Sr. died on November 3, 1931 at the age of eighty years (Exh. C). His nephew, Valentin Salao, died on February 9, 1933 at the age of
sixty years according to the death certificate (Exh. A. However, if according to Exhibit 21, he was forty-eight years old in 1918, he would be sixty-three
years old in 1933).

The intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudicially on December 28, 1934 between his two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo and
Victorina Salao-Alcuriza (Exh. 32). His estate consisted of the two fishponds which he had inherited in 1918 from his grandmother, Valentina Ignacio.

If it were true that he had a one-third interest in the Calunuran and Lewa fishponds with a total area of 145 hectares registered in 1911 and 1917 in the
names of his aunt and uncle, Ambrosia Salao and Juan Y. Salao, Sr., respectively, it is strange that no mention of such interest was made in the
extrajudicial partition of his estate in 1934.

It is relevant to mention that on April 8, 1940 Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece, plaintiff Benita Salao, three lots located at Barrio Dampalit with
a total area of 5,832 square meters (Exh. L). As donee Benita Salao signed the deed of donation.

On that occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to her and to the children of her sister, Victorina, the Calunuran fishpond if it were true
that it was held in trust by Ambrosia as the share of Benita's father in the alleged joint venture.

But she did not make any such demand. It was only after Ambrosia Salao's death that she thought of filing an action for the reconveyance of the
Calunuran fishpond which was allegedly held in trust and which had become the sole property of Juan Salao y Santiago (Juani).

On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's death on September 14, 1945 due to senility (she
was allegedly eighty-five years old when she died), she donated her one-half proindiviso share in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S.
Salao, Jr. (Juani). At that time she was living with Juani's family. He was already the owner of the other half of the said fishponds, having inherited it from
his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli). The deed of donation included other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the
usufruct over the said properties during her lifetime (Exh. 2 or M).

The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950 (page 39, Defendants' Record on Appeal).

The lawyer of Benita Salao and the children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January 26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-
third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third
share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000 (Exh. K).
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds and that
the sole owners thereof were his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he (Juani) was the
donee of Ambrosia's one-half share (Exh. K-1).

Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan S. Salao, Jr. on January 9, 1952 in the Court of First Instance of
Bataan (Exh. 36). They amended their complaint on January 28, 1955. They asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the
reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names
of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured by his father and aunt. He also invoked the Statute
of Frauds, prescription and laches. As counter-claims, he asked for moral damages amounting to P200,000, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of
not less than P22,000 and reimbursement of the premiums which he has been paying on his bond for the lifting of the receivership. Juan S. Salao, Jr.,
died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one. He was substituted by his widow, Mercedes Pascual, and his six children and by the administrator of his estate.

In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds in question were adjudicated to his seven legal heirs in equal shares with
the condition that the properties would remain under administration during the pendency of this case (page 181, Defendants' Record on Appeal).

After trial the lower court in its decision consisting of one hundred ten printed pages dismissed the amended complaint and the counter-claim. In sixty-
seven printed pages it made a laborious recital of the testimonies of plaintiffs' fourteen witnesses, Gregorio Marcelo, Norberto Crisostomo, Leonardo
Mangali, Fidel de la Cruz, Dionisio Manalili, Ambrosio Manalili, Policarpio Sapno, Elias Manies, Basilio Atienza, Benita Salao, Emilio Cagui, Damaso de
la Peña, Arturo Alcuriza and Francisco Buensuceso, and the testimonies of defendants' six witnesses, Marcos Galicia, Juan Galicia, Tiburcio Lingad.
Doctor Wenceslao Pascual, Ciriaco Ramirez and Pablo P. Salao. (Plaintiffs presented Regino Nicodemus as a fifteenth witness, a rebuttal witness).

The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran and
Pinañganacan (Lewa) lands were acquired; that a co-ownership over the real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed among her heirs after her death in
1914; that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918 when her estate was partitioned among her three
children and her grandson, Valentin Salao.

The trial court surmised that the co-ownership which existed from 1914 to 1918 misled the plaintiffs and their witnesses and caused them to believe
erroneously that there was a co-ownership in 1905 or thereabouts. The trial court speculated that if Valentin had a hand in the conversion into fishponds
of the Calunuran and Lewa lands, he must have done so on a salary or profit-sharing basis. It conjectured that Valentin's children and grandchildren
were given by Ambrosia Salao a portion of the earnings of the fishponds as a reward for his services or because of Ambrosia's affection for her
grandnieces.

The trial court rationalized that Valentin's omission during his lifetime to assail the Torrens titles of Juan and Ambrosia signified that "he was not a co-
owner" of the fishponds. It did not give credence to the testimonies of plaintiffs' witnesses because their memories could not be trusted and because no
strong documentary evidence supported the declarations. Moreover, the parties involved in the alleged trust were already dead.

It also held that the donation was validly executed and that even if it were void Juan S. Salao, Jr., the donee, would nevertheless be the sole legal heir of
the donor, Ambrosia Salao, and would inherit the properties donated to him.

Both parties appealed. The plaintiffs appealed because their action for reconveyance was dismissed. The defendants appealed because their
counterclaim for damages was dismissed.

The appeals, which deal with factual and legal issues, were made to the Court of Appeals. However, as the amounts involved exceed two hundred
thousand pesos, the Court of Appeals elevated the case to this Court in its resolution of October 3, 1966 (CA-G.R. No. 30014-R).

Plaintiffs' appeal. - An appellant's brief should contain "a subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the argument and page references" to the
contents of the brief (Sec. 16[a] Rule 46, 1964 Rules of Court; Sec. 17, Rule 48, 1940 Rules of Court).

The plaintiffs in their appellants' brief consisting of 302 pages did not comply with that requirement. Their statements of the case and the facts do not
contain "page references to the record" as required in section 16[c] and [d] of Rule 46, formerly section 17, Rule 48 of the 1940 Rules of Court.

Lawyers for appellants, when they prepare their briefs, would do well to read and re-read section 16 of Rule 46. If they comply strictly with the formal
requirements prescribed in section 16, they might make a competent and luminous presentation of their clients' case and lighten the burden of the Court.

What Justice Fisher said in 1918 is still true now: "The pressure of work upon this Court is so great that we cannot, in justice to other litigants, undertake
to make an examination of the voluminous transcript of the testimony (1,553 pages in this case, twenty-one witnesses having testified), unless the
attorneys who desire us to make such examination have themselves taken the trouble to read the record and brief it in accordance with our rules"
(Palarca vs. Baguisi, 38 Phil. 177, 181). As noted in an old case, this Court decides hundreds of cases every year and in addition resolves in minute
orders an exceptionally considerable number of petitions, motions and interlocutory matters (Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 395; See In re
Almacen, L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 573).

Plaintiffs' first assignment of error raised a procedural issue. In paragraphs 1 to 14 of their first cause of action they made certain averments to establish
their theory that Valentin Salao had a one-third interest in the two fishponds which were registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) and
Ambrosia Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) in his answer "specifically" denied "each and all the allegations" in paragraphs 1 to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action with
the qualification that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 185 and 472 were issued "more than 37 years ago" in the names of Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia
under the circumstances set forth in Juan S. Salao, Jr.'s "positive defenses" and "not under the circumstances stated in the amended complaint".

The plaintiffs contend that the answer of Juan S. Salao, Jr. was in effect an admission of the allegations in their first cause of action that there was a co-
ownership among Ambrosia, Juan, Alejandra and Valentin, all surnamed Salao, regarding the Dampalit property as early as 1904 or 1905; that the
common funds were invested in the acquisition of the two fishponds; that the 47-hectare Calunuran fishpond was verbally adjudicated to Valentin Salao
in the 1919 partition and that there was a verbal stipulation to register "said lands in the name only of Juan Y. Salao".

That contention is unfounded. Under section 6, Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court the answer should "contain either a specific denial or a statement of
matters in avoidance of the cause or causes of action asserted in the complaint". Section 7 of the same rule requires the defendant to "deal specifically
with each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters which he
will rely upon to support his denial". "Material averments in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of damage, shall be deemed admitted when
not specifically denied" (Sec. 8). "The defendant may set forth by answer as many affirmative defenses as he may have. All such grounds of defenses as
would raise issues of fact not arising upon the preceding pleading must be specifically pleaded" (Sec. 9).

What defendant Juan S. Salao, Jr. did in his answer was to set forth in his "positive defenses" the matters in avoidance of plaintiffs' first cause of action
which supported his denials of paragraphs 1 to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action. Obviously, he did so because he found it impracticable to state
piecemeal his own version as to the acquisition of the two fishponds or to make a tedious and repetitious recital of the ultimate facts contradicting the
allegations of the first cause of action.

We hold that in doing so he substantially complied with Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court. It may be noted that under the present Rules of Court a
"negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the complaint essential to the plaintiff's cause or causes of action". On the
other hand, "an affirmative defense is an allegation of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint, expressly or impliedly,
would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff". Affirmative defenses include all matters set up "by way of confession and avoidance". (Sec.
5, Rule 6, Rules of Court).

The case of El Hogar Filipino vs. Santos Investments, 74 Phil. 79 and similar cases is distinguishable from the instant case. In the El Hogar case the
defendant filed a laconic answer containing the statement that it denied "generally and specifically each and every allegation contained in each and
every paragraph of the complaint". It did not set forth in its answer any matter by way of confession and avoidance. It did not interpose any affirmative
defenses.

Under those circumstances, it was held that defendant's specific denial was really a general denial which was tantamount to an admission of the
allegations of the complaint and which justified judgment on the pleadings. That is not the situation in this case.

The other nine assignments of error of the plaintiffs may be reduced to the decisive issue of whether the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for
Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao. That issue is tied up with the question of whether plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had
already prescribed.

The plaintiffs contend that their action is "to enforce a trust which defendant" Juan S. Salao, Jr. allegedly violated. The existence of a trust was not
definitely alleged in plaintiffs' complaint. They mentioned trust for the first time on page 2 of their appellants' brief.

To determine if the plaintiffs have a cause of action for the enforcement of a trust, it is necessary to make some exegesis on the nature of trusts
(fideicomisos). Trusts in Anglo-American jurisprudence were derived from the fideicommissa of the Roman law (Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Abadilla, 46 Phil. 642, 646).

"In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is
vested in another, but the word 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate duties, relations, and responsibilities which are not strictly technical trusts" (89
C.J.S. 712).

"A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of another person is known
as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary" (Art. 1440, Civil Code). There is a fiduciary
relation between the trustee and the cestui que trust as regards certain property, real, personal, money or choses in action (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil.
505).

"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by
operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by parol evidence. An
implied trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid, Arts. 1443 and 1457).

"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid, Art. 1444; Tuason de
Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546). "Express trusts are those which are created by the
direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust"
(89 C.J.S. 722).

"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are
superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They
are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).

"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust
raised by implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their
transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are found in articles 1448 to 1455
of the Civil Code. (See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179; Martinez vs. Graño, 42 Phil. 35).

On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of law, or arising by operation of law". In a more restricted sense and as
contradistinguished from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention
to create a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice". It does not arise "by agreement or intention, but by
operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727).

Thus, "if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
the person from whom the property comes" (Art. 1456, Civil Code).

Or "if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of
the defrauded party". Such a constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense. (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil. 244).

Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to prove that there was an express trust over the Calunuran fishpond in favor of
Valentin Salao. Purely parol evidence was offered by them to prove the alleged trust. Their claim that in the oral partition in 1919 of the two fishponds the
Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao is legally untenable.

It is legally indefensible because the terms of article 1443 of the Civil Code (already in force when the action herein was instituted) are peremptory and
unmistakable: parol evidence cannot be used to prove an express trust concerning realty.

Is plaintiffs' massive oral evidence sufficient to prove an implied trust, resulting or constructive, regarding the two fishponds?
Plaintiffs' pleadings and evidence cannot be relied upon to prove an implied trust. The trial court's firm conclusion that there was no community of
property during the lifetime of Valentina Ignacio or before 1914 is substantiated by defendants' documentary evidence. The existence of the alleged co-
ownership over the lands supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao in 1885 is the basis of plaintiffs' contention that the Calunuran fishpond was held in
trust for Valentin Salao.

But that co-ownership was not proven by any competent evidence. It is quite improbable because the alleged estate of Manuel Salao was likewise not
satisfactorily proven. The plaintiffs alleged in their original complaint that there was a co-ownership over two hectares of land left by Manuel Salao. In
their amended complaint, they alleged that the co-ownership was over seven hectares of fishponds located in Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal. In their
brief they alleged that the fishponds, ricelands and saltbeds owned in common in Barrio Dampalit had an area of twenty-eight hectares of which sixteen
hectares pertained to Valentina Ignacio and eleven hectares represented Manuel Salao's estate.

They theorized that the eleven hectares "were, and necessarily, the nucleus, nay the very root, of the property now in litigation" (page 6, plaintiffs-
appellants' brief). But the eleven hectares were not proven by any trustworthy evidence. Benita Salao's testimony that in 1918 or 1919 Juan, Ambrosia,
Alejandra and Valentin partitioned twenty-eight hectares of lands located in Barrio Dampalit is not credible. As noted by the defendants, Manuel Salao
was not even mentioned in plaintiffs' complaints.

The 1919 partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate covered about seventeen hectares of fishponds and ricelands (Exh. 21). If at the time that partition was
made there were eleven hectares of land in Barrio Dampalit belonging to Manuel Salao, who died in 1885, those eleven hectares would have been
partitioned in writing as in the case of the seventeen hectares belonging to Valentina Ignacio's estate.

It is incredible that the forty-seven-hectare Calunuran fishpond would be adjudicated to Valentin Salao merely by word of mouth. Incredible because for
the partition of the seventeen hectares of land left by Valentina Ignacio an elaborate "Escritura de Particion" consisting of twenty-two pages had to be
executed by the four Salao heirs. Surely, for the partition of one hundred forty-five hectares of fishponds among three of the same Salao heirs an oral
adjudication would not have sufficed.

The improbability of the alleged oral partition becomes more evident when it is borne in mind that the two fishponds were registered land and "the act of
registration" is "the operative act" that conveys and affects the land (Sec. 50, Act No. 496). That means that any transaction affecting the registered land
should be evidenced by a registerable deed. The fact that Valentin Salao and his successors-in-interest, the plaintiffs, never bothered for a period of
nearly forty years to procure any documentary evidence to establish his supposed interest or participation in the two fishponds is very suggestive of the
absence of such interest.

The matter may be viewed from another angle. As already stated, the deed of partition for Valentina Ignacio's estate was notarized in 1919 (Exh. 21).
The plaintiffs assert that the two fishponds were verbally partitioned also in 1919 and that the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao as his
share.

Now, in the partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate, Valentin was obligated to pay P3,355.25 to Ambrosia Salao. If, according to the plaintiffs, Ambrosia
administered the two fishponds and was the custodian of its earnings, then it could have been easily stipulated in the deed partitioning Valentina
Ignacio's estate that the amount due from Valentin would just be deducted by Ambrosia from his share of the earnings of the two fishponds. There was
no such stipulation. Not a shred of documentary evidence shows Valentin's participation in the two fishponds.

The plaintiffs utterly failed to measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on
vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations (De Leon vs. Molo-Peckson, 116 Phil. 1267, 1273).

"Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of proof. Where a trust is to be established by oral proof, the testimony supporting
it must be sufficiently strong to prove the right of the alleged beneficiary with as much certainty as if a document proving the trust were shown. A trust
cannot be established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens title, upon vague and inconclusive proof." (Syllabus, Suarez vs. Tirambulo, 59 Phil. 303).

"Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. In order to establish a trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully
convincing as if the act giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. Such a trust cannot be established upon testimony
consisting in large part of insecure surmises based on ancient hearsay." (Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del Rosario, 50 Phil. 110).

The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as already noted, allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence.
Trustworthy oral evidence is required to prove an implied trust because oral evidence can be easily fabricated.

On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong
presumption exists that Torrens titles were regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as to the
fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and convincing (Yumul vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17-18).

The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land. "Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land" (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593).

There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to
create any trust. There was no constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by
fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond as being held in trust by
the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao.

And even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs' action is clearly barred by prescription or laches (Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December
3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284; Quiñiano vs. Court of Appeals, L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 221; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29,
1972, 43 SCRA 503; Alzona vs. Capunitan and Reyes, 114 Phil. 377).

Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was
only ten years (Sec. 40; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266).

The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action
was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao,
slept on their rights, if they had any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S. 1011, citing
Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21 Phil. 518, 521).

"Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit in the claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights
more strongly when they are threatened or invaded". "Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only
persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself." (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435, 440-
441).

Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer necessary to pass upon
the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds. The plaintiffs have no right and
personality to assail that donation.

Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was
her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal
heir, together with his first cousin, Juan Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of
Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood
(Art. 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-grandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde, 5 Phil.
176).

The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint.

Defendants' appeal. The defendants dispute the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs filed their action in good faith. The defendants contend that they
are entitled to damages because the plaintiffs acted maliciously or in bad faith in suing them. They ask for P25,000 attorney's fees and litigation
expenses and, in addition, moral damages.

We hold that defendants' appeal is not meritorious. The record shows that the plaintiffs presented fifteen witnesses during the protracted trial of this case
which lasted from 1954 to 1959. They fought tenaciously. They obviously incurred considerable expenses in prosecuting their case. Although their
causes of action turned out to be unfounded, yet the pertinacity and vigor with which they pressed their claim indicate their sincerity and good faith.

There is the further consideration that the parties were descendants of common ancestors, the spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio, and that
plaintiffs' action was based on their honest supposition that the funds used in the acquisition of the lands in litigation were earnings of the properties
allegedly inherited from Manuel Salao.

Considering those circumstances, it cannot be concluded with certitude that plaintiffs' action was manifestly frivolous or was primarily intended to harass
the defendants. An award for damages to the defendants does not appear to be just and proper.

The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously instituted are not the moral damages contemplated in the law (Solis &
Yarisantos vs. Salvador, L-17022, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 887; Ramos vs. Ramos, supra).

The instant case is not among the cases mentioned in articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code wherein moral damages may be recovered. Nor can it be
regarded as analogous to any of the cases mentioned in those articles.

"The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate; such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it
erroneously." (Barreto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771, 779).

The defendants invoke article 2208 (4) (11) of the Civil Code which provides that attorney's fees may he recovered "in case of a clearly unfounded civil
action or proceeding against the plaintiff" (defendant is a plaintiff in his counterclaim) or "in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable"
that attorney's fees should be awarded.

But once it is conceded that the plaintiffs acted in good faith in filing their action there would be no basis for adjudging them liable to the defendants for
attorney's fees and litigation expenses (See Rizal Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-23729, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 61).

It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the
winning party (Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan, 110 Phil. 1020, 1028; Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo, 61 O.G. 6959).

The trial court's judgment is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.