Case Histo °es of Pump
Explosions while Running Isolated
b
Douglas S. Giles' and Peter N, Lodal
,Senior Chemical Engineer
bSenior Technical Associate
Tennessee Operations, Eastman Chemical Company, Kingsport, TN 37662
Standard industrial centrifugal pumps that isolate
process material (i.e. "deadheaded" with both suction and
discharge valves closed) inside the pump casing can explode
catastrophically if the pump is inadvertently started and left
running.
Case histories and lessons learned at Tennessee Eastman
Division (TED) involVing pump explosions while running
isolated will bepresented in this paper. Case histories involve
both combustible and non-combustible process streams
where the pump was inadvertently started and allowed to
run isolated until the process material heated up and built
enough pressure to rupture the pump housing creating a
BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion). Inci-
dent learnings will bepresentedfor each case.
INTRODUCTION
Significant amounts of time and energy are put into
hazard analyses to determine the level of risk, and
appropriate safeguards against running a centrifugal
pump completely isolated, or "deadheaded" with both
suction and discharge valves closed. Much of the
debate centers on whether or not the consequences of
such an action are dependent upon the fluid being
pumped. The following case histories illustrate the
real hazard potential of improper isolation, regardless
of what fluid is being pumped.
CASE 1: SLUDGE PUMP
A distillation column underflow containing organic
acids and decomposition solids (sludge) was pumped
from the column to a heated dumpster via parallel
3,500 rpm centrifugal pumps, capable of a maximum
(low-flow) 140 psi discharge. This level of discharge
pressure is required due to the viscosity of the materi-
al and the distance it must be pumped. Normally, one
pump runs continuously, with the other pump manu-
152 June 2001
ally valved in when necessary. Since this pumping
operation can be interrupted for several hours at a
time with no process penalty (the sludge stream is rel-
atively small, and the column base has a holdup vol-
ume of several hours), no automatic throwover was
installed. However, Distributed Control System (DeS)
start/stop capability was installed for both pumps.
On the morning in question, the primary pump
was running and in service (Figure 1). The spare was
started remotely without a proper field check to see if
it had been valved in properly. Some time after the start
of the operation, the pump casing exploded, with the
report audible from several hundred feet away. A small
puff of white smoke, which dissipated within 15 sec-
onds, was observed leaving the general vicinity.. The
pump casing was tom in two (Figure 2), and parts were
found up to 35 feet away. Personnel were not in the
immediate vicinity of the pump at the time of the inci-
dent, so no injuries were sustained, and all process
material was contained and disposed of properly.
Subsequent investigation and analysis indicated
that the pump had run in this condition for some time.
In that time, the temperature of the fluid increased from
60 0 C to approximately 230 0 C, raising the process
vapor pressure to over 210 psig. Mechanical analysis of
the casing and the failed bolts indicated that the failure
pressure was in the 200-225 psig range, in good agree-
ment with the temperature analysis. A further piece of
supporting data was found in the local pressure gauge,
which had a range of 0-150 psig. Although the gauge
indicator was wrapped around the stop pin, a manual
reconstruction of the needle indicated a pressure of
approximately 200 psig.
CASE 2: CAUSTIC (SODIUM HYDROXIDE) PUMP
A chemical manufacturing operation which had
been shut down permanently was "abandoned in
Process Safety Progress (Vo1.20, No.2)
Figure 1. Sludge pumps.
Figure 3. Damaged caustic pump.
place" to save the cost of demolition and removal of
the equipment. Among the equipment items were a
50% caustic (sodium hydroxide) tank and centrifugal
feed pump. The pump had been isolated by closing
both the suction and discharge hand valves, but had
never been drained. On the afternoon in question, a
contractor was sent into the area to start a local venti-
lation fan in preparation for an unrelated maintenance
activity in an adjacent area. Unbeknownst to the con-
tractor, the caustic pump wiring and starter had never
been de-energized. Further, the switch used to start the
pump was identical to the switch used to start the venti-
lation fan. Although the switch was labeled, the tag was
very small, and could only be read from up close. These
switches were remote (> 50 ft) from the caustic pump
installation, well outside of the diked area, and labeled
with an engraved, hard-to-read tag. There was no logi-
cal proximity reason to assume that the switch and
pump were associated with one another.
Some time after the pump was started, a loud
boom was reported, rattling windows as far as 200
feet from the pump. The pump head was dam-
aged, and the motor and baseplate were complete-
ly dislodged as a result of the forces generated by
the explosion (Figures 3-11). No one was present
in the immediate vicinity of the pump at the time
Process Safety Progress (Vo1.20, No.2)
Figure 2. Close-up of damaged head.
Figure 4. Another view of the pump.
of the incident, so no injuries were sustained, and
all material was contained and disposed of proper-
ly.
CASE 3: CONDENSATE PUMP
A large (2,600 gpm, 250 ft head, 75 HP motor) cen-
trifugal condensate pump was discovered to have
exploded following a major steam system upset (Fig-
ures 12-17). Significant damage was done to the instal-
lation and surrounding piping. A five-pound piece of
the pump casing was found more than 400 feet from
the installation (Figure 13). As with the previous two
examples, both the suction and discharge valves were
found in the closed position. The manual valves were
in the closed position due to a plantwide power upset
that had temporarily cut off electrical power, allOWing
condensate to flow backwards through the pump.
Recognizing that a restart with the impeller turning
backwards could cause significant damage to the
pump, operations closed the valves, not recognizing
that the power had not been permanently shut off.
Because no one was present in the immediate vicinity
of the pumps at the time of the incident, no injuries
were sustained.
June 2001 153
Figure 5. Damaged head.
Figure 7. Damaged motor and baseplate.
COMMON FACTORS
Although these three pumps were of different sizes
and were filled with different fluids, they had some
features in common:
1. Isolation-All pumps had been completely isolat-
ed by closing both the suction and discharge hand
valves.
2. Fluid Filled-All pumps were liquid filled when
isolated
3. Remote Start Capability-All pumps had the capa-
bility for remote start, two from a control room,
and the other from a hand switch remotely located
from the pump.
4. Lack of Run Indication-None of the pumps were
provided with indication that they were running to
an occupied location. Hence, they all ran for some
period of time before rupturing.
5. Seal Failure-None of the pumps was protected
by the failure of the seal providing relief prior
to explosion (as is sometimes assumed). For
cases 1 and 2, the viscous, dirty nature of the
fluid may have contributed to this. For case 3,
the reasons are unclear.
Also of note are the dissimilarities between the
two operations:
154 June 2001
Figure 6. Damaged head.
Figure 8. Another view of the damaged motor and
baseplate.
1. One was pumping a combustible fluid, one a
non-combustible water/caustic mix, and the
other, just water.
2. One pump was a 1,750 rmp pump capable of only
123 feet head of discharge; the other two were
3,500 rpm pump capable of 275-300 feet head dis-
charge.
CONCLUSIONS
Although pumping dissimilar fluids at different dis-
charge pressures, all of these pumps appear to have
sustained a boiling liqUid expanding vapor explosion
(BLEVE). The key feature allowing this to happen was
the combination of liquid-filled total isolation and
remote start capabilities that allowed the pumps to run
isolated for a significant period of time undetected. In
general, the potential for damage increases as the size
and horsepower of the pump increases, and seal failure
as a relief mechanism was not adequate in any of these
cases. While these examples do not cover all possible
mechanisms for pump explosions, they do illustrate the
need for careful analysis of centrifugal pump installa-
tions with remote start capability to prevent such an
occurrence, since hazard assessments do not always
address these factors. In fact, remote stop capabilities
are often added as a safety feature, and the remote start
Process Safety Progress (Vo1.20, No.2)
Figure 9. Damaged impeller. Figure 10. Close-up of impeller.

Figure 11. Damaged baseplate and motor. Figure 12. Damaged condensate pump.

Figure 13. A piece of the condensate pump casing Figure 14. Installation showing both pumps.
found 400 feet from the installation.
capability comes with it at almost no additional cost.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Since it offers a convenience, remote start is some-
The authors wish to thank Tennessee Operations
times incorporated without a full assessment of the
Management, Eastman Chemical Company, for per-
implications of adding such a feature. For addition-
mission to share these cases and their learnings with
al information on risk and cost assessment for cen-
the broader safety community.
trifugal pumps, refer to the paper by Schisla and
Chastain [1].

Process Safety Progress (Vo1.20, No.2) June 2001 155

Figure 15. Damaged impeller. Figure 16. Damaged motor.

LITERATURE CITED
1. Schisla, R.M. andJ.W. Chastain, "Risk and Cost
Assessment of Catastrophic Failures of Pumps
Resulting from Isolated Running," 5th Biannual
Process Plant Safety Symposium, Houston, TX,
April 2001.

Figure 17. Damaged piping.

156 June 2001 Process Safety Progress (Vo1.20, No.2)