Amelia Lindsay-Kaufman

Russian Self-Victimization and the Language of Imperialism; from Pushkin to Putin

Russia has received a great deal of media attention recently for its involvement in the

Crimean Crisis. From a Western point of view the situation, and especially Putin’s remarks on

the necessity of the invasion, might seem nonsensical. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea

makes more sense when it is examined along with Russia’s history as an empire. Under the

surface, Russian culture is intrinsically tied to imperialism and the Russian people value being

part of a powerful empire in a way that North Americans have no historical context to

understand. Putin’s popularity in Russia stems from the fact that Russians believe he will make

their country powerful again.1 The annexation of Crimea is the most recent of a list of Russia’s

annexations that goes back nearly to the beginning of the Russian state, and there are many

parallels between the Crimean Crisis (and other conflicts occurring currently around Russia) and

historical occupation of the Caucasus. One of these parallels is the rhetoric that is used to

garner support for imperialist military actions. The rhetoric commonly used to justify Russian

conquest of the Caucasian tribes in the 18th and 19th centuries can be seen in literary works

from that time period. Pushkin’s poem Prisoner of the Caucasus and other works inspired by it

exemplify this rhetoric and even validated it by becoming for many Russians the main source of

information about the Caucasus. The tricks of language and rhetoric used to rationalise

aggression against Circassians, Chechens, Dagestanis, Tatars, Cossacks, and other peoples were
given their greatest platform by Pushkin and have survived to the present in current Russian

politics.

It will help in understanding the use of imperialist language to look at a brief history of

Russian imperialism. Since Ivan III annexing Novgorod and Tver for the Grand Duchy of Moscow

in the 15th century, the state we now call Russia has been capturing nearby lands for most of its

history. One official rationale for the annexation of land by Ivan III was that Moscow would

become a refuge for Christianity in the form of a third reincarnation of the Roman Empire. After

Ivan IV became the first Tsar, he annexed several khanates populated mostly by Tatars. In 1721

Peter I assumed the title of Emperor and Russia officially became an empire. Peter I also

became the first Russian ruler to exert control in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea with a short-

lived reign over Safavid territories resulting from The Russo-Persian War (called “The Persian

Expedition of Peter the Great” by Russians). Catherine II claimed territory up to the Black Sea

from the Ottoman Empire. She also annexed territories of the Polish–Lithuanian

Commonwealth, which had been ruled by Russia for over a century. The annexation was

justified by the fact that most of the inhabitants were Orthodox Christians. Following Catherine

II, Alexander I took Finland from the Swedish Empire and Bessarabia from the Ottoman Empire.

In 1817 Russia entered the Caucasian War, during which Russia acquired areas in the North

Caucasus and violently expelled many Circassians to Persia. By the reign of Nicholas I, Russia

had control over all Ottoman territories in Persia and the Caucasus. In the Crimean War of

1853-56 Russia was defeated after France and Britain allied with the Ottoman Empire in order

to prevent further acquisition of territory at the expense of the declining empire. In 1863

Alexander II, in response to uprisings in Poland, abolished Poland’s autonomy and incorporated
it into Russia. After the 1917 revolution and the formation of the Soviet Union, many territories

and ethnic groups were incorporated into the Union, including Baltic, Central Asian, Caucasian,

and Eastern European nations. The Soviet Union often touted its ethnic diversity and the

cooperation between its constituent peoples (especially in comparison to the United States),

despite its prevalent racism against non-Russian ethnic groups. During WWII, Stalin seized

control of several Eastern and Central European countries including Poland, Romania, Hungary,

Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, with the rationale that the Soviet Union needed a buffer zone to

protect it from Germany.2 After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the creation of the

Russian Federation many Russians were upset by their loss of empire status, and when the

Republic of Chechnya attempted to become independent, Russia invaded and started the first

and second Chechen Wars. Following a rise in influence of the imperialist political party

Eurasianism, Putin annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, justifying the action by claiming that

the region is mostly inhabited by Russians and was previously part of Russia. The history of

Russia is the continuous history of an empire, and the acquisition of new land has been a goal

and mark of success of its leaders for centuries. Despite no longer being an empire officially,

Russians have not lost this mindset.

There is a strong connection between Russia’s attempts at expansion and literary

accounts of the lands that Russia invades, specifically the Caucasus. In 1820 and 1821 Pushkin

wrote his poem Prisoner of the Caucasus (Кавказский пленник), the first in his series of Byronic

poems and inspired by his own travels in the Caucasus. Pushkin was part of the Russian

Romantic movement, and this poem heavily features Romantic themes such as nature and the

power of primitivism. The plot of the poem follows a Russian officer who has been taken
captive by Circassians.3 Just as he is about to die of exposure, a beautiful native girl comes to

him at night and brings him food and water. She visits him every night and quickly professes her

love for him, begging him to take her away and save her from marriage to an unknown man in

another town. Jaded by previous relationships with insincere and cold Russian women, he tells

her that he is incapable of returning her love. Meanwhile, by day the officer observes the life

and customs of the Circassians and comes to admire their aptitude for battle and their genuine

enthusiasm for life. Eventually the girl comes to him at night when the other villagers are

distracted and frees him by cutting his chains. He tells her that he loves her after all and asks

her to leave with him. She refuses, and in the end throws herself in a river as he escapes.

This poem was written during the Russo-Circassian War, in which Peter I invaded Circassia in

order to have better access to the Black Sea to gain a military advantage over the Ottoman

Empire. 4 The end of the poem directly references the invasion by mentioning General Aleksey

Yermolov, a successful military figure appointed in 1816 5 (“But lo! The east shall howl with

woe. Yield, and bow down your heads of snow, Yield, Caucasus, here comes Yermolov!”6) While

it was not the first literary work describing the conquest of the Caucasus, Pushkin’s poem

turned Russian public attention to the Caucasus and established a particularly orientalist

depiction of the region in Russian popular consciousness. This was intensified by the fact that

Pushkin’s description was perceived as valid, “reliable ethnography”7 (even though Pushkin had

never actually met a Circassian), and the exaggerated descriptions of the Circassians were often

taken at face-value. Pushkin used many phrases in describing the Circassians that helped

construct an oriental image, specifically one of noble savagery. He described the Caucasians as

wild and free (‘And all their thrilling, wild existence”), strong and violent (“Fly, effortlessly
leaping up, To learn war’s methods in advance”, “Behind him runs a trail of blood”), and

primitive (“To such a love, childlike and frank”, “And yet a world which stays the same, Must

weary hearts for warfare born…slaves heads into the dust would fly, to cheers of rapturous

young men”8). The coinciding of the rise of Romanticism and the rise in popularity of travel

accounts of the Caucasus meant that often the Caucasus was described in the Romantic style,

i.e. with flowery, emotion-laden, nature-related phrasing. This association with nature helped

the association between the Caucasus and orientalism, with Pushkin’s poem being one of the

most widely read Romantic accounts. In fact, Pushkin’s Prisoner of the Caucasus was so iconic

that the title and basic storyline have become a trope in Russian literature, appearing in works

by Tolstoy, Lermontov, Bitov, and Makanin, a ballet based on the original poem, and more than

five films. The end result of this trend was that, once the Caucasian peoples had been branded

with the oriental, “noble savage” image, Russians were able to feel culturally superior.9 Even

though Pushkin may have been against the violence of the Caucasian War, literature including

his poem helped justify efforts to wipe out local culture in the Caucasus and replace it with

Russian culture. Russia has often struggled with its own identity as either Asian or European,

but we can see even in the phrasing of Pushkin’s poem that Russians at this time were

attempting to label themselves as European. When the Russian officer in the poem is watching

the Circassians, Pushkin writes, “The mind, though, of the European, These wondrous folk could

not help heeding”10 in order to contrast the sophisticated Russian culture with the “oriental”

culture of the Caucasians. Even though the ending of Pushkin’s poem already seems to endorse

the Russian invasion, at the time of its publishing the ending was thought to be not patriotic

enough, and it was changed in the ballet version to be more suitable to Russian audiences. In
the ballet, “Circassians are the aggressors, and Russian troops take up arms only in their efforts

to free their compatriot. The Circassian woman ably swims to shore with her beloved; the two

are wed in holy matrimony; and her Circassian khans take pains to pledge allegiance to the

Russian crown publicly.”11 It is interesting that in this story a Russian is at the mercy of peoples

who in reality were subjugated by Russians. In this essay this dynamic will be referred to as

“self-victimization”, meaning framing an account to paint oneself as a victim or passive party

when realistically one represents or acts as an aggressor. The trend in this story is one of self-

victimization on the part of the Russians. During a time of Russian aggression and conquest in

Caucasian territories when Russia had a military advantage in terms of both technology and

population, a story that resonates to such a great extent with Russian audiences is one in which

a Russian is the injured party. “It is less clear why the idiom of the prisoner has resonated so

long with audiences despite the establishment of a firm stronghold in the south”.12 This self-

victimization functions as subtle imperialist propaganda as it builds a conception of Caucasian

peoples as violent and dangerous in the minds of Russian citizens. “Yermolov’s policies,

although extremely brutal by any standard, were based upon a set of preconceptions

articulated by the literary minds of the early nineteenth century”.13 Due to its establishment of

the Caucasus as Russia’s orient and the Caucasians as primitive barbarians, Pushkin’s Poem

Prisoner of the Caucasus helped further the Russian imperialist conquest of Circassia, Chechnya,

Dagestan, and other Caucasian lands.

Inspired by Pushkin’s poem were many other literary works dealing with Caucasian

peoples, often with the same name, “Just as the novels of James Fenimore Cooper led to an

explosion of the so-called “dime novel” Westerns in the United States, so Pushkin’s stories
spawned a series of widely available romantic stories about the Caucasus. These works helped

tie down the images that Pushkin had already established”.14 Tolstoy’s story Prisoner of the

Caucasus was written in 1872 and had a similar story to Pushkin’s poem; A Russian soldier Zhilin

is captured by “Tatars” (Tolstoy’s collective term for all Caucasian groups) and held for ransom

until a young Tatar girl helps him escape.15 Tolstoy’s story was hugely popular and was used in

the curriculum for Russian schoolchildren (and a movie version of it was made in 1996, showing

that the story is still popular), and it too helped to propagate the conception of the Caucasus

that dominated in the minds of Russian citizens during and beyond the time of the Caucasian

War. Tolstoy depicts his Tatars as fighting purely for enjoyment and being not at all interested

in Russian “civilization”. Bruce Grant notes a logical inconsistency in the popularity of Russian

hostages in Russian literature; that they were the only thing of value possessed by Caucasians

(“Already this plotline is a puzzle: for despite the fact that the Caucasus had been famous for its

Silk Road trade routes since the 9th century, the ironic premise in these stories is that the

mountain highlanders had little of their own to barter. To participate in the new social order,

Caucasians had to acquire a new currency of exchange value—a Russian body”16). Mikhail

Lermontov also wrote a story titled Prisoner of the Caucasus which was heavily influenced by

Pushkin’s writing, however more interesting is his story The Hero of our Time as it portrays the

Russian officers much more negatively than preceding stories. The protagonist, Grigory

Alexandrovich Pechorin, is cynical, arrogant, and unconcerned with the feelings of others. In the

substory called “Bela” Pechorin has a beautiful Circassian girl named Bela abducted for him

(reversing the established prisoner relationship) and eventually wins her complete devotion

and love. Once Bela loves him, Pechorin becomes bored with her and is tempted to leave and
continue traveling, claiming that he is, like Pushkin’s prisoner, incapable of love. When Bela is

kidnapped by Pechorin’s enemy and is mortally wounded, he stays with her as she slowly dies

and deliriously professes her love for him. He is emotionally unaffected by her death.17 Notably,

even though Lermontov portrays Russians unsympathetically, he maintains the same oriental

descriptions of his Circassians. Bela is a primitive, innocent girl, and Pechorin’s enemy Kazbich is

a ruthless fighter who values his horse above everything else. Makanin’s 1995 story Prisoner of

the Caucasus was written during the First Chechen War, in which Russia under Yeltsin invaded

the Chechen Republic after they had separated from the Republic of Ingushetia and declared

independence from Russia in 1993. The story deals with a Russian soldier who has taken a

Chechen hostage but finds himself attracted to his prisoner, whom he nevertheless eventually

kills to protect his military mission.18 While the captor/captive dynamic is reversed from in

Pushkin’s poem, the Russian is still emotionally ensnared by not only the beauty of his hostage

but also by the beauty of the landscape. Even though the story was intended to show

dissatisfaction with Russia’s involvement in Chechnya, Makanin, in a sense, has still managed to

frame the Russian as a victim rather than an aggressor. As the Russian colonel is bartering with

a Chechen soldier, the Chechen remarks “Me, a prisoner? You’re the prisoner here…. He’s a

prisoner. You’re a prisoner. And every one of your soldiers is a prisoner.”19 Additionally the

Russian soldiers are impressed by the natural beauty of the Chechen landscape, but they are

simultaneously intimidated by it (“They sensed the beauty of the mountains too well, and it was

frightening. A spring suddenly leaping forth in a mountain gorge. Even more alarming for both

was an open meadow, which the sun had painted a blinding yellow.” 20) This story, including the
framing of the landscape itself as threatening, is a further example of Russian self-victimization

in the context of imperialist conquests.

One interesting interpretation of self-victimization is that Russians are discomforted by the

oriental Caucasus because of their own uncertain identity. To some extent the military

aggression can be explained by suggesting that Russia was trying to distance its culture from

the cultures of the Caucasians as much as possible by asserting its European sophistication.

Layton wrote that “Pushkin, Bestuzhev-Marlinsky, and Lermontov produced the Muslim tribes

as unusually problematic noble primitives who raised restive issues of Russia’s own semi-Asian

identity”.21 This could account for Russians compulsively twisting narratives to see the peoples

of the Caucasus as a threat, as well as Russia’s desire to have its own Orient to civilize like the

countries of Europe.

Russian annexation of nearby autonomous peoples did not stop in the 19 th century; today

Russia is involved in conflicts in Georgia, Chechnya, and Crimea. Very similar language is being

used today to justify Russia’s actions in these conflicts as was used during the Caucasian War.

The conflict in Georgia stems from the fact that Russia supported South Ossetia in its attempts

to break off from Georgia, as South Ossetia will likely be absorbed into the Russian Federation

once its independence is recognized by Georgia. In March of 2015, Putin and the South

Ossetian leader Tibilov signed the Treaty on Alliance and Integration, which provides South

Ossetia with monetary aid and protection as well as “hand[ing] border control to Russia, which

would also formally take charge of South Ossetia's economy and military. Residents of the

region would also have easier access to Russian citizenship.”22 The signing of this treaty has

been criticized by western leaders as it is almost certainly the first step in annexing South
Ossetia, and many fear that Putin will try to rebuild a Russian empire by taking over more

regions. In a speech, Putin has claimed that the United States interfered in Georgia and is

responsible for the conflict, and that Russia had no choice but to invade when many of its

peacekeepers in South Ossetia were killed.23 Georgia’s former president Saakashvili accused

Putin of attempting to gain control of former Soviet nations, and has said “Armenia has been

cornered and forced to sign a customs union that is not in this nation’s interest or in the

interest of our region. Moldova is being blockaded, Ukraine is under constant attack, Azerbaijan

faces extraordinary pressure, and Georgia is occupied. Why? Because an old empire is trying to

reclaim its bygone borders.”24 Putin’s remarks about the conflict emphasize the violence of

Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia (“The Georgian leadership have resorted to very aggressive

actions against South Ossetia”25) and the loss of lives, including those of Russian peacekeepers,

and the fact that it is their duty to intervene (“This is a worrying development, which of course

we will have to respond to…. All of us have to do our best to stop the bloodshed”26). This is

reminiscent of rhetoric used in the 19th century to justify the invasion of Circassia. The conflict

in Chechnya is a continuation of the conflict of the Chechen Wars in the 90’s. In 1999 Russia

invaded Chechnya again (in response to an armed incursion led by Chechen fighters in support

of a Dagestani separatist movement) and ended completely the de facto independence of the

Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.27 Sporadic violence is still common in Chechnya. Putin in his

speeches and articles emphasizes the senseless violence of the rebel fighters (“Likewise, those

who do not understand good intent and good, normal language, those who do not wish to lay

down their arms and who continue fighting against their own people, must also be found and

punished”) and the necessity of intervening in order to prevent further casualties (“Sadly,
decisive armed intervention was the only way to prevent further casualties both within and far

outside the borders of Chechnya, further suffering by so many people enslaved by terrorists”28).

In an opinion piece for the New York Times in 1999 Putin, in an attempt to gain American

support for Russia’s actions in Chechnya, argued that the Chechen separatists were associated

with Osama bin Laden. He wrote that “the same terrorists who were associated with the

bombing of America's embassies have a foothold in the Caucasus. We know that Shamil

Basayev, the so-called Chechen warlord, gets assistance on the ground from an itinerant

guerrilla leader with a dossier similar to that of Osama bin Laden. And one of your television

networks recently reported that -- according to United States intelligence sources -- bin Laden

himself is helping to finance the guerrillas.”29 Putin’s fearmongering relies on the fact that

Russian people still imagine Caucasian peoples as being violent and uncivilized, a conception

which traces its way back to Pushkin’s poem Prisoner of the Caucasus. Russia’s latest imperialist

action was the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the justification of which being that Crimea is

mostly populated by ethnic Russians and most Russians consider the Crimea a part of Russia.30

While Crimea is not in the Caucasus, some of the same rhetoric is used referring to the

annexation of Crimea as to the annexation of Caucasian nations. This rhetoric can be seen in

Putin’s March 2014 speech on his reasons for annexing Crimea, which relies heavily on self-

victimization. He reminds the Russian citizens repeatedly that Russia’s interests were

threatened or that Russia had been dealt an injustice (“It was only when Crimea ended up as

part of a different country that Russia realized that it was not simply robbed, it was

plundered.”, “And what about the Russian state? What about Russia? It humbly accepted the

situation. This country was going through such hard times then that realistically it was
incapable of protecting its interests.”) He also uses the same rationalisation as in Chechnya and

South Ossetia; that Russia must intervene to prevent violence, claiming that “naturally, we

could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress.

This would have been betrayal on our part.”31 Another strong connection with the Caucasian

War is the fact that Putin argued that Russia had not really invaded Ukraine. He insisted that

Russian troops were already there as per an agreement, and defended other aspects of the

invasion on legal technicalities (“What exactly are we violating? True, the President of the

Russian Federation received permission from the Upper House of Parliament to use the Armed

Forces in Ukraine. However, strictly speaking, nobody has acted on this permission yet. Russia’s

Armed Forces never entered Crimea; they were there already in line with an international

agreement. True, we did enhance our forces there; however – this is something I would like

everyone to hear and know – we did not exceed the personnel limit of our Armed Forces in

Crimea, which is set at 25,000, because there was no need to do so.” 32) in a similar manner to

Russians attempting to rationalize invasions of the Caucasus during Pushkin’s time. Layton

writes that “…Russian historian Adolf Berzhe objected to the very word “conquest”… by arguing

that the annexation of the Caucasus had unfolded over the centuries in a haphazard, virtually

unwilled manner”.33 Both of these arguments represent attempts to dither over words and

obscure past events to avoid blame.

In examining language used to refer to Caucasians and the annexation of the Caucasus

by Pushkin and by other writers after him, and language today used by Putin to refer to the

annexation of Crimea and Russia’s military involvement in South Ossetia and Chechnya, there

can be seen several trends. First, in the case of Caucasian peoples, stereotypes were created to
build conviction that Russia needed to occupy land to function as a civilizing force for the

ultimate benefit of the tribes living there. In Pushkin’s case this consisted of depicting

Caucasians as violent and uncivilized. In Putin’s case this consists of labeling his enemies as

terrorists and warlords who either do not understand what they are doing or are actively

seeking to harm civilians. Second, self-victimization was used to garner sympathy for Russia and

blur perceptions of blame. In the various works with the title Prisoner of the Caucasus self-

victimization took the form of reversing the power dynamic between representatives of Russia

and of the Caucasus. The stories frequently showed Russians in danger of being harmed,

dominated, or overwhelmed by Caucasians in order to sow paranoia and support for military

campaigns. In present day Russia, self-victimization is a tool commonly used by Putin to justify

his use of military force. It is much more pleasant for one to feel that one has been wronged

than to feel guilty that one has wronged someone else, so self-victimization is an effective way

to distract and placate the Russian populace from real issues and create a sense of entitlement.

These tactics used by Russian writers, historians, and politicians throughout Russia’s history

have dangerous consequences and should be met with suspicion. It is almost certain that Putin,

with the enthusiastic support of the Russian populace, would like to control a “Eurasian

Empire”, and it is likely that he will try to realise this goal in some form. We must recognize his

propaganda for what it is, and perhaps use this understanding to try to curb Russia’s imperialist

ambitions to protect the autonomy of nearby nations.

1
Bakunina, Jana. "Why Do Russians Still Support Vladimir Putin?" NewStateman. N.p., 4 Mar. 2015.
Web.
2
"Russian History: Kievan Rus." Russian History – Russiapedia. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Apr. 2015.
3
Pushkin, Aleksandr Sergeevich. "Prisoner of the Caucasus." The Complete Works of Alexander Pushkin.
Norfolk: Milner, 1999. 101-22. Print.
4
"Caucasian War of 1817–64." The Great Soviet Encyclopedia. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag.
TheFreeDictionary.com. Web. 15 Apr. 2015.
5
Foley, Patrick. "Ermolov." Russias Periphery. N.p., Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Apr. 2015.
6
Pushkin, Aleksandr Sergeevich. "Prisoner of the Caucasus." The Complete Works of Alexander Pushkin.
Norfolk: Milner, 1999. 101-22. Print.
7
Layton, Susan. "Introduction." Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin
to Tolstoy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994. 1-14. Print.
8
Pushkin, Aleksandr Sergeevich. "Prisoner of the Caucasus." The Complete Works of Alexander Pushkin.
Norfolk: Milner, 1999. 101-22. Print.
9
Foley, Patrick. "Cultural Depictions of the Caucasus." Russias Periphery. N.p., Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Apr.
2015.
10
Pushkin, Aleksandr Sergeevich. "Prisoner of the Caucasus." The Complete Works of Alexander Pushkin.
Norfolk: Milner, 1999. 101-22. Print.
11
Grant, Bruce. "The Good Russian Prisoner: Naturalizing Violence in the Caucasus Mountains." Cultural
Anthropology 20.1 (2005): 39-67. Web.
12
Ibid
13
Foley, Patrick. "Ermolov." Russias Periphery. N.p., Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Apr. 2015.
14
Foley, Patrick. "Cultural Depictions of the Caucasus." Russias Periphery. N.p., Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Apr.
2015.
15
Grant, Bruce. "The Good Russian Prisoner: Naturalizing Violence in the Caucasus Mountains." Cultural
Anthropology 20.1 (2005): 39-67. Web.
16
Ibid
17
Lermontov, Mikhail, Vladimir Vladimirovich Nabokov, and Dmitri Nabokov. A Hero of Our Time: A
Novel. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1958. Print.
18
Makanin, Vladimir. "Prisoner of the Caucasus." Out of the Blue: Russia's Hidden Gay Literature: An
Anthology. San Francisco, CA: Gay Sunshine, 1997. N. pag. Print.
19
Ibid
20
Ibid
21
Layton, Susan. "Introduction." Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin
to Tolstoy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994. 1-14. Print.
22
"On Crimea Anniversary, Russia Signs South Ossetia Deal | News | DW.DE | 18.03.2015." DW.DE. N.p.,
18 Mar. 2015. Web. 15 Apr. 2015.
23
Chance, Matthew. "Putin Accuses U.S. of Orchestrating Georgian War." CNN. Cable News Network, 28
Aug. 2008. Web. 15 Apr. 2015.
24
McChesney, Andrew. "Russia Walks Out During Saakashvili's 'Crazy' Speech | Business." The Moscow
Times. N.p., 27 Sept. 2013. Web. 15 Apr. 2015.
25
"RUSSIA & GEORGIA at WAR! Aug. 8, 2008. Putin's Speech." YouTube. YouTube, n.d. Web. 15 Apr.
2015.
26
Ibid
27
"Chechnya Profile - Overview." BBC News. N.p., 9 Dec. 2014. Web. 15 Apr. 2015.
28
Putin, Vladimir. President of Russia. N.p., 12 Dec. 2005. Web. 15 Apr. 2015.
29
Putin, Vladimir. "Why We Must Act." The New York Times. The New York Times, 13 Nov. 1999. Web.
15 Apr. 2015.
30
Putin, Vladimir. "Full Text of Putin's Speech on Crimea." - PRAGUE POST. N.p., 19 Mar. 2014. Web. 15
Apr. 2015.
31
Ibid
32
Ibid
33
Layton, Susan. "Introduction." Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin
to Tolstoy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994. 1-14. Print.