THIRD DIVISION Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved
the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals,
G.R. No. 163509 December 6, 2006
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES CORPORATION, and THE MINES ADJUDICATION
BOARD,respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated November
28, 2003 and its Resolution2 dated May 5, 2004, which respectively denied its petition for review
and motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts quoted from the appellate court's Decision are as follows:
In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity)
entered into a Mines Operating Agreement (Agreement for brevity) with Banahaw Mining
and Development Corporation (Banahaw Mining for brevity) whereby the latter agreed to
act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and eventual commercial
operation of CMMCI's eighteen (18) mining claims located in Agusan del Sur.
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining
Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988,
Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and
dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Upon its expiration, the
temporary permit was subsequently renewed thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last being
on June 28, 1991.
Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP's
logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of each other's right to
the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to
its mining claims.
In 1991, Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for brevity).
While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to
sell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private
respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The
transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner,
as well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI.
thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims.
On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining's
pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and
to submit additional documents in support of the application. Area clearances from the
DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary
were submitted, as required.
On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals' amended MPSA applications were
published in accordance with the requirements of the Mining Act of 1995.
On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau
(MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private
respondent Base Metals' application on the following grounds:
I. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE MPSA OF
BASE METALS WILL VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AGAINST
IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION IN A CONTRACT.
II. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION WILL DEFEAT THE RIGHTS OF
THE HEREIN ADVERSE CLAIMANT AND/OR OPPOSITOR.
In its Answer to the Adverse Claim and/or Opposition, private respondent Base Metals
alleged that:
a) the Adverse Claim was filed out of time;
b) petitioner PICOP has no rights over the mineral resources on their concession
area. PICOP is asserting a privilege which is not protected by the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution;
c) the grant of the MPSA will not impair the rights of PICOP nor create confusion,
chaos or conflict.
Petitioner PICOP's Reply to the Answer alleged that:
a) the Adverse Claim was filed within the reglementary period;
b) the grant of MPSA will impair the existing rights of petitioner PICOP;
c) the MOA between PICOP and Banahaw Mining provides for recognition by
Banahaw Mining of the Presidential Warranty awarded in favor of PICOP for the
exclusive possession and enjoyment of said areas.
As a Rejoinder, private respondent Base Metals stated that:
1. it is seeking the right to extract the mineral resources in the applied areas. It is
not applying for any right to the forest resources within the concession areas of
PICOP;
2. timber or forest lands are open to Mining Applications;
3. the grant of the MPSA will not violate the so called "presidential fiat";
4. the MPSA application of Base Metals does not require the consent of PICOP;
and
5. it signified its willingness to enter into a voluntary agreement with PICOP on
the matter of compensation for damages. In the absence of such agreement, the
matter will be brought to the Panel of Arbitration in accordance with law.
In refutation thereto, petitioner PICOP alleged in its Rejoinder that:
a) the Adverse Claim filed thru registered mail was sent on time and as
prescribed by existing mining laws and rules and regulations;
b) the right sought by private respondent Base Metals is not absolute but is
subject to existing rights, such as those which the adverse claimant had, that
have to be recognized and respected in a manner provided and prescribed by
existing laws as will be expounded fully later;
c) as a general rule, mining applications within timber or forest lands are subject
to existing rights as provided in Section 18 of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995 and it is an admitted fact by the private respondent that petitioner
PICOP had forest rights as per Presidential Warranty;
d) while the Presidential Warranty did not expressly state exclusivity, P.D. 705
strengthened the right of occupation, possession and control over the concession
area;
e) the provisions of Section 19 of the Act and Section 15 of IRR expressly require
the written consent of the forest right holder, PICOP.
After the submission of their respective position paper, the Panel Arbitrator issued an
Order dated December 21, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads as:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
Application Nos. (XIII) 010, 011, 012 of Base Metal Resources Corporation
should be set aside.
The disapproval of private respondent Base Metals' MPSA was due to the following
reasons:
Anent the first issue the Panel find (sic) and so hold (sic) that the adverse claim
was filed on time, it being mailed on November 19, 1997, at Metro Manila as
evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 26714. Under the law (sic) the date of mailing
is considered the date of filing.
As to whether or not an MPSA application can be granted on area subject of an
IFMA3 or PTLA4 which is covered by a Presidential Warranty, the panel believes
it can not, unless the grantee consents thereto. Without the grantee's consent,
the area is considered closed to mining location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2), DAO No.
96-40). The Panel believe (sic) that mining location in forest or timberland is
allowed only if such forest or timberland is not leased by the government to a
qualified person or entity. If it is leased the consent of the lessor is necessary, in
addition to the area clearance to be issued by the agency concerned before it is
subjected to mining operation.
Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because it is off tangent to
mining. Both are extremes. They can not exist at the same time. The other must
necessarily stop before the other operate.
On the other hand, Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation can not insist
the MPSA application as assignee of Banahaw. PICOP did not consent to the
assignment as embodied in the agreement. Neither did it ratify the Deed of
Assignment. Accordingly, it has no force and effect. Thus, for lack of consent, the
MPSA must fall.
On January 11, 1999, private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with public
respondent MAB and alleged in its Appeal Memorandum the following arguments:
1. THE CONSENT OF PICOP IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE APPROVAL OF
BASE METALS' MPSA APPLICATION.
2. EVEN ASSUMING SUCH CONSENT IS NECESSARY, PICOP HAD
CONSENTED TO BASE METALS' MPSA APPLICATION.
In Answer thereto, petitioner PICOP alleged that:
1. Consent is necessary for the approval of private respondent's MPSA
application;
2. Provisions of Memorandum Order No. 98-03 and IFMA 35 are not applicable
to the instant case;
3. Provisions of PD 7055 connotes exclusivity for timber license holders; and
 4. MOA between private respondent's assignor and adverse claimant provided
for the recognition of the latter's rightful claim over the disputed areas.
Private respondent Base Metals claimed in its Reply that:
1. The withholding of consent by PICOP derogates the State's power to
supervise and control the exploration, utilization and development of all natural
resources;
2. Memorandum Order No, 98-03, not being a statute but a mere guideline
imposed by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), can be applied retroactively to MPSA applications which
have not yet been finally resolved;
3. Even assuming that the consent of adverse claimant is necessary for the
approval of Base Metals' application (which is denied), such consent had already
been given; and
4. The Memorandum of Agreement between adverse claimant and Banahaw
Mining proves that the Agusan-Surigao area had been used in the past both for
logging and mining operations.
After the filing of petitioner PICOP's Reply Memorandum, public respondent rendered the
assailed decision setting aside the Panel Arbitrator's order. Accordingly, private
respondent Base Metals' MPSA's were reinstated and given due course subject to
compliance with the pertinent requirements of the existing rules and regulations.6
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB, ruling that the Presidential Warranty of
September 25, 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber
license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's peaceful and adequate possession and
enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the Board of Investments
to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The Presidential Warranty did
not convert PICOP's timber license into a contract because it did not create any obligation on the
part of the government in favor of PICOP. Thus, the non-impairment clause finds no application.
Neither did the Presidential Warranty grant PICOP the exclusive possession, occupation and
exploration of the concession areas covered. If that were so, the government would have
effectively surrendered its police power to control and supervise the exploration, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources.
On PICOP's contention that its consent is necessary for the grant of Base Metals' MPSA, the
appellate court ruled that the amendment to PTLA No. 47 refers to the grant of gratuitous permits,
which the MPSA subject of this case is not. Further, the amendment pertains to the cutting and
extraction of timber for mining purposes and not to the act of mining itself, the intention of the
amendment being to protect the timber found in PICOP's concession areas.
The Court of Appeals noted that the reinstatement of the MPSA does not ipso facto revoke,
amend, rescind or impair PICOP's timber license. Base Metals still has to comply with the
requirements for the grant of a mining permit. The fact, however, that Base Metals had already
secured the necessary Area Status and Clearance from the DENR means that the areas applied
for are not closed to mining operations.
In its Resolution7 dated May 5, 2004, the appellate court denied PICOP's Motion for
Reconsideration. It ruled that PICOP failed to substantiate its allegation that the area applied for is
a forest reserve and is therefore closed to mining operations because it did not identify the
particular law which set aside the contested area as one where mining is prohibited pursuant to
applicable laws.
The case is now before us for review.
In its Memorandum8 dated April 6, 2005, PICOP presents the following issues: (1) the 2,756
hectares subject of Base Metals' MPSA are closed to mining operations except upon PICOP's
written consent pursuant to existing laws, rules and regulations and by virtue of the Presidential
Warranty; (2) its Presidential Warranty is protected by the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution; and (3) it does not raise new issues in its petition.
PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining operations as these are within the
Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 of then Gov. Gen.
Dwight Davis. The area is allegedly also part of permanent forest established under Republic Act
No. 3092 (RA 3092),9 and overlaps the wilderness area where mining applications are expressly
prohibited under RA 7586.10 Hence, the area is closed to mining operations under Sec. 19(f) of RA
7942.11
PICOP further asserts that to allow mining over a forest or forest reserve would allegedly be
tantamount to changing the classification of the land from forest to mineral land in violation of Sec.
4, Art. XII of the Constitution and Sec. 1 of RA 3092.
According to PICOP, in 1962 and 1963, blocks A, B and C within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao
forest reserve under Proclamation No. 369 were surveyed as permanent forest blocks in
accordance with RA 3092. These areas cover PICOP's PTLA No. 47, part of which later became
IFMA No. 35. In turn, the areas set aside as wilderness as in PTLA No. 47 became the initial
components of the NIPAS under Sec. 5(a) of RA 7586. When RA 7942 was signed into law, the
areas covered by the NIPAS were expressly determined as areas where mineral agreements or
financial or technical assistance agreement applications shall not be allowed. PICOP concludes
that since there is no evidence that the permanent forest areas within PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No.
35 have been set aside for mining purposes, the MAB and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
reinstating Base Metals' MPSA and, in effect, allowing mining exploration and mining-related
activities in the protected areas.
PICOP further argues that under DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 96-40 implementing RA
7942, an exploration permit must be secured before mining operations in government reservations
may be undertaken. There being no exploration permit issued to Banahaw Mining or appended to
its MPSA, the MAB and the Court of Appeals should not have reinstated its application.
PICOP brings to the Court's attention the case of PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Hon. Heherson T.
Alvarez,12 wherein the Court of Appeals ruled that the Presidential Warranty issued to PICOP for
its TLA No. 43 dated July 29, 1969, a TLA distinct from PTLA No. 47 involved in this case, is a
valid contract involving mutual prestations on the part of the Government and PICOP.
The Presidential Warranty in this case is allegedly not a mere confirmation of PICOP's timber
license but a commitment on the part of the Government that in consideration of PICOP's
investment in the wood-processing business, the Government will assure the availability of the
supply of raw materials at levels adequate to meet projected utilization requirements. The
guarantee that PICOP will have peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its
concession areas is impaired by the reinstatement of Base Metals' MPSA in that the latter's mining
activities underneath the area in dispute will surely undermine PICOP's supply of raw materials on
the surface.
Base Metals' obtention of area status and clearance from the DENR is allegedly immaterial, even
misleading. The findings of the DENR Regional Disrector and the superintendent of the Agusan
Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary are allegedly misplaced because the area applied for is not inside
the Agusan Marsh but in a permanent forest. Moreover, the remarks in the area status itself
should have been considered by the MAB and the appellate court as they point out that the
application encroaches on surveyed timberland projects declared as permanent forests/forest
reserves.
Finally, PICOP insists that it has always maintained that the forest areas of PTLA No. 47 and
IFMA No. 35 are closed to mining operations. The grounds relied upon in this petition are thus not
new issues but merely amplifications, clarifications and detailed expositions of the relevant
constitutional provisions and statutes regulating the use and preservation of forest reserves,
permanent forest, and protected wilderness areas given that the areas subject of the MPSA are
within and overlap PICOP's PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35 which have been classified and
blocked not only as permanent forest but also as protected wilderness area forming an integral
part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
In its undated Memorandum,13 Base Metals contends that PICOP never made any reference to
land classification or the exclusion of the contested area from exploration and mining activities
except in the motion for reconsideration it filed with the Court of Appeals. PICOP's object to the
MPSA was allegedly based exclusively on the ground that the application, if allowed to proceed,
would constitute a violation of the constitutional proscription against impairment of the obligation of
contracts. It was upon this issue that the appellate court hinged its Decision in favor of Base
Metals, ruling that the Presidential Warranty merely confirmed PICOP's timber license. The instant
petition, which raises new issues and invokes RA 3092 and RA 7586, is an unwarranted departure
from the settled rule that only issues raised in the proceedings a quo may be elevated on appeal.
Base Metals notes that RA 7586 expressly requires that there be a prior presidential decree,
presidential proclamation, or executive order issued by the President of the Philippines, expressly
proclaiming, designating, and setting aside the wilderness area before the same may be
considered part of the NIPAS as a protected area. Allegedly, PICOP has not shown that such an
express presidential proclamation exists setting aside the subject area as a forest reserve, and
excluding the same from the commerce of man.
PICOP also allegedly misquoted Sec. 19 of RA 7942 by placing a comma between the words
"watershed" and "forest" thereby giving an altogether different and misleading interpretation of the
cited provision. The cited provision, in fact, states that for an area to be closed to mining
applications, the same must be a watershed forest reserve duly identified and proclaimed by the
President of the Philippines. In this case, no presidential proclamation exists setting aside the
contested area as such.
Moreover, the Memorandum of Agreement between Banahaw Mining and PICOP is allegedly a
clear and tacit recognition by the latter that the area is open and available for mining activities and
that Banahaw Mining has a right to enter and explore the areas covered by its mining claims.
Base Metals reiterates that the non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative
power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power. The Constitution prohibits the passage of a law
which enlarges, abridges or in any manner changes the intention of the contracting parties. The
decision of the MAB and the Court of Appeals are not legislative acts within the purview of the
constitutional proscription. Besides, the Presidential Warranty is not a contract that may be
impaired by the reinstatement of the MPSA. It is a mere confirmation of PICOP's timber license
and draws its life from PTLA No. 47. Furthermore, PICOP fails to show how the reinstatement of
the MPSA will impair its timber license.
Following the regalian doctrine, Base Metals avers that the State may opt to enter into contractual
arrangements for the exploration, development, and extraction of minerals even it the same
should mean amending, revising, or even revoking PICOP's timber license. To require the State to
secure PICOP's prior consent before it can enter into such contracts allegedly constitutes an
undue delegation of sovereign power.
Base Metals further notes that Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705), under which PTLA No. 47,
IFMA No. 35 and the Presidential Warranty were issued, requires notice to PICOP rather than
consent before any mining activity can be commenced in the latter's concession areas.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Memorandum14 dated April 21, 2005 on behalf of
the MAB, contending that PICOP's attempt to raise new issues, such as its argument that the
contested area is classified as a permanent forest and hence, closed to mining activities, is
offensive to due process and should not be allowed.
The OSG argues that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process and
non-impairment clauses. The Presidential Warranty merely guarantees PICOP's tenure over its
concession area and covers only the right to cut, collect and remove timber therein. It is a mere
collateral undertaking and cannot amplify PICOP's rights under its PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35.
To hold that the Presidential Warranty is a contract separate from PICOP's timber license
effectively gives the latter PICOP an exclusive, perpetual and irrevocable right over its concession
area and impairs the State's sovereign exercise of its power over the exploration, development,
and utilization of natural resources.
The case of PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez, supra, cited by PICOP cannot
be relied upon to buttress the latter's claim that a presidential warranty is a valid and subsisting
contract between PICOP and the Government because the decision of the appellate court in that
case is still pending review before the Court's Second Division.
The OSG further asserts that mining operations are legally permissible over PICOP's concession
areas. Allegedly, what is closed to mining applications under RA 7942 are areas proclaimed as
watershed forest reserves. The law does not totally prohibit mining operations over forest
reserves. On the contrary, Sec. 18 of RA 7942 permits mining over forest lands subject to existing
rights and reservations, and PD 705 allows mining over forest lands and forest reservations
subject to State regulation and mining laws. Sec. 19(a) of RA 7942 also provides that mineral
activities may be allowed even over military and other government reservations as long as there is
a prior written clearance by the government agency concerned.
The area status clearances obtained by Base Metals also allegedly show that the area covered by
the MPSA is within timberland, unclassified public forest, and alienable and disposable land.
Moreover, PICOP allegedly chose to cite portions of Apex Mining Corporation v. Garcia,15 to
make it appear that the Court in that case ruled that mining is absolutely prohibited in the Agusan-
Surigao-Davao Forest Reserve. In fact, the Court held that the area is not open to mining location
because the proper procedure is to file an application for a permit to prospect with the Bureau of
Forest and Development.
In addition, PICOP's claimed wilderness area has not been designated as a protected area that
would operate to bar mining operations therein. PICOP failed to prove that the alleged wilderness
area has been designated as an initial component of the NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential
decree, presidential proclamation or executive order. Hence, it cannot correctly claim that the
same falls within the coverage of the restrictive provisions of RA 7586.
The OSG points out that the Administrative Code of 1917 which RA 3092 amended has been
completely repealed by the Administrative Code of 1978. Sec. 4, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution,
on the other hand, provides that Congress shall determine the specific limits of forest lands and
national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Once this is done, the area thus
covered by said forest lands and national parks may not be expanded or reduced except also by
congressional legislation. Since Congress has yet to enact a law determining the specific limits of
the forest lands covered by Proclamation No. 369 and marking clearly its boundaries on the
ground, there can be no occasion that could give rise to a violation of the constitutional provision.
Moreover, Clauses 10 and 14 of PICOP's IFMA No. 35 specifically provides that the area covered
by the agreement is open for mining if public interest so requires. Likewise, PTLA No. 47 provides
that the area covered by the license agreement may be opened for mining purposes.
Finally, the OSG maintains that pursuant to the State's policy of multiple land use, R.A. No. 7942
provides for appropriate measures for a harmonized utilization of the forest resources and
compensation for whatever damage done to the property of the surface owner or concessionaire
as a consequence of mining operations. Multiple land use is best demonstrated by the
Memorandum of Agreement between PICOP and Banahaw Mining.
First, the procedural question of whether PICOP is raising new issues in the instant petition. It is
the contention of the OSG and Base Metals that PICOP's argument that the area covered by the
MPSA is classified as permanent forest and therefore closed to mining activities was raised for the
first time in PICOP's motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.
Our own perusal of the records of this case reveals that this is not entirely true.
In its Adverse Claim and/or Opposition16 dated November 19, 1997 filed with the MGB Panel of
Arbitrators, PICOP already raised the argument that the area applied for by Base Metals is
classified as a permanent forest determined to be needed for forest purposes pursuant to par. 6,
Sec. 3 of PD 705, as amended. PICOP then proceeded to claim that the area should remain forest
land if the purpose of the presidential fiat were to be followed. It stated:
Technically, the areas applied for by Base Metals are classified as a permanent forest
being land of the public domain determined to be needed for forest purposes (Paragraph
6, Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended) If these areas then are
classified and determined to be needed for forest purpose then they should be developed
and should remain as forest lands. Identifying, delineating and declaring them for other
use or uses defeats the purpose of the aforecited presidential fiats. Again, if these areas
would be delineated from Oppositor's forest concession, the forest therein would be
destroyed and be lost beyond recovery.17
Base Metals met this argument head on in its Answer18 dated December 1, 1997, in which it
contended that PD 705 does not exclude mining operations in forest lands but merely requires that
there be proper notice to the licensees of the area.
Again in its Petition19 dated January 25, 2003 assailing the reinstatement of Base Metals' MPSA,
PICOP argued that RA 7942 expressly prohibits mining operations in plantation areas such as
PICOP's concession area. Hence, it posited that the MGB Panel of Arbitrators did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that without PICOP's consent, the area is closed to mining
location.
It is true though that PICOP expounded on the applicability of RA 3092, RA 7586, and RA 7942 for
the first time in its motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's Decision. It was only in its
motion for reconsideration that PICOP argued that the area covered by PTLA No. 47 and IFMA
No. 35 are permanent forest lands covered by RA 7586 which cannot be entered for mining
purposes, and shall remain indefinitely as such for forest uses and cannot be excluded or diverted
for other uses except after reclassification through a law enacted by Congress.
Even so, we hold that that the so-called new issues raised by PICOP are well within the issues
framed by the parties in the proceedings a quo. Thus, they are not, strictly speaking, being raised
for the first time on appeal.20 Besides, Base Metals and the OSG have been given ample
opportunity, by way of the pleadings filed with this Court, to respond to PICOP's arguments. It is in
the best interest of justice that we settle the crucial question of whether the concession area in
dispute is open to mining activities.
We should state at this juncture that the policy of multiple land use is enshrined in our laws
towards the end that the country's natural resources may be rationally explored, developed,
utilized and conserved. The Whereas clauses and declaration of policies of PD 705 state:
 WHEREAS, proper classification, management and utilization of the lands of the public
domain to maximize their productivity to meet the demands of our increasing population is
urgently needed;
WHEREAS, to achieve the above purpose, it is necessary to reassess the multiple uses
of forest lands and resources before allowing any utilization thereof to optimize the
benefits that can be derived therefrom;
… Sec. 19 Areas Closed to Mining Applications.—Mineral agreement or financial or
Sec. 2. Policies.—The State hereby adopts the following policies:
a) The multiple uses of forest lands shall be oriented to the development and
progress requirements of the country, the advancement of science and
technology, and the public welfare;
In like manner, RA 7942, recognizing the equiponderance between mining and timber rights, gives
a mining contractor the right to enter a timber concession and cut timber therein provided that the
surface owner or concessionaire shall be properly compensated for any damage done to the
property as a consequence of mining operations. The pertinent provisions on auxiliary mining
rights state:
Sec. 72. Timber Rights.—Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, a
contractor may be granted a right to cut trees or timber within his mining areas as may be
necessary for his mining operations subject to forestry laws, rules and
regulations: Provided, That if the land covered by the mining area is already covered by
existing timber concessions, the volume of timber needed and the manner of cutting and
removal thereof shall be determined by the mines regional director, upon consultation
with the contractor, the timber concessionair/permittee and the Forest Management
Bureau of the Department: Provided, further, That in case of disagreement between the
contractor and the timber concessionaire, the matter shall be submitted to the Secretary
whose decision shall be final. The contractor shall perform reforestation work within his
mining area in accordance with forestry laws, rules and regulations.
… government reservations may be opened for mining applications upon prior written clearance by
Sec. 76. Entry into Private Lands and Concession Areas.—Subject to prior notification,
holders of mining rights shall not be prevented from entry into private lands and
concession areas by surface owners, occupants, or concessionaires when conducting
mining operations therein: Provided, That any damage done to the property of the surface
owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be
properly compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and
regulations: Provided, further, That to guarantee such compensation, the person
authorized to conduct mining operation shall, prior thereto, post a bond with the regional
director based on the type of properties, the prevailing prices in and around the area
where the mining operations are to be conducted, with surety or sureties satisfactory to
the regional director.
With the foregoing predicates, we shall now proceed to analyze PICOP's averments.
PICOP contends that its concession area is within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao Forest Reserve
established under Proclamation No. 369 and is closed to mining application citing several
paragraphs of Sec. 19 of RA 7942.
The cited provision states:
technical assistance agreement applications shall not be allowed:
(a) In military and other government reservations, except upon prior written clearance by
the government agency concerned;
…
(d) In areas expressly prohibited by law;
…
(f) Old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves, wilderness
areas, mangrove forests, mossy forests, national parks, provincial/municipal forests,
parks, greenbelts, game refuge and bird sanctuaries as defined by law in areas expressly
prohibited under the National Ingrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) under Republic
Act No. 7586, Department Administrative Order No. 25, series of 1992 and other laws.
[emphasis supplied]
We analyzed each of the categories under which PICOP claims that its concession area is closed
to mining activities and conclude that PICOP's contention must fail.
Firstly, assuming that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is a government reservation,
defined as proclaimed reserved lands for specific purposes other than mineral reservations, 21 such
does not necessarily preclude mining activities in the area. Sec. 15(b) of DAO 96-40 provides that
the government agency having jurisdiction over such reservation.
Sec. 6 of RA 7942 also provides that mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral
reservations may be undertaken by the DENR, subject to certain limitations. It provides:
Sec. 6. Other Reservations.—Mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral
reservations may be undertaken by the Department, subject to limitations as herein
provided. In the event that the Department cannot undertake such activities, they may be
undertaken by a qualified person in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Secretary. The right to develop and utilize the minerals found therein
shall be awarded by the President under such terms and conditions as recommended by
the Director and approved by the Secretary: Provided, That the party who undertook the
 exploration of said reservations shall be given priority. The mineral land so awarded shall
be automatically excluded from the reservation during the term of the
agreement: Provided, further, That the right of the lessee of a valid mining contract
existing within the reservation at the time of its establishment shall not be prejudiced or
impaired.
Secondly, RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves but only
those proclaimed aswatershed forest reserves. There is no evidence in this case that the area
covered by Base Metals' MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed forest reserves.
Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve, such does not necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to mining activities.
Contrary to PICOP's obvious misreading of our decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia,
supra, to the effect that mineral agreements are not allowed in the forest reserve established
under Proclamation 369, the Court in that case actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended
by PD 1385, one can acquire mining rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-
Surigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and
Development and subsequently for a permit to explore with the Bureau of Mines and
Geosciences.
Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestty subject to existing rights
and reservations. It provides:
Sec. 18. Areas Open to Mining Operations.—Subject to any existing rights or reservations
and prior agreements of all parties, all mineral resources in public or private lands,
including timber or forestlands as defined in existing laws, shall be open to mineral
agreements or financial or technical assistance agreement applications. Any conflict that
may arise under this provision shall be heard and resolved by the panel of arbitrators.
Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations in forest lands which include the public
forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations.22 It states:
Sec. 47. Mining Operations.—Mining operations in forest lands shall be regulated and
conducted with due regard to protection, development and utilization of other surface
resources. Location, prospecting, exploration, utilization or exploitation of mineral
resources in forest reservations shall be governed by mining laws, rules and regulations.
No location, prospecting, exploration, utilization, or exploitation of mineral resources
inside forest concessions shall be allowed unless proper notice has been served upon the
licensees thereof and the prior approval of the Director, secured.
… Incorporated (PRI), Timber License Agreement.25
Significantly, the above-quoted provision does not require that the consent of existing licensees be
obtained but that they be notified before mining activities may be commenced inside forest
concessions.
DENR Memorandum Order No. 03-98, which provides the guidelines in the issuance of area
status and clearance or consent for mining applications pursuant to RA 7942, provides that timber
or forest lands, military and other government reservations, forest reservations, forest reserves
other than critical watershed forest reserves, and existing DENR Project Areas within timber or
forest lands, reservations and reserves, among others, are open to mining applications subject to
area status and clearance.
To this end, area status clearances or land status certifications have been issued to Base Metals
relative to its mining right application, to wit:
II. MPSA No. 010
1. Portion colored green is the area covered by the aforestated Timberland
Project No. 31-E, Block A and Project No. 59-C, Block A, L.C. Map No. 2466
certified as such on June 30, 1961; and
2. Shaded brown represent CADC claim.23
III. MPSA No. 011
1. The area applied covers the Timberland, portion of Project No. 31-E, Block-E,
L.C. Map No. 2468 and Project No. 36-A Block II, Alienable and Disposable
Land, L.C. Map No. 1822, certified as such on June 30, 1961 and January 1,
1955, respectively;
2. The green shade is the remaining portion of Timber Land Project;
3. The portion colored brown is an applied and CADC areas;
4. Red shade denotes alienable and disposable land.24
IV. MPSA No. 012
Respectfully returned herewith is the folder of Base Metals Mineral Resources
Corporation, applied under Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA (XIII)
012), referred to this office per memorandum dated August 5, 1997 for Land
status certification and the findings based on available references file this office,
the site is within the unclassified Public Forest of the LGU, Rosario, Agusan del
Sur. The shaded portion is the wilderness area of PICOP Resources
V. MPSA No. 013
 1. The area status shaded green falls within Timber Land, portion of Project No.
31-E, Block-A, Project No. 59-C, Block-A, L.C. Map No. 2468 certified as such on
June 30, 1961;
2. Colored brown denotes a portion claimed as CADC areas;
3. Violet shade represent a part of reforestation project of PRI concession; and
4. The yellow color is identical to unclassified Public Forest of said LGU and the
area inclosed in Red is the wilderness area of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PRI),
Timber License Agreement.26
Thirdly, PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area covered by the MPSA is a protected
wilderness area designated as an initial component of the NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential
decree, presidential proclamation or executive order as required by RA 7586.
Sec. 5(a) of RA 7586 provides:
Sec. 5. Establishment and Extent of the System.—The establishment and
operationalization of the System shall involve the following:
(a) All areas or islands in the Philippines proclaimed, designated or set aside,
pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order
as national park, game refuge, bird and wildlife sanctuary, wilderness area, strict nature
reserve, watershed, mangrove reserve, fish sanctuary, natural and historical landmark,
protected and managed landscape/seascape as well as identified virgin forests before the
effectivity of this Act are hereby designated as initial components of the System. The
initial components of the System shall be governed by existing laws, rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with this Act.
Although the above-cited area status and clearances, particularly those pertaining to MPSA Nos.
012 and 013, state that portions thereof are within the wilderness area of PICOP, there is no
showing that this supposed wilderness area has been proclaimed, designated or set aside as
such, pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order. It
should be emphasized that it is only when this area has been so designated that Sec. 20 of RA
7586, which prohibits mineral locating within protected areas, becomes operational.
From the foregoing, there is clearly no merit to PICOP's contention that the area covered by Base
Metals' MPSA is, by law, closed to mining activities.
Finally, we do not subscribe to PICOP's argument that the Presidential Warranty dated September
25, 1968 is a contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.
An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the
government's commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees
PICOP's peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic
sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to
cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of
other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession.
The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA
No. 35. We agree with the OSG's position that it is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot
amplify PICOP's rights under its timber license. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran27 that a
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We
declared:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, this Court held:
"x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or a privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.
'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it a
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation' (C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x"
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary:
"x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable
right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein.
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee)
and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry,
G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
cannot be invoked.28 [emphasis supplied]

The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking

assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an
interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the
sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the
natural resources in the area.

In closing, we should lay emphasis on the fact that the reinstatement of Base Metals' MPSA does
not automatically result in its approval. Base Metals still has to comply with the requirements
outlined in DAO 96-40, including the publication/posting/radio announcement of its mineral
agreement application.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals November 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio Morales, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.
Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.
Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks Development Corporation.
COURTS, J.:
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17,
1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto
Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber
license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the
revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation
without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance
of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area
[Annexes "6" and "7" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63].
Petitioner made the following allegations:
(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No.
87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose
Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except
prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares
located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from October 12, 1965 until
June 30, 1990;
(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter
referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all
logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging
concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential
instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex
"5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];
(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the contents of which
were as follows:
PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE
REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE
REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF
LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE WITH THE
RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT
PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE REPORT
WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED — [Annex "4" of the Petition;
Rollo, p. 48];
(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter
addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's
directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to alleging that it was not given the forest
conservation and opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging 531, but no
operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken on this letter;
(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly
covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation
under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to
be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,
(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President
Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda
issued an order dated July 22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber
license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege
which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was
not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses
were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for reinstatement has been
denied in view of the total ban of all logging operations in the provinces of Nueva
Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao which was imposed for reasons of
conservation and national security.
The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear
[sic] in respect to forest t considers itself the trustee thereof. This being the case,
it has to ensure the availability of forest resources not only for the present, but
also for the future generations of Filipinos.
On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of the country
are well documented. Their financial demands on logging concessionaires are
well known. The government, therefore, is well within its right to deprive its
 enemy of sources of funds in order to preserve itself, its established institutions
and the liberty and democratic way of life of its people.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating, among others. its request
that TLA No. 356 issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however
denied this motion in an order dated September 15, 1986. stating in part:
xxx xxx xxx
Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare portion of TLA
No. 87 to Twin Peaks Realty Development Corporation under TLA No. 356 be
declared null and void, suffice it to say that the Ministry is now in the process of
reviewing all contracts, permits or other form of privileges for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of natural resources entered into,
granted, issued or acquired before the issuance of Proclamation No. 3, otherwise
known as the Freedom Constitution for the purpose of amending, modifying or
revoking them when the national interest so requires.
xxx xxx xxx
The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has jurisdiction and
authority over all forest lands. On the basis of this authority, the Ministry issued
the order banning all logging operations/activities in Quirino province, among
others, where movant's former concession area is located. Therefore, the
issuance of an order disallowing any person or entity from removing cut or uncut
logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA No. 356, would constitute an
unnecessary or superfluous act on the part of the Ministry.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]
On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Meanwhile, per MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November 26, 1986,
the logging ban in the province of Quirino was lifted.
Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. In a
resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the
President ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having been
terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 14, 1987.
Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of
a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it
filed a supplement to its petition for certiorari. Thereafter, public and private respondents submitted
their respective comments, and petitioner filed its consolidated reply thereto. In a resolution dated
May 22, 1989, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.
After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds several factors which
militate against the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner.
1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative
orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the
purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the
rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general
jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by
competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497
(1956); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September
30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989].
In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April 2,
1986, respectively, sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of
Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the
revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.
But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8
of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until
after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister
of the MNR requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already settled
matters as far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil.
300 (1959); Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609; Ocampo v.
Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 374].
No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September 19, 1983 which
petitioner claimed to have sent to then President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53],
seeking the reconsideration of the 1983 order issued by Director Cortes of the Bureau. It must be
pointed out that the averments in this letter are entirely different from the charges of fraud against
officials under the previous regime made by petitioner in its letters to public respondents herein. In
the letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in the list of
concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled, by defending its record of selective logging and
reforestation practices in the subject concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to
have been taken by petitioner until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent scheme
became apparent in 1984 as evidenced by the awarding of the subject timber concession area to
other entities in that year.
2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present
case because he failed to file his petition within a reasonable period.
The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is whether or not
public respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the past
regime. Yet, what the petition ultimately seeks is the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling
TLA No. 87 and granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983
and 1984, respectively.
Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier
administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its
cause. For although no specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be done within
a "reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the
"reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts
complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No.
56761, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566, 571]. And failure to file the petition for certiorari within
a reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences
of laches [Municipality of Carcar v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December
27, 1982, 119 SCRA 392).
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either
abandoned it or declined to assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23
SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is
that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may,
depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws aid those who
are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura
subveniunt) [See Buenaventura v. David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918)].
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984.
Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the
opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay
constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of
certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.
3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of
petitioner and against public respondents herein. It is precisely this for which prevents the Court
from departing from the general application of the rules enunciated above.
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR
which were ed by the Office of the President, will disclose public policy consideration which
effectively forestall judicial interference in the case at bar,
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to
develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department
evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the
previous dispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative departments of the incumbent
administration are presently taking stock of its environmental policies with regard to the utilization
of timber lands and developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation and
rehabilitation.
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing
global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in
sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed,
most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the
country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna
peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social
effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts
has been triggered and the supply of food and energy resources required by the people seriously
depleted.
While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's
immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of
Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment demands effective and circumspect action from
the government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less
is expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced
and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79
Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905
(1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G. R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA
543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v.
Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-
33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-
30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a
private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy
issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by
the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage
natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these
resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim,
Sr. v. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34
SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted
by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to
the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections
3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-
24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify the
Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the
previous regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the
department.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the
issuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention
of the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on
department officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to
regulate the use and exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special
favors" to preferred individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this
Court will not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought showing a
clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with
respect to the implementation of this public policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield
its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1,
Article VIII].

However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of public respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant
any of the affirmative reliefs sought.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992
SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS,
ISIDRO GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI, respondents.
Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner.
Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents
CRUZ, J.:
The Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues raised in this petition — the correct
application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and
utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del
Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992.
On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious
violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.
The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a
complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction
over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the
injunction sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605.
Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987, 1 and the motion for
reconsideration on February 15, 1988. 2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent
Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a decision dated July 4, 1988, 3 and in its
resolution of September 27, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration. 4
The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
without exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be
dispensed with. The respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception
was the urgent need for judicial intervention, which it explained thus:
The lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the City Council of
Pagadian in its Resolution No. 111 requested the Bureau of Forest Development
to reserve 1,000 hectares in Lison Valley. This request remained unacted upon.
Instead in 1982, a TLA covering 29,500 hectares, including the area requested,
was given to petitioner.
Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its resolution became
reality.
"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the logging
operations of the defendant has caused heavy siltation not only
in the Labangan River (as predicted by the City Council of
Pagadian City in 1981) but also in the Tukuran River, Salug
River, Sindangan River, and Sibuguey River. In other words, the
adverse effects of the logging operations of the defendant have
already covered a wider area than that feared to be adversely
affected by the City Council of Pagadian City.
Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested areas years
back, particularly in the Island of Mindanao. When the grant of
logging concessions started, so was the denudation of forests. .
. . It is common knowledge that heavy floods have occurred in
areas/places adjoining logging concessions. (Resolution dated
December 11, 1987, p. 5).
Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. Irreparable damage
would ensue unless the court intervenes. Reliance on the DENR may not be
enough, judging from its inaction on the council's request seven years back.
The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the case of De Lara v. Cloribel, 5 where
"irreparable damage and injury" was allowed as an exceptional ground, and Arrow Transportation
Corporation v. Board of Transportation, 6 where the doctrine was waived because of "the strong
public interest in having the matter settled" as soon as possible.
The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:
Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case
involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or
suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative official or
body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in
connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or
development of the natural resources of the Philippines.
This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the
lower courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited Export
Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 7where several presidential decrees were declared
unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the judicial power to determine just compensation in
expropriation cases.
The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not correctly applied and that the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1
of PD 605 was improper.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in
lack of a cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the
dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a
waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with
the case as if the doctrine had been observed.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon
the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not
exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative
authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and
that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given
a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually
questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed
only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may
be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number
of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets. 9
As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when
the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among
these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 10 2) when the
administrative body is in estoppel; 11 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 12 4) when
there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 13 5) when the claim involved is small; 14 6) when
irreparable damage will be suffered; 15 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; 16 8) when strong public interest is involved; 17 9) when the subject of the controversy is
private land; 18 and 10) in quo warranto proceedings. 19
The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because
forestry laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action;
the question they are raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and
irreparable damage; and public interest is involved.
We rule for the petitioner.
Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative
remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its
observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of
pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the development,
disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all lands of the public domain," 20 and in the
Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the
enforcement of the forestry laws aid regulations 21 here claimed to have been violated. This
comprehensive conferment clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to
rule in the first instance on any controversy coming under its express powers before the courts of
justice may intervene.
The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The
private respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the
civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, that the petitioner has violated the
terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The charge
involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best
evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the
agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers
of review.
As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case
on the national interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily
established these extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion
of administrative remedies and immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular
submission must fall flat against the petitioner's uncontested contention that it has since 1988
stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with the order of the DENR.
In the Petition for prohibition filed with the respondent court, the petitioner alleged that its logging
operations had been suspended pursuant to a telegram 22 received on February 23, 1988, by the
District Forester from the Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Zamboanga City; reading as
follows:
DISTRICT FORESTER
PAGADIAN CITY
QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1988 FROM
SECRETARY FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR. QUOTE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY
CMA SUSPEND ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS OF SUNVILLE IN VIEW OF SERIOUS
VIOLATIONS OF FOREST PROTECTION AND REFORESTATION UNQUOTE SUBMIT
REPORT ASAP.
RED BATCAGAN
The petition now before us contains the allegations that the "petition for cancellation of petitioner's
TLA is still pending up to this date and that petitioner's logging operations (were) ordered
suspended by the Secretary of the DENR pending further investigation." 23
In the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is informed that "the Secretary of the
DENR suspended petitioner's logging operations until further investigation. The suspension is still
in force up to this date after the lapse of almost 3 years." 24

These statements have not been disputed by the private respondents in their pleadings before the
respondent court and this Court and are therefore deemed admitted.

There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent
court. Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result
of the unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or
not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for
emphasis, determination of this question is the primary responsibility of the Forest Management
Bureau of the DENR. The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the
resolution of the issue raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still
necessary, of the same question by a court of justice.

In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to
declare the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of
constitutionality must be avoided where the case can be decided on some other available
ground, 25 as we have done in the case before us. The resolution of this same question must await
another case, where all the indispensable requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional
question are satisfactorily established. In such an event, it will be time for the Court "to make the
hammer fall, and heavily," in the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated July 4,
1988, and its resolution dated September 27, 1988, as well as the resolutions of the trial court
dated December 11, 1987 and February 15, 1988, are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case
No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 135527 October 19, 2000
Spouses GEMINIANO and AMPARO DE OCAMPO and Spouses PEDRO and CRISANTA
SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
FEDERICO ARLOS, MARY ARLOS, TEOFILO OJERIO and BELLA OJERIO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain may be judicially confirmed. Unless a public land is reclassified and declared as such,
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights. A suit for the reversion of such property to the State may be instituted only by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The Case
1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the August 28, 1998 Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52048, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:2
"ACCORDINGLY, for want of merit, the appeal is DENIED and the challenged Decision dated 26
November 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Balanga, Bataan, is AFFIRMED. No costs."
The affirmed Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled on the following: (1) Land
Registration Case No. N-340, filed in 1977 for confirmation of respondent’s title to three parcels of
land; and (2) Civil Case No. 4739, filed in 1981 for cancellation of petitioners’ Sales Patents and
Transfer Certificates of Title covering two of the said lots. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision reads:4
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered:
I. In Civil Case No. 4739 -
1. Ordering the cancellation of Sales Patent Nos. 5387 and 5388 as well as Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205 in the names of [herein petitioner-]spouses
Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x x Pedro Santos and Crisanta
Santos.
2. Taking judicial cognizance of the decision in Civil Case No. 3769, which ordered the
cancellation of Free Patent Nos. 522697 and 502977 as well as Original Certificate of
Title Nos. 296 and 297, which decision has already become final and executory;
3. Ordering [Petitioners] Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x x Pedro
Santos and Crisanta Santos to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs attorney’s fees in
the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and the costs of suit.
II. In Land Registration Case No. N-340 -
1. Confirming [herein respondents’] title [to] the land subject of registration and ordering
the registration thereof in the names of [Respondent] Teofilo D. Ojerio, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Bella V. Ojerio and a resident of Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan - ½
share; and Cecilia P. Arlos, Jose P. Arlos, Gloria P. Arlos, Luisito P. Arlos, all of legal age,
Filipinos, single and residents of 500-A, Fifth Avenue corner Baltazar Street, Grace Park,
Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and Alberto U. Arlos, minor, Filipino, and a resident of 500-
A, Fifth Avenue corner Baltazar Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro Manila - ½
share; and
2. As soon as this decision becomes final and executory, let an order for the issuance of
the corresponding decrees be issued.
SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The undisputed facts are quoted by the CA from the RTC judgment, as follows:5
"On 14 April 1977, Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an application for registration,
docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-340, wherein they seek judicial confirmation of their
titles [to] three parcels of land, namely: (1) a parcel of land covered by SGS 4140 [PLAN] with an
area of 226,105 square meters; (2) a parcel of land identified as Lot 1, SGS 41241 [PLAN] with an
area of 111,333 square meters; and (3) a parcel of land identified as Lot 2, SGS 4141 [PLAN] with
an area of 63,811 square meters, all located at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and having a total
area of 401,159 square meters or 40.1159 hectares.
"Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo De Ocampo and spouses Pedro Santos and
Crisanta Santos opposed the application for registration, alleging that they are the co-owners of
Lots 1 and 2 of Plan SGS 3062, situated at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and their ownership is
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205, and that they became
owners of said lots by purchase from the government through sales patents.
"The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application, contending that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question for at least 30 years immediately
preceding the filing of the application; and that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
"Spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez and spouses Armando Manalo and Jovita Baron
also opposed the application for registration.
"Almost four years after the filing of the land registration case or, to be exact, on 20 February
1981, applicant Arlos and his spouse, Mary Alcantara Arlos, and applicant Ojerio and his spouse
Bella V. Ojerio, filed Civil Case No. 4739, seeking to cancel; (1) the free patent title of defendants-
spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez, that is, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 296-
Bataan, covering Lot, 1, Plan F-(III-4) 508-D with an area of 155,772 square meters, and Lot 2,
same plan, containing an area of 43,089 square meters, or a total area of 198,861 square meters
or 19.8861 hectares; (2) the free patent title of defendants Armando Manalo and Jovito Baron, that
is, OCT No. 297-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, F-(III-4) 510-D with an area of 72,065 square meters or
7.2065 hectares; and (3) the sales patent title of defendants-spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and
Amparo de Ocampo and defendants-spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos, that is, Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-44205-Bataan with an area of 225,011 square meters or 22.5011
hectares, and T-43298-Bataan with an area of 111,333 square meters or 11.1333 hectares.
"In the Order dated 31 July 1991 of the RTC, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, Civil Case No. 4739
which was then assigned to said Branch was ordered consolidated with the land registration cases
assigned to Branch 2.
"Of relevance to this case on appeal is the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 26 April 1989 in
G.R. 64753 involving Civil Case No. 3769 entitled ‘Spouses de Ocampo et al. v. Manalo, et al.’
which annulled the free patent titles of the spouses Manalo and declared as valid the sales patent
title issued in favor of the spouses De Ocampo and spouses Santos involving the same properties
subject of this appeal."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the factual findings of the trial court, the CA ruled that petitioners had failed to comply
with the Public Land Act, which required sales patent applicants to be the actual occupants and
cultivators of the land. It held that the testimonies of petitioners, which were "incongruous with
reality," bolstered the "finding that [they had] never occupied, cultivated or made improvements on
the property." It explained:
"On the basis of its own findings, the trial court, after evaluating the evidence presented,
concluded that [herein respondents] and their predecessors-in-interest were in actual possession
of the subject lands in 1947 and continuously up to the present. In contrast, the checkered
testimonies of [petitioners] reveal that they have never been in possession of the lands. And
because of the absence of the actual occupancy on their part, the sales patents and titles issued
in their favor are null and void citing therein the ruling in Republic v. Mina (114 SCRA 946) that
‘the alleged misrepresentation of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land
are sufficient grounds to nullify the patent and title under Section 9 of the Public Land Laws.’
"On this particular note, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. x x x." 6
Debunking petitioners’ reliance on Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,7 the CA ratiocinated as follows:
"[Herein respondents] do not challenge the Decision of the High Court dated 26 April 1989 in GR
No. 64753 which annulled the free patent titles of defendants-appellants Manalos and granted the
issuance of sales patent titles of [Petitioners] De Ocampos and Santoses.
"What is being disputed is that the issuance of the sales patents of the subject property in favor of
the Santoses and the De Ocampos was allegedly tainted by fraud and misrepresentation on their
part by misrepresenting themselves to be actual occupants of the subject properties when in fact
the subject properties were being actually occupied by the [respondents] since 1947 way back
when the land still formed part of the military reservation and further on when it was declared to be
public agricultural land. x x x."8
Hence, this Petition.9
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:10
"I
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in disregarding the Decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 64753 entitled, ‘Placido Manalo, et al. vs. Spouses Geminiano de
Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo, et al.,’ wherein the validity and legality of petitioners’ TCT No.
T-44205 and TCT No. T-43298 [pertaining to] the land in dispute were upheld.
"II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering the cancellation of petitioners’
Sales Patent as well as TCT Nos. T-43298 and T-44205 considering that private respondents are
not the proper party to institute the action for annulment of petitioners’ titles [to] the lots.
"III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ruling that petitioners committed an act
of misrepresentation in their Application for Sales Patent.
"IV
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering petitioners to pay private
respondents the amount of ₱50,000.00 representing attorney’s fees."
In short, petitioners ask this Court to determine the propriety of (1) the registration of respondents’
title under the Public Land Act and (2) the cancellation of petitioners’ Sales Patents and Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs).
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:Registration of Respondents’ Title
Respondents’ application for registration of title to the three parcels of land that were once part of
the public domain is governed by the Public Land Act,11 the pertinent portion of which reads:
"SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.
"xxx xxx xxx"
Respondents claim that they purchased the subject lots in 1967 from Bernardo and Arsenio
Obdin,12 who in turn had been in possession of the property since 1947. Hence, when the former
filed their application for registration in 1977, they and their predecessors-in-interest had been
occupying and cultivating, in the concept of owners, the said parcels of land for at least 30 years,
as required by the Public Land Act.
We are not convinced. First, a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land
Act only if it pertains to alienable lands of the public domain.13 Unless such assets are reclassified
and considered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter
how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No.
107314 clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the latter applied
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.15
In the present case, the disputed land which was formerly a part of a US military reservation that
had been turned over to the Philippine government in 1965, was declared disposable and
alienable only in 1971. In Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,16 a suit involving the same parcel of land
and instituted by herein petitioners against other claimants, the Court held:
"As correctly pointed out by the appellate court in its questioned decision:
‘x x x. It is not correct to say that when the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan, of which the land in
question forms part, was turned over to the Philippine government, the same automatically
became a disposable land of the public domain. The ownership and control over said reservation
was transferred to the Philippine government, but its nature as a military reservation remained
unchanged. Said parcels of land became a disposable land of public domain only on May 19,
1971, per certification of the Bureau of Forestry (Project No. 4-A, C-C. Map No 26-40). Its
disposition only by sale was duly authorized pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 274. If
the land in question became immediately disposable upon its turn over to the Philippine
government in 1965, then why, it may be asked, was it certified disposable only in 1971. This
Court is of the conclusion that this land above referred to continued to be a military reservation
land while in the custody of the Philippine government until it was certified alienable in
1971." (Emphasis supplied.)
Second, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest could not have occupied the subject
property from 1947 until 1971 when the land was declared alienable and disposable, because it
was a military reservation at the time. Hence, it was not subject to occupation, entry or settlement.
This is clear from Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land Act, which provide as follows:
"SEC. 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the President
may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for
the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants
thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or
purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for
railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales,
public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, working-men's village and other improvements for
the public benefit.
SEC. 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be
non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until
again declared under the provision of this Act or by proclamation of the President." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Verily, in Manalo, the Court debunked therein petitioners’ similar argument that they had been
occupying the property since 1944. It ruled in this wise:
"The big tract of land in Mariveles, Bataan to which the parcels of land involved in the case belong
was formerly a portion of the US Military Reservation in Mariveles, Bataan which was turned over
to the Philippine Government only on December 22, 1965 (Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals et al., No. L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648). Under the situation, the Court
seriously doubts whether Placido Mapa and their predecessors-in-interest could have been in
possession of the land since 1944 as they claimed:
‘Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired (Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., No. 14912, September 30,
1976, 73 SCRA 146).’"
We reiterate that the land was declared alienable only in 1971; hence, respondents have not
satisfied the thirty-year requirement under the Public Land Act. Moreover, they could not have
occupied the property for thirty years, because it formed part of a military reservation. Clearly then,
their application for the registration of their titles was erroneously granted by the appellate and the
trial courts.
Second Issue: Cancellation of Petitioners’ Titles
Petitioners claim that their titles can no longer be challenged, because "it is a rule that the Torrens
Title issued on the basis of a free patent becomes indefeasible as one which was judicially
secured upon registration upon expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent."17
Petitioners further contend that the action for the cancellation of their Sales Patents and TCTs
should have been initiated by the solicitor general, not by herein respondents, pursuant to Section
101 of the Public Land Act, which we quote:
"SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead,
in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines."
Solicitor General. Since petitioners’ titles originated from a grant by the government, their
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.20 At the risk of being repetitive, we
stress that respondents have no personality to "recover" the property, because they have not
shown that they are the rightful owners thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General for a possible review, in
its sound discretion, of the issuance of the Sales Patents and Certificates of Titles in the name of
herein petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Respondents argue, however, that the present proceedings are not for reversion, but for Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
reconveyance. Hence, they have the personality to file the present suit. Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part.

We are not persuaded by respondents’ argument. In an action for reconveyance, "the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property,
in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person’s name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. That is what reconveyance is all
about."18

Reconveyance, however, is not available to respondents, because they have not shown a title
better than that of petitioners. As earlier shown, the former have not proven any title that may be
judicially confirmed.

Moreover, respondents’ invocation of Heirs of Nagano v. CA19 must be rejected. In that case, the
Court noted that the allegations in the Complaint, which were deemed admitted for the purpose of
resolving the Motion to Dismiss, were "an assertion that the lot is private land, or that even
assuming it was part of the public domain, private respondents had already acquired imperfect title
thereto under Section 48 (b) of CA No. 141 x x x." Hence, the Court ruled that respondents, not
the OSG, were the proper parties to file the suit.

In the present case, we reiterate that respondents failed to show entitlement to the
land.1âwphi1 They have not established that they are the rightful owners of the property; or at
least, that they, not petitioners, have a better right thereto.

Respondents vigorously contend that the Sales Patents were fraudulently obtained by petitioners,
who have allegedly failed to prove the requisite actual occupation of the land in
question.1âwphi1 The former cite several portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, showing
that the latter have not actually occupied or cultivated the property.

The Court, however, finds that a ruling on the veracity of these factual averments would be
improper in this Decision. If petitioners’ Sales Patents and TCTs were in fact fraudulently obtained,
the suit to recover the disputed property should be filed by the State through the Office of the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares,
as they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable
under the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired
under private ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by
these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality
of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He
was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry then came to this Court
in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not
subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that
the land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the
parties is the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal
and therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land.
The issue before us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the
earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the
Philippine Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber
or forest lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth,
promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter
expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other
categories. 3 This provision has been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present
Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only
agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No.
141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first
reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps
or manglareswere defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various
kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their
roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there.
These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but
which are also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible
wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the
opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in
the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over
them are not available for purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of
without impairment of the public interest in what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the
custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which
became a common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of
the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the
Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a
public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private
ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that
mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative
Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public
land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever
character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in
the Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
 ...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that
Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this
translation and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber
land in English means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would
never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes,
shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does
not change the general character of the land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said
that the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish
law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the
Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands
that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm
lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code
of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights
of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated
on March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917.
Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the
application there are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we
think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has
been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in
which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano
and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of
Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in
nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the
trees are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing
are not of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land.
Such lands are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public
domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral
lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa
swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the
contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court
ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove
lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.
13
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, the Court was more positive
when it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.'
Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of
forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code
as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore,
they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of
private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private
land' better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes
and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands'
do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive
of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed
with the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp
mangrove or forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was
decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical
pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps
are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the
authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and
is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made
such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role,
administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step
into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid,
it is claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three
departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution
in the conservation and utilization of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function
of making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public
domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public
domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use
or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this
section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one
class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon
there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the
Department Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves
from the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of
such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves
shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for
forest uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or
modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such
proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and
become part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been
made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public
forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of
Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural
than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under
forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of
the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The
legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in
effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to
date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More
importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or
unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny.
The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the
Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
That determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we
have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be
understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the
Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as
forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due
process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it
was much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove
swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of
Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject
of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in
support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and
reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue
under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the
Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the
mere existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as
forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The
Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the
Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for
agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release
for private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain
that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither
the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant,
sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for
grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp
lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are
still classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other
purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which
can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable.
Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private
property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private
respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of
the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone
the fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been
shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property
and that the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for
twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These matters are not presumed but
must be established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis
used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in
favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the
subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section
1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now,
mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they
are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and
unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for
registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983
SERAFIN B. YNGSON, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE
GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ, defendants-appellees.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which
upheld the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the
President regarding the disposition of swamplands for conversion into fishponds. Originally taken
to the Court of Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court on a finding that only a pure question
of law was involved in the appeal.
There is no dispute over the facts. The Court of Appeals adopted the statement of facts in the
Solicitor-General's brief. We do the same:
The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an
area of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini,
municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental. In view of the
potentialities and possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes, several persons
filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said
purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her
application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio Doromal who filed his on
October 28, 1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because said area
were then still considered as communal forest and therefore not yet available for
fishpond purposes.
On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar
application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of
the respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their
respective applications with the same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953.
When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said
area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was only
released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the
aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of the Director of the Bureau of
Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor
of the petitioner-appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees
(pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal). Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez
appealed the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources where their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases
Nos. 901 and 901-A (p. 3, Rec. on Appeal).
In an order dated April 5, 1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the order of the Director of the
Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division of the area in question into three
portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by
their respective applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). Appellant filed a petition
for review dated July 6, 1955 from the aforesaid order of the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources but the same was dismissed by the Office of
the President of the Philippines on December 20, 1955 (pp. 5-8, Rec. on Appeal).
A motion for reconsideration filed by the appellant on February 15, 1956 was
likewise denied on August 3, 1956. A second and third motion for
reconsiderations filed by the appellant was also denied on August 5, 1958 and
October 26, 1960, respectively (p. 18, Rec. on Appeal).
Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of First Instance against the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, Anita V. Gonzales, and Jose M. Lopez.
The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void
and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition on the ground that plaintiff
had not established such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment" on the part of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President of the
Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts in a special
civil action.
The plaintiff-appellant made the following assignments of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED
SUCH 'CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE
DEFENDANTS- APPELLEES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES
AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AS TO CONSTITUTE GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, JUSTIFYING REVIEW THEREOF IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION BY
THE COURT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RULE OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES IN EFFECT ITSELF HOLDING THAT THE 'PRIORITY RULE'
ESTABLISHED IN PARAGRAPHS (a) AND (d), SECTION 14, FISHERY ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. 14 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO FISHPOND APPLICATIONS FILED PRIOR TO THE
CERTIFICATION OF THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY THAT THE AREA APPLIED FOR IS
AVAILABLE FOR FISHPOND PURPOSES; IN TREATING THE APPLICATIONS OF THE
APPELLANT AND THAT OF THE APPELLEES LOPEZ AND GONZALES ON EQUAL FOOTING
ONLY AND IN ORDERING THE DIVISION OF THE AREA INVOLVED IN THESE
APPLICATIONS INTO THREE EQUAL PARTS AWARDING ONE-THIRD SHARE EACH TO
THESE APPLICANTS.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for development into
fishponds gravely abuse their discretion in interpreting and applying their own rules? This is the
only issue in this case.
The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:
SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application-In determining the priority of application or
right to a permit or lease the following rules shall be observed:
(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is
unoccupied and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of preference
thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
(d) A holder of fishpond application which has been rejected or cancelled by the
Director of Fisheries by reason of the fact that the area covered thereby has
been certified by the Director of Forestry as not available for fishpond purposes,
SHALL NOT LOSE his right as a PRIOR APPLICANT therefore, if LATER ON,
the area applied for is certified by the Director of Forestry as available for
fishpond purposes, provided that not more than one (1) year has expired since
the rejection or cancellation of his application, in which case, his fishpond
application which was rejected or cancelled before, shall be reinstated and given
due course, and all other fishpond applications filed for the same area shall be
rejected.
The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates:
1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.
2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947
3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952
4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953
5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953
The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on
January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was
no land available for lease permits and c• nversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants
filed their applications.
After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably gave due course
to Yngzon's application and rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason
given was Yngzon's priority of application.
We see no error in the decision of the lower court. The administrative authorities committed no
grave abuse of discretion.
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber
or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the
Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other
modes of utilization. (Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175; Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10; Vda. de Alfafara v. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125; Director of Forestry v.
Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1184).
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove
lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or
timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes.
All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential
right over another. The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications
filed so close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a
period of one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether or
not the administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is not challenged
in this case. The validity of paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is
clearly not covered by the provision. His application was filed almost two years before the release
of the area for fishpond purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the
one-year period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact
that the latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the
respondent Secretary's order states that all three applications must be considered as having been
filed at the same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share
the lease of the 66 hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this
order. They pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto.
The Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose of the provision in question is to
redeem a rejected premature application and to consider it filed as of the date the area was
released and not to grant a premature application a better right over another of the same category.
We find such an interpretation as an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.
In the case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) we reiterated the rule that the construction of
the officer charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should be given
controlling weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA 220) we held that in the absence of a
clear showing of abuse, the discretion of the appropriate department head must be respected. The
records show that the above rulings should also apply to the present case.

During the pendency of this petition, petitioner Yngson filed a motion to have Patricio Bayoborda,
Rene Amamio, and nine other respondents, declared in contempt of court. Petitioner charged that
Bayoborda and Amamio entered the property in controversy and without petitioner's consent, laid
stakes on the ground alleging that the same were boundaries of the areas they were claiming; that
the other respondents likewise entered the property on different dates and destroyed petitioner's
hut and the uppermost part of his fishpond and started to build houses and to occupy the same. In
their comment, the respondents in the contempt motion denied petitioner's charges. Bayoborda
and Amamio stated that they were bona-fide applicants for fishpond purposes of areas outside the
22 hectares alloted for the petitioner and that they were authorized to place placards in the areas
they applied for. As evidence the respondents attached a copy of the resolution of the Presidential
Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) showing that their applications have been duly
received and acknowledged by the latter and in compliance with government regulations, they
placed markers and signs in their respective boundaries. The resolution likewise stated that these
markers and signs were subsequently destroyed and later on Mr. Yngson started development by
building dikes in the area applied for, which he has no authority to do so due to the present
conflict. The resolution further prohibited Yngson from constructing any improvements in any area
outside his 22 hectares and also prohibited Bayoborda and Amamio from entering and making
constructions in the applied for areas pending the issuance of their permits.

The petitioner has failed to show that the acts committed by the respondents were a direct
disturbance in the proper administration of justice and processes of the law which constitutes
contempt of court. If there were any violations of petitioner's rights, he should resort to PACLAP
which issued the resolution between him and respondents or file, as he alleged he did, a criminal
complaint or other action before the courts. The motion also raises factual considerations including
boundaries and geographical locations more proper for a trial court.

We have held that contempt of court presupposes contumacious and arrogant defiance of the
court. (De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23; Matutina v. Judge Buslon, 109 Phil. 140,142)

The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court which we can take cognizance of and
punish. If any of his property or other rights over his one-third's share of the disputed property are
violated, he can pursue the correct action before the proper lower court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is
also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondents-appellants.
Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna dated 3 June
1968 in a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil Case No. SC-650 entitled
International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines vs. University of the Philippines
and Jose Campos, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner and against the
respondents:
(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of the Philippines,
in lieu of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry, to scale, measure and
seal the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land referred to in said Act, and
collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue
Code therefor; and
(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim.
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 49409-
R.
After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)
promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this Court as the "entire
case hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic Act 3990 as it applies to a set of
facts which are not disputed by the parties and therefore, is a legal question. 1
Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on 28 June
1966.2 Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent University of the Philippines
(hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise and regulate the cutting and
removal of timber and other forest products, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or to
collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from petitioner and/or impose any other duty
or burden upon the latter in that portion of its concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A
issued on 1 February 1963, ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act No. 3990; asks that
respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained of and prays that respondents be
required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as damages and costs of the suit.
Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably acted upon, and
pursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967, respondents filed their Answer on 13
September 1987,3 wherein they interpose the affirmative defenses of, among others, improper
venue and that the petition states no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for the
payment of it by petitioner of forest charges on the forest products cut and felled within the area
ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and interests as provided
in the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim.4
On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission of the
Case for Judgment,5 which reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties in the above entitled case by the undersigned counsel, and
respectfully submit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND JOINT
SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT, without prejudice to the presentation of
evidence by either party:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of
plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the Government an exclusive license for a
period of 25 years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber from
that portion of timber land located in the Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc
Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavite and
Calauan, Province of Laguna under License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) issued
and promulgated by the Government through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources on January 11, 1960. ... ;
3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a renewal of the
Timber License Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by the Government to the plaintiff
on June 4, 1953 to February 1, 1963. ... ;
4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been in peaceful
possession of said timber concession and had been felling cutting and removing timber
therefrom pursuant to the aforementioned Timber License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) of January 11, 1960;
5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the Government on
June 4,1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) of January 11, 1960, has constructed roads and other improvements and
installations of the aforementioned area subject to the grant and purchased equipment in
implementation of the conditions contained in the aforementioned License Agreement and
has in connection therewith spent more than P7,000,000.00 as follows: ... ;
6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License Agreement No. 27-
A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of the Philippines issued Executive
Proclamation No. 791 which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AS EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY
RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE AND FOR AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THIS COLLEGE A CERTAIN
PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY IN THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND PAKIL ,PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND
PARTLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON,
ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of the
Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the College of
Agriculture, University of the Philippines, as experiment station for the proposed Dairy
Research and production studies of this College, a certain parcel of land of the Public
domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil province of Laguna, and
partly in the municipality of Infants, Province of Quezon, Island of Luzon, subject to
private rights, if any there be, and to the condition that the disposition of timber and other
forest products found therein shall be subject to the forestry laws and regulations, which
parcel of land is more particularly described as follows, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila this 25th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the sixteenth.
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA
President of the Philippines
xxx xxx xxx
7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the aforementioned License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11, 1960, Republic Act No. 3990 was enacted
by the Congress of the Philippines and approved by the President of the Philippines,
which Republic Act provides as follows:
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central experiment station for the use
of the University of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension
functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary
Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.
SEC. 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public domain consisting of three
thousand hectares, more or less, located in the Municipality of Paete, Province of
Laguna, the precise boundaries of which are stated in Executive Proclamation
791, Series of 1961, is hereby ceded and transferred in full ownership to the
University of the Philippines, subject to any existing concessions, if any.
SEC. 3. All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station
shall be exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall
pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, June 18, 1964.
8. That on the strength of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3990, and prior to the
institution of the present suit, defendants have demanded, verbally as well as in writing to
plaintiff-.
(a) That the forest charges due and payable by plaintiff under the License
Agreement 27-A (Amendment) referred to in paragraph 2 hereof be paid to the
University of the Philippines, instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
(b) That the selling of any timber felled or cut by plaintiff within the boundaries of
the Central Experiment Station as defined in Republic Act No. 3990 be
performed by personnel of the University of the Philippines.
9. That the position of the plaintiff oil the demand of the defendants was fully discussed in
the letter dated April 29, 1966 of plaintiffs lawyer addressed to the President of the
University of the Philippines, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof.
10. That in line with its position as stated in paragraph thereof, plaintiff has refused to
allow entry to personnel of the University of the Philippines to the Central Experiment
Station area assigned thereto for the purpose of supervising the felling cutting and May we request that proper instructions be issued by the district Forester of
removal of timber therein and scaling any such timber cut and felled prior to removal Laguna about this matter. Thank you.

11. That in view of the stand taken by plaintiff and in Relation to the implemetation of Very truly yours,
Republic Act No. 3990 the defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below to
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue: Sgd.) JOSE C. CAMPOS JR.
Business Executive
xxx xxx xxx
12. That in reply to the above letter of defendant Business Executive dated February 8,
February 8, 1966 1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the following letter-ruling dated
March 11, 1966:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Manila xxx xxx xxx

Re: Forest Charges of U.P. Paete Land Grant March 11, 1966

Dear Sir: U.P. Paete Land Grant

University of the Philippines
Under Republic Act 3990 approved in June, 1964 a parcel of forest land Diliman, Quezon City
approximately 3,500 hectares in area was ceded in full ownership by the
government to the University of the Philippines. This area is known as Paete Attn: Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Land Grant, the title to which is presently issued in the name of the University of Business Executive
the Philippines. The law transferring the ownership to the University of the
Philippines gives the university full rights of dominion and ownership, subject to Gentlemen:
the existing concession of International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the
Philippines. Under the terms of this law all forest charges due from the
This has reference to your letter dated February 8, 1966 stating as follows:
concessionaire should now be paid to the University of the Philippines. The
purpose of giving this land grant to the University is to enable us to generate
income out of the land grant and establish a research and experimental station xxx xxx xxx
for the Colleges of Agriculture, Forestry, Arts and Sciences and Veterinary
Medicine. In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you as follows:

I would like, therefore, to inform you and to secure your approval of the following
matters:
1. All forest charges paid by Interwood to the District Forester of Laguna
from June, 1964 up to the present should be remitted in favor of the
University of the Philippines pines;
2. All forest charges presently due from Interwood shall hereafter be
paid to the University of the Philippines and lastly
3. Hereafter the University of the Philippines shall receive all forest
charges and royalties due from any logging concession at the land grant.
In accordance with Section 266 of the Tax Code as amplified by Section 15(a) of
Revenue Regulations No. 85, the Forest Products Regulations, forest products,
cut, gathered and removed from registered private woodlands are not subject to
forest charges, but they must be invoiced when removed to another municipality
or for commercial purposes in the manner prescribed by the regulations. As the
Paete Land Grant was ceded by law to the U.P. in full private ownership and as
the grant is manifestly to be considered registered, no forest charges are actually
due and payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom. The forest charges
purportedly to be paid by any concessionaire under any licensing agreement
entered or to be entered into by the U.P. are, therefore, to be considered not as
the charges contemplated by the National Internal Revenue Code but as part of
the royalties payable by the concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber
resources of the land grant.
 Accordingly, you queries are answered viz:
1. The University may directly collect the supposed forest charges
payable by concessionaires of the land grant.
2. The forest charges paid by International Hardwood and Veneer
Company of the Philippines may be refunded provided that a formal
claim for the refund thereof is made within two years from the date of
payment. The proper claimant shall be International Hardwood and not
the University.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MISAEL P. VERA
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
13. That subsequently, defendant Business Executive sent the letter quoted below to the
District Forester of the province of Laguna una dated April 18, 1 966:
April 18, 1966
The District Forester
Bureau of Forestry
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
concerning the right of the University of the Philippines to collect forest charges
from the existing logging concessionaire at the Laguna Land Grant (formerly
Paete Land Grant). This tract of forest land containing some 3,500 hectares was
ceded to the University of the Philippines in full ownership by Republic Act No.
3990, approved in June, 1964. In view thereof, the University of the Philippines
requested that its authority over said land be recognized and that the existing
concessionaire, International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines,
in turn pay its forest charges directly to the University instead of to the national
government.
Please take note of page "2" of the enclosed letter of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on the official ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the
following points raised by the University:
1. That the University of the Philippines may now directly collect forest
charges from INTERWOOD, the existing logging concessionaire.
2. That forest charges paid by INTERWOOD to the Bureau of Forestry
from June, 1964 up to April, 1966 shall be refunded to the University of
the Philippines. In this manner, INTERWOOD is requested to file a claim
for the refund in the amount heretofore paid by it to be remitted to the
University of the Philippines.
On the basis of this letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is
understood that forest charges on timber cut from the Laguna Land Grant as
scaled by scalers of the University of the Philippines shall now be paid directly to
the University of the Philippines. In another ruling by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, the University, particularly the Laguna Land Grant, is
exempted from all kinds of Internal Revenue taxes.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Jose C. Campos, Jr.
Business Executive
14. That the above quoted letter of defendant Business Executive dated April 18, 1966
was duly endorsed by the District Forester of the province of Laguna to the Director of
Forestry.
15. That on or about June 7, 19667 the Assistant Director of Forestry addressed to
plaintiff the letter dated June 7, 1966, which states as follows:
Sirs:
This is in connection with your request for this Office to comment on your reply to
the letter of Mr. Jose C. Campos, Jr. of the University of the Philippines.
In your reply to the letter of Mr. Campos, it is stated that the University of the
Philippines is claiming the right:
(a) To scale, measure and seal the timber cut inside the area covered by
the U.P. Land Grant at Paete, Laguna;
(b) To collect the corresponding forest charges;
(c) To collect royalties aside from the forest charges; and
(d) To exercise in effect all the authority vested by law upon the Bureau
of Forestry in the cutting, removal and disposition of the timber from said
area, and the authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue respecting the
measurement and scaling of the logs and the collection of the
corresponding forest charges and other fees in connection therewith.
 This office is in full accord with your arguments against the claim of the University
of the Philippines to have acquired the above rights. We believe that the right
vested the INTERWOOD by virtue of number License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) to utilize the timber inside subject area is still binding and should
therefore, be respected. It is on the basis of this acknowledgment that we sent
your client our letter of November 4,1965 requesting him to comment on the
application of the State University for a Special Timber License over the said
area.
16. That acting on the endorsement referred to in paragraph l4, the Director of Bureau of
Forestry issued the letter ruling quoted below, dated June 30,1966:
xxx xxx xxx
June 30, 1966
District Forester
Sta. Cruz, Laguna
(Thru the Regional Director of Forestry, Manila)
Sir:
This concerns your inquiry contained in the 3rd paragraph of your letter dated
April 26, 1966, designated as above, as to whether or not you shall turn over the
scaling work for logs cut from the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer
Company of the Philippines in the Pacto Land Grant to Scalers of the University
of the Philippines.
In view of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the Paete
Land Grant, which embraces the area of the International Hardwood & Veneer
Company of the Philippines, is considered a registered private woodland of the
University of the Philippines and therefore no forest charges are actually due and
payable on the timber cut and removed therefrom, and in view further of the
ruling of said Commissioner that the forest charges purportedly to be paid by any
concessionaire under any licensing agreement entered or to be entered into by
the U.P. are to be considered not as the charged contemplated by the National
Internal Revenue Code but as part of the royalties payable by the
concessionaires for the exploitation of the timber resources of the land grant, you
may turn over the scaling work therein to the scalers of the U.P.
However, you should guard against the use of such licensing agreements
entered or to be entered into by the U.P. as a means of smuggling forest
products from the neighboring public forests.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ANTONIO A. QUEJADA
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the above JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS, the pleadings filed in the case, and
whatever additional evidence may be presented by the parties, the parties hereto, through
counsel, jointly move and pray of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered granting full and
appropriate relief, on the following issues:
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest charges
due and payable under its timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth
in paragraph 2 hereof', to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of the
Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges are to be
paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of the Philippines is
entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, telling and
removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act
No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled and cut.
Manila for Laguna, September 29,1967.
Upon the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the trial court rendered its judgment on 3 June 1968 in
favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which is quoted at the beginning of this decision.
In deciding the case against UP, it held:
... the court finds that the respondents' demand on the petitioner has no legal basis. In the
first place, the cession in full ownership of the tract of land referred to in the Act was
expressly made 'subject to any existing concessions.' Inasmuch as at the time of the
enactment of the Act, the petitioner's timber concession over the tract of land was existing
and would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, the University of the Philippines will
acquire full ownership' and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer the property
only after February 1, 1985. The cession of the property to the University of the
Philippines is akin to the donation of a parcel of land, subject to usufruct. The donee
acquires full ownership thereof only upon the termination of the usufruct. At the time of
the donation, all what the donee acquires is the 'naked' ownership of the property
donated. In the second place, the respondents' demand cannot be valid unless the
provisions of Sees. 262 to 276 of the National Internal Revenue Code regarding the
measuring of timber cut from the forest and the collection of the prescribed forest charges
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry are first amended. In their
arguments, the respondents tried to stretch the scope of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3990 in order to include therein such amendment of the provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code and Revised Administrative Code, but they failed to convince the
Court, not only because of the first reason above stated, but also because it clearly
appears that such amendment is not intended in Republic Act No. 3990, which does not
contain even a remote allusion thereto in its title or a general amendatory provision at the
end. In the third place, under Republic Act No. 3990, the University of the Philippines
 cannot legally use the tract of land ceded to it for purposes other than those therein
expressly provided, namely, 'for the use of the University of the Philippines in connection
with its research and extension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture,
College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.' Hence, upon the
expiration of the petitioner's timber concession, the University of the Philippines cannot
even legally renew it or grant timber concession over the whole tract of land or over
portions thereof to other private individuals and exercise the functions of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry by scaling and measuring the timber cut within
the area and collecting from them the forest charges prescribed by the National Internal
Revenue Code.
Respondents claim in their Brief that the trial court erred:
I The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy the requisites
... WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WITH
INJUNCTION INSPITE OF ITS INHERENT JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS THAT
SHOULD WARRANT A DISMISSAL.
II
... WHEN IT DECLARED THAT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3990 DOES NOT EMPOWER THE
RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, IN LIEU OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF FORESTRY, TO SCALE, MEASURE AND
SEAL THE TIMBER CUT BY THE PETITIONER WITHIN THE TRACT OF LAND
REFERRED TO IN SAID ACT, AND COLLECT THE CORRESPONDING FOREST
CHARGES PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.
1. The first assigned error is without merit. In the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the parties jointly move
and pray that the trial court render judgment granting full and appropriate remedy on the following
issues:
1. Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest
charges due and payable under its Timber License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines; and
2. In the event that it be found by this Honorable Court that said forest charges
are to be paid to the University of the Philippines, whether or not the University of
the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area
as described in Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled
These issues bring the matter within the scope of an action for declaratory relief under Section 1,
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and render meaningless the appeal to the rule laid down
in Sarmiento, et al. vs. Caparas, et al.6 that declaratory relief cannot be joined by injunction,
because herein petitioner, for all legal intents and purposes, abandoned it by its failure to raise it in
the Stipulation of Facts. Thus, what attains is an amendment to both pleadings (the complaint and
the answer), which is authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Said section
pertinently provides:
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.—
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respect, as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause
them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend
does not affect the result of the trial by these issues. ...
for declaratory relief. (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a
legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ape for judicial determination. 7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of
one exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the
declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy
when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.8
2. On the second assigned error, respondents assert that: (a) Under R.A. No. 3990, the Republic
of the Philippines may effect collection of forest charges through the University of the Philippines
because the License Agreement does not expressly provide that the forest charges shall be paid
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue; in the absence of a specific contractual provision limiting it to a
particular agency in collecting forest charges owing to it, the Republic may effect such collection
through another agency. (b) Having been vested with administrative jurisdiction over and being the
owner of the tract of land in question, the UP acquired full control and benefit of the timber and
other resources within the area. Timber areas within the ceded property but outside the
concession of petitioner can be fully exploited by UP. However, in respect to timber areas within
the ceded property but covered by the concession of petitioner, only forest charges (or more
appropriately, royalties) may be enjoyed by UP until the expiration of petitioner's license. To deny
it such charges would render its "full ownership" empty and futile. (c) The UP is clearly entitled to
the income derived from the tract of land ceded to it, for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 expressly
provides:
All operations and activities carried on in the central experiment station shall be
exempt from taxation, local or general, any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to
the general fund of the University of the Philippines. (emphasis supplied for
emphasis).
(d) As provided by R.A. No. 3990, the UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a central
experiment station; since this law does not provide for appropriations for such purpose, it is clearly
the legislative intention that the establishment and maintenance thereof must be financed by the
earnings or income from the area, which can only come from the timber and the royalties or
charges payable therefrom. This is in accordance with the general principle that a grant of
authority or jurisdiction extends to all incidents that may arise in connection with the matter over
which jurisdiction is exercised. (e) Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of petitioner by
UP was intended by R.A. No. 3990. (f) Finally, the two government agencies affected by R.A. No.
3990 have issued specific rulings recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties or charges
and to supervise petitioner's logging operations.
Petitioner refutes the foregoing arguments of respondents by asserting that: (a) The UP has not
been granted by R.A. No. 3990 the authority to collect forest charges or the authority to supervise
the operation by the petitioner of the timber concession affected by said Act.
The rule is well-settled that legislative grants must be construed strictly in favor of the public and
most strongly against the grantee, and nothing will be included in the grant except that which is
granted expressly or by clear implication. Under Section 262 of the Tax Code, as amended, the
duties incident to the measuring of forest products and the collection of the charges thereon shall
be discharged by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under the regulations of the Department of
Finance. The reforestation fee shall be collected by the Bureau of Forestry. 9 The supervision and
regulation of the use of forest products and of the cutting and removal of forest products are
vested upon the Bureau of Forestry.10 R.A. No. 3990 does not expressly, or even impliedly, grant
the UP any authority to collect from the holders of timber concessions on the area ceded to it
forest charges due and payable to the Government under the Tax Code, or to enforce its
provisions relating to charges on forest products or to supervise the operations of the concessions
by the holders thereof; (b) The cession in full ownership of the land in question was expressly
made "subject to any concession, if any", and that petitioner's concession would continue until 1
February 1985; the UP then would acquire full ownership and exclusive jurisdiction to control and
administer the property only after 1 February 1985. The position of UP is akin to that of a donee of
a parcel of land subject to usufruct. (c) The rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forestry are patently incorrect; moreover, said agencies do
not have the power to interpret the law, which is primarily a function of the judiciary. (d) Finally, it
has acquired a vested right to operate the timber concession under the supervision and control of
the Bureau of Forestry.
There is merit in the second assigned error.
Under Proclamation No. 791, dated 25 September 1961, a parcel of land of the public domain
described therein, with an area of 3,500 hectares, which is the very parcel of land subject of R.A.
No. 3990, was withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved for the College of Agriculture
of the UP as experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and Training Institute and for
research and production studies of said college, subject however to private rights, if any, and to
the condition that the disposition of timber and other forest products found thereon shall be subject
to forestry laws and regulations.
The above reservation is within the area covered by petitioner's timber license.
Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station for the use of
the UP in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the above
"reserved" area was "ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines
subject to any existing concessions, if any."
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely
removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the
timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its
rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the
absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of
the absolute ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe
it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any essential
quality.11 The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner. All
that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected,
impaired or diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is
concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to
UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further home out by Section
3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any incidental receipts or income therefrom
shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines. Having been effectively
segregated and removed from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted
into a registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it
were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition in Proclamation No. 971
to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations is not
reproduced iii R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions
set forth in the proclamation. An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law.12 The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to
receive from the thing what it produces, and the jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by
its use.13 As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the natural fruits,
the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however, exceptions to this rules, as where the
property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits.14 In the instant
case, that exception is made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has
been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to
UP until I February 1985.1âwphi1 However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the
forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the
Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through
the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated.
Consequently, even the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction
to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees due
thereon.
The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not grant the UP
the authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of its concession insofar as
the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its argument that it has acquired vested rights to
operate its concession under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is
preposterous. The grantor, Republic of the Philippines, was by no means bound under the License
to perpetuate the Bureau as its agent. Neither is there force to its contention that legislative grants
must be construed strictly in favor of the public and most strongly against the grantee. The grant
under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of absolute, full and entire ownership which leaves no room for a
strict interpretation against the grantee, the UP. The reservation therein made is in favor of the
private party pursuant to the license, which is nevertheless protected. It is the concession in favor
of the petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound by the rule.

It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel,
the logging, felling and removal of timber within the area covered by R.A. No. 3990.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-650, rendered on 3 June 1968; DECLARING that
forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within the area ceded and transferred to the University of the
Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to the University of the Philippines;
DECLARING that the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its duly
appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the aforesaid area covered
by R.A. No. 3990.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, FOREST STATION WARDEN, DISTRICT 13, BUREAU OF
FORESTRY, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE
AUTHORITY 1 and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EMMANUEL M. MUÑOZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I,
the SHERIFF OF THE PROVINCE of BULACAN, and PINAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC.,respondents.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-25459 June 28, 1968
PINAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. MACARIO PERALTA, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of National Defense;
HON. ENETERIO DE JESUS, in his capacity as Undersecretary of National Defense;
GENERAL RIGOBERTO ATIENZA, in his capacity as the Chief of Staff; 2 Armed Forces of
the Philippines,
COLONEL MANUEL V. REYES, in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General, Armed
Forces of the Philippines;
and the TASK FORCES COMMANDER, Task Force Preserve (Tabak Division), 1st Infantry
Division, Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner Director of Forestry, et al.
Gualberto Cruz for respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Two original actions involving divers legal questions are now before this Court.
In the first, L-24796, the corresponding government officials seek — on certiorari and prohibition
— to annul the order and writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its
Civil Case 3035-M allowing Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco,
for short) to haul its logs in the area hereinafter to be mentioned.
In the second, L-25459, it was Piadeco's turn to ask — on prohibition and injunction — for a ruling
that respondent government officials are "without authority and jurisdiction to stop logging
operations, construction of the roads, cutting, gathering and removing of timber and other forest
products" from said corporation's private woodland area.
Because of their interrelation, the two case are here jointly considered.
The following undisputed facts control:
Piadeco claims to be the owner of Some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the municipalities of
Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban,
province of Rizal. Piadeco's evidence of ownership consists of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136,
dated April 25, 1894,4 and a deed of absolute sale of July 12, 1962, in its favor. Piadeco applied
for registration as private woodland some 10,000 hectares of this land. The Bureau of Forestry, on
December 4, 1963, issued in Piadeco's name Certificate of Private Woodland Registration No.
PWR 2065-New, covering but a portion of the land an aggregate area of 4,400 hectares and an
average stand of 87.20 cubic meters, situated in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray, and San
Jose del Monte, all of the province of Bulacan, and Montalban, in Rizal. It was to expire on
December 31, 1964. By virtue of the registration certificate, Piadeco conducted logging
operations..
The controversy in the these cases began on April 11, 1964, when Acting Director of Forestry
Apolonio F. Rivera issued an order cancelling PWR No. 2065-New. He required Piadeco to
surrender the original certificate to him. Ground for this cancellation was that Piadeco had violated
forestry rules and regulations for cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed
Reservations, expressly excluded from the said certificate.5
On April 14, 1964, Forest Station Warden Reinaldo B. Marquez, District 13, Bureau of Forestry,
wrote Piadeco requesting the latter to desist, effective the same day, April 14, 1964, from
conducting its logging operation inside or outside the area covered by PWR 2065-New, and to
refrain from removing logs already cut unless they have been scaled and properly invoiced by
forestry officers.
Previously, on April 10, 1964, Nawasa's board of directors advised Piadeco, by letter, of the
revocation of the 1964 grant to Piadeco, of a right of way from a barrio in Bosoboso, Antipolo, to
Montalban, Rizal, as an access road to its logging concession under PWR 2061.
Offshot of the foregoing is Piadeco's petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, lodged on April 17, 1964 with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. 6 This petition was
directed against the Director of Forestry, Forest Station Warden Marquez and Nawasa, essentially
upon the averment that their acts heretofore narrated were "all precipitate, arbitrary, whimsical and
capricious." On the same day, April 17, 1964, Judge Emmanuel M. Muñoz of the Bulacan court
directed the government authorities to show cause why preliminary injunction should not issue.
On May 4, 1964, over the Director of Forestry's opposition, the judge ordered the issuance —
upon a P10,000-bond — of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Director of Forestry, the
Forest Station Warden and Nawasa from carrying out and executing the April 10, 1964 revocation
by Nawasa of Piadeco's right of way, the April 11, 1964 order of the Director of Forestry, and the
April 14, 1964 directive of the Forest Station Warden, heretofore mentioned.
On May 5, 1964, Piadeco moved to declare the forestry officials in default for failure to answer its
petition on time.
On May 6, 1964, unaware of Piadeco's May 5 motion, the forestry officials, upon a motion dated
April 29, 1964, asked the Bulacan court to dismiss Piadeco's petition upon the averments that said
court had no jurisdiction over their persons or the subject matter of the petition, and that
administrative remedies have not yet been exhausted by Piadeco. On the same date, too, but in a
separate motion, said forestry official asked for a reconsideration of the lower court's order
granting preliminary injunction, bottomed upon their charge that the illegal cutting of trees by
Piadeco inside the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations — which are the main source of
water supply of the City of Manila and its surrounding towns and cities — poses a grave danger of
causing them to dry up to the prejudice and irreparable injury of the inhabitants thereof. Piadeco
file written opposition on May 13, 1964.
On May 14, 1964, acting on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and opposition thereto, the
judge below ruled that although Piadeco is entitled to injunction, the continuance thereof would
cause great damage to the government, while Piadeco can be fully compensated for any damages
Piadeco may suffer because of the dissolution thereof. That bond, however, was not filed by the
forestry officials.
On July 13, 1964, upon Piadeco's May 5 motion earlier adverted to, the forestry officials were
declared in default.
On July 24, 1964, said forestry officials filed a verified motion to set aside the default order and to
admit their answer thereto attached. They pleaded excusable neglect and/or oversight of the clerk
of the records of the Records section of the Bureau of Forestry.
On July 29, 1964, the court shunted aside the foregoing motion for the reason that their six days'
delay was not excusable and their answer was prepared only after three days from their receipt of
the order of default. A motion for reconsideration registered by the forestry officials on August 12,
1964 was unavailing. The court below struck down that motion on September 4, 1964.
Thus it is, that Piadeco submitted evidence ex parte to the court below against the Director of
Forestry and the Forest Station Warden.
Piadeco had, in the meantime, entered into an amicable settlement with Nawasa whereby
Piadeco's case against Nawasa was withdrawn, the right of way granted by Nawasa to Piadeco
remaining revoked and cancelled; and Nawasa's counterclaim against Piadeco was also
withdrawn in consideration of P1,651.59 paid by Piadeco to Nawasa, representing the former's
liabilities to the latter.
On December 29, 1964, the court below rendered judgment. It approved Piadeco's compromise
agreement with Nawasa. It held that Piadeco was the owner of the land in question; that its
operation was not in violation of forestry rules and regulations; that aside from its regulation
certificate, Piadeco was permitted by Nawasa thru the latter's Resolution 1050, Section of 1963, to
conduct selective logging within the Angat-Marikina Watershed upon payment of P2.00 for every
cubic meter of timber classified in the first group and P1.75 belonging to the second group; that
similar permits were issued to other individuals by the Director of Forestry with the acquiescence
of Nawasa; that Piadeco's logging under Resolution 1050 aforesaid could not be contrary to
forestry rules and regulations; and that, upon the doctrine laid down in Santiago vs. Basilan
Lumber Co., L-15532, October 31, 1963, even if Piadeco's private woodland was unregistered, it
still retains its inherent "rights of ownership, among which are (its) rights to the fruits of the land
and to exclude any persons from the enjoyment and disposal thereof", its only liability being the
payment of surcharges on the timber severed from the land. Thereupon, the court reinstated the
writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued and made it permanent, with costs..
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1964, one day before the rendition of the judgment just mentioned,
Piadeco applied for the renewal of its Certificate of Private Woodland Registration PWR 2065-
New, which would expire on the last day of that month. On January 12, 1965, in reply thereto,
Assistant Director of Forestry J. L. Utleg denied the renewal requested. He informed Piadeco that
its Titulo de Propiedad 4136 was not registerable under Forestry Administrative Order No. 12-2
which took effect on January 1, 1963. The expiration of its registration certificate and the non-
renewal thereof notwithstanding, Piadeco continued logging operations. It was about this time that
illegal logging was denounced by some members of Congress thereby attracting national
attention. This led to a directive by the President of the Philippines on March 8, 1965 to stop all
illegal logging operations. Complying therewith, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources wrote the Secretary of National Defense with the request that units of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines be detailed at the areas involved, deputizing them agents of the Bureau
of Forestry to assist in the enforcement of forest laws, rules and regulations, and the protection of
the forests. The Secretary of National Defense, in turn, direct the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces to implement the request. And, the Chief of Staff dispatched at ask force of the army into
the Angat area, which impounded and seized all logs cut by Piadeco and other loggers which
were purportedly conducting illegal operations.
On May 11, 1965, Piadeco sought from the Bulacan court an ex parte writ of execution of the
December 29, 1964 decision. That decision had by then become final for failure of the forestry
officials to appeal therefrom. Piadeco prayed that it be not molested in its logging operations
including the hauling of about 600 pieces (unscaled) and 1,000 pieces of mixed (scaled and
unscaled) timber from the log ponds.
On May 12, 1965, the Bulacan court presided over temporarily by Judge Ricardo C. Puno set
Piadeco's motion for execution for hearing on May 27, 1965. Before the day of the hearing arrived,
however, Piadeco withdrew its ex parte motion for execution with the manifestation that it would
look for a more expeditious way or a more appropriate remedy to enable it to haul the logs before
the rains set in. But on May 27, 1965, Piadeco refiled its motion for execution with Judge Muñoz,
who had meanwhile resumed his duties.
On June 1, 1965, Judge Muñoz granted Piadeco's motion. In line therewith, on June 3, 1965, the
corresponding writ of execution was issued, directing a special sheriff to make effective and
execute the aforesaid lower court's decision of December 29, 1964.
Execution notwithstanding, the forestry officials still refused to permit Piadeco to haul its logs.
Because of this, on June 11, 1965, Piadeco asked the court below to declare the forestry officials
and those acting under them in contempt. On June 30, 1965, the forestry officials opposed. They
averred that Piadeco's registration certificate already expired on December 31, 1964; that despite
this expiration, Piadeco continued illegal logging operations, which resulted in the seizure of its
logs: that after December 31, 1964, the December 29, 1964 decision of the court below
became functus officio and could no longer be executed. Piadeco's rejoinder of July 1, 1965 was
that its registration certificate is not expirable and that it is not a license.
On July 8, 1965, the judge came out with an order declaring that notwithstanding "the expiration of
petitioner's [Piadeco's] license (?) on December 31, 1964, their said property remains registered
with the Bureau of Forestry subject only to renewal, in which case it can still pursue its logging
operations, conditioned upon the payment by it of forest charges." The judge took into
consideration a certificate issued on May 4, 1965 by Assistant Director of Forestry J. L. Utleg, as
officer-in-charge, that "all the timber cut ... during the lifetime" of the registration certificate "may be
transported by" Piadeco "provided they are properly documented." Finding that Piadeco "complied
with all the requirements of the Bureau of Forestry and the Bureau of Internal Revenue as regards
the proper documentation of the logs in question," the judge thereupon directed the forestry
officials "and all members of the Armed Forces stationed along the way" to allow Piadeco "to haul
its logs which have already been properly documented."
This precipitated the filing on July 28, 1965 by the Director of Forestry, the Forest Station Warden,
the Armed Forces Chief of Staff 7 of an original petition with this Court (L-24796, now at bar)
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the June 1,1965 order of
execution, the June 3, 1965 writ of execution and the July 8, 1965 order allowing Piadeco to haul
its logs. Named respondents were Piacedo, Judge Emmanuel M. Muñoz of the Bulacan court, and
the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan..
On July 30, 1965, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, as prayed for by the
aforenamed government officials. On August 3, 1965, Piadeco sought the dissolution thereof for
the reason, amongst others, that Mr. J. L. Utleg, Assistant Director of Forestry and Officer-in-
Charge of the Bureau of Forestry, was already agreeable mentioned, as per his letter of June 7,
1965 to Piadeco informing the latter that the writ of execution was being referred to the Forest
Station Warden for compliance. On August 9, 1965, the Solicitor General blocked Piadeco's
motion to dissolve, with an allegation, amongst others, that the June 7, 1965 letter just mentioned
was deemed recalled when the Director Forestry — realizing that the said writ would allow
Piadeco to continue logging after the expiration and non-renewal of its certificate in a public forest
area or in an area excluded from the expired permit — did not give effect to the said letter.
On August 18, 1965, manifestation was made by the Solicitor General to this Court thru a motion
dated August 17, 1965, that the logs seized and imposed by the armed forces were being
exposed to the elements; that the rainy season having set in, there was grave danger that the said
logs might deteriorate and become useless. He thus prayed that the forestry officials be
authorized to turn the logs over to the engineer corps of the Armed Forces for the construction of
prefabricated schoolhouses pursuant to General Circular V-337, series of 1961, of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. On August 31, 1965, Piadeco objected upon the ground that the said logs are
still its private property; and that there is no law empowering the State to seize, confiscate and turn
over the cut logs to the Armed Forces.
On September 29, 1965, Piadeco, in turn, petitioned for preliminary injunction and moved again to
dissolve this Court's writ of preliminary injunction of July 30, 1965. It called attention to the fact that
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the court below on May 4, 1964 in Civil Case 3035-M is
still enforceable and has not yet been dissolved because the forestry officials have not filed their
P10,000.00-bond as required by the trial court in its order of May 14, 1964.
On October 8, 1965, this Court denied the two motions of Piadeco, declared that the writ of
preliminary injunction it issued stands enforced and is effective until otherwise lifted, and
authorized the Solicitor General to effect the removal of all the logs subject of his motion of August
17, 1965 from the log ponds but only for the purpose of turning them over to the Armed Forces for
safekeeping and custody pending final resolution of the case.
On October 14, 1965, Piadeco traversed the averments of the forestry officials' petition before this
Court, thru an answer dated October 12, admission of which was however denied for being late.
The case was submitted without further memoranda.
Meanwhile, a companion case (L-25459, also at bar)emerged from subsequent events hereunder
related.
On October 20, 1965, pending this Court's resolution of the foregoing petition of the forestry
officials (L-24796), Piadeco wrote the Director of Forestry with a request to grant it
"AUTHORITY to cut, gather and remove timber" from its alleged private woodland. At the same
time, it advised the Director of Forestry that "in the absence of such authority or permit", it "shall
cut, gather and remove timber from the said area subject to the payment of regular forest charge
and 300% surcharge for unlawful cutting in accordance with the penal provisions" of Section 266
of the Tax Code.
On November 4, 1965, Acting Director J. L. Utleg replied. He told Piadeco that "pending
meticulous study" of its application for renewal of PWR 2065-New, his "[o]ffice is not now in a
position to grant" the desired authority and "will consider any cutting, gathering and removal of
timber" from the land "to be illegal, hence, subject to the provisions of Section 266 of the National
Internal Revenue Code."
Obviously taking the foregoing letter as a case, Piadeco, on December 6, 1965, advised the
Director that immediately upon receipt of said letter, it (Piadeco) resumed logging operations
within its private woodland area in the municipality of Montalban, Rizal, "thereby subjecting all
timber cut therefrom to the payment of 300% penalty, plus regular forest charges." Piadeco also
requested the Director to inform the Task Force Commander that it "can be allowed to continue its
logging operation within their private woodland" subject to Section 266 of the Tax Code.
So, on December 7, 1965, Acting Director J. L. Utleg notified the Task Force Commander, through
the Undersecretary of National Defense, that Piadeco "can conduct logging operations within its
private woodland, as it is a constitutional right on its part to use and enjoy its own property and the
fruits thereof" but that whatever timber cut therefrom "should be subject to the payment not only of
the regular charges but also of the surcharges imposed by Section 166" of the Tax Code. This
notwithstanding, the army authorities refused to heed Utleg's December 7, 1965 letter and stood
pat on its posture not to allow Piadeco to conduct logging operations.
Hence, it was Piadeco's turn to come to this Court on December 22, 1965 on an original petition
for injunction and prohibition (L-25459 aforesaid) against respondents Secretary of National
Defense, the Undersecretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, the Judge Advocate General
and the Task Force Commander (Task Force Preserve, Tabak Division). Specifically, Piadeco
charges as follows: On December 17, 1965, army men [Capt. Zamuco, Lt. Oresque, Sgts. Albino,
Gutierrez, Ramirez, and Sawada, and Cpl. Manlapus], boisterously, unlawfully, wilfully, and
feloniously entered — upon orders of a certain Major Elfano — Piadeco's land at Barrio Anginan,
Montalban, Rizal, outside the watershed reservations. They made a portion of the land their
private quarters. They prevented Piadeco's officers (a) from continuing its logging operations,
especially the construction of the road inside the land; (b) from cutting, gathering and removing
timber and other forest products therefrom; and (c)from living and moving in freedom and
engaging in the pursuit of happiness on said land. Piadeco asks principally that respondent
officials be declared "without authority and jurisdiction to stop logging operations, construction of
the roads, cutting, gathering and removing of timber and other forest products from the Private
Woodland area" of the former.
There was a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which this Court, however,
denied on December 31, 1965, and upon reconsideration, on February 1, 1966.
After respondents' answer, and hearing on oral arguments, the case was submitted for decision.
1. Basic to an intelligent appraisal of the rights of Piadeco, who comes to us as an alleged private
wood landowner, is the all-important question: Is Piadeco's title registrable with the Bureau of
Forestry?
The pertinent statutory provision is Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, viz:
SEC. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. — Every private owner of land
containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to the
same with the Director of Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement of the
boundaries of their property, shall be furnished by said Director to the Collector of Internal
Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time to time as occasion may
require.
Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any such
land lies shall render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a view to its
registration in the Bureau of Forestry.
Ampliatory thereof is Section 7, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 of July 1, 1941, as amended
by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, which took effect on January 1, 1963. It reads:
7. Titles that may be registered. — Only the following titles covering lands containing
timber, firewood and other minor forest products may be registered under and pursuant to
Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code;
(a) Administrative titles granted by the present Government, such as homestead patent,
free patent, and sales patent; and
(b) Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land Registration Act (Act
496, as amended) or under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended).
The amendment of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2
consisted in the omission of one paragraph, paragraph (c), which particularized as one of the titles
registrable pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, "[t]itles granted by the
Spanish sovereignty in the islands and duly recognized as valid titles under the existing laws."
Piadeco's position is that such amendment contravenes said Section 1829, which does not specify
the titles that are registrable thereunder; and that it is diametrically opposed to the Opinion of the
Attorney General of October 15, 1919, which ruled that a royal title "issued in September, 1896,
and inscribed in the Registry of Property within a year after its issuance is valid, and therefore its
owner is entitled to the benefits" of Section 1829 aforesaid. Also cited are the Opinion of the
Secretary of the Interior of November 7, 1916, stating that registration under Section 1829 is not
subject to change and revocation unless title is established in a different person by judicial
declaration; the Opinion of the Director of Forestry of January 8, 1925, which recognized as
registrable, titles "such aninformacion posesoria ..., composicion con el estado and purchase
under the Spanish sovereignty" amongst others; and the Opinion of the Collector of Internal
Revenue of February 6, 1926, declaring imperfect titles within the purview of Section 45(a) of Act
2874, as also registrable.
True it is that the law, Section 1829, does not describe with particularity titles that may be
registered with the Bureau of Forestry. Concededly, too, administrative authorities in the past
considered as registrable, titles issued during the Spanish regime. In fact, as late as 1962,
Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 was still in force, authorizing registration of such Spanish titles.
But when Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 came into effect on January 1, 1963, that order
should be deemed to have repealed all such previous administrative determinations.
There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect
of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative Code,
empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue regulations
"deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in
such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the
future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same end."
Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an
administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by
jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation, "[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it,
but conform to the standards that the law prescribes."8 In Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706,
712, we pronounced that the necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make
rules and regulations for various and varying details of management has been recognized and
upheld by the courts.
And we are certainly totally unprepared to jettison Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 as illegal
and unreasonable.
Spanish titles are quite dissimilar to administrative and judicial titles under the present system.
Although evidences of ownership, these Spanish titles may be lost thru prescription. They are,
therefore, neither indefeasible nor imprescriptible. The law in this jurisdiction, both under the
present sovereignty and the previous Spanish regime is that ordinary prescription of ten years may
take place against a title recorded in the Registry of Property "in virtue of another title also
recorded,"9 and extra-ordinary prescription of thirty years will run, even "without need of title or of
good faith."10 For possession for along period fixed by law, the "unquestionable foundation of the
prescription of ownership ... weakens and destroys the force and value of the best possible title to
the thing possessed by one who is not the owner thereof."11 The exception, of course, is the
Torrens title, expressly recognized to be indefeasible and impresciptible.12
And more. If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public forest
land, is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated.13 Before private interests have
intervened, the government may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set
aside and reserved as forest land.14 Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.15
In this case, it is undisputed that Picadeco's title which it sought to register was issued by the
Spanish sovereignty — Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136, dated April 25 or 29, 1894. It is
unmistakably not one of those enumerated in Section 7 aforesaid. It should not have been allowed
registration in the first place. Obviously, registration thereof can never be renewed.
2. Piadeco is nonetheless insistent in its plea that it can still cut, gather, and remove timber from
its alleged private woodland, upon payment of forest charges and surcharges.
The purposes of registration, as succinctly stated in Section 6, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1
dated July 1, 1941, are:
6. Objects of registration — (a) to exempt the owners of private woodlands from the
payment of forest products gathered therefrom for commercial or industrial purposes.
(b) To regulate the transportation of forest products gathered or collected therefrom and
to avoid fraud which may be committed in connection with utilization of such forest
products with respect to their origin.
(c) To determine the legality of private claims for the protection of the interest of the
owners as well as of the Government, and to exclude all land claimed under valid titles
from the mass of the public forest in order to facilitate the protection, administration, and
supervision of the latter.
The foregoing has in part gained judicial approval in Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Company, L-
15532, October 31, 1963, where we pronounced: "Obviously, the purpose of the registration
required in Section 1829 of the Administrative Code is to exempt the titled owner of the land from
the payment of forestry charges as provided for under Section 266 of the National Internal
Revenue Code."16 And Section 266 of the Tax Code, therein mentioned, provides in full:
SEC. 266. Charges collectible on forest products cut, gathered and removed from
unregistered private lands. — The charges above prescribed shall be collected on all
forest products cut, gathered and removed from any private land the title to which is not
registered with the Director of Forestry as required by the Forest Law: Provided, however,
That in the absence of such registration, the owner who desires to cut, gather and remove
timber and other forest products from such land shall secure a license from the Director of
Forestry in accordance with the Forest Law and regulations. The cutting, and the
removing of timber and other forest products from said private lands without license shall
be considered as unlawful cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public
forest and shall be subject to the charges prescribed in such cases in this Chapter. (As
amended by Rep. Act No. 173, approved June 20, 1947.)17
Following this provision in the Tax Code is Section 267, which in part provides:
SEC. 267. Surcharges for illegal cutting and removal of forest products or for delinquency.
— Where forest products are unlawfully cut or gathered in any public forest without
license or, if under license, in violation of the terms thereof, the charges on such products
shall be increased by three hundred per centum....
To recapitulate, registration of titles by the owners of private woodlands with the Bureau of
Forestry results in an exemption "from the payment of forest products gathered therefrom for
commercial or industrial purposes." If an owner fails to so register, he is obliged to pay forest
charges, as prescribed in Sections 264 and 265 of the Tax Code, because "he still retain(s) his
rights of ownership, among which are his rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any person
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code)." 18 However, as provided in
Section 266 above-quoted, if an owner does not register his title, but he desires to cut, gather and
remove timber and other forest products from his land, he may "secure a license from the Director
of Forestry in accordance with the Forest Law and regulations." If he does not, under the same
Section 266, his cutting, gathering and removing of timber and other forest products "shall be
considered as unlawful cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forests and
shall be subject to the charges prescribed in such cases." And this would bring into play Section
267, where, as heretofore quoted, the charges on forest products "unlawfully cut and gathered in
any public forest without license, or, if under license, in violation of the terms thereof ... shall be
increased by three hundred per centum."
But it should be stressed that all of the situations herein mentioned refer specifically to owners of
private woodlands. The position Piadeco has taken is a jump ahead of where it should be. We are
not ready to grant the assumption that Piadeco owns the forest land it seeks to register. Such
unwillingness can come from even a superficial assessment of Piadeco's pretensions of
ownership based on the Titulo de Propiedad in question.
Neither said Titulo, nor a copy thereof, was presented in the two proceedings before us. What we
have is merely a description thereof, viz:
TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NUMERO 4136
DATED APRIL 25, 1894, ISSUED BY
 GOBIERNO CIVIL DE LA PROVINCIA
DE BULACAN
Titulo de Propiedad Numero 4136, in the name of Dn. Mariano San Pedro y Esteban,
dated April 25, 1894, being a gratuitous composicion title, grated to Dn. Mariano San
Pedroy Esteban, by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, pursuant to Resolution
dated April 14, 1894, of the Board of Land Adjustment of the (Spanish) Administration
Civil de Filipinas, as authorized under Royal Decree of May 14, 1867 and August 31,
1888, and signed by Dn. Alejandro Garcia, El Jefede la Provincia de Bulacan and Dn.
Mariano Lopez Delgado El Secretario de la Junta, with the Seal of the Spanish
Government in the Philippines attached thereto and to said Titulo de Propiedad Numero
4136, is affixed a "Sello 10aA*s 1894 y 95 de Peso" documentary stamp bearing Serial
Number NO. 292-404 inscribed in the Office of the Registry of Property of Bulacan, on
pages 127 and 129 of Book I, for Norzagaray, as Tax Declaration (Fincas) Nos. 57 and
58, Inscripcion No. 1, on July 16, 1894 (or within one (1) year from April 25, 1894,
pursuant to Royal Decree of January 12, 1863), the inscription of the said TITULO DE
PROPIEDAD NUMERO 4136 of Dn. Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, having been
accomplished by the Office of the Land Registry of Bulacan, on the said date of July 16,
1894, by the then Registrar of Bulacan, Dn. Miguel de Lizan, as follows:
Ynscrito el titulo que precede, a los folios ciento veinti-sietey ciento veintinueve del Tomo
primero de Norzagaray, fincas numeros cincuenta y siete y cincuenta y ocho inscripcion
numero uno, Bulacan, diez y seis de julio de mil ocho cientos noventa y cuatro (Fdo.)
MIGUEL DE LIZAN.
Two (2) vast parcels of land (agricultural and mountainous lands), together with the
improvements thereon, including all the trees in the mountains, all mineral deposits or
resources ( pertenecia minera), including lime, gravel and lumber for ship building,
located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon and Quezon City, and bounded, on
the North, by Sierra Madre Mountains and Rio Grande (Laog to Kinabayunan); on the
East, by Maputi, Umiray and Caliwatcanan (Ibona Estate and Public Land); on the South
by Susong Dalaga and Cupang (Hegmatangan to Pinugay) and on the West, by Pugad-
Lawin and Sapang-Alat (Pinugay, Public Land, Bignay, Lauan to Laog).
The various types of titles granted by the Spanish crown, it will be remembered, were: (1) the
"titulo real" or royal grant; (2) the "concession especial" or special grant; (3) the "composicion con
el estado" title or adjustment title; (4) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (5) the
"informacion posesoria" or possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a
gratuitous title.19
Piadeco's Titulo appears to be an adjustment title. Piadeco asserts in its answer in L-2479620 that
it is a "titulo de composicion con el estado"21 or a "composicion" with the State.22 The given
description of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 above-quoted calls it a "gratuitous composition title."
Title by "composicion con el estado" was granted by the Direccion General de Administracion
Civil, pursuant to the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, or by the Chief of the Province by
delegation, pursuant to the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, or under the Royal Decree of
February 13,1894, otherwise known as the Maura Law. The theory behind this title is that all lands
belong to the State. Applicants to be entitled to adjustment must possess the lands sought to be
acquired for a number of years.23 These titles, as the "titulo real", altho evidences of ownership,
may be lost by prescription.24
Piadeco's Titulo de Propiedad 4136, as heretofore described, was signed, pursuant to the Royal
Decrees of May 14, 1867 and August 31, 1888, by Dn. Alejandro Garcia, el Jefe de la Provincial
de Bulacan, and Dn. Mariano Lopez Delgado, el Secretario de la Junta, purportedly with the Seal
of the Spanish Government in the Philippines.
The main difficulty here lies with the requirements, then obtaining, for the issuance of Spanish
adjustment titles.
The Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 — under which Piadeco's title was issued — classified
public lands subject to adjustment into two groups:
First. Those bounded at any point thereof by other lands belonging to the State, and those which,
though entirely encircled by private lands, had a total area of more than 30 hectares.
Second. Those with an area of less than 30 hectares and entirely bounded by private lands.
By this royal decree, adjustment of the lands of the first group just mentioned continued to be
heard and determined by the general directorate of civil administration with the intervention of the
Inspector General of Forests; adjustment of lands of the second group were heard and determined
by "a provincial board for the adjustment of lands "headed by a Civil or Military-Civil Governor as
president. When the provincial board approves the adjustment, "the chief of the province, in his
capacity as deputy of the General Directorate of Civil Administration, shall issue the corresponding
title."25
The property here involved unquestionably belongs to the first group. That is because the area
thereof is more than 30 hectares (72,000 or 74,000 hectares); and, going by the descripcion of its
boundaries, the property is bounded by public land. In particular, the description is that it is
"bounded, on the North, by Sierra Madre Mountains and Rio Grande (Laog to Kinabayunan); on
the East, by Maputi, Umiray and Caliwatcanan (Ibona Estate and Public Land); on the South by
Susong Dalaga and Cupang (Hegmatangan to Pinugay) and on the West, by Pugad-Lawin and
Sapang-Alat (Pinugay, Public Land, Bignay, Lauanto Laog)."26
As stated, the title were was "signed by Dn. Alejandro Garcia, El Jefe de la Provincia de Bulacan,
and by Dn. Mariano Lopez Delgado, El Secretario de la Junta, with the Seal of the Spanish
Government in the Philippines attached thereto."
Piadeco now claims before this Court that its title "appears to be issued by (on its face) the
DIRECTOR GENERAL DE ADMINISTRACION DE FILIPINAS"; that the title is in printed form,
with the dry seal in the form of a mountain, bearing the inscription, "Office of the Inspector General
of Forests in the Philippine Islands — Adjustment of Lands" and the rubric of the said Inspector
General of Forests and is serially numbered, pursuant to the Circular dated February 14, 1894 of
the General Directorate of Civil Administration. In the same breath, however, Piadeco avers that
the title was approved by the Chief of the Province of Bulacan as Deputy of the General
Directorate of Civil Administration and the said Chief issued Titulo 4136 pursuant to the Royal
Decree of August 31, 1888.27 These averments, we must say, merely emphasize the necessity of
adducing evidence to prove the validity of Piadeco's title, which should be done in appropriate land
registration proceedings. Ramirez vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114, 123, struck down a similar
title covering land which it thereupon declared public forest land, upon grounds, amongst others,
that the title was not issued by the proper authority. On this ground, this Court there specifically
declared —
Judging from the area of the land28 in question and that of the two-third portions from
which it has been segregated, upon the supposition that the three-third portions above-
mentioned constitute the whole tract of land which had originally passed from Tomas Ilao,
it is obvious that the same belonged to the first group, as defined in the aforesaid Royal
Decree, on the ground that the area thereof greatly exceeded thirty hectares and was not
entirely bounded by private lands. Notwithstanding such facts, the title Exhibit D-2 was
not issued by the General Directorate of Civil Administration with the intervention of the
Inspector General of Forests, but merely by the provincial board, in open violation of the
laws and regulations relative thereto.29
But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed facts. First. The
title embraces land "located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon
City." Second. The title was signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in
the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries desperately for a plausible
answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of land must
be proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the land
claimed.30 This Court ruled in a case involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land
must be concretely measured per hectare or per quiñon, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos),31 That fact
that the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands
strongly suggests that the land applied for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite are seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadeco's "Rejoinder to
Opposition" dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified the area covered by
its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares.32 In its "Opposition" of May 13, 1964 in the same case,
it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares.33 Which is which? This but accentuates the
nebulous identity of Piadeco's land. Piadeco's ownership thereof then equally suffers from
vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on the title,
acquired his rights over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of
June 25, 1880,34 the basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications
for adjustment — showing the location, boundaries and area of land applied for — were to be filed
with the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, which then ordered the classification and
survey of the land with the assistance of the interested party or his legal representative. 35
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment at one
year from the date of the publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10,
1880, extended for another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881. 36 If Don Mariano sought
adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have, then, seriously to be considered here
are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to
1,000 hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable
lands.37 And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that Piadeco's Titulo is held out to
embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of lands.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894), published
in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894.38 That decree required a second petition for adjustment
within six months from publication, for those who had not yet secured their titles at the time of the
publication of the law.39 Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of lands
established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August
31, 1888, which boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards
established by Decree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and
documents which they may hold in their possession.40
Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that that title was either
dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the Maura Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its rights
under the Titulo. The original owner appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
From Piadeco's explanation — not its evidence —41 we cull the following: On December 3,1894,
Don Mariano mortgaged the land under pacto de retro, redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00
to one Don Ignacio Conrado. This transaction was said to have been registered or inscribed on
December 4, 1894. Don Mariano failed to redeem within the stipulated period. When Don Ignacio
died, his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only her, adjudicated the land to herself. At about
the same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of registration was issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became
a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the land to Piadeco's treasurer and an incorporator,
Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad
B. Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo,
appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land. Castillo also executed an
affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same land, and then sold the same to Piadeco.
Consideration therefor was paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under
Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to Fabian Castillo
made to depend on the registration of the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of
the validity of Titulo de Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein pointed out, cast great
clouds of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadeco's title.
The standing presumption, we must not forget, is that land pertains to the State, and any person
seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the owner. 42 And his
presumption clings with greater force here where "a portion" of the land Piadeco claims is, as
Piadeco itself admits, directly affected by Proclamation No. 71 dated March 10, 1927 of the then
Governor-General Leonard Wood of the Philippines, which reserved for watershed purposes an
area of 62,309.0952 hectares of land located in Montalban, Province of Rizal, in San Jose del
Monte, Norzagaray, Angat, San Rafael, and San Miguel, Province of Bulacan, in Peñaranda,
Province of Nueva Ecija, and in Infanta, Province of Tayabas (now Quezon),subject to "private
rights if any there be." Private rights must then have to be proved. It will be remembered that, by
Article VIII of the Treaty of Paris of December 10,1898, property of the public domain was
relinquished and ceded by the Kingdom of Spain to the United States of America, which, of
course, transferred the same to the present Republic.
Assertion has likewise been made that Piadeco's title has already been judicially recognized in the
judgment rendered in Civil Case 3035-M, the case below, at least insofar as the portion of the land
that lies in Bulacan is concerned. This is less than persuasive. Piadeco's title was not directly in
issue in the court below. A reading of the decision thereof suggests that said title was not
submitted therein. The judge did not even examine that title. According to the decision, Piadeco's
ownership was gleaned merely from the registration certificate which stated that a copy of
Piadeco's land title, including the corresponding plan, was submitted to the Director of Forestry. A
mere statement by the judge below that Piadeco appears to be the owner of the land cannot wipe
out the objectionable features of its title.
From all the foregoing, our conclusion is that we cannot give prima facie value to Piadeco's title.
We cannot thus truly state that Piadeco is a private woodland owner for purpose of these
proceedings. This all the more strengthens our view that Piadeco needs to acquire an indefeasible
title to be entitled to registration under Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code.
3. Even on the assumption that Piadeco's alleged title is registrable, said corporation cannot
complain against the cancellation thereof by the Director of Forestry on April 11, 1964. Why?
When the Director of Forestry cancelled Piadeco's registration certificate, he only performed his
duty as he saw fit. By Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, "[t]he Director of Forestry may cancel a
certificate of registration for any violation of the provision of this Order or of the forest and internal
revenue laws and regulations or of the terms and conditions embodied in the certificate, or when
found that the area is no longer covered with forest, or upon failure of the landowner thereof, or of
his representatives, to obey, follow or implement instructions of the said Director of Forestry." 43 To
him, a condition expressly written into the registration certificate was being violated. Piadeco was
found to be cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations in direct
contravention of a specific prohibition in the certificate. And this, upon the basis of positive and
actual findings of qualified and competent forestry officers.
Quite revealing is Piadeco's admission44 before the court below that "it made cuttings on that
portion of its own private land within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservation where it was
constructing its access road to the area covered by P.W.P. No. 2065 to the construction of which
no objection was interposed by ... Nawasa as per its resolution No. 126, Series of
1964."45 Deducible from the foregoing is that Piadeco was cutting within the watershed
reservations outside the area covered by its registration certificate, altho within the land it claims in
private ownership, which is now disputed.
Piadeco's registration certificate should remain cancelled. It could be stricken down anytime. It is a
nullity. And, notwithstanding the fact that said registration certificate had expired and was not
renewed, Piadeco had the temerity to continue operations. Correctly, there was necessity for
freezing forthwith Piadeco's illegal acts.46
4. True it is that the judgment below virtually reinstated Piadeco's registration certificate. However,
as shall be discussed later on in this opinion, that judgment has now no legal effect. For, said
certificate, by its very terms, expired on December 31, 1964. Piadeco cannot be heard to protest
further.
But Piadeco still insists that it objected to the expiry date of the registration certificate, when it was
issued that certificate. Granting the truth of this averment, Piadeco nonetheless accepted the
certificate, did not follow up its objection to its logical conclusion, sat supinely until the certificate
was cancelled; only then did it renew the bid that its registration certificate is non-expirable.
At all events, Piadeco's submission is inaccurate. Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, promulgated
pursuant to law, amended Section 11 of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1, the pertinent part of
which reads:
(b) Duration of the certificate. — The certificate of registration issued under this Order
shall be made to expire on the last day of the 12th month from the date of its issuance.
This regulation is not without rational basis. This Court had occasion to say once47 that: "Land may
be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or
mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth
of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, land classified as agricultural today may be
differently classified tomorrow." Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 verily declares that certificates
"are renewable for as long as there are substantial amounts of forestry in the area, upon filing of
the necessary application therefor" and that those "cancelled for causes may be renewed upon
submission of application for registration by the owner and if the cause of cancellation is explained
satisfactorily."48 If only for purposes of effective regulation, annual registration of private
woodlands cannot be successfully assailed.
5. We cannot place our stamp of approval on Piadeco's claim that it should be permitted to
remove from the premises those logs that have already been cut before December 31, 1964, the
expiry date of its registration certificate. We have already said that its registration certificate is a
nullity. Even if it is not, the facts and the law will not support its plea.
It is not altogether clear whether the 600 pieces of unscaled and the 1,000 pieces of mixed (scaled
and unscaled)timber sought to be hauled by Piadeco, were cut before December 31, 1964.
Piadeco could present only one auxiliary invoice thereon, which but covers 256 logs and that very
invoice stated that those logs were "cut or ordered cut" in the area covered by P.W.R. No. 2065-
New, "after its expiration on Dec. 31, 1964."49
Worse, a factual assumption that the logs were cut before that date, is meaningless in law. A
contrary view would easily lend itself to misuse and mischief. For, loopholes could then be bored
through which an unscrupulous logger may crawl. Such that a holder of a registration certificate
could be at complete liberty to just cut and cut during the lifetime of that certificate and leave the
hauling for later, as he pleases, even long after expiry thereof. This, we must say, should not be
allowed to pass.
6. Absent a valid registration certificate under Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, or
a license to cut, gather and remove timber, and more important, credible evidence of private
ownership over the forestry land in question, Piadeco's logging operations logically descend to the
level of unlawful cutting from public forests.
Seizure made by the government authorities here of logs illegally cut cannot be branded as illegal.
It was but in obedience to Bureau of Internal Revenue General Circular No. V-337 of May 24,
1961, which prescribed rules on the disposition of illegally cut logs, pursuant to a directive from the
Office of the President to the Secretary of Finance on March 22, 1961. Section 3 of Circular V-337
declares as follows:
3. Logs illegally cut from public forests, such as timberlands, forest reserves other than
national parks, 50 communal forests and communal pastures shall be subject to seizure
and delivered to the nearest Bureau of Internal Revenue Officer who in turn shall deliver
them to the duly authorized representative of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for use
in the manufacture of prefabricated school houses. The illegal cutter shall not be allowed
to pay the forest charges and surcharges and other fees on the logs cut. However, if such
forest charges and fees have already been paid, the same shall be retained by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue Officer concerned as part of the collection for forest charges,
but shall not be the basis for the release of such logs. On the other hand, such payment
shall be used as evidence should the illegal cutter be prosecuted in court for the violation
of the corresponding forest laws.51
Could this Court then justifiably order the delivery to Piadeco of the logs impounded right there on
the land? The answer must certainly have to be in the negative; a contrary posture is tantamount
to abetting a wrong. The logs belong to the State. They are not Piadeco's. Piadeco cannot later on
come back to claim them by curing defects in the proof of its ownership over the land. It has
submitted the controversy over the logs for decision to this Court. Any ruling thereon should bind
Piadeco. It cannot be overturned by fresh convincing proof of ownership, which it should have
offered in the first place.
We hold that government seizure of Piadeco's logs here complained of is valid.
7. The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be
followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and
quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development
and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's
natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover
on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees,
watersheds try up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish
disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will
hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results.
With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property — crops,
livestock, houses and highways — not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing
observations should be written down in a lumberman's decalogue.
Because of the importance of forests to the nation, the State's police power has been wielded to
regulate the use and occupancy of forests and forest reserves.
To be sure, the validity of the exercise of police power in the name of the general welfare cannot
be seriously attacked. Our Government has definite instructions from the Constitution's preamble
to "promote the general welfare." Jurisprudence has time and again upheld the police power over
individual rights, because of the general welfare. Five decades ago, Mr. Justice Malcolm made it
clear that the "right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law
for the common good" and that the "liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of public
health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power."52 Mr. Justice Laurel, about twenty years later, affirmed the precept when he declared that
"the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations" and that"[p]ersons and property may be subjected to all kinds
of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state."53 Recently, we quoted from a leading American case,54 which pronounced that "neither
property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at
will use his property to the detriment of his fellow, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm," and that, therefore, "[e]qually fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
regulate in the common interest.55
These precepts more than suffice to sustain the validity of the government's action with respect to
Piadeco's logging operations.
8. We come to consider the effects of the judgment in Civil Case 3035-M, where the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan adjudged Piadeco's operation not to be in violation of forestry rules and
regulations and made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the defaulting
forestry authorities, upon Piadeco's ex-parte evidence. That judgment, it should be remembered,
is sought to be executed by Piadeco and the execution proceedings in that case are not before
this Court on review.
Said judgment enjoined the forestry officials from carrying out and executing the order of April 11,
1964 and the implementing letter of April 14, 1964, cancelling Piadeco's registration certificate,
PWR 2065-New. But when execution was ordered on June 1, 1965, and the writ of execution
issued on June 3, 1965, and when the court ordered on July 8, 1965 that Piadeco be allowed to
haul its logs, the registration certificate had already expired on December 31, 1964. It is, therefore,
not inappropriate for us to say that judgment had already become functus officio56 and can no
longer be executed.
The over-all position we have here taken should dispose of all other issues raised by the parties;
hence, unnecessary is a discussion thereof.
For the reasons given —
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in L-24796 is hereby granted; the June 1, 1965 order of
execution, the June 3, 1965 writ of execution issued pursuant thereto, and the July 8, 1965 order,
allowing respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. to haul its logs, all
of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case 3035-M, are hereby declared null and void;
the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein is hereby made permanent; and the Chief of the
Engineer Corps, Armed Forces of the Philippines, who was permitted by this Court on October 8,
1965 to retain for safekeeping and custody the logs previously seized by the State from the log
ponds of respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc., is now given
authority to use the same for the manufacture of prefabricated school houses; and —

The petition of Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. for injunction and
prohibition in L-25459 is hereby denied.

Costs in both cases against Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. So

ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA
SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents
ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents
SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA,
minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.
PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE
ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE
CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T.
NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all
surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and
THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA,
minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR.
and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH,
STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their
parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and
FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR.
and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the
said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati,
Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal
plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the
new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by
the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before
the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and
verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found;
these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are
also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since
time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful
ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent
(54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial,
commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages
resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers,
brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality
of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters
per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other
aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of
the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying
water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of
the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as
a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine
archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of
3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or
25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included —
the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation
and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of
fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already
being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
— especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use,
benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex
"B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with
a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora,
fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly
blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary
to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in
pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
 (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life
of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned
TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of
the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article
II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the
natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him
and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion,
the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2)
the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in
behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural
law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion
in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of
action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in
the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to
file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging
totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain
period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition
to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of
the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted
Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not
take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class
suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but
to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare
that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of
all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant
petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm
and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation
of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the
petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order
reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot
help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have
but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs
fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed
with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading
of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to
a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions
against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment
necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing
the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of
the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health,
as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources,
including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure
equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to
the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the
state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the
objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural
resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as
future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes
into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other
hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to
the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve
as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks
of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology
is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions
under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be
renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground
of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the
facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively
nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It
bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part
of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive
and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course,
is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that
can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even
invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have
acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government
to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes
in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform
Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
 Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting
it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right,
nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court
held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of
the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No.
705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October
27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
27
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does
not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe
vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be
absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest
of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts
are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that
both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will
use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of
the public to regulate it in the common interest.
31
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply
with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder
is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby
set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ.,
concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983
WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO THE
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y.
FELICIANO, respondents-appelllees,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
AND N ATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respon dents-appellees,RAVAGO
COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and ATANACIO MALLARI, intervenors,
Camito V Pelianco Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Solicitor General for respondent Director.
Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ravago Comm'l Co.
Anacleto Badoy for respondent Atanacio Mallari.
Mariano de Joya, Jr. for respondent Jorge Lao Happick, Jr.
MAKASIAR, J:
This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary prohibitory injunction (p. 2. rec.), which dismissed the petition of petitioner-
appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan on the ground that it does not state a sufficient cause of action,
and upon the respondents-appellees' (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources and the
Director of Forestry) motion to dismiss (p. 28, rec.).
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public
bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were
received on or before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI rec.). This public forest land, consisting of 6,420
hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of
timberland, which was turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine Government
(P. 99, CFI rec.).
On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due
form after paying the necessary fees and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants
submitted their offers before the deadline (p. 29, rec.).
Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or
allow the same to be awarded to the most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President
Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry, which read as follows:
It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest
reserve for watershed purposes. Prepare and submit immediately a draft of a
proclamation establishing the said area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo,
Zambales. It is also desired that the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the
issuance of the timber license in the area during the public bidding conducted last May
22, 1961 be rejected in order that the area may be reserved as above stated. ...
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA
(pp. 98, CFI rec.).
On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained
the findings and re comendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded that "it would be
beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under certain
conditions," and
We quote:
Respectfully forwarded to the honorable, the Executive Secretary Malacanang.
Manila inviting particular attention to the comment and recommendation of the
Director of Forestry in the proceeding in indorsement in which this Of fice fully
concurs.
The observations of responsible forest officials are most revealing of their zeal to
promote forest conservation and watershed protection especially in Olongapo,
Zambales area. In convincing fashion, they have demonstrated that to declare
the forest area involved as a forest reserve ratify than open it for timber
exploitation under license and regulation would do more harm than of to the
public interest. To convert the area into a forest reserve without an adequate
forest protection force, would make of it a 'Free Zone and Logging Paradise,' to
the ever 'Problem Loggers' of Dinalupihan, Bataan . . . an open target of timber
smugglers, kaingineros and other forms of forest vandals and despoilers. On the
other hand, to award the area, as planned, to a reputable and responsible
licensee who shall conduct logging operations therein under the selective logging
method and who shall be obliged to employ a sufficient number of forest guards
to patrol and protect the forest consecration and watershed protection.
Worthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of Forestry had already conducted
a public bidding to determine the most qualified bidder to whom the area
advertised should be awarded. Needless to stress, the decision of the Director of
Forestry to dispose of the area thusly was arrived at after much thought and
deliberation and after having been convinced that to do so would not adversely
 affect the watershed in that sector. The result of the bidding only have to be
announced. To be sure, some of the participating bidders like Mr. Edgardo
Pascual, went to much expense in the hope of winning a virgin forest concession.
To suddenly make a turn about of this decision without strong justifiable grounds,
would cause the Bureau of Forestry and this Office no end of embarrassment.
In view of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the Director of Forestry be
allowed to proceed with the announcement of the results of the bidding for the
subject forest area (p. 13, CFI rec.).
The Office of the President in its 4th Indorsement dated February 2, 1962, signed by Atty. Juan
Cancio, Acting Legal Officer, "respectfully returned to the Honorable Secretary of the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources for appropriate action," the papers subject of Forestry Notice
No. 2087 which was referred to the Bureau of Forestry for decision (p. 14, CFI rec.).
Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitioner-
appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.).
Against this award, bidders Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions
for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon — who
succeeded Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in office — issued General Memorandum Order No. 46,
series of 1963, pertinent portions of which state:
xxx xxx xxx
SUBJECT: ... ... ...
(D)elegation of authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber
licenses.
1. ... ... ...
2. The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to grant (a) new ordinary timber
licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each;
and (be the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 5,000
hectares each;
3. This Order shall take effect immediately (p. 267, CFI rec.).
Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, replacing secretary Benjamin M. Gozon. Upon assumption of office he Immediately
promulgate on December 19, 19b3 General memorandum Order No. 60, revoking the authority
delegated to the Director of Forestry, under General Memorandum order No. 46, to grant ordinary
timber licenses, which order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963. Pertinent portions
of the said Order read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No 46 dated May 30,
1963 —
1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume and Nature of the work of
the Department, the authority delegated to the Director of forestry under General
Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30, 1963, to grant (a) new ordinary
timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares
each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding
3,000 hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the issuance of' new
licenses , including amendments thereto, shall be signed by the secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
2. This Order shall take effect immediately and all other previous orders,
directives, circulars, memoranda, rules and regulations inconsistent with this
Order are hereby revoked (p. 268, CFl rec.; Emphasis supplied).
On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963, Ordinary
Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan,
was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by
the Office of the Director of Forestry (p. 30, CFI rec.; p. 77, rec.). It was not signed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by Order No. 60 aforequoted.
On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources shall be considered by tile Natural Resources praying that, pending
resolution of the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick from the
order of the Director of Forestry denying their motion for reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the
name of Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was
irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.
On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago Commercial Company, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber
License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as having been issued by the
Director of Forestry without authority, and is therefore void ab initio. The dispositive portion of said
order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office is of the opinion and so holds
that O.T. License No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan should be,
as hereby it is, REVOKED AND DECLARED without force and effect whatsoever
from the issuance thereof.
The Director of Forestry is hereby directed to stop the logging operations of
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, if there be any, in the area in question and shall see to
it that the appellee shall not introduce any further improvements thereon pending
 the disposition of the appeals filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge
lao Happick in this case" (pp. 30-31, CFI rec.).
Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources denied the motion in an Order dated March 25, 1964, wherein this paragraph
appears:
In this connection, it has been observed by the Acting Director of Forestry in his
2nd indorsement of February 12, 1964, that the area in question composes of
water basin overlooking Olongapo, including the proposed Olongapo watershed
Reservation; and that the United States as well as the Bureau of Forestry has
earmarked this entire watershed for a watershed pilot forest for experiment
treatment Concerning erosion and water conservation and flood control in
relation to wise utilization of the forest, denudation, shifting cultivation, increase
or decrease of crop harvest of agricultural areas influenced by the watershed,
etc. .... (pp. 3839, CFI rec.; p. 78, rec.).
On April 11, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, acting on the separate
appeals filed by Jorge Lao Happick and Ravago Commercial Company, from the order of the
Director of Forestry dated April 15, 1963, awarding to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan the area under
Notive No. 2087, and rejecting the proposals of the other applicants covering the same area,
promulgated an order commenting that in view of the observations of the Director of Forestry just
quoted, "to grant the area in question to any of the parties herein, would undoubtedly adversely
affect public interest which is paramount to private interests," and concluding that, "for this reason,
this Office is of the opinion and so holds, that without the necessity of discussing the appeals of
the herein appellants, the said appeals should be, as hereby they are, dismissed and this case is
considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is concerned" (p. 78, rec.).
On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, petitioner-appellant filed the instant case before tile court a
quo (Court of First Instance, Manila), Special Civil Action No. 56813, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (pp. 1-12, CFI rec.). Petitioner-
appellant claims that the respondents-appellees "unlawfully, illegally whimsically, capriciously and
arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by
revoking a valid and existing timber license without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of
the equal protection of the laws, by depriving him of his constitutional right to property without due
process of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts" (P. 6, CFI rec.). Petitioner-
appellant prayed for judgment making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction against the
respondents- appellees; declaring the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources dated March 9, March 25, and April 11, 1964, as well as all his acts and those of the
Director of Forestry implementing said orders, and all the proceedings in connection therewith, null
and void, unlawful and of no force and effect; ordering the Director of Forestry to renew OTI No.
20-'64 upon expiration, and sentencing the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the
petitioner-appellant the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.000) by way of
pecuniary damage, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) by way of moral and exemplary
damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000-00) as attorney's fees and costs. The
respondents-appellees separately filed oppositions to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, Ravago Commercial Company, Jorge Lao, Happick and Atanacio Mallari, presented
petitions for intervention which were granted, and they too opposed the writ.
The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss dated April 24, 1964, alleges the following
grounds: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction; (2) that the respondents may not be sued without
their consent; (3) that the petitioner has not exhausted all available administrative remedies; (4)
that the petition does not state a cause of action; and (5) that purely administrative and
discretionary functions of administrative officials may not be interfered with by the courts. The
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources joined the motion to dismiss when in his answer of
May 18, 1964, he avers the following special and affirmative defenses: (1) that the court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; (2) that the petitioner
has no cause of action; (3) that venue is improperly laid; (4) that the State is immune from suit
without its consent; (5) that the court has no power to interfere in purely administrative functions;
and (6) that the cancellation of petitioner's license was dictated by public policy (pp. 172-177,
rec.). Intervenors also filed their respective answers in intervention with special and affirmative
defenses (pp. 78-79, rec.). A hearing was held on the petition for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction, wherein evidence was submitted by all the parties including the intervenors,
and extensive discussion was held both orally and in writing.
After the said hearing, on January 20, 1965, the court a quo, from the evidence received, resolved
not only the question on the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but also the motion to
dismiss, declared that the petition did not state a sufficient cause of action, and dismissed the
same accordingly. To justify such action, the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, stated
that "the court feels that the evidence presented and the extensive discussion on the issuance of
the writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction should also be taken into consideration
in resolving not only this question but also the motion to dismiss, because there is no reason to
believe that the parties will change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). His
motion for reconsideration having been denied (p. 488, CFI rec.), petitioner-appellant Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan appealed directly to this Court.
I
Petitioner-appellant now comes before this Court, claiming that the trial court erred in:
(1) holding that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action: and
(2) dismissing the petition [p.27,rec. ].
He argues that the sole issue in the present case is, whether or not the facts in the petition
constitute a sufficient cause of action (p. 31, rec.). Petitioner-appellant, in his brief, presented a
lengthy discussion on the definition of the term cause of action wherein he contended that the
three essential elements thereon, — namely, the legal right of the plaintiff, the correlative
obligation of the defendants and the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that right —
are satisfied in the averments of this petition (pp. 31-32, rec.). He invoked the rule that when the
ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be determined
only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other
matters aliunde He further invoked the rule that in a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of
cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted for the
purpose of the motion (pp. 32-33, rec.).
A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellant's contentions are untenable.
As already observed, this case was presented to the trial court upon a motion to dismiss for failure
of the petition to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Rule 16 [g], Revised Rules of
Court), on the ground that the timber license relied upon by the petitioner- appellant in his petition
was issued by the Director of Forestry without authority and is therefore void ab initio. This motion
supplanted the general demurrer in an action at law and, as a rule admits, for the purpose of the
motion, ail facts which are well pleaded however while the court must accept as true all well
pleaded facts, the motion does not admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are
not true, nor does the rule apply to legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence,
nor to facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded (Vol.
1, Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 505, citing cases).
It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case wherein answers were
interposed and evidence introduced. In the course of the hearing, petitioner-appellant had the
opportunity to introduce evidence in support of tile allegations iii his petition, which he readily
availed of. Consequently, he is estopped from invoking the rule that to determine the sufficiency of
a cause of action on a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be
considered. If there were no hearing held, as in the case of Cohen vs. U.S. CCA Minn 1942,129 F.
2d 733), "where the case was presented to District Court upon a motion to dismiss because of
alleged failure of complaint to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and no answer
was interposed and no evidence introduced, the only facts which the court could properly consider
in passing upon the motion were those facts appearing in the complaint, supplemented be such
facts as the court judicially knew.
In Llanto vs. Ali Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court, thru Justice Conrado
V. Sanchez, held that the trial court can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due
to lack of cause of action even without a hearing, by taking into consideration the discussion in
said motion and the opposition thereto. Pertinent portion of said decision is hereby quoted:
Respondents moved to dismiss. Ground therefor is lack of cause of action. The
Court below granted the motion, dismissed the petition. The motion to reconsider
failed. Offshoot is this appeal.
1. The threshold questions are these: Was the dismissal order
issued without any hearing on the motion to dismiss? Is it void?
WE go to the record. The motion to dismiss was filed on February 1, 1961 and
set for hearing on February 10 following. On February 8, 1961 petitioner's
counsel telegraphed the court, (r)equest postponement motion dismissal till
written opposition filed.' He did not appear at the scheduled hearing. But on
March 4, 1961, he followed up his wire, with his written opposition to the motion
to dismiss. Adverting to the 5-page motion to dismiss and the 6-page opposition
thereto, We find that the arguments pro and con on the question of the board's
power to abolish petitioner's position to discussed the problem said profusely
cited authorities. The May 15, 1961 8-page court order recited at length the said
arguments and concluded that petitioner made no case.
One good reason for the statutory requirement of hearing on a motion as to
enable the suitors to adduce evidence in support of their opposing claims. But
here the motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action. Existence of a
cause of action or lack of it is determined be a reference to the facts averred in
the challenged pleading. The question raised in the motion is purely one of law.
This legal issue was fully discussed in said motion and the opposition thereto. In
this posture, oral arguments on the motion are reduced to an unnecessary
ceremony and should be overlooked. And, correctly so, because the other
intendment of the law in requiring hearing on a motion, i.e., 'to avoid surprises
upon the opposite party and to give to the latter time to study and meet the
arguments of the motion,' has been sufficiently met. And then, courts do not exalt
form over substance (Emphasis supplied).
Furthermore even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion to dismiss for-
insufficiency of cause of action will be granted if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation
disclosing facts sufficient to defeat the claim enabled the court to go beyond disclosure in the
complaint (LOCALS No. 1470, No. 1469, and No. 1512 of the International Longshoremen's
Association vs. Southern Pacific Co., 6 Fed. Rules Service, p. 107; U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7, 1952; 131 F. 2d 605). Thus, although the evidence of the parties were
presented on the question of granting or denying petitioner-appellant's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, the trial court correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of the motion
to dismiss. Moreover, in applying said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, the trial
court, in its order dismissing the petition, pointed out that, "there is no reason to believe that the
parties will change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant
did not interpose any objection thereto, nor presented new arguments in his motion for
reconsideration (pp. 482-484, CFI rec.). This omission means conformity to said observation, and
a waiver of his right to object, estopping him from raising this question for the first time on appeal.
" I question not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal" (Matienzo vs.
Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 276).
Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is
that the complaint states no cause of action, its sufficiency must be determined only from the
allegations in the complaint. "The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely
secondary in importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been
misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be
countenanced" (Vol. 1, Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2 ed., 1973, p. 157, citing cases).
What more can be of greater importance than the interest of the public at large, more particularly
the welfare of the inhabitants of Olongapo City and Zambales province, whose lives and
properties are directly and immediately imperilled by forest denudation.
The area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license practically comprises the entire
Olongapo watershed (p. 265, CFI rec.). It is of public knowledge that watersheds serves as a
defense against soil erosion and guarantees the steady supply of water. As a matter of general
policy, the Philippine Constitution expressly mandated the conservation and proper utilization of
natural resources, which includes the country's watershed. Watersheds in the Philippines had
been subjected to rampant abusive treatment due to various unscientific and destructive land use
practices. Once lush watersheds were wantonly deforested due to uncontrolled timber cutting by
licensed concessionaries and illegal loggers. This is one reason why, in paragraph 27.of the rules
and regulations included in the ordinary timber license it is stated:
The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of
the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier
date, when public interests so require (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.).
Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, We therefore take judicial
notice of the fact that, on April 30, 1964, the area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license
has been established as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve by virtue of Executive
Proclamation No. 238 by then President Diosdado Macapagal which in parts read as follows:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1824 of the Revised Administrative Code,
as amended, 1, Diosdado Macapagal, President of the Philippines do hereby
withdraw from entry, sale, or settlement and establish as Olongapo Watershed
Forest Reserve for watershed, soil protection, and timber production purposes,
subject to private rights, if any there be, under the administration and control of
the Director of Forestry, xx the following parcels of land of the public domain
situated in the municipality of Olongapo, province of Zambales, described in the
Bureau of Forestry map No. FR-132, to wit: ... ... (60 O.G. No. 23, 3198).
Petitioner-appellant relies on Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) for his alleged right over
the timber concession in question. He argues thus: "The facts alleged in the petition show: (1) the
legal right of the petitioner to log in the area covered by his timber license; (2) the legal or
corresponding obligation on the part of the respondents to give effect, recognize and respect the
very timber license they issued to the petitioner; and (3) the act of the respondents in arbitrarily
revoking the timber license of the petitioner without giving him his day in court and in preventing
him from using and enjoying the timber license issued to him in the regular course of official
business" (p. 32, rec.).
In the light of petitioner-appellant's arguments, it is readily seen that the whole controversy hinges
on the validity or invalidity of his timber license.
WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timber license was
signed and released without authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and
is therefore void ab initio. WE hereby quote such findings:
In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963, the
Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license only
where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of
public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares (Exhs. 2-A and
2-B Ravago, embodied in Annex B; Exh. B). The petitioner contends that only
1,756 hectares of the said area contain commercial and operable forest; the
authority given to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license
of not more than 3,000 hectares does not state that the whole area should be
commercial and operable forest. It should be taken into consideration that the
1,756 hectares containing commercial and operable forest must have been
distributed in the whole area of 6,420 hectares. Besides the license states,
'Please see attached sketch and technical description,' gives an area of 6,420
hectares and does not state what is the area covered of commmercial and
operable forest (Exh. Ravago Also Annex B of the petition, which was marked as
Exhibit B, states:
Under Notice No. 2087, a tract of public forest containing 6,420
hectares located in Olongapo, Zambales was declared available
for timber utilization and development. Pursuant to this Notice,
there were received bid proposals from the following persons: ...
Wherefore, confirming the findings of said Committee, the area described in
Notice No. 2087 shall be awarded, as it is hereby awarded to Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan, subject to the following conditions: ... ...
In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting
Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any license. The license was
signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on December 19, 1963, and released to
the petitioner on January 6, 1964 (Exh. RavaGo The authority delegated to the
Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license was contained in
general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This was revoked by
general memorandum order No. 60, which was promulgated on December 19,
1963. In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to
release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore void ab
initio (pp. 479480, CFI rec.).
The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated
to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But,
what is of greatest importance is the date of the release or issuance, and not the date of the
signing of the license. While petitioner-appellant's timber license might have been signed on
December 19, 1963 it was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is
acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer
any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not
acquired any legal right under such void license. This is evident on the face of his petition as
supplemented by its annexes which includes Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in
the case of World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Macrohon, et al. (105 Phil. 250, Feb. 28,
1959), this Court held that if from the face of the complaint, as supplemented by its annexes,
plaintiff is not the owner, or entitled to the properties it claims to have been levied upon and sold at
public auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks indemnity, the said complaint does
not give plaintiff any right of action against the defendants. In the same case, this Court further
held that, in acting on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint from its
annexes where it clearly appears that the claim of the plaintiff to be the A owner of the properties
in question is predicated on said annexes. Accordingly, petitioner-appellant's petition must be
dismissed due to lack of cause of action.
II
Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all his administrative remedies
to no avail as respondents-appellees have failed, neglected, refused and continue to refuse to
allow petitioner-appellant to continue operation in the area covered by his timber license. He
further alleged that he has neither recourse by way of appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru this special civil action, as the last official act of
the respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in declaring void the
timber license referred to above after denying petitioner-appellant's motion for reconsideration, is
the last administrative act. Petitioner-appellant relies on the case of Demaisip vs. The Court of
Appeals, et al. (106 Phil. 237, Sept. 24, 1959), wherein it was held that the failure of the plaintiff to
appeal from the adverse decision of the Secretary to the President cannot preclude the plaintiff
from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-
ego of the President. The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied
sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the latter (Villena vs. the Secretary of
Interior, 67 Phil. 451; p. 7, CFI rec.).
To this We cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive
Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the
Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on
appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to
take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, this Court, in
the case of Calo vs. Fuertes (5 SCRA 399, 400, June 29, 1962), held that:
At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are
also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of the
former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of
the Director of Lands he had exhausted the administrative remedies, is
untenable.
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is
tantamount to not appealing all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the
appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case.
In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps (22 Phil. 491-92, July 22, 1912), this Court stressed the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, thus:
When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the
executive department of the government the courts will not interfere until at least
that remedy has been exhausted. Jao Igco vs. Shuster, 10 Phil. Rep. 448; Ekiu
vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 651; U.S. vs. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161; U.S. vs. Ju Toy 198
U.S. 253; Chill Yow vs. U.S., 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201). The administrative remedies
afforded by law must first be exhausted before resort can be had to the courts,
especially when the administrative remedies are by law exclusive and
final. Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely and
absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive department of
the government. When the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the
executive department of the government to dispose of particular questions, their
judgments or the judgments of that particular department are no more reviewable
by the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be
reviewed and modified by them" (emphasis supplied).
Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has
no other speedy and adequate remedy (Diego vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 54 Off. Gaz., No.
4, 956). In the case at bar, petitioner- appellant's speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the
President of the Philippines.
Accordingly, "it is settled to the point of being elementary that the only question involved n
certiorari is jurisdiction, either want of jurisdiction or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion shall
warrant the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari when the same is so grave as when
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty,
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law" FS
Divinagracia Agro-Commercial Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 191 [April .1, 1981]). The
foregoing is on the assumption that there is any irregularity, albeit there is none in the acts or
omissions of the respondents-appellees. certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and
again by this Court (People vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465), "it being a time honored and well
known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party must first exhaust the administrative
remedies available" (Garcia vs. Teehankee, 27 SCRA 944, April 18, 1969).
Moreover, from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources complained of,
petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appealing therefrom to the Chief
Executive. In other words, before filing the present action for certiorari in the court below, they
should have availed of this administrative remedy and their failure to do so must be deemed fatal
to their case [Calo vs. Fuertes, et al., G.R. No. L-16537, June 29,1962]. To place petitioners' case
beyond the pale of this rule, they must show that their case falls — which it does not — within the
cases where, in accordance with our decisions, the aggrieved party need not exhaust
administrative remedies within his reach in the ordinary course of the law [Tapales vs. The
President and the Board of Regents of the U.P., G.R. No. L-17532, March 30, 1963; Mangubat vs.
Osmena, G.R. No. L- 12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio vs. Hon. Jose Rodriguez, G. R. No. L-11078,
May 27, 1959; Pascual vs. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-11959, Oct. 31, 1959; Marinduque Iron
Mines, etc. vs. Secretary of Public Works, G.R. No. L-15982, May 31, 1963; Alzate vs. Aldaba,
G.R. No. L-14407, Feb. 29, 1960 and Demaisip vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L- 13000, Sept. 25,
1959] (Ganob vs. Ramas, 27 SCRA 1178, April 28, 1969).
III
Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also failed to note
that his action is a suit against the State which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit,
cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued Kawananakoa vs. Polybank, 205
U.S. 349; Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution).
The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellant's timber license, were acting
within the scope of their authority. Petitioner-appellant contends that "this case is not a suit against
the State but an application of a sound principle of law whereby administrative decisions or
actuations may be reviewed by the courts as a protection afforded the citizens against oppression"
(p. 122, CFI rec.). But, piercing the shard of his contention, We find that petitioner-appellant's
action is just an attempt to circumvent the rule establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot
use that principle of law to profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The
promotion of public welfare and the protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are
property, rights and interest of the State. Accordingly, "the rule establishing State exeraiption from
suits may not be circumvented by directing the action against the officers of the State instead of
against the State itself. In such cases the State's immunity may be validly invoked against the
action as long as it can be shown that the suit really affects the property, rights, or interests of the
State and not merely those of the officer nominally made party defendant" (SINCO, Phil. Political
Law, 10th ed., p. 35; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724; see also Angat River Irrigation System vs.
Angat River Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-10943-44, Dec. 28, 1957, 102 Phil. 789, 800-802; Mobil
PhiL vs. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120, 1121-1125; Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of
Printing Employees' Association, 1 SCRA 340, 341, 343).
Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their
capacity as officers of the State, representatives of the sovereign authority discharging
governmental powers. A private individual cannot issue a timber license.
Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result in the government
losing a substantial part of its timber resources. This being the case, petitioner-appellant's action
cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued.
IV
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees
can validly revoke his timber license. As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and
regulations included in the ordinary timber license states: "The terms and conditions of this license
are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be
made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require" (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). A
timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this ceise
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation"
(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin 54 O.G. 7576). In the case of Pedro vs.
Provincial Board of Rizal (56 Phil. 123), it was held that:
A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of
which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere
privilege which may be revoked when public interests so require.
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to
defeat the proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao,
24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The State has inherent power enabling it to prohibit all things
hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24,1970).
V
As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director
of Forestry. The utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and
supervision of the Director of Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any
forest only upon license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate
officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (See. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose
reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer" (Director of
Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power of control of the Department
Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of
subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969; Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148). Accordingly,
respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has the authority to revoke,
on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry. There being supporting
evidence, the revocation of petitioner-appellant's timber license was a wise exercise of the power
of the respondent- appellee (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid.
Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as
corollary to which the alleged right to them of private individuals or entities was meticulously
inquired into and more often than not rejected. We do so again" (Director of Forestry vs.
Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate Our fidelity to the basic policy of conserving the national patrimony
as ordained by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS
HEREBY .AFFIRMED IN TOTO. COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT.
SO ORDERED,
Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J, concurs in the result.
De Castro, JJ., is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant
PUNO, J.:p
Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705 1 as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277. 2
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the
Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing
plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on
said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the
vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City. 3
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc
went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the
corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler
truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the
Marcos Bridge. 4
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson
Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified accused- appellant as the owner of the truck
and the cargo. 5
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed,
accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the
coconut slabs. 6
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the cargo's supporting documents, specifically: (1)
certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt
from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut
slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents . All he could show was a
certification 7 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate
transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. 7
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the
provincial capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task Force
that there were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs. 9
At 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together with three
CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of
coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck,
concealing the tanguile lumber. 10 When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the seized
forest products, they counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total
volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50. 11
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with
violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-
548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest
Products chainsawn lumber (species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3
bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of
P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from
the proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited provision of the law, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 12
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of
tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits
(PLTP) issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa 13 and Elpidio Sabal. 14 The
PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the
permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by the PLTP's of
Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his
hauling services. 15
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence against
him. He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an uncounselled
extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also
ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-
appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision 16 states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended by Executive Order No. 277 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
 penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties provided by
law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the ten-
wheeler truck bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the commission of
the crime are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be
disposed of in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.17
Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of
errors: 18
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD 705 as
amended by EO 277 for possessing timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations on the
ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first time mere
possession of timber was criminalized, there are no existing forest laws and
regulations which required certain legal documents for possession of timber and
other forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional
rights of accused against unlawful searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional
rights of accused under custodial investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for violation of
Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the possession
of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular
documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and
regulations existing at the time of its enactment.
Appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705 provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products
Without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens,
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on
the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found. (emphasis supplied).
Appellant interprets the phrase "existing forest laws and regulations" to refer to those laws and
regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. The suggested
interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but
give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the
time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of
1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products.
Section 3 of the Administrative Order provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood,
veneer, non-timber forest products and wood-based or nonwood-based
products/commodities shall be covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin,
issued by authorized DENR officials, as specified in the succeeding sections.
xxx xxx xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be
accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the
CENRO or his duly authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the
processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to deal
in such commodities. In order to be valid, the CLO must be supported by the
company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales
invoice.
xxx xxx xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any certificate of origin
of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court found:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not
present a single document to justify his possession of the subject lumber. . . .
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he
readily showed documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs. Thus,
he showed a certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the
DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a xerox copy of the
original certificate of title covering the parcel of land where the coconut slabs
were cut.(Exhibit "F").
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut
slabs to be transported by Mr.Wilson Que on board truck
bearing Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from matured coconut
palms gathered inside the private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado
under OCT No. P-11614(8) located at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson
Que for the purpose of facilitating the transportation of said
coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or
upon discharge of its cargoes at its final destination, whichever
comes first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to
transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994.
The accused was apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate
number PAD-548 which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with
chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the
outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut
slabs which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very
much aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber
(b)ut could not secure one and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the
same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police authorities by
merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3,
1994 addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan
informing the CENRO that he would be transporting the subject lumber on March
7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was
returned to him for the reason that he did not need a permit to transport the
subject lumber. (Exhibits "8", "8-A").
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March
4, 1994, the Court has doubts that this was duly filed with the concerned office.
According to the accused, he filed the letter in the morning of March 4 and
returned in the afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by an employee
of the CENRO whom he did not identify that he did not need a permit to transport
the lumber because the lumber would be for personal used (sic) and ". . . came
from PLTP." (Ibid) The letter-request was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance
of the accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed
with a government agency are not returned. Hence, when a person files or
submits any document to a government agency, the agency gets the original
copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show that he has filed such
document with the agency. Moreover, his avoidance as regards the identity of the
employee of the CENRO who allegedly returned the letter-request to him also
creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on cross-examination, the accused, when
asked about the identity of the employee of the CENRO who returned the letter-
request to him answered that he could recognize the person ". . . but they were
already reshuffled." (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused
also said that he did not know if that person was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid,
p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letter-
request, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement
in view of the fact that I am hauling and transporting my own
lumber for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of
transport agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this
letter with him when he transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted
source. 19
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant's possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly
constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellant's argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest
products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering,
collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate
offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority; and
 (2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the
DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting
and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the
proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source
is immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are
inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous tree". Appellant avers that these pieces of
lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures
as well as his right to counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by this court
in People vs. Bagista, 20 thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner:
no person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or
belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the
occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to
be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of
the aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding."
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits
of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure
of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
(citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellant's truck.
A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a
ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through
Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along
General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they
apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo,
admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers
asked for the lumber's supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present any. The
foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the
extensive search of appellant's truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile
lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of
accused-appellant.
The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether appellant's right to counsel
under custodial investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding of
guilt of appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170308 March 7, 2008
GALO MONGE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court whereby petitioner Galo Monge
(petitioner) assails the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 June 2005 which affirmed his
conviction as well as the discharge of accused Edgar Potencio (Potencio) as a state witness.
The factual antecedents follow. On 20 July 1994, petitioner and Potencio were found by barangay
tanods Serdan and Molina in possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany lumber
in Barangay Santo Domingo, Iriga City. Right there and then, the tanods demanded that they be
shown the requisite permit and/or authority from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able to produce any.3 Petitioner fled
the scene in that instant whereas Potencio was brought to the police station for interrogation, and
thereafter, to the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-
CENRO).4 The DENR-CENRO issued a seizure receipt for the three pieces of lumber indicating
that the items, totaling 77 board feet of mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had been seized from
Potencio.5 Later on, petitioner was arrested, but Potencio’s whereabouts had been unknown since
the time of the seizure6 until he surfaced on 3 January 1998.7
An information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35 charging petitioner
and Potencio with violation of Section 688 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,9 as amended by
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, series of 1997. The inculpatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the 20th day of [July 1994], at about 9:30 o’clock in the morning, in
Barangay Sto. Domingo, Iriga City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with each other,
without any authority of law, nor armed with necessary permit/license or other documents,
with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, transport and
have in their possession three (3) pieces of Mahogany of assorted [dimension] with a[n]
appropriate volume of seventy-seven (77) board feet or point eighteen (0.18) cubic meter
with a total market value of P1,925.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice
of the DENR in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
At the 26 November 1996 arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea.11
Trial ensued. On 17 June 1997, Serdan testified on the circumstances of the apprehension but for
failing to appear in court for cross examination, his testimony was stricken out. 12 On 16 January
1998, Potencio was discharged to be used as a state witness on motion of the
prosecutor.13 Accordingly, he testified on the circumstances of the arrest but claimed that for a
promised fee he was merely requested by petitioner, the owner of the log, to assist him in hauling
the same down from the mountain. Potencio’s testimony was materially corroborated by
Molina.14Petitioner did not contest the allegations, except that it was not he but Potencio who
owned the lumber. He lamented that contrary to what Potencio had stated in court, it was the latter
who hired him to bring the log from the site to the sawmill where the same was to be sawn into
pieces.15
The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner was imposed nine (9) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods and ordered to pay the costs.16
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where he challenged the
discharge of Potencio as a state witness on the ground that the latter was not the least guilty of
the offense and that there was no absolute necessity for his testimony.17 The appellate court
dismissed this challenge and affirmed the findings of the trial court. However, it modified the
penalty to an indeterminate prison sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to
ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor as maximum.18 His motion for reconsideration
was denied, hence the present appeal whereby petitioner reiterates his challenge against the
discharge of Potencio.
The petition is utterly unmeritorious.
Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto transporting, and thus in possession of,
processed mahogany lumber without proper authority from the DENR. Petitioner has never denied
this fact. But in his attempt to exonerate himself from liability, he claims that it was Potencio, the
owner of the lumber, who requested his assistance in hauling the log down from the mountain and
in transporting the same to the sawmill for processing. The contention is unavailing.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct and separate
offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land without any authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other forest products without the
legal documents required under existing laws and regulations.19 DENR Administrative Order No.
59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest
products. Section 3 thereof materially requires that the transport of lumber be accompanied by a
certificate of lumber origin duly issued by the DENR-CENRO. In the first offense, the legality of the
acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products may be proven by
the authorization duly issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial
whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of forest products are legal precisely
because mere possession of forest products without the requisite documents consummates the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
crime.20 AFFIRMED.

It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the subject mahogany SO ORDERED.
lumber and their subsequent failure to produce the requisite legal documents, taken together, has
already given rise to criminal liability under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the second act Carpio, Acting Chairperson, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
punished thereunder. The direct and affirmative testimony of Molina and Potencio as a state
witness on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes petitioner’s liability.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber found in his
possession nor in his claim that his help was merely solicited by Potencio to provide the latter
assistance in transporting the said lumber. P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute that punishes
acts essentially malum prohibitum. As such, in prosecutions under its provisions, claims of good
faith are by no means reliable as defenses because the offense is complete and criminal liability
attaches once the prohibited acts are committed.21In other words, mere possession of timber or
other forest products without the proper legal documents, even absent malice or criminal intent, is
illegal.22 It would therefore make no difference at all whether it was petitioner himself or Potencio
who owned the subject pieces of lumber.

Considering the overwhelming body of evidence pointing to nothing less than petitioner’s guilt of
the offense charged, there is no cogent reason to reverse his conviction.

Petitioner’s challenge against Potencio’s discharge as a state witness must also fail. Not a few
cases established the doctrine that the discharge of an accused so he may turn state witness is
left to the exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion23 limited only by the requirements set forth
in Section 17,24 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus, whether the accused offered to be
discharged appears to be the least guilty and whether there is objectively an absolute necessity
for his testimony are questions that lie within the domain of the trial court, it being competent to
resolve issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of the trial court with respect this highly factual
issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of
discretion.25 No such grave abuse is present in this case. Suffice it to say that issues relative to the
discharge of an accused must be raised in the trial court as they cannot be addressed for the first
time on appeal.26

Moreover and more importantly, an order discharging an accused from the information in order
that he may testify for the prosecution has the effect of an acquittal.27 Once the discharge is
ordered by the trial court, any future development showing that any or all of the conditions
provided in Section 17, Rule 119 have not actually been fulfilled will not affect the legal
consequence of an acquittal.28 Any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution, therefore, in
moving for the discharge and of the court in granting the motion—no question of jurisdiction being
involved—will not deprive the discharged accused of the benefit of acquittal and of his right
against double jeopardy. A contrary rule would certainly be unfair to the discharged accused
because he would then be faulted for a failure attributable to the prosecutor. It is inconceivable
that the rule has adopted the abhorrent legal policy of placing the fate of the discharged accused
at the mercy of anyone who may handle the prosecution.29 Indeed, the only instance where the
testimony of a discharged accused may be disregarded is when he deliberately fails to testify
truthfully in court in accordance with his commitment,30 as provided for in Section 18, Rule 119.
Potencio lived up to his commitment and for that reason, petitioner’s challenge against his
discharge must be dismissed.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 184098 November 25, 2008
AMADO TAOPA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac,
Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido
Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On
investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the
owners of the seized lumber.
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 705,1 as amended, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes. The
information against them read:
That on or about the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning at
Barangay Capilihan, Municipality of Virac, Province of Catanduanes, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
possess, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, criminally possess, transport in a truck bearing Plate No. EAS 839 and have in
their control forest products, particularly one hundred thirteen (113) pieces of lumber of
Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong species with an aggregate net volume of One
Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Four (1,684) board feet with an approximate value of
Ninety-Nine Thousand One Hundred Twenty (Php99,120.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency,
without any authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits, the RTC
found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt.3
Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Cuison was
acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.4 The dispositive portion of the CA decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with respect to accused-
appellant Placido Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on reasonable doubt,
and MODIFIED with respect to accused-appellants Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco
by reducing the penalty imposed on them to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven
(11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.5
In this petition,6 Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He alleges that the
prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in
the truck when the lumber was seized.
We deny the petition.
Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because Cuison's testimony
proved Taopa's active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC
and the CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house and that
Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and
lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and
control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco)
constituted possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the police was likewise
largely indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the
seized lumber.
However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed on Taopa.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended, is punished as qualified theft.8 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and
possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.
Articles 309 and 310 read:
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value
of the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos;
but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty
shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
 purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis supplied)

2. xxx

Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding
articles xxx (emphasis supplied).

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.9 Following Article 310 in
relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus
an additional period of four years for the excess of P47,630.

The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence10 imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty next
lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be anywhere between 10
years and one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the medium
period11 of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 16 years, five months and
11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore
may be anywhere between 16 years, five months and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22 years,
two months and 21 days of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31, 2008 decision and July 28, 2008
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30380
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Amado Taopa is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, and sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided
for by law.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 125797 February 15, 2002
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Region VIII,
Tacloban City, Represented by Regional Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C. ROSALES,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog City, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized representative may order the
confiscation in favor of the government of, among others, the vehicles used in the commission of
offenses punishable by the said Code.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
December 6, 1995 Decision1 and the June 3, 1996 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused GREGORIO
DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de [o]ficio.
"The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.
"The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is taking
custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle ‘St. Jude’, with Plate No. HAJ-848, to return
the said vehicle to the owner thereof."3
The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last paragraph of the
Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein respondents.
The Facts
In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
"The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with] violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 in an
information which is quoted herein below:
‘That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at
Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather,
collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total volume of
72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY
CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper
authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended and further
Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.
‘CONTRARY TO LAW.’
"Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not guilty.
"Thereafter trial was conducted.
"The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:
"That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a Forest
Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while he was in his house
in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named ‘St. Jude’ with Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from
barangay Blanca Aurora passed by. He stopped the said vehicle and found some lumber of
assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside. The lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1" x 2" x 4", 16
pieces of 1" x 24" x 2.3" and 1 piece of 1" x 2" x 4." In his estimate at the price of ₱10.00 per board
foot the total value of the lumber would be ₱729.30. He asked the driver for [the] owner of the
lumber and he was informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also
informed him that the vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy Cross
Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then took hold of the vehicle and the assorted lumber and,
thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs. ‘B’ and series. He also took photographs
of the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. ‘C’ and series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit
with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for
some papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not
his. Daraman further told him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood
shavings from the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his
assorted lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to his (Asan’s)
house in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City.
"The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both the
prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that the case
would be merely corroborative [of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion. The prosecution rested
its case with the admission of Exhs. ‘A’ and ‘B’ and their series. Its Exhs. ‘C’ and series were
rejected because the photographer who took them did not testify to identify [them].
"For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused would merely
offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts have been established:
"That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio instructed him to
procure some wood shavings (‘sinapyo’) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the service vehicle of the
Holy Cross Funeral Services. His companion[s] were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol.
They went to barangay Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got some wood
shavings from the furniture shop owned by a certain Asan Abing. They loaded 20 sacks of wood
shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2 inches in circumference as he
demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were] being used by the Holy Cross Funeral Services
as cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood shavings were loaded, Asan Abing asked him
a favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the
Holy Cross Funeral Services [was] also located. Asan himself personally loaded his assorted
lumber into the vehicle. The subject assorted lumber were already in the furniture shop where they
got the wood shavings. On their way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo Opinion stopped
him and took the wood shavings. Opinion also inquired about the assorted lumber and he told him
that they were owned by Asan, owner of the furniture shop in Brgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded
them in his vehicle to be brought to his (Asan’s) house in Barangay Obrero, Calbayog City. He told
Opinion also that Asan advised him that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to tell the
person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca
Aurora, San Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead
impounded the vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon,
the vehicle was still not returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his
employer at Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the latter about what happened."4
After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed vehicle to
Lucenecio.
Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-
Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) of Catbalogan,
Samar conducted administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle in the
presence of private respondents.5 The two failed to present documents to show the legality of their
possession and transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera
recommended to the Regional Executive Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber
and conveyance.6 Atty. Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994,
concurring with the recommendation to forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from private
respondents. The Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus L. Momongan and Arty. Fiel I.
Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the DENR, Region VIII, Tacloban City.7
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the reconsideration of the
assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the "return of the said vehicle to the owner
thereof."8 He contended that the vehicle had already been administratively confiscated by the
DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.9 He
further claimed that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which had been
used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended
by EO 277.
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence. The unrebutted
testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood shavings from Asan, the
former agreed to take the lumber to the latter’s house in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross
Funeral Services office was also located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the
papers showing the authorization for the lumber were in the former’s shop in Barangay Blanca
Aurora. Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise insufficient, the RTC
considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him.
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was untenable on
procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did
not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign of his disapproval of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
"x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by the Court the
owner of the vehicle in question, ‘St. Jude,’ which is the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned by
accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution
failed to sufficiently establish that accused Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the
lumber subject of the motion which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x possession of the
subject forest products. Instead, as established by the evidence it was a certain Asan who owned
the subject lumber. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
"The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has long become
final and executory.
"Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by the OIC
DENR Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the lumber in question [was]
found to be owned by Asan Abing. But notwithstanding this fact, for reasons not known to the
Court, the said Asan Abing was never made an accused in the present case.
"Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is himself a
violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have conspired with any other persons who committed
the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of his vehicle in violating the said law.
In the present case as shown by the evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner
accused Narciso Lucenecio has committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared by the
Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused Gregorio Daraman. In fact both
were declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the decision has not been appealed."10
Hence, this Petition.11
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
 "(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the return of
property already owned by the government.
(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known
as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of mistake,
error or failure of its officers to perform their duties."12
Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated
vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3) whether, as a result
of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from confiscating the vehicle
administratively.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle
Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the return of the
disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government property by virtue of the
forfeiture Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly authorized
representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation
and disposition of all conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in illegally cutting, gathering,
removing, possessing or abandoning forest products.
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.13 A comparison of the provisions of the two
relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the
confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and
tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that
has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the
commission of the offense. Section 68 reads:
"Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: x x x.
"The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are
found."14
Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:
"SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws
rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned,
and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter."15
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal meaning and
applied without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording correctly expresses its
intent or will. The courts may not construe it differently.16
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial
arts;17 equipment covers physical facilities available for production, including buildings,
machineries and tools;18 and implements pertains to whatever may supply a want, especially an
instrument, tool or utensil.19 These terms do not include conveyances that are specifically covered
by Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner
that includes "any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used either in land,
water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode of transport used in the movement of any forest
product."20
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of "all conveyances used either
by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same" is vested in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized
representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry,
reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations.21
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-93, amending
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides the guidelines for the
confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and
regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to private
respondents to "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72)
pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first securing and obtaining any permit or license
therefor from the proper authorities, x x x." The Information did not contain any allegation
pertaining to the transportation or conveyance of illegally cut, gathered, possessed or abandoned
lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended.
Confiscation Without Due Process
Private respondents’ main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex "C") is a "false, falsified
and perjurious document." The Order was attached to and made part of the record only when
petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only after the trial court
rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it appear, according to the private respondents,
that RED Momongan had approved the Memorandum on January 26, 1994. This does not appear
to be true because Atty. Marmita, officer-in-charge (OIC) of the DENR Legal Division of Tacloban
City, signed the Memorandum recommending approval only on January 31, 1994.
Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32) ordered the
provincial environment and natural resources officer to transfer the confiscated vehicle and pieces
of lumber in connection with the prosecution of Criminal Case 1958.22 Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC
of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could
not deliver the vehicle because it was not in running condition.23
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls outside the ambit of
the review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed Order to release the
vehicle was private respondents’ acquittal of the charge of violating Section 68. On the other hand,
the forfeiture Order issued by the DENR was based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and
separate matter cognizable by it. Petitioner is questioning only the RTC’s jurisdiction over the
assailed Order to release the confiscated vehicle. Private respondents have not appealed the
DENR’s Order of Forfeiture, the validity of which can thus be presumed. 24 The genuineness of the
Order and its proper service upon them are factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court,
which is not a trier of facts.25
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the main limited to
reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court.26 Under PD 705, the actions and the decisions
of the DENR are reviewable by the courts only through special civil actions for certiorari or
prohibition.27
Second Issue:
Construing PD 705, as Amended
Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-A, PD 705
contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator or was a
conspirator with other violators of that law. Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993, provides that
the proceedings for the confiscation and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall be directed against
its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture.
In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of PD 705
contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law or conspired with
other persons who violated it or consented to the use of his or her vehicle in violating it.
Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have violated PD 705, and their
acquittals were not appealed.
We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case is
immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or
conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized
representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of making such a
ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended, does
not clothe petitioner with that authority.
Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial courts the
confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws.1âwphi1 Hence, we cannot expect
the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section
68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest products without proper documents. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms,
and interpretation is resorted to only where a literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity
or an injustice.28
We also uphold petitioner’s argument that the release of the vehicle to private respondents would
defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry laws. The preamble of the
amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the
country for the benefit of the present and future generations. Our forest resources may be
effectively conserved and protected only through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of
our forestry laws.29 Strong paramount public policy should not be degraded by narrow
constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.30
Third Issue:
Estoppel
In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioner’s third issue. It
is no longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that the assistant
provincial prosecutor’s failure to comment on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was an
implied disapproval thereof. The public prosecutor’s disapproval does not vest in the trial court the
jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 115880 January 23, 2007
PEDRO GONZALES, ELY GONZALES, BENITO CASIDSID, TANDOY MINDORO, and
BADBAD PIANA, in their respective personal capacities and in behalf of other prior forest
land occupants similarly affected by AFFLA No. 82, Petitioners,
vs.
MADAME PILAR FARM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Regional Director BERNARDO
AGALOOS, Director EDMUND CORTEZ, Bureau of Forest Development, and Honorable
RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, Minister of Natural Resources, Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
PEDRO GONZALES and ELY GONZALES, Petitioners,
vs.
Honorable INOCENCIO JAURIGUE, Presiding Judge, MTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
MADAME PILAR FARM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, District Forester ALFREDO
SANCHEZ, Regional Director BERNARDO AGALOOS, and Director EDMUND CORTEZ,
Bureau of Forest Development, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before us is this petition* for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated March
24, 1994 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 31159, affirming an earlier Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, in its Civil Case Nos. 525
and 542 which directed the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro to
proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 7852, a prosecution for Illegal Pasturing thereat filed
against the herein petitioners Pedro Gonzales and Ely Gonzales.
The facts:
The case revolves around the lease of public lands for agro-forestry farm purposes, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, as amended. The
standard documentation then for this public land award was a pro forma "Agro-Forestry Farm
Lease Agreement" (AFFLA) prepared and processed by the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR),
now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), thru the then Bureau of
Forest Development (BFD).
On or around October 8, 1982, Pilar Alarcon Paja, for and in behalf of "Madame Pilar Farm
Development Corporation," applied for an agro-forest farm lease covering parcels of land situated
in Sitio Tugtugin – Caguray River, Barangay Murtha, Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
for the purpose of raising plant crops for the Alcogas program of the government. At that time,
"Madame Pilar Farm Development Corporation" (hereinafter "Pilar Farm") was still unregistered,
its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws having been filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) only on March 1, 1983, and the corresponding registration certificate -
Registration No. 111139 – being issued over two weeks later on March 18, 1983.
Out of the total 2,400 hectares applied for, which included an abandoned pasture area of one
Fidel del Rosario, the MNR approved only a slightly smaller area. On June 16, 1983, then Natural
Resources Minister Teodoro O. Peña issued in favor of Pilar Farm AFFLA No. 82 for 1,800
hectares. Shortly thereafter, it would appear that herein petitioners Pedro Gonzales and his son,
Ely Gonzales (collectively, the Gonzaleses), who were then into livestock raising, entered into and
occupied a portion of the awarded area. This encroachment and the refusal of the alleged
intruders to vacate impelled then District Forester Alfredo Sanchez to file in the MTC of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro a criminal complaint, thereat docketed as Criminal Case No. 7852, against the
Gonzaleses for Illegal Pasturing under the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended, allegedly committed as follows:
That sometime in June, 1983 up to the present, at Sitio Panagsangan, [Brgy] Murtha, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, both the accused without
any permit or authority from the [BFD] director … did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously occupy portion of forest zone for their livestock pasturing and is within [Pilar Farm’s
AFFLA No. 82] … [to] its damage …. (Words in bracket added)
To the aforesaid complaint, the Gonzaleses filed a Motion and Petition2 therein praying the MTC to
dismiss the complaint, or, in the alternative, to suspend the criminal action on grounds of
erroneous venue, violation of the equal protection guarantee and prejudicial question, among
others.
On January 21, 1985, the Gonzaleses, joined by several others also claiming to be prior
occupants of certain parcels covered by AFFLA No. 82, filed with the RTC of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the then MNR Minister, certain BFD
officials and Pilar Farm. The petition, basically to challenge the agro-forest lease award, was
docketed as Civil Case No. 525.
Meanwhile, on April 25, 1985, in Criminal Case No. 7852, the MTC issued an Order denying
the Motion and Petition therein interposed by the Gonzaleses for the dismissal of said case or for
the suspension of said criminal proceedings.
In view of the above denial order, the Gonzaleses filed a second petition before the RTC, this time
a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition against MTC Judge Inocencio M. Jaurigue who
issued the said order of denial and against the BFD officials earlier impleaded as respondents in
Civil Case No. 525. The RTC docketed the second petition as Civil Case No. 542.
On October 31, 1985, the public respondents in Civil Case No. 525 filed a motion to dismiss said
case. On December 6, 1985, the petitioners filed a motion for the consolidation of Civil Case Nos.
525 and 542.
On August 20, 1986, the RTC, on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, issued
a Resolution dismissing the petition in Civil Case No. 525, rationalizing as follows:
The Court has not lost sight of the fact that petitioners quoted a declaration of the B.F.D. District
Officer … that the award to respondent [Pilar Farm] by the B.F.D. Central Office was made
"despite the B.F.D. District Certification that ----the applied area falls within Southern Mindoro
Lumber Corporation and District Forest Occupancy Management Project wherein forest occupants
were permanently settled".
Towards the close of hearing on June 4, 1986, public respondents signified that verification of that
matter would have to be conducted. This situation adds support for the stand that the entire
dispute is still within the sphere of the executive department.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the above resolution.
On February 11, 1987, the RTC ordered the consolidation of Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542.
On June 4, 1987, the RTC resolved to reconsider its dismissal of Civil Case No. 525 in the light of
an alleged supervening execution of an affidavit by San Jose District Forester Alfredo Sanchez
who allegedly instructed petitioner Pedro Gonzales to transfer his herd to the cancelled pasture
area of Fidel del Rosario, a portion of which had been included in AFFLA No. 82. The pertinent
part of the reinstating resolution3 reads:
It must be mentioned the petitioners’ Motion For Reconsideration of the dismissal of Case No. 525
had been pending as of the date the Order for consolidation was issued; xxx.
The result of the succession of pleadings is that in the first case (No. 525), the Court has to act on
the Motion For Reconsideration without any pleading nor comment from any of [the] respondents.
In specifically giving a margin for the officials to interpose the Bureau's comment, the Court gave
way for that Office to manifest whether any action had been taken by the Bureau on petitioners’
claim after the Resolution of dismissal had been issued … that the government was "still locating"
an area to be awarded to petitioners, and that the situation depicted in the District Forester's
statement would be verified.
On the other hand, petitioners now harp on the abuse-of-discretion-angle, which shifts the
jurisdiction to the judiciary.
Definitely … the Court should not seek to substitute its judgment, its assessment, for that of the
administration body, the [BFD]. All that is believed now open to be inquired into is the subject of
abuse of discretion, the conduct of proceedings which led to that award.
xxx xxx xxx
It is understood that the decision on Case No. 525 will be decisive of Case No. 542; hence, no
pleading need be filed in Case No. 542 meanwhile. (Underscoring in the original; words in bracket
added.)
On April 19, 1988, however, the RTC issued in Civil Case No. 525 a Resolution again dismissing
the said case, predicating its action basically on the same reason set forth in its earlier August 20,
1986 ruling. Wrote the court:
The fundamental issue … encountered in the beginning was want of jurisdiction for non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Dismissal therefore was reconsidered, because petitioners
cited a basis for alleging abuse of discretion. In essence, the "abuse" … was the circumstance that
the area to which petitioners had been previously instructed by the District Forester to transfer his
herd became a part of the area leased to [Pilar Farm]. The impression given … was that the [BFD]
Central Office, which granted [AFFLA No. 82] …, disregarded the word of the District Forester,
which would have favored petitioners. Giving way to the possibility that the procedure observed …
constituted an abuse of discretion, the Court set the case for trial solely on that question.
Public respondents, moving for reconsideration …, state that the sworn statement of the District
Forester (April 3, 1986) to the effect that sometime in 1981, he instructed Pedro Gonzales to
transfer his herd to the cancelled pasture area of Fidel del Rosario, was a "reversed stand" of that
official …. It was deemed a reversal of his letter of September 1, 1982, stating that a suitable
place for Pedro Gonzales’ herd had not been found. This apparently runs counter to the sworn
statement aforecited.
The actuation of the District Forester was regarded by public respondents as an encroachment
into the power and authority of the Bureau Director.
The Supplemental Opposition to that Motion reiterated petitioner's reliance on the District
Forester's alleged instruction and cited the disregard thereof as abusive.
Replying to that Supplemental Opposition, the public respondents dwelt on the factual, physical
justification for the award to private respondent, that is, the finding that during the investigation or
inspection in July 1981, [the Gonzaleses] were not occupants of subject area. Moreover, public
respondents state that to petitioners’ [pasture] lease agreement had expired … and a
"Certification" by the Regional Director (February 19, 1985) states that the processing of the
application for renewal was held in abeyance pending the location of replacement site.
The determination of whether petitioners’ application for lease of an area … was accorded the
requisite attention or given the proper action by the [BFD] falls initially on the executive
department …. It may be gleaned from the papers now on file (quite voluminous) that the internal
organization, the delineation of functions according to the set-up, the detailed instructions and
regulations issued, all come into play in the present dispute, and, at this stage, these are not for
the Court to dwell upon. The questions of confirming whether the District Forester instructed or
authorized Pedro Gonzales to transfer his herd as claimed, and, in the affirmative, whether that
was within his power or functions, so as to confer a right on Pedro Gonzales, are all embraced
within the administrative aspect - in which, judicial intervention is not authorized.
xxx xxx xxx
In resume, since it now appears that the sworn statement relied upon by petitioners is, after all, for
the Bureau to consider, the Court is constrained to revise its ruling embodied in the Resolution of
June 4, 1987 and declare, as it hereby declares, that the dismissal was warranted. xxx..
Therefrom, the petitioners went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 15341. On October 18,
1989, the appellate court, on the premise that the RTC erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 525
without giving the petitioners the chance to prove that the findings of forestry officials were not
supported by the evidence on record, ordered the remand of the case for trial and decision.
Following the remand of Civil Case No. 525 and the subsequent trial of the consolidated cases,
the RTC, via an Order4 dated December 21, 1992, dismissed Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542, with
an express directive for the MTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro "to proceed to try and decide
Criminal Case No. 7852 against Pedro Gonzales for illegal pasturing."
Again, the petitioners went on appeal to the CA whereat their appellate recourse was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 31159. For its part, respondent Pilar Farm also interposed an appeal which the
CA dismissed for having been filed out of time.
In the herein assailed Decision5 dated March 24, 1994, the CA dismissed the petitioners’ appeal
on the strength of, inter alia, the following considerations:
1. The nature of the petition filed before the RTC basically required the petitioners to
establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent MNR and BFD officials, but
petitioners failed to discharge the burden;
2. But assuming that the cases before the RTC partake of an appeal from the MNR, the
recourse would still fail owing to submitted evidence showing that:
a. AFFLA No. 82 was regularly issued;
b. all portions of the leased area applied for under bona fide occupation or claims
were excluded from the coverage of AFFLA No. 82;
c. that the priority right of Mrs. Pilar Alarcon Paja over the leased area was
acquired ahead of other applicants; and
d. that during the investigation and inspections on July 1987, the Gonzaleses
were not the occupants of the subject area.
Thereafter, the petitioners filed a pleading styled "Motion" asking the CA to render a ruling on
whether or not the RTC violated procedural due process in not resolving their offer of rebuttal
evidence which forced them to make a proffer of proof. In a Resolution6 dated June 15, 1994, the
CA denied the motion.
Hence, petitioners’ present recourse submitting for our consideration the following issues: 7
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DECLINED TO RULE ON WHETHER THE LOWER COURT
VIOLATED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN REFUSING TO ADMIT PETITIONERS’
REBUTTAL EVIDENCES, DESPITE A MOTION BY PETITIONERS PRAYING FOR A
RULING ON THE MATTER.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
"BY THE NATURE OF THIS PETITION, PETITIONERS TOTALLY FAILED TO
ESTABLISH LACK OF JURISDICTION, GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND/OR THE
UNLAWFUL NON-PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IMPOSED BY LAW ON PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS," DESPITE ADMISSIONS OR PROOF TO THE CONTRARY.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
"THERE NO LONGER EXIST ANY HINDRANCE TO THE PROSECUTION OF
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 7852 NOR ANY BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF DAMAGES IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLANTS," DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION BY THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT AND BASIS FOR THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.
As we see it, all the above three (3) issues or grounds emanate from a single core argument
involving the disinclination of the RTC to consider the petitioners’ offer of rebuttal evidence.
The petition lacks merit.
To begin with, the rules of evidence accords trial courts considerable discretion on the matter of
admission of rebuttal evidence,8 the rule being that, for an effective and efficient administration of
justice, it is essential that litigation must end sometime and somewhere.9 A contrary policy could
result to an absurd situation where, after admission of rebuttal evidence, the trial court, to be fair,
must allow: sur-rebuttal of the rebuttal evidence; refutation of the sur-rebuttal of the rebuttal
evidence; thereafter, a sur-refutation of the refutation of the sur-rebuttal of the rebuttal evidence;
and so on ad infinitum.
Anent the first issue, petitioners claim that during the hearings for the presentation of their rebuttal
evidence, the RTC was unusually lenient whenever respondents’ counsels were absent, but did
not exhibit the same behavior when petitioners’ counsel was absent, as exemplified when the RTC
viewed the latter’s absence as waiver of the right to present rebuttal evidence. Scoring the CA for
not correcting a wrong allegedly dealt them below by the RTC, petitioners now lament:
And now comes the decision of respondent [appellate] court which refused to review the most
crucial assigned error raised by petitioners. From pages one to twelve thereof, the decision never
discussed the issue on whether the trial court "committed obvious errors in its ruling during the
trial, showed unusual leniency to respondents and practically ignored the offer of rebuttal
evidences, which constrained appellants to submit the pending incidents for resolution without
further arguments and to make proffer of proof." Then on page [13] thereof, respondent court
finally concluded that "[w]ith the foregoing disquisition, the Court sees little or no reason to go into
minute detail in discussing the appellants’ remaining assignments to error". Hence, the decision of
respondent court also ignored the rebuttal exhibits of herein petitioners.10 (Bracketed words
added)
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for not striking down the RTC’s refusal
to admit petitioners’ rebuttal evidence.
For one, the most appropriate time and forum for the petitioners to present their evidence, be they
evidence-in-chief or rebuttal, is during the trial of Criminal Case No. 7852 before the MTC.
Petitioners have only themselves to blame for disrupting the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
7852. They cannot plausibly deny having commenced Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542 hoping that
the outcome in either case would thwart efforts towards continuing with Criminal Case No. 7852 in
the MTC. Else, why attack as sham the steps and proceedings taken by the BFD leading to the
issuance of AFFLA No. 82, question the regularity of the final lease award and seek its nullification
before the courts when, as correctly held by the CA and the RTC, these are matters immediately
cognizable and better addressed by the MNR?
For another, even at the RTC level, we can readily observe not only the voluminous evidence
coming from both the petitioners and the respondents, but also the painstaking evaluation of
evidentiary details in the RTC’s single space 20-paged Order11 of December 21, 1992. There is,
therefore, no compelling reason for us to disturb the CA’s findings, in its challenged decision,
affirmatory of that of the RTC, that –
Over and above the foregoing considerations, the record is replete with documentary evidence
showing the regularity of the award of AFFLA No. 82 in favor of [ Pilar Farm]. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
Absent such stronger countervailing proof as would disprove the evident showing of the foregoing
documents, the [CA] is not inclined to disturb the lower court’s affirmance of the Ministry of Natural
Resources award of AFFLA No. 82 as well as the findings made in relation thereto.
Among the pieces of rebuttal evidence which the petitioners are raising all the way up to this Court
concern alterations and/or intercalation allegedly committed by the respondents, acts which
petitioners insist as being punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
according to the petitioners:
Respondent court failed to consider that AFFLA No. 82 was purportedly executed
on October 8, 1982 between the government and respondent corporation at Quezon City but
notarized by a notary public commissioned at the City of Manila. Yet, respondent corporation was
incorporated only on March 18, 1983! It appears what was notarized onOctober 8,
1982 was another document, entered as Doc. No. 258, Page 19, Book No. 53, Series of 1982, in
the notarial registry of Atty. Armando Cortez. The lease agreement appears to be falsified.
Unwittingly, public respondents admitted under paragraph 3, page 19 of its (sic) Comment to an
alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning and punishable under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. (Underscoring in the original.)
For reference¸ we quote paragraph 3, page 19 of the public respondents’ Comment 12 to this
petition:
3. The records of this case also show that AFFLA No. 82 was originally applied for under the name
of "Mrs. Pilar Alarcon Paja", and that the same was changed and put under the name of private
respondent corporation after the latter was organized in 1983. Evidently, this explains the
discrepancy between the dates of the Contract of Lease of AFFLA No. 82, and the incorporation of
private respondent corporation in March 1983.
Analyzing the text of the AFFLA, we find no provision therein requiring that the lessee must first be
a corporation before it may plant and raise crops necessary for the Alcogas program of the
government. Regardless of whether the lessee is a single proprietor, a partnership, a corporation
or a cooperative, what matters here is the lessee’s accomplishment of the undertaking to plant
and raise said crops.
This brings us to the matter of notarial jurisdiction. It must be stressed right off that Pilar Alarcon
Paja signed the necessary lease contract documents. When she affixed her signature on and
acknowledged executing the AFFLA before a Notary Public for the City of Manila on October 8,
1982, her act did not necessarily amount to an alteration or intercalation of a genuine document
because the address of her principal, Pilar Farm, at that time was "1160 Tayuman, Tondo, Metro
Manila."13 While the issuing office of the ready-made AFFLA is in Quezon City, the Court
perceives no compelling legal reason why the same cannot be signed and acknowledged by the
proposed lessee’s agent somewhere else. It would of course be different if the integrity of the
accomplished application is otherwise compromised, which does not appear so in this case.
It cannot be over emphasized that when Mrs. Paja signed the AFFLA ready-made form on
October 8, 1982, her act was nothing more than an offer to lease, the kind of offer contemplated
under the first paragraph of Article 1319 of the Civil Code as a prelude to contract perfection. Until
accepted with the issuance of a final lease award, following a BFD investigation of the applicant’s
qualification, among other tedious processing tasks, the offer confers no enforceable contractual
right. To be precise, the first paragraph of Article 1319 of the Civil Code reads:
Article 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing
and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance
absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.
It may be that Pilar Farm was issued its SEC registration certificate only on March 18, 1983. It
should be stressed, however, that what Mrs. Paja submitted shortly before that date in behalf of
what, for the nonce, may rightly be regarded as an unregistered association in the process of
incorporation, was still an "offer." The meeting of the offer and acceptance occured only on June
16, 1983 when then Minister Teodoro O. Peña signed AFFLA No. 82. At that defining time, Pilar
Farm had already been duly registered and had acquired a judicial personality.
In any event, the MNR, following its rules and exercising its administrative discretion, did not find
the situation thus depicted sufficient ground to reject the application altogether. To borrow from
National Power Corporation v. Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc.,14 the exercise of discretion is usually
a policy decision that necessitates inquiry and deliberation on the wisdom and practicalities of a
given course of action, in this case approving or denying the lease application. The role of courts
is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of government has transgressed its
constitutional boundaries. Courts will not interfere with executive or legislative discretion exercised
within those boundaries. Otherwise, they stray into the forbidden realm of policy decision-
making.15
And until the MNR or the DENR cancels AFFLA No. 82, Pilar Farm shall continue to enjoy the
rights accruing therefrom to the exclusion of petitioners Gonzaleses, et al.
Turning now to the second issue, petitioners bemoan the fact that the RTC, in refusing to consider
their rebuttal evidence, arrived "at a conclusion based on pure speculation, surmises and or
conjectures, which calls for the judicial reexamination of this … Court." Pressing the point, the
petitioners state:
This is where respondent court erred the most. By refusing to consider the rebuttal exhibits of
petitioners, it relied upon respondents’ documentary evidences … that were hearsay and self-
serving. xxx .
We are not impressed.
issues in Civil Case Nos. 525 and 542, without more, no longer pose as impediment to the
continuance of Criminal Case No. 7852.
The sub-issue about "whether or not a Forest Officer has authority to conduct preliminary
investigation" is misleading, assuming as it does that District Forester Alfredo Sanchez conducted
a preliminary investigation. What is more, this sub-issue is really a non-issue because District
Forester Alfredo Sanchez did not conduct a "preliminary investigation." With the view we take of
this matter because the record is unclear, the investigation Mr. Sanchez conducted was not a
"preliminary investigation" under the rules on criminal procedure, but rather an administrative
investigation authorized under Section 89 of the Forestry Code, as amended, which reads:
Section 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. – A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or
any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without
warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses
defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools
and equipment used in committing the offense xxx. The arresting forest officer or employee shall
thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from the time of arrest and seizure, the offender and the
confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to, and file the proper complaint with, the
appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigation and file information in
court.

Doubtless, the second issue thus raised pivots on the factual findings of the CA respecting the
Lastly, the sub-issue that calls for a clinical analysis of the criminal complaint, or, to a specific
right of respondent Pilar Farm to its leased area and the petitioners’ lack of right to enter and
point, a determination of whether or not the scene of the crime is situated in the barangay
occupy a portion thereof. Needless to stress, such issue is beyond the province of the Court to
mentioned in the complaint, need not detain us any longer. For, at bottom, this sub-issue involves
review, just as it is improper to raise the same in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
factual matters that should properly be addressed by the MTC, pursuant to the principle of
Court.16 The Court is not a trier of facts; it is not its function to examine, analyze, winnow or weigh hierarchy of courts.
anew the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. This rule all the more
assumes an imperative dimension where, as here, the CA affirms the findings of the lower court.
Stated differently, substantiated findings of the CA are binding on the Court and they carry even WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court.17 As it were, the
RTC’s Order 18 of December 21, 1992 directs the MTC to exercise its jurisdiction over and to No pronouncement as to costs.
proceed with the trial and decide Criminal Case No. 7852. If at all, the petitioners may hope to
pursue their call for judicial reexamination in the MTC. SO ORDERED.

The last issue in the petitioners’ memorandum involves three (3) sub-issues. In the first, the
petitioners argue that the MTC may not proceed with Criminal Case No. 7852 since the issue,
particularly in Civil Case No. 525, respecting their entitlement to those parcels of Pilar Farm’s
leased area occupied by them, constitutes a prejudicial question, such that there would no longer
be any basis for their prosecution for illegal pasturing if they are adjudged as so entitled. The
second would question a Forest Officer’s authority to conduct a preliminary investigation for
violation of the Forestry Code, as amended. In the third, petitioners call for a "clinical analysis" of
the criminal complaint in question.

The prejudicial question angle is now moot and academic owing to the RTC’s Order 19 of
December 21, 1992, as affirmed in toto by the CA, making short shrift of petitioners’ challenge
against the validity and the regularity of the issuance of AFFLA No. 82 and their outlandish claim
of having a vested right on a portion of respondent Pilar Farm’s leased area. In net effect, the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 93540 December 13, 1999
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, VICENTE A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW, as, Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and May 18, 1990, respectively, dismissing petitioners' charge that
Honorable Benigno T. Dayaw, Presiding Judge of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering them to deliver to private
respondents the six-wheeler truck and its cargo, some 4,000 board feet of narra lumber which
were confiscated by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and forfeited
in favor of the government. 1
The antecedent facts:
On August 9, 1988, two (2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III,
intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber
as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private
respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation
Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon
City. There, petitioner Atty. Vecente Robies of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered
the following discrepancies in the documentaion of the narra lumber: 2
a. What were declared in the documents (Certificate of Timber Origin, Auxiliary
Invoices and various Certifications) were narra flitches, while the cargo of the
truck consisted of narra lumber;
b. As appearing in the documents, the Plate Numbers of the truck supposed to
carry the forest products bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 OR NSN-267,
while the Plate Number of the truck apprehended is NVT-881;
c. Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have been
accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and
not by a Certificate of Timber Origin, which merely covers only transport of logs
and flitches;
d. The log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup
International as the seller and Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and
not with Lily Francisco Lumber and Hardware. 3
which are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10. The said BFD
Circular requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the following
documents: (1) Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only be the District
Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester; (2) Sales Invoice; (3) Delivery Receipt;
and (4) Tally Sheets. 4 Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. 5 Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a
temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck. 6
On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as petitioner Secretary) issued an order for the
confiscation of the narra lumber and the six- wheeler truck. 7
Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed, the said order to the Office
of the President. Consequently, the confiscated narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited
in favor of the government. They were subsequently advertised to be sold at public auction on
March 20, 1989. 8
On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of writs of
replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery of the
confiscated lumber and six-wheeler truck, and to enjoin the planned auction sale of the subject
narra lumber, respectively. 9 Said complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2045 and
raffled to Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City.
On the same day, the trial court issued an Order directing petitioners to desist from proceeding
with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction on March 27, 1989. 10
On March 20, 1989, the scheduled date of the auction sale, private respondents filed an Ex-
Parte Motion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an
Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the
amount of P180,000.00. 11 The trial court granted the writ of replevin on the same day and directed
the petitioners "to deliver the . . . [n]arra lumber, original documents and truck with plate no. NJT
881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their representative . . . .12
On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply
therewith. 13David G. Brodett, Sheriff of Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City (hereinafter referred
to as the Sheriff) reported that petitioners prevented him from removing the subject properties from
the DENR Compound and transferring them to the Mobil Unit Compound of the Quezon City
Police Force. To avoid any unwarranted confrontation between them, he just agreed to a
constructive possession of the properties in question. 14
In the afternoon of the same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating their intention to file a
counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the execution of the writ of seizure and to
post a cash bond in the amount of P180,000.00. But the trial court did not oblige petitioners for
they failed to serve a copy of the Manifestation on private respondents. Petitioners then
immediately made the required service and tendered the cash counterbond in the amount of
P180,000.00, but it was refused, petitioners' Manifestation having already been set for hearing on
March 30, 1989. 15
On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond which was, however,
denied for the same reason. 16
On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in contempt for
disobeying the writ of seizure. 17 The trial court gave petitioners twenty-four (24) hours to answer
the motion. Hearing thereon was scheduled on March 30, 1989.
However, on March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the Orders of the trial court dated March 20, 1989 and
March 27, 1989. 18
On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a
temporary restraining order (TRO).
On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of preliminary
injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00. 19
However, on March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and
dismissed the petition. It declared that as the complaint for replevin filed by private respondents
complied with the requirements of an affidavit and bond under Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the
Revised Rules of court, issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory. 20
As for the contempt charges against petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed the same were
sufficiently based on a written charge by private respondents and the report submitted by the
Sheriff. 21
On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision.
However, that motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated May 18, 1990. 22
Hence this petition.
On the one hand, petitioners contend, thus:
(1) Confiscated lumber cannot be subject of replevin. 23
(2) Petitioners not compelled to criminally prosecute private
respondents but may opt only to confiscate lumber. 24
(3) Private respondent charged criminally in court. 25 and
(4) Writ of Replevin issued in contravention of PD #605. 26
On the other hand, private respondents argue that:
(1) The respondent Judge had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the complaint for recovery of personal property and, therefore,
had jurisdiction to issue the necessary orders in connection
therewith. 27
(2) The issuance of the order for the delivery of personal
property upon application, affidavit and filing of replevin bond by
the plaintiff is mandatory and not discretionary, hence, no abuse
of discretion can be committed by the trial court in the issuance
thereof.28
(3) The Order of March 20, 1989 was in accordance with
Section 4, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court and is, therefore,
valid. 29
(4) The private respondents have not been proven to have
violated Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code. 30
(5) The petitioners do not have the authority to keep private
respondents' property for an indefinite period, more so, to
dispose of the same without notice and hearing or without due
process. 31
(6) Contrary to the allegation of petitioners, no formal
investigation was conducted by the PIC with respect to the
subject lumber in this
case. 32
(7) The alleged Order dated January 20, 1989 of the petitioner
Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. of the DENR is not valid and
does not make the issuance of the order of replevin
illegal. 33 and
(8) The subject properties were not in custody of the law and
may be replevied. 34
At the outset we observe that herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of
petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President as provided for in Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705 which
reads:
All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or
upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose
 decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from
receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed to the President .
. . . The decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts
except through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law,
comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative
remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an
appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the
administrative forum. 35 As to the application of this doctrine in cases involving violations
of P.D. No. 705, our ruling in Paat v. Court of Appeals, is apropos:
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules
and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest
lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the
DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine
a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial
court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by the private respondents constitutes
an encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence. In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and
Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, which was reiterated in the recent case
of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, this Court held:
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and
multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these
resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies. 36
However, petitioners did not file a motion to dismiss based on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived. 37
Nonetheless, the petition is impressed with merit.
First. A writ of replevin does not just issue as a matter of course upon the applicant's filing of a
bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans
allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Sec. 2, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court,
cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin. Said provision reads:
Affidavit and bond. — Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must show by his
own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing
it, or entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause
of detention thereof to his best knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That it has not been taken for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law, or
seized under an execution, or an attachment against the property of the plaintiff,
or, if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure; and
(d) The actual value of the property.
xxx xxx xxx
Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be
satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be
issued.
In the case at bar, the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by petitioner
Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No.
277, to wit:
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly
Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. — In all cases of violations of
this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his
duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all
conveyances used either by land, water, or air in the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter. 38
As the petitioner Secretary's administrative authority to confiscate is clearly provided by
law, the taking of the subject properties is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance
of a writ of replevin prayed for by private respondents.
Second. Issuance of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary was a valid exercise of his
power under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705. By virtue of said order, the narra lumber and six-wheeler
truck of private respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin.
Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. 39 When a
thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal
writ, replevin will not lie to recover it. 40 Otherwise, there would be interference with the possession
before the function of law had been performed as to the process under which the property was
taken. 41 So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, Sec. 2(c), Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that:
 Affidavit and bond. — Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must show by his
own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or
fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution, or preliminary
attachment or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is
exempt from such seizure or custody; . . .
xxx xxx xxx. 42
Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No.
705 is distinct from and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action
provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, in Paat, we held that:
. . . precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more responsive to
present situations and realities" and in view of the "urgency to conserve the
remaining resources of the country," that the government opted to add Section
68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and
distinct from criminal proceedings. . . . . The preamble of EO 277 that added
Section 68-A to PD 705- is most revealing:
WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining
forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved
and protected through the vigilant enforcement and
implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from
technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the Penal
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this [sic] difficulties, there is a need to
penalize certain acts more responsive to present situations and
realities;
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR
to confiscate, not only "conveyances" but forest products as well. On the other
hand, confiscation of forest products by the "court" in a criminal action has long
been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power of
confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68,
then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would
not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, . . . . 43
Sec. 68-A was added precisely to supplant the inadequacies and supplement criminal
enforcement of forestry laws.
Fourth. Sec. 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within six (6)
hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct
preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to
administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.
Sec. 80 of P.D. No. 705 provides:
Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. — A forest officer or employee of
the Bureau shall arrest even without a warrant any person who has committed or
is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He
shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered
or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense. The arresting
officer or employee shall thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from the time of
arrest and seizure, the offender and the confiscated forest products, tools and
equipment to, and file the proper complaint with, the appropriate official
designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations and file informations in
court.
xxx xxx xxx
The title of Sec. 80 — "Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions" — bespeaks this intendment
of the law. The fact, too, that Secs. 68 and 80 were co-existing prior to the introduction of
Sec. 68-A, proves that Sec. 80 applies to the criminal prosecutions subject of Sec. 68 and
not to the administrative confiscation subject of Sec. 68-A. Sec. 68-A, therefore, should
not be interpreted in relation to Sec. 80 as to require that criminal charges be filed with
and seized forest products be immediately delivered to, the fiscal in case of administrative
confiscation, for this renders nugatory the purpose sought to be achieved thereby.
Statutes should always be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil
or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such interpretation as will
advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 44
Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that their right to due process
was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to the confiscation of their properties.
On the contrary, by private respondents' own admission, private respondent Sy who drove the six-
wheeler truck was properly investigated by petitioner Atty. Robles at the PIC/SAID Office of the
DENR. Thereafter, private respondent Sy and his witnesses were given full opportunity to explain
the deficiencies in the documents. 45 Private respondents categorically stated that they made a
"continuous and almost daily follow-up and plea . . . with the PIC for the return of the truck and
lumber . . . ." 46 Finally in a letter dated December 30, 1989, private respondent Lily Francisco Uy
requested petitioner Secretary for "immediate resolution and release of the impounded narra sawn
lumber." 47
Undoubtedly, private respondents were afforded an opportunity to be heard before the order of
confiscation was issued. There was no formal or trial type hearing but the same is not, in all
instances, essential in administrative proceedings. It is settled that due process is satisfied when
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or
an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 48

Moreover, respondents claim that the order of confiscation was antedated and not the product of
the investigation supposedly conducted by the PIC of the DENR. However, they proffer no proof to
support that allegation. On the other hand, there is the legal presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties is
even particularly strong with respect to administrative agencies like the DENR which are vested
with quasi-judicial powers in enforcing the laws affecting their respective fields of activity, the
proper regulation of which requires of them such technical mastery of all relevant conditions
obtaining in the nation. 49

Finally. The writ of seizure and the writ of replevin were issued by the trial court in grave abuse of
its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect contempt of court which
presupposes that the court order thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order
having been issued, no contempt of court could be committed. 50

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17194 are
hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Respondent Presiding Judge Benigno T. Dayaw, of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from enforcing the Orders
dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, 1989 in Civil Case No. Q-89-2045, or if said orders have
already been enforced, the said respondent Judge is directed to render judgment of forfeiture on
the replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the said respondent Judge is
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by private
respondents against the petitioners.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and other pertinent
SUPREME COURT transport documents covering the forest products, as required by DENR Administrative Order No.
Manila 07-94. Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable
period of time, the DENR considered them as abandoned and, on 31 January 2005, the Provincial
EN BANC Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Richard N. Abella,
issued a seizure receipt to NMC Container Lines, Inc.2
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017 June 19, 2008
On 1 February 2005, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) OIC Loreto
A. Rivac (Rivac) sent a notice to NMC Container Lines, Inc. asking for explanation why the
LT. GEN. ALFONSO P. DAGUDAG (Ret.), complainant,
government should not confiscate the forest products.3 In an affidavit4 dated 9 February 2005,
vs.
NMC Container Lines, Inc.’s Branch Manager Alex Conrad M. Seno stated that he did not see any
JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro
reason why the government should not confiscate the forest products and that NMC Container
City, respondent.
Lines, Inc. had no knowledge of the actual content of the container vans.

DECISION
On 2, 9, and 15 February 2005, DENR Forest Protection Officer Lucio S. Canete, Jr. posted
notices on the CENRO and PENRO bulletin boards and at the NMC Container Lines, Inc. building
PER CURIAM, J.: informing the unknown owner about the administrative adjudication scheduled on 18 February
2005 at the Cebu City CENRO. Nobody appeared during the adjudication.5 In a resolution6 dated
This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge filed by retired 10 March 2005, Rivac, acting as adjudication officer, recommended to DENR Regional Executive
Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Gen. Dagudag), Head of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan, against Director Clarence L. Baguilat that the forest products be confiscated in favor of the government.
Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City. In a complaint7 dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger C. Edma
(Edma) prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen.
On or about 30 January 2005, the Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him and that judgment be rendered ordering
(PNPRMG) received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was the defendants to pay him moral damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. On 29 March
shipping container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The 2005, Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin8 ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take
shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid inspection by the possession of the forest products.
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).1
In a motion to quash the writ of replevin,9 the defendants DENR, CENRO, and Gen. Dagudag
On 30 and 31 January 2005, a team composed of representatives from the PNPRMG, DENR, and prayed that the writ of replevin be set aside: (1) Edma’s bond was insufficient; (2) the forest
the Philippine Coast Guard inspected the container vans at a port in Mandaue City, Cebu. The products were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains; (3) Edma was not a party-in-
team discovered the undocumented forest products and the names of the shippers and interest; (4) the forest products were not covered by any legal document; (5) nobody claimed the
consignees: forest products within a reasonable period of time; (6) the forest products were already considered
abandoned; (7) the forest products were lawfully seized under the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines; (8) replevin was not proper; (9) courts could not take cognizance of cases pending
Container Van No. Shipper Consignee
before the DENR; (10) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (11) the DENR was
NCLU – 2000492-22GI Polaris Chua Polaris Chua the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. In a motion to dismiss ad
IEAU – 2521845-2210 Polaris Chua Polaris Chua cautelam10 dated 12 April 2005, the defendants prayed that the complaint for replevin and
NOLU – 2000682-22GI Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot damages be dismissed: (1) the real defendant is the Republic of the Philippines; (2) Edma failed to
exhaust administrative remedies; (3) the State cannot be sued without its consent; and (4) Edma
INBU – 3125757-BB2210 Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot failed to allege that he is the owner or is entitled to the possession of the forest products.
NCLU – 20001591-22GI Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez
GSTU – 339074-US2210 Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez In an order11 dated 14 April 2005, Judge Paderanga denied the motion to quash the writ of
CRXU – 2167567 Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez replevin for lack of merit.
NCLU – 2001570-22GI Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez
Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an affidavit-complaint12 dated
8 July 2005 charging Judge Paderanga with gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming
a judge. Gen. Dagudag stated that:
During the x x x hearing, [Judge Paderanga] showed manifest partiality in favor of x x x
Edma. DENR’s counsel was lambasted, cajoled and intimidated by [Judge Paderanga]
using words such as "SHUT UP" and "THAT’S BALONEY."
xxxx
Edma in the replevin case cannot seek to recover the wood shipment from the DENR
since he had not sought administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for
[Judge Paderanga] to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.
xxxx
[Judge Paderanga’s] act[s] of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit, issuing the writ
of replevin and the subsequent denial of the motion to quash clearly demonstrates [sic]
ignorance of the law.
In its 1st Indorsement13 dated 1 August 2005, the OCA directed Judge Paderanga to comment on
the affidavit-complaint. In his comment14 dated 6 September 2005, Judge Paderanga stated that
he exercised judicial discretion in issuing the writ of replevin and that he could not delve into the
issues raised by Gen. Dagudag because they were related to a case pending before him.
In its Report15 dated 10 July 2006, the OCA found that Judge Paderanga (1) violated the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; and (3)
used inappropriate language in court. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter; that Judge Paderanga be held liable for gross ignorance of the law
and for violation of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary;16 and that he be fined P30,000.
In its Resolution17 dated 16 August 2006, the Court re-docketed the case as a regular
administrative matter and required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the
case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. Judge Paderanga manifested his
willingness to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. 18 Since Gen.
Dagudag did not file any manifestation, the Court considered him to have waived his compliance
with the 16 August 2006 Resolution.19
The Court finds Judge Paderanga liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct
unbecoming a judge.
The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. Section 4 of Executive
Order No. 192 states that the DENR shall be the primary agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development, and proper use of the country’s natural resources.
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, states that
possessing forest products without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A
states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives may order the confiscation
of any forest product illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or abandoned.
In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. without the
required legal documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently, the DENR
seized the forest products.
Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies. In Factoran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court held that:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons
of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have
been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,
committed in the administrative forum. (Emphasis ours)
In Dy v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies
before he can resort to the courts. In Paat v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court held that:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed
of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to
one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is
susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. (Emphasis ours)
In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight
to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 705,
as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development
Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary
are appealable to the President; and (3) courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR
Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy,23 the Court held
that all actions seeking to recover forest products in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to
that agency — not the courts. In Paat,24 the Court held that:
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private
respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the
proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over
the case and consequently issuing the writ [of replevin]. Exhaustion of the
remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one’s
 recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents’
right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
xxxx
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the
orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the
authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit
that actions taken by the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the
provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that
courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil
action for certiorari or prohibition. (Emphasis ours)
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is the agency
responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated that
members of DENR’s Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought them
to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have alerted
Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products, that administrative
proceedings may have been commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright.
In Tabao v. Judge Lilagan25 — a case with a similar set of facts as the instant case — the Court
held that:
The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment x x x [was] seized by the NBI for
verification of supporting documents. It also states that the NBI turned over the seized
items to the DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action." x x x To our
mind, these allegations [should] have been sufficient to alert respondent judge that
the DENR has custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may
have already been commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence. x x x The prudent thing for
respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright. (Emphasis
ours)
In Paat,26 the Court held that:
[T]he enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development
and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the
Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free
hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well
within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin
suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the
domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve
a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence. (Emphasis ours)
Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin.
There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in
accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court held that properties lawfully seized
by the DENR cannot be the subject of replevin:
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in
accordance with law, in our view the [properties seized] were validly deemed
in custodia legis. [They] could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is
property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law,
and not otherwise. (Emphasis ours)
Judge Paderanga’s acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin
constitute gross ignorance of the law. In Tabao,28 the Court held that:
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative of special competence. x x x [T]he plaintiff in the replevin
suit who [sought] to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the
administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for respondent judge to
have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.
Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his authorized
representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned.
xxxx
Respondent judge’s act of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit clearly
demonstrates ignorance of the law. x x x [J]udges are expected to keep abreast of all
laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges are duty bound to have more than just a
cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal
commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be
excused, not even a judge. (Emphasis ours)
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence
is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges
shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper
performance of judicial duties. Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments
and show acquaintance with laws.29
The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before administrative
agencies is basic. There was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this rule.
The forest products were in the custody of the DENR and Edma had not availed of any
administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright.
In Español v. Toledo-Mupas,30 the Court held that:
Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigants, a wanton
display of utter lack of familiarity with the rules by the judge inevitably erodes the
confidence of the public in the competence of our courts to render justice. It subjects the
judiciary to embarrassment. Worse, it could raise the specter of corruption.
When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a
rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his or her duties, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and title he or she holds, or the
oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority.
The OCA found Judge Paderanga liable for using inappropriate language in court: "We x x x find
respondent’s intemperate use of "Shut up!" and "Baloney!" well nigh inappropriate in court
proceedings. The utterances are uncalled for."31
Indeed, the 14 and 22 April 2005 transcripts of stenographic notes show that Judge Paderanga
was impatient, discourteous, and undignified in court:
Atty. Luego: Your Honor, we want to have this motion because that is...
Judge Paderanga: I am asking you why did you not make any rejoinder[?]
xxxx
Atty. Luego: I apologize, Your Honor. We are ready to...
Judge Paderanga: Ready to what? Proceed.
Atty. Luego: Yes, Your Honor. We filed this motion to quash replevin, Your Honor, on the
grounds, first and foremost, it is our contention, Your Honor, with all due respect of [sic]
this Honorable Court, that the writ of replevin dated March 29, 2005 was improper, Your
Honor, for the reasons that the lumber, subject matter of this case, were apprehended in
accordance with...
Judge Paderanga: Where is your proof that it was apprehended? Where is your proof? Is
that apprehension proven by a seizure receipt? Where is your seizure receipt?
Atty. Luego: Under the rules...
Judge Paderanga: Where is your seizure receipt? You read your rules. What does [sic]
the rules say? Where in your rules does it say that it does not need any seizure receipt?
You look at your rules. You point out the rules. You take out your rules and then you point
out. Do you have the rules?
xxxx
Atty. Luego: Your Honor, there was no seizure receipt, but during the apprehension, Your
Honor, there was no claimant.
Judge Paderanga: Answer me. Is there a seizure receipt?
Atty. Luego: But during the apprehension, Your Honor, no owner has [sic] appeared.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: According to [the] rules, Your Honor, if there is no...
Judge Paderanga: Whom are you seizing it from? To [sic] whom are you taking it from?
Atty. Luego: From the shipping company, Your Honor.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: Your Honor please, the shipping company denied the ownership of that
lumber.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: But the shipping company, Your Honor,...
Judge Paderanga: Shut up. That’s baloney. You are seizing it from nobody. Then how
can you seize it from the shipping company. Are you not? You are a lawyer. Who is in
possession of the property? The shipping company. Why did you not issue [a] seizure
receipt to the shipping company?
Atty. Luego: But the... May I continue, Your Honor?
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Stop talking about the shipping company. Still you did not issue a
seizure receipt here. Well, I’m telling you you should have issued [a] seizure receipt to the
shipping company.
xxxx
 Judge Paderanga: You are a lawyer. You should know how to write pleadings. You
write the pleadings the way it should be, not the way you think it should be.
Atty. Luego: I’m sorry, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: You are an officer of the court. You should be careful with your
language. You say that I am wrong. It’s you who are [sic] wrong because you do not
read the law.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Then you read the law. How dare you say that the Court is wrong.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Are you not representing [the DENR]?
Atty. Luego: Yes, in this case, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: Then you are representing them. They are your clients. What kind of
a lawyer are you?32
xxxx
Atty. Tiamson: Specifically it was stated in the [Factoran] versus Court of Appeals [case]
that the Court should not interfere, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: No.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: The problem with you people is you do not use your heads.
Atty. Tiamson: We use our heads, your Honor.
xxxx
Atty. Tiamson: Your Honor, we would like to put on record that we use our heads, your
Honor.33 (Emphasis ours)
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that
judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous in relation to lawyers. Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should be patient and courteous to lawyers, especially
the inexperienced. They should avoid the attitude that the litigants are made for the courts, instead
of the courts for the litigants.
Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. They must refrain
from inflammatory, excessively rhetoric, or vile language.34 They should (1) be dignified in
demeanor and refined in speech; (2) exhibit that temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint;
and (3) be considerate, courteous, and civil to all persons who come to their court. 35 In Juan de la
Cruz v. Carretas,36 the Court held that:
A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers x x x who appear in his
sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the people’s faith in the
judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.
xxxx
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer x x x. The act betrays lack of patience,
prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He
must choose his words x x x with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just
man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.
Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice. A
judge should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and
overcome his reason. He descends to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty
tyrant when he utters harsh words x x x. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and
erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
Judge Paderanga’s refusal to consider the motion to quash the writ of replevin, repeated
interruption of the lawyers, and utterance of "shut up," "that’s baloney," "how dare you say that the
court is wrong," "what kind of a lawyer are you?," and "the problem with you people is you do not
use your heads" are undignified and very unbecoming a judge. In Office of the Court Administrator
v. Paderanga,37 the Court already reprimanded Judge Paderanga for repeatedly saying "shut up,"
being arrogant, and declaring that he had "absolute power" in court. He has not changed.
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the law as a serious
offense. It is punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits, and disqualification
from reinstatement to any public office; (2) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more
than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.38 Section 10 of Rule 140 classifies conduct unbecoming
a judge as a light offense. It is punishable by (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not
exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; or (4) admonition with warning.39
The Court notes that this is Judge Paderanga’s third offense. In Office of the Court Administrator
v. Paderanga,40the Court held him liable for grave abuse of authority and simple misconduct for
unceremoniously citing a lawyer in contempt while declaring himself as having "absolute power"
and for repeatedly telling a lawyer to "shut up." In Beltran, Jr. v. Paderanga,41 the Court held him
liable for undue delay in rendering an order for the delay of nine months in resolving an amended
formal offer of exhibits. In both cases, the Court sternly warned Judge Paderanga that the
commission of another offense shall be dealt with more severely. The instant case and the two
cases decided against him demonstrate Judge Paderanga’s arrogance, incorrigibility, and
unfitness to become a judge.

Judge Paderanga has two other administrative cases pending against him — one42 for gross
ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and grave abuse of authority, and
the other43 for gross misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law.

The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have fallen short of their
accountabilities. It will not tolerate any conduct that violates the norms of public accountability and
diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system.44

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38,
Cagayan de Oro City, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and UNBECOMING
CONDUCT. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES him from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.