UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT

“That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed”

Presumption of validity. An interpretation that validates outweighs one that invalidates.

Interpretatio fienda est ust res magis valeat quam pereat.

A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it. One portion of a
statute should not be construed to destroy the other. A construction that would render a provision
inoperative or ineffective should be avoided. The provision should be harmonized and reconciled,
if possible; they should be construed together as means to effect the purpose of the law.

REVIEW OF A LAW IN ITS ENTIRETY AND ITS INTENDMENT

MUST BE GIVEN EFFECT
One part of a statute is as important as the other. The statute should be construed and given
effect as a whole. A provision which is unclear by itself may be made clear by reading and
construing it in relation to the whole statute.

In construing a statute, courts “have to take the thought conveyed by the statute as a whole;
construe the constituent parts together; ascertain the legislative intent from the whole act;
consider each and every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the statute; and
endeavor to make every part effective, harmonious and sensible.

WISDOM/PRACTICALITY OF LAW
“It is the duty of the legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the
Judiciary to construe the law.”

This division of responsibility, as mandated by the Constitution, precludes one department from
encroaching upon the power of the other.

Accordingly, since the legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom,
reasonableness and expediency of any law, Courts may not take any of these matters into account
in construing or interpreting the law. As long as laws do not violate the Constitution, the courts
merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary

EXECUTIVE/ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION
The duty of the executive branch to enforce the law necessarily calls for the interpretation of its
ambiguous provisions. Accordingly, executive and administrative officers are generally the very
first officials to interpret the law, preparatory to its enforcement.

These interpretations are in the form of rules and regulations, circulars, directives, opinions
and rulings. They are entitled to great weight and respect by the courts in the interpretation of
ambiguous provisions of law, and unless it is shown to be clearly erroneous, it will control the
interpretation of statute by the courts. In the absence of error or abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, the action of the agency would not be disturbed by the
courts.
LITERAL INTERPRETATION
Plain-meaning rule or verba legis non est recendendum (from the words of a statute there should
be no departure).

If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. The rule rests on the presumption that the words employed by
the legislature in a statute correctly expresses its intent or will and preclude the court from
construing it differently.

It must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its
mandate is obeyed. There is no room for construction or interpretation.

VALID IN PART, VOID IN PART

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. The separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature
intended separability, rather than complete nullity, of the statute.

To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it
is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it
could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible
and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent.

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent
and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate
the rest.

AMBIGUITY, CONSTRUED AGAINST PART WHO CAUSED IT

Contra proferentem also known as “interpretation against the draftsman”

Where a promise, agreement or term is ambiguous, the preferred meaning should be the one that
works against the interests of the party who provided the wording.

The doctrine is often applied to situations involving standardized contracts or where the parties
are of unequal bargaining power. However, the doctrine is not directly applicable to situations
where the language at issue is mandated by law, like in insurance contracts and bills of lading. The
reasoning behind this rule is to encourage the drafter of a contract to be as clear and explicit as
possible and to take into account as many foreseeable situations as it can.

LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD NOT

DISTINGUISH
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of
the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their
natural and general significance.
The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part
distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of law. In other words,
there should be NO distinction in the application of a statute where NONE is indicated.

Courts should administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without
regard to consequences. The axiom applies not only in the construction of general words and
expressions used in a statute but also in the interpretation of a rule laid down therein. Thus,
where the legislature has clearly laid down a rule for one class of cases, it is NOT readily to be
supposed that, in the same act, a different rule has been prescribed for another class of cases
within the same as the first.

MANDATORY/DIRECTORY/PROHIBITURE
A mandatory statute is a statute which commands either positively that something should be
done, or performed in a particular way, or negatively that something should not be done, leaving
the person no choice on the matter except to obey. A mandatory statute is one that contains words
of command or of prohibition.

A directory statute is a statute which is permissive or discretionary in nature and merely outlines
the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it.

Whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory depends on its effect. If no substantial

rights depend on it and no injury can result from ignoring it; and the purpose of the legislature can
be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, then the statute will be generally
regarded as directory; but if not, it will be mandatory.

A statute will not be construed as mandatory of it will cause hardship or injustice on the part of
the public who is not at fault. Nor will a statute be interpreted as mandatory if it will lead to
absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences.

Mandatory. Shall, must, ought, should; cannot, shall not, ought not.

Directory. Generally, may and other words importing permissiveness

Use of “may” and “shall.” Whether the word “may” is to be construed as mandatory and imposing
a duty, or merely as permissive and conferring discretion, is to be determined in each case from
the apparent intention of the statute as gathered from the context, as well as from the language of
the particular provision. The word “may” will, as a rule, be construed as “shall” where a statute
provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or public duty, or where it concerns
public interest or rights of an individual. The word “shall” may be construed as “may” when no
public benefit or private right requires that it be given an imperative meaning.

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is formulated in a number of ways.

First variation is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matter, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.

Second variation is the canon that a general expression followed by exceptions therefrom implies
that those which do not fall under the exceptions come within the scope of the general expression.
Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.

Third variation is the axiom that the expression of one or more things of a class implies the
exclusion of all not expressed, even though all would have been implied had none been expressed.

EJUSDEM GENERIS
While general words or expressions in a statute are, as a rule, accorded their full, natural and
generic sense, they will not be given such meaning if they are used in association with specific
words or phrases. The general rule is that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration
of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to, persons, things or
cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

The purpose of the rule of ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general
words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating
all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words. This is
justified on the ground that if the lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their
restricted sense, it would not have made an enumeration of particular objects but would have used
only general terms.

STATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATOR

The views expressed by legislators during deliberations of a bill as to the bill's purpose,
meaning, or effect are not controlling in the interpretation of the law.

For statements made by assemblyman during floor deliberations do not necessarily reflect the
views of the assembly. It is impossible to determine with authority what construction was put upon
an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of
the members thereof. Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did; and those
who spoke might differ with each other. And even if the statements of those who spoke reflect the
views of the assembly, if the act as passed is plain and clear, then it has to be given effect as thus
enacted and not as the individual members considered it to be.

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
Where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be ma clear and specific by considering the company of
words in which it is found or with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general word or
phrase may have limited application if viewed with other companion words or phrases.

AND/OR
Disjunctive and conjunctive words The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation
and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated.

Ex. where a tax statute imposes an amusement tax on gross receipts of the "proprietor, lessee, or
operator of the amusement place," the disjunctive word "or" positively implies that the tax should
be paid by either the proprietor, the lessee, or the operator, as the case may be, singly and not by
all at one and the same time.
The term "or" has sometimes been held to mean "and," when the spirit or context of the law so
warrants. For instance, the word "or" in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court authorizing a
municipal judge (now municipal trial judge) to conduct "preliminary examination or investigation"
may mean "and" because under the law he has the authority to conduct both the first and second
stages of preliminary investigation.

RETROACTIVITY
The presumption is that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is
clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied. In every case of doubt, the
doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws.

Words or phrases indicating prospectivity Where by its terms a statute is to apply hereafter or
thereafter or is to take effect immediately or at a fixed future date, or where a statute contains,
in the enacting clause, the phrase "from and after the passing of this Act," or employs such words
as "shall have been made" or "from and after" a designated date, the statute is prospectively in
operation only. The word "shall" in a statute implies that the lawmakers intend the enactment to
be effective only in futuro. Where a statute provides that it "shall take effect upon its approval,"
or on the date the President shall have issued a proclamation or executive order, as provided in the
statute, it shows that the statute should have no retroactive but prospective effect.

The Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of retroactive statutes which do not impair the
obligations of contract, deprive persons of property without due process of law, or divest rights
that have become vested, or which are not in the nature of ex post facto laws. However, since the
general rule is that laws operate prospectively, unless otherwise provided, whether a statute will
be construed as having retroactive effect is a question of legislative intent. Some statutes are
by their nature intended to be retroactive, such as remedial or curative statutes as well as statutes
which create new rights. Where a statute expressly provides that it shall apply retroactively, or
where it uses words which clearly indicate such intent, the problem of statutory construction is
whether the statute violates any of the constitutional restrictions. If it does, then the statute
will not be applied or construed retroactively, so as to avoid a frontal clash with the Constitution
and save the law from being declared unconstitutional.

When statutes are applied retroactively PREP

● When expressly provided
● Remedial or curative in nature
● Procedural
● Penal in character and favorable to the accused

CASUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST

A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object
or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration.

The rule of casus omissus does not apply where it is shown that the legislature did not intend to
exclude the person, thing or object from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is clearly
indicated, the court may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent of the
legislature and will not do violence to its language.