DIGESTS

JOINT WILLS

G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964

PAULA DE LA CERNA vs. MANUELA REBACA POTOT & CA

FACTS: The spouses Bernabe Dela Cerna and Gerasisa Rebaca executed a joint will where they gave two (2)
parcels of land to Manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child. When Bernabe died, the said will
was probated in 1939. Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed
in 1952 but due to the failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in 1954.

The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law. While the Court of Appeals
reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive
as to the due execution of the will. Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are
concluded by the 1939 decree admitting his will to probate.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner’s contention is correct

HELD: No. The contention that being void the will cannot be validated, overlooks that the ultimate decision on
Whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts, and here they have spoken with finality when the will was
probated in 1939. On this court, the dismissal of their action for partition was correct.

To avoid future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased
husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who
was then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction,
precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new
Civil Code) prohibits the making of a will jointly by two or more persons either for their reciprocal benefit or for the
benefit of a third person. In the present case, one such joint last will and testament has been admitted to probate
by final order of a Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no alternative except to give effect to the
provisions thereof that are not contrary to law, as was done in the case of Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267,
wherein our Supreme Court gave effect to the provisions of the joint will therein mentioned, saying, "assuming
that the joint will in question is valid."

Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not
exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the
only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
G.R. No. L-27531 December 24, 1927
In re estate of the deceased Victoriana Saavedra.
MACARIO MACROHON ONG HAM vs. JUAN SAAVEDRA, ET AL

FACTS: Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, widower and executor of the joint last will and testament of Victoriana
Saavedra and himself, presented said will for probate, which was ordered by the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga in its decree of February 21, 1924. The married couple, Macario and Victoriana executed a joint will
which was also expressly stated in the will.

The only near relations of the said Victoriana Saavedra, with the right to inherit her estate are her brothers Juan
and Segundo Saavedra; her nephews and nieces, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra, Victoriana Saavedra, Mariano
Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josefa Saavedra, Encarnacion Carpio and Macra Carpio, in case that the said Victoriana
Saavedra died intestate, or did not dispose of her property in said will. It was stated in the will that in case of the
death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham before Victoriana Saavedra, the properties be given to Ong Ka Chiew and
Ong Ka Jian jointly, and should either of the two die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, all the said properties be
given to the survivor. In case that Victoriana Saavedra should survive Macario Macrohon Ong Ham,Lot No. 838, Lot
No. 817 and Lot No. 768 shall belong exclusively to Victoriana Saavedra. Should Victoriana Saavedra die before
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, Lot No. 817 be adjudicated to Segunda Saavedra, widow, sister of Victoriana
Saavedra, free of all liens and encumbrances. Lot No. 768 be adjudicated to Segunda Saavedra and her heirs, on
condition that she devote the products of the same to having masses said for the repose of the soul of Victoriana
Saavedra. In case of the death of either of the two, the surviving spouse be appointed executor of this our last will
and testament. This executor submitted a scheme of partition and distribution of the property in accordance with
the terms of the joint will, to which Juan Saavedra and others filed an opposition. The executor rejoined insisting
upon the approval of the scheme and asking that the opposition of Juan Saavedra and others be overruled.

ISSUE: W/N Segunda Saavedra is the only one entitled to the properties and not Juan Saavedra and the others
because the testator did not die partly testate and partly intestate

HELD: No. The oppositors have a right to the testatrix’s property as well.

Assuming that the joint will in question is valid, it follows that the deceased Victoriana Saavedra specified therein
that parcels 187 and 768 in proceeding No. 7880 be delivered as a legacy to her sister Segunda Saavedra, the first
parcel free of all liens and encumbrances, and the second on the condition that the legatee devote the products of
the same to having masses said for the repose to the testatrix's soul. As to the remaining sixteen parcels, the
testatrix disposed of her part in them conditionally, that is to say, in case her husband Macario Macrohon Ong
Ham died before she died, said parcels were to be awarded to her husband's nephews, or to either of them in case
one should have died before the said Macario Macrohon Ong Ham. The condition imposed in the will as precedent
to the vesting in the alleged legatees Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian of the right to the legacy, not having been
complied with, the trial court found that the part of said property belonging to the testatriz should be partitioned
among the persons called on to succeed her under the law. We are of the opinion that this finding is in accordance
with the law, since, under article 791 of the Civil Code, conditions imposed upon heirs and legatees shall be
governed by the rules established for conditional obligations in all matters not provided for by this section (articles
790 to 805). And, in accordance with article 1114 of the Code, in conditional obligations the acquisition of rights, as
well as the extinction or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the occurrence of the event constituting
the condition.

Such joint will has sometimes been used as a basis for the distribution of the estate.
TIME OF PROBATE

[G.R. No. L-5405. January 31, 1956.]

ERNESTO M. GUEVARA vs. ROSARIO GUEVARA and PEDRO C. QUINTO

Victorino L. Guevara, resident of Bayambang, Pangasinan executed a will. The will contains the distribution of
assorted movables and residential lot of Victorino L. Guevara among his children, Rosario and Ernesto Guevara and
stepchildren, Vivencio, Edwigis, Dionista, Candida and Pio Guevara. Victorino Guevara also bequeathed to his 2nd
wife Augustia Posada various movables, portion of 25 ha to be taken out of a 259 odd ha parcel outlined in Plan
Psu-68618 And another 5 ha in settlement of her widow’s usufruct. Ernesto Guevara was appointed executor
without bond.

Victorino executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto Guevara, conveying to the latter the southern hall of the 259
ha lot heretofore mentioned and expressly recognized Ernesto Guevara as owner of the northern half. Victorino
and Ernesto jointly applied for registration of the big parcel in view of the sale from the former to the latter. The
decree was issued in the name of Ernesto Guevara exclusively and for the whole tract, a certificate of title being
issued in his sole name on 12 October 1933. Victorino Guevara died but his will was not filed for probate.

Rosario Guevara, claiming to be a recognized natural child of the deceased Victorino and on the assumption that
he had died intestate, brought suit against Ernesto Guevara to recover 423,492 sq m. CA rendered decision in favor
of Rosario but SC modified judgment upon certiorari. Ernesto Guevara appeared and opposed the probate.
Ernesto Guevara, through counsel filed a motion to dismiss petition on grounds:
a. petition itself alleged that will was revoked
b. whatever right to probate the parties may have has already prescribed
c. purpose of the probate was solely to have petitioner Rosario declared on acknowledged natural child of the
deceased.

ISSUE: W/N the petition for probate of the will of Victorino L. Guevara is barred by the statute of limitations

HELD: No. Person interested in the estate ‘may at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court
having jurisdiction to have the will proved.’ This implies that there is no arbitrary time limit. Under Section 1 of
Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an
extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate
in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are
contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such
suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public
policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant
case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated
of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among
themselves to the exclusion of others.
REVOCATION OF A WILL

Maloto v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988
Sarmiento, J. (Ponente)

Facts:
Petitioners and respondents are the nieces/nephews or Adriana Maloto who died in 1963. The four heirs believed
that the deceased did not leave a will; hence they filed an intestate proceeding. However, the parties executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate dividing it into four equal parts.

In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate of the deceased's counsel allegedly discovered her last will which was
purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet. Hence the annulment of the proceedings and a probate petition was
filed by the devisees and legatees. The said will was allegedly burned by the house help under the instruction of
the deceased.

The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the animus revocandi in the burning of the will was
sufficiently proven. This could not stand because the two witnesses that support such statement did not have
direct personal knowledge of such and must be considered as hearsay. Furthermore, it was not proven that the
other papers burned by the maid was or were wills. Another point was that the fact that documents were burned
in the presence and under express direction of Adriana Maloto was not proven.

Issue: Whether or not there was valid revocation of the will

RULING: No, there was no revocation. For a valid revocation to occur, the 'corpus' and 'animus' must concur, one
without the other will not produce a valid revocation. The physical act of destruction of a will must come with an
intention to revoke (animus revocandi). In this case, there's paucity of evidence to comply with the said
requirement. The paper burned was not established to be the will and the burning though done under her express
direction was not done in her presence.

Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction, in this case the burning of the will, does not constitute an effective
revocation, unless it is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. Since animus is a state of mind,
it has to be accompanied by an overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling done by the
testator himself or by another under his express direction and presence.
Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)

Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation

Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a
revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived
by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.

2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It
was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due
execution.

3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors
alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance
of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939
will

RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will,containing a
clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with
law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the
original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The
earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when
a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to
make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some
reason