The Art of Persuasive Communication, Fourth Edition

The art of The art of
PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION
The art of
PERSUASIVE PERSUASIVE
COMMUNICATION
A process
Fourth edition
COMMUNICATION
A process
Fourth edition
This fourth edition of The art of Persuasive Communication – A process situates contemporary
persuasive practices against the background of the rich history of rhetoric and within the setting of a
democratic state.
The work is theoretically well-grounded and considerate of the practical dimensions of persuasion –
A process
from its broad starting points in an interpersonal setting to its manifestation as mass persuasion or
propaganda in the wider political sphere. Contemporary examples, including rhetorical discourses of
South African statesmen, are provided to facilitate understanding. Fourth edition
Throughout, the author addresses critical issues that are important to communication science scholars
and practitioners, as well as those active in related disciplines such as political science, sociology,
social psychology and rhetorical studies. In fact, the book should be helpful to potential persuaders and
Johann C. de Wet
persuadees across the broad spectrum of society. It will give persuadees a better chance to identify
persuasion and defend themselves against the unscrupulous.
There is much new material in the fourth edition, especially with regard to the role of social media;
leadership, political language and persuasion; and rhetorical criticism, including constructing the
rhetorical imprint of a public rhetor.
Professor Dr Johann de Wet, author, co-author and editor of numerous academic titles, is currently
attached to the Department of Communication Science at the University of the Free State in Bloemfontein,
South Africa. He teaches, and consults on, persuasive communication, political communication and
leadership communication.
www.jutaacademic.co.za Johann C. de Wet

WN43_persuasive communication_print ready.indd 2,4 29/11/2016 5:59 PM
The art of persuasive communication
– A process
JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 1 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

The art of
persuasive
communication
A p r o c e s s
Fourth edition
Johann C de Wet

The art of persuasive communication – A process
First edition 1988

Second edition 1991
Third edition 2010
Fourth edition 2017
Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd

PO Box 14373, Lansdowne 7779, Cape Town, South Africa
© 2017 Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
ISBN 978 1 48511 713 1 (Print)
ISBN 978 1 48512 459 7 (WebPDF)
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or
by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information
storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Subject to
any applicable licensing terms and conditions in the case of electronically supplied publications,
a person may engage in fair dealing with a copy of this publication for his or her personal or
private use, or his or her research or private study. See section 12(1)(a) of the Copyright Act 98
of 1978.
Project manager: Seshni Kazadi

Editor: Danya Ristić-Schacherl
Proofreader: Pat Hanekom
Cover designer: WaterBerry Design
Typesetter: Firelight Studio
Indexer: Lexinfo
Typeset in Adobe Text Pro 11pt on 13pt
The author and the publisher believe on the strength of due diligence exercised that this work
does not contain any material that is the subject of copyright held by another person. In the
alternative, they believe that any protected pre-existing material that may be comprised in it
has been used with appropriate authority or has been used in circumstances that make such use
permissible under the law.
This book has been independently peer-reviewed by academics who are experts in the field.

Table of contents
Preface .................................................................................................................................... xi
Chapter one: Communication and persuasion: A democratic setting ..... 1

1.1 Introduction: On communication ...................................................................... 2
1.2 Persuasion as a process of communication ..................................................... 4
1.2.1 Forms of persuasion: A brief synopsis .................................................. 5
1.2.2 Persuasion as art and science ................................................................... 6
1.3 Persuasion in the service of democracy ........................................................... 7
1.3.1 Democracy as a form of government .................................................... 7
1.3.2 Democracy as ideology .............................................................................. 9
1.3.3 Democracy and freedom ........................................................................... 11
1.3.3.1 Individual freedoms and democracy .................................... 12
1.3.3.2 Freedom of thought and discussion ..................................... 13
1.3.3.3 Freedom in a democracy: The underlying
communicological idea .............................................................. 15
1.3.4 Democracy and equality ............................................................................ 15
1.3.4.1 Tocqueville’s warning ................................................................. 16
1.3.4.2 Equality in a democracy: The basic
communicological idea .............................................................. 17
1.3.5 Freedom versus equality ............................................................................ 17
1.3.6 Questions for South African and other communities .................... 18
1.4 Persuasion and ethics .............................................................................................. 21
1.4.1 Ethical persuasion: A question of approach and culture .............. 22
1.5 Resistance to persuasion ........................................................................................ 24
1.5.1 Creating a social consciousness and self-consciousness of
persuasion ........................................................................................................ 25
Chapter two: Persuasive communication: The historical context ........... 28

2.1 Introduction: The Greek roots ............................................................................. 29
2.2 Plato’s criticism of rhetoric ................................................................................... 29
2.3 Aristotle’s view of rhetoric .................................................................................... 31
2.3.1 Rhetoric as an art .......................................................................................... 32
2.3.2 Artistic proofs and the enthymeme ....................................................... 34
2.4 The Romans and the classical tradition ............................................................ 36
2.5 Further historical development of rhetoric: A brief overview ............... 37
Chapter three: Broad starting points of interpersonal persuasion .......... 43

3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 44
3.2 Verbal messages ......................................................................................................... 44
3.2.1 Consider human emotions ........................................................................ 44
3.2.1.1 Attitudes ........................................................................................... 44
3.2.1.2 Needs ................................................................................................. 45
3.2.1.3 Consistency .................................................................................... 47

3.2.2 Be rational ........................................................................................................ 48

3.2.2.1 Evidence .......................................................................................... 48
3.2.2.2 Reasoning ........................................................................................ 50
3.2.2.3 Argumentation .............................................................................. 51
3.2.3 Show credibility ............................................................................................ 55
3.2.3.1 Expertness ....................................................................................... 55
3.2.3.2 Trustworthiness ............................................................................ 55
3.2.3.3 Goodwill .......................................................................................... 55
3.3 Non-verbal messages ............................................................................................... 56
3.3.1 Objectics ........................................................................................................... 57
3.3.2 Proxemics ......................................................................................................... 57
3.3.3 Chronemics ..................................................................................................... 58
3.3.4 Haptics ............................................................................................................. 58
3.3.5 Kinesics ............................................................................................................. 58
3.3.6 Oculesics ........................................................................................................... 59
3.3.7 Vocalics ............................................................................................................. 59
3.4 Key questions and answers ................................................................................... 60
Chapter four: Theories of interpersonal persuasion ....................................... 65

4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 66
4.2 Attitude change theory ........................................................................................... 66
4.3 Theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour .................................. 67
4.4 Learning theories ...................................................................................................... 68
4.4.1 Classical conditioning and Skinnerian behaviourism .................... 68
4.4.2 Social learning theory ................................................................................. 70
4.5 Consistency theories ................................................................................................ 70
4.5.1 Balance theory ............................................................................................... 71
4.5.2 Congruity theory .......................................................................................... 71
4.5.3 Cognitive dissonance theory .................................................................... 71
4.5.4 Belief hierarchy .............................................................................................. 72
4.6 Social judgement–involvement theory ............................................................ 73
4.7 Elaboration likelihood theory .............................................................................. 74
Chapter five: Persuasion, mass and social media, and public

opinion ....................................................................................................... 77
5.1 Introduction: A changed circumstance ............................................................ 78
5.2 Traditional theories of mass media effects ...................................................... 79
5.3 The role of the traditional news media ............................................................. 83
5.3.1 On defining news .......................................................................................... 83
5.3.2 Towards an integrated approach to understanding news
selection ............................................................................................................ 84
5.4 Social media ................................................................................................................ 86
vi

Table of contents
5.5 Public opinion ............................................................................................................ 89

5.5.1 Solid, fluid and gaseous public opinion ............................................... 89
5.5.2 Characterising public opinion ................................................................. 90
5.6 A model and a sequence of mass persuasion .................................................. 93
5.6.1 Rank’s model of persuasion ...................................................................... 93
5.6.2 Monroe’s motivated sequence ................................................................. 95
Chapter six: Perspectives of propaganda ............................................................ 98

6.1 Propaganda: A historical orientation ................................................................ 99
6.2 The traditional perspective of propaganda ..................................................... 101
6.2.1 The basic techniques .................................................................................... 103
6.2.2 The difference between democratic and totalitarian
propaganda ...................................................................................................... 104
6.3 Bureaucratic propaganda ....................................................................................... 105
6.4 Ellul’s view of propaganda ..................................................................................... 107
6.4.1 Ellul on democracy’s need of propaganda .......................................... 112
6.4.2 Ellul’s contribution ....................................................................................... 113
Chapter seven: Leadership, persuasive language and politics ................. 117

7.1 Leadership ................................................................................................................... 118
7.1.1 On transformational leadership .............................................................. 118
7.2 Language and politics .............................................................................................. 120
7.3 Political persuasion: Language styles and settings ...................................... 121
7.3.1 The oratory setting ....................................................................................... 122
7.3.2 The small group bargaining setting ........................................................ 124
7.3.3 The assembly debate setting ..................................................................... 126
7.3.4 The non-violent resistance setting ......................................................... 127
7.4 Directed political language .................................................................................... 131
7.4.1 Shifting patterns in key words and phrases in South Africa ........ 134
Chapter eight: Image and persuasive political campaign

management ........................................................................................ 139
8.1 Persuasion, politics and image management ................................................. 140
8.1.1 Political image, identity and personality ............................................. 140
8.1.2 The art of image management: Goffman’s view ............................... 140
8.1.2.1 Defensive measures in the art of image management ...... 142
8.1.2.2 Protective measures in the art of image management ..... 142
8.1.3 A case for news media diplomacy .......................................................... 143
8.2 Persuasion and political election campaigns ................................................. 145
8.2.1 On political campaigns and movements .............................................. 145
8.2.2 The candidate ................................................................................................. 147
8.2.3 The style and arrangement of a formal political speech ................ 148
8.2.3.1 Style ................................................................................................... 149
8.2.3.2 Arrangement .................................................................................. 150
vii

8.2.4 Campaign management .............................................................................. 151

8.2.4.1 Research ........................................................................................... 151
8.2.4.2 Strategy formulation ................................................................... 152
8.2.4.3 Fund-raising ................................................................................... 156
8.2.4.4 Advertising and media use ....................................................... 156
8.2.4.5 Debate planning ............................................................................ 159
Chapter nine: Persuasion and political debates ............................................... 162

9.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 163
9.2 Arguments for and against debate ...................................................................... 166
9.3 Content and relational strategies ........................................................................ 167
9.3.1 Content strategies ......................................................................................... 167
9.3.2 Relational strategies ..................................................................................... 168
9.4 Debate tactics .............................................................................................................. 169
9.4.1 Verbal tactics ................................................................................................... 169
9.4.2 Non-verbal tactics ......................................................................................... 172
9.5 Debate effects ............................................................................................................. 173
9.5.1 The concept of the debate winner .......................................................... 174
Chapter ten: Persuasion and political negotiation ........................................... 178

10.1 The concepts of political negotiation and bargaining ................................ 179
10.2 Negotiation as a peaceful alternative to political conflict ......................... 179
10.3 Negotiation styles and skills .................................................................................. 181
10.4 A joint problem-solving approach as the ideal .............................................. 182
10.4.1 A win-win strategy ...................................................................................... 183
10.5 The role of a mediator ............................................................................................. 186
10.6 International political negotiation ..................................................................... 187
10.6.1 Diplomatic persuasion: Complicating factors ................................. 190
10.6.1.1 The role of interests ................................................................. 190
10.6.1.2 The role of power ...................................................................... 191
10.6.1.3 The role of ideology ................................................................. 191
10.6.1.4 The role of propaganda .......................................................... 192
10.6.1.5 The role of trust ......................................................................... 193
Chapter eleven: Rhetorical discourses of South African statesmen ...... 195

11.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 196
11.2 F W de Klerk’s historic speech, February 1990 ............................................. 196
11.2.1 The text of De Klerk’s opening address .............................................. 197
11.3 Mandela and De Klerk on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize,
December 1993 .......................................................................................................... 210
11.3.1 The text of Mandela’s acceptance speech .......................................... 211
11.3.2 The text of De Klerk’s acceptance speech ......................................... 215
viii

Table of contents
11.4 Nelson Mandela’s inaugural address, May 1994 ............................................ 222

11.4.1 The text of Mandela’s inaugural speech .............................................. 223
11.5 Thabo Mbeki on NEPAD and the AU, October 2001 ................................. 226
11.5.1 The text of Mbeki’s speech on NEPAD and the AU ...................... 226
11.6 Jacob Zuma’s inaugural address, May 2009 ..................................................... 235
11.6.1 The text of Zuma’s inaugural speech .................................................... 236
11.7 Critiquing political discourses ............................................................................. 241
11.7.1 Focusing on structure ................................................................................ 243
11.7.1.1 De Klerk’s first parliamentary opening address,
February 1990 ............................................................................. 243
11.7.1.2 Mbeki’s speech on NEPAD and the AU, October 2001 244
11.7.2 Focusing on the use of the Aristotelian artistic proofs ................ 244
11.7.2.1 De Klerk’s first parliamentary opening address,
February 1990 ............................................................................. 245
11.7.2.2 Mandela’s inaugural address, May 1994 ........................... 249
11.7.3 Focusing on worth and Nilsen’s four-part method ........................ 250
11.7.3.1 Mandela and De Klerk’s acceptance speeches,
December 1993 .............................................................................. 251
11.7.3.2 Mbeki’s address on NEPAD and the AU,
October 2001 ............................................................................... 252
11.7.4 Focusing on outcomes .............................................................................. 255
11.7.4.1 Zuma’s inaugural address, May 2009 ................................. 256
Chapter twelve: P
ersuasion and the rhetorical imprint of a
public rhetor ..................................................................................... 261
12.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 262
12.2 A rhetorical imprint ................................................................................................. 262
12.2.1 Focusing on lines of argument .............................................................. 263
12.3 Constructing a rhetorical imprint ...................................................................... 264
12.3.1 Deconstructing the data ........................................................................... 264
12.3.2 Building the interpretation ..................................................................... 264
12.4 Dr Van Zyl Slabbert as a public rhetor .............................................................. 265
12.4.1 Van Zyl Slabbert’s lines of argument ................................................... 267
12.4.1.1 From South Africa’s options: Strategies for sharing
power (1979:1–30; 120–153) ................................................ 267
12.4.1.2 From The last white Parliament (1985:105–143) .......... 268
12.4.1.3 From Van Zyl Slabbert’s 1985 parliamentary
speeches (in Hansard: 22–44; 409–411; 686–694;
1282–1283; 3114–3119; 3728; 3862–3867;
4910–4918; 7100–7110) ......................................................... 270
ix

12.4.1.4 From The system and the struggle (1989:7–22; 44–83)

(which includes chapters written between 1975
and 1985) ...................................................................................... 272
12.4.2 Discussion and summation ..................................................................... 273
12.5 Van Zyl Slabbert’s rhetorical imprint ................................................................ 276
References ............................................................................................................................ 279
Name index ........................................................................................................................... 291
Subject index ....................................................................................................................... 294

Preface
This fourth edition of The art of persuasive communication – A process is a

revision and expansion of the third edition published in 2010.
As argued before, apart from the vast scholarly interest shown in persuasive
communication throughout the centuries, persuasion also stimulates much
wider interest. This is due to its broad social significance, among other things.
After all, the ‘in-groups’ in society are always interested in how persuasion
can be used to cement their privileged positions, while the ‘out-groups’ see
persuasive communication as a non-violent means of effecting change, so that
they too can enjoy a better life. While most of us want to be effective
persuaders, we should recognise that we are always victims of persuasion as
well. Thus, the original motive for writing about persuasive communication
remains the same: It has pervasive existential relevance.
There are two things that separate this book from others in the field. First, it
attempts to situate most of the critical issues within the theoretical framework
of a democratic society. Secondly, it provides examples related to South
Africa’s transition to democracy and beyond. With regard to the practical
application of persuasion, this book focuses mainly on one-to-many
persuasion. It does so by situating persuasive practices against the rich
background of rhetoric.
While the text does not, of course, set out to convey all the insight on the
topics discussed, it aims to provide useful knowledge to both potential
persuaders and persuadees – to potential persuadees in the sense that it will
give them a better chance to identify persuasion and defend themselves
against the unscrupulous.
A large part of this edition is devoted to persuasive communication in politics.

The choice of politics is deliberate. With regard to its rhetorical base and
organisational variables, political communication has been rather neglected
by South African communication scientists, partly because it is a relatively
new sub-discipline of communication science. Moreover, throughout the ages
rhetoric has identified itself as a powerful political instrument that functions
as a form of art.
Many years ago, a critical reader of an earlier edition reminded me that I

should emphasise somewhere that, after much has been said and written,
human beings are persuaded only as far as they consider it to be in their own
interests. I agree, but where persuadees are reluctant to be persuaded (also for
their own good), the persuader can attempt to make them believe that it

would be in their own interests to do as he/she has suggested. That is the real
art of persuasion. Art implies the ability to do something – to influence, in
this case. Creating identification between the persuader and persuadee is
crucial to the process, as Kenneth Burke would say. But persuasive
communication is also a science, since it involves theories or creative
explanations of how processes occur as they do.
How does this edition differ from the third edition?

• The arrangement of the contents has been revised to facilitate greater
understanding.
• New contemporary examples related to South Africa have been included.
• There is much new material, especially with regard to the role of social
media; leadership, political language and persuasion; and rhetorical
criticism, including constructing the rhetorical imprint of a public rhetor.
Johann C de Wet
Bloemfontein, South Africa
July 2016

chapter ONE
Communication and persuasion:

A democratic setting
LOOKING AHEAD
After reading this chapter, you will be able to, among other things:
• define and describe persuasion using communication science
terminology
• explain different forms of persuasion
• situate persuasion in a democratic context and relate its relevance
for South African society
• relate persuasion to ethics
• understand the various ways that the individual can resist
persuasion.

1.1 INTRODUCTION: ON COMMUNICATION

The word ‘communication’ originates from the Latin communicatio, which
has two major meanings (Gepp & Haigh, 1935:102):
1. Making common, imparting.
2. Taking your audience into your confidence.
Our focus is on the first meaning of communication. The linking of ‘making

common’ and ‘imparting’ seems to suggest that making common implies not
so much ‘reducing to one’ as achieving mutual understanding through
imparting ideas.
The concept of communication is defined and used in different ways in the

literature of communication science. But it is often reduced to mean the process
of expressing and interpreting messages – of imparting ideas –
between
communicator and recipient, with the aim of coming to mutual understanding
on certain subject matter.
Such a basic understanding implies the presence of a timeless and durable

structure that characterises all forms of human communication, a structure
that Van Schoor (1979:13) calls the communication ‘triptych’. The structure
consists of a communicator, a medium in which a message is embedded, and
a recipient. Also rightfully implied in this definition is the active role of the
communicator and recipient, the recipient being not just an object to be
manipulated by the communicator.
Communication always takes place within a given social circumstance or

context.
Communication has various forms: intrapersonal, dyadic, small group, public,

mass and vertical communication. These are defined as follows:
• Intrapersonal communication refers to an individual’s ability to think, feel
and use language for understanding and expressing ideas. It sometimes
also refers to a dialogue held within the self, as ‘intra’ in the word
‘intrapersonal’ means ‘within’.
• Dyadic communication happens only between two people. This is
communication in its most basic sense, and it is generally agreed that here,
in the dyadic setting, the force of persuasion is at its strongest.
• Small group communication takes place in small groups, usually ranging in
size from three to about 12 members. Small group communication is used to
enable people to accomplish things together, such as solving problems or
making decisions. Examples of small groups are committees and the family.

Communication and persuasion: A democratic setting
• Public communication refers to a situation in which a communicator (for

example, a public speaker, an entertainer or a lecturer) does most of the
talking, while several dozens to several hundreds or thousands do most of
the listening. The relatively face-to-face nature of public communication
allows recipients to participate actively in the communication process
through their occasional responses to what the communicator says. Such
responses also enable the communicator to make on-the-spot adjustments
to the message.
• Mass communication is mediated; it involves various media, which range
from the now traditional (such as newspapers, radio and television) to
fairly new media (such as bulk e-mails and SMSs and the internet), in order
to transmit messages to an almost unlimited number of recipients. The
concept of ‘mass’ in ‘mass communication’ has a quantitative meaning – it
refers to the number, rather than the nature, of recipients who are reached.
• Vertical communication is seen as your communication with a God or higher
being. However, in the organisational or corporate world, vertical
communication (as opposed to horizontal communication) refers to the
usually downward flow of communication in the hierarchical structure.
This book speaks of forms of communication rather than contexts of

communication. The author takes this position because, for example, the
nature or quality of your message transmission with another person, the
quality of your dyadic communication with another, depends on the context
in which it takes place. But it is still dyadic communication. To speak of a
context of communication when referring to dyadic communication would
not allow for the different circumstances in which dyadic communication can
take place.
The literature sometimes refers to levels of communication. The forms of

communication noted above do function at various levels, namely:
• Intrapersonal level.
• Interpersonal level (for dyadic, small group and public communication).
• Mass level.
• Vertical level.
Communication can take place with or without words. When we communicate

or persuade intentionally without using words, we communicate or persuade
non-verbally. The use of non-verbal messages in the process of persuasion is
discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.

1.2 PERSUASION AS A PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION

Persuasion predominates in our life-worlds. In every field of human existence,
be it at the dyadic, group or public level, people are confronted with persuasion
and take part in it.
Moreover, persuasion pervades human communication in all its forms: in

intrapersonal, dyadic, small group, public, mass and vertical communication.
With regard to intrapersonal communication, we speak of self-persuasion,
when a person takes an active role in persuading him-/herself to think or act
in a certain way (cf. Bettinghaus & Cody, 1994:79ff.).
Of course, persuasion can be studied in various other disciplines and sub-

disciplines, such as social psychology. But it is fundamentally a process of
communication (cf. Benoit & Benoit, 2008:7ff.) –
its natural home is
communication science.
Like communication, persuasion is defined and used in various ways.

However, for our purposes, persuasion in its ideal state may be defined as a
process of communication in which a communicator succeeds in voluntarily
forming, sustaining or changing the attitudes and/or behaviour of a recipient
or a group of recipients in accordance with what the communicator intends
by his/her message.
The following words and phrases in this working definition need to be

emphasised:
• A process of communication. There is expression and interpretation of
messages when persuasion occurs. The process and effect of such
expression and interpretation may take place fairly quickly, or over a
period of time. Moreover, as in the case of communication, a timeless and
durable structure is present in the persuasion process. This structure, or
‘triptych’, consists of a persuader (communicator), a medium in which a
message is embedded, and a persuadee (recipient).
• Voluntarily. The recipient is not forced into being persuaded. He/She
always has the right to choose, even though the choices are sometimes
very limited.
• Forming, sustaining or changing. Persuasion is used not only to change (as is
the general perception), but also to sustain or to maintain, or even to
intensify, the attitudes or behaviour of recipients.
• What the communicator intends. As in the case of communication, persuasion
is intentional – it always has a purpose.
A situation becomes persuasive through the focus on accomplishing something

predetermined and directional with regard to recipients. For this reason, not all

communication can be regarded as persuasion. Engaging in small talk with a

friend, for example, which is a form of dyadic communication, may have
nothing to do with being persuasive – of accomplishing something
predetermined and directional.
Persuasion directs itself at problems of, or opportunities for, human action in

the areas of the contingent and the probable. Therefore persuasion concerns
itself with human affairs.
Persuasion seeks to adapt ideas to people and people to ideas. We may see this
process as a continuum that runs from the comprehensive adaptation of ideas
at one extreme — ‘telling people only what they want to hear’ – to full
regeneration of ideas at the other extreme, expressed in terms such as ‘facts
speak for themselves’. Persuasion normally functions closer to the more
moderate centre of the continuum, away from the extremes. Here, on the one
hand, in order for recipients to be accommodated, difficult and unfamiliar
ideas have to be modified without being distorted or invalidated, while on the
other hand recipients have to be prepared, through the breaking-down of
their prejudices and ignorance, without being deprived of their judgements
(Bryant, 1953:23).
1.2.1 Forms of persuasion: A brief synopsis

There are many forms of persuasion. Arguably, the more important forms are
education, seduction, sanctions, manipulation, blackmail, propaganda,
indoctrination and psychological warfare (Finn, Weich & Rensburg, 1983; cf.
Brown, 1963).
• Education broadly revolves around helping recipients (such as learners and
students) to understand why they do what they do, whereas in persuasion
it is not essential for the recipient to understand why he/she acts in a
certain way.
• Seduction, often used in advertising and public relations, aims partly to
persuade the recipient to surrender to spending money. Think of a beautiful
model promoting a new perfume or a charity fund-raising campaign
during the festive season, respectively.
• Sanctions are measures applied to ‘enforce’ obedience to rules and laws,
and may be put in place overtly or covertly. During apartheid, South Africa
was overtly subjected to international sanctions.
• Manipulation has broad relevance and may be viewed as the successful
attempt by the communicator to use the recipient as an object to be
exploited, by, for example, using his/her charm to get what he/she wants.
• Blackmail is severe manipulation in that it is the act of putting pressure on
a person or a group to do something they do not want to do, for example by
threatening them or making them feel guilty.

• Propaganda, a highly problematic form of persuasion, is usually addressed,

for good or bad purposes, to the group or the many (the masses) rather
than to individuals. For this reason, the terms ‘mass persuasion’ and
‘propaganda’ are often used interchangeably. (Propaganda is discussed in
detail in Chapter 6.)
• Indoctrination refers to the systematic teaching of beliefs and attitudes to a
person or a group without providing contrary messages, thus ensuring
that there are few alternatives, if any. Indoctrination is often practised in
totalitarian states and in religion.
• Psychological warfare takes place when the persuader is dealing with a
foreign adversary whose morale he/she seeks to destroy by psychological
means. The idea is that the opponent should begin to doubt the validity of
his/her beliefs and actions. This type of warfare flourishes during war, but
it is also practised in peacetime, for example as we see in the ongoing
tensions between the Muslim and Western worlds.
Although persuasion is often used for dishonest ends, there is no doubt that
human beings cannot live without it. This is because people are continually
confronted with choices, whether real or fictional, and want to be comfortable
with what they think should be done, or is to be done, about a given matter.
1.2.2 Persuasion as art and science

Persuasion is an art, because it relates to the capability of doing something
(persuading someone, which of course also requires thought) and involves
probabilities rather than certainty – we cannot know exactly what the effects
will be if the persuader uses this or that particular technique.
But persuasion is also a science, as it relies on theories to explain why people

may be persuaded by a communicator. Science is the pursuit of ‘truth’, while
a theory is a creative interpretation or explanation of why processes (or
events) occur as they do. In short, a theory is a way of knowing. A theory of
persuasion attempts to interpret and explain how persuasion works. A theory
of communication also attempts to interpret how communication takes place.
A theory consists of two parts:

1. Basic concepts (words or phrases that have a particular meaning in a
given context).
2. Statements concerning the relationships between these concepts.
A theory is different from a model. A model is a graphic representation of a

phenomenon, such as persuasion. Because by its nature the model highlights
only certain aspects of the process under investigation, be it persuasion or
simple communication, it is a limited representation. A model of persuasion

would show how persuasion takes place – in graphic form, and in an incomplete
or simplified way. A theory of persuasion, by contrast, is much more
comprehensive, because it focuses on more of the aspects of the process under
investigation.
Persuasive communication, like all scientific disciplines and sub-disciplines,

can be studied from different angles. In examining persuasion in this book,
we take the functional approach: Persuasion is seen to function in the service
of something, in this case in the service of a democratic society.
1.3 PERSUASION IN THE SERVICE OF DEMOCRACY

For a democracy to work and to survive, it must rely on persuasion, whether
in settling disputes, selling ideas and products, or changing people’s attitudes.
This applies to interpersonal relationships, organisations, public relations,
advertising, print and broadcast journalism, politics, public speeches and
debates, religion and the arts, among others. Persuasion is therefore integral
to the functioning of a democracy.
The presence of persuasion in the context of a modern democracy immediately

raises questions as to the nature of the concept of democracy itself. After all,
‘democracy’ is a contested term – its proper usage is continually debated. The
term is most often used to refer to a form of government, even though strictly
speaking it is more of a procedure designed to place a government in office
and to establish a public order in which diverse legal interests are harmonised
and balanced. We focus on this sense of democracy, as well as on democracy
as an ideology and a way of life that relates to humans as existing beings.
1.3.1 Democracy as a form of government

The word ‘democracy’ or demokratia is derived from the Greek demos (the people),
and it was taken in ancient Greece to mean literally ‘the power of people who
qualify as citizens’. Here, the word ‘people’ has a very particular meaning. The
Greeks did not include slaves in their conception of people (see Van Zyl Slabbert,
1991). And for the Greeks demos meant the people in the sense of ‘the common
people’ or ‘the ordinary man’ or, simply put, ‘the poor’ – not in the modern sense
of ‘the people as a whole’ or ‘every member of society’.
The ancient Greeks are often regarded as the founders of democracy when
the concept is used to mean a form of government, but antiquity ultimately
rejected this form of government (Wolheim, 1975:109). It did not last even in
Athens, and famous thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle opposed it because
for them equality of political opportunity and freedom for the individual to do
as he/she likes were the salient characteristics of democracy.

Democracy as a form of government, as practised today, is a product of the

19th and 20th centuries. In ancient Athens there was a form of ‘direct
democracy’, in which ‘all’ citizens participated in decision-making, by voting
and accepting a majority verdict. But except for this, authoritarianism of
some type prevailed throughout the world until after the American and
French revolutions of the late 18th century.
A characteristic of all authoritarian systems is the denial of significant political

rights or privileges to most members of the body politic. Consequently,
minority rule prevails in the sense that ultimate, and immediate, control of
the government is confined to a small proportion of the total adult population.
Policies are decided by officials who are legally and politically responsible not
to the general public, but only to the minority who enjoy a monopoly of
governmental power.
The American and French revolutions were influenced by the ideas of the
Enlightenment, and especially by ideas propagated by the great French
philosophers of the 18th century. In particular, Rousseau’s assertion that the
individual exists prior to the state, and thus has rights that are in no sense
dependent on the will of any ruler, was a major contribution to democratic
thought during this period (Barbrook, 1975:115–116).
However, the Western conception of democracy – as a form of government

created by the will of the majority of citizens – was not accepted unconditionally
during the 19th century. In fact, 19th century thought is pervaded with a fear
of democracy, on the grounds that it could lead to a ‘tyranny of the majority’
(see Arblaster, 1984:264–283).
To speak of democracy as a form of government is also to distinguish

arrangements and actions in society as characteristics from a normative
perspective (see Connolly, 1983:29–34). In contemporary Western thought,
democracy is seen as ‘representative’ or ‘indirect’ (as opposed to ‘direct’
democracy), in which the people choose, for example by voting for,
representatives who are then answerable to them, but who are also directly
involved in the practice of government, usually without further consultation
(Raphael, 1979:146ff.; Scruton, 1982:115–117). The term ‘democracy’ in this
sense is usually reserved for political systems that accept certain basic
normative assumptions. These may be divided into three broad categories:
1. Government should reflect the people’s electoral will and choice – hence
the constitutional provision for regular elections, usually by the universal
right to vote, by secret ballot, with representatives of at least two parties
standing for election.
2. Basic individual freedoms (other than political rights) should be
recognised by government. These freedoms include freedom of speech,

information and the press; freedom of assembly; freedom of association;

religious freedom; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment.
3. These freedoms should be exercised according to the rule of law. The rule
of law may be described as a doctrine which prescribes that no power can
be exercised except according to procedures, principles and constraints
contained in the law. (The law must obviously be directly or indirectly
representative of the people’s will.) Moreover, any citizen can find redress
against any other, however powerfully placed, and against the officers of
the state itself, for any act that involves a breach of the law. This implies
that (governmental) powers are kept separate, that is, an independent
judiciary and an executive separately elected or responsible to an elected
legislature.
The idea of an independent political public sphere operating as an intermediary

system between state or government and society in a democracy has long been
propagated by the German sociologist and philosopher Juergen Habermas.
Habermas (2006) notes that the political public sphere should be instrumental
in forming considered public opinions through, among other matters, diversity
of independent mass media and through general access of inclusive mass
audiences to the public sphere. Habermas (2006) suggests that ‘the different
weighting citizens of different nations assign to either rights and liberties, or to
inclusion and equality, or to deliberation and problem solving, determines how
they see themselves as members of their political community’.
1.3.2 Democracy as ideology

Along with nationalism, socialism and communism, democracy may be regarded
as a fundamental ideology in our age. The term ‘ideology’ is an anglicised version of
the French word idéologie, and it was invented in the late 18th century by a school
of thinkers called les idéologues led by Destutt de Tracy. This concept was first used
to describe a new ‘science of ideas’ (Cox, 1969:10).
After Napoleon accused the ideologues of advocating revolutionary ideas,

ideology gained the additional meaning of abstract, impractical or fanatical
theories, which of course gave the concept a negative connotation. This view
became more widely accepted, especially after the appearance of The German
Ideology by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in 1939. Here, ideology acquired
the meaning of ‘false consciousness’, that is, a state of mentality that does not
keep track, or is a distortion, of social reality (see Larrain [1982:35–67], and
Marx & Engels [1939]).
This mainly negative connotation has gradually disappeared, but ideology

continues to be linked with socio-political ideas and officially sanctioned
doctrines of society acquired in the past three centuries.

Today ideology generally refers to a system of socio-political ideas that social

groups aim to implement practically in a given society. These ‘ideas’ are
characterised by elements of:
• valuation – cherished ideas
• actuality – ideas relating to the present
• belief – believed, rather than proven, ideas (Ellul, 1973:116).
In connection with democracy, these ideas have to do with the individual’s

natural right to control the government of the day (a cherished idea relating
to the present) through regular elections and the exercise of basic freedoms in
accordance with the rule of law. The idea that this natural right is recognised
only in a democracy, and that democracy is therefore the best form of
government, is an idea that is believed rather than proven.
In African philosophy, democracy relates to socialist goals and aims, and has
a communal focus. According to Senghor (1998:443):
[t]his is a community-based society, communal, not collectivist. We are

concerned, here, not with a mere collection of individuals, but with people
conspiring together, conspiring in the basic Latin sense, united among
themselves even to the very center of their being, communing through their
ancestors with God, who is the center of all centers.
Thus, in the working out of our “African mode of socialism”, the problem is
not how to put an end to the exploitation of man by his fellow, but to prevent
its ever happening, by bringing political and economic democracy back to
life; our problem is not how to satisfy spiritual, that is, cultural needs, but
how to keep the fervour of the black soul alive. It is a question, once again, of
modernising our values by borrowing from European socialism its science
and technical skill, above all its spirit of progress.
The Western conception of democracy focuses on differences between parties in

which the winner reigns supreme through the ballot box. By contrast, the
African conception of democracy upholds unity through consensus and dialogue
as the ideal. Everyone ideally has the right to participate in the dialogue and
decision-making. Respect is given to the individual who contributes to unity and
justice in dialogue, which may lead to a kind of coalition process.
In former president Thabo Mbeki’s (2001:149–157) definitive speech on the

New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), democratic principles
and institutions, as well as popular participation and good governance, are
clear objectives for the continent (see Chapter 11 Section 11.5.1). Mbeki
(2001) calls for African leaders to adopt the true spirit of democracy in which,
among other things, human rights are protected and people-centred
10

development and market-orientated economies predominate. In this call, a

mixture of traditional Western and African approaches to democracy comes
to the fore (Mbeki, 2001).
Achille Mbembe (2009), an influential African historian and political

philosopher who was born in Cameroon but now resides in South Africa,
suggests that in many African countries the masses feel that democracy has
betrayed them. They believe that they are still powerless and bent on survival
(Mbembe, 2009). The law and constitution in many African countries have
made a mockery of freedom (Mbembe, 2009). The idea that Africans held
during the first half of the 20th century, if they could rid themselves of
colonialism and become independent, was of a (democratic) state in which life
would be humane and governed by ethics (Mbembe, 2009). Instead, in many
cases, independence brought about domination by a few, and the self-interest of
those in power replaced ethics (Mbembe, 2009). Freedom was abandoned in
favour of domination, corruption and violence, explains Mbembe (2009).
The above description of democracy focuses mainly on its governmental and

ideological nature. But democracy’s aims are most clearly concerned with a
person’s quality of life, as manifested in human freedom and equality and,
concomitantly, as manifested in a person’s ability to communicate freely with
others and the world. In short, any communicator in a democracy has the
right to try to persuade the recipient of his/her point of view (within the limits
set by the law). The recipient, in turn, has the right (the freedom) to choose
whether he/she wants to accept the communicator’s point of view.
We now turn to the respective principles of freedom and equality underlying

the (Western) concept of democracy.
1.3.3 Democracy and freedom

Freedom is absence of restraint. The principle has negative and positive
connotations: the former conveyed in the expression ‘freedom from’ (for
example, legal restraints or racial discrimination), the latter in ‘freedom to’
(for instance, realise your aims or to express your views in public).
All too often, the negative side of freedom has dominant concerns. We feel
that just ‘freedom from’ is not enough for freedom to prevail. The quest on
the road into the unknown, uncertain and insecure is also part of freedom.
After all, since we do not always know what is best for us, we explore in order
to find solutions. Freedom (as the absence of restraint) is therefore always
freedom from some possible restraint and freedom to do what you want or
choose to do provided that you do it responsibly, and do not encroach upon
another person’s freedom (Scruton, 1982:180–181; cf. Raphael, 1981:81).
11

1.3.3.1 Individual freedoms and democracy

It is argued above that certain individual freedoms are indeed essential to
democracy: rights of direct or indirect participation in the process of
government; freedom of speech, information and the press; freedom of
assembly; freedom of association; and religious freedom.
These freedoms are granted because they conform to basic liberal ideas
associated with Western democracy, such as:
• belief in the supreme value of the individual (and thus not of the state)
• belief that the individual has natural rights – rights that belong to all human
beings by nature, such as the right to life and to control government
• belief that these natural rights exist independently of government, and
ought to be protected by and against government
• recognition of the supreme value of an individual’s freedom (see Beck,
1979:47–64).
The relationship between democracy and liberalism is not as natural as we

might expect, despite ‘liberal democracy’ being such a common term that we
tend to imagine the two constituent principles having always operated in
harmony. In fact, throughout history there have been tensions between the
advocates of democracy and liberalism. Democracy, in its original sense of
rule by the people or government in accordance with the will of the bulk of
the people, emphasised equality and was regarded by liberals as a ‘bad’ word,
fatal to individual freedom and to the civilised living that liberalism stands
for. However, since the 20th century liberals have come to view Western
democracy not as an end in itself, but as a means of preserving freedom of the
individual, to secure a maximum of freedom for citizens (see Arblaster,
1984:75–79).
‘Freedom’ (of the individual) also implies that to which you have a right (with
its concomitant obligations), and ‘right’ in turn implies ‘right to choose’.
(‘Freedom’ and ‘liberty’ are sometimes used interchangeably. But ‘liberty’ is
normally used in English to refer only to ‘social freedom’, that is, freedom
from restraint by the action of other people; it is not used in the sense of
freedom to choose – see Raphael [1981:82].)
This right (or freedom) to choose also distinguishes human beings from
animals. For instance, a human being can choose to commit suicide, an
animal cannot. Choice is the selection of one possibility among several. More
than one possibility or course of action must be open to a person before that
person can be said to have a choice – you must not be prevented by physical or
psychological causes from having at least two genuine options.
12

Absolute freedom, however, is an unattainable ideal; legal and societal

constraints – such as custom, tradition and public opinion – prevent it. Also,
to the extent that you are ‘duty-bound’ to respect the freedom of another,
freedom is limited rather than absolute. Moreover, if all people were absolutely
free to do as they pleased, the extent of an individual’s actual freedom would
be measured by his/her power to do what he/she wanted and by his/her ability
to resist invasive action by others and the law. The term ‘power’ is used
broadly here – in the Weberian sense – as the chance of an individual realising
his/her own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others
who participate in the action (Weber, 1982:80).
1.3.3.2 Freedom of thought and discussion

In a democracy, a person’s ‘freedom to choose’ also implies that we have a
right to think whatever we want – hence the principle of freedom of thought.
Any attempt to impose thoughts on an individual or to stop him/her choosing,
through law, is doomed to failure.
This right to think whatever we want does not, however, mean that such
thoughts are entirely our own. In fact, your thoughts can never be regarded as
a product just of your own deliberation, free from external influences of any
kind. Thinking is conditioned, for instance, by social circumstances and by
various propaganda practices that flourish in a democracy. Nevertheless we
can make many of our thoughts our own by living them, by attaching meanings
to them.
In theory, by adhering to the principle of freedom, a democracy attempts to

provide the individual with a wide variety of viewpoints, which in turn give
him/her an opportunity to choose the viewpoint that pleases him/her the
most – for example through the doctrine of the freedom of the press, among
others. But press freedom, understood broadly as meaning that the mass
media should not be under governmental control, does not guarantee that the
individual can choose a particular viewpoint among many. Private media
groups may all propagate the same view (on the merits of the free enterprise
system, for instance) to the exclusion of other viewpoints.
Freedom of thought is an evasive but necessary ideal for a democracy. In the

essay On liberty, written in 1859, John Stuart Mill advocates complete freedom
of thought and discussion within the political order. Mill (1975:50–51) bases
his argument on four grounds:
Firstly, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we
can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility.
13

Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly
does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion
on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by collision of
adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being
supplied.
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth;
unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested,
it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of prejudice,
with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds.
And not only this, but fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in
danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the
character and conduct; the dogma becoming a mere formal profession,
inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth
of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.
As Levi (1959:37–46) suggests, Mill advocates such freedom of thought and

discussion in order to foster free development of individuality. Individuality
incorporates the elements of spontaneity and diversity, and the latitude of
choice, provided by the very freedom of thought, expression and discussion
(mutual criticism) (Levi, 1959).
Consciousness of individuality is a fairly recent phenomenon in human

history. Historically, human beings have been regarded as social animals. It
was only in the Renaissance that the individual and his/her needs began to
move closer to the centre of human thought. Mill (1975) was thus in line with
post-medieval tradition, which he carried forward when he stressed the
unique importance of the individual. He did not imply that the individual was
something apart from, and unrelated to, the society in which he/she lived and
of which he/she was a product (Mill, 1975). His point was that each individual
has a unique set of personal qualities significantly different from those of his/
her fellow men and women, qualities which must be prized and encouraged
for their creative potentialities (Mill, 1975).
For Mill (1975), there is no real freedom for a person in a democracy if

conflicting interests cannot be recognised without the individual being
victimised either in his/her relations with the institutions of government or in
his/her personal claims against the pressures of mass sentiment.
As Alexis de Tocqueville (1951) expounds in Democracy in America, Mill

emphasises that the threat to individual freedom in a democracy lies not so
much in the mandates of law, but in the pressures of public sentiment, which he
fears will also lead to intellectual stagnation. The pressure of public sentiment
14

that enhances conformity, Mill (1975:15) warns, is an evil that tends to grow
more formidable. People, whether as rulers or as fellow citizens, impose their
own opinions and inclinations as a rule on others (Mill, 1975). Furthermore,
this is so energetically supported that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by
anything but want of power, and that power is not declining but growing
(Mill, 1975).
Mill’s (1975) pointed remarks seem to suggest that an individual’s freedom in a

democracy could also depend on his/her ability to demand and receive the right
to seek alone (if necessary) the truth about any matter that interests him/her.
Dahrendorf (1979) may say that such ability would increase an individual’s ‘life
chances’ in a democracy (see also Boraine’s [1991] reference to ‘life chances’).
Dahrendorf (1979:34) describes life chances as opportunities for individual

action arising from the interrelationship between ‘opinions’ (possibilities of
choice) and ‘ligatures’ (bonds, such as family or community, that the
individual has been born into or has acquired). An individual’s life chances
could increase or decrease, depending on the relationship between his/her
options and his/her ligatures – the fewer ligatures and the more options, the
greater his/her life chances. Although Dahrendorf (1979:38) does not equate
freedom with life chances, he notes that they are ‘closely related’, in that
freedom is about giving an individual opportunities to choose.
1.3.3.3 Freedom in a democracy: The underlying communicological idea

Theoretically, then, in a democracy, freedom (as a principle with active
connotations) revolves around providing an individual with opportunities to
make meaningful choices about his/her existence.
The democrat is prepared to make his/her own mistakes rather than to be

directed by someone else, even though that person may have superior wisdom.
The basic idea of freedom here is that self-direction – choosing and expressing
for yourself in a responsible manner – is far preferable to having decisions made
for you and imposed upon you by another (see Dewey, 1963:53–55).
1.3.4 Democracy and equality

Some degree of equality is essential to a democracy (Raphael, 1979:183ff.;
Schulz, 1977:110–114). This is generally seen as including the following:
• Equality before the law. This means that the rights of all individuals in a
democracy are subject to a sovereign legislative body (such as Parliament)
and to no other factor (such as race or class). Naturally, there is never full
equality before the law. For instance, children and people who are
considered to have a mental health condition are treated differently from
15

adults of sound mind. Neither does legal equality guarantee that all
individuals are equally able to take full advantage of the rights conferred.
For example, some people, by having superior education or more money,
may be in a better position to exercise their legal rights than the poorly
educated or those with much lower funds. This has given rise to the
distinction between de jure equality and de facto equality: rich and poor
have equal rights in law, but it would be wrong to claim that they have
equal power to enforce those rights.
• Political equality. This means that there should be equality in the ability to
vote someone into office, and to stand for election to office yourself. Such
political rights should not, for instance, be confined to the rich and the
well born. Political equality, like legal equality, never exists absolutely. For
example, children never have the vote – it is usually the norm that only
adults have the right to vote. In the United Kingdom, for instance, certain
offices of state (notably that of sovereign) are hereditary and not open to
everyone, while in the United States, you can become president, among
other things, only if you were born in that country. In conferring the vote
on ‘all’ adults, democracy presupposes the view that all adults generally
have the ability to exercise their vote. A form of factual equality is implied;
that is, that every adult (excluding those with a mental health condition)
has the ability to form a political judgement and to make a rational political
choice – which, of course, may not in fact be true.
• Equality of opportunity. This means that all individuals should be given the
same opportunity (such as in the field of education) to develop whichever
personal talents they have and to make whichever unique contributions
they can. Equality of opportunity lies at the very heart of democracy. Of
course, despite favouring equal opportunity, democracy still has many
inequalities, such as those of income, wealth and power.
Some kinds of equality are unattainable, it seems safe to assume. Differences

in individuals’ intelligence, talents, temperaments and physical characteristics,
as far as we know, are inherent in humankind.
1.3.4.1 Tocqueville’s warning

Tocqueville (1951:11) pointedly warns that equality can be taken too far and
can result in a situation where people are prone to be ‘lost in the crowd’ of
their fellows; they lose respect for their own freedom and soon become
grossly indifferent to the free expression of individual thought.
As legal, political and social conditions became more equal for people in 19th
century America, Tocqueville (1951) notes, Americans seemed more and
more to take pride not in their individuality, in their freedom, but rather in
their sameness. He suggests that this is because the principle of equality is
16

partly based on the notion that there is more intelligence and wisdom in a
number of men united than in a single individual and that the interests of the
many are to be preferred to the few (Tocqueville, 1951 Vol 1:255–256).
Moreover, Tocqueville (1951) proposes that democracy in 19th century

America had, in the sacred name of the majority, raised up a tyranny over the
minds of men as oppressive and as formidable as any in history: the tyranny
of the majority. However, it is important to recall that Tocqueville had an
aristocratic bias; he argues throughout Democracy that uniformity, conformity
and mediocrity are fixed returns of egalitarian (democratic) society
(Tocqueville, 1951) (see also Aron, 1970:9).
On specific tendencies created by the principle of equality, Tocqueville (1951

Vol 2:288) notes that ‘the one [tendency] leads men straight to independence
and may suddenly drive them into anarchy; the other conducts them by a
longer, more secret, but more certain road to servitude. Nations readily
discern the former tendency and are prepared to resist it; they are led away by
the latter, without perceiving its drift’.
1.3.4.2 Equality in a democracy: The basic communicological idea

Theoretically, in a democracy the principle of equality conventionally relates
to equality before the law, political equality and equality of opportunity,
bearing in mind that there will always be differences in, for example, the
talents and temperaments of individuals. The idea behind these forms of
equality seems to be that all people should be treated with ‘fairness’ in a
democracy. A truly democratic society would then, as Dahrendorf (1961:
182–185) suggests, combine a maximum of equality of circumstances with
a minimum of equality of character.
Equality in a democracy would prevail if individuals had equal opportunity to

participate and to be involved as self-conscious subjects in the communication
process. Mutual respect, spontaneity and awareness of the other as an
individual would be prerequisites for people to participate in communication
in this way.
1.3.5 Freedom versus equality

One of the essential conditions of a democratic state is the free play of
conflicting opinions – the right of all people to freely disagree.
Consequently, we would presume that a democratic state would also respect

the line between the power of the majority and the rights of minorities
(including dissident minorities). In fact, no state can afford to disregard
17

individual differences, conflicts of interest and diversity of needs in devising

satisfactory solutions for the many problems that arise in all communities.
Equality is a great leveller. Equality makes it exceedingly difficult for one

person or a few people to oppress the many, but in turn it makes it just as
difficult for one person to be free from the oppression of the many.
Equality by itself is not ideal. If all people were equally wretched, equally
poor or equally powerful, the equality would be of no benefit; in this sense,
people may be more equal in a totalitarian regime than in a democracy.
The point is that if people say they want to be free and equal their demand for
freedom often puts a limit on their demand for equality (see Lipson, 1986).
For example, any attempt to achieve equality in wealth for all citizens would
surely result in a form of totalitarianism. To keep people equal in wealth, in
spite of their unequal abilities, differing work performance and varying
aptitudes, would require a degree of all-round regimentation surpassing
anything that a dictator has yet achieved.
Although democracy implies that certain freedoms, such as freedom of

speech, are conferred equally on all people, in the final analysis it has to be
decided which is the more important: freedom or equality.
In this respect, we may be inclined to agree with Dahrendorf (1961) that a

person’s freedom must be the supreme goal. Applying equality (of people) as
an all-embracing principle leads to the degeneration of humankind: It
prevents individuals from developing their personal capacities (which are
always qualitatively unequal) to the greatest possible extent, thus sacrificing
individuality for the sake of equality.
In communicological terms, applying equality as an all-embracing principle

would obstruct a person’s power of individual expression, since it aims to
make people think and do alike. People tend to become the same, rather than
becoming self-conscious subjects. It would be in order if equality implied that
everyone could communicate on an equal subject footing so that they are able
to actualise themselves.
1.3.6 Questions for South African and other communities

As argued, the principles of freedom and equality should reign supreme in a
democratic state. But the right to freedom is not an absolute right, and
absolute equality is unattainable.
18

The principle of freedom, from which freedom of expression, press freedom

and religious freedom are all derived, has limitations, obligations and social
responsibilities in a democratic state. There is no legal or moral escape
from them.
Broadly speaking, communication practices in a democratic state are always

influenced by social circumstances, which include the prevailing politico-
ideological and religious climates at a given time. Let us take the 2005 furore
in South Africa over cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad as an
example. The disturbance began in Denmark when an author was unable to
find anybody willing to illustrate a book about Muhammad. The Danish
newspaper Jyllands-Posten regarded this as evidence of a Muslim threat to free
expression, and commissioned and published a series of cartoons of the
prophet to make a point (Kruger, 2006). In South Africa, the weekly Mail &
Guardian published one of the cartoons and was vehemently criticised by the
Muslim community. The editor later apologised, after she and her family had
received death threats. A High Court interdict was granted preventing any
further publication of the cartoons in South Africa. Many commentators
shouted that press freedom was under threat.
A more recent example occurred in 2015 when Islamist gunmen killed 12

staff members of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris for
publishing controversial cartoons of Muhammad.
The point, however, is that the press or mass media must also abide by
constraints on freedom in a democratic state, because they are part of that
state
– they do not function outside of it. This would apply to any
communicative practice that, for example, promotes ‘hate speech’ (see
Gelber’s [2002] work on the subject) or the ridicule, insult or denigration of a
widely practised religion.
A position, albeit a conservative one, on the issue suggests that an apology for
publishing the cartoons or other insulting material does not have ramifications
for freedom of expression or press freedom. Freedom sometimes has to be
balanced against other values, such as intercultural harmony, which
legitimises encroaching upon it.
When choosing to rely on (press) freedom to defend particular communicative

actions, individuals and institutions need to consider true human
responsibilities in the process of verbal and non-verbal communication, also
with regard to religious issues. Too many wars have raged, and are still raging,
in the name of one or other religion or religious denomination.
19

Intercultural sensitivities are, and have been, rife in South Africa for many
decades. Communication practitioners should know this and should strive to
take others’ viewpoints into consideration. Balance is an overriding concern.
In communicating interculturally, use of the ‘free word’ or illustration must
be approached circumspectly. The free word can cause major conflict, and
has indeed done so. Those who use the free word to wound the honour or
pride of others shoot with words (Esterhuyse, 2004).
This can be said while fully appreciating the fact that without press freedom
a democratic state cannot exist. Citizens must be kept informed about socio-
economic and political circumstances that influence their lives. Public
opinion is formed mainly by events that the press and other media have made
publicly known. Citizen involvement in the interpretation of news is necessary
for the effective functioning of public opinion. And an active public opinion
steers democratic practices. The press, as the fourth estate, is part of this
process.
This implies that the press must be able to do its work fearlessly – in freedom,
but also with the necessary responsibility to achieve the democratic ideal.
The press must be the watchdog and not the rag doll of government.
As Merrill (2004:17) notes, press freedom usually leads to best journalism

practices: Freedom is needed for maximum news coverage, for the discovery
of truths and for diversity of information.
The challenge facing the principle of equality in South Africa does not lie in
the idea of political equality discussed above, or in equality before the law,
but in the idea of equal opportunity in the land.
Stories abound of the deep divisions between the so-called ‘haves’ (in-groups)
and ‘have-nots’ (out-groups) in South Africa. For example, many of the
winning entries in a journalism competition held over more than a decade
show that the South African state has continued to grapple with inequalities:
the exploitation of the poor by the rich, the plight or hardship of disabled
people, the plight of the poor in informal settlements and rural villages, and
the devastating effects of HIV/Aids on especially the poor.
Inequalities will have to be bridged as soon as possible if political stability is

to be maintained over the medium and long term. The divide between rich
and poor is not simply a racial one, as in apartheid South Africa – it is also
class-based. While political transformation has taken place in many spheres,
the challenge of economic transformation for the benefit of most, if not all,
has yet to be realised.
20

Perhaps the greatest threat to the democratic South African state is the
pervasiveness of violent crime, which mocks the principles of freedom and
equality. This country has one of the highest crime rates in Africa. Each day
South Africans are the victims of murder, rape, robbery and hijacking. Violent
crime against children is especially horrifying. Other contact crimes against
citizens of all walks of life continue unabated. Among many citizens, there
seems to be very little respect for law and order, and for the life of other
human beings.
The principle of freedom in this context seems to be operationalised as ‘doing

what you want’ without taking the other person into consideration. With
such freedom comes a climate of unhappiness where, as the then president
Thabo Mbeki noted in 2007, ‘communities live in fear, closeted behind walls
and barbed wire, ever anxious in their houses, on the streets and on our roads,
unable freely to enjoy our public spaces’.
Likewise, the principle of equality is distorted. Violent crime offenders have

become more equal than others through their disregard for the dignity or
property of others and for (often) escaping punishment for their crimes.
Efforts to bring down the rate of certain crimes, such as theft, and to build the
democratic South African state, are complicated by widespread poverty and
the lack of equal opportunity.
Let us turn our attention to ethical issues in persuasion.
1.4 PERSUASION AND ETHICS

Ethical issues in persuasion focus on value judgements concerning right and
wrong, or goodness and badness. While knowledge of what is right and wrong
is highly problematic, society often teaches us what is right and what is wrong.
Throughout history, two macro theories that relate to the study of ethics,
which is the study of moral conduct, have prevailed: teleological and
deontological.
Teleological theories focus on consequences, that is, an action (persuasion)

being right or wrong depends on its consequences, irrespective of how the
action was carried out. A pragmatic and utilitarian tendency thus prevails.
For example, if you punish a learner more harshly than is necessary for not
studying for a test during the year and it has the desired result that he/she
passes the examination at the end of the year, then your persuasive action,
teleologically speaking, would be regarded as ethical.
21

Deontological theories, by contrast, deal with the duties of the participants in

the action (persuasion). For example, it would be ethically wrong for a
Christian person to try to persuade someone to kill another person, thus
going against the Ten Commandments.
The process of persuasive communication always carries with it potential

ethical issues, because it:
• involves a persuader (communicator) trying to influence a recipient or a
group of recipients by forming, sustaining or changing his/her or their
attitudes or behaviour
• concerns consciously choosing from among a group of sought objectives
and using persuasive means to achieve those objectives
• necessarily involves a potential judge – any or all of the recipients, the
persuader or an independent observer (Johannesen, 2013:41–42).
Although the relationship between persuasion and ethics is problematic,

three general principles can be posited (cf. Bostrom, 1983:14):
• Persuasion can be employed to ethical or non-ethical ends.
• Persuasion is used by many types of people, who may or may not have
respect for ethics. However, knowledge of persuasive processes is useful in
defending yourself against unscrupulous practitioners.
• Ethical issues are often relative, as they can allow for several acceptable
answers. The way in which the persuader, persuadee or observer evaluates
the ethics of a persuasive practice depends on the kind of approach
adopted, which in turn is most often governed by the predominating
cultural values.
1.4.1 Ethical persuasion: A question of approach and culture

A number of approaches can be adopted when deciding whether persuasion
has been ethical or not (Benoit & Benoit, 2008:45ff.; cf. Johannesen, 2013).
For example, a human nature perspective on ethics assesses behaviour as
ethical when the essence of human nature is preserved – such as allowing
recipients to make rational decisions. A legal approach requires comparing
current laws and regulations with the persuasive techniques used. In South
Africa, it is illegal and thus unethical to make direct comparisons between
commercial products in advertisements. One may not advertise that a certain
(named) soft drink is better than another (named) soft drink. A religious
approach may involve judging persuasion in terms of the use of lies, slander
and bearing false witness – which the Bible forbids. A situational approach (or
relativism), which focuses on contextual factors to determine an ethical
evaluation, may involve matters such as whether urgency justifies the means
used by the persuader.
22

The most important point is that ethics is related to culture, and thus good
human conduct (persuasion) in one culture may be regarded as bad behaviour
in another culture.
The concept of culture has different meanings. At first, culture denoted a

noun of process: the culture (cultivation) of crops or the culture (rearing and
breeding) of animals. In the late 18th century it became, especially in German
and English, ‘a noun of configuration or generalisation of the “spirit” which
informed the “whole way of life” of a distinct people’ (Williams, 1981:10).
The term evolved from the older emphasis on an ‘informing spirit’ – ideal or

religious or national – to a more modern emphasis on a ‘lived culture’, which
has been determined mainly by ‘designated social processes –
usually
particular kinds of political or economic order’ (Williams, 1981:11).
According to Williams (1983:43–52), there are three definitions of culture:

1. The ideal definition, in which culture is ‘a state or process of human
perfection, in terms of certain absolute or universal values’.
2. The documentary definition, which describes culture as the ‘body of
intellectual and imaginative work, in which, in a detailed way, human
thought and experience are variously recorded’.
3. The social definition, in which culture is ‘a description of a particular way
of life, which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and
learning but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour’.
This book adopts Williams’s (1983) social definition of culture as ‘a whole way
of life’ of a given human group, or as Maletzke (1976:409) puts it, ‘the
distinctive way of life of a group of people, their designs for living’. This
definition enables us to deal with ethical issues that emanate from the values
implicit and explicit in a particular way of life found here and now in society,
and that find expression in the process of persuasion.
In situating the relevance of culture for ethics and persuasion in

communicological terms, we may say that the goodness or badness of
persuasive communication is often influenced by the social circumstances
(culture) in which the process of persuasion takes place.
Judgement with regard to the ethical nature of persuasion may operate

ideologically as well. Would not a Marxist regard persuasive communication
in the service of capitalism as unethical?
Possibly the most clear-cut statement that we can make about the ethics of
persuasion is that persuasion is ethical in so far as it is an alternative to force,
23

coercion or violence for purposes of producing a community of minds about a

given subject.
1.5 RESISTANCE TO PERSUASION

This chapter has focused on the concepts of communication, persuasion and
democracy, as well as on the ethics of persuasion. Persuasion, as a process of
communication, is the lifeblood of a modern democracy, a society in which it
is most relevant. This is because a democratic social system, as argued, does
not rely predominantly on the use of force or coercion – as authoritarian
societies tend to do. A person has the freedom or the right to choose whether
he/she wants to be persuaded by others. In other words, a person in a
democratic society is theoretically quite capable of resisting persuasive efforts.
There are various ways in which the potential persuadee may resist persuasive
attempts. The recipient can ignore, rebut or reject outright the arguments of
the communicator. The recipient may also intellectualise, supplant and
generally rationalise the information with which he/she does not agree, or
deny that the information is important when he/she perceives it as a threat to
his/her own position.
A further, widely used way of protecting individuals against persuasive ideas

is proposed by McGuire (1961). He suggests that you can be ‘inoculated’
against persuasive attempts (McGuire, 1961). In this context, inoculation
essentially means exposing people to arguments against their attitudes and
then refuting those arguments. Thus, having heard various arguments against
their attitudes demolished, individuals may be better equipped to withstand
later attempts at persuasion. For example, in a speech presented to his/her
constituents, a political party candidate may first list all the so-called good
points that his/her opponents are making. The candidate then breaks down
these points, clarifying for the constituents what they are to argue when
confronted with opposing views. In effect, the candidate has attempted to
inoculate his/her constituents against the political arguments of opposing
candidates.
The foregoing techniques that relate to resisting unwanted attempts at

persuasion in a democratic society presuppose that much of the population
has a social consciousness and self-consciousness of persuasion. Where social
consciousness and self-consciousness of persuasion are lacking, we may
suggest guidelines for creating such consciousness.
24

1.5.1 Creating a social consciousness and self-consciousness

of persuasion
For a social consciousness of persuasion to be created, persuasion must
capture people’s attention and awaken their interest. In other words, people
must form their own mental image of the state of affairs brought about by the
nature and scope of persuasion. In forming this mental image, three
dimensions of a social consciousness of persuasion can be posited. Each is
coupled with a motif and leads to a clearer understanding of the persuasion
phenomenon. These dimensions and their concomitant motifs are derived
from Berger (1963). Such a social consciousness of persuasion could trigger
the start of self-knowledge, for self-knowledge also entails knowledge of the
circumstances in which you find yourself.
The first dimension of a social consciousness of persuasion is characterised by

the debunking motif. Here a person is interested in looking some distance
beyond the commonly accepted, popular or officially defined goals of human
actions. It presupposes a certain awareness that human events have different
levels of meaning, some of which are hidden from the consciousness of
everyday life. Or it may even presuppose a measure of suspicion about the way
in which human events, whatever they may be, are officially interpreted by
those in power, or accepted by most people. It is, in short, a person’s attempt
to ‘see through’ communicative interactions.
The second dimension of a social consciousness of persuasion incorporates

the motif of unrespectability. Here ‘unrespectability’ means that a person, in
appraising communicative interactions in democratic society, judges these
interactions not only from the world of middle-class respectability, which is
most often regarded as the ‘best’ view of the world (the one that should be
taken seriously), but also from the perspective of other or ‘unrespectable’
views in society. A person should thus, in some measure, be detached from
the taken-for-granted postures of communicative interactions and be involved
in a holistic evaluation of the situation.
The third dimension of a social consciousness of persuasion is characterised

by the relativising motif. Technological innovation and the growth of the mass
media, including social media, have provided people with insight into other
cultures and their communicative interactions. This exposure has led to a
form of cultural imperialism through which the receiving culture has come to
accept many of the cultural products (including the communicative
techniques) of the sending culture, even though fundamentally these cultures
represent contradictory meaning systems. Through the motif of relativising,
people acknowledge that not only identities but also ideas are relative to
specific social circumstances.
25

Having established a social consciousness of persuasion, it is then imperative

that the individual alone must determine his/her place within his/her
circumstances (within the persuasion milieus). In other words, the individual
must determine the implications of his/her circumstances – the implications
of persuasion – for his/her own existence.
This is partly what Mills (1959) has in mind in his concept of the sociological
imagination (or the communicological imagination – Mills [1959:19] suggests
that it does not matter whether ‘sociological’ is replaced with another term).
The communicological imagination is a ‘quality of mind’ or ‘mental attitude’
(Jansen, 1980:31) that helps the individual to understand persuasion, among
other things, in terms of its meaning for his/her own life and for other people.
Mills (1959:5ff.) believes that the individual can understand his/her experience
and gauge his/her fate only by locating him-/herself within, among other
things, the persuasion milieus. This must be done before he/she can help
others to understand their circumstances. In short, Mills (1959) advocates a
form of self-consciousness that promises an understanding of the intimate
realities of ourselves in connection with larger realities, such as persuasion.
In the next chapter, persuasive communication is situated in its historical

context.
26

A REMINDER
• Persuasion is a process of communication.
• Persuasion is both an art and a science.
• Persuasion is most relevant in democratic society.
• Persuasion can be used for ethical and non-ethical purposes.
• McGuire’s (1961) inoculation theory explains how potential
persuadees can come to resist persuasive attempts.
27

chapter TWO
Persuasive communication:
The historical context
LOOKING AHEAD
• identify the Greek roots of persuasion
• provide Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric
• discuss rhetoric as an art as well as the use of the Aristotelian
artistic proofs
• name the classical canons of rhetoric
• outline the further, post-classical, historical development of
rhetoric.

Persuasive communication:The historical context
2.1 INTRODUCTION: THE GREEK ROOTS

The study of persuasive communication is not a recent trend. In fact, since
the days of the ancient Greeks (and Romans) people have been interested in
the uses and abuses of persuasive communication.
Broadly speaking, the ancient Greeks called the study of persuasive

communication ‘rhetoric’. Rhetoric was invented by Corax of Syracuse and
introduced to mainland Greece by Corax’s pupil, Tisias, in the fifth century
bc. In the beginning, rhetoric was primarily viewed as an art of oral persuasion
used in public life. But a clearer classification of rhetoric soon emerged. As
Kennedy (1980:16ff.) notes, the broad field of rhetoric was divided into
technical, Sophistic and philosophical rhetoric.
Technical rhetoric focused mainly on civil questions. With respect to the

communication triptych – communicator/speaker, medium/message/speech
and recipient(s)/audience – it concentrated on the message.
The term ‘Sophistic rhetoric’ was derived from the persuasive oratory of
Sophists such as Protagoras of Abdera, Gorgias and Isocrates, while the name
‘Sophist’ came from the Greek word sophos, meaning ‘wisdom’ or ‘knowledge’.
Sophistic rhetoric emphasised the role of the communicator rather than the
message or recipient. Sophistic rhetoric provided a clearer picture of the so-
called ideal orator who would lead society to noble fulfilment of national
ideals.
Philosophical rhetoric developed out of Socrates’s objections to technical and

Sophistic rhetoric. Philosophical rhetoric focused on the systematic
interaction between communicator, message and recipient, while its natural
topic was deliberation about the recipient’s best interests. Philosophical
rhetoric is covered in more detail in Section 2.3.
Rhetoric or persuasive communication was not accepted unconditionally by

the ancient Greeks. Let us turn to Plato’s criticism.
2.2 PLATO’S CRITICISM OF RHETORIC

As referenced in his dialogues, the Greek philosopher Plato (c. 429–347 bc)
was especially critical of Sophistic rhetoric.
Sophistic rhetoric can be described as the art of persuasion that seeks to

capture in suitable moments that which is appropriate and which may be
believed (Poulakos, 1983).
29

With regard to the probable believability of expression, Sophistic rhetoric

thus explores:
• the how – through verbal ornamentation
• the when – the timely imparting of ideas, the question of whether now is
the time to speak
• the what – that which conforms to the occasion, to the characteristics of
the situation (Poulakis, 1983:35–48).
As pointed out by Plato (1971) in the Gorgias, believability was regarded by

the Sophists – who made a reputation for themselves as teachers of rhetoric in
the Greek city-states – as the goal of communication.
The Sophists were interested in communication as a technical skill and as a

tool with which the communicator manipulates recipients, through elaborate
conceits and stylistic refinements of the message, to accept the communicator’s
point of view by appealing to their emotions (see Jansen, 1983:31). And so the
Sophists have been maligned through much of Western history.
In Sophistic rhetoric, then, recipients are not dynamically involved in

communication, because such rhetoric is monologic: One communicator
speaks to a target audience. The audience consists of passive recipients who
are presumed to be inexpert – mere objects to be manipulated by the shrewd
oratorial skills of the communicator. There is no question of the participants
involving themselves in the communication process.
In the Gorgias, philosophy and rhetoric are treated as mutually incompatible

and exclusive – for Plato (1971:43), philosophy is the search for truth while
(Sophistic) rhetoric is regarded as merely an ‘unscientific knack’.
The Gorgias was completed in about 387 bc, while Plato finished his later
dialogue, the Phaedrus, in about 380 bc. In the Phaedrus, Plato (1973) no
longer condemns rhetoric as inherently bad. He concedes that there can be a
‘scientific’ or philosophical art of persuasion, and the main aim of the Phaedrus
is to ascertain the true principles of that rhetoric (Plato 1973). Hence, in the
second half of the Phaedrus, Plato (1973) provides 94 rational principles that
underlie rhetoric as an art (cf. Engel, 1973:59):
1. The persuader, or rhetor, must be knowledgeable about the subject on
which he is speaking.
2. The persuader must define his subject at the beginning of a speech.
3. There must be good order in the speech – it must be arranged appropriately
and be complete.
4. There must be a method of collection for, and division in, the speech.
5. The persuader must know the nature of the soul and its types, as well as
the types of speeches that are suitable for the different types of souls.
30

Although these principles of persuasive communication are as valid now as

they were in Plato’s day, it was left to one of Plato’s students at his Academy in
Athens, Aristotle (384–322 bc), to write the first systematic and philosophical
treatise on rhetoric.
2.3 ARISTOTLE’S VIEW OF RHETORIC

Aristotle was born in 384 bc in the small town of Stagira in Macedonia. His
father, Nicomachus, was the court physician to Amyntus II, King of Macedonia
and the father of Philip the Great. In 367 bc, at the age of 17, Aristotle went to
Athens and enrolled as a student at Plato’s Academy. He stayed there for the
next 20 years, as a student and a teacher, until Plato’s death in 347 bc. Aristotle
then left Athens, mainly because of the anti-Macedonian feeling that had
sprung up as a result of Philip’s military victories, which weakened the Greek
confederacy. He spent the next five years in Asia Minor and on the island of
Lesbos, studying and teaching biology and zoology (see Aristotle, 1984:viiiff.).
In 342 bc, Philip appointed Aristotle as tutor to his son, Alexander, the future
military conqueror of the Middle East. In 335 bc, on the death of Philip,
Aristotle returned to Athens. He founded the famous Peripatetic School of
Philosophy at the Lyceum, where he lectured on a wide variety of subjects
and wrote or revised most of his surviving works. With the death of Alexander
the Great in 323 bc, anti-Macedonian feeling again broke out in Athens.
Aristotle returned to his native land, where he died in 322 bc (see Aristotle,
1984:viiiff.).
The Aristotelian text known as the Rhetoric is still generally considered to be

the most important single work in the literature of persuasive oratory.
We are not certain when the Rhetoric was written or ‘published’, but scholars
have made educated guesses. Because the text contains a number of topical
references to Athenian events and concerns, it is believed that the Rhetoric
was addressed to an Athenian audience. This, in turn, suggests that the
Rhetoric was written either during Aristotle’s first residence in Athens (367–
347 bc) or during his second (335–323 bc), or during both periods. EM Cope,
an influential commentator on the Rhetoric, believes that the text was not
completed until after 335 bc (see Aristotle [1984:x]). Wilson and Arnold
(1983:307) suggest that the Rhetoric was completed in about 330 bc.
The Rhetoric consists of three books. Book I deals mostly with the role of the
speaker, Book II with the role of the audience and Book III with the speech itself.
In general, Book I seems to say: ‘Be logical. Think clearly. Reason cogently.
Remember that argument is the life and soul of persuasion’; Book II: ‘Study
31

human nature. Observe the characters and emotions of your recipients, as

well as your character and emotions’; and Book III: ‘Attend to delivery. Use
language correctly. Arrange your material well. End crisply’ (Corbett, in
Aristotle, 1984:xv).
Aspects of Aristotle’s thoughts on the style and arrangement of speeches, as

found in Book III of his Rhetoric, are dealt with specifically in Chapter 8,
Section 8.2.3, when the style and arrangement of a formal political speech is
discussed.
Aristotle (1984:24) defines rhetoric as ‘the faculty [ability] of observing in any

given case the available means of persuasion’. It is thus relevant to all subjects.
Furthermore, in Chapter 1 of Book I, he identifies four uses of rhetoric
(Aristotle, 1984):
1. It makes us argue both sides of a case.
2. It is a means of defence.
3. It will serve to instruct when scientific instruction is of no use.
4. Through a proper knowledge and exercise of rhetoric, fraud and injustice
will not be allowed to succeed.
Aristotle (1984) argues that rhetoric is similar to dialectic, which can also
deal with any topic. But there are three differences between rhetoric and
dialectic (cf. Kennedy, 1980:66):
1. Rhetoric is found in continuous discourse, whereas dialectic takes the
form of a debate.
2. Rhetoric usually addresses a large audience, and the speaker must
anticipate the reaction of his hearers. Dialectic usually involves one-to-
one argument and explicit agreement or disagreement.
3. Rhetoric usually deals with concrete or practical questions, while
dialectic is more concerned with philosophical, or at least general,
questions.
In considering the three books of the Rhetoric as a whole, and given the broad
classification of classical Greek rhetoric at the beginning of this chapter, we
may say that Aristotle’s (1984) exposition is part of philosophical rhetoric.
Aristotle’s (1984) ethical demands on the communicator are consistently high
(as opposed to Sophistic rhetoric), while he also views the recipient in the role
of a judge – thus as an active participant in the process of persuasion, which is
characteristic of philosophical rhetoric.
2.3.1 Rhetoric as an art

For Aristotle (1984), rhetoric is an art that determines the rules for practical
use, not a science. Art is a level of knowledge that comes after sensory perception
32

(observation), memory and experience, but which precedes science or

scientific knowledge.
To understand these levels of knowledge, consider the example of television.

If you see a television set for the first time, you have observed it. If you can
remember that such an object is a television set, then you have reached the
level of memory. Once you switch it on and receive a picture, then you have
experienced television. If the picture is unsatisfactory and you manipulate the
setting on the television set so that a clear picture is received, you have been
artful. If the television set is faulty, you open the back cover to investigate the
cause of the fault and you repair the fault, you may justifiably be said to have
a measure of scientific knowledge of a television set.
Art is systematic and can be taught, but it is also a technique that, if applied,
can lead to a particular product. Furthermore, art depends to a certain extent
on knowledge of causes. According to Aristotle (1984), however, art is mainly
concerned with probabilities – unlike science, which is the highest form of
knowledge and concerned with the absolute truth about cause and effect.
In reconciling Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric and his claim that rhetoric is

an art, it may be suggested that if we have mastered the art of rhetoric, we
have the faculty or ability to discover the available means of persuasion in any
given case (Corbett, in Aristotle, 1984:xv).
As discussed in the Rhetoric (Aristotle, 1984:xiii–xiv), rhetoric is a (practical)

art concerned with civic life and with the following three kinds of speeches:
1. Forensic (legal) rhetoric is limited to the law courts and deals with events
that have already occurred. The end or objective of forensic rhetoric is
the establishment of justice and injustice, while the procedural means are
accusation and defence.
2. Epideictic (demonstrative) rhetoric deals with issues of honour. Funeral and
inaugural orations are good examples of this category. Epideictic rhetoric
is situated in the present, the objective is the establishment of honour and
dishonour, and the procedural means are praise and blame.
3. Deliberative (political) rhetoric deals with issues of expediency. Deliberative
rhetoric is situated in the future, the objective is the establishment of the usefulness
or harmfulness of a proposed course of action, and the procedural means are
exhortation and dehortation, with which the communicator strongly urges or
discourages a course of action, respectively.
Aristotle (1984) is especially concerned with political rhetoric, perhaps

more so than all the classical theorists on rhetoric, such as Plato, Cicero and
Quintilian. For Aristotle (1984), the practice of political rhetoric (persuasion)
engages motives, principles, thoughts, arguments and sentiments in
33

communication – an engagement that functions pragmatically to form

attitudes and assist judgements regarding, among other things, ways and
means, war and peace, defence, imports and exports, and legislation. After
all, citizens cannot be left dissatisfied with regard to these affairs.
Political discourse, among other discourses, makes claims and urges

judgements about policies and actions, which deserve to stand or fall on the
strength of the evidence and proofs that support them. This is the very essence
of rational thought that was so important to Aristotle (see Arnhart, 1981). For
this reason, Aristotle (1984:24–28) proposes that the essential element of (all)
rhetorical discourse is proof, while all else is accessory.
2.3.2 Artistic proofs and the enthymeme

There are two broad kinds of proofs or means of persuasion: non-artistic
proofs and artistic proofs. Non-artistic proofs are not produced in the art of
rhetoric, they are just available from outside the art; artistic proofs are
produced in the art of rhetoric (Corbett, in Aristotle, 1984:xvi).
For Aristotle (1984), non-artistic proofs do not strictly belong to the art, they
are mere substantiating data, such as laws, witnesses, contracts, oaths and
evidence given under torture. These are all ‘proofs’ that pertain especially to
forensic oratory and perhaps play a more prominent role in contemporary
persuasion than they did in Aristotle’s time.
The artistic proofs that are the true modes of proofs in the art of rhetoric are
as follows (Aristotle, 1984):
• Ethos – ethical proof.
• Pathos – emotional proof.
• Logos – logical proof.
For Aristotle (1984), ethos is an artistic proof consisting of a complex quality

of credibility that derived from a speaker’s seeming expertness (intelligence),
trustworthiness and goodwill (the beginning of friendship) towards the
audience (cf. Arnhart, 1981:34–48).
A speaker’s reputation, which he brings to the speech-making occasion, also

influences his credibility, although ethos essentially refers to what happens
during the speech-making process. Moreover, we should consider how the
language and development of the message reflect good taste, common sense
and sincerity – factors that contribute to the credibility of the communicator.
While the verbal aspects of presentation are emphasised, non-verbal aspects
are considered in so far as they may complement (or contradict) verbal
messages that display ethos.
34

Pathos relates to emotion. It includes appeals to the passions or the will – in

other words, psychological appeals. In using psychological appeals, the
speaker assesses the emotional state of his audience and artistically designs
his message to appeal to that state to gain maximum effect.
Logos addresses the intellect or the rational side of human beings. It relies on
the audience’s ability to perceive information, such as statistical data,
examples and testimony, in logical ways to arrive at some conclusion.
Logos, ethos and pathos are relevant to all three kinds of rhetorical speeches
(forensic, epideictic and deliberative). Although these proofs overlap in the
sense that they often work together in persuasive oratory, logos is most
concerned with the speech, ethos with the speaker and pathos with the
audience.
For Aristotle (1984) the most important rhetorical instrument for testing the
logic of the speech deductively (as opposed to inductively) is the enthymeme,
which is an argument of probability only, and the rhetorical counterpart of
the syllogism of dialectic. A syllogism is a logical argument in three
propositions: two premises, and a conclusion that follows necessarily from
them. For centuries, Aristotle’s (1984) enthymeme and syllogism have been
major instruments for analysing arguments.
The enthymeme differs from the dialectical syllogism in the crucial respect
that one of the (two) premises on which the conclusion is based is implicit,
not explicit. Here is an example of each:
Syllogism
All philosophers are Greek (premise). Aristotle is a philosopher (premise).
Therefore, Aristotle is Greek (conclusion).
Enthymeme
All philosophers are Greek, therefore Aristotle is Greek. (It is assumed that it
is common knowledge that Aristotle is a philosopher.)
As Corbett (in Aristotle, 1984:xviii) notes, ‘the Aristotelian enthymeme often

involved premises that were merely probable, thus leading to conclusions that
were only generally or usually true’. According to Aristotle (1984), although
enthymematic reasoning usually involves mere probability, it does not make
the reasoning invalid. Aspects that happen for the most part can be objects of
knowledge – probability should be distinguished from chance, which cannot
provide knowledge.
35

The use of the enthymeme in rhetoric seems appropriate because, as Arnhart

(1981:8) points out, ‘the subject of rhetoric has as its content human action,
and the regularities of human action can be known with probability but not
with absolute certainty’.
2.4 THE ROMANS AND THE CLASSICAL TRADITION

Although, as shown above, we can trace interest in the study of persuasion to
Athens and elsewhere in ancient Greece, the Romans, especially Cicero and
Quintilian, also dealt with the topic.
According to Hostettler (1967:21), an unknown author produced one of the

first Latin treatises on rhetoric that is available to us: the Rhetorica ad
herennium (c. 86–82 bc). This work, for centuries incorrectly attributed to
Cicero, is a comprehensive summary of Hellenistic rhetoric as it developed
after Aristotle. Hellenistic culture, which consisted of mainly Greek and
oriental elements, profoundly influenced Roman culture.
In the Ad herennium we encounter the five ‘canons’, or major divisions, of

rhetoric, which were developed by Aristotle and other classical rhetoricians:
1. Inventio (invention) – the discovery and analysis of subject matter and
proofs.
2. Dispositio (disposition) – the structure and arrangement of discourse.
3. Pronuntiatio (delivery) – the use of the voice, articulation and the use of
body movement.
4. Elocutio (style) – the appropriate use of language.
5. Memoria (memory) – usually referred to as a speaker’s retention and grasp
of the content in some kind of sequential order (although, strictly
speaking, it actually meant command of the whole speech).
These canons became part of the vocabulary and tradition of rhetoric and
have survived to this day (cf. Terblanche, 1989).
Cicero (106–43 bc) produced seven works on rhetoric. De oratore (On the
orator) (55 bc) is the most complete statement of his doctrines, but it was his
De inventione (On invention) (87 bc) that had the greatest influence in the
Middle Ages and early Renaissance (Hostettler, 1967:22; cf. Kennedy,
1980:90).
Although Cicero writes extensively on all five canons, he emphasises

invention, as the title of the work suggests. Cicero insists that we can only be
a real orator if we have attained the knowledge of everything important and
of all the liberal arts, and that rhetoric should be considered a part of politics.
Its function is to persuade an audience.
36

One of the greatest Roman teachers of rhetoric was Quintilian (c. ad 40–95).
His Institutio oratoria (Institutes of oratory) (c. ad 95) consists of 12 books. This
text proposes that rhetoric, or ‘a knowledge of speaking well’, as he defines it
(Kennedy, 1980:101), includes all that is needed for the training of a speaker.
However, he emphasises the necessity of ethical and responsible speech-
making. He advocates that the Perfect Orator be the good man speaking well.
With Quintilian, the substance of the classical tradition is completed. This

tradition assigns rhetoric the function of making truth prevail in society and
insists on responsible communication. It prioritises invention: rational thought
and adequate proofs. A rhetoric that is designed to enhance reputation, and to
mislead in order to win assent at the expense of truth, is rejected as Sophistic.
Classical rhetoric is also audience-centred, recognising that speeches must be
primarily concerned with responses to be gained from accessible recipients.
Generally speaking, during the Roman Empire (from about ad 150 to 400)
rhetoric experienced a debased period in which the emphasis was on Sophistic
rhetoric, on the canons of delivery and style – hence this period is also known
as the ‘Second Sophistic’.
2.5 FURTHER HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF

RHETORIC: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Rhetoric during the Middle Ages (fifth to 15th centuries) owes much to the
views and influence of St Augustine (ad 354–430), given the dominant role of
the Church in medieval education (Hostettler, 1967:23). Augustine’s De
doctrina Christiana (On Christian doctrine) (c. ad 426) acclaims the virtue of
rhetoric, properly conceived and practised, to win men to truth and the
Church. In the context of truth, as viewed by the Church, rhetoric’s nobler or
philosophical function is restored to it (cf. Van Schoor, 1985), although
features of Sophistic, and especially technical, rhetoric are retained (see also
Herrick, 2005:125ff.).
During the Middle Ages, rhetoric became one of the seven liberal arts in
Europe (the others being grammar, logic [dialectic], arithmetic, geometry,
astronomy and music), which formed the core of education until the end of
the Renaissance. With grammar and logic, rhetoric made up the trivium, the
basic arts that in turn formed the framework for the study of communication
(Hostettler, 1967:24).
However, medieval rhetoric was but a poor reflection of the full classical
tradition. Of the ancient works on rhetoric, only the Ad herennium and Cicero’s
De inventione were readily available to teachers and serious students of
rhetoric. The concept of rhetoric as style predominated. For the most part,
37

learned arguments were derived from theology, and rhetoric was thus left
with the task of clothing theological ‘truth’ in appropriate language. Moreover,
in the authoritarian society of feudalism the task of rhetoric was to supply
barons, bishops and kings with verbiage that would honour and placate.
Stylistic rhetoric also tended to dominate the English and French Renaissance
(from 1400 to 1600). The 16th century French philosopher Petrus Ramus
(1515–1572) divided the traditional canons of rhetoric into specialisations:
invention and disposition were assigned to dialectic; memory was simply de-
emphasised. Rhetoric was considered to deal only with elocution and
pronunciation – these were treated as if they were composed just of figures of
speech and gestures (Dahnke & Clatterbuck, 1990:5–6).
But the Renaissance also brought a renewal of the full rhetorical tradition
(Hostettler, 1967:24–27). It has been established that many 15th and 16th
century Greek and Latin editions of Aristotle’s Rhetoric were available to
facilitate scholarship (see Brandes, 1985).
As far as we know, the very first book on rhetoric in English was Leonard
Cox’s The arte or crafte of rhetoryke (1530), but Thomas Wilson’s Arte of
rhetorique (1553) was the first text in English to extensively explore each of
the five canons while highlighting invention. Aristotle’s Rhetoric received
renewed attention in England during the 17th century, with Thomas Hobbes
(1588–1679) publishing one of several translations in 1637.
With the rise of scientific method and thought, sponsored by Francis Bacon
(1565–1621), among others, rhetoric received more attention. Although
Bacon authored no work on rhetoric, in The advancement of learning (1605) he
gives it a paramount place – equal to logic – among the arts and sciences, and
assigns to it the persuasive function of illuminating knowledge so that it can
be ‘seen’ and understood. Bacon emphasises honesty in communication, and
suggests that effective speech must rely on psychological concepts of human
motivation and behaviour – an argument especially reminiscent of Aristotle,
from whom Bacon draws many of his ideas (cf. Kennedy, 1980:215–219).
Modern rhetoric in the West has been greatly influenced by the elocutionary
movement of the 18th and 19th centuries. This movement identified delivery
as the most significant aspect of speaking. An important proponent of the
elocutionary movement was the Irishman Thomas Sheridan (1719–1788),
who lectured and published widely, and whose best-known work is A course in
the lectures on elocution (1762). As Kennedy (1980:229) points out, the only
part of ancient rhetoric that really mattered to Sheridan was delivery.
38

Major factors that gave rise to the elocutionary movement were the desire to
standardise the spoken word, the need for acceptable speech by people
seeking improved social status, and the feeling that pleasing delivery was
needed for effective participation in the rising democratic political systems.
The elocutionary movement’s excessive preoccupation with the mechanics of

delivery is similar to the sterile stylists of the late Roman period. To an
elocutionist, the way in which something is said is more important than what
is said. This view pays little or no attention to substance, rational thought and
ethics. The elocutionary movement may be regarded as the ‘Third Sophistic’.
The elocutionary movement (and hence the emphasis on delivery in rhetoric

or persuasion) flourished not only with the rise of democratic political
systems, but also in authoritarian systems. After all, where there is no free
speech, thought must be equally restricted. Sadly, as the core of healthy
rhetoric, of healthy persuasion, invention (thought, argument, proof) seldom
reigns supreme.
The major alternative to the elocutionary movement in the 18th and 19th
centuries was the works of writers who sought to integrate classical theory
with the newly emerging science of human nature. British writers (and
Protestant ministers) such as George Campbell (1719–1796), in his The
philosophy of rhetoric (1776), Hugh Blair (1718–1800), who authored Lectures
on rhetoric and belles lettres (1783) and Richard Whateley (1758–1859), who
wrote Elements of rhetoric (1828), were all influenced by the Enlightenment’s
faith in reason (Dahnke & Clatterbuck, 1990:7; Wilson & Arnold, 1983:307).
James A Winans was one of the first Americans to contribute significantly to

rhetorical theory early in the 20th century. His discussion of delivery in Public
speaking (1915) is a fine treatment of this canon of rhetoric in the English
language. Other Americans have also made contributions worthy of attention
(cf. McCroskey, 1972:15–17). In Fundamentals of speech (1920), Charles Henry
Woolbert was the first to approach rhetoric as a behavioural science. Herbert
A Wichelns, with his contribution to Studies in rhetoric and public speaking in
honor of James A Winans (1925), was the first to clearly distinguish between
rhetorical criticism and literary criticism. He held that rhetorical criticism
was primarily concerned with the effect of a speech.
A combination of new approaches to the study of rhetoric, called ‘new

rhetorics’, arose out of the work of IA Richards, together with the Polish-
born, Belgian-educated Chaim Perelman and Kenneth A Burke. (See Foss,
Foss & Trapp [1985] for useful summaries of the works of Richards, Perelman
and Burke.) In The philosophy of rhetoric (1936), Richards is specifically
concerned with how language in any kind of discourse works to produce
39

understanding in an audience. Perelman devoted himself to the analysis of

informal reasoning, a branch of study that he called the new rhetoric. Along
with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, he published a two-volume work entitled Traité
de l’argumentation – la nouvelle rhétorique in 1958, which was translated into
English as The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation in 1969.
Burke’s major contribution to the theory of rhetoric is his concept of

identification. He argues that for one person to persuade another, it is
necessary to identify – to become ‘consubstantial’ – with the audience. In
other words, you persuade people only in so far as you speak their language,
which embraces speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea and
the identification of your ways with theirs. Burke’s best-known works are A
grammar of motives (1945) and A rhetoric of motives (1950).
According to Burke, the process of identification is carried out through

symbolic acts that are related to concepts of hierarchy, acceptance and
rejection, and guilt, purification and redemption. He suggests that symbolic
acts of any kind are a response to hierarchy, contain acceptance or rejection,
and involve the processes of psychological guilt, purification (cleansing or
catharsis, where the guilt is washed away) and redemption (whereby
cleanliness, whether physical, spiritual or psychological, is achieved) (cf.
Foss, Foss & Trapp, 1985:178).
For Burke, rhetoric is the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or
to induce actions in other human agents. Therefore, every rhetorical act has a
moral or ethical dimension.
To summarise, Burke’s rhetorical philosophy evolves from the view that

language is a strategic response to a situation, and that people react
symbolically to their environment (Brock, 1972:316). Furthermore, he
believes that when we communicate and attempt to persuade others, we
choose words for and because of their dramatic potential. His rhetorical
system focuses on the ‘drama’ of human society, in which symbols are
employed as meaningful acts, that is, dramatistic responses to divisive societal
situations. In this system, individuals are viewed as acting out their purposes
on a life stage (Cathcart, 1988:87).
Contemporary scholars of rhetoric tend to be eclectic, drawing not only on

the rhetorical treatises of classical Greece and Rome and other periods but
also on a variety of academic disciplines, such as linguistics, psychology,
sociology and philosophy. Herrick (2005:269) notes that the ways in which
we use discourse to address a range of problems, including how power is
distributed and how gender is rhetorically constructed, have become the
40

subjects of study based on the works of, among others, Michel Foucault and
feminist critics such as Sonja Foss.
In the next chapter, broad starting points of interpersonal persuasion are

considered in order to provide a framework for understanding the dynamics
of persuasive communication in the interpersonal context.
41

A REMINDER
• The ancient Greeks called the study of persuasive
communication ‘rhetoric’.
• Aristotle’s (1984) exposition of rhetoric is part of philosophical
rhetoric.
• Ethos, logos and pathos are the Aristotelian artistic proofs.
• The classical canons of rhetoric became part of the vocabulary
and tradition of rhetoric and have survived to this day.
• Kenneth Burke’s major contribution to the theory of rhetoric is
his concept of identification.
42

Broad starting points of interpersonal persuasion
chapter THREE
Broad starting points of

interpersonal persuasion
LOOKING AHEAD
• describe the importance of both verbal and non-verbal messages in
the process of persuasion
• discuss the broad starting points of verbal messages in the
persuasive process
• understand Toulmin’s structure of argumentation
• explain briefly the meanings and study areas that are attached to
non-verbal messages in persuasion
• answer key questions about persuasive communication effects in
an interpersonal setting.
43

3.1 INTRODUCTION
We should know by now that in the process of persuasion the communicator
deliberately tries to influence the recipient(s) to his/her way of thinking. It is
widely believed that in order for a communicator to do this – to influence a
recipient by means of persuasion – he/she often has to help the recipient to
motivate him-/herself.
Human motivation is a complex phenomenon that is at the heart of many

philosophical and psychological theories about why human beings think and
behave as they do. For our purposes, motivation pertains to any stimulation
or inducement that leads to voluntary change in attitude or behaviour that
results in the persuadee eventually being persuaded.
At the outset, we should recognise that in the interpersonal setting the

communicator/persuader will use both verbal and non-verbal (not-word)
messages in certain ways as means of motivation in the persuasion process.
The idea is that such messages should complement each other.
3.2 VERBAL MESSAGES

Broadly speaking, when encoding verbal messages the potential persuader
has to consider human emotions, be rational and show credibility
(cf. Cockcroft & Cockcroft, 1992:17ff.).
3.2.1 Consider human emotions

In considering the emotions, the persuader must bear in mind the attitudes
and needs, especially the need for consistency, that human beings have.
3.2.1.1 Attitudes
Given the definition of persuasion in Chapter 1 Section 1.2, it should be clear
that attitudes play a very important role in the process of persuasion. Every
human being has certain attitudes, which may serve as aids or obstacles to
persuaders. A change of attitude on the part of the persuadee (which may be
the primary aim of the persuader) does not always, or necessarily, lead to
behavioural change.
Attitudes are different from opinions. Attitudes often govern opinions, that
is, those verbal answers that a person gives in response to questions that do
not anticipate a factual answer. Attitudes are also more enduring, and are
considered to be a tendency to respond in a given way towards subjects or
issues and situations. This response may be cognitive (how you think),
44

affective (how you feel) or behavioural (how you behave, or intend to behave).
The critical role of attitudes is referred to again in Section 3.4 and in
Chapter 4.
3.2.1.2 Needs
All people have needs, which have to be satisfied from time to time. The
problem is to identify these human needs early in the process of persuasion.
People’s needs make people susceptible to persuasion, and effective persuaders
determine these needs and exploit them for their own purposes. Various
human needs may be identified, but the focus here is on hidden needs and
major need levels.
In the 1950s, Vance Packard identified eight hidden needs to which advertisers
might appeal in attempting to persuade recipients to buy their products.
These eight needs, which have a much wider application than mere advertising,
can be described briefly as follows (cf. Packard, 1986:66–74):
1. Emotional security. In an increasingly insecure world, human beings have
a need for emotional security. The role of the mother in providing
emotional support to the family cannot be overestimated. The family
members’ need for emotional security, which is connected with their
feelings, is often successfully exploited by contemporary advertisers,
politicians and promoters of ideas when, for example, they market family
values.
2. Affirmation of value. People live in an impersonal, competitive society in
which they often feel like insignificant cogs in a vast machine. Packard
(1986) observes that people have a need to be esteemed according to their
true worth. They want to be valued for what they are and what they do.
For example, home executives tend to feel that they and their work are
generally underrated. In a typical affirmation-type advertisement, a
leading pasta producer helps the attractive home executive to cook her
family a wonderful dinner; she is appreciated by all and rewarded with a
kiss from her husband.
3. Ego satisfaction. Only one step on from the need for appreciation is the
need to have our ego boosted. It is apparently remarkably easy to sell an
idea to people by concentrating on this need. A certain aftershave, for
example, is said to boost a man’s sexual prowess.
4. Creative outlets. People want to feel that they do more than just
contribute – they want to contribute creatively. This is a reason that books
on gourmet cooking, knitting and the like sell so well in South Africa.
The so-called ‘personal touch’ still matters. Advertisers and other
persuaders are quick to spot this need.
45

5. Love objects. Often people whose children have grown up and left home
(the ‘empty nest’ syndrome) have a need to replace their young with a
new love object. This could be a pet, a public figure or a sporting
personality. The world of persuasion abounds with examples of love
objects providing the central motivation in the message.
6. Sense of power. People generally relish power, and power (as well as status)
is often associated with expensive material goods, such as cars or watches
produced by famous brands and advertised with an implication of
exclusivity.
7. Need for roots. This need – according to Packard (1986), a very natural
one – often surfaces. The world has become extremely cosmopolitan, and
a loss of identity has resulted. In South Africa, the quest for roots on the
part of the individual or group has sometimes been exploited by right-
wing politicians.
8. Immortality. Life insurance advertising often plays on this need – the idea
being that you can achieve some form of immortality by securing your
family financially after your death.
With respect to people’s major need levels, Abraham Maslow offered a starting
point. He observed that people have different kinds of needs that keep arising
until they are satisfied. Once the primary needs have been satisfied, their
place may be taken by some secondary need.
The needs levels are shown in Figure 3.1, and can be explained as follows (cf.
Rogers, 2007:171):
Need
for self-
actualisation
Need for love or esteem
Need for belonging
Security needs
Basic needs
Figure 3.1 Maslow’s levels of needs
46

• Basic needs. At the bottom of Maslow’s pyramid are people’s most powerful
needs: basic ones such as the physiological need for water, food, sex, sleep
and the like. This is a reason that bread-and-butter issues often feature in
political election campaigns. Only when these needs have been satisfied
can the person attend to other, higher needs.
• Security needs. The second level of the pyramid comprises needs for
security. People want to feel safe. These needs are satisfied by the family,
the home, a job, an income and political circumstances, for example.
Whenever danger threatens, this need emerges powerfully.
• Need for belonging. Once people feel that their need for security is more or
less satisfied, they become aware of a third level of need: the need to
belong. Everybody likes to feel that they belong in their family, job, social
group or community.
• Need for love or esteem. The fourth level comprises the need for love or
esteem, which follows the satisfaction of belonging needs. For example, as
a member of a group, we want to feel wanted and loved.
• Self-actualisation needs. Maslow puts self-actualisation at the pinnacle of
his pyramid. This is something integral to human nature and many
persuasive techniques are directed at it. For years, institutionalised racial
discrimination in South Africa dashed the hope of self-actualisation on the
part of most people of colour.
The needs for belonging and self-actualisation are often in conflict with one
another. People who continually try to do the best they can for themselves in
a responsible manner usually have to be careful not to antagonise the group in
which they place themselves.
3.2.1.3 Consistency
The idea of consistency relates to people’s need for predictability and a sense
of security. As pointed out, persuaders who are aware of this need can use it
to good effect.
People usually need to resolve their dissonance, or discomfort, with their

circumstances and aspire to a state of consonance, or ease. There are various
sources of dissonance and consonance that usually apply in a persuasive
situation (cf. Larson, 2013:221–223).
Sources of dissonance, which may make recipients vulnerable to persuasion,

are as follows:
• Loss of group prestige – reactionary politicians exploiting the fact that
Whites have lost their privileged position in South Africa.
• Economic loss – an insurance salesperson warning you of possible future
serious illness or accident.
47

• Loss of personal prestige – management explaining the consequences if you

do not increase your productivity.
• Uncertainty of prediction with respect to people’s behaviour or the course of
events – owners insuring their cars against damage caused by political
riots.
• Sense of guilt – companies paying huge bonuses to supplement poor salaries.
Sources of consonance, which a persuader can possibly rely on to keep a

recipient on his/her side, are as follows:
• Reassurance of security – by reassuring voters that a specific party is the
only one that can provide political and economic stability.
• Demonstration of predictability – which is related to the reassurance of
security, for example a certain flour, the one that you have always used,
helps you to make excellent cakes and pastries.
• Use of rewards – primary school teachers giving learners gold stars for doing
good work.
3.2.2 Be rational
In addition to considering human emotions, the potential persuader needs to
be rational.
In the persuasion process rational factors are not concerned with personal
preferences or inner psychological factors per se, but with the evidence (a
tactical element) and reasoning (a strategic element) that the potential
persuader uses to underlie his/her case. In short, evidence and reasoning are
the so-called components of proof that a potential persuader offers in support
of his/her case or ideas.
3.2.2.1 Evidence
Broadly speaking, evidence may be classified as direct or indirect
(circumstantial). Direct evidence tends to show the existence of a fact in
question without the intervention of the proof of any other fact. When
someone is caught stealing a radio from a house (he/she is holding the radio),
that would be direct evidence in support of the fact. Indirect or circumstantial
evidence, by contrast, tends to show the existence of a fact in question by proof
of another fact or other facts from which the fact in question may be inferred.
For example, if neighbours notice someone running away from a house, they
may become suspicious and stop him/her for questioning. When it is later
established that a robbery took place in one of the houses shortly before,
circumstantial evidence can be provided.
48

Various specific types of evidence that may be used in the process of persuasion
include the following (see Freely, 1976:79):
• Primary or secondary evidence. Primary, original or first-hand evidence is
the best evidence that the circumstances admit – it gives the greatest
certainty of the matter in question. Secondary evidence falls short of this
standard, since by its nature it suggests that there is better evidence of the
matter. Chapter 2 of this book would be primary evidence that this book
contains a chapter on the history of persuasion; a friend’s statement that
this is the case would be secondary evidence.
• Written or unwritten evidence. Written evidence is supplied by writings of
all kinds: books, newspapers, magazines, journals, etc. Unwritten evidence
includes both oral testimony and objects offered for personal inspection.
• Real or personal evidence. Real evidence is provided by objects placed on
view or under inspection, such as fingerprints or weapons in a courtroom.
Personal evidence is evidence furnished by persons, and it may be in the
form of oral or written testimony.
• Lay or expert evidence. Lay evidence is provided by people without special
training, knowledge or experience in the matter under consideration.
With expert evidence, the opposite is true.
• Prearranged or casual evidence. Prearranged evidence is created for the
specific purpose of recording certain information for possible future
reference. The average adult has prearranged evidence in the form of a
birth certificate, driver’s licence, marriage certificate and deeds to
property. Casual evidence, by contrast, is created without any intentional
effort and is therefore not designed for possible future reference. For
example, a photograph of someone attending a tennis match could be used
later as an alibi in criminal proceedings against that person, who may be
accused of being elsewhere at the time.
• Dramatic or rational evidence. Dramatic evidence appeals to our emotions
and may take the form of, among other things, a narrative or story,
testimony and anecdote. Rational evidence appeals to our reasoning and
often relies on statistics and facts.
What kind of evidence is most persuasive? How much evidence is enough?

When should we use what kind of evidence? These are all relevant questions,
but there are no exact answers.
Larson (2013:231ff.) provides 10 useful generalisations about evidence

deduced from behavioural studies in the late 20th century:
1. Evidence increases the persuasive effects if the persuader is unknown or

has low to moderate credibility. [See Section 3.2.3.]
2. There seems to be little difference in the persuasive effects generated from
emotional as opposed to rational evidence.
49

3. Usually some evidence is better than no evidence.

4. ‘Reluctant’ evidence (that given by people against themselves or their
own interests) is no more effective than biased or unbiased objective
evidence.
5. Good delivery can enhance the potency of evidence (but perhaps only when
the sources are unknown or have low credibility, so that the delivery makes
them and their evidence more believable and therefore more persuasive).
6. Evidence can make persuasive changes more permanent.
7. Evidence is most effective when the persuadee has not heard it before.
8. The method of transmitting the evidence (live, recorded, and the like)
seems to have no effect on evidence potency.
9. People are likely to believe evidence that agrees with their own position
more than evidence that does not.
10. Highly dogmatic people differ from people who are not so dogmatic; the
highly dogmatic are more affected by evidence.
3.2.2.2 Reasoning
Reasoning may be broadly classified as induction and deduction. Inductive
reasoning proceeds from the particular to the general; deductive reasoning
proceeds from the general to the particular. More specifically, in inductive reasoning
we go from a number of particular premises to a general conclusion, while in
deductive reasoning we go from a general statement in the premise to a particular
statement in the conclusion. Here is an example of each type of reasoning:
Induction
The crime rate has increased in Johannesburg since 2010.
The crime rate has increased in Bloemfontein since 2010.
The crime rate has increased in Durban since 2010.
Therefore, the crime rate has increased in South Africa since 2010.
Deduction
The crime rate has increased in South Africa since 2010.
Bloemfontein is a city in South Africa.
Therefore, the crime rate has increased in Bloemfontein since 2010.
However, the distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning is not

absolute. They supplement each other. Some deduction is present in
induction, since induction must proceed from assumptions, and the
inductive method for establishing a general premise serves as the starting
point for deduction.
Various types of reasoning may be employed in the process of persuasion. We

consider five types, which often occur in practice:
50

1. Reasoning from cause to effect. The reasoner infers that when A occurs, B
will most probably follow. In other words, such reasoning attempts to
establish the most probable effect of a given circumstance. For example,
widespread violence in South Africa will not attract investors from
overseas.
2. Reasoning from effect to cause. The reasoner observes a known effect and
tries to determine the cause. For example, Marxism is dead; it led to
economic stagnation wherever it had become institutionalised.
3. Reasoning from criteria to application. Persuaders establish what may
appear to be a reasonable set of criteria for purchasing a product, voting
for a candidate or supporting a cause, and then offer their product,
candidate or cause as the one that meets those criteria. For example, if
you are young but wish to be seen as already very successful, you need to
drive a particular car made by a particular well-known car manufacturer.
4. Reasoning from comparison. Persuaders may use comparisons as the logical
substantiation for a certain conclusion. Such reasoning, then, involves
comparing two different things; when the two have enough significant
attributes in common, it is possible to conclude that they are similar in other
ways as well. For example, a casino in one town would provide needed revenue
for the town because a casino has done so in another town.
5. Reasoning from example. This process entails moving from one or more
specific cases to a generalisation. On the basis of even a small number of
cases, we generalise about a larger group. For example, from among 10
recent Master’s students in communication science those that were
proficient writers completed their degrees successfully. You need to have
excellent writing skills to successfully complete a Master’s degree in
communication science.
3.2.2.3 Argumentation
The process of providing evidence and reasoning to gain adherence to ideas is
generally called argumentation. The principal aim of argumentation is
cogency, that is, being clear, logical and convincing.
More specifically, argumentation is the entire communication process of

making claims, challenging these claims, backing them up by providing
evidence and reasons, criticising this evidence and these reasons, rebutting
those criticisms and so on (cf. Toulmin, Rieke & Janik, 1979:13).
In argumentation we are concerned with the argumentative uses of language,

as opposed to its instrumental uses. By instrumental uses, we mean ‘those
utterances that are supposed to achieve their purpose directly, as they stand,
without the need to produce any additional “reasons” or “supporting
arguments”’ (Toulmin, Rieke & Janik, 1979:5–6). Examples of such uses are
51

giving orders, greeting our friends and shouting for joy. By contrast,
argumentative uses are those utterances that succeed or fail only to the extent
that they can be supported by arguments, reasons, evidence or the like, and
are able to carry the recipient along with them only because they have such a
rational foundation (Toulmin, Rieke & Janik, 1979:6).
However, in practice, utterances lie along a continuum from the purely

instrumental to the purely argumentative. So, for instance, even an order may
give rise to an argument, if the addressee is prepared to challenge the
addressor’s authority or purposes.
There are of course limits to what can be accomplished by argumentation.

For example, many of our most significant personal and interpersonal
problems are not solved rationally. They often occur on an emotional
level – involving feelings, preferences, etc.
While Aristotle’s syllogism and enthymeme (see Chapter 2 Section 2.3.2)

have been the methods of analysing arguments for centuries, it was in 1958
that the English logician Stephen E Toulmin proposed a most useful model
for everyday practical and rational argumentation in his work The uses of
argument.
A structure of argumentation: The Toulmin model

Toulmin suggests that any argument can have six elements, as illustrated in
Figure 3.2 on page 54:
1. Claims. An argument consists of a claim (C). Claims are the ‘assertions
put forward publicly for general acceptance’ (Toulmin, Rieke & Janik,
1979:29). In other words, a claim is whatever conclusion you would like
recipients to accept. For example: ‘Jack will fail the examination on
persuasive communication this semester’.
2. Data (grounds). A claim needs some data (D) to support it. Data are
evidence, which may take the form of statements, statistics, quotations,
etc, that ‘clarify and make good the previous claim’ (Toulmin, Rieke &
Janik, 1979:33). Data therefore tell recipients that there is reason to trust
or accept the claim. In our example, the data might be that ‘Jack has not
passed any of the tests on persuasive communication this semester’.
3. Warrants. An argument moves from the data through a warrant (W) to a
claim. A warrant is the justification for making the claim about what the
data show. In other words, a warrant answers the question: How do you
get from the data to the claim?
52

Warrants that apply to all areas of arguments are called field invariant
warrants and may take the form of generalisation, analogy, direct
observation and comparison, among others. In our example, the warrant
could be that ‘test marks are usually reliable indicators of success rates in
examinations’.
4. Backing. Backing (B) supports or certifies the warrant. Backing makes
explicit ‘the body of experience relied on to establish the trustworthiness
of the ways of arguing applied to any particular case’ (Toulmin, Rieke &
Janik, 1979:57). For instance, if the warrant is based on generalisation,
the backing tells recipients why the generalisation is accurate. In our
example, the backing might be that ‘statistics over the past 10 years show
this to be true!’.
5. Qualifiers. A qualifier (Q ) shows the kind and degree of reliance that is to
be placed on the claim (Toulmin, Rieke & Janik, 1979:69). The claim can
be qualified by saying it may, probably, presumably, always, certainly or
sometimes be so. In our example, the qualifier could be that ‘Jack will
probably fail the examination on persuasive communication this
semester’.
6. Rebuttals. A rebuttal (R) clause reveals the ‘extraordinary or exceptional
circumstances that might undermine the force of the supporting
arguments’ (Toulmin, Rieke & Janik, 1979:75). We use the rebuttal clause
to anticipate certain objections that recipients may have about the claim.
Rebuttals often start with the word ‘unless’. In our example, the rebuttal
clause may be ‘unless Jack becomes committed to studying persuasive
communication this semester’.
53

D
C
Jack has not
Jack will fail
passed any of Q the exam on
the tests on
So probably persuasive
persuasive
communication
communication
this semester.
this semester.
W
Test marks are usually R
reliable indicators
Unless Jack
of success rates in
becomes
examinations.
committed
to studying
persuasive
B communication
this semester
Statistics over the past 10
years show this to be true.
D = Data W = Warrant B = Backing Q = Qualifier R = Rebuttal C = Claim
Figure 3.2 The five steps of the Toulmin model
Using the Toulmin model

The following five steps may be used by analysts, speakers and the like who
wish to use the Toulmin model in an actual argument (cf. Eisenberg & Illardo,
1980:42–43):
1. Establish exactly what is being claimed, and whether a qualifier has been
attached to the claim.
2. Find out what data or evidence is being presented in support of the claim.
3. Determine whether a warrant has been introduced. Remember that a
warrant is information that justifies linking the claim with its supporting
data (evidence).
4. Establish whether backing (additional data that reinforce the warrant)
has been provided, should the warrant still require further explication.
5. Look out for a rebuttal, a critical element in the Toulmin model.
The Toulmin model reveals the structure of any entire argument. But not
every argument necessarily has all six elements (claim, data, warrant, backing,
qualifier and rebuttal). The communicator (speaker) may fail to provide a full
argument, or recipients (the audience) will supply part of it.
54

3.2.3 Show credibility

It is also important for the potential persuader to come across as a credible
communicator.
Credibility revolves around a communicator’s seeming expertness

(intelligence), trustworthiness and goodwill towards recipients. Other
contributing factors are the communicator’s reputation, which is brought to
the rhetorical situation, and whether the language and development of the
message reflect good taste, common sense and sincerity.
Non-verbal factors – see Section 3.3 – also play a role in this regard. Let us

look at the idea of showing expertness, trustworthiness and goodwill towards
recipients in order to enhance the potential persuader’s credibility.
3.2.3.1 Expertness
Expertness is conveyed when a communicator’s material and treatment of it
shows that he/she knows the subject well and can apply it accurately and
appropriately to the situation.
3.2.3.2 Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness is attributed to a communicator when recipients think the
communicator knows what he/she is talking about and shares and respects
the values prized by the recipients. Moreover, recipients seem to trust
communicators who know more and understand better than they do.
3.2.3.3 Goodwill
Goodwill is a quality attributed to a person. We feel goodwill towards someone
when we think that we perceive goodness in him/her. A feeling of goodwill is
conveyed when there is a sense of undeveloped friendship between a
communicator and recipients. In other words, in treating the material at
hand, the communicator should show recipients that he/she is at least a
possible friend to them and their interests.
The discerning reader will realise that the broad starting points of
interpersonal persuasion discussed so far relate closely to Aristotle’s
conception of ethos, pathos and logos as explored in Chapter 2 Section 2.3.2.
55

3.3 NON-VERBAL MESSAGES

The process of persuasion includes not only verbal messages but also non-
verbal messages. However, people are generally less aware of attempts at non-
verbal persuasion than they are of verbal persuasion, although non-verbal
messages often carry much more weight than verbal messages – for example,
in a face-to-face communication situation such as an interview.
Non-verbal messages can contradict, repeat, regulate, substitute, accentuate

or complement verbal messages. They can thus dramatically affect the
outcome of the process of persuasion. Of course, the overall idea is that non-
verbal messages should complement verbal messages.
At the outset, we should bear the following in mind about the meanings of
non-verbal messages (Rogers, 1984:77):
• Non-verbal messages frequently have an iconic relationship with their
meanings – they often look like what they mean. For example, a raised-
fist gesture actually looks hostile, probably because of its similarity to the
action of punching. Similarly, a sad face looks sad, in contrast to a happy
face. But words have an arbitrary relationship with their meanings – the
way a word looks or sounds usually has no bearing on its meaning.
• While words tend to have explicit or specific meanings, non-verbal messages
tend to be more implicit or subtle in meaning. For example, if someone asks a
favour of you, you can say yes or no. But your facial expression may reflect a
response that is not clearly yes or no, but rather something in between.
• Non-verbal messages depend heavily on social contexts for their meanings.
It would say a lot if you went to a nudist beach with your clothes on. In fact,
most non-verbal messages do not really mean anything in isolation. By
contrast, the meanings of words are usually more closely associated with
the word, even out of context.
• Individual mannerisms must be taken into account when interpreting non-
verbal messages. For example, if a person twitches his/her eyebrows
continually in conversation, it should not necessarily be interpreted as a
sign of nervousness. This is an important point because persuasion (both
verbal and non-verbal), like communication, is an intentional process.
When non-verbal signs are conveyed unintentionally, we speak of non-
verbal behaviour. And here analysing and evaluating non-verbal messages
becomes difficult: It is often unclear whether the communicator has
intentionally given off certain signs.
• Non-verbal messages are often culture-related, as is the case of verbal
messages. So non-verbal messages employed for the purposes of persuading
someone may not be as effective, or effective at all, when the persuader,
who is from one culture, such as African, tries to persuade recipients from
another culture, for example Western.
56

Traditionally, non-verbal communication has been organised into several

study areas (Hickson & Stacks, 1989; Richmond & McCroskey, 2004; Rogers,
2007:33–37; Tubbs & Moss, 1981:162–192). We will focus briefly on seven of
them: objectics, proxemics, chronemics, haptics, kinesics, oculesics and
vocalics.
3.3.1 Objectics
Objectics concerns the use of objects in the process of persuasion. The idea is
that objects surrounding a potential persuader should convey certain
favourable impressions about that person. For example, a national flag may
connote patriotism, and books may indicate intelligence or expertness. A
luxury car or house could convey prestige. Included in the study of objectics
is the use of clothing: A police uniform, for instance, would symbolise
authority.
3.3.2 Proxemics
Proxemics focuses on the use of space or distance, which is especially relevant
to interpersonal relationships. Four general distances are usually used by
persuaders in Western culture:
1. Public distance. This is the distance found in public-speaking situations,
where speakers are at least a few metres away from their audiences.
2. Social distance. The distance between communicating participants is
closer than the public distance. This is used in committee meetings and
at more formal social gatherings.
3. Personal/informal distance. This is the distance used when two colleagues
or friends discuss a matter they are concerned about.
4. Intimate distance. This is the distance between two people who, for
example, lovingly whisper messages that they do not want others to hear.
The use of environment may also be classified under proxemics. A candlelit

restaurant may be more appropriate than a fast-food outlet for a date, while a
spacious environment such as the bushveld may be preferred over a bar for the
purpose of deliberating serious matters of state. So the persuader often selects
the environment in which persuasion is to take place.
An environment may be used for more subtle purposes as well. For example,
a public relations practitioner may decide to invite prospective clients to an
exclusive game lodge to convey the impression that the company concerned is
an established and admired one, and thus that it is quite capable of looking
after their best interests.
57

3.3.3 Chronemics
Chronemics concerns the use of time. Time can communicate many things to
people. Potential persuaders must observe how time works in their culture or
in the unfamiliar cultural environment to be entered in order to persuade
others about, for example, their feelings and intentions.
In Western culture, it is generally the norm to arrive punctually at an

appointment. Being on time shows that you are disciplined and respectful
towards others. Of course, time can be used to serve ulterior purposes. For
example, arriving at a party quite late may give the impression that you have
a hectic schedule and thus should be regarded as an important guest.
3.3.4 Haptics
Haptics concerns the use of touch. While the practice of touching others is
often culture-related, it is universal to touch someone when you are in love
with that person. Moreover, touch invariably functions to persuade in the
lovemaking process. In other words, touch may convey a specific attitude.
Touch also has less exciting functions – for example, you may touch someone
simply to get his/her attention. Hickson and Stacks (1989:75–89) report
research showing that moderate touching seems to be helpful to people with
speech difficulty, and that librarians are evaluated more positively when they
‘incidentally’ touch students checking out books!
3.3.5 Kinesics
Kinesics concerns the use of facial expressions, gestures and postures, among
other things.
The face is an excellent instrument for communication and persuasion.

Fundamental emotions associated with certain facial expressions are:
surprise, fear, anger, interest, disgust, sadness, happiness, contempt,
bewilderment and determination. These basic expressions can be combined
to form what are called blends. Facial blends include the more complex
expressions such as sarcasm.
Human gesture can involve the hands, arms, shoulders, head and feet. As
brief movements of these body parts, gestures usually accompany speech, but
can also be made when we are quiet. Gesticulation that occurs when we are
quiet – for example, hand-wringing – is more likely to express some emotional
state in reaction to persuasion attempts. Gesticulation that occurs during
speech usually helps to express, and thus complement, the meaning of the
persuader’s words.
58

More specifically, gestures that have a direct verbal translation are called
emblems. Argyle (1988:53) lists the following emblems as being very common:
point, shrug, head-nod, clap, beckon, wave, halt sign, pat on back, thumb
down, outline female body and tilt head with flat palm (sleep). Illustrators are
important gestures that are used to support what is being said verbally, and
are often linked to persuasive speech, especially in an interpersonal setting.
One class of illustrators – batons – is employed to emphasise words or
sentences, such as shaking your fist and telling the other person how angry
you are.
Gestures therefore often convey attitudes. How many times have we seen
political candidates with clenched fists or, conversely, shaking hands at
rallies, waving at crowds or hugging children to convey a friendly attitude
towards people?
Human posture, which of course also conveys attitudes, refers to how you
hold your body when standing, sitting or walking. In Western culture, the
hands-on-the-hips pose is commonly used during anger to persuade a child
not to do the same thing again, while an upright posture often signifies
confidence and alertness.
3.3.6 Oculesics
Oculesics is the study of eye behaviour. With our eyes we can avoid, approach,
control, love or hate our fellow human beings without speaking a word.
Hence, messages sent by the eyes have a powerful influence on expressing
emotions and regulating interactions between people.
The role played by eye behaviour in our non-verbal interactions with other
people should not be underestimated, nor should the fact that eye behaviour
can stimulate positive or negative arousal and involvement with people. After
all, the initial contact made between people usually is eye contact. If such
contact does not please either of the individuals, it is likely (if it is at all
possible) that no further contact will take place.
3.3.7 Vocalics
The study of the persuasive value of vocal behaviour, or paralanguage, is
called vocalics.
The term ‘paralanguage’ means something beyond or in addition to language

itself. The importance of vocal behaviour/paralanguage lies in the impact it
has on perceptions of the verbal content of our messages.
59

Vocalics mainly concerns the use of oral but non-verbal aspects of spoken
language, especially voice qualities such as pitch, tempo or rate of speech, and
vocalisations, which are noises without linguistic structure, such as crying,
laughing and grunting. Silences or pauses when speaking – for example, to
convey the importance of a given matter – are also a matter of vocalics. We all
know that a ‘boring’ speaker – one who, for example, keeps his/her pitch of
voice at the same level throughout the speech, or one who never pauses
appropriately – often fails to keep our attention as recipients, and thus his/her
persuasive ability is negatively influenced.
According to Richmond and McCroskey (2004:113–114), studies of vocal

behaviour and persuasion have found that the speed with which we speak may
influence our ability to persuade others:
[T]he faster we talk (within reason, of course) the more likely we are to
influence our listeners. Maybe there is something to the stereotype of the
fast-talking salesperson. The probable explanation for this finding is that
faster speech rates are often associated with perceptions of competence,
expertise, and intelligence. If we as listeners perceive those characteristics in
speakers, we are more likely to consider them credible sources and,
consequently, to believe their messages. Often the perception we hold of
others greatly affects their ability to influence us.
Richmond and McCroskey (2004:114) also note that:
[v]ocal nonfluencies such as tongue slips, stuttering, and repetitions can

harm perceptions of the competence and dynamism of the speaker […] While
studies have not demonstrated an immediate impact on persuasion because
they found the nonfluencies hurt a speaker’s credibility, it is likely that these
negative impressions of credibility would affect the speaker’s persuasiveness.
Let us address certain key questions that relate to persuasive communication

effects in an interpersonal setting.
3.4 KEY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Scholars have reached tentative conclusions about the effects of persuasive
communication in an interpersonal setting through various laboratory and
field experiments (Bettinghaus & Cody, 1994:3ff; Richmond & McCroskey,
2004; cf. Schramm & Porter, 1982:187–213). Significant conclusions are as
follows:
60

Who makes the best persuader?
The one who, through his/her verbal and non-verbal messages, shows
expertness, trustworthiness and goodwill towards recipients is usually
regarded as a very effective persuader.
More often than not, recipients must like the communicator as well – they
must feel that the communicator is ‘their kind of person’.
What makes the most effective message?
Normally an effective message is conveyed at the appropriate time and

combines emotional and logical appeals, thus capturing the attention of
recipients. Preferably, the message should also fit comfortably with what
recipients know and believe, and offer an opportunity or a gain that will be
easy and pleasant for recipients to take or accept.
The timing of the message is very important. This applies to situations as far-
ranging as asking somebody out on a date for the first time to asking your
boss for a pay rise. For example, asking for a first date when other people are
around, or asking for a pay rise when the company is experiencing falling
sales, would normally be ineffective.
Should a message draw its conclusions explicitly or let the recipient decide what
they are?
On the one hand, laboratory experiments typically find that more change
occurs and more desired points are learned when the conclusions are stated
explicitly. Field experiments, on the other hand, often show that messages are
more persuasive when recipients are led to discover the conclusions for
themselves.
How should you deal with the opposition’s arguments?
Generally, it seems better to mention and refute the opposition’s arguments

rather than to ignore them when:
• recipients are initially hostile to your view
• recipients are highly educated and used to hearing both sides of an
argument
• recipients are likely to hear the other side’s arguments anyway.
This raises the possibility of ‘immunising’ recipients against opposing

arguments.
61

The question of primacy versus recency (whether the main points of your
argument should be placed first or last) is also relevant. The most general finding
is that arguments placed first have some advantage in attracting attention,
while arguments placed last have some advantage in being remembered. Also,
arguments that will be well accepted should usually be placed first in order to
make later, potentially problematic arguments more easy to accept.
Are both the non-verbal and verbal components of communication often necessary
for a recipient to be persuaded?
Verbal messages mainly serve a content or cognitive function, while non-

verbal messages tend to have an affective, relational or emotional function.
Both types of messages are often relevant to the success of the persuasive
process between people. If we expect others to develop positive attitudes
about or towards us, our verbal communication alone may not accomplish
this. But if we ignore the verbal content of our messages, others may not
understand what we are conveying and the possibility of persuasion taking
place may be lost.
Do recipient variables play a crucial part in persuasion?
Recipient variables do play a crucial role in persuasion, because persuasion is

not simply a linear process but one that involves interaction and feedback.
Thus it is very useful for the communicator to determine the following
variables, among others: recipients’ demographic characteristics, such as sex,
age, culture, occupation and education; and, where possible, personality
variables such as self-esteem and the degree to which the recipient is ego-
involved with or committed to the issue at hand.
Usually, low self-esteem makes people vulnerable to being influenced and to

shifting their attitudes, but less willing or able to comprehend, retain or
analyse complex evidence and reasoning. With high self-esteem we normally
have the confidence to face the risk of analysing the issues and perhaps
arguing against them. The more ego-involved we are with an issue, the more
likely we are to defend our position on the issue concerned, and vice versa.
What are the effects of group membership and decisions on recipients?
Whether you are dealing with family, work, social class, or professional,
political or other groups, it helps greatly to know which groups people value
and which norms they will consequently defend against change. It would be
unwise to attack any group loyalties or valued group memberships. It seems
that when a major change is achieved in a recipient’s values and behaviour, it
usually has to be accompanied by a change in the recipient’s valued groups.
62

Thus, group decisions are used to affect individual decisions. To a large

extent, such a change on the part of the individual promises social support
and approval by the group.
Do decisions made on the basis of outside influence tend to change with time?
Decisions made on the basis of outside influence do tend to change with time,
since people often forget who influenced them in the first place. They may
well feel that another person, with whom they had originally disagreed
because he/she was regarded as untrustworthy etc, was the source of their
preferred view. The idea is to bring the original view or decision to the fore by
reminding recipients of the trustworthy source.
Again, we need to bear in mind the importance of how the communicator of

the accepted message is perceived.
By now we should have a good idea of the broad starting points of the process
of persuasion as it relates to verbal and non-verbal messages, as well as of a
few notable but tentative conclusions about the effects of persuasive
communication in an interpersonal setting. However, the above account is
not enough. We also need to focus on the more important theories of
interpersonal persuasion that play out in contemporary society.
63

A REMINDER
• In the persuasive process, non-verbal messages should
complement verbal messages.
• The potential persuader should consider human emotions, be
rational and show credibility when encoding verbal messages.
• Toulmin proposes a useful model for everyday practical and
rational argumentation.
• Various meanings are attached to non-verbal messages.
• Key questions and answers about persuasive communication
effects in an interpersonal setting have emerged over the years.
64

Theories of interpersonal persuasion
chapter FOUR
Theories of interpersonal
persuasion
LOOKING AHEAD
After reading this chapter, you will be able to, among other things,
explain and compare the salient characteristics of:
• attitude change theory
• theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour
• learning theories
• consistency theories
• social judgement–involvement theory
• the elaboration likelihood theory.
65

4.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 1 Section 1.2.2, it was pointed out that a theory is a creative
interpretation/explanation of why processes or events occur as they do.
Therefore, a theory of persuasion attempts to interpret/explain how
persuasion works. In practice, however, a given theory usually focuses only
on certain aspects that are important in the process of persuasion. So a theory
can rarely be regarded as a complete explanation of the persuasion process.
In this chapter, we will deal with the main points of attitude change theory,
theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour, learning theories,
consistency theories, the social judgement–involvement theory and the
elaboration likelihood theory, which are often found in the literature (Benoit
& Benoit, 2008; Bettinghaus & Cody, 1994; Littlejohn & Foss, 2008; Reardon,
1981; Rogers, 2007; Severin & Tankard, 1992; cf. Perloff, 2010).
It should be clear by now that where the encoding of persuasive messages is

involved, non-verbal messages should complement verbal messages.
4.2 ATTITUDE CHANGE THEORY

This theory developed out of a research project conducted in the mid-1950s
by the Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program, headed by the
psychologist Carl Hovland. The Yale programme was based on the idea that
persuasion depends on a persuadee listening to, understanding, accepting
and remembering the message, as well as acting on the message appeal. The
researchers focused on the acceptance stage of the message appeal.
Attitude change theory revolves around the hypothesis that the behaviour of
potential recipients is constrained or controlled by the attitudes that these
recipients have towards the various aspects of, for example, the issue,
candidate, product or service under consideration. For instance, if you have a
positive attitude to preserving the ozone layer, it will probably cause you to
buy ozone-friendly products.
Therefore, if persuaders want to change the behaviour of recipients, they

usually need to change recipients’ attitudes, that is, their tendencies to respond
in given ways towards subjects or issues and situations.
The Yale programme reported that attitude change depended on the

persuadee viewing it as potentially rewarding, and that he/she must find the
change environment or circumstances – the opinions of others, appeals used,
source characteristics and so on – favourable. Belief as a change agent of
attitude was emphasised.
66

Attitudinal changes do not, however, always lead to behavioural changes – as

pointed out in Chapter 3 Section 3.2.1.2. Smokers who are confronted with
shocking messages about the relation between smoking and cancer might
change their attitudes towards smoking from positive to negative, but they
might not change their actual behaviour – that is, stop smoking. In other
words, persuasion cannot be regarded merely as a linear process.
Given the difficulty of finding significant attitude-behaviour relationships,

Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) developed the theory of reasoned action, and Ajzen
(1991) subsequently modified it with his theory of planned behaviour, to
which we now turn.
4.3 THEORIES OF REASONED ACTION AND PLANNED

BEHAVIOUR
According to the theory of reasoned action (TRA), it is our intention to
change our behaviour that is the most important predictor of actually
changing that behaviour, not our attitudes towards the behaviour itself.
The theory assumes that people rationally calculate the costs and benefits of
taking a particular action, and think carefully about how others who are
important to them will view that behaviour of theirs.
As Perloff (2010:95) notes:
There are four components of the theory. The first is attitude toward the
behavior (the person’s judgment that performing the behavior is good or
bad); the second is subjective norm (the person’s perceptions of the social
pressures put on him to perform or not perform the behavior in question).
The third component is behavioral intention, the intent or plan to perform
the behavior. The final aspect (component) is behavior itself – action in a
particular situation.
Consider the following example: Joe, who is married with three children,
drinks too much alcohol at night. While Joe recognises this and regards his
behaviour (drinking too much alcohol) in a negative light, he does not reduce
his intake. But if he intends to drink less, which will be welcomed by his wife
and children whom he wants to please, Joe will more likely change his
behaviour on this matter.
The main shortcoming of this theory is that it assumes that people have
control over their behaviour. What if Joe cannot gather enough willpower to
drink less alcohol at night? In this case the TRA breaks down because people
are not always able to do what they intend.
67

One of the developers of the TRA, Icek Ajzen, introduced a variation to the
theory with his theory of planned behaviour (TPB). While attitude (whether
the behaviour is good or bad) and subjective norm (what other people would
think) underlie behavioural intention in the TRA, Ajzen (1991) adds perceived
behavioural control as an important component to behavioural intention.
Perloff (2010:100) explains:
Perceived behavioral control is the individual’s perception of how much

control he or she has over the behavior; it is a subjective estimate of how easy
or difficult it will be to perform the behavior. The more I perceive that I can
perform the action, the more successful I should be in translating intention
into behavior.
According to the TPB, Joe wants to, and has the perception that he can, drink
less at night, which would please his family.
4.4 LEARNING THEORIES

Some researchers conceptualise persuasion as a specialised kind of learning.
There are many learning theories; in this book we look at Ivan Pavlov’s
classical conditioning and Skinnerian behaviourism, which is derived from
the work of the psychologist BF Skinner, as well as the social learning theory
of Albert Bandura.
4.4.1 Classical conditioning and Skinnerian behaviourism

With classical conditioning, behavioural change and, then, persuasion can only
be explained through a stimulus–response relationship. The recipient is seen
as little more than a robot responding to external stimuli. More specifically,
when a particular (unconditioned) response follows a given (unconditioned)
stimulus, the repeated pairing of the unconditioned stimulus with a neutral
stimulus results in the neutral stimulus – now the conditioned stimulus –
eliciting the same response.
Pavlov conducted an experiment in which he rang a bell shortly before

blowing meat powder into a dog’s mouth. The dog initially salivated in
response to the meat powder, but later started salivating in response to the
bell alone. Classical conditioning postulates that, with the proper negative or
positive association, behavioural patterns can be established or learned.
Much of propaganda theory, especially fascist and authoritarian, is founded

on a crude Pavlovian associational psychology. Nazi domestic propaganda
was based almost entirely on such classical conditioning, in which the desired
68

virtues of courage, patriotism, loyalty and obedience were embedded and

strengthened in large parts of the population. The idea was that the
propagandist should repeat mechanically his/her assumptions and
suggestions, and lessen the opportunity for communicating disagreement.
The individual is regarded as essentially a conditioned reflex or response
machine.
The process of persuasion often involves influencing a person to respond to

one object or word in the same negative or positive way in which he/she
typically responds to another object or word. For example, it has been argued
that in South Africa many leftists respond to the word ‘capitalism’ (conditioned
stimulus) in much the same way that they respond to the word ‘exploitation’
(unconditioned stimulus) – that is, with hatred (conditioned response).
Exploitation, by the few over the masses, has been associated for so long with
capitalism (albeit in a distorted way) that capitalism and exploitation are
regarded as one and the same thing.
Pavlov made a valuable contribution by drawing attention to the irrational

and unconscious forces in human nature. But the human being is overall much
more complicated than a responding machine. At best, the conditioned
response accounts for a limited part of human behaviour. Mass persuaders, no
matter how skilled, cannot produce any and every effect they wish to in entire
populations.
Skinnerian behaviourism revolves around the prediction that behavioural

change is a response to our environment. In other words, behaviour relates to
external rather than internal (mental) factors. Again, the recipient is seen as
little more than a robot responding to external stimuli. Given the proper
administration of positive or negative reinforcers, patterns of behaviour can
be established or learned.
The central idea in this theory is that behaviour is determined by its

consequence: reward or punishment. The stimulus per se is less important
here; rather, the relationship between the response and the consequences of
the response is decisive. For example, behaviourist theory would predict that
when a husband who is used to the traditional division of domestic labour
decides to cook his first meal, and is reinforced in such behaviour by praise
from his wife, the chances of his repeating that behaviour are increased. Or, if
a person notices that his/her salary increases significantly as a result of
working overtime of his/her own free will, that person is more likely to be
persuaded to work overtime in future.
While it would of course be very useful for persuaders to identify the

conditions (stimuli) that led to the desired response in the first place (cooking
69

a meal, working overtime), researchers using this theory focus just on the
response–reinforcement connection.
4.4.2 Social learning theory

Social learning theory, as explained by Bandura, views human beings as
active participants in the process of persuasion. Bandura’s theory can be
stated briefly as follows:
• People establish goals that entail rewards or positive consequences if achieved.
• People choose to behave in ways that have the potential for achieving their
goals.
• People interpret the consequences of behaviour as rewards or punishments.
• Choices are affected by the perceived successes and failures of the past, as
well as by anticipated consequences in the future. In other words, behaviour
is shaped by interaction between external conditions and internal cognitive
processes.
This theory, then, suggests that there is a continuous interaction between a

person’s internal state and the social reinforcements that follow from his/her
behaviour with others. Through observation, experience and self-regulation,
we learn to behave in certain ways in our social interactions.
When we perceive that a certain behaviour is not socially rewarding, or

perhaps even leads to social punishment, we learn or are persuaded to stop
the behaviour, and vice versa. For example, when you realise that your absence
from church has led the community to ignore you, and you need to feel part
of that community, you may well be persuaded to become a more regular
churchgoer in future.
4.5 CONSISTENCY THEORIES

Consistency theories rest on the assumption that human beings do not like
inconsistencies. Inconsistencies may be found in three situations:
1. Two sets of messages.
2. A difference between a person’s existing attitudes and his/her behaviour.
3. A difference between your behaviour and the behaviour that is expected
of you by another person in a given situation.
Consistency theories predict that behaviour will change as a result of

inconsistencies perceived by the recipient.
These theories include the balance theory of Heider and Newcomb, the
congruity theory of Osgood and Tannenbaum, Festinger’s cognitive
dissonance theory and the belief hierarchy of Rokeach.
70

4.5.1 Balance theory

The earliest consistency theory is the balance theory, which was first proposed
by Fritz Heider and adapted by Theodore Newcomb to an interpersonal
communication situation.
This theory is relatively simple, involving two people and a single topic. The
idea is that the recipient must be positively orientated towards the
communicator, and the communicator must communicate a relationship
towards a single topic that is different from the relationship held by the
recipient. This would produce an unstable state that would be resolved in
some way: The recipient would change his/her attitude/behaviour towards
either the communicator or the topic. For example, you and your boyfriend
disagree about religion. You may decide not to speak about the subject, or you
may decide in the end to leave your boyfriend because his views on religion
are unacceptable to you.
4.5.2 Congruity theory

Congruity theory, proposed by Charles Osgood and Percy Tannenbaum, can
involve two people, two concepts or two sets of information on which a
judgement needs to be made by a single observer. If the two are similar or
congruent, there is no problem. If not, the prediction is that the recipient will
experience pressure to change his/her judgement on one of them.
Take any popular celebrity, or politician, as an example. At first, we may

idolise the person for the good things he/she does for the larger community.
However, as the media start to report on discrepancies in his/her financial
affairs and/or private life, we may start to change our view of that person.
Congruity theory is often applicable when considering the merits of a

particular player in a sports team. Generally, the strong and weak points of
the player require a judgement to be made as to whether that player should be
included in the national team. Often the judgement is a personal one, made
according to the observer’s logic.
4.5.3 Cognitive dissonance theory

Cognitive dissonance theory was first proposed by Leon Festinger, and is one
of the most important theories in the history of social psychology (Littlejohn
& Foss, 2008:78).
The term ‘cognitive dissonance’ means the feeling of discomfort caused by

conflicts or inconsistencies between a person’s attitudes and/or behaviour.
71

There is an important difference between Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory

and the balance and congruity theories: Whereas the earlier theories predict a
change in attitudes, judgements or evaluations, dissonance theory predicts that
when one thing does not logically follow another thing, we will experience
psychological tension, which we will attempt to reduce in some way.
Tension reduction involves more than change. Tension has a quantitative

dimension (which balance and congruity theories do not address) as well as a
qualitative dimension. We can change our attitudes, judgements or evaluations
a little, a little more than a little, a lot or not at all. An example would be a
wife and mother who firmly believes in family life but often spends her free
time with her friends. She may well decide to cut down on her female
socialising (quantitative dimension) and at the same time pay more careful
attention to the needs of her husband and children (qualitative dimension).
Another feature of dissonance theory is that the tension is produced by

dissonance within an individual’s psychological system. Balance and congruity
theories rely more on logical inconsistencies than on psychological ones.
So where there is dissonance within an individual’s psychological system,

there will be pressure for his/her attitudes to change. Dissonance is thus a
motivating factor in its own right – a source of psychological discomfort that
the person must seek to relieve. Where there is no dissonance, the pressures
are for preservation and stability. New information by itself cannot cause
persuasive change, dissonance has to be present as well.
Persuaders can find in dissonance theory a very powerful tool. Disruption,

confusion or attitude change can be initiated by drawing attention to the
dissonant components of messages. Or stability can be maintained by
disguising or denying the dissonant elements. The problem, however, as with
all psychological theories, is that effects must be looked for in the person’s
behaviour, because there is no visible evidence or direct observation of an
attitude or of dissonance.
4.5.4 Belief hierarchy

The belief hierarchy of Milton Rokeach suggests that attitudes, beliefs and
values are interwoven and ranked in various hierarchies, or layers, from the
least to the most important, in a single belief system that recipients bring to
the persuasive situation.
For Rokeach, beliefs and attitudes may predispose us to action, but values
guide us to action and are therefore the most important element in the
attitude–belief–value triad.
72

Rokeach identifies two types of values:

1. Terminal values – life goals, such as success and happiness.
2. Instrumental values – types of behaviour, such as discipline, ambition or
cheerfulness, that help us to achieve the life goals.
Taken together with our attitudes and beliefs, values result in what Rokeach
calls our self-concept. We all want to be satisfied with our self-concept, and
we work hard to attain this sense of wellbeing.
Although shifts in beliefs and attitudes may result in short-term changes in

behaviour, it is only when inconsistency, incongruity or dissonance is great
enough to lead us to question our self-concept that lasting and valuable
change can take place. Thus, for persuasion to occur in a significant,
enduring way, a recipient’s self-concept needs to be challenged by some
kind of inconsistency.
People who are persuaded to start studying later in life often want to improve
their self-concept. They realise that tertiary education can help them to
achieve a sense of wellbeing. After all, education may enable us to know
ourselves and choose ourselves better.
4.6 SOCIAL JUDGEMENT–INVOLVEMENT THEORY

Based partly on attitude change theory, social judgement–involvement theory
originated with Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues in the United States. This
theory involves two important concepts, both of which are internally based in
the recipient: anchor points and ego-involvement.
Anchor points are internal reference points. When faced with the need to make
a judgement, we turn to our internal reference points and compare them with
the information regarding the judgement. In other words, you make your
judgement in reference to your anchors.
Ego-involvement or social affiliation is an attitude about which recipients feel

strongly and which they incorporate within themselves.
The greater the balance between these variables, the more open the
recipient is to persuasion. A request and decision to become (or not to
become) a councillor in your local community would be an appropriate
example here.
73

4.7 ELABORATION LIKELIHOOD THEORY

The elaboration likelihood theory (ELT) developed from the work of
psychologists Richard Petty, John Cacioppo and their associates in the 1980s.
Research has produced a great deal of experimental support for this theory.
The key word in this theory is ‘elaboration’, which refers to the concentrated
thinking that receivers do about a message.
The theory assumes the following:

• People are motivated to take correct attitudes. They want to feel rational
and right about things that matter to them – about what they feel is good
for them.
• Nevertheless, in order to evaluate a message, people are willing or able to
engage with only a certain amount and a certain type of issue-relevant
elaboration. And these vary according to individual and situational factors.
The ELT states that there are two routes to persuasion: central and peripheral.
As Benoit and Benoit (2008:23–24) explain:
The central route to persuasion consists of thoughtful consideration of the

arguments (ideas, content) in the message, and occurs when a listener has
both the motivation and the ability to think about the message and its topic.
The listener or audience member who engages in central processing is an
active part of the process of persuasion, thinking carefully about the ideas
and arguments in the message. Many thoughts (cognitive responses) are
produced during central processing. The key to persuasion in central
processing is the strength or quality of the arguments in the message.
The peripheral route to persuasion, on the other hand, takes place when the
receiver does not expend the effort to think carefully about the ideas in a
message. Instead, in peripheral processing the audience member decides
whether to agree with the message on the basis of other cues, such as the
number (but not the quality) of arguments in the message, its length, or
whether the source is credible or attractive. Peripheral processing will occur
when the listener lacks the ability or motivation (or both) to engage in much
thought on the message.
Topic relevance for a potential persuadee is usually important. If you decide

to buy a house, the estate agent (persuader) will probably rely more on your
issue-relevant thinking or on your central processing of the message, and less
on your peripheral processing (mental shortcuts). The latter would come into
play when, for example, a thin salesperson tries to sell you a new brand of
breakfast cereal.
74

As Rogers (2007:211) points out, other variables are involved as well, including
the following:
• Receivers’ ability to scrutinise the message. High ability will likely lead to
central processing, low ability to peripheral processing.
• Receivers’ biases. For example, they may not want to see the flaws in a
message that they like.
• Receivers’ need for cognition. Some people like to examine arguments,
others do not.
• Receivers’ moods or states of mind. If they do not feel like thinking
rigorously at the time, then the peripheral route will probably come into
play.
• Prior knowledge of a topic may give recipients an enhanced ability to think
centrally.
Finally, Rogers (2007:211) points out that the ELT ‘predicts that attitude
changes that result from receivers’ central processing of a message’s arguments
will show greater longevity in the minds of the receivers, greater impact on
their actual behaviour, and greater immunity to counterpersuasion than will
attitude changes resulting from peripheral processing’.
There are clearly various possible explanations for persuasion to occur. This
would suggest once again that the study of persuasive communication is
complex, in the sense that it is difficult to say with certainty that if the
persuader follows certain guidelines the effects will be predictable. Remember
that we are dealing with probabilities only.
Given the predominant role of the mass media (including social media) and
public opinion in a modern democratic (mass) society, the next chapter will
consider, among other matters, the media’s role in persuasive communication.
75

A REMINDER
• Attitudinal changes do not always lead to behavioural changes,
which has resulted in the development of the theories of
reasoned action and planned behaviour.
• With classical conditioning and Skinnerian behaviourism,
recipients are viewed almost as robots responding to external
stimuli, whereas social learning theory regards human beings
as active participants in the persuasion process.
• Consistency theories rest on the assumption that human beings
do not like inconsistencies.
• The social judgement–involvement theory explains persuasion
as the result of individuals comparing persuasive messages
with their internal reference points and perceptions.
• The elaboration likelihood theory suggests two routes to
persuasion: central and peripheral.
76

Persuasion, mass and social media, and public opinion
chapter FIVE
Persuasion, mass and social

media, and public opinion
LOOKING AHEAD
• write notes on traditional and social media and various theories of
mass media effects as they relate to persuasion
• discuss the idea of news selection in society
• understand the nature and role of public opinion in the process of
persuasion
• critically discuss Rank’s model of persuasion
• explain the steps in Monroe’s motivated sequence.
77

5.1 INTRODUCTION: A CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCE

We have seen that rhetoric or persuasive communication has been an
important subject for study and contemplation through the ages. Aristotle, in
particular, provided the foundations for Western thought on persuasive
communication.
Notably, the basic structure of the (persuasive) communication

triptych
– communicator, medium with its message and recipient – has
remained the same since the heyday of persuasive communication in ancient
Greece.
However, the social circumstances in which persuasive communication takes

place have changed. Late-modern democratic society no longer resembles the
ancient Greek city-states, nor does it resemble the classic liberal-democratic
society of early 19th century America.
Late-modern democratic society (as from the late 1940s) is mass society.
Characterised by mass production and mass consumption, this society
depends on:
• a high level of technology and modern transport, without which the society
could not exist, because the economic and industrial order depends on
technology
• a system of organisation (bureaucracy) that legitimises the elite, structures
decision-making and establishes boundaries of jurisdiction
• (mass) communication systems, including online systems, functioning on
advanced technology and fuelling mass persuasion (propaganda), and
without which the masses cannot be brought into instantaneous contact.
Therefore a person in late-modern democratic society encounters numerous

communicators/persuaders, some of whom are anonymous. There are many
persuasive messages, and although it is still mainly through human speech
that people seek to influence others, platform oratory is no longer the primary
means by far.
Instead, we are bombarded by persuasive messages from the following:

• Traditional mass media, such as television, radio, film, newspapers and
magazines – mass media that use various techniques to persuade even millions
of recipients to specific viewpoints. The capacities of these media present
rhetorical or persuasive choices, some unique to themselves and some shared
with public speech and other media. These choices were not available in
antiquity. As Brockriede (1966) reminded us some 50 years ago, the ‘modern’
persuader had to feed into his/her ‘rhetorical system’ more data, and account
for more variables, than did the ancient Greek rhetorician.
78

• Social media, a product of the development of information and

communication technology over the past 14 years, which contribute to the
creation of a digital, converged and networked ‘new’ media environment
that is linked to the formation of a global society. The introduction of
social media has changed the media landscape and the manner in which
many people, communities and organisations interact in contemporary
democratic society (see Section 5.4).
But what effects do the mass media have on recipients?
5.2 TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF MASS MEDIA EFFECTS

Research on the persuasive function of traditional mass media started early in the
20th century. As far back as 1922, in his much-celebrated work Public opinion (see
the 1956 reference), Lippmann described the role that such media play in shaping
our perceptions of public affairs – in forming the ‘pictures in our heads’.
Writers such as Mills (1963; 1978) went even further. Mills suggests that
reality for the recipient tends to be that which is presented by the mass media,
even though all now-traditional mass media operate within a specific
framework, within prescribed politico-ideological, socio-economic and
administrative boundaries that influence the picture of reality. According to
Mills (1978:311), the mass media infiltrate our experience of ourselves:
‘[They] tell the man in the mass who he is – they give him identity, they tell
him what he wants to be – they give him aspirations, they tell him how to get
that way – they give him technique, and they tell him how to feel that way
even when he is not – they give him escape’.
This would suggest that mass communication has a direct persuasive effect
on individuals. And this is despite the fact that much of mass communication
research has shown that direct effects are minimal and that it cannot be
predicted with absolute certainty how human beings will react to any
particular message (Fauconnier, 1975:177–199; McQuail, 1975:191). Fourie
(2007:232) reminds us that only under extreme circumstances, such as in war
or when a natural disaster strikes, may direct persuasive effects of the media
on most people’s behaviour be evident.
Giner (1976:236) points out that many factors influence the views and
opinions of individuals, such as their work environment, family ties, and
economic and political interests, and that the mass media are much more
likely to reinforce their existing views than to change them.
But so-called ‘cultural indicators research’, undertaken by Gerbner (1973)

for instance, seems to bear out Mills’s arguments on the persuasive effects
79

of the mass media. Cultural indicators research shows how the mass media
provide role models, how role models inf luence (desired) lifestyles and thus
how recipients are inf luenced by the media to adapt to certain desired
modes of behaviour. Recipients are not forced into doing so; perhaps it is
because they do not know that they are being inf luenced that the persuasive
power of the mass media is established and is most effective.
Another theory that gives the mass media considerable strength is the spiral
of silence theory developed by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1973). Noelle-
Neumann contends that, on a controversial issue, people form impressions
about the distribution of public opinion from the mass media. Severin and
Tankard (1992:253) explain:
[People] try to determine whether they are in the majority, and then they try to
determine whether public opinion is changing to agree with them. If they feel
they are in the minority, they tend to remain silent on the issue. If they think
public opinion is changing away from them, they tend to remain silent on the
issue. The more they remain silent, the more other people feel that the particular
point of view is not represented, and the more they remain silent […]
The mass media can affect the spiral of silence in three ways: (1) they shape
impressions about which opinions are dominant; (2) they shape impressions
about which opinions are on the increase; (3) they shape impressions about
which opinions one can utter in public without becoming isolated.
A person’s willingness to speak out on issues is greatly influenced by

perception of the climate of opinion – if the climate of opinion goes against a
person, he/she will remain silent for fear of isolation.
Mass media effects theories also include the technological determinism

theory, the uses and gratifications theory, and theories of climate-setting,
priming, agenda-setting and media framing.
The technological determinism theory is advocated by Marshall McLuhan,

who suggests that the medium is the message (see McLuhan & Fiore, 1967).
This means that the medium, for example television, determines the kinds of
messages that people receive and the way in which they interpret those
messages. So the message is structured in terms of the medium – the medium,
and not the content, constitutes the message. Given that large groups of
recipients share certain information and experiences through the mass media,
especially television, persuaders can attempt to resonate with that and tie
their product or idea to the resonated experience or information. For example,
in a TV advert for a well-known brand of brandy, the persuader attempts to
link the product to the idea of drinking iced tea.
80

Researchers have also tried to determine which medium has the greatest
effect when an identical message is presented. Findings generally show that
messages conveyed via the audio-visual medium usually result in greater
attitude change than do those on the medium of audio alone. In turn, audio
medium messages produce greater acceptance and attitude change than does
the printed version of the same message, if the message is simple. With complex
messages, the written medium is the most effective.
Uses and gratifications theory takes a different starting point. Instead of

centring persuasion in the media as such, this theory gives recipients the
decisive role in maintaining that they are actively utilising media contents to
satisfy, for example, informational or entertainment needs, rather than being
passively acted upon by the media.
Researchers have explored differing components of the relationship between

the content of the mass media and recipients. Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch
(1973) identify the components as follows:
• The social and psychological origins of needs, which generate expectations
of the mass media or other sources.
• These expectations lead to differential patterns of media exposure, or
engagement in other activities.
• The patterns result in need gratifications and other consequences, perhaps
mostly unintended ones.
In the uses and gratifications theory, then, the central question is not what
the media do to recipients, but what recipients do with the media.
The theory of climate-setting suggests that the mass media are instrumental
in providing recipients with frameworks for evaluating forthcoming events,
especially news events. Essentially, climate-setting works as a form of
explanation. Climate-setting reports therefore aim to provide recipients with
the surrounding circumstances (the interpretive context) within which the
events should be evaluated. For example, when a newspaper article expresses
the opinion that high interest rates must be seriously questioned, that article
is setting the climate for a possible lowering of interest rates.
Related to climate-setting is media priming, where the mass media deliberately

provide value judgements on issues in the news, such as high interest rates.
When the news media focus on certain events more than others, they are
agenda-setting. Climate-setting usually comes before agenda-setting – literally,
a climate is set for an agenda. But it is equally true that climate-setting reports
can be part of the agenda-setting content of a news medium on a given day.
81

The theory of agenda-setting is perhaps best conceptualised by Cohen

(1963:13), who notes that the mass media do not so much tell members of the
public what to think as they are ‘stunningly successful’ at telling them what to
think about.
Finally, framing of the media is a commonly used concept in media effects

studies. Perloff (2014:158), in following Entman, notes that for persuasive
communication scholars framing is defined as ‘selecting and highlighting
some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to
promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution’. Hence, the
term ‘framing’ refers to the frames of reference offered by journalists in news
stories that suggest to the audience not only what to think about but how to
see the world. However, as Capella and Jamieson (in Negrine & Stanyer,
2007:183) explain:
Framing effects are more subtle than media priming and agenda setting.
Framing is not simply concerned with the presence of the topics but with how
topics are treated in the news. The implication is that how the news frames
issues will invite certain inferences and suppress others, cognitively priming
some information in the network of knowledge while bypassing other nodes.
These inferences and associations become a part of what is made accessible
by the framed message. Framing may alter the interpretation of the events
described through these inferences and associations.
News framing research identifies five common frames utilised by the media
(De Vreese, 2005:56):
1. Conflict – between individuals, groups, institutions or countries.
2. Human interest – bringing a human face or an emotional angle to the
presentation of an event, issue or problem.
3. Attribution of responsibility – presenting an issue or problem in such a way
as to attribute responsibility for causing or solving either to the
government or to an individual or group.
4. Morality – principles regarding right and wrong or good and bad behaviour.
5. Economic consequences – concerning profit and loss.
In reviewing a number of studies on the impact of political frames in the

media on individuals, Perloff (2014:165) concludes as follows:
1. Media frames probably have a greater impact when the issue is new or
novel. On many issues, people bring their own framework to the media
and do not necessarily accept media or elite frames lock, stock, and barrel.
2. Frames do not usually change the attitudes of strong partisans […].
3. Framing has a stronger effect when the frame is consistent with the
audience members’ political values. Thus, communicators frequently
82

attempt to convince audience members that an ambiguous frame is

congenial with what they already believe.
4. A frame does not operate in a vacuum. Frames operate in a political arena
characterized by multiple voices. When there is competition among
frames, the effect of a particular frame may be reduced […].
5.3 THE ROLE OF THE TRADITIONAL NEWS MEDIA

No organisation can ignore the influential role of the news media in society.
This is especially true of a political party, which can seldom influence its
image favourably by ignoring the primary role played by the news media in
providing political information and in interpreting political events for
citizens.
In their contact with the news media, politicians and party workers need to
understand what news is and how news is selected, so that they will be in a
better position to influence the nature of news about their party. This is true
during election campaigns as well as in everyday political life.
5.3.1 On defining news

John Bogart, a former editor of the New York Sun, is credited with providing
the conventional explanation of what news is: He told a young reporter that
‘[w]hen a dog bites a man, that’s not news because it happens so often; but if a
man bites a dog, that is news’ (Cannon, 1977:15).
This saying has survived because it dramatically states the enduring nature
of novelty in the news business. However, it does not adequately explain
‘news’, because most of the pronouncements and information that fill the
pages of our newspapers, for example, are much less rare than a dog-
biting man.
Just as unsatisfactory is the conventional definition of news as being a report

in a mass communication medium that is normally about a topical, contingent,
prominent, human interest or conflicting event. The definition does not get
to the heart of what constitutes news – it does not take into account the factors
that influence the making and presentation of news.
Gaye Tuchman (1978:1), using Goffman’s ideas on frames in Frame analysis

(1974), among others, gives us a more accurate sense in suggesting that news
is a ‘window on the world’. She explains that therefore news must have a
definite frame: the politico-ideological, socio-economic and administrative
boundaries within which the principles of journalistic practice are exercised
(Tuchman, 1978). And like any frame, this news frame conceals as well as
83

reveals, giving some events a public character while preventing others from
becoming public information (Tuchman, 1978).
Tuchman (1978) suggests that, through the news frame, recipients have their
view of the world structured and curtailed by the news media. News thus only
partly represents (objective) reality, that is, the totality of conditions and
views in society, which cannot be just wished away or ignored.
Tuchman’s (1978) description of the conditions and characteristics of an event

becoming news may be summarised as follows:
• News must be news for someone. It is directed at a target group.
• Journalists who publicise the news have something to do with what and
how much we see of the world through the ‘news frame’.
• News comprises accounts or reports of everyday events. Only once events
are publicised, and in a specific form, do we view them as news or as
newsworthy reports on events.
• News is a social institution, meaning that it is a pattern of behaviour that
fulfils a function.
• News is the outcome of negotiations among those who give it shape
(reporters and editors), other recognised groups at a news organisation
(for example, management) and those outside the news medium (such as
politicians).
We can thus define news as:

• public accounts
• of selected events
• written or broadcast by professionals
• according to institutional methods, conditions and limitations
• with a profit-making or influencing motive
• aimed at everyone but no one in particular within a target group
• providing readers, listeners and viewers with an ideological framework in
which they orientate themselves to others and the community.
5.3.2
Towards an integrated approach to understanding news
selection
Traditionally, four broad sets of approaches concerning news selection in
democratic societies can be identified from the literature (cf. Gans, 1980):
• The first approach centres on journalists per se. The argument is that news
is shaped only by journalists’ professional judgements.
• The second focuses on the requirements of news organisations. Some scholars
emphasise commercial interests at the news firm, while others concentrate
on how the structure of the news organisation and its division of labour
affect news selection (see Roshcoe, 1975).
84

• The third centres around events, and suggests that events determine news
selection. This is the so-called mirror approach.
• The fourth approach sees forces outside the news organisation determining
news selection. Technological determinists argue that the message is
determined by the technology of the medium. Economic determinists
regard the national economy as determining story selection and view
journalists as the public relations agents of monopoly capitalism. Cultural
determinists believe that journalists select news which accords with the
values of the national culture or the culture of their target group. Ideological
determinists suggest that journalists align the news to the political ideology
of the ruling class in society.
These brief descriptions all seem to be at least partly true.
Journalists do apply news judgements, both as individuals and as members of

a news organisation, but they have to work within, for instance, the internal
administrative–bureaucratic limits set by the news organisation.
Organisational requirements are always a factor in news selection, but a news
organisation also has to take other things, for example legal requirements,
into account.
The mirror approach is wrong in emphasising that only events determine

news selection – many ‘newsworthy’ events fail to become news. However, it
is a useful approach in the sense that journalists do not usually fabricate news
but begin with what they deem an empirically graspable external reality.
Technology or the nature of the medium may determine the presentation and
style of news. But the fact that identically worded news items (obtained from
the wire services, for instance) are carried by newspapers, radio and television
alike suggests that technology is not a determining factor. Commercial
interests do play a role in news selection in Western democratic (capitalist)
societies, but it is also true that newspapers do not always show a profit.
Cultural determinists are correct in implying that accommodation of the
recipients’ cultural values (and ‘tastes’) is an aspect of news selection, but
news organisations also take the lead in changing values in society and then
sustaining the revised values.
Ideological determinists seem to have a point in implying that news may be

shaped, consciously and unconsciously, by the dominant ideology of a social
group whose members own or control media organisations. The dominant
ideology of the journalists who work there also plays a role, because as human
beings journalists, too, perceive news items within their own conceptual
(ideological) framework.
85

We cannot simply reduce the complex process of news selection to any one of
these approaches. None take into account holistically the role of the journalist
and the broad administrative and political controls imposed on news
organisations, which vary from country to country. An integrated approach is
needed.
Researchers using a phenomenological perspective, such as Molotch and

Lester (1974), and Tuchman (1978), may provide an answer. They would
suggest that we may view news selection as the reproduction of newsworkers’
understandings of both news processes (the organisation of newswork) and cultural
factors (including politico-ideological factors) in society.
This integrated approach to news selection implies that journalists interpret

and experience society in terms of meanings – they actively construct their
own social reality – because unlike objects and animals, people have
consciousness (thoughts, feelings and an awareness of being). They are
subjects, but they are what they are because they live with other human
beings; they unfold as people in intersubjective relationships. Therefore their
actions are meaningful: They define situations and give meaning to their
actions and those of other people. Meanings have neither an independent
existence nor a reality of their own that is somehow separate from people.
Meanings are never fixed permanently, they are open to question or revision,
but they become institutionalised when a broad spectrum of society regard
them as valid (cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1976).
In constructing their own social reality (a construction of meanings), people

are not functioning in a vacuum, they are living in a situation in which their
ability to communicate, and hence to give meaning, unfolds. Thus, a
newspaper reporter would give meaning to his/her actions (for example, by
writing a report in a certain way to have it published) while taking into
account constraints imposed by society (such as legal and politico-
ideological constraints) and institutions (for example, spatio-temporal
constraints).
Tuchman’s (1978) approach seems the most plausible, as it takes the active
role of the journalist into account, as well as the various constraints on news
production.
5.4 SOCIAL MEDIA

Mayfield (in Coetzee, 2014:83) describes social media as ‘a group of new
kinds of online media’, which are distinct from the traditional media referred
to in Section 5.1. The development of these media is the product of the
emergence of Web 2.0 at the turn of the 21st century. Also known as the
86

‘social web’, Web 2.0 is a user-centred, user-generated and user-controlled

network that allows users to manage, share, tag, link and own data.
The social media landscape comprises many applications such as blogs,

forums and discussion forums, multimedia and file sharing, podcasting and
vodcasting, social networking services, virtual worlds and wikis. Each of
these applications, or apps, has a number of tools at its disposal, for example
Blogger and Wordpress (for blogs), Google Groups (for forums and discussion
forums), Instagram and Flikr (for multimedia and file sharing), iTunes and
YouTube (for podcasting and vodcasting), Facebook and LinkedIn (for social
networking services), MySpace (for virtual worlds), and Wikipedia and
Google Docs (for wikis).
In following Mayfield, Coetzee (2014:83) notes that social media offer these
features:
• Participation – social media encourage contributions and feedback from
everyone taking part in the communication between creator and audience.
• Openness – most social media services encourage users to vote about one or
more items on the site, leave comments and share the site with other
people.
• Conversation – whereas traditional media are often about content
transmitted or distributed to an audience, social media are seen more as a
two-way conversation.
• Community – social media allow communities of common interests to form
and to communicate effectively.
• Connectedness – most kinds of social media thrive on their connectedness,
making use of links to other sites, resources and people.
The advent and development of social media has significantly changed the
way in which many people and communities, and all kinds of organisations,
communicate and interact. Many traditional media organisations, both print
and electronic, are increasingly creating a social media presence.
Ngai, Tao and Moon (2015:41–42) report that social media are widely used all
over the world, and that certain effects may be identified in general. At the
social level, social media have broken communication barriers once caused by
geographic isolation, which has led to individuals developing more friends,
especially those who are not able to travel a lot (Ngai, Tao & Moon, 2015).
Through the provision of a boundless platform, which has stimulated and
nurtured the concept of ‘crowdpreneur’, social media have opened up business
opportunities for individuals and organisations. By capitalising on the power
of the crowd, the crowdpreneur can, for example, raise funds to start or run a
business, or obtain advice or expertise from members of the crowd to make a
business more successful and sustainable.
87

Non-profit advocacy organisations and groups often rely on individual

support in the form of donations and volunteers, as well as general support for
their very existence. In her study of pro-life/pro-choice and gun control/pro-
gun organisations, Auger (2013) suggests that these groups use social media
to ethically persuade people to their point of view. Through Twitter thanks
and recognition are provided, while Facebook is used to solicit feedback and
other two-way communication with stakeholders. Auger (2013) finds that
YouTube is reserved for authority figures to communicate messages.
There is ongoing research on the use of social media, for example:

• Health issues – see Neubaum and Kramer (2015).
• The internet’s potential for reshaping contemporary democracies in
facilitating more inclusive public participation and deliberative exchange
between ordinary citizens and political elites – see Davis (2010:98ff.).
• A variety of attitude-behaviour theories of persuasion that relate to
marketing practices on social media – see Teng and Khong (2015).
Larson (2013:402–403) indicates that not every business has welcomed online
media, since it has made the process of persuasion in terms of pricing and so
on much more competitive. Think of the car salesperson who has to deal with
a customer (persuadee) empowered with information on similar vehicles
through Google, or the travel agent whose direct assistance with making
reservations is no longer needed.
Social media have also affected the political sphere – as can be seen in the
planning and execution of the 2011 revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and
Libya through citizens communicating with one another via cellular and
social networking media.
In South Africa in October 2015, the successful ‘#FeesMustFall’ movement of

university students nationwide (with support even from students in the
United States, Great Britain and Australia, for example) was organised
through social media. As Evans (2015) notes:
Social media was not used by the students just to communicate, but also as an
integral part of mobilisation. The internet became the go-to source for
everything, from where marches would take place to legal advice for arrested
students. […] #FeesMustFall took traditional media out of the equation. It
was the students who led the coverage on the internet, leaving traditional
media scrambling to catch up with what the protest was all about.
Political parties and governments also use various platforms to persuade voters
and potential voters to their points of view, or to mobilise them. Moreover,
major governments in the world conduct surveillance using the internet and
88

social media. As Picard (2015:37–38) points out: ‘They are not likely to stop
even though revelations may lead to some constraints on their activities. Why
would they? Governments have opened the post for centuries and have
eavesdropped on telephone calls and tracked bank transfers for decades’. The
popularisation of communication through social media, Picard (2015:38)
warns, ‘also produces a multitude of voices that can leave us vulnerable to
hysteria and moral panic’ through, for example, the spreading of rumours.
All of the above, of course, has implications for managing public opinion and
the concomitant persuasive practices in contemporary democratic societies.
5.5 PUBLIC OPINION

According to Edelman (2001:53), public opinion is a social construction, a
construction ‘of governments, of the media, and of everyday conversation
influenced by governments and the media’.
The traditional mass media (including news media) have been and are so
closely intertwined with public opinion in contemporary democracies that
we can hardly imagine the existence of public opinion without the role played
in it by these mass media. Given that such media respond to government
actions and public awareness, taste and opinions, they are a major force,
directly and indirectly (through the work of opinion leaders who use the mass
media), in creating public opinion (see Janowitz & Hirsch, 1981).
For the purposes of this discussion, public opinion may be described as the
opinion active in the public realm that is expressed by a significant (large)
number of people (members of the public) on an issue of general (public)
importance (see Hennessy, 1981:2–9; Scruton, 1982:387–388). For an
interesting discussion on the ways in which the idea of public opinion has
been approached since about the mid-19th century, refer to Qualter (1985).
Furthermore, in following the useful classification of public opinion

developed by Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936), we can distinguish between
three categories of public opinion. Using the terminology of the natural
sciences, Tönnies suggests the existence of solid, fluid and gaseous states of
public opinion (see Hardt, 1979:142–145).
5.5.1 Solid, fluid and gaseous public opinion

For Tönnies, solid public opinion must be understood as a steadfast conviction
of a public about matters such as personal and economic freedom, forms of
government and rationality (Hardt, 1979).
89

Fluid public opinion means short-lived public opinion that, from time to time,
is focused on topical issues (Hardt, 1979), such as fashion or the merits of a
rugby or soccer team.
Gaseous public opinion is highly unstable public opinion. It is hastily formed

and affected by the news events of the day, such as the initial reaction in South
Africa to the shooting of Reeva Steenkamp by Oscar Pistorius, but usually
acts in support of the generally accepted social and moral framework. This
type of opinion on an issue may become fluid or solid public opinion in time,
and vice versa (Hardt, 1979).
5.5.2 Characterising public opinion

Lippmann (1956) suggested that public opinion was supposed to be the
predominant force in democracies. This makes sense on the theoretical
grounds that a democracy would allow an electorate to inf luence the course
of governmental action by legal means. The democracy would do so because
it is everyone’s right to have thought out for themselves certain opinions
that are defensible by arguments as to what the country needs, which
principles ought to be applied in governing it, and in whose hands the
government ought to be entrusted. It is assumed that ‘all’ people exercise
this right, and that they are thus participating in the socio-economic and
political life of the state.
Public opinion is regarded as having emerged not from an organic entity

called the state but from the individual, and as continually approaching
rational principles, which can be perfectly expressed through political process
(see Jaspers, 1961:291ff.). Hence, public opinion is seen as the ultimate and
rational standard for directing politics.
Freedom of thought and discussion, coupled with freedom for all in political
participation, is the basis of democratic public opinion (Wilson, 1962:150).
A truly democratic public opinion is loyal to these basic ideals of democracy,
but it also accepts its responsibilities with respect to these ideals.
An essential question for those who believe in democracy is whether

something may be done to help the reasonableness of citizens to emerge in
concrete political situations. For, as Wilson (1962:275) notes, ‘we recognise
that much opinion is irrational or superstitious’ – and ideological and based
on perception, we might add. Hence the debate about ‘democratic’ public
opinion often also shifts between the idea of participation and the idea of the
worth of public judgement.
90

The concept of democracy in its ideal form does not demand that all people
understand all things equally, because there are degrees of appreciation in
techniques and morality. In addition, we can admit the complexity and danger
of human motivation. A democracy must seek, through its public opinion, to
achieve popular support above the level of average opinion on technical and
administrative matters, and on matters of principle. It is also extremely
important that ‘the common man’ understands there is a common good – one
which leaves space for the individual to achieve self-realisation amid the
pitfalls of public opinion.
What passed for public opinion in a modern democracy was, sadly, often
much more like mass persuasion, no matter how widespread it was. The
reason is that public opinion was presented by the traditional mass media to
members of the public, and not by people actively and responsibly participating
in the formation of public opinion through individual expression or as
members of discussion groups – as, for example, in the classic liberal-
democratic society of early 19th century America. As Dewey (1927:177)
points out in his renowned work The public and its problems, opinion formed
under the direction of those (traditional) mass media institutions, which have
a vested interest in having that opinion believed, is a distortion of the ideal
notion of public opinion. In short, public opinion was no longer the outcome
of organised face-to-face communication, of interpersonal enquiry and
debate by members of the public.
Before the advent of social media, through extensive study scholars such as
Cantril (in Cutlip, Center & Broom, 1985:178) had developed useful
generalisations about public opinion:
• Opinion is highly sensitive to important events [for example, terrorist

bombings].
• Events of unusual magnitude are likely to swing public opinion temporarily
from the one extreme to the other. Opinion does not become stabilised
until the implications of events are seen with some perspective [for
example, the recall of President Mbeki in 2008 and the rise of the
Economic Freedom Fighters in 2014].
• Opinion is generally determined more by events than by words – unless
those words are themselves interpreted as ‘events’.
• Verbal statements and outlines of courses of action have maximum
importance when opinion is unstructured, when people are suggestible
and seek some interpretation from a reliable source.
• Mostly, public opinion does not anticipate emergencies. It only reacts to
them.
91

• Psychologically, opinion is basically determined by self-interest. Events,

words, or any other stimuli affect opinion only in so far as their relationship
to self-interest is apparent.
• Opinion does not remain aroused for any long period of time unless
people feel their self-interest is acutely involved or unless opinion (aroused
by words) is sustained by events.
• Once self-interest is involved, opinions are not easily changed.
• When self-interest is involved, public opinion in a democracy is likely to
be ahead of official policy.
• When opinion is held by a slight majority, or is not solidly structured, an
accomplished fact tends to shift opinion in the direction of acceptance.
• [In times of crisis,] people become more sensitive to the adequacy of their
leadership. If they have confidence in it, they are willing to assign more
than usual responsibility to it; if they lack confidence in it, they are less
tolerant than usual.
• People are less reluctant to have critical decisions made by their leaders if
they feel that somehow they, the people, are taking some part in the
decision.
• People have more opinions and are able to form opinions more easily with
respect to goals than with respect to methods necessary to reach those
goals.
• Public opinion, like individual opinion, is colored by desires. When
opinion is based chiefly on desire rather than information, it is likely to
show especially sharp shifts with events.
• […] The more enlightened people are to the implications of events and
proposals for their own self-interest, the more likely they are to agree
with the more objective opinions of realistic experts.
The emergence and development of social media (see Section 5.4) have
modified the predominant manner through which public opinion is formed in
contemporary democratic society.
Citizens have almost an overload of information at their disposal, as social

media complement the content of the traditional news media, comment on
events and become involved in a variety of campaigns. There is interactive
and interconnective discourse, some of which can sway public opinion from
one vantage point to another. Such discourse is similar to that used by the
deliberative American public of two centuries ago, except that today it takes
place through a convergence of network, traditional mass and interpersonal
communications (see Fourie, 2015; Jensen, 2010).
92

However, Picard (2015:38–39) questions whether social media represent a

reformation of media and are acting as a humanising force:
There is no doubt that social media provide more ways for individuals to
express and share observations, ideas, opinions, and content that pleases or
stimulates. Social media also afford opportunities to publicly assert and
perform an identity and to support relationships and communities that
previously were more difficult to construct and maintain through
interpersonal and [traditional] mass communication.
We benefit from those who use social media to record and disseminate
current events, photographs, evidence of abuses of power such as police
brutality, and to provide information and documentation that contradicts or
moderates elite interpretations of the world about us. At the very least, social
media have reduced the power of legacy [traditional] media and forced them
to shake off their complacency.
Nevertheless, they still remain highly mediated communication,

incorporating artificiality and lacking genuine authenticity. Social media at
best represent only a slight improvement on the legacy media of the past. At
worst, they are replicating legacy media as a means of social control.
Are social media humanising? They may be to the extent that they allow more
individual voices to be heard, albeit with constraints, and permit multi-
directional communication. However, there is no evidence that social media
are moving us toward the ideals of becoming enlightened, tolerant, rational,
cultured, and civilised human beings. Neither is there convincing evidence
that social media are making society any more egalitarian by reducing the
power or wealth of elites; rather, the evidence indicates that they are
exacerbating it and have created new wealthy elites.
5.6 A MODEL AND A SEQUENCE OF MASS PERSUASION

In this section, we focus on Rank’s model of persuasion and Monroe’s
motivated sequence for explaining important mass persuasive practices that
can influence the way the public forms opinions on matters that affect them.
5.6.1 Rank’s model of persuasion

Hugh Rank, a scholar of persuasion, offers a model of persuasion that can
help to teach people to be critical recipients of persuasion. This is not the only
persuasion model (Bostrom, 1983:108–126; cf. Rogers, 2007:12), but it is most
useful for describing and analysing certain important strategies and tactics
used by mass persuaders.
93

The basic idea, according to Rank, is that persuaders use two plans of action
or strategies, coupled with three possible tactics or rules, to achieve their
aims. Calling his model the intensify/downplay scheme, Rank argues that
persuaders either intensify certain features of their product, service, ideology
or candidate, or they downplay certain aspects. Often, they do both.
Rank’s model is shown in Figure 5.1.
Intensify
Repetition My strong points;
Association the other party’s weak points
Composition
Downplay
Omission My weak points;
Diversion the other party’s strong points
Confusion
Figure 5.1 A diagrammatic representation of Rank’s model of persuasion
There are thus three tactics for intensification: repetition, association and
composition.
With repetition, the strong or weak points of a product, candidate or idea may
be intensified by repeating them often. Through repetition, the persuader
‘teaches’ the recipient certain things. For example, in South Africa we now
‘know’ that democracy is good, and drinking and driving is bad.
For Rank, association means that an idea, product or candidate is associated

with something that the recipient has already accepted or rejected. For example,
‘Dr Such-and-such supports the preservation and promotion of the Afrikaans
language’, and ‘Dr So-and-so upholds scientific socialism’. These statements
may be proclaimed at the meetings of two particular South African political
parties. Usually, persuaders in all settings conduct a thorough destination
analysis to establish the fears, needs and prejudices of their target group.
94

With composition, strong or weak points may be intensified by being contrasted

with something else. More specifically, we may see composition as the placing
of information next to information. Juxtaposing a cricket player with a can of
beer, or depicting a regular person drinking a cocktail on an exotic island,
may produce a dramatic and favourable impression of these products among
interested recipients. Or setting the bright lights of a city against poverty in
the rural areas may intensify a sense of guilt among the in-groups in South
African society.
The three basic tactics for downplay are omission, diversion and confusion.
With omission, the persuader’s weaknesses or the opposition’s strengths may

be played down by simply omitting information. This tactic is widely used in
product advertising, in politics and in interpersonal relationships. The
persuasive tactic ‘fly now, pay later’ omits to mention that the cost of the trip
would be much more than advertised when interest on the outstanding money
is calculated.
With diversion, persuaders shift the focus of the debate away from their own
shortcomings or away from the positive points of their opponents. For
example, some politicians may beg their supporters to campaign for a White
homeland (‘volkstaat’) in South Africa rather than accept an integrated
society with the potential for racial violence. Their appeal, however, hardly
ever focuses on exactly how they would lure millions of Whites to the so-
called homeland, or on the many successes of the integrated, democratic
South Africa.
To create confusion is another tactic for playing down your weaknesses or the
opposition’s strengths, for example by releasing conflicting information
about the number and morale of your own and enemy troops during war
(especially when your side appears weak). Jargon and over-detailed
information are also often used as part of this tactic.
Finally, we must bear in mind that the model does not address the importance
of the timing of persuasive messages (refer to Chapter 3 Section 3.4), and the
credibility of the communicator being in question because of the frequently
one-sided nature of the communication. Also, the model focuses only on the
message, and pays little attention to recipient variables.
5.6.2 Monroe’s motivated sequence

A noteworthy pattern for persuasive message appeals was developed by the
rhetorician Alan Monroe (1962) and has come to be known as Monroe’s
motivated sequence.
95

As Benoit and Benoit (2008:82) indicate, the motivated sequence is an

organisational plan or pattern that ‘gets its name from the idea that individuals
go through a normal sequence of steps as they are motivated to respond to the
speaker’s purpose’.
The sequential pattern consists of the following steps: attention, need,

satisfaction, visualisation and action. Monroe’s motivated sequence is
particularly useful for persuasive messages that advocate a change in policy or
attempt to recruit people. But it may also be used in sales. The steps broadly
involve the following:
• Attention – the idea is to arouse the attention of recipients and to obtain
their goodwill.
• Need – show recipients that they are losing something, or are about to lose
something, or are currently not gaining something that they could be
gaining.
• Satisfaction – propose a new course of action that should satisfy recipients.
• Visualisation – look to the future and point out the benefits for recipients
who accept the new course of action and the negative consequences for
those who do not.
• Action – request some specific and realistic action on the part of recipients.
The sequence of the satisfaction and visualisation steps can be reversed in

given circumstances.
The next chapter looks as propaganda as a form of mass persuasion. The

exploration is useful and necessary because propaganda is pervasive in all
societies.
96

A REMINDER
• The mass media, including social media, can have various
effects on recipients.
• News selection is a complicated process, which potential
persuaders have to bear in mind.
• Public opinion has a number of characteristics.
• One of the criticisms of Rank’s model of persuasion is that it
does not take into account the timing of the message.
• Monroe’s motivated sequence is often used when advocating a
change in policy.
97

chapter SIX
Perspectives of propaganda
LOOKING AHEAD
• provide a historical orientation to the concept of propaganda
• discuss the traditional perspective of propaganda
• identify the basic techniques of propaganda as formulated by the
Institute for Propaganda Analysis
• situate bureaucratic propaganda in the literature on propaganda
• critically discuss Jacques Ellul’s view of propaganda.
98

6.1 PROPAGANDA: A HISTORICAL ORIENTATION

The word ‘propaganda’ originates from the Latin verb propagare, which means
a gardener’s practice of pushing the fresh shoots of a plant into the earth in
order to produce new plants.
In June of 1622, in Rome, Pope Gregory XV reviewed the state of the Roman
Catholic Church in Europe in the light of the effects of the Protestant
Reformation. As a result of this review, he created the Sacra congregatio de
propaganda fide (the Sacred congregation for the propagation of the faith). The
Sacra congregatio was established as an official organ of the Church, with
responsibility for carrying the faith to the new world, and for reviving and
strengthening it in the old world. This was the first time that propaganda was
used in a communicological sense, to propagate a doctrine.
Pope Gregory’s plan for the systematic propagation of Catholicism established

a precedent that was followed by others interested in the control of the
opinions and actions of people. Significantly, from 1622 until the beginning
of the First World War in 1914 the concept of propaganda was highly respected,
and indicated the praiseworthy action of spreading an important doctrine or
report (Ford, 1967:vii).
It was during the First World War that the meaning of the word ‘propaganda’
was extended to cover all efforts and methods to mislead, to tear down as well
as build up group morale, to influence and in every manner to direct and
control the thoughts and actions of people (Choukas, 1965:19–20).
Only in the 20th century, then, did propaganda gain a disturbing connotation
in the Western world. For instance, as Brown (1963:11) suggests, propaganda
has acquired ‘overtones implying a process which is frequently sinister, lying,
and based on the deliberate attempt on the part of an individual or group to
manipulate, often by concealed or underhand means, the minds of others for
their own ulterior ends’.
The methods of propaganda are not new, of course – they are as old as society
itself. Ever since humans first began to live in organised communities, leaders
and aspirant leaders have used these methods to enlist wider support.
Plato showed an active interest in propaganda, despite his criticism of

Sophistic rhetoric, as explained in Chapter 2 Section 2.2. In The republic, Plato
provides detailed instructions about what should not be said to the inhabitants
of his ideal city-state (see especially Part Three, Book Two and Part Four,
Book Three of Plato [1979]) (Popper, 1963:331–332; cf. Levine, 1984:59ff.).
99

For example, the producer must be controlled by state propaganda to instil

loyalty, work motivation and social cohesion for the perfect state. The need
for censorship of what must not be known in the Republic is as great as the
need for propaganda, in order to bring about desired beliefs and attitudes.
The history of classical Rome is full of examples of propaganda. The ‘triumphs’,

festive receptions and processions held in honour of victorious Roman
generals who returned from foreign wars with treasure and slaves, Fraser
(1957:18) points out, were intended to convince the ordinary Roman of the
greatness and glory of the mother State. Having founded the Roman Empire,
Emperor Augustus (63 bc–ad 14) created the cult of emperor-worship to
capture and keep the loyalties of the many nations and tribes under Roman
rule.
A reflective treatise on propaganda methods was written at the beginning of

the 16th century by Niccolò Machiavelli (1459–1517). Machiavelli’s The prince
(1963) describes the political trickery practised in the Italy of his day, and the
ways in which power was obtained and preserved. The text spreads the
knowledge of such tactics not only among the rulers (who may not have
needed it) but among the people as well. Its general disregard for moral
principles and close observation of humans as they are – rather than as we
might wish them to be – has caused the adjective ‘Machiavellian’ to be given
to anyone who, indifferent to questions of morality, devotes him-/herself to
the pursuit of power.
For example, when considering whether or not a prince should keep his word,
Machiavelli (1963:62–63) suggests the following:
How praiseworthy it is that a prince keeps his word and governs by candor
instead of craft, everyone knows. Yet the experience of our own time shows
that those princes who had little regard for their word and had the craftiness
to turn men’s minds have accomplished great things and, in the end, have
overcome those who governed their actions by their pledges. […] It follows,
then, that a wise prince cannot and should not keep his pledge when it is
against his interest to do so and when his reasons for making the pledge are
no longer operative. […] Therefore a prince will not actually need to have all
the qualities previously mentioned, but he must surely seem to have them.
Indeed, I would go so far as to say that having them all and always conforming
to them would be harmful, while appearing to have them would be useful.
Propaganda techniques were advocated and practised not only by rulers and
philosophers, but also by ‘ordinary’ people. As the 18th century unfolded
under the stimulus of the liberal movements in England and on the European
and North American continents, propaganda became increasingly the method
100

through which the people hit back at rulers whom they considered to be
tyrannical or in any other way objectionable. Propaganda was found to
be highly valuable in revolution.
Choukas (1965:59ff.) notes that both the American and French revolutions
might not have occurred, at least not at the time they did, if men like John
Adams and Thomas Paine in the colonies, and the French philosophers on
the continent, had not intensified matters considerably through their
propaganda.
The Industrial Revolution of the 19th century, followed by the rapid growth
and concentration of populations in new cities, the spread of literacy and the
establishment of the modern press and advertising proved to be just the right
context in which propaganda could succeed and grow. By 1914, propaganda
had replaced bribery and force as the principal means of enlisting support in
a nation, while the First World War provided opportunities for experiments
in practical propaganda on an unprecedented scale (Qualter, 1965:5).
During the First World War, many social and political scientists became
involved in the study of propaganda, especially investigating more effective
ways to trick enemy citizens through the mass media. When these scientists
began publishing on propaganda in the mid-1920s, the word itself became
popularised and was incorporated into regular political vocabulary.
6.2 THE TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF PROPAGANDA

The traditional perspective of propaganda is most often associated with the
techniques used in Germany by the Third Reich and its leader Adolf Hitler.
The story of National Socialist (Nazi) propaganda surpassed anything the
world had ever experienced.
Hitler knew from the very beginning what he meant by propaganda and how
he could use it to gain and hold power. He devoted a chapter to the subject in
Mein kampf (1939), recognising that in future wars the process of propaganda
rhetoric against the enemy would replace the pre-assault artillery barrage.
According to Albert Speer, who became Hitler’s Minister of War Production,

propaganda in the Third Reich differed from propaganda in all previous
dictatorships in its use of most of the means of communication available in
Germany at the time to sustain itself and to deprive its subjects of the power
to think for themselves (see Rutherford, 1978:8).
For example, books that did not conform to Nazi ideology were burned; radio
broadcasts were used to intimidate the German populace and frighten the
101

peoples of the world. Mass rallies were staged in Berlin, Nuremberg and
elsewhere to whip up enthusiasm for the military expansion of Germany and
hysteria for the Third Reich and its leader. Magazines and newspapers played
their role in a more subtle way, emphasising Nazi triumphs and minimising or
leaving unreported criticism of the regime and its failures. Colourful posters
supporting German patriotism were put up throughout Germany.
All of these propaganda techniques were masterminded by Josef Goebbels,

Hitler’s Minister of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, whose genius in
using these techniques was acknowledged even by his enemies.
Since the 20th century, then, common usage of the word ‘propaganda’ has
extended its meaning far beyond its original reference, often without imposing
universally recognised limits. For example, we are inclined to call reports
that favour our own interests true; reports from the opposition are labelled
propaganda. And so the word has become a synonym for the ‘lies’ told by the
other side. Simply put, propaganda has become a term of abuse in the Western
world.
In spite of this popular Western trend, many scholars, such as FE Lumley,

Leonard Doob, Harold Lasswell, William Albig and Lindley Fraser, have
provided extensive works on and definitions of propaganda (see Fauconnier,
1975:130–135).
Generally, it seems that American authors in particular have come to accept

the definition given by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, which was
formed in 1937 to educate the American people about propagandist
techniques. Here, propaganda is defined as the expression of opinions or
actions by individuals or groups deliberately designed, through psychological
manipulation, to influence the opinions or actions of other individuals or
groups in order to achieve predetermined ends (Ellul, 1973:xi; Lee & Lee,
1972:15).
In this vein, another noteworthy ‘traditional’ (to use Altheide and Johnson’s
[1980:11] term) definition of propaganda focuses exclusively on its psychological
character. According to Qualter (1965:27), ‘[p]ropaganda is the deliberate
attempt by some individual or group to form, control or alter the attitudes of
other groups by the use of the means [media] of communication, with the
intention that in any given situation the reaction of those so influenced will
be that desired by the propagandist’.
Finally, Fauconnier’s (1975:135) definition is slightly more sophisticated:

‘Propaganda is a form of mass communication in which the communicator
[the propagandist] consciously attempts to influence the opinions, attitudes
102

and behaviour of a person, a group of persons or the masses exclusively or

predominantly by means of directive persuasive techniques’. While
propaganda is rather a form of (mass) persuasion than mass communication,
Fauconnier’s (1975:135) reference to the crucial role of ‘directive persuasive
techniques’ in the process of propaganda is important. As he explains,
directive persuasive techniques (for example, ‘Vote for him, he is the best’)
aim at enforcing decisions and placing limits on recipients’ free choice, as
opposed to just providing information that appeals to human reason and does
not limit free choice (Fauconnier, 1975:133).
Scholars adhering to the traditional view of propaganda all seem to agree that
propaganda is usually addressed, for ‘good’ or ‘bad’ purposes, to the group or
the many, rather than to individuals as such – hence the terms ‘mass persuasion’
and ‘propaganda’ have been used interchangeably.
The objective of propaganda is thus to deliberately influence public opinion

entirely or partly. This is usually done through techniques using
suggestion – that is, ‘the attempt to induce in others the acceptance of a
specific belief without giving any self-evident or logical ground for its
acceptance, whether this exists or not’ (Brown, 1963:25) – rather than by
means of facts and logic. Propaganda conceptualised in this way is almost the
same as advertising, the only difference perhaps being that the results of
advertising lie mostly in the field of commerce, while those of propaganda lie
mainly in the field of politics.
6.2.1 The basic techniques

When arguing from the traditional view of propaganda, it should be clear that
the propagandist is trying to ‘put something across’, good or bad, without
being subjected to careful scrutiny and criticism. Such action could be socially
harmful to thousands or even millions of people. For this reason, as far back
as 1939 the Institute for Propaganda Analysis identified seven basic
propaganda techniques (Ford, 1967:12–19; Lee & Lee, 1972:22ff.):
1. Name-calling – the practice of making an idea seem to be bad, which is
used to make recipients reject and condemn the idea without examining
the evidence.
2. Glittering generality – the unsupported, sweeping statement that aims to
provoke a positive response among recipients without their having
examined the matter.
3. Transfer – a technique whereby the propagandist transfers the respect of
recipients from one thing or person to the thing or person he/she wants
them to respect; or the propagandist transfers the recipients’ rejection of
one thing or person to the thing or person he/she wants them to reject.
103

4. Testimonial – the device of using someone who is generally respected or

hated to say that a given idea, programme or person is good or bad.
5. Plain folks – the technique by which a propagandist tries to convince
recipients that certain ideas are good because they are ‘of the people’, the
‘plain folks’.
6. Card-stacking – the technique of ‘stacking the cards’ against the truth by
selectively distorting and manipulating facts or arguments in order to
give the best or worst possible case for an idea, a programme or a person.
7. Bandwagon – the technique of trying to convince recipients to support or
reject an idea, a programme or a person on the grounds that ‘everybody – at
least, all of us – is doing it’.
6.2.2 The difference between democratic and totalitarian

propaganda
In the literature, Western authors distinguish between democratic and
totalitarian concepts of propaganda. This is done on the premise that
propaganda basically involves a conscious attempt to influence the public in a
particular way using carefully designed techniques.
Hence, authors such as De Volder (1957) and Huxley (1958; 1967) emphasise
the centralised nature of totalitarian propaganda, as opposed to the more
diversified and competitive nature of democratic propaganda. (A few authors,
such as Lee and Lee [1972:18], make the simplistic, misguided suggestion that
the concept of democratic propaganda refers to all propaganda that tends to
preserve and extend democracy.)
The basic argument of most of the authors is that the state is the only
propagandist in a totalitarian state – there is no freedom of expression and
hence no freedom of choice for individuals – while in a democratic state
propagandists compete for the support of the public.
A totalitarian state uses every device and all communication media to try to
make its subjects feel and think alike. But the attempt can be only partly
successful – as seen in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin
(Chakhotin, 1942; Fraser, 1957:52ff.; Rutherford, 1978).
Studies of the political institutions of totalitarian states always draw attention

to the complex apparatus of official propaganda and censorship. The
implication is that those in power in totalitarian states have become skilled
propagandists, a situation that remains relatively underdeveloped in the
democracies. Because the concept of a rational, free-willed electorate is at the
heart of democratic ideology, Western commentators often suggest that
totalitarian states depend more on propaganda than democracies do. Two
104

contrasting images are created: one of the robot-like victims of, especially,
former Soviet propaganda; the other of the free, independent spirit of
the democracies.
Objections may be raised to such an image, as is argued in more detail in the

discussion of Ellul’s view of propaganda in Section 6.4 below. For now, we
note Qualter’s (1965:139) point that there is more propaganda in a democracy
than in a totalitarian state. In a democracy, there are the official and near-
official appeals of the government and its political party. And there is the
propaganda of rival parties and many, often mutually antagonistic, groups.
Examples of these groups are of labour, business and agriculture; movements
for socio-political reform or reaction; political societies; and groups that
come into being and fade away as issues arise and disappear. By contrast, in a
dictatorship all propaganda is official propaganda. A dictatorship cannot
hope to match the appeals made to public opinion in a democracy, nor has it
any need to do so (Qualter, 1965:139).
Despite having less propaganda, totalitarian states under Hitler, Mussolini

and Mao, for example, have been able to mould public opinion far more easily
than any propagandist in democratic society. Two major reasons have been
provided for this in the literature:
1. Propaganda techniques in totalitarian states are supplemented by force
and terror.
2. The propaganda organs of totalitarian states tolerate no rivals as they
function within what may be called a closed society. The government or
the leader, as sole interpreter of right and wrong, takes on the moral
responsibility of preserving the faith of the people.
But no society is completely closed. The development of mass communication

and the contacts that must be made between states today, even between sworn
enemies, are such that no state can exclude foreign ideas.
This is just one view, albeit the best known view, of propaganda in a democracy
or in a totalitarian state. A far more comprehensive view is offered by the
French philosopher and sociologist Jacques Ellul.
Before turning to Ellul, however, we explore bureaucratic propaganda in the

modern democratic state. As proposed in Chapter 5 Section 5.1, bureaucracies
are integral to contemporary democracy, and bureaucratic propaganda is also
dealt with in the literature.
6.3 BUREAUCRATIC PROPAGANDA

Along with the rise of the modern state came the establishment and
development of large-scale bureaucracies, although Max Weber (1982:204ff.)
105

reminds us that there were clearly developed and large bureaucracies in

earlier periods of history. Weber’s (1982) examples include Egypt in the
period of the New Empire (from the 16th to the 11th centuries bc), the later
Roman Principate (27 bc–ad 284) and the Roman Catholic Church (especially
since the 14th century).
In fact, bureaucracy as a key administrative tool has become necessary to the

establishment of rational–legal administration and organisation in the
modern state.
Bureaucratic propaganda, by contrast, came into being as official information

from bureaucracies was formed and distributed. Thus it became
institutionalised primarily through organisational reports.
Bureaucratic propaganda strives to maintain the legitimacy of an organisation

and its activities. The daily activities are usually well understood by
employees, but most actions are symbolically changed when placed in the
context of an official report. Accounts that are evaluated by superiors or other
organisations are often designed to put the organisation in a positive light.
Thus, in attempting to satisfy evaluators and thereby legitimise the
organisation’s activities and purposes, official reports may have to present
manipulated pictures of their activities (Altheide & Johnson, 1980:18).
Accordingly, reports may be compiled so as to obtain further funding,
promote individual careers, blame a particular unpopular act on an ‘enemy’,
or in general cover the organisation itself from being exposed in front of a
sanctioning body.
For example, according to Bogart (1976:11ff.) the United States Information

Agency (USIA) became very good at manipulating actions to cover itself during
the Cold War. He found that even though field operators did not think that
strong anti-communist messages would be effective, pressures from the office
of Senator Joseph McCarthy in Congress forced USIA personnel to emphasise
the ‘communist menace’, proving to McCarthy’s allies that they were ‘good’
Americans (Bogart, 1976:11ff.). In the 1970s and 1980s in South Africa, the
ruling National Party presented the same propaganda in official state reports,
frequently warning the minority White Afrikaner establishment of a communist
threat and of the communists working together with the Black majority in the
land to delay the implementation of an integrated society.
Bureaucratic propaganda is found in most aspects of social life, including

politics, commerce, education and religion. It is quite a new form of discourse
and is often presented as being rational and scientific, thus enhancing its
general legitimacy. Exposing it and breaking down its legitimacy is difficult,
because so many people work hard to maintain its air of respectability.
106

Bureaucratic propaganda presented as official information can be particularly

harmful to society, because it also contributes to the construction of reality.
Official information disseminated by the mass media is often the main or
even the only connection between organisational insiders and outsiders. And
if such information creates the (false) impression that a particular organisation
is complying with societal expectations, it can influence people’s perceptions
about affairs that involve them directly with regard to that organisation. As
reality definers, then, bureaucracies are significant shapers of modern life.
In broadly comparing the traditional view of propaganda with bureaucratic

propaganda, we need to look at their respective targets, media and purposes
(see Altheide & Johnson, 1980:13–21).
The target of traditional propaganda is a mass (large) audience, while

bureaucratic propaganda most often addresses an individual, a group or a
specific segment of the population. Unlike traditional propaganda, where a
leader tries to gain support from a crowd of people, bureaucratic propaganda
normally aims at influentials and interest groups that make specific
decisions.
The medium used by traditional propaganda is usually public appearances or

the mass media, whereas bureaucratic propaganda is conveyed through
official reports, often at hearings and committee meetings.
As traditionally viewed, the purpose of propaganda is broadly to attempt to

alter opinions and attitudes so that they correspond to those of the
propagandist, while bureaucratic propaganda aims to maintain the legitimacy
of an organisation and its activities.
Let us now turn to Ellul’s view of propaganda.
6.4 ELLUL’S VIEW OF PROPAGANDA

First appearing in English in 1965, Ellul’s (1973) massive text on propaganda
is called Propaganda: The formation of men’s attitudes. In the Introduction,
Konrad Kellen (in Ellul, 1973:v) notes:
Jacques Ellul’s view of propaganda and his approach to the study of

propaganda are new. The principal difference between his thought edifice
and most other literature on propaganda is that Ellul regards propaganda as a
sociological phenomenon rather than as something made by certain people
for certain purposes. Propaganda exists and thrives; it is the Siamese twin of
our technological society.
107

Ellul (1973) believes that we can fully understand the pervasive influence of
propaganda only if we view it as a major way of life in modern democratic
society, which is a technological and mass society. In fact, Ellul’s entire view
of propaganda can be placed appropriately within the spectrum of mass
society theory.
According to Ellul, people in a democratic society are saturated by various

opposing kinds of propaganda (the French title of his book uses the word
‘propaganda’ in the plural). He categorises the types as follows (Ellul, 1973:61–
87):
• Political and sociological propaganda. Political propaganda is used by a
government or political party to change the actions of the public, while
sociological propaganda tries to persuade individuals or masses to a
particular ideology so that they can participate actively in a specific
sociological context.
• Propaganda of agitation and of integration. Propaganda of agitation is
highly visible and widespread, and usually tries to exploit areas of conf lict.
Propaganda of integration is a ‘propaganda of conformity’, which aims to
stabilise the social system, unifying and reinforcing it.
• Vertical and horizontal propaganda. Vertical propaganda is the classical
type, in which a leader tries to inf luence the people below him/her.
Horizontal propaganda is made inside a group, where all individuals are
regarded as ‘equal’ and there is no leader.
• Rational and irrational propaganda. Rational propaganda relies on logic
and facts (which of course can be manipulated), whereas irrational
propaganda is aimed at individuals’ feelings. Ellul contends that
propaganda is increasingly rational and is almost always based
on fact.
With these categories, Ellul (1973) arguably presents a more holistic view of
propaganda. The traditional view just looks at critical issues in political
propaganda, propaganda of agitation and vertical propaganda, while
emphasising the often irrational nature of propaganda.
For Ellul, by contrast, the least important propaganda today is in the form of
irrational appeals for change from the political leader agitating downwards
(that is, vertically) to the crowd – basically because such propaganda is easily
recognisable. He suggests that propaganda in democratic societies flourishes
on sociological constraints and impulses, as well as on political slogans, and
that it seeks not to bring about change but to integrate the individual in the
established social system (Ellul, 1973). This is done through (horizontal)
interaction between individuals to establish collective standards and group
norms, as well as through a leader’s (vertical) influence. Ellul argues that
rational propaganda, rather than irrational propaganda, overwhelms
108

individual and group life with true but selectively edited news, information,
statistics, figures and facts. His conception of propaganda thus includes
bureaucratic propaganda (Ellul, 1973).
So for Ellul propaganda in democratic society is total, combining all mass and
interpersonal media.
A closer inspection of sociological propaganda and the concomitant

propaganda of integration is required, as these forms are often overlooked
when propaganda in democratic societies is considered. But first we must
refer to the special relationship between propaganda and Ellul’s concept of la
technique.
In The technological society (1964) and in Perspectives on our age (1981a), Ellul
argues that democratic society, like other technological societies, is
characterised by the ever-expanding and irreversible rule of technique. La
technique, he proposes (1964:xxv), is ‘the totality of methods rationally arrived
at and having absolute efficiency in every field of human activity’. La technique
is thus more than technology: It is the organised collection of all individual
techniques that have been used to secure any end whatsoever. In this view
technique is totalistic, but it is not a totalitarianism of terror. This
totalitarianism is much more similar to Huxley’s Brave new world than to
Orwell’s Nineteen eighty-four, because its ultimate technical accomplishment
is of manipulating man into believing that he wants to do what the state and
society demand of him.
For Ellul (1981b:162), democratic society is governed by an overriding

concern for efficiency, an ethic of efficiency in fact, which is enforced,
among other human techniques, by various propagandas. Ellul (1973:xvii)
suggests that propaganda is required to solve problems created by
technology, to take advantage of people’s failures with regard to society and
to integrate the individual into a technological world. Propaganda is not
only the political weapon of a regime, but also the effect of a technological
society that embraces the individual and tends to create an integrated
society.
Propaganda is found in all forms of government and in all walks of life, but the
modern person has no clear idea of the extent of the phenomenon in
democratic society, Ellul (1964:368) indicates. This is partly because the
democrat clings to the classic 19th century view of the individual as an
essentially rational being who is able to resist propaganda.
109

Propaganda coordinates life in democratic society through an omnipresent

set of methods (Ellul, 1973:61). It flourishes in technological societies,
including modern democratic societies, in which most individuals are no
longer part of cohesive family and neighbourhood groupings and instead are
subjected to the uniformities of the mass media, mass education, an average
level of culture and an average standard of living (see Christians & Real,
1979:87). These people are depersonalised and unknowingly forced into the
mass from which they derive their identity. The mass is united by propaganda.
It is through the mass media that people in democratic societies are most
easily reached by propaganda. Propaganda would in fact be much less effective
without it, but only if the mass media succeed in operating on the individual
at the level of the unconscious. You must not know that you are being shaped
by outside forces, such as the mass media, but your core must be reached so as
to release the mechanism in your unconscious that will provide the appropriate
action for propaganda to be so effective.
In Propaganda (1973) and The political illusion (1967), Ellul suggests that the
mass media enhance sociological propaganda by providing stereotypes and
ideologies that permeate people’s existence and make them gradually adapt to
a certain order of things in society.
Sociological propaganda also operates at the level of unconsciousness with

regard to communicators. For example, ‘when an American producer makes
a film, he has certain definite ideas he wants to express, which are not intended
to be propaganda. Rather, the propaganda element is in the American way of
life with which he is permeated and which he expresses in his film without
realizing it’ (Ellul, 1973:64).
Sociological propaganda, unconscious at first, may become more and more

deliberate, so much so that the Western democratic way of life, in which we
may think we are so well off, becomes a criterion of value. This does not
necessarily mean that we are well off, but that, regardless of the actual
situation, we think we are. We are totally adapted to our environment.
Everything that expresses our particular way of life, which reinforces and
improves it, is good; everything that tends to disturb, criticise or destroy it is
bad (Ellul, 1973:67).
The mass media are not neutral message exchangers, but sociological
propaganda systems seeking to integrate people. Such propaganda is more
pervasive through state monopoly over the mass media, as in much of Africa,
or through private monopoly, as increasingly evidenced in the United States
and South Africa.
110

Integration propaganda, a propaganda of conformity, is related to the fact

that democratic society wants its members to adhere to its truth and
behavioural patterns. The more perfectly uniform the society, the stronger its
power and effectiveness; therefore, each member should be only an organic
and functional fragment of it, perfectly adapted and integrated (Ellul,
1973:74–75). In this respect the views of Ellul and, for instance, Marcuse
(1966) complement each other. Both imply that the established (democratic)
order is maintained because it is legitimised by an underlying ideology of
conformism perpetuated by mass media and other bureaucratic institutions.
Through integration propaganda, the social system becomes subtly despotic

in the sense of fully integrating the individual and making him/her
‘totalitarian’ in attitude. Such an attitude is fostered through what Ellul
(1981b:172) calls a ‘process of auto-justification’, where everything that is
‘other’ is denounced as wrong.
As agents of integration propaganda, the mass media do not produce fast,

impressive results, but act gradually and almost invisibly in order to achieve
an in-depth moulding. The mass media, then, provide the framework by
which people form opinions, rather than choice and personal experience
(Christians, 1977:70; Ellul, 1973:87).
Ellul shares Tocqueville’s 19th century concern that conformism is disastrous

for democratic life. But instead of viewing massification and conformism as
inherent to democracy itself, as Tocqueville (1951) does, Ellul (1973) locates
this trend in contemporary mass communication in democratic society.
Democracy will not function, we are told, without full access by everyone to
each day’s events. The mass media have the essential role of supplying this
material. Through Ellul’s Propaganda, we are forced to question this
informational lifeline per se (see Christians, 1976).
Information and propaganda are not always in conflict. Information is an

essential element of propaganda – to succeed or even to exist, propaganda
must be able to refer to political or socio-economic information. As Ellul
points out, in most of the older countries (such as Russia and China)
propaganda was localised and restricted to groups that had direct contact
with political life; it was not designed for the masses uninterested in such
questions – uninterested because they were uninformed. The masses cannot
be interested in political and economic questions, or in the great ideological
debates that are based on them, until mass media of communication give
them information (Ellul, 1973:112ff.). In this context Ellul maintains that
mass education and the leadership of intellectuals do not prevent propaganda
but coincide with its spread. In fact, he regards the intellectual as a most
111

propagandised member of society, because of his/her access to overwhelming

amounts of information and his/her need to have an opinion on every subject
(Ellul, 1973:111).
According to Ellul (1973), then, the information explosion produces crystallised

people, rather than informed people – the mass media are not just information
channels but also purveyors of social conformity, which makes it increasingly
difficult for each of us to affirm ourselves as an individual, as an ‘I’.
Given the mass media’s accepted role in democratic life, Ellul’s (1973)
conclusions have disturbing implications. As the media create our world for
us, determine our conversations and direct our decisions, they foster an
environment in which propaganda flourishes. The situation is worsened by
the fact that democratic society needs propaganda in order to survive.
6.4.1 Ellul on democracy’s need of propaganda

From the moment that a democratic society is born, propaganda sets itself up
alongside this society in various forms. This is despite the fact that the
principles of democracy are in conflict, particularly in relation to the freedom
of individuals and the processes of propaganda. The idea of a person who can
think and live according to reason, and choose freely between good and evil,
seems directly opposed to the hidden influences and the mobilisation of
myths so characteristic of the traditional view of propaganda.
But why do modern democratic societies need propaganda? One reason is

that the government needs it (Robins, Webster & Pickering, 1987). As Ellul
(1973:126–127) notes:
Even in a democracy, a government that is honest, serious, benevolent, and

respects the voter cannot follow public opinion. But it cannot escape it either.
The masses are there; they are interested in politics. The government cannot
act without them. So, what can it do? Only one solution is possible: as the
government cannot follow opinion, opinion must follow the government.
One must convince this present, ponderous, impassioned mass that the
government’s decisions are legitimate and good and that its foreign policy is
correct. […] the citizens must be tied to the decisions of the government. This
is the great role propaganda must perform. It must give people the
feeling – which they crave and which satisfies them – to have wanted what the
government is doing […].
Another reason is that at the level of international relations a democratic state

must safeguard its interests against enemies who wish to see the destruction
of democracy. Where the problem is to overcome national conflict, nothing
112

can be gained from straightforward information. Facts are not believed.

Except during military occupation and so on, people generally believe their
own government over a foreign government. A democratic state therefore
needs to use propaganda against the enemy if it is to influence it (Ellul,
1976:273; cf. Choukas, 1965:280–282).
A further reason is that individuals in a democracy also seem to need propaganda.

They are thus not simply the victims of a vast, overwhelming phenomenon.
Propaganda provides psychological support for people in facing the complexities
of modern life through simplifying critical issues and thus making the world
more understandable. Furthermore, propaganda promotes feelings of
involvement and meaning, which may boost people’s self-esteem, as well as
providing relief from guilt and anxiety through auto-justification (Ellul,
1973:147ff.).
Ellul’s primary suggestions may be summarised as follows (see Christians &

Real, 1979):
• Propaganda is not a set of tricks, but a continuing, ever-present, interrelated
system of human techniques that pervades all modern, technological or
mass societies in which la technique (or the quest for more efficiency
through technology) overtakes dialogical communication.
• Propaganda always occurs in societies where people are depersonalised
and unknowingly forced into masses. We get our identity from the mass or
crowd, which is united through propaganda. Individualism is systematically
stamped out in such society.
• The purpose of modern propaganda is not so much to agitate the masses to
action (although uniformity of action is promoted by propaganda), but to
integrate them unconsciously into society, mainly through collective
norms, standards and ideas.
• Propaganda in a technological society is total in the sense that it combines
all mass and interpersonal media and is aimed at communicators and
recipients, and totalitarian in that it tries to absorb man’s life completely.
• A modern democracy needs propaganda to keep its complicated social
structure intact in the face of possible adversaries within and beyond its
borders.
• Among the effects of contemporary propaganda are the stereotyping of
public opinion (socio-political effect) and the provision of clear-cut
solutions to people’s complex problems (psychological effect).
6.4.2 Ellul’s contribution

Notably, Ellul’s treatise on propaganda came before social media. But if social
media had existed at the time, they probably would have influenced some of
his arguments, given their pervasiveness.
113

In Propaganda (1973), Ellul offers no solutions, but insists that there is a

possibility of choice and differentiation for people in democratic societies
(Ellul, 1973:255; cf. Real, 1981:124). His analysis ends with a warning that
propaganda today is a greater danger to humanity than any of the other more
widely advertised threats.
However, in an article translated as The ethics of propaganda, Ellul (1981b:174)

suggests that to overcome propaganda’s disastrous consequences, people
must turn towards an ethical lifestyle, towards dialogical encounter with
others. This is in line with the existence-centred (and not just thought-
centred) nature of his work, in which the individual plays the main role.
Not surprisingly, Ellul’s ideas on propaganda are controversial – he is accused

of being a pessimist, a technological determinist and a fatalist, among others
(see Christians, 1981). Nevertheless, Ellul’s central concern is to show
holistically the modern ‘mess’ caused by this phenomenon. He is never
categorically pessimistic, deterministic or fatalistic, but warns that if people
limit themselves to a ‘trivial existence’ they may well find that propaganda
will become inevitable and inescapable (Ellul, 1964:xxix). A trivial existence
would be one in which people are comforted in conforming to propaganda.
For Ellul, the individual must not be taken in by propaganda and must
critically engage with the self-evident. Therefore, the individual – rather than
ideologies, economic systems or institutions such as education or
government – is the starting point for moving away from propaganda. But
Ellul refuses to construct fixed models of conduct for the individual, insisting
that we must work out for ourselves the meaning of our involvement in
modern society. He encourages us to choose our own course of action. The
choice then is existential, since the individual determines his/her precise
content freely at each new moment of decision (see Christians, 1981).
In reconceptualising propaganda, Ellul provides a different intellectual

framework for understanding propaganda and the mass media in modern
society. His arguments are not without problems, however. His presentation
of the traditional view of propaganda and his own conception have
connotations that are interesting but also confusing.
Usually, propaganda is morally questionable because it implies evil intent and

persuasive manipulation – with Hitler and Goebbels being the prototype
propagandists. Ellul’s reconceptualisation gets rid of this intentional
manipulation, but keeps the negative moral connotation associated with the
word. As a result, the reader may tend, wrongly, to transfer feelings of shock
and moral outrage at Nazi atrocities to the normal conditions of modern
societies, including democratic societies, everywhere. Another problem with
114

Ellul’s work is that he does not fully appreciate or discuss the positive aspects
of the mass media, which, after all, broaden our horizons about developments
in the world and also provide entertainment.
But Ellul has contributed substantially to the literature on propaganda and

the implications that it has for a democracy, pointing out that even a modern
liberal democracy can enslave people through propaganda if they do not wake
up, re-examine their life-worlds and assert themselves. Ellul appeals to people
in democratic societies to do just this, retaining as he does the ideal of
democracy: freedom above equality.
In the next chapter, we turn our attention to leadership, persuasive language

and politics, because most of the remaining chapters in this book deal with
persuasive communication in a political context.
115

A REMINDER
• Historically, propaganda was regarded as a concept with
positive connotations.
• The traditional perspective of propaganda focuses on its
psychological nature.
• Jacques Ellul’s perspective emphasises propaganda’s
sociological nature.
• A democratic state needs propaganda to survive.
• For propaganda to achieve its greatest effect, recipients need
to believe that they have always wanted what is being offered
or proposed by the propagandist.
116

Leadership, persuasive language and politics
chapter SEVEN
Leadership, persuasive
language and politics
LOOKING AHEAD
• characterise the relationship between leadership, persuasive
language and politics
• discuss the predominant language styles in the oratory, small group
and assembly debate settings
• explain that non-violent resistance is predominantly a strategy of
agitation which in turn is a form of mass persuasion
• write notes on the concept of directed political language
• contextualise the shifting patterns of directed political language in
South Africa over the past 30 years and more.
117

7.1 LEADERSHIP
Communication and persuasion (as a process of communication) go hand in
hand with leadership at all levels. In the political context, we may define
leadership as the ability of a person, a leader, to inspire and mobilise large
numbers of people in support of a cause or causes that, in a perfect world,
would be universally ethical. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela displayed to
most people iconic moral leadership after his release from prison in 1990.
Leadership is distinct from management. Leadership involves a leader leading

people; management involves a manager managing physical assets, systems
and processes, among other things.
The literature on leadership suggests that effective leaders:

• focus attention through a compelling vision
• communicate meaning to their followers
• develop trust through reliability and integrity
• elicit cooperation and teamwork from a large network of people and
organisations
• inspire these people and organisations, using various means of persuasion,
to keep motivating themselves to cooperate and work in teams (see Van
Zyl [2009] and Puth [2002] for comprehensive discussions of what effective
leaders do).
Leadership must often deal with change, and particularly transformation, in

society. As is indicated in Grobler and Puth (2002:8), transformation implies
‘really large changes […] it is not enough to change strategies, structures, and
systems unless the thinking that produced those strategies, structures, and
systems also changes’. These thought patterns are not merely politico-
ideological in nature, they are also aimed at making change succeed in a
pragmatic way. Change is difficult and people often fear it (Grobler & Puth,
2002). South Africa has been in a process of transformation (massive change)
for decades, and a lot still has to be done to fulfil the promise of an egalitarian
society. Effective transformational leadership is needed.
7.1.1 On transformational leadership

According to Du Plessis (in Van Zyl, 2009:138), many of the research findings
present the following four interdependent dimensions of ‘transformational
leader qualities/leadership qualities’:
1. Idealised influence or charisma. The leader builds the confidence, trust,
respect and loyalty of people so as to lessen their initial resistance to
change, if there is any, and so that they can motivate themselves to accept
change.
118

2. Inspirational motivation. ‘[I]nspirational leadership is about the

communication of expectations to followers inspiring them through
motivation to become committed to and be a part of the shared vision’.
3. Intellectual stimulation. The transformational leader communicates to
change his/her followers’ ‘awareness of problems and their ability to
solve those problems, question assumptions and beliefs, and encourage
followers to be innovative and creative, approaching old problems in new
ways’.
4. Individualised consideration. A supportive climate is provided to address
followers’ differing needs and concerns. And followers are treated on the
basis of their talent and knowledge in order to confront the challenges of
transformation as successfully as possible.
Nelson Mandela, a charismatic and transformational political leader, is

credited for offering eight lessons, or ‘secrets’, about political leadership.
Richard Stengel (2008:24), who worked with Mandela on his autobiography
Long walk to freedom, explains that ‘these lessons are mostly practical; many
of them stem from his personal experience. All of them are calibrated to cause
the best kind of trouble: the trouble that forces us to ask how we can make the
world a better place’. These lessons are as follows (Stengel, 2008:26–28):
• Lesson 1 Courage is not the absence of fear – it’s inspiring others to move beyond
it. […] Through the act of appearing fearless, inspire others.
• Lesson 2 Lead from the front – but don’t leave your base behind. [You make sure
to] take your support base along with you [when you undertake something
that may be viewed as] an unbelievable initiative […] a massive risk.
• Lesson 3 Lead from the back – and let others believe they are in front. The trick of
leadership is allowing yourself to be led too. “It is wise,” Mandela said, “to
persuade people to do things and make them think it was their own idea.”
• Lesson 4 Know your enemy – and learn about his favorite sport. As far back as
the 1960s, Mandela began studying Afrikaans […] and he even brushed up on
his knowledge of rugby. He knew that one day he would be fighting [the
Afrikaners] or negotiating with them, and either way, his destiny was tied to
theirs.
• Lesson 5 Keep your friends close – and your rivals even closer. Mandela believed
that embracing his rivals was a way of controlling them: they were more
dangerous on their own than within his circle of influence.
• Lesson 6 Appearances matter – and remember to smile. [T]hroughout his career,
Mandela [was] concerned about dressing appropriately for his position. [For
example, as a young man he wore a suit, and when he was old, Mandela wore
brightly patterned shirts that] declared him the joyous grandfather of modern
Africa.
• Lesson 7 Nothing is black or white. For Mandela, life [was] never either/or.
Decisions [were] complex, and there [were] always competing factors. To
119

look for simple explanations [was] the bias of the human brain, but it [didn’t]
correspond to reality. Nothing [was] ever as straightforward as it appeared.
• Lesson 8 Quitting is leading too. In 1993 […] Mandela proposed that the voting
age be lowered to 14 […] [H]e had to face the reality that [the idea] would not
win the day. He accepted it with great humility. […] Knowing how to abandon
a failed idea […] is often the most difficult kind of decision a leader has to
make. Mandela’s greatest legacy as President of South Africa is the way he
chose to leave it. […] In the history of Africa, there have been only a handful
of democratically elected leaders who willingly stood down from office.
Mandela was determined to set a precedent for all who followed him – not
only in South Africa but across the rest of the continent. He knows that
leaders lead as much by what they choose not to do as what they do.
While Mandela was arguably not a great orator, he was a master politician in
the way that he used language to embrace the South African nation. Let us
now turn to the general interrelationship of language and politics.
7.2 LANGUAGE AND POLITICS

Politics, as the management of a state by professional politicians and political
institutions, is mainly a word game – the practice of politics is predominantly
constituted in language (a system of signs). Chilton (2004:4) points out that
no matter how we define politics (see Van Dijk 1997:15ff.), there is a linguistic,
discursive and communicative dimension attached to it.
The communicative dimension of politics leads us to the study of persuasive

practices of political communication. McNair (2007:4) indicates that political
communication incorporates:
• all forms of communication undertaken by politicians and other political
actors for the purpose of achieving specific objectives
• communication addressed to these actors by non-politicians such as voters
and newspaper columnists
• communication about these actors and their activities, as contained in
news reports, editorials and other forms of media discussion of politics.
Politicians who rise to power do so mainly because they can talk persuasively
to voters and political elites. The language of political persuasion shares the
major properties of language in general. It is a means of translating
observations and ideas into verbal and non-verbal symbols. It is a means of
transmitting these observations and ideas to recipients who may be persuaded
by them, if the recipients are familiar with the symbol codes employed for the
message. There are many ways of communicating politics through non-verbal
messages, but it is mainly through verbal political messages or (verbal)
political language that political reality or political illusion in a state is
120

understood. The South African state has been (see especially Louw, 1994),
and still is, no exception.
Politicians focus on persuading voters to their own or their party’s point of

view. In the absence of persuasion, force could be used to impose discipline
on people, but it could never produce a community of minds.
Messages designed for persuasion in political speeches, assembly debates,

election campaigns and so on use emotional arguments and language that
rouse and satisfy recipients by means of their forms as well as substance.
Political persuasion, which presents itself as objective or empirical, disguises
the operating forces of valuation. Even the empirical opinion polls used
during election campaigns are used in favour of the particular cause and thus
function persuasively, even though their authors claim scientific and
journalistic purity.
It is often said that facts or ideas are powerful, rather than the words that
express them. But facts and ideas cannot be powerful until they become
known. Appropriately formulated language is needed in order to convey those
facts and ideas, so that they appear important in very specific ways to
recipients. Without language, facts and ideas are silent, unable to generate
thought and communicate meanings.
7.3 POLITICAL PERSUASION: LANGUAGE STYLES AND

SETTINGS
The language of political persuasion aims to guide recipients’ attitudes and/
or behaviour, that is, to either form, sustain or change their attitudes on a
political issue or push them to act. Such political messages may range from an
ordinary plea to an electorate to vote for particular issues or candidates, to a
call for violent action on behalf of the suffering of oppressed people.
Often, and in general, a potential persuader has to consider the mood of a

particular audience. Benoit and Benoit (2008:131ff.) offer five useful
guidelines for addressing hostile, apathetic and motivated audiences.
A hostile audience is antagonistic toward the speaker and/or the message.

Benoit and Benoit (2008:141) suggest that the speaker:
1. introduce humour to make the audience less hostile
2. emphasise common ground
3. express understanding and respect for the audience’s position
4. acknowledge past mistakes
5. reassure the audience.
121

An apathetic audience is indifferent to the speaker and/or the message. Benoit

and Benoit (2008:147) suggest that the speaker:
1. establish common ground
2. adopt a new approach
3. show how audience members are affected
4. share a surprising statistic
5. invite audience participation.
A motivated audience has a positive attitude towards the speaker and/or the
topic. Benoit and Benoit (2008:153) suggest that the speaker:
1. reinforce similarities with the audience
2. convey respect for the audience
3. use vivid description and imagery
4. use extended narratives
5. pay attention to the rhythm of the speech.
The language styles of political persuasion vary in different settings,

depending mainly on the:
• degree of openness and visibility of the event
• number of speakers who are interacting
• primary purpose of the event.
We now consider four major contemporary settings in which politically

persuasive messages are found: the oratory setting, the small group bargaining
setting, the assembly debate setting (see Graber, in Nimmo & Sanders, 1981),
and the non-violent resistance setting.
7.3.1 The oratory setting

The oratory setting involves a public and visible event where the communicator
generally seeks to persuade the audience with a formal speech. The main
feature of this setting is the ability of the communicator (politician) to control
the speech situation almost completely.
Oratory is virtually a solo performance rather than an interactive one. The

communicator can develop lines of reasoning and present them as planned,
generally without worrying about instant, point-by-point rebuttal.
Political language in an oratory setting is usually hortatory. The hortatory style is

reassuring: It gives the impression that large and important issues are being discussed
and that the public has a chance to participate in the decision-making process.
Hence, people are reassured that important matters have been, and will be, carefully
weighed according to acceptable criteria. The final decisions, whichever they may
be, must therefore be supported because they were reached in the proper manner.
122

The hortatory style is quite distinct from the other language styles used in
political discourse. Administrative or bureaucratic language, for example, is
designed to regulate and command. This language is thus full of complex
definitions and vague, wordy statements. It orders recipients to behave in
prescribed ways, without urging them to act through appeals to high
principles.
The hortatory style varies in character depending on the appeals used to

interact with the audience. Forms range from the oratory of the statesperson
to the oratory of the charismatic leader and the tirades of the agitator or
demagogue.
The underlying characteristic of a statesperson’s oratory is an appeal to

reasoned argument, underemphasising appeals to emotions such as love or
pride, fear or prejudice. Moderate language is used and value judgements are
presented on an intellectual plane rather than trivialised through slogans and
simplistic explanations. FW de Klerk and Thabo Mbeki are good examples of
statesmen who often used such oratory.
Charismatic oratory appeals to the deeply held emotions and ideals shared by large
numbers of people. Charismatic speakers have a personal quality or gift that enables
them to impress and influence many of their fellows. Examples of such speakers are
Mmusi Maimane, Cyril Ramaphosa, Allan Boesak and Helen Zille, who can
articulate these emotions and ideals in ways that make their audiences feel that a
spokesperson is expressing their most deeply felt needs.
Demagogic oratory also appeals to emotions, but on a base level. Deceptive or

irresponsible promises are often made. Speakers such as Julius Malema, and
Donald Trump in his 2015–2016 campaign to become the United States
Republican presidential nominee, may stir up prejudice, hatred and bigotry.
They may point out social evils to show that they are on the ‘side of the angels’,
without suggesting any practical remedies. They have little concern for
fairness or balance. Appeals are opportunistic, judged only by their
effectiveness.
In most parts of the world today, traditional statespeople’s oratory is often not
the norm. A mixture of charismatic and demagogic rhetoric, presented as
being rational, is predominant. Attempts to persuade through logical
reasoning have given way to attempts to manipulate audiences, mainly
through psychological tactics.
In our mass communication age, political speeches are rarely reported in

their entirety – often the public receives excerpts or summaries only.
Moreover, the preferred forms of public discourse are press conferences or
123

interviews in which no single theme controlled by the orator is fully

developed. Instead, interviewers ask disjointed questions. Public figures
are forced to respond to issues raised by the questioners rather than
presenting their own well-developed arguments. Their answers must be
brief, which often causes them to be glib and superficial. All of this debases
oratory in general.
7.3.2 The small group bargaining setting

Small group bargaining is particularly important in political persuasion
because most political decisions, especially in a democracy, are made by small
groups operating in committees, subcommittees and ad hoc committees.
The primary purpose of ‘bargaining’ language in the small group setting is to

reach agreement on the political issues involved. Bargaining language offers
‘a deal, not an appeal’, and as the name suggests it is not used in addressing
the general public.
In a small group bargaining setting, heads of state or leaders such as Jacob

Zuma and Helen Zille need not be concerned about the image they present to
the news media and the public, nor about the effects of their words on outside
audiences. They do not have to impress their constituents with the firm
statements of non-negotiable positions that are so common to open meetings.
Instead, they can concentrate on reaching a compromise based on consensus.
Their language is mostly cautious and cooperative. There are fewer deceptions
and threats than in oratory settings, and the motives of opponents are less
likely to be doubted or questioned.
Of course, these norms are not universally observed. In fact, at times, they
are deliberately violated when a party believes that it can thereby intimidate
the opposition.
The choice of persuasive techniques and tactics to employ in the small group
bargaining setting depends generally on:
• the degree of incompatibility between two or more politicians’ objectives
and interests
• the extent to which the politicians are committed to those interests
• the degree to which the politicians want to reach agreement.
Political allies are usually responsive to each other’s interests, and thus have a
good basis for compromising. Where the objectives of political opponents are
fundamentally incompatible, and both sides remain strongly committed to
124

their respective positions, the issue of influencing attitudes and behaviour

through persuasive bargaining becomes much more complex.
Two stages are involved in reaching agreement in such conditions:

1. One party must persuade the other to want an agreement of some sort.
He/She must make the other realise that any agreement or settlement is
preferable to the status quo of incompatible positions of non-agreement,
or that the consequences of non-agreement are more unfavourable to
him/her than the consequences of agreement.
2. Once the stage of ‘agreeing to an agreement’ has been reached, the two
parties must still bargain over the specific terms of the agreement. When
bargaining over these terms, politicians present their conditions, define
their objectives and use persuasion by making arguments or presenting
data to illustrate the correctness of their views or the degree of their
needs. They sometimes use credible threats and offers of reward (such as
suspending hostilities or promising key appointments in high office) to
obtain acceptance of their proposals. If these tactics fail, politicians can
reassess their original positions in terms of possible concessions that they
hope will gain agreement or a change in the objectives of the other side.
At the same time they must reveal their commitment to their bargaining
positions, in order to avoid the other party assuming that they do not feel
strongly about their conditions and would be willing to compromise
them without significant compensation.
Other persuasive techniques used by politicians to induce agreement include

the following (Jandt & Gillette, 1985; cf. Karrass, 1974):
• Exploiting the impatience of opponents, especially when they want an
agreement quickly, by causing them to take part in lengthy bargaining
discussions they would rather avoid. Effective ways of exploiting
impatience are haggling over minor details, introducing new and
unexpected topics for the agenda, and evading crucial points.
• Offering large concessions at first on the assumption that if they show
their goodwill, the other side will feel compelled to do so too. This of
course is a calculated gamble, because the other side might not offer any
valuable concessions.
• Making it clear that they will increase the terms later if the opponents do
not accept what is offered now.
Each bargaining situation is potentially unique, and thus no one can predict
with certainty which methods of persuasion will work.
125

7.3.3 The assembly debate setting

The assembly debate setting includes aspects of both the oratory setting and
the small group bargaining setting.
The South African Parliament and other legislative assemblies of various

kinds, international bodies like the United Nations and political conventions
are all examples of the assembly debate setting. Here, persuasion takes place
before a large, live audience and often many mass media representatives – as
in the oratory setting. Moreover, formal debates and discussions in assemblies
are interactive – as in the small group bargaining setting.
The main purpose of persuasion in the assembly debate setting is to produce

agreements on laws, regulations and resolutions that affect important aspects
of political life. While assembly debates set the agenda for action on public
issues, and define the rationales for political decisions, they also shape and
reveal divisions among political elites.
There are conflicting interests and personalities in the assembly debate

setting, but language use is controlled. Because there is a need to maintain an
atmosphere of civility conducive to continuous working relationships – even
among conflicting parties – persuasive verbal exchanges are generally kept
moderate. Most assemblies have formal and informal rules to ensure this, and
these rules are usually carefully followed. When highly emotional language is
used, it is often interpreted as a sign that the speaker is unwilling to reach a
compromise about the issues in question. Debaters strive to use language that
indicates they are people of strength, dignity and grand ideals who strongly
defend the legitimate interests of their constituents. There are many
exceptions, of course, for example the new hostile rhetoric prevalent in the
proceedings of the post-2014 South African Parliament.
In contrast to the oratory setting, the flow of persuasive arguments in a debate

setting is often difficult to guide, because fellow assembly members may
bring up matters that a given speaker would prefer not to discuss. Also, the
interactive nature of debates can limit speakers’ topic choices, because other
speakers may mention or discuss their preferred topic and line of argument
before they do.
We also need to consider the political language of the non-violent resistance

setting, because it has become so prevalent in the world today.
126

7.3.4 The non-violent resistance setting

In non-violent resistance, the term ‘non-violence’ refers to opposition to
physical violence. But non-violent resistance often relates to psychological
and structural violence or, as it is often called, ‘covert’ violence.
For our purposes, non-violent resistance as a strategy of agitation specifically

entails non-violent protest such as marches and mass attendance at funerals,
non-violent non-cooperation such as strikes and consumer boycotts, and
non-violent intervention such as sit-ins and fasts.
While the discussion focuses on non-violent resistance as a strategy of

agitation (cf. Bowers & Ochs, 1971), non-violent resistance may also function
purely as an agitation technique (a method used to further a strategy) or an
agitation tactic (a rule to complement a technique and strategy).
As a strategy of agitation, non-violent resistance does not specify a set of

tactics that are to be used in every situation, but it does require the tactics of
persistence and appropriate timing in resistance efforts.
Agitation may be regarded as a form of mass persuasion that usually occurs

when social groups outside the normal decision-making establishment advocate
significant social change and meet with resistance from the establishment that
requires more than the usual discursive methods of persuasion (Bowers &
Ochs, 1971:4). Agitation is often characterised by highly emotional argument
based on citation of grievances and alleged violation of moral principles.
This conceptualisation of agitation relates to what Ellul (1973) calls

propaganda of agitation – see Chapter 6 Section 6.4. For Ellul (1973:70ff.)
agitation propaganda usually attracts a lot of attention, because it tries to
exploit areas of conflict. All revolutionary movements and popular wars have
been encouraged by agitation propaganda. Ellul (1973:72–73) explains the
essential nature of this form of propaganda:
In all cases, propaganda of agitation tries to stretch energies to the utmost,

obtain substantial sacrifices, and induce the individual to bear heavy ordeals.
It takes him out of his everyday life, his normal framework, and plunges him
into enthusiasm and adventure […] it operates inside a crisis or actually
provokes the crisis itself. On the other hand, such propaganda can obtain
only effects of relatively short duration. If the proposed objective is not
achieved fast enough, enthusiasm will give way to discouragement and
despair. Therefore, specialists in agitation propaganda break up the desired
goals into a series of stages to be reached one by one. There is a period of
pressure to obtain some result, then a period of relaxation and rest […]
127

Non-violent resistance is purposeful. The idea is to inf luence public opinion

in favour of the non-violent resister’s cause.
The communication of image is an important part of any conf lict and so the
need for dramatising the conf lict issue(s) is well understood by non-violent
resisters. As we know, news f lourishes on conf lict, especially dramatic
conf lict, which in turn leads to dramatic storytelling. Dramatic stories draw
attention and non-violent resisters are attention-seekers.
Non-violent resistance is instrumental, it is a means to an end, rather than

the end itself. And it is almost always symbolic. At marches and sit-ins, non-
violent resisters use their bodies as symbols to show their powerful
convictions about laws and customs or other issues.
Non-violent resistance is proactive in the sense that initiatives are taken to

address problems. In confronting government, non-violent resisters often
aim at making the mechanics of government so difficult that the government
would eventually submit to their will – in much the same way as people give
in to a nagging spouse or crying child. Direct action, then, is involved. As
Sharp (1990:149) points out:
Nonviolent action may involve: 1) acts of omission – that is, people

practicing it may refuse to perform acts which they usually perform, are
expected by custom to perform, or are required by law or regulation to
perform; 2) acts of commission – that is, the people may perform acts
which they do not usually perform, are not expected by custom to perform,
or are forbidden by law or regulation to perform; or 3) a combination of
acts of omission and commission.
In the context of socio-economic and politico-ideological resistance, non-

violent resistance has been a universal phenomenon – with Mohandas
Karamchand (Mahatma) Gandhi (1869–1948) and Martin Luther King Jr
(1929–1968) being the leading exponents in the 20th century.
As a strategy of agitation, non-violent resistance has been used throughout

history by people who seek immediate justice and immediate human
rights – often presented as part of a call for democracy. Non-violent resisters
want social and legal change to correct a social or political injustice. An
ethical position is thus implied, and this in turn is inf luenced by cultural–
ideological factors.
Gandhi’s devotion to human rights and India’s independence from Britain by

means of non-violent resistance, or ‘satyagraha’ (a term born in South
Africa), resulted in millions of people seeing him as a saint – he died a
128

mahatma: a wise, holy and moral leader (Fischer, 1982). In the 1950s and
1960s, King, an African American Civil Rights leader, gained world
recognition in his non-violent crusade for social and legal equality in the
United States, where he worked for integration in the South and an end to
segregation in the North (Laqueur, 1973:280). Ironically, and tragically,
both Gandhi and King were assassinated.
Non-violent resistance in the socio-political realm thrives on group or mass

participation. In his famous work Moral man and immoral society (1932),
Reinhold Niebuhr argues that humankind’s basic egoism is often magnified
into unthinking behaviour, and that the success of non-violent resistance, or
the use of ‘soul force’ as opposed to ‘body force’ (as Mahatma Gandhi
[1982:81] suggests), depends also on group solidarity.
While the number of people comprising the image is important in non-

violent struggles, the overall image transmitted by non-violent resistance is
of greater importance. The person for whom non-violence is a matter of faith
is more likely to give a ‘consistent performance’, making fewer ‘slips’ (and
thereby presenting a clear-cut image of suffering and courageous humanity)
than those who follow without real commitment (Goffman, 1982:203). The
quality of the resistance, rather than its quantitative aspects, may also
increase in terms of enlisting support. For example, the number of non-
violent resisters enrolled under Gandhi’s leadership in South Africa from
1893 to 1915 rose from 16 to 60 000 people (Sharp, 1973:478).
Non-violent resistance often involves suffering, but if the larger community

reacts in sympathy with the non-violent resister, the strategy of agitation has
succeeded. In a sense, the non-violent resister has had victory without war.
Non-violent resistance is not always civilly disobedient (in the sense of

breaking a statute), but it is often the case. When not civilly disobedient,
non-violent resistance violates custom rather than law.
By combining non-violent discipline with solidarity and persistence in

struggle, non-violent resisters may cause the opponent’s repression to be
exposed in the worst possible light. As Sharp (1973:657–658) points out, this
may lead to a political battle that culminates in opinion and then power
relationships becoming favourable to the non-violent group. Support for the
opponent may be withdrawn and given instead to the non-violent resisters.
Non-violent resistance thus aims at lessening the power (the ability to have
your way even when resisted by others) and authority of the opposition.
Authority is taken to be the form of power that is accepted as legitimate, as
right and just, and obeyed on that basis. For instance, if members of South
129

African society accept that Parliament has the right to make certain
decisions, and they regard those decisions to be lawful, then Parliamentary
power may be defined as legitimate authority.
Sharp (1973:745) suggests that non-violent resistance affects the opponent’s

authority in three ways:
1. It may show how much authority the opponent has already lost. A
demonstrated loss weakens his power.
2. Non-violent action may help to undermine his authority further.
3. People who have rejected his authority may transfer their loyalty to a
rival in the form of a parallel government, which may in turn weaken his
authority even more, as well as create or aggravate other serious
problems.
Furthermore, non-violent resisters act on the assumption that the exercise of

power depends on the consent of the ruled. And by withdrawing that consent,
the ruled can control or even destroy the power of the rulers. In other words,
non-violent resistance is a strategy used to control, combat or destroy the
rulers’ power by non-violent means.
The strategy of non-violent resistance against successive White regimes in

South Africa (Smuts & Westcott, 1991; cf. Kuper, 1956) reappeared in the
1980s. There was a lot of non-violent resistance throughout the country in
that decade, and before the 1989 Defiance Campaign. It took the form of
school and rent boycotts, conscientious objection against military service,
courting arrest for resisting petty apartheid, rejecting the tricameral system,
burning the South African f lag, attending funerals in large groups, and
holding hunger fasts, sit-ins, stay-aways and marches (cf. Smuts & Westcott,
1991). These actions led the American theologian and activist Walter Wink
(in Smuts & Westcott, 1991:161) to declare, after visiting South Africa in
1986, that the practice of non-violent resistance in the country was ‘probably
the largest grassroots eruption of diverse non-violent strategies in a single
struggle in human history’.
During the Defiance Campaign itself, peaceful protest marches proved a

highly effective way of expressing resistance. In September 1989 nearly
30 000 people – led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Dr Allan Boesak and the
Mayor of Cape Town, Mr Gordon Oliver, among others – marched in Cape
Town’s central business district to appeal for immediate political reforms
and peace. In September and October of that year protest marches in which
thousands participated also took place in Grahamstown, Johannesburg,
Oudtshoorn, Durban, East London, Kimberley, King William’s Town, in
Botshabelo near Bloemfontein and in Uitenhage. A factor in the success of
130

these marches was the new approach of then President FW de Klerk, who
suspended the laws and emergency measures prohibiting such demonstrations.
Non-violent resistance has not decreased in post-apartheid South Africa or

in other parts of the world. Social media has become another weapon for
non-violent resisters. One recent example is the initial resistance during the
purple revolution in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011. Other
examples include the 2015 #FeesMustFall and #AfrikaansMustFall
movements instigated by South African students trying to persuade the
government that higher education should eventually be totally free, and that
Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in higher education institutions should
not have the same or higher status than English.
The #FeesMustFall movement succeeded in getting President Jacob Zuma to

declare no increases in 2016 fees. Evans (2015) proposes that this achievement
was based on the fact that the movement identified divisions early on, chose
the right target, did not lose momentum, and realised that a figurehead or a
press conference is not needed and that Twitter is not just for hashtags.
In conclusion, non-violent resisters are faced with the dilemma of organising

non-violent actions in such a way that they do not violate the human rights of
others. While freedom to protest may be legitimate, the issue of bearing
responsibility for our actions is also relevant. The question arises as to
whether non-violent resistance is waged humanely and constructively to
further human needs, or whether it contributes to destruction and chaos.
We now turn to the use of directed political language in South Africa. Let us
ref lect broadly, mainly reasoning by example, on directed political language
as used by the National Party (NP) and African National Congress (ANC)
governments respectively in South Africa before (as well as immediately
before) and after the advent of democracy in 1994.
7.4 DIRECTED POLITICAL LANGUAGE

For the purposes of the discussion, directed communication (as a form of
distorted communication) is defined as restricted communication that by its
nature stops a full discussion taking place on problems, issues and ideas that
have public relevance, and results from governmental policy on structuring
language and communication (Mueller, 1973:19).
Directed communication is not limited to political systems in which all

socio-economic institutions are subordinate to the interests of one group or
party. But this communication has been prevalent in totalitarian states, such
131

as in Germany during the Third Reich and in the (East) German Democratic
Republic following the Second World War, as Mueller (1973:24) explains:
Totalitarian systems consciously manipulate language and ideas through

the rigid control of educational institutions and the mass media. The
imposition of the ideology of the totalitarian system usually takes the form
of a reinterpretation of all prior history and the elimination of references
to any interpretative scheme other than the dominant one. […] Totalitarian
societies ideologize the public to an extent that all acts, even those of daily
life, have political overtones. As a part of a ubiquitous political totality, the
individual “participates” in politics while remaining politically powerless.
Mueller (1973:42) further asserts that:
[i]f an individual has spent most of his lifetime in a political system

dominated by directed communication, his language and consciousness
will be shaped accordingly. Those who grew up in East Germany were
most likely to accept the language of the dominant ideology, but even
those who had experienced a different political system could not separate
themselves from the distorted language. Thus refugees of all ages who
came from East Germany in the fifties needed a number of weeks before
they became adjusted to the language of West Germany even though they
had opposed the communist system. The manipulation of language was
more powerful than their convictions.
Ideology plays a significant role in structuring and directing political

language in any state (cf. Blommaert, 1997:2ff.). In short, we may deconstruct
ideology as follows (cf. Larrain, 1982):
• Secular belief. This is often called or experienced as (empirically) unproven
knowledge. A belief is an assumption or set of assumptions that is not
questioned or likely to be questioned because it seems ‘natural’ to the
believer. Knowledge, by contrast, is not ‘natural’ but ‘logical’ in that it
has coherence, is consistent (not contradictory) and is capable of being
ratified by people using the same methods of procedure.
• Group phenomenon. Ideology can even act as the ‘cement’ keeping the
group together.
• Entailing perceptions of reality. Ideology provides broad principles by
which group members interpret reality.
• Organising. Ideology is an instrument for making life itself understandable
to group members.
Political language has a variety of functions. One of the first Western

philosophers to recognise this was Aristotle in the Politics (Chilton,
2004:199):
132

• Language (speech) indicates to members of a group what is harmful or

useful.
• Language (speech) indicates what is good and evil, or just and unjust.
Humans have conceptions, or intuitions, of good and evil, justice and
injustice.
• The producing and sharing of a common view regarding these concepts is
an intrinsic part of constituting a social or political group.
Modern political language disseminates information, sets agendas and

frames, interprets and relates events and various aspects thereof with each
other, legitimises and delegitimises actions, stimulates action, and projects
the future and past (often in agreement with a dominant ideology) (see
Chilton, 2004; Joseph, 2006:110–135; Meadow, 1980:179–181).
Politicians often deny the importance of using language tactically, but as

Chilton (2004:8) informs us:
[p]olitical parties and government agencies employ publicists of various

kinds, whose role is not merely to control the f low of, and access to
information, but also to design and monitor wordings and phrasings, and
in this way to respond to challenges or potential challenges. The terms
“spin”, “put a spin on” and “spin doctor” are terms that ref lect the public
belief in the existence of and significance of discourse management by
hired rhetoricians.
Directed communication is often highly symbolic, ideological and politically

manipulative. Edelman (2001:94) notes:
The highlighting of evocative political symbols is likely to confuse

assumptions and beliefs about facts, values and blame and to do so in a way
that maintains support for the status quo. It is common, for example, to try
to win and maintain power by evoking an enemy (e.g. Jews, blacks,
homosexuals, women) that then erases or minimizes grievances against
others and diverts attention from poverty, inequality, and lives of misery,
frustration, and discontent. But the liberal notion that the creation of a
forum for debate and discussion promotes healthy policy changes
regardless of the content of the discussion tends to mask this effect.
Directed communication is predetermined and is aimed at adapting ideas to

people, and people to ideas – in other words, its intention is to persuade.
The focus here is on the rhetoric of political communicators. Key words and
phrases directed by spokespersons of the respective South African
133

governments, and which predominated in the political sphere during the

periods considered, are listed as a shorthand route to explain the changed
political circumstances, and illustrate that power and discourse are closely
related.
The discussion is somewhat exploratory. There are, and will always be, more
lines of enquiry to pursue when dealing with key political concepts and
phrases.
Ambiguity is especially noticeable in political language because politics

always involves conf licts of interest. Often a concept or phrase can have
quite different meanings for different people. As Edelman (2001:80) explains:
Meanings are created by the conceptual frameworks, interests, biases,

mistakes, and assumptions of those who use language and by their
audiences […] Political language is typically ambiguous because the
ambiguity serves a purpose for interest groups and public officials. It often
states a promise or threat with little or no intention to carry it out but
rather to reassure a constituency.
7.4.1 S
hifting patterns in key words and phrases in South
Africa
The NP government: From apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism to

non-racial South Africanism
Some of these key words and phrases are supported by explanatory
information, in brackets.
Key words and phrases used before 1989

• apartheid (the premise being sectionalist [Afrikaner] nationalism),
separateness, self-determinism, separate development, multinational
development, plural democracy
• homelands, independent states
• peoples, nations
• immorality
• inf lux control, orderly urbanisation
• group areas, location
• total onslaught
• Tricameral Parliament, own affairs administration
134

Key words and phrases used during the transitional period of 1989 to
1994
• non-racialism (non-racial South Africanism)
• one undivided state with one citizenship for all (that is, one South African
nation)
• common fatherland
• common values and principles are the political dividing line (such as
justice, peace, prosperity and Christian faith)
• checks and balances to block centralisation of power
• protection of minority rights
• Government of National Unity
The ANC government: From a non-racial democratic society to

African nationalism to (Black) Africanism?
Some of these key words, phrases and sentences are supported by explanatory
information, in brackets.
Key words, phrases and sentences used from 1994 to 2016

• South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White (in the
introduction of the ANC’s Freedom Charter of 1955)
• non-racial struggle (against apartheid)
• non-racial democratic society
• majoritarianism
• African nationalism
• a better life for all
• nation-building, Reconstruction and Development Programme, Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, Batho Pele (People First, the spirit of
service to the community)
• ubuntu (humaneness towards others, on the premise that a person is a
person through other people)
• masakhane (to build each other)
• ukama (emphasises the interdependence of people from birth until death)
• transformation, affirmative action, previously disadvantaged, designated
groups (except the White male group), quotas
• equity (with regard to employment, women’s emancipation, justice for
the disabled), redress
• redistribution (of land), restitution
• community engagement, izimbizo activities (direct interaction between
the government and the people)
• urban renewal programme (for example, in the main business area of
Johannesburg)
135

• social cohesion (including an anti-poverty strategy and issues of national

unity, value systems and identity, as manifested also in the idea of an
African renaissance [1999], NEPAD [New Partnership for Africa’s
Development] [2001] and the AU [African Union] [2002])
• Black economic empowerment (Act 53 of 2003, on Broad-based Black
Economic Empowerment, states that a Black person is African, Coloured
or Indian. Hence you can be a Black person without being an African – see
Van Zyl Slabbert [2006:153ff.])
• Africanisation (a renewed focus on Africa; the process of defining or
interpreting African identity and culture – also part of postcolonial, anti-
racist discourse)
• renewal (post-Polokwane)
• National Planning Commission for a National Development Plan in order
to bring about a developmental state (the National Development Plan
takes a market-related approach to the economy, with decentralisation
and less state interference as outcomes. The Plan ‘aims to eliminate
poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. […] South Africa can realise these
goals by drawing on the energies of its people, growing an inclusive
economy, building capabilities, enhancing the capacity of the state, and
promoting leadership and partnerships throughout society’ [South
African Government 2013])
• national democratic revolution (an ideological framework advocated by
the ANC to free Blacks from political and economic suppression through,
among others, democratic centralisation and critique of White monopoly
capital, which is even to blame for the poor funding of tertiary education)
• White racism versus Black chauvinism (according to Dr Blade Nzimande
(in Swart, 2016), Minister of Higher Education and General Secretary of
the South African Communist Party, which is in alliance with the ruling
African National Congress, previously disadvantaged people cannot be
racist, only chauvinist)
What should be clear from the key words, phrases and sentences listed above
is that directed political language tries to suggest ‘pictures in our heads’, to
use Lippmann’s (1956) well-known phrase, first published in 1922. For
Edelman (2001:78), these pictures relate to:
• beliefs about the past and present
• the implications of specific policy changes for various social groups in the
future
• beliefs about which interest groups and public officials should be regarded
as allies and which as threats or enemies.
136

In conclusion, directed political language can be regarded as an instrument

of power in the Foucauldian sense. Power, Foucault (1980:131) would argue,
is discursive rather than purely coercive, and it determines which kinds of
discourses will be viewed as true:
Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is,
the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; and the status of
those who are charged with saying what counts as true.
In the next chapter, we will look at image and persuasive political campaign
management.
137

A REMINDER
• No matter how we define politics, leadership and persuasive
dimensions are attached to it.
• Persuasive language styles differ when used in the oratory,
small group bargaining and assembly debate settings.
• Non-violent resisters often carefully focus resistance on certain
key issues.
• The role of ideology in structuring and directing political
language is significant.
• Directed political language in South Africa has undergone major
changes in the past 30 years and more.
138

Image and persuasive political campaign management
chapter EIGHT
Image and persuasive political

campaign management
LOOKING AHEAD
• explain the difference between political image, identity and
personality
• relate the art of image management to political persuasion
• distinguish between a political campaign and a political movement
• write notes on the style and arrangement of a formal political speech
• discuss critical persuasive communication issues related to modern
political campaign management.
139

8.1 PERSUASION, POLITICS AND IMAGE MANAGEMENT

Persuasion plays an important role in helping to create and maintain the
favourable image of a political party, organisation or candidate among
potential voters. But what is this image that is deemed so valuable to all
involved directly in political life?
8.1.1 Political image, identity and personality

A perception is an intuitive awareness of the subjective truth about something
or someone. A political party’s image is the image that is perceived by voters.
The content of voters’ images of a political party has cognitive, affective and
conative aspects. In other words, what voters know (cognitive) about the party,
how they feel (affective) about the party and what they propose to do (conative)
about the party (support or reject it) are all part of their images of that political
party (Nimmo & Savage, 1976:9). Therefore, it is only the voters, as an
‘external public’, who can create an image and not the political party itself,
because voters consciously and unconsciously choose ideas and impressions
on which their image of the political party is based.
We must distinguish between image, identity and personality. As explained,

the image is in the hands of voters. Identity, by contrast, means the sum of all
the ways a political party chooses to identify itself to the voters. Personality is
concerned with whatever makes the party unique – in other words, all of its
characteristics.
Much has been written about image management, also with regard to
establishing and maintaining positive news media relations in order to
generate mutual understanding between a political party or organisation and
the voters. In most cases, this ‘mutual understanding’ is sought to favour the
party, of course. The role played by the news media is highly important, and
is dealt with in Chapter 5.
Let us consider briefly Erving Goffman’s (1982:207ff.) views on the art of

image management, or ‘impression management’, as he terms it. Goffman
provides a useful frame of reference for understanding important aspects of
the art of image management in interpersonal communication settings.
8.1.2 The art of image management: Goffman’s view

Goffman is a major exponent of the dramaturgical approach to understanding
human behaviour. In this approach, communication and persuasion are
described through the metaphor of theatre.
140

Goffman explains impression management in terms of performers and teams

in a theatre using the front area (visible to an audience) and the back area (not
visible to an audience) to make an impression on an audience. He recognises
that a person is also a role player and manipulator of ‘props’ (any object or
furnishing that helps to convey desired impressions to recipients), costumes,
gestures and words.
The arts of image management follow from the fact that it is in the interests of
the party or organisation to control the conduct of others, especially their
perceptions of it and responses to it. This control is best achieved by giving
others the kind of impression that will lead them to act in line with the party’s
plan. This may, of course, be done through various persuasive techniques.
The basic techniques of (mass) persuasion outlined in Chapter 6 Section 6.2.1
are most relevant here.
We draw on Goffman’s ideas as set out in his best-known book The presentation
of self in everyday life (1982), first published in 1956, and his ideas on ‘frames’
in Frame analysis (1974). Two central organisational needs for managing the
image of a political party immediately become clear:
1. The party must gather enough information about its voters to be able to
identify the situation and define it. This information is essential for using
‘frames’ (see, for example, Goffman, 1974:10–11) or frameworks, and is
inferred from the general behaviour of the observed voters. The
framework offers guidelines to the boundaries within which the arts (or
techniques) of image management are to be carried out. In addition, the
framework both conceals (is not known to the voters) and reveals (is
known to the voters), thereby giving some occurrences a public character
while preventing others from becoming public information.
2. The party must at least partly control the situation it has identified and
defined. To meet this organisational need, the party must project
particular (favourable) impressions.
In short, the party or political organisation must first identify and define the
situation and then affect it favourably.
To use Goffman’s (1974; 1982) terminology, in image management a stage is

set, and politicians and party workers perform as players on the stage. They
act in various ways, verbally and non-verbally, to control the expressions and
information they give to others, so as to control the definition of the situation
by managing the voters’ impressions. These, then, are the basic elements and
terms of a Goffmanian dramaturgical pentad of impression management or
political image management. The pentad, or set of five, answers questions as
to what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent),
how it was done (agency) and why (purpose).
141

Rational decision-making, moulded by a practical persuasive motive, is also

involved in image management. Calculated interaction takes place between a
political party and the voters.
The arts of image management identified by Goffman (1982:203–230), and

which are particularly relevant to political parties and the like, consist of two
broad kinds: defensive measures and protective measures.
8.1.2.1 Defensive measures in the art of image management

Performers (politicians or party workers) need to use three defensive measures
to save their (image management) show:
1. Dramaturgical loyalty. The (political) team keeps the team’s secrets and
accepts its moral obligations. Two types of secrets are particularly
important: dark secrets and strategic secrets. A dark secret refers to
(unfavourable) factual information that will disrupt the impressions the
voters are supposed to receive and believe. A strategic secret involves the
intentions and capacities of a team, which it conceals from the voters in
order to impress them later. Strategic secrets are also used to surprise the
opposition and to keep it guessing.
2. Dramaturgical discipline. This implies that the performer (politician) must
remember the part he has to play (the functions he has to execute) and
must not make mistakes in his performance.
3. Dramaturgical circumspection. Through the wise use of factual information
about the voters, the performer can determine in advance how to stage
the show (the image-management programme).
8.1.2.2 Protective measures in the art of image management

Performers must make it possible for the audience (voters) to take protective
measures on their behalf.
Goffman notes that the performer must be aware of the hints provided by the
audience and act upon them – often in the manner suggested by the audience.
Moreover, if the performer is to misrepresent the facts (about the party), he
must do so in accordance with the (cultural) etiquette for misrepresentation.
The idea of presenting dramas is central to Goffman’s (1974:508) overall

persuasive communication theory:
142

I am suggesting that often what talkers undertake to do is not to provide

information to a recipient but to present dramas to an audience. Indeed, it
seems that we spend most of our time not engaged in giving information but
in giving shows. And observe, this theatricality is not based on mere displays
of feelings or faked exhibitions of spontaneity or anything else by way of the
huffing and puffing we might derogate by calling theatrical. The parallel
between stage and conversation is much, much deeper than that. The point is
that ordinarily when an individual says something, he is not saying it as a bold
statement of fact on his own behalf. He is recounting. He is running through
a strip of already determined events for the engagement of his listeners.
In engaging others, then, the politician or party worker presents a particular

character to the voter. He/she divides the self into a number of parts and, like
the stage actor, presents this or that character in a particular engagement role.
In conclusion, we are not suggesting that the political party or organisation

itself necessarily sees the dramaturgical model as an accurate representation
of its image-management programme in an interpersonal setting. Instead,
this model should rather be viewed as a useful frame of reference for
outsiders (analysts and so on) to focus attention on a few important
regulatory aspects of a political party’s behaviour in its attempt to inf luence
its image favourably.
Given the important role of the news media and journalists in any political
image-management programme, politicians and party officials should follow
some kind of policy, albeit a broad and flexible one.
8.1.3 A case for news media diplomacy

The main aim of a political party’s image-management policy is to influence
public opinion in such a way that it reflects the policies and programmes of
that party. In this process of mass persuasion, the news media should be fully
exploited. This applies in South Africa as much as anywhere else, and is
necessary because the news media reflect, interpret and construct South
African realities, if only partially.
A primary goal should be to establish and maintain mutual trust between a

political party and the news media – a difficult task indeed.
A major problem lies in the relations between party officials and news media
practitioners. The party official wants the news media to serve only his/her
interpretation of the party’s interests. This would entail publishing a version
of reality where publication promises a good return, and not publishing
whenever the official has doubts about whether disclosure would be wise or
143

appropriate. The journalist, by contrast, generally believes that the interests

of the public, as well as his/her own interests, are best served by disclosing as
much as possible. The journalist wishes to exercise his/her judgement, and to
publish an interpretation or version of the reality that he/she thinks is
important or newsworthy, while it is still fresh and new.
In the image-making field, the news media are suspicious of the motives of
party officials, sometimes inaccurate in their approach to problems, and
anxious for a good (possibly front-page) story, even when the consequences of
publication go against the party’s image. This makes many officials distrustful,
secretive and defensive. But the way these officials behave in turn underpins
the reporters’ suspicion of official news sources, sharpens their distrust and,
in general, throws them back on their own (often inadequate) resources for
the bits and pieces that make up the stories they put together on their own.
The result is coverage that is often disjointed, unfocused and oversimplified.
Therefore, the question is how to influence the terms in which this relationship
functions, so that it loses some of its ‘I win, you lose’ character. In trying to
overcome the problem, political parties should ask their officials to take
attitudes and approaches that increase the area of compatibility between
them and the news media.
The functions of party officials and journalists generally differ. But both
groups are concerned with conflict, crises and peace, and both supply political
intelligence, or information, to the image-making process. For this common
function to be facilitated, the professional approach of party officials towards
the news media should be re-examined continually.
In short, political parties should follow a policy of ‘news media diplomacy’ – the

tactful and artful management of the news media by party officials through a
process of cooperation; of give and take.
In the interests of a news media diplomacy policy, political parties should:

• serve as an early warning system to identify potential issues
• be fully aware of gross and hidden biases in commenting on controversial
issues
• recognise that management of the news media is about 80 per cent a public
relations effort and 20 per cent negotiation, but should soft-sell their
image-making programmes to the news media so as to meet the news
media’s expectations timeously or as early as possible
• when setting the agenda for the news media, ensure that they attempt to
keep to that agenda
• establish a reputation for reliability – as far as possible, information should
be supplied where and when it is requested
144

• supply good copy that is of interest and value to the news media (to their
readers, listeners and viewers)
• cooperate as much as possible with regard to requested media interviews
• build up personal relationships with members of the news media that are
based on honesty and mutual professional respect
• realise that news media relations essentially consist of doing favours, not
receiving them – the idea is that the news media should feel that they would
be less successful if there were no party officials
• encourage continuing education of the news media among their officials.
8.2 PERSUASION AND POLITICAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

Goffman’s (1982) dramaturgical pentad (see Section 8.1.2) may also be applied
broadly to political election campaigns, because they certainly convey a sense
of drama. A political stage is set and politicians perform as players on that
stage. In various persuasive ways, they act to control the expressions and
information they give to others, so as to control the definition of the situation
by managing the voters’ impressions therein.
Even electoral campaigns that do not involve real competition have a noticeable
element of political dramatics. In authoritarian countries, the ruling party
schedules elections, organises a huge campaign effort complete with speeches,
rallies and tours, and then mobilises a vast turnout on election day, although
the outcome has in effect already been decided. Such an election appears to
serve an integrative purpose: The ruling party dramatises its responsibility to
the electorate by courting them, and the citizens give pro forma ratification of
the ruling party’s policies and leaders, thus dramatising solidarity.
8.2.1 On political campaigns and movements

A political election campaign is essentially a planned series of organised,
communicative actions that are carried out over a specifically defined period
of time and are designed to have specific effects among voters in favour of the
candidate or party involved in an election.
Therefore, a political election campaign:

• involves an organised set of communicative actions
• has a purpose
• is aimed at a large number of recipients
• has a specifically defined time limit (cf. Rogers & Storey, 1987).
While these campaigns are aimed at mobilising support for a party’s cause or
a candidate, their overriding purpose is to win. This means that the candidate
for office, for example, has to persuade the voter that he/she and his/her party
145

can provide, or has provided, the political leadership that the voter needs. To
do this, the candidate and the party that he/she represents must design a
persuasive campaign strategy, which may need to be adapted to meet changing
circumstances as the campaign progresses.
A political election campaign is developmental – it grows and changes to engage

with voters’ responses and emerging issues. Most electoral campaigns pass through
some, if not all, of the following five stages (Larson, 2013:313–321):
1. Identification. Each candidate needs to generate the voters’ identification
of his/her name and purpose. This is achieved through public appearances
and advertising in various media, among others.
2. Legitimacy. Usually, candidates have automatic legitimacy: Their right to
participate is generally accepted, unless they have failed in office.
Challengers have a major task in trying to destroy another candidate’s
legitimacy, and often resort to mudslinging.
3. Participation. Candidates and their campaign managers seek to ensure
that volunteers take part in their campaigns, and that previously
undecided voters become involved in their cause.
4. Penetration. This is achieved when a candidate either wins the election, or
gains a sizeable percentage of the vote if he/she had had no chance
previously.
5. Distribution. The winning candidate must fulfil the promises made to his/
her voters and/or campaign workers. Of course, politicians do not always
do this – the community centre is not built, jobs are not forthcoming and
so on.
There is a difference between a campaign and a movement. It has been argued

that a political campaign consists of systematic communicative actions that
are carried out in a specifically defined period of time (usually a relatively
short period, as in South Africa). When the process of political persuasion is
boosted by chance spontaneous events and followed by long-term planned or
unplanned motivation, we speak of a movement (Ross, 1985:182).
Various strategies are used by (politico-) ideological movements to propagate

their cause. The following strategies, which may be effected in the
developmental stages, have been identified by Bowers and Ochs (1971:21ff.):
• Petition. The communicators, in this case agitators of an ideological
movement, address the sources of power, for example the government,
labour unions, schools and churches.
• Promulgation. The ideological movement is marketed. Agitators inform
outsiders and others about their movement and its goals using traditional
media, for example leaflets and rallies, and social media such as Twitter.
• Solidification. Newly recruited members are educated and promoted
through, for example, meetings and protest or freedom songs.
146

• Polarisation. The movement tries to create conflict between large groups

of people, for example by focusing on a flag or national anthem issue.
• Non-violent resistance. Students or workers might, for example, occupy a
building or organise a strike to further their cause (see Chapter 7 Section 7.3.4).
• Escalation. The movement seeks to increase tension in the sources of power
through violent acts, such as disturbances in public places, which can lead
to public confrontation.
• Revolution. The movement tries to overthrow the existing power sources
and replace them with its own.
An election campaign is a symbol of democracy. Democracy involves more than

the election of public representatives, but an election is the heart of the system.
Elected public representatives must preserve the system’s values, and the
electorate has the opportunity to decide, on a regular basis (by means of
elections), how its interests can best be served. Regular elections also provide
the government with legitimacy – the general acceptance of their right to govern.
An election may revolve around a party or an issue, but in a democratic

political election campaign, the focus is on the candidate for office, on his/
her persuasive presentation skills and on the related campaign management
(see Mauser, 1983; Redman, 1979:194–211; Sadie, 2011; cf. Nimmo, 1970).
8.2.2 The candidate

When assessing the merits or chances of a given candidate, his/her verbal
ability to persuade voters must be taken into account. The candidate does a
lot of public speaking on the campaign trail. He/She can use to his/her
advantage the specific guidelines first offered by Aristotle on the style and
arrangement of a formal political speech (see Section 8.2.3).
A candidate’s non-verbal communication can of course also be a major aid or

obstacle to his/her campaign. Candidates often use facial expressions, gestures,
postures and objects to complement their attempts at verbal persuasion. (For a
discussion on non-verbal messages, see Chapter 3 Section 3.3.)
During an election campaign, the candidate can also take advantage of

favourable factors relating to his/her special training or talent, age, education,
family background, occupation, ability to interact with people, temperament,
leadership quality, administrative ability and reputation among other opinion
leaders.
The unpredictability of the individual voter is always a major dilemma for a

candidate. But there are generally three kinds of voters:
1. Those who will vote for the candidate no matter what.
147

2. Those who will vote for the opposing candidate(s) no matter what.
3. Those who are undecided.
It is the undecided voters who often make the difference in an election, and
therefore to whom special persuasive efforts ought to be addressed. Redman
(1979:200–201) notes that there are several basic factors, or combinations of
factors, that can persuade an undecided voter to vote for a particular
candidate:
• The candidate’s name must be familiar.
• The candidate’s policies must be acceptable.
• He/she must dislike the same things that the candidate dislikes.
• The candidate’s image must be acceptable – for example, his/her family
life, religious affiliation, and so on.
• There must be some difference between the candidate and the opponent
that reflects favourably on the candidate and against the opponent.
• The candidate must have made personal contact with the voter, such as
through a visit or speech.
• The candidate must be endorsed by respected third parties.
The persuasive strategies used by candidates and challengers often overlap.

But candidates generally emphasise their accomplishments while they have
been in office, especially with regard to what they have done for their
constituents (for example, provided greater access to water, electricity and
housing in a rural area), while challengers usually attack the candidates’
record and call for a change in leadership.
8.2.3 The style and arrangement of a formal political speech

In Book III of the Rhetoric (1984), Aristotle provides guidelines as to the style
and arrangement of a formal political speech that would apply especially to
the oratory setting. Being a practical man as well as a theoretician, Aristotle
recognised the undoubted relevance of style and arrangement to the
presentation of speeches.
Aristotle’s treatise on political (deliberative) speeches is the first systematic

work on this subject ever recorded. It is relevant as much in today’s world as it
was in the Greek city-states. No statesperson or politician addressing the
nation or his/her constituency, no diplomat explaining the merits of his/her
government’s policies in the United Nations General Assembly, can afford to
ignore the basic guidelines laid down by Aristotle over 2 300 years ago.
Aristotle states often in Book III of the Rhetoric that good style and the proper
arrangement of political speeches advance persuasive discourse and please
recipients by instructing them.
148

8.2.3.1 Style
In briefly summarising Aristotle’s ideas about style, we may say that good
style in a persuasive political speech is characterised by clarity of expression,
rhythm and liveliness, and appropriateness.
Expression is made clear through the use of the current idiom. Rare, compound
and newly invented words should be used sparingly. Ideas should be described
rather than merely stated, because the style of public speaking is like that of
painted scenery – it must be impressionable. Metaphors must be used carefully
as they provide recipients – in a manner similar to the enthymeme (see
Chapter 2 Section 2.3.2) – with ‘quick learning’, satisfying the recipients’
desire to know. Conjunctions should be used judiciously in order to ensure
that paragraphs flow smoothly and thereby present a continuous and logical
train of thought. So the politician must avoid ambiguous language, unless he/
she uses it to pretend to say something while actually saying nothing useful.
The speech must be rhythmical, not metrical or monotonous. A metrical

speech is boring and predictable. Rhythm is achieved through emphasising
certain ideas, repeating words and phrases, and pausing at particular times.
The style of a political speech should also be lively. Liveliness may be achieved
through the use of metaphors that show things in a state of activity, antithesis
(whereby things are described in terms of what they are not) and dramatic
presentation.
Appropriateness of style has to do with the manner in which the material in the
speech is dealt with and presented. Style should be part of the substantive
argument. The style is appropriate when it is adapted to the character of the
speaker, to the emotions of the audience, to the theme and to the mass medium
or media used to present the speech. For example, when discussing serious
issues, the speaker should use corresponding terminology, and when trying
to provoke outrage, the speaker should use the language of anger.
Aristotle argues, in effect, that it is not enough for politicians to know what to
say, they must also know how to say it.
A major problem related to Aristotle’s useful guidelines is that recipients who

evaluate a politician’s ‘style’ interpret it in the framework of their cultural and
ideological values. We must always bear in mind the complexity of evaluation,
linked directly to the recipients as complex human beings.
149

8.2.3.2 Arrangement
According to Aristotle, a political speech must have a fixed structure. Broadly
speaking, when structuring a speech, the speaker should move from the
general to the specific, from the whole to the details.
Aristotle suggests that a political speech has two main parts: a statement and
an argument, which means persuasion by proof or proofs. In other words, in
arranging a political speech, the politician states his/her case and then
‘proves’ it.
A political speech can be divided into four parts:

1. Proem, or introduction.
2. Statement.
3. Argument.
4. Epilogue.
The proem and epilogue should support the statement and the argument by
serving as aids to memory. In the proem, or introduction, the politician begins
with the familiar (to the audience) and introduces the theme. The function of
an introduction is to make clear the objectives of the speech. Introductions
are related either to the speaker, the opponent, the audience or the specific
subject matter. Accordingly, the idea is almost always to create attitudes
among the audience that favour the speaker rather than the opponent. When
the introduction is related to the audience, the politician may seek to make
the audience think highly of him/her, arouse their passions or make them pay
attention to the case being argued. When a sensitive or ‘bad’ subject appears
to be uppermost in the audience’s mind, the introduction can be used to
direct their attention away from it.
In the statement, the politician states his/her factual case. But the statement
should be presented in a manner that also displays character (ethos) and
emotion (pathos).
In a political speech, the argument tries to provide rational proof (logos). The
argument usually concerns the unknown future, but can be substantiated
with examples drawn from the past. The argument contends that a certain
action is unjust, cannot be done, or can be done but will do no good or is not
as important as the opposition claims it is.
Aristotle indicates that refutation of an opponent is not a separate division of

the speech, it is part of the argument. If the politician speaks first, he/she
should present arguments and anticipate and deal with the opposing ones,
unless the opponent has many. If his/her turn comes later, he/she must first
150

deal with the opposing arguments, so as to make the audience receptive. The
politician, Aristotle urges, is to provide hard (unarguable) proofs, if possible.
Proofs are difficult to provide in politics because the ‘common good’, which
is often the subject in political speeches, is less clearly defined than, for
example, the law. Again, examples drawn from the past are highly suitable for
political oratory. Enthymemes can also be used, but not just one after the
other.
Ethical discourse is appropriate as well, especially when there are few or no

enthymemes to provide. For Aristotle, the best way for a politician to be
ethically (or emotionally) persuasive is to support his/her case with principles
that are familiar to the audience.
Finally, an effective epilogue aims briefly to make the audience sympathetic to

the speaker and unsympathetic to the opponent, to make the speaker’s side
look strong and the opponent’s weak, to put the audience in the desired
emotional state, and to refresh their memory of what has been said.
Book III of the Rhetoric emphasises that any politician presenting a persuasive
speech ought to use language correctly, attend to delivery, arrange his/her
material well and end thoughtfully and clearly.
8.2.4 Campaign management

The management of a contemporary political election campaign has become
highly professionalised and dynamic. A candidate’s campaign manager and
workers are involved in ‘selling’ the candidate or the party to the voters. Thus,
often they must assist in or do the necessary (general) research, strategy
formulation, fund-raising, advertising and media use, and debate planning.
8.2.4.1 Research
In order to plan a political campaign effectively, research must be conducted
on:
• the general nature and turnout of the candidate’s potential voters
• the opposing candidate(s) and his/her likely voters
• socio-economic conditions in the constituency and in the nation as a
whole.
While formal and informal opinion polls may be conducted, previously

recorded data are often analysed. The main idea is to determine the candidate’s
strengths and weaknesses and the opportunities for gain and threats against
him/her (the so-called SWOT evaluation: strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats).
151

8.2.4.2 Strategy formulation

The campaign manager, along with the candidate, should coordinate the
campaign and design its persuasive strategies. To be effective, a strategy
should complement the principle (the fundamental ‘truth’ or dominant
ideology) and policies (the systems of administration) of a party, and be
linked with appropriate techniques (methods) and tactics (rules).
The overall strategy of a party at this time follows certain broad rules
(Nimmo, 1970:50–51):
• If the electorate is divided along party lines – as is often the case – the

candidate of the majority party [for example, the African National Congress]
will emphasise party appeals and play down personal traits, qualifications
and issues that might split off supporting groups of voters. The candidate of
a minority party [for example, the United Democratic Movement], on the
other hand, would rather emphasise ‘the person, not the party’.
• If party lines are not clear-cut, and there is not much party identification
because it is a new party [for example, Agang South Africa in the 2014
national and provincial election], specialised appeals to voting blocs must
be worked into the strategy.
• If the electorate is generally indifferent to politics, then a commanding
personality and sensational issues are the best approach for gaining voter
interest and turning out voters.
• Content and relational strategies have to be clarified. Content strategies
relate to the issues that the party is going to focus on, be it service delivery,
crime or the state of the economy. Relational strategies, on the other
hand, refer to the approach that the party is going to adopt against its
opponents, be it one of attack, ignore or defend. [See also Section 8.2.4.4
and Chapter 9.]
• It is important for the party or candidate to develop an overall campaign
message as soon as possible [in this regard, see Benoit and Benoit
(2008:248)]. [For example, during the 2014 election campaign in South
Africa, the ANC propagated the idea of ‘together we move South Africa
forward’, while the Democratic Alliance (DA) emphasised that opposition
supporters should be ‘together for change, together for jobs’.]
The communication strategy is a comprehensive plan for all organised

communication activities aimed at contacting target voters up until election
day.
When funds are low, the development of the communication strategy can be
limited to the messaging, targeting of voting districts (VDs) and techniques
for contacting the voter (cf. Turkington & De Wet, 2012).
152

Campaign messaging involves the campaign choosing the words and visuals
that it plans to communicate. This messaging does not include the
communication techniques or the different formats of the message in each
technique (Moffitt, 1999:139). A message is the ‘single thought, idea, concept,
truth or meaning’ the campaign uses to persuade its target voters (Fourie,
1975:10). Answering the question ‘Why should I support you?’, as if it were
coming from the potential voter, is a useful exercise for developing the
message.
The campaign message should also set the tone for the campaign. Tone is the
manner in which communication is phrased and delivered, and the manner in
which the campaign themes are addressed. The campaign themes are the
issues that the campaign chooses to speak about. A campaign should choose
a limited set of themes, especially those that are important to its target voters
(Maarek, 1995:47–48). All themes must be continually linked back to the
campaign message during the course of the campaign, which is facilitated by
the tone being kept consistent throughout.
Luntz (2007:1–33) provides rules for the effective use of language in a

campaign message. The message should be simple, short, believable and
consistent in its repetition all through the campaign. It should be new, and
should engage with the voters’ wishes in a relevant context. It may also include
a powerful question, with a distinctive sound or ‘feel’.
A good message distinguishes between the candidate or party and their

opponents by highlighting the positives of the former and the negatives of the
latter, or simply by demonstrating difference.
Finally, an important aspect is credibility – how believable or trustworthy a

party is in the eyes of the voter. How much negativity a campaign should
allow, or how much time it should spend attacking the opponent to lower
their credibility, depends on the tone that has been set for the messaging, and
on how the campaign is faring in comparison to its viable opponents in the
days leading to election day (Morris, 1999).
The targeting of voting districts entails prioritising the VDs that should be given
special attention in a campaign. Four factors usually come into play: the
number of registered voters in a VD, the predicted turnout, the size of the
campaign’s base vote in the VD and the VD’s amount of swing potential.
High numbers of voters prevalent in one or more of these factors in a particular

VD suggests that it should be prioritised above other VDs that are not
numerically significant to achieving objectives.
153

In general, it is easier to target base voters and swing voters than it is to go

after an opponent’s base vote (Shaw, 2010:165–208). At times, however, the
dynamics of a VD that must be won demand that the campaign pursue the
opponent’s base voters. In this case, the availability of resources is assessed to
determine to what extent its base vote can be neglected and the opposition’s
base can instead be pursued.
While the communication strategy is the plan through which the campaign
achieves its goals and objectives, techniques are the means by which this is
accomplished, that is, the activities or methods that are used to implement a
strategy.
Persuading target voters generally applies to convincing either the opponent’s

base voters to switch allegiance or swing voters to lean towards the campaign.
Turning out the vote, otherwise known as the ‘get out the vote’ phase of the
campaign, takes place in the close run-up to election day and is aimed at
mobilising sufficient voters to go to the polls and cast their vote for the
candidate or party.
Many techniques can be used to contact the voter. Some techniques allow
indirect contact, such as mass media coverage (see Section 8.2.4.4), and
others allow direct contact (Maarek, 1995:89–98). The purpose of describing
the various techniques below is to represent the range of options that may be
considered for a communication strategy.
One of the traditional techniques for direct voter contact is door-to-door

canvassing, involving volunteers and/or the candidate personally meeting the
voter.
Canvassing generally involves three concurrent phases that need to be

planned for the get out the vote phase (Burton & O’Shea, 2010:193–196):
1. VDs need to be canvassed street by street in order to identify supporters,
take requests for more information or campaign branding material from
supporters, and note where follow-up visits need to be made.
2. The same areas need to be re-canvassed in order to visit homes where
target voters were not reached the first time.
3. Canvassers need to actually make the noted follow-up visits.
Shortly before and on election day, the get out the vote phase takes place.
This involves contacting supporters to urge them to vote and arranging the
logistics for people requiring assistance to get to the polling stations. Careful
planning is needed in this phase, as the costs tends to run very high, something
which many campaigns do not take seriously enough in the earlier phases
(Green & Gerber, 2008).
154

Closely related to canvassing is the literature drop, where campaign literature

is left at voters’ houses for their later perusal. Literature can also be handed
out at strategic locations such as busy road intersections and shopping centres.
Phone banks made up of teams of people who are either paid staff or volunteers
tasked with contacting voters telephonically may be used to monitor support
levels, respond to queries raised during canvassing, remind people to vote or
persuade voters to consider the campaign’s candidate.
Automated calls, called robocalls, can be programmed to deliver a generic

message to a voter, but this is neither effective nor cost-effective, according to
the findings of numerous studies (Green & Gerber, 2008).
A popular form of personal contact is made when the candidate attends coffee
meetings to meet supporters and interested parties in an intimate setting,
such as a supporter’s home. The concept can be adapted to any more intimate
gathering such as a braai or daytime yard meeting with homemakers or
younger voters.
Supporters may also be requested to endorse the candidate to their friends

through the use of a card template provided by the campaign. Endorsements
from influential figures in a community, or from celebrities in the case of
high-profile campaigns, should ideally be obtained.
Civic organisations such as churches and special interest groups may also be
willing to endorse a candidate or offer their time and people for canvassing
and other tasks on a voluntary basis. This is a viable option in some instances,
but campaign planning should consider two factors: Civic organisations are
external to the campaign organisation and therefore to its planning, and
uncoordinated or even tactically incorrect activities may end up taking place.
And these groups often come with their own political history, which could
harm a campaign’s image.
There are two types of techniques related to events:

1. Pre-set events. These are events organised by people other than the
campaign that the candidate attends and possibly addresses, such as gala
dinners, debates or funerals.
2. Created events. These events are organised by the campaign. The most
common form is the rally where larger numbers of supporters are
addressed by the candidate.
155

8.2.4.3 Fund-raising
No party or candidate can wage a campaign without money. Large sums are
needed, and must be raised by the candidate, the campaign manager and
workers, and their party.
For the 2014 national and provincial election campaign in South Africa,
Parliament approved an allocation of R114.8 million of taxpayers’ money for
parties represented in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures.
Ninety per cent of the total amount was allocated proportional to the number
of seats each party held in the National Assembly and the provincial
legislatures at the time. The other 10 per cent was shared equally among all
the political parties represented (Williams, 2013:1). New parties such as
Agang South Africa and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) received no
public (state) funding.
Political parties raise funds through membership fees, mass rallies, house
meetings, door-to-door interactions, merchandise sales (for example, the
R80 red beret of the EFF) and other creative outlets such as concerts, golf
days and karaoke evenings. Funds can also be raised online. In an extreme
example, in 2012 President Barack Obama’s campaign team managed to raise
$690 million online in the United States, with more than $200 million of it
through donations of $200 or less (Scherer, 2012)! The business sector and
foreign donors also contribute to funds raised.
There is no secret formula for raising political funds. Most individuals and
interest groups contribute because they believe in the party or the candidate
and his/her cause. Thus the party or candidate must be packaged to meet
potential contributors’ likes and dislikes, and must not concede to unrealistic
conditions that may be attached to contributions.
8.2.4.4 Advertising and media use

Political advertising can be defined as a paid, non-personal form of
presentation of political ideas undertaken by an intermediary on behalf of an
identified communicator whose aim is to influence voters’ attitudes and/or
behaviour.
Advertising is part of any election campaign. Political advertising, it has been

found, makes a genuine contribution to voter information. Through
advertising, candidates are kept in the public eye and voters without
information on political issues are given the chance to get information
(cf. Meadow, 1980:170).
156

Advertising practitioners are often hired by candidates, or the parties they

represent, to interpret to the voters not so much what the situation is as what
they suspect the voters want the situation to be. Of course, the advertising
message or messages must be acceptable to the candidate or party as well.
The art of persuasive advertising therefore involves providing voters with a

clear and accessible version of what they expect. This must be done without
compromising the party or the candidate’s views. Voters need to be encouraged
to develop positive attitudes towards the party or candidate, and break their
traditional voting habits, where applicable.
Media used for advertising in a political election campaign include printed

media, such as newspapers, brochures, pamphlets and general campaign
literature; display media, such as posters, banners, billboards, bumper
stickers, buttons, water bottles and other visual aids; audio media, such as
radio; audio-visual media such as TV and DVDs; SMSs on cellphones; and the
internet.
In South African elections, social media was used for the first time in 2014. It
did not play a significant role, especially with regard to policy issues, even
though major political parties were present on online platforms (Alfreds,
2014). Party leaders such as Jacob Zuma, Helen Zille and Julius Malema had
higher numbers of Twitter followers than their respective parties. Goldstuck
(2014) suggests that the situation will be different in 2019, when there will be
more than 20 million social media users, half of whom will be of voting age.
The power of Facebook cannot be underestimated. Scherer (2012) reports

that in the United States Facebook was ‘an afterthought’ in Barack Obama’s
2008 presidential campaign, but that in 2012, during Obama’s re-election
campaign, Facebook ‘became the new electronic telephone call, employed to
persuade more than 600,000 Obama supporters to reach out to 5 million
swing-state friends online with targeted messages in the days before the
election’.
Where possible, parties use all of the abovementioned media – they use all
available means of persuasion. Traditional mass media uses social media to
become more powerful, and vice versa. Media research has found that
frequency of message exposure also has to be taken into account. For example,
message reception of a poster (a popular and relatively inexpensive medium,
costing about R70 per poster in 2016, labour included) often goes through
three stages:
157

1. What is it?
2. What does the recipient think of it?
3. Decisions with regard to earlier evaluations and the start of disengagement,
when the recipient will stop considering it.
In sum, research shows that three exposures are necessary to obtain

(hopefully) desired results (see Pfau & Parrott, 1993:291).
Television and the internet have greatly affected the nature of political
campaigning in developed countries such as the United States. Political
advertising on TV was only introduced in South Africa in the 2009 election
campaign. The two largest parties, the ANC and the DA, both ran TV adverts
during the campaign.
The first advert, that of the ANC, was screened about two months before the
election on SABC 1 in the late evening. In this advert an old gentleman, Mr
Alfred Xaba, living in Queenstown in the Eastern Cape, relates how his
dreams have come true since Nelson Mandela was freed in 1990. We see
Mandela and his second wife, Winnie, walking hand in hand after his release
from prison. Xaba’s life has improved, the advert shows, since the ANC first
came to power in 1994. We see his green cornfields and well-tended cattle.
Evocative music plays in the background. Xaba continues the story of how the
ANC has helped communities to receive water, housing, education, and
treatment at hospitals and clinics. Near the end of the advert, he states that
there is, however, still much work to be done. After the image of Xaba fades,
Jacob Zuma appears on the screen informing South Africa that he is willing to
accept the challenges and reinforcing the ANC election campaign message:
‘Together we can do more’.
Many of the other political contenders settled for radio, given the high costs
of television advertising. For example, a 30-second advert screened during
Generations on SABC 1 cost R68 000 at the time (Rapport 1 March 2009:6).
During the 2014 election campaign in South Africa, the ANC spent an
estimated R17 million on over 600 advertising spots on TV prior to the voting
period, and the DA spent an estimated R13 million on 377 spots (see www.
electionupdate.org.za).
As in 2009, budget constraints meant that in 2014 the smaller parties did not
use television as a campaign medium, and instead used the free party election
broadcast slots, allocated by the public broadcaster on its radio platforms,
that were provided to each party contesting the election.
158

Like mass commercial advertising, mass political advertising is an attempt at

one-to-many persuasion. The basic relational strategies used in political
campaign adverts (and in political campaign debates) are as follows: sell a
position on an issue; defend the position; attack the policies of the opponent(s);
and claim that the party or candidate is also in favour of something generally
viewed favourably, but that he/she is in a better position to make it happen – the
so-called ‘me too … me better’ strategy. More than one strategy is often used
in a single advert.
Political adverts can also use intensification and downplay (the two main
strategies in Rank’s model of (mass) persuasion, and the related tactics,
discussed in Chapter 5 Section 5.6.1), as well as the basic techniques of mass
persuasion (outlined in Chapter 6 Section 6.2.1).
8.2.4.5 Debate planning

In a political campaign full of adverts and news snippets, viewers may turn to
debates to provide sustained analysis of issues and close comparison of candidates.
‘Debate’ has become a buzzword for ‘serious democratic politics’. In following
Martel (1983:2), we may define political campaign debate broadly as ‘the joint
appearance by two or more opposing candidates, who expound on their positions,
with explicit and equitable provisions for refutation without interruption’.
Every candidate wants to achieve certain goals during his/her debate

performance.
A general goal of all candidates in political campaign debates is either to

outperform the opponents or, when facing formidable ones, at least to debate
well enough to maintain their support among the electorate.
Specific goals usually come from a decision to target a specific segment of the
electorate (the committed, uncommitted and opposition), which in turn is
related to the prevailing circumstances.
If the candidate, or his/her party, is leading by a reasonably large margin in

the polls, the goal is generally to reassure the committed (supporters), or at
least to avoid doing or saying something that might jeopardise their support.
If the candidate/party is behind in the polls, the goal may be to pursue the
uncommitted and possibly the weakly committed opposition. These voters
are more likely to be influenced by the candidate’s debate performance than
are strongly partisan opponents. The risk, however, is that the candidate may
lose weakly committed supporters or create non-voters. As Martel (1983:
59–60) notes:
159

In such instances, the candidate has to calculate (often somewhat blindly)

whether the sacrifices of some supporters might not attract a greater number
of his new audience. In so doing, he must not only understand his own support
base – how large and solid it is and why – but the nature of the uncommitted
and the weakly committed opposition as well. Do they constitute a potentially
decisive audience? To what extent are they likely to vote? Are they more or
less likely to vote than a segment of the candidate’s supporters? What issues
and image factors are most likely to influence them? What party do they
generally vote for? What affiliations other than party might be pertinent, for
example, religious, ethnic, union, professional? How specifically do they
perceive the candidates?
When the membership of a candidate’s party is significantly smaller than that

of another party, but there is a reasonable chance of success in the election,
the goal of the debate may be to appeal broadly to the heart and mind of the
typical voter. Such a goal also applies when polls show that candidates have
more or less equal support, and thus that the election will be a very close
contest.
Of course, all candidates have an image that they want to project in the debate.
For example, a candidate may want to show that he/she strongly advocates
defence and public safety, or that he/she is compassionate and a champion of
human rights.
We must not forget that campaign workers, who are often volunteers, must
try to deliver friendly voters to the polls on election day. Sophisticated ways
of doing this have developed recently, for example through digital social
networks such as Facebook and Twitter. But canvassing during the election
campaign is arguably still done best through sincere door-to-door visits.
However, telephone calls are often the only practical way.
To summarise, a persuasive (and developmental) political election campaign

is the product of sound coordination between a good candidate and effective
management, which in turn involves, among other things, the organisation of
solid research and strategy formulation, adequate fund-raising, appropriate
advertising and media use, and intelligent debate planning.
In the next chapter, we will focus on persuasion and political debates.
160

A REMINDER
• There is a difference between the image, identity and
personality of an organisation or political party.
• A political election campaign is developmental.
• A successful political election campaign is a product of sound
coordination between a viable candidate or party and effective
management.
• When participating in a political debate, the candidate or party
seeks to accomplish certain goals.
• The use of social media is becoming increasingly important in
political election campaigns.
161

chapter NINE
Persuasion and political debates
LOOKING AHEAD
• write notes on the history and importance of political debates
• explain the difference between a political debate and an
educational debate
• distinguish between content and relational strategies to enhance
persuasion in political debates
• discuss verbal and non-verbal tactics that may be used in political
debates
• write notes on debate effects and the concept of a debate winner.
162

9.1 INTRODUCTION
Political debates have featured in society at decision-making levels for

thousands of years. Thoughtful men such as Plato, whose dialogues were an
early form of cross-examination debate, and John Stuart Mill in the 19th
century have recognised the importance of debate for people and society.
Political debates in Western society have become more significant since the
televised American presidential debates between John F Kennedy and
Richard Nixon in 1960. In apartheid South Africa, the De Klerk–Treurnicht
debate of 1988 was a landmark: For the first time, two powerful politicians – the
leader of the governing National Party in the Transvaal and the leader of the
Conservative Party, the official opposition in the House of Assembly – faced
each other and debated issues on national television.
Traditional or educational debate may be defined broadly as ‘the process of

inquiry and advocacy, seeking reasoned judgment on a proposition’ (Freely,
1976:1). Such debate involves a confrontation, held according to rules, and in
equal and adequate time, of matched contestants on a stated proposition to
gain an audience decision (Jamieson & Birdsell, 1988:10).
Political debates also entail a confrontation according to rules in essentially

equal (but usually inadequate) time to gain (or perhaps contribute to) an
audience decision (albeit delayed). And there is often at least a basic matching
of participants (politicians). However, there is usually no stated proposition.
The format of political campaign debates tends to generate more criticism

than almost any other aspect of the debate process. Educational debate
coaches in particular attack them for not having the essential features of true
(rational) debates. In educational debates there is always a stated proposition,
as pointed out, and a standard agenda for rational decision-making. This
agenda usually involves:
• defining the problem, by defining its terms and its scope or limits
• analysing the problem, by examining its factual nature; developing causal
relations; and setting criteria for evaluating solutions
• proposing possible solutions
• testing solutions against the criteria
• selecting or constructing a solution.
The most popular way of focusing political debates is through the use of
topics. This has certainly been the case in the United States, although the
open-ended format (where no specific topics have to be dealt with) has also
been used (see Martel, 1983:119–122). In South Africa, the 1988 moderated
163

televised debate between De Klerk and Treurnicht consisted of specific

topics: a constitutional and political plan for the future of South Africa, and
the role of extra-Parliamentary organisations with reference to the National
and Conservative parties. The debate concluded with an open-ended
discussion period.
An interesting innovation in South Africa during the 1989 general election

campaign – for White, Coloured and Indian members of the old Tricameral
Parliament – was the introduction of televised ‘telepolations’ and
‘audiopolations’ on radio. These short political debates involved a specific
proposition, such as that the Democratic Party was fielding candidates in
constituencies to help the Conservative Party win seats against the ruling
National Party.
However, running for about 20 minutes at a time, these mini-debates did not
follow the standard agenda for rational decision-making on a proposition, as
in educational debates (see above).
In a telephone survey conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council

(HSRC) for the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) during the
election campaign at that time, the popularity of these telepolations among
White voters was found to be 74.9 per cent. By contrast, short open debates on
a given topic, which also featured on TV during the ‘general’ election
campaign, were more popular – 80.7 per cent of the White South African
voting public supported them.
Being so new, South African televised political campaign debates were widely
commented on in 1989 in the mass media, and gave rise to certain (at times
quite vague) suggestions about how to look at and deal with pertinent matters
in a televised debate context. For example, Bjorkman (in Kemp, 1989) suggests
certain guidelines for the candidate:
• Have a sense of humour, and identify with the values of the community:
honesty, sincerity and noble ideals.
• Have a clean appearance, and speak with a voice that conveys authority,
knowledge and status.
• Know his/her audience and talk to them.
• Pay special attention to what he/she says.
• Restrict him-/herself to the topic under discussion.
• Be polite towards the opponent.
• Be business-like, and do not protest too much.
• Use accurate and specific statistics in arguments.
• Stick to the real problems at hand.
• Do not be too shy of the camera.
164

Topics provide focus without being too restrictive. Moreover, topics generally
include a sufficient variety of sub-issues to interest a large audience, contribute
to coherence, and allow candidates to concentrate their efforts on a limited
number of issues – thereby making it more likely that the discussion and
debate will be of higher quality. During the 2009 election campaign in Free
State Province, three debates were held at the University of the Free State in
Bloemfontein for representatives of the major political parties. Three topics
featured on three occasions, respectively. The first revolved around whether
a new political era was beginning in South Africa, the second focused on
service delivery and the third looked at crime. In the 2014 campaign, the
SABC broadcast weekly election debates from February to May which were
streamed live on its YouTube channel. Topics included youth and
unemployment, education, land, accountability and corruption, and crime.
The basic justification for institutionalising debates lies in the usefulness that
such debates may have for increasing knowledge among some voters. This
ties up with the idea that political debates can enable society to take another
step towards realising the democratic ideal: All citizens are capable of voting
responsibly based on knowledge, not on prejudices (see Kraus & Davis,
1981:291).
While political debates can be viewed as a serious attempt at following the

democratic ideal, they are often criticised for emphasising candidates’ images
over issues or substance, which invites excessive manipulation.
Image is certainly important and necessary in political debate. As Aristotle

(1984:24) indicates, the duty of a public communicator is to be able to discover
in any given case the available means of persuasion, and to adapt to whichever
medium of communication is being used. Since persuasion is the lifeblood of
politics, a politician needs to bear Aristotle’s dictum in mind.
In the case of contemporary political debates worldwide (though not in South

Africa), the major medium is television – a medium that accentuates the
formation of images and perceptions. In this regard, Berkman and Kitch
(1986:131), for example, note that Ronald Reagan’s briefing book before his
1980 televised debate against President Jimmy Carter counselled him to
display ‘Competence – Compassion – Reasonableness, moderation, and
thoughtfulness – Strength’. Carter was advised to show ‘[i]ntegrity, sincerity,
openness, intelligence, steadiness and common-man touch’ (Berkman &
Kitch, 1986:131).
However, it does not necessarily follow that such debate is excessively

manipulative. As Martel (1983:3) points out, a campaign debate is a form of
job interview: When someone seeking employment wears their best clothes
165

for the interview, makes extra effort to be clean and neat, strives to be more
calm and polite than usual, and listens and pays attention to what he/she says
more carefully than usual, that person is not being overly manipulative.
Besides, as it has been argued, it is only the poorly informed who can be
manipulated by candidates’ image creations. The better informed are more
likely to engage with the merits or demerits of the issues at hand.
9.2 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DEBATE

Much has been written about the general and strategic advantages and
disadvantages of participating in a political campaign debate. Five main
arguments can be put forward in each case (Jamieson, 1987:28–33; Jamieson
& Birdsell, 1988:120ff.; Kraus, 1987; Martel, 1983:31–49; Meadow, 1987).
Arguments for debate:

1. It points to a candidate’s openness and accessibility.
2. It supplements costly advertising.
3. Debates have a civilising influence on what are, or might be, bitterly
fought or sometimes dirty campaigns.
4. It can help the candidate who is behind in the polls, since it gives him/her
more exposure.
5. It reveals candidates’ communicative competence and habits of mind.
Arguments against debate:

1. Ideas must be trimmed to fit pre-set time limits. Thus, stock answers are
usually repeated and complex problems are often presented simplistically.
2. Candidates tend to show their command of the facts rather than to relate
the facts to the larger issues.
3. In debates, candidates do not demonstrate many of the skills they would
need for being in office: asking the important questions, securing good
advice, acting judiciously and compromising without violating their
conscience or basic social principles.
4. Candidates’ mistakes during debate are blown out of proportion in
subsequent media reports.
5. In political debates candidates practise spontaneity and are trained to be
enthusiastic.
Political campaign debates do have shortcomings. But the contention is that

they are beneficial in most societies, including South Africa, where situation
comedies and detective series lure voters away from critical political issues
and where adverts and news snippets tend to dominate political thought and
gossip.
166

9.3 CONTENT AND RELATIONAL STRATEGIES

Candidates use two interrelated types of strategies to attain their image goals
in political campaign debates: content and relational strategies (cf. Martel,
1983:62–75).
9.3.1 Content strategies

Content strategies define the issues or content areas on which the candidate
should focus. Several content areas have to be considered, including the
candidate’s and opponent’s experience, character, position on issues, actions
in office, party positions, or record and campaign practices.
The candidate should focus on his/her potential or demonstrated strength in

relation to the opponent’s weakness in any of the above areas. If a candidate is
not well known, his/her main aim is to sell him-/herself. This takes precedence
over issues per se.
Candidates and their advisers gather and study all the available and
authoritative information on their opponents’ issue positions, speaking skills,
public regard, support base and campaign momentum. They need to do this
in order to choose appropriate content strategies. In other words, issues, and
the way the candidate addresses them, can be the major vehicle to build or
reinforce his/her image.
While the most striking feature of a candidate’s rhetoric in discussion of

policy issues is often its extreme vagueness, significant research provides the
candidate with information about which issues are the most important and
how he/she and his/her opponent are perceived on these key issues. In this
way, the candidate can focus on the issues that he/she can develop to his/her
advantage.
When debating with their opponents in the 2009 and 2014 general elections
in South Africa, most of the major political parties focused on issues of service
delivery, corruption, education, poverty, unemployment, violent crime,
health care and HIV/Aids. In 2014, particular attention was also paid to land
reform, the Marikana massacre and the Nkandla and Gupta scandals. In fact,
and depending on whether it was the governing ANC party or an opposition
party, each party seemed to take ownership of issues that it thought would
serve it best. For example, the ANC has always blamed the country’s apartheid
past for most of the problems that still exist in the nation, while the DA has
tried to ‘own’ the issue of widespread state corruption.
167

9.3.2 Relational strategies

Relational strategies are involved in the dominant mode of conduct or
interaction between political debaters. As noted in Chapter 8 Section 8.2.4.4,
five broad relational strategies are available to the candidate:
1. In an attack, a debater’s arguments are directed offensively at his/her
opponent’s positions, party, character or campaign. Under most
circumstances, an opposition candidate is advised to attack the candidate
of the governing party in order to undermine the higher status that comes
with his/her official position and to point out crucial differences between
the candidate’s actions in office and the voters’ attitudes. However, a
candidate should also attack when he/she believes that he/she will lose
support by not attacking. This would apply where the candidate may have
seemed to be too sell-orientated, soft or even arrogant (by giving the
impression, for example, that it is not worth arguing with the opponent).
2. Defend is a candidate’s response strategy after being attacked by his/her
opponent.
3. The sell strategy is the candidate’s presentation of his/her credentials that
are not clearly related to attack or defence.
Defending and selling are useful as dominant relational strategies when the
candidate has a clear lead or has a reasonable chance of gaining the lead, does
not want to create a backlash, or, naturally, when the opponent is not
particularly vulnerable to attack. Defending is usually necessary when a
potentially decisive issue position or action has been attacked, whereas selling
is most appropriate when a candidate’s credentials are not known or have
been questioned.
4. The ignore strategy involves the candidate taking part in a debate but on
his/her own terms, paying little or no attention to the opponent’s
arguments. Ignoring opponents is far easier in multi-candidate debates
than in one-to-one debates. The frontrunner (especially a candidate) is
more likely to ignore opponents in order to avoid the risks of engagement.
Moreover, when candidates or parties are very similar, ignoring is a useful
strategy because attack would be ineffective or counterproductive. A
variation of the ignore strategy is the ‘above the battle’ strategy, in which
candidates separate themselves from the conflict and instead focus on
selling their own positions.
5. Me too … me better is in effect a combination of the attack and sell strategies.
This strategy is often used against a frontrunner or any candidate who
has advocated a popular idea with which the opponent must agree if he/
she wants to gain widespread support. Therefore, the candidate identifies
with such an idea (‘me too’), but says that, if elected, he/she would
implement it more effectively (‘me better’).
168

9.4 DEBATE TACTICS

We may distinguish between the use of verbal and non-verbal tactics during
the introduction, body and conclusion of a debate. Non-verbal behaviour
should complement, not contradict, the verbal tactics employed.
First let us examine the more important verbal tactics used by candidates
(Martel, 1983:77–115; cf. Atkinson, 1984). These tactics are not presented in
any particular order, and they may be linked to logical arguments (logos),
emotional arguments (pathos) or arguments based on credibility (ethos).
9.4.1 Verbal tactics

• The shotgun blast. This tactic involves a forceful, concentrated, multi-
faceted denunciation of the opponent’s character, record, issue positions
or campaign. It contains references to several issues that cannot be refuted
in the allocated response time. The candidate who uses this tactic does not
qualify each element of his/her denunciation, but shifts the burden of
proof to his/her opponent.
• The laundry list. With this tactic, the debater poses a concentrated series of
difficult and often incriminating questions to the opponent. The opponent
can respond in much the same way, or say in effect that it is easy to ask
questions but that not everyone can discuss complicated public policy
issues intelligently.
• Forewarning. A candidate may know what the opponent will say in his/her
attacks. In this case, a useful defensive tactic is for the candidate to warn
the audience. Usually, this tactic involves refuting attacks made on the
campaign trail.
• Turning the tables. This tactic involves redirecting the opponent’s attack
back to him/her. In using this tactic, the candidate not only shows mental
agility, but heightens the dramatic conflict of the debate as well.
• Direct questions and challenges. The direct question and challenge tactic is
risky and therefore not always popular. In preparing for direct examination,
the candidate should be aware of these major risks:
– The opponent might ‘turn the tables’ by, in turn, making the candidate
respond to direct questions and challenges.
– With its implied give and take, this tactic may cause debaters to become
emotional, and respond with raised voice and defensiveness, and be
more likely to make mistakes, for example.
Another implication of this tactic is that it can even out the stature of
participants. In the absence of panellists, the interaction of the candidates
can cause recipients to compare them more closely – which may not always
be beneficial to the candidate who poses the questions and challenges.
169

• Direct address. At times the candidate may present his/her arguments or

appeals directly to the audience to highlight the urgency of the issue at
hand, or to show his/her sincerity in asking for their support.
• Flat denial. With this tactic the candidate firmly denies the opponent’s attacks
in a sentence or two that may or may not be followed by an elaboration.
• Quotable lines. These are normally related to the candidate’s strategy of
attacking, defending or selling. Concise, compelling phrases standing by
themselves or used to introduce or to end a line of argument can have more
impact than any other statements made during the debate, especially if
they are then reported in the mass media.
• Highlighting evasiveness. Political debates are often characterised by skilful
evasiveness on the part of the candidates, which negatively affects their
credibility. While candidates can project non-evasiveness by appearing to
be candid and forthright, and comprehensive in their statement, they can
do so perhaps more effectively by highlighting the evasiveness of their
opponents.
• Closing with a surprise. This tactic is available to the candidate designated
to deliver the closing, or last, address. While a strong or potentially
effective final impression can be made or a surprise ‘pulled’ on the
opponent, this tactic poses the major risk of being seen as foul play – as
sneaky – because the opponent had no opportunity to respond.
• The apology or confession. This tactic seems to be gaining favour in political
debate because it provides candidates with the chance to show their human
qualities by admitting error or poor judgement. In so doing, they contrast
themselves favourably with stereotypical politicians who try to hide their
weaknesses. After all, within the human spirit there is sometimes a need to
forgive, and even admire, the wrongdoer who confesses.
• Reference tactics. Before the actual debate, a candidate must decide how to
refer to the opponent. This should prevent hesitations during debate. The
most common forms of address are as follows:
– My opponent. This form helps to establish a distance, a ‘coldness’ or
unfriendliness, between the candidate and his/her opponent.
– Title alone. This reference form is used to imply distance and coldness as
well. It may also be used effectively if the opponent is vulnerable to
attack and recipients need to be reminded that he/she specifically (for
example, the Minister) is responsible for many of the problems cited.
– Title and surname. Although quite formal, this is a less distancing
reference form than the previous one, and is used frequently.
– First name only. First names are generally used to diminish the stature of
an opponent, to establish the superiority of the candidate, or to suggest
informality and warmth or friendliness.
The candidate must also decide how to refer to him-/herself. ‘I’ can
communicate singularity of purpose, responsibility and strength
170

appropriately. But if it is overused it can also convey conceit, selfishness

and insensitivity to the reality that very little in politics is achieved alone.
‘We’ indicates the team player, and may imply a candidate’s openness to
advice and ability to work cooperatively with others, including his/her
willingness to compromise. However, ‘we’ may fail to communicate
singularity of purpose, responsibility or strength. Sometimes, but not
often, a candidate refers to him-/herself by name to project a strong sense
of commitment and to help increase name identification.
• Wit/humour. There are advantages and disadvantages in using wit or
humour in political debates. On the positive side, it can project the
candidate’s quick thinking and natural manner while creating rapport
with recipients. It can also be used to attack an opponent without being
too strident. On the negative side, it may sound f lippant or sarcastic to
voters.
• Appeals to commonly held values. Values act as guides to life, and any
candidate who can genuinely and compellingly appeal to the more
important values of the target group (the voters whom he/she wants to
reach) strengthens his/her case. The candidate’s credibility is enhanced by
his/her identification with the values concerned. And his/her issue
positions will find greater acceptability if he/she subtly links them with
the commonly held values.
The use of the metaphor is important when seeking to reach common
ground with an audience. Metaphors that appeal to patriotism, fairness
and so on are appropriate here.
• Rhetorical questions. Rhetorical questions have two major functions in
political debates: They stimulate audience or listener involvement, and
they may control the issues of the debate without necessarily developing
the arguments that the questions imply.
• Being the ‘person with the facts’. This is a very popular tactic, whereby the
candidate cites statistics and examples to show that he/she is knowledgeable
and thus is qualified to serve the people.
• Well-informed sources. The candidate refers to something said by somebody
who is widely respected, in order to back up his/her own arguments.
• Non-responsive insertions. Candidates often reply vaguely, or do not respond
at all to questions posed by a moderator or panellist. Instead they use the
time allocated to insert arguments and evidence to support their own
strategy. The non-responsive insertion can take these forms:
– It makes up the entire response, regardless of the question.
– It is presented at the beginning of the response opportunity, then
followed by a more appropriate response to the question.
– It may follow the appropriate response.
As Martel (1983:112) notes, the last form is usually applied ‘without the
candidate drawing the audience’s attention to it, although a candidate
171

occasionally asks for or states politely that he/she will use the remaining
time to develop further an earlier response or to advance a new argument’.
9.4.2 Non-verbal tactics

• Shaking hands with the opponent. The decision whether or not to shake
hands with the opponent is a tactical one that can affect the tone of the
debate. A handshake at the beginning of the debate can project confidence
and friendliness and may surprise the opponent, leaving him/her uneasy
for a while. A handshake at the end can also be effective, but it poses some
risks: It can seem false, or improper if the debate was especially tense. But
if a handshake seems required, the candidate can of course certainly
control his/her unfriendliness.
• Leaving the lectern. This tactic is related to a platform debate more than to
a televised debate, where the candidates’ movements are confined because
of the cameras and lighting. The tactic has these main purposes:
– To establish a close relationship with the audience.
– To contrast the candidate’s skill of appearing relaxed and spontaneous
with the opponent’s tenseness.
• Sitting versus standing. This position may be preferable to a candidate for
these reasons:
– To make the event appear to be more of a ‘discussion’ than a ‘debate’.
– To reduce speech anxiety (including stiffness or lack of animation),
which he/she is more likely to experience when standing.
A disadvantage of the seated debate is the lack of opportunity to give
opening and closing addresses naturally and compellingly. This
disadvantage is compounded by the fact that the speech manuscripts are
normally placed on the table lying flat and in the audience’s view, rather
than on the slanted table of a lectern.
A related concern is the extent to which the candidates should be physically
separated from one another during the debate. Usually, if one candidate is
much taller than the other, the shorter candidate should ask for greater
separation. This is to prevent the live or the viewing audience from noticing
the contrasting heights – a taller person is usually perceived to be ‘stronger’.
Closer lecterns, by contrast, can emphasise the perception of conflict and
a possibly preferred image that a candidate is quite capable of defending
him-/herself against the other.
• Audience right or audience left? The issue of whether a candidate should
stand or sit to the audience’s right or left has not been empirically resolved.
Besides, it may only be a factor when non-committed audiences are
involved. Some interesting and conflicting ideas have been suggested:
– The speaker on the audience’s right has the advantage, since most
people are right-handed.
172

– The speaker on the audience’s left has the dominant position, because
we are trained to read from left to right.
Media advisers propose that the right side of the television screen is
inherently more dominant than the left. But this idea is not all that useful,
because cameramen/women present few shots of both or all candidates at
once, instead relying almost exclusively on close-ups.
• Tactical eye contact. Eye contact is an important aspect of the candidate’s
physical image, especially during televised debates where the audience
has a closer view than do most members of a live audience. Maturity and
confidence may be conveyed by looking intently at the opponent. A glance
coupled with a smile may indicate slightly confused disagreement.
Looking downward and not at the opponent, by contrast, can suggest lack
of confidence, indecisiveness or poor preparation.
• Tactical note-taking. This can complement tactical eye contact, or serve
as an effective alternative. It may be necessary for the candidate to record
points he/she might otherwise forget. But it may also be used to distract
the audience when the opponent is saying something with which he/she
disagrees, or when the opponent is specifically attacking him/her.
• Timing the response. The skilful debater is sensitive to time, and understands
that to speak for as long as possible in promoting his/her case is not always
the best thing to do. Lengthy answers do not always suggest that the
candidate is knowledgeable and intelligent. And the opponent may try to
contrast the candidate’s wordiness with a noticeably shorter answer.
A short answer on the candidate’s part may be used to throw the opponent
off balance by forcing him/her to speak sooner than expected.
There are few absolute rules in political debates, but ‘honour thy time
limits religiously’ always applies. The candidate makes a grave debating
error when failing to finish his/her response within the time allocated,
because the moderator’s announcement of overtime usually overrides
anything the candidate may still be trying to say.
9.5 DEBATE EFFECTS

Most of the literature, especially that on American televised presidential
debates, suggests that political campaign debates tend to reinforce the
conviction of voters who were already committed to a particular party or
candidate. In other words, debates confirm existing perceptions and
predispositions rather than change existing images of candidates or parties,
issue positions or voting intentions. The minimum effects tradition seems to
prevail in this context.
This should not come as a surprise. After all, social-psychological theory tells
us that people generally try to maintain cognitive consistency and more
173

readily take in new information that is consistent with their existing beliefs.
Moreover, changing candidate or party preference on the basis of what is said
in a debate could be as difficult, or unbelievable, as a loyal rugby fan switching
allegiance to the opposing team during or after a particular game.
Debates seem to have the greatest effect on undecided or wavering voters,

especially those who are quite interested in politics and who want to base
their vote decisions on information from campaign communication. Such
voters usually have weak party affiliations and make voting decisions very
late in political campaigns. It is these voters to whom candidates participating
in political debate need to direct their persuasive efforts.
Political campaign debates deal with specific policy issues. Therefore, they
also serve the purpose of telling voters what they should be thinking about.
Finally, as some studies show, when a candidate performs badly in debate, it

can slow down the momentum of his/her candidature, dampen the enthusiasm
of his/her supporters and even prompt supporters to have second thoughts.
But when does a candidate perform ‘badly’, or when does a candidate win a
debate, in the eyes of recipients?
9.5.1 The concept of the debate winner

There is always the urge to choose a winner immediately or shortly after a
debate. TV networks in the United States have been doing it for decades, and
this was the case after the 1998 De Klerk–Treurnicht debate in South Africa
as well (see ‘Soos ’n paartjie op huweliksnag’ 1998). However, unless a
respondent states the criterion or criteria that were used to judge the
participants, any decision about the so-called winner could be misleading or
simply uninformative. When voters have strong political passions, there are
barriers to persuasion in a debate (cf. Perloff, 2014:328ff.).
At least six criteria influence recipients’ decisions about which candidate is

the winner, as Vancil and Pendell (1984) point out:
1. The winner is simply the candidate whom the recipients preferred before
the debate. This criterion ties up with the idea that political debates
usually tend to reinforce the conviction of voters who were already
committed to a particular party or candidate. Such voters may even
admire the opposing candidate for skills in debate, knowledge of the
issues and attractive personality, but would still give unwavering support
to the preferred candidate.
2. The winner is the candidate whose position statements on the issues are
most consistent with those of the recipients. ‘Political ideologies, party
preferences, and issue predispositions markedly determine which
174

candidate will be perceived as sensible, wise, knowledgeable, and truthful

as the debate progresses’ (Vancil & Pendell, 1984:64). This ‘issues
agreement’ criterion may sometimes conflict with the first criterion (the
‘pre-debate candidate preference’ criterion), although the two usually go
hand in hand. If a conflict occurs, the voter will probably be undecided
about the debate winner, and also about post-debate candidate preference,
at least for a while.
3. The winner may be the candidate whom recipients perceive to have the
superior skills of advocacy. Advocacy skills are sometimes viewed in
terms of educational debate skills criteria: analysis, reasoning, evidence,
organisation, refutation and delivery. The general public usually responds
vaguely in terms of one candidate having done ‘a better job’ during the
debate – meaning that the candidate was a better debater but not
necessarily the winner of the debate. Therefore, ‘winning’ a debate can
be a much more complex judgement, which may or may not be related to
advocacy skills. After all, if a voter had a strong pre-debate preference for
a candidate or agrees strongly with the position statements of a candidate,
the voter might not be expected to use the ‘superior advocacy skills’
criterion in deciding the debate winner.
4. The winner may be the candidate whom viewers perceive to have a
superior leadership personality. Two kinds of recipients tend to be
attracted to a candidate who shows such a personality, made up of
wisdom, courage, honesty and vision: those who are bored by the finer
detail of political argumentation and instead are attracted to image, and
those who judge debaters just on their ability to deal with pressure.
5. The winner is the candidate who profits from a major error of his/her
opponent. Political campaign professionals seem committed to this
standpoint. Fatal errors are dramatic and lend themselves to headlines,
and can be greatly exaggerated by the news media. Moreover, mistakes
may continue to occupy the attention of traditional mass media and social
media once they are exploited by the opposing candidate or party, and
this can shift public judgements of the debate winner. Candidates should
avoid blunders at all costs, and appear to measure their own performance
in these terms.
6. The winner is the candidate labelled as such by the mass media. Although
uninformed and unintelligent voters might simply believe the mass
media, there is some evidence that people are driven by what they hear
about who is the winner (Vancil & Pendell, 1984:70). While the mass
media often play a dominant role in providing such information, other
factors, such as the influence of social media and discussions with family,
friends, colleagues and so on, may also account for their decisions.
According to Vancil and Pendell (1984:72), perhaps the most disturbing

implication of these criteria for winning a debate is that they can complement
175

as well as conflict with each other when recipients rely on them. For example,
agreement with a candidate’s positions on the issues may complement
perceptions about which candidate has the best leadership personality, which
has the superior skills of advocacy and which has the backing of mass media
commentators. But such judgements may also differ, and when this is the case
does the recipient arrange the criteria in some sort of hierarchical order? For
instance, does the superior projection of a leadership image outweigh debating
or advocacy skills? As yet, we do not know the answer to this and related
questions.
The next chapter deals with persuasive aspects in a political negotiation

context. Communication, and specifically persuasion as a process of
communication that aims to achieve something predetermined and directional
with recipients, underlies all political negotiations. The discussion revolves
around national and international political negotiation.
176

A REMINDER
• There is a difference between an educational debate and a
political debate.
• Political debates have various formats.
• There are arguments for and against political debates.
• Political debates are characterised by content and relational
strategies, as well as verbal and non-verbal tactics.
• Identifying a political debate winner depends on various
applicable criteria.
177

chapter TEN
Persuasion and political

negotiation
LOOKING AHEAD
• relate persuasion to political negotiation and bargaining
• write notes on various negotiation styles and the persuasive skills
needed to adapt to these styles
• discuss a win-win strategy as part of a joint problem-solving
approach to negotiation
• define diplomacy and its various forms, and situate the role of a
mediator in a diplomatic negotiation process
• explain complicating factors in diplomatic persuasion.
178

Persuasion and political negotiation
10.1 T
HE CONCEPTS OF POLITICAL NEGOTIATION AND
BARGAINING
Political negotiation may be defined as a process of communication in which
two or more conflicting parties with a vested interest in the issues at stake
strive to reach a mutually binding political agreement through exchanging
structured information over a period of time.
The concept of negotiation is used broadly in this chapter. It should not be

equated with the concept of bargaining, although in the literature these
concepts are sometimes used interchangeably (Bettinghaus & Cody,
1994:309ff.; cf. Nieuwmeijer, 1988:8). In this book, negotiation refers to the
complete and developmental communication process of striving to reach a
mutually binding agreement, whereas bargaining entails the competitive
interaction that occurs when parties provide and respond to details within
the negotiation process.
In Chapter 7 Section 7.3.2, we discussed the general language style and

persuasive techniques that apply in the small group bargaining setting. Those
comments are applicable to the matter of bargaining in the process of political
negotiation.
10.2 N
EGOTIATION AS A PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE TO
POLITICAL CONFLICT
Political conflict may be seen as a conscious struggle that occurs when there
are two or more competing responses to a given political situation and where
inconsistent or incompatible goals are sought.
Whenever such conflict cannot be resolved through persuasion per se,

negotiation is a peaceful alternative. This does not mean that persuasion is
not part of negotiation and bargaining. In fact, at the least the broad starting
points of persuasion in an interpersonal setting, as discussed in Chapter 3,
must be kept in mind and applied artfully by the negotiator. What we mean is
that the successful resolution of conflict through persuasion may in fact
prevent negotiations on some conflicting political issue.
Other obvious peaceful options would be to avoid or ignore conflict. But to

avoid or ignore sources of serious political conflict, especially when conflicting
parties are interdependent, is just to wish that they did not exist. They rarely
disappear by themselves, and if they do disappear, they always recur. This is
because interest groups usually want to participate in political decisions that
affect them; they dislike accepting decisions dictated by someone else.
179

Political conflict is destructive, as Albert (1986:4) points out, when it uses up

effort that should be focused on the critical work to be done in society, such
as education, housing and health services; destroys national morale; polarises
social groups; deepens differences in group values; and causes violence – as
witnessed in South Africa over the years.
Given the undoubted importance of power (which we remember is the ability

to have your way even when it is resisted by others) in political negotiations,
seven basic principles may be proposed:
1. Power is always relative. Rarely, if ever, do opponents enjoy complete power.
2. Power may be real or apparent. The fact that a position is supported by
logic, justice or force does not guarantee success. A negotiator may be in
a preferred position, but if neither he/she nor the opponent recognises
the advantage, he/she has no power.
3. Power may be exerted without action. If an opponent believes that action
can and will be taken against him/her, it may be unnecessary to act.
4. Power is always limited. Its range depends on the situation, government
regulations, ethical standards and present or future competition.
5. Power exists to the extent that it is accepted.
6. The exercise of power always entails costs and risk.
7. Power relationships change over time. The balance of power moves as the
assets and contributions of the parties change.
So political conflict should be addressed through negotiation – especially in

societies that present themselves as being democratic or as striving towards
democracy. The climate for political negotiation must, however, be favourable.
De Klerk (1991:164ff.) lists, among others, five preconditions for political

negotiation in general:
1. The conflicting parties and their supporters must have expectations of
positive outcomes of negotiation.
2. There must be a firm decision by the parties in favour of political
settlement through negotiation.
3. The power bases of the respective negotiating parties must be more or
less evenly balanced in order to make give and take possible in
negotiations.
4. The conflicting parties must be legitimate in the sense that they have a
broad support base or recognised constituencies.
5. The negotiating parties ought to be versed in the dynamics of negotiation.
The fifth precondition covers a broad field and is referred to again in this
chapter. For now, we note that during political negotiation, participants may
be confronted with individual and differing negotiation styles, which have to
be dealt with appropriately.
180

10.3 NEGOTIATION STYLES AND SKILLS

Casse (1981) suggests that negotiators have various styles: factual, intuitive,
analytical or normative.
The basic assumption of the factual negotiating style is that facts speak for
themselves. People using this style are usually calm, collected, patient,
present-orientated and precise. They are able to document their statements
and stick to the facts. The factual style is quite often effective when the
situation requires a clarification of the available information.
The intuitive negotiating style rests on the assumption that imagination can
solve any problem. People using this style are often charismatic, and have a
vivid imagination, a tendency to jump from one subject to another, a deductive
way of approaching problems and a future orientation. The intuitive style is
particularly effective when a set of objectives (projections into the future)
have to be identified.
The analytical negotiation style is based on the belief that logic leads to the
right conclusion. People using this style are able to reason, analyse each
situation in terms of cause and effect, place things in logical order and weigh
the pros and cons of a case. They are unemotional and focus on the relationship
between parts. The analytical style can be used effectively to explore different
strategies to achieve the agreed-upon objectives.
The basic assumption of the normative negotiating style is that norms and values
are important in negotiation. People using this style judge, assess and evaluate
facts according to their personal values. They appeal to feelings, offer bargains,
and propose rewards and incentives. They also tend to seek compromise. This
style is helpful when normative evaluations have to be made.
There are ways of negotiating with people who predominantly display the
above negotiating styles. The following are simply guidelines; each negotiation
is potentially unique, and involves participants who may have equally unique
ways of responding to a given negotiation situation.
Negotiating with someone who has a factual style

• Be precise in presenting your facts.
• Refer to the past – what has already been tried, what has worked, what has
been shown from experience.
• Be indicative – go from the facts to the principles.
• Know your brief – including the details.
181

Negotiating with someone who has an intuitive style

• Focus on the situation as a whole.
• Project yourself into the future.
• Tap into the person’s imagination and creativity.
• React quickly.
• Build on the reaction of the other person.
Negotiating with someone who has an analytical style

• Use logic when arguing.
• Look for causes and effects.
• Analyse the relationships between the various elements of the situation or
problem.
• Be patient.
• Analyse the advantages and disadvantages of various options.
Negotiating with someone who has a normative style

• Establish a good relationship from the start of the negotiation.
• Show interest in what the other person is saying.
• Identify his/her values and adjust to them as far as possible.
• Be ready to compromise wherever possible.
• Appeal to the person’s feelings.
This chapter argues that political conflict should be confronted through

negotiation. We now turn to the kind of approach that should be followed in
political negotiation and focus on the wider communicative and persuasive
dynamics of the negotiation process. This approach and strategy should be
regarded as an ideal to be accomplished.
10.4 A
JOINT PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH AS THE
IDEAL
A joint problem-solving approach to political negotiation is based on the
following broad assumptions (Albert, 1986:19):
• The parties in conflict are capable of competing, but wish to avoid large-
scale and potentially violent confrontation.
• There is enough common ground to make consultation worthwhile.
• Some mutually acceptable programme of change can be found through
honest negotiation.
The phases of negotiation are the planning or pre-negotiation phase, the

opening phase and face-to-face negotiating or bargaining phase, and the post-
negotiation phase, in which finalisation and implementation occur.
Throughout these phases, the conflicting parties work together to solve
common problems. They see the problems as their problems, meaning that
182

the problems are jointly defined, including the recognition of basic needs.
Together they generate possible solutions, and evaluate these solutions with
special attention to their impact on basic needs. Finally, the parties agree and
commit themselves to the implementation of the settlement proposals.
A joint problem-solving approach is governed by rational dialogue. In rational

dialogue the roles of interests, perceptions and public opinion, ideology,
propaganda, trust and power are not ignored, but are overridden by a deeply
felt desire to work together.
In rational dialogue, there is no place for manipulative communication, which

is characterised by a distorted communicative relationship between the
negotiating participants. The ‘relationship’ is distorted in the following ways:
• Messages flow in only one direction – from the communicator to the
recipient.
• There is no mutual participation of the participants. The communicator
plays a dominating and manipulative role.
• A subject–object relationship exists between communicator and recipient.
The communicator approaches the recipient as an object of experience
and use.
• The recipient is not allowed to express him-/herself.
• The communicator tries to make all recipients think in the same way by
imposing directives that deny the free expression of ideas and various
possibilities of doing.
Rational dialogue also requires a specific outlook on life from the participants.
In this context, the outlook should support the values that underlie the
promise of democratic political communication. In such communication,
each participant relates to the other in freedom and equality, with the aim of
arriving at mutual understanding about messages that have been shaped for,
or have consequences for, the functioning of the political system.
In a joint problem-solving approach, a win-win strategy is adopted.
10.4.1 A win-win strategy

A win-win strategy in political negotiation differs from a win-lose and lose-
lose strategy.
With a win-lose strategy, a party in negotiation seeks the ability to control the
situation to its sole advantage. Such a strategy should be avoided, because the
losing party, or the one that sees itself as having lost, seldom keeps to the
agreements eventually reached in the negotiation.
183

In a lose-lose strategy there are no winners, only losers – compromise is

sought at all costs. This strategy should also be avoided because it usually fails
to address the causes of the conflict and grievances tend to reappear in time.
A win-win strategy aims to benefit all the negotiating parties. The basis of
such a strategy is compromise by way of consensus decisions. Political issues
are decided on their merits rather than through a haggling process in which
each party states what it will and will not do.
Fisher and Ury (1981) suggest that negotiators interested in adopting a win-
win strategy at the negotiation table should use four important tactics:
1. Separate the people from the problem.
2. Focus on interests, not positions.
3. Invent options for mutual gain.
4. Insist on objective criteria.
In separating the people from the problem, the idea is to be ‘hard’ on the problem
and ‘soft’ on the participants in negotiation. Rather than confronting one
another, the parties should build a working relationship in order to confront
the problem at hand together. A negotiator should put him-/herself in the
position of others, but not deduce intentions from his/her own fears. One
party must not be blamed for the other’s problems.
By focusing on interests, the parties in negotiation hold on to the needs that are
crucial to their cause, but let go of (earlier) hard positions that have become
less important. The more parties focus on their respective positions, the more
they become committed to them. The more a party tries to persuade the other
participants of the impossibility of changing its position, the more difficult it
becomes to do so. Egos often become identified with positions. If the party
has had to undergo something, such as compromise or admit a mistake, then
a face-saving technique is needed in order for the party to agree to the
compromise or admit to the error without being too embarrassed. Important
human needs of all participants (representing specific interest groups), such
as the need for security, a sense of belonging and self-actualisation, should be
catered for in negotiation.
Options for mutual gain are invented when negotiations appear to be failing as a
result of, among other things, premature judgement by a party or all parties,
their search for a ‘one and only’ answer and their belief that solving ‘their’
problem is ‘their’ problem only. Inventing options is best done through
brainstorming sessions in which creative thinking may well loosen up
previously set positions. While wild ideas often arise in such sessions, the
parties need to focus serious attention on the ideas that seem to hold out real
promise for mutual gain.
184

By insisting on objective criteria to govern the process of negotiation, the parties

ensure that decisions are based and solutions are reached on merit rather than
on pressure. In other words, persuasion takes places through evidence and
reasoning, and not through power play and threat-making.
According to Van den Berg (1986:97ff.), 10 broad, noteworthy communication

principles of negotiation should be followed in a win-win strategy. She groups
the principles in the ‘DRIP FUED BE MAP’ formula (Van den Berg 1986:163).
With this formula it is suggested that the communication of negotiation
should be as follows:
D – Dialogic
In (rational) dialogue messages flow in two directions (from the communicator
to the recipient and from the recipient back to the communicator), because
the recipient is regarded as the turning point in the communication process.
Moreover, mutual understanding is emphasised – an understanding that
depends on the recognition, and not the exclusion, of differences.
R – Reciprocal
There is a give-and-take relationship between the parties in negotiation.
I – Intersubjective
There is recognition of a relationship between subjects. In other words, one
party should not approach the other as an object for experience and use.
P – Purposive
Negotiation must work towards a goal. Without an idea of a goal, the process
of negotiation will lose its direction.
F – Flexibly rigid
While this term seems contradictory, the idea is that negotiators should be
rigid, or consistent, with regard to their (noble) aspirations, but flexible and
open-minded about ways of searching for, and achieving, solutions that will
satisfy both sides.
U – Unambiguous
Proposals put forward in negotiation should be specific and clear. Intentional
ambiguity should be avoided.
E – Ethical
In the context of the joint problem-solving approach, negotiation must be
based on the recognition that the parties have free choice, in the sense that
they cannot be forced into agreement.
185

D – Democratic
The communication of negotiation is democratic when the parties exercise
freedom responsibly – that is, they use their right to choose between alternatives –
and when they are allowed to participate on an equal subjective footing.
Finally, the communication of negotiation in a joint problem-solving approach

should take place within a:
B – Benign
E – Environment (environmental factors or social circumstances always

influence communication)
according to
M – Mutually
A – Agreed (upon)
P – Procedures (and agenda).

To which should be added: at an appropriate time (when the circumstances are
favourable).
10.5 THE ROLE OF A MEDIATOR

Mediation entails an impartial third party coming into the negotiation process
voluntarily to assist in negotiating a mutually beneficial settlement (cf.
Berridge, 2005:194ff.). During his term of office (1999–2008) in South Africa,
former President Thabo Mbeki played that role in the Zimbabwean conflict
(though his impartiality was questioned by those opposed to President Robert
Mugabe) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example.
Mediation is an extension of negotiation. It may be needed when negotiations

have broken down temporarily, or even at an early stage when the viability of
the negotiation process is threatened by, for instance, increased tension and
polarisation, deeper hostility and fears, and intensified demands among the
conflicting parties.
A mediator is expected to have a number of basic responsibilities: ‘humanising

the conflict, establishing trust, opening channels of communication,
interpreting the issues, and providing support, particularly if one party has
far less power and resources than the other’ (Albert, 1986:30–31). The
mediator also draws up an agenda, calls and chairs negotiating sessions, and
proposes solutions.
186

The attributes of an effective mediator include the following:

• Listening as carefully and as objectively as possible.
• Knowing more than anyone else about the issues and real positions of the
conflicting parties.
• Being committed to, and an advocate of, the negotiation process.
• Showing empathy towards all the parties.
• Resolving the political conflict with patience, persistence and
determination.
The mediator provides information to the parties on each side, giving insight
on the strengths, threats, promises and negotiation boundaries of the parties.
He/She also makes important and relevant suggestions, preventing the
negotiation parties from being embarrassed. The mediator helps not only to
explore solutions that may have occurred to the parties independently, but
also creates new solutions for a political settlement – possibly by using the
one-text procedure.
One of the most successful uses of the one-text procedure was by the United
States during the Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel in
September 1978. As Fisher and Ury (1981:121–122) explain:
The United States listened to both sides, prepared a draft to which no one was
committed, asked for criticism, and improved the draft again and again until
the mediators felt they could improve it no further. After thirteen days and
twenty-three drafts, the United States had a text it was prepared to
recommend. When President Carter did recommend it, Israel and Egypt
accepted. As a mechanical technique for limiting the number of decisions,
reducing the uncertainty of each decision, and preventing the parties from
getting increasingly locked into their positions, it worked remarkably well.
The one-text procedure simplifies the process of decision-making, and thus it

works well for two-party negotiations. In multilateral negotiations it is almost
essential. After all, in the United Nations it is impossible to constructively
discuss every proposal made by the member states, and concessions that rest
on mutual concessions by everybody else also cannot be made – such a
procedure would simply be too time-consuming.
10.6 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL NEGOTIATION

The above discussion of political negotiation must not be seen as separate
from the discussion on international political negotiation that follows. We
now focus on negotiation at the macro level (between or among nation states),
but the communicative and persuasive principles that govern negotiation per
se relate to all negotiation settings.
187

When states conduct their relations peacefully with other states, they engage
in diplomacy. Diplomacy may be defined as the management of international
relations by negotiation. The terms ‘diplomacy’ and ‘foreign policy’ are not
synonyms. Diplomacy is an instrument of foreign policy. People employed in
the management of these relations, which include political relations, are
called diplomats.
The method that diplomats use to adjust international political relations,

then, is negotiation.
Two other terms are often used in the context of diplomacy: Bilateral diplomacy
is conducted by representatives of two states only, while multilateral diplomacy
is carried out between more than two states. Today, multilateral or conference
diplomacy is institutionalised in the United Nations and its specialised
agencies. But it also occurs in hundreds of ad hoc conferences and less formal
meetings between diplomats or government officials.
The main purpose of political negotiation between two or more states is to

change or sustain each other’s objectives and policies, or to reach agreement
over some contentious issue. However, such negotiations may have other
purposes as well. Holsti (1977:197) indicates that a lot of diplomatic
communication takes place mainly for exchanging views, probing intentions
and trying to convince other governments that certain actions, such as
offering diplomatic support on a particular international political issue,
would be in their interest. No hard bargaining is involved, and diplomats or
government officials do not usually make threats or offer rewards. Most
routine diplomatic contacts between governments are of this nature.
In addition, bilateral diplomatic meetings or multilateral conferences may be

arranged for the purpose of stalling, diverting attention, seeking intelligence
about the other party and its negotiating position, or creating the illusion that
a state is seriously interested in negotiation, even though it really desires no
political settlement. After all, states often prepare their strike force while
using diplomacy to ease the suspicions of those who oppose them and to keep
other countries’ forces unprepared and unmobilised.
A state may also take part in diplomatic negotiations in order to create

propaganda. In other words, a state may use a conference not so much to
reach agreement over a limited range of issues as to make broad appeals to the
outside public, partly to undermine the bargaining positions of its opponents.
But when states are committed to political negotiations, the process of

negotiation often follows a basic formal pattern. Barston (2006:53–54)
summarises it as follows:
188

1. Preparatory phase:
• preparation of national position;
• agree venue;
• outline agenda approved;
• level at which talks are to be conducted.
2. Opening phase (procedural):
• confirm credentials of the parties;
• re-establish purpose and status of the talks (eg whether they are
informal or preliminary discussions, formal talks or whether any
follow-up talks are envisaged and at what venue);
• working documentation;
• working procedures:
− recess (if any);
− language to be used;
− rules of procedure;
− agree which text or draft (if any) will be used as the basis for
negotiation;
− decide whether there is to be an agreed record.
3. Opening phase (substantive):
• confirm or amend agenda;
• exposition of opening position.
4. Substantive negotiation:
• exploration of areas of difference;
• construction of areas of agreement.
5. Adjournment of the negotiation for further rounds of talks (if appropriate).
6. Framework agreement reached.
7. Legal clearance and residual drafting amendments.
8. Initialling or signature of final agreement.
9. Statement on proceedings or communiqué.
A step-by-step approach to international political negotiations is often

followed. Setting intermediate goals, though time-consuming, helps to keep
the process on track. While deadlines are part of the process, they must be
flexible to accommodate unforeseen circumstances. The mutual concerns
and fears of the states in negotiation must be heard during the process in
order to make a win-win situation possible.
It is sometimes necessary to conduct political negotiations out of the public

eye to prevent public expectations and/or biases overtaking hard realities.
The multilateral diplomatic negotiations in the late 1980s that led to the
independence of Namibia in March 1990 were treated in this manner.
189

Sophisticated technologies of mass communication have developed in our

contemporary age. Governments and their diplomats have had to recognise
the need to communicate on new media forums, including social media, with
a variety of publics – such as large transnational firms and global civil society
organisations – as well as with their official counterparts in other nation-
states (Pigman, 2010:11ff.). In fact, as Pigman (2010:24) indicates:
Not only have nation-state governments as diplomatic actors become more

different from one another, but now they are no longer the only type of
government actor seen to be engaging actively in diplomacy. Sub-national
regional governments, such as those of Catalonia and Québec, and
supranational actors such as the European Union […] and the African Union,
are recognized as diplomatic actors in their own right. Moreover, increasingly,
governments of large metropolitan urban areas such as London, Tokyo,
Mexico City and New York exchange representatives with other diplomatic
actors and engage in diplomatic communications over a range of issue areas
extending from crime prevention to attracting international expositions and
sporting events.
Persuasion serves the international political (diplomatic) negotiation process

by acting as a non-violent means of resolving conflict and disputes and
bringing about mutual understanding between the parties in negotiation. But
certain major factors may also complicate the functioning and thus slow down
the progress of persuasion in the diplomatic negotiation process.
10.6.1 Diplomatic persuasion: Complicating factors

This section focuses briefly on interests, power, ideology, propaganda and
trust as factors that can complicate diplomatic persuasion.
10.6.1.1 The role of interests

Conflicts of interest among states are a major subject of diplomacy. Yet
diplomatic persuasion can function only when there is at least some
understanding among the states involved.
Any state aiming to engage in diplomacy with another state seeks to preserve
its independence and national survival. Therefore it must recognise that the
other state is also able and entitled to make its own decisions, and that it wants
to do so, if effective communication is to take place between the two.
190

According to Watson (2013:23):

The desire of every political entity to look after its own interests and take its
own decisions arises from the fact that the interests of different states and
groups differ. It is wholly false to suppose that the interests of different groups
do not, or need not, ever conflict. If states were replaced by other structures,
these conflicts of interests would remain. However, this does not mean that
interests are irreconcilable. Interests can be harmonized, or reconciled, or
fairly divided by consent, as well as maintained in the teeth of opposition.
Such interests of a state naturally refer to both its internal and external
interests, be they of a cultural-ideological, economic or security nature.
10.6.1.2 The role of power

In a state, citizens generally obey the law and governmental regulations, and
if they do not machinery is available to enforce their obedience. But in the
international arena, where there is no common government to speak with
authority and to enforce laws (international law is unenforceable), ‘states
speak with such authority as their ability and willingness to act may give
them. Such ability and willingness derive ultimately from their power’
(Watson, 2013:41).
Fundamentally, then, the extent to which one state can persuade another to
act or not to act in a certain way depends on the power that each of them
commands (or is perceived to command), including the will to use it and the
extent to which other states support them (cf. Watson, 2013). The relative
power of each state concerned is generally measured in terms of its economy,
military strength and alliances. In any act of diplomatic bargaining, this
power is taken into consideration, and is significant in the understanding of
diplomatic negotiation.
10.6.1.3 The role of ideology

The way in which a state conducts its internal affairs has become a major
issue between states today. This is a consequence of the increasingly prevalent
ideological element in diplomacy. In this context, ideology may be viewed as
the broad principles by which a state organises and interprets the reality with
which it has to cope. These ‘broad principles’ are socio-political ideas that a
given state aims to implement practically.
The ideological element undoubtedly complicates the process of diplomatic
persuasion. But there is no place for ideological indignation in such
persuasion, which is concerned with obtaining mutually acceptable
compromises over matters of common interest. Diplomacy must learn to live
with ideology – now as in the past – if it is to function in the real world.
Diplomats in political negotiation seem to find themselves in the same camp
as those concerned with trade: Both want to arrive at a bargain, and both
191

recognise interests that are compatible, though opposed. Hence a prominent

theme of diplomatic negotiations among states with different social systems
and ideological loyalties is the question: ‘At what level do we set ideological
and political interference with trade?’
The tendency of both trade and diplomacy to downplay ideological differences

for the sake of peace and prosperity does not exclude the use of economic
sanctions by the international community or the majority of states. Sanctions are
a way of putting pressure on an uncooperative state to behave in a way that is
more in line with the demands of international society as a whole. This was the
case for many years with apartheid South Africa, and more recently Zimbabwe
under Mugabe’s despotic rule, though international sanctions on Zimbabwe
restricted trade and certain financial dealings on the part of its leadership only.
Where states differ ideologically, the most satisfactory compromise for them,
Watson (2013:70) suggests, would be to ‘deal with matters of ideology as far as
possible in the public side of international dialogue’, meaning communication
between countries or nations across frontiers. In private, diplomats should
discuss practical courses of action. As Watson (2013:70) notes:
For just as public debate tends towards issues of principle, so private

negotiation inclines towards compromise and understanding of the other
man’s point of view, and tends to bring even matters of principle onto the
bargaining table. This is not hypocrisy. It is a natural division of labour
between public and private dialogue, between the clash of incompatible
values and the search for compatible ones like peace and independence,
between the vision of the desirable and the art – or the craft – of the possible.
It is in this double light of belief and bargaining that we should view the
debates and the negotiations in our time about collective security and
aggression, about economic justice and about human rights.
10.6.1.4 The role of propaganda

Propaganda operates in the public arena of international communication.
Here, we suggest, the propagandist plays an important role in paving the way
for constructive private diplomacy, for conventional diplomacy.
Propaganda and diplomacy, Stearns (1981:113) points out, need each other in
furthering the process of persuasion in international relations, even though
the diplomat may be suspicious of propaganda, or see it as an embarrassment
rather than as a means to his/her task (also see Ellul, 1973:13). Thus it is
propaganda that must clarify the ideological stance of competing states in the
interest of any negotiations that may follow.
192

Berridge (2005:128) would disagree about the merits of propaganda in

diplomacy, but concedes that propaganda ‘directed towards a foreign state’s
external policy is generally considered acceptable, and the resident
ambassador is now heavily involved in it. This is now known as “public
diplomacy”, and is very fashionable – though hardly new’.
However, we must not forget that propaganda cannot solve problems or lessen
conflicts, it can only gratify public opinion and explain what a state wants to
accomplish. Propaganda should thus be subordinated to professional
diplomacy if it is to be constructive in alleviating conflicts among states.
10.6.1.5 The role of trust

Watson (2013:55) contends that ‘there is no substitute for trust in diplomacy’.
Trust between states usually comes into being after credibility has been
earned when agreements reached during negotiations have been adhered to
or implemented.
However, where there is no trust, especially after countries have been at war
with one another or where conflict has existed for some time, the rebuilding
of trust has to begin somewhere. The best place to begin seems to be with
diplomats who conduct professionally the official relations of their countries.
Traditional diplomacy has to deal with all forms of agreement and disagreement
among states, and with violence and war, which often have been used to enforce
state decisions. Even though diplomacy may have failed to prevent conflicts and
war, it remains the only method or technique for stopping violence – by finding
acceptable compromises and, possibly, solutions. Diplomacy depends on human
skills and judgement, which are fallible – everyone makes mistakes at times.
Nevertheless, diplomacy is a ‘sensitive’ instrument of foreign policy, designed
to register and work on the smallest shifts in the attitudes of states to one
another that can lead to a cessation of violence. Regarding more lasting effects,
it is the work of diplomacy to translate shifts in the relative positions of states
during periods of conflict into acceptable political settlements.
In conclusion, the core diplomatic functions of representation and persuasion,

or negotiation, are likely to remain. But the popularisation of representation
and negotiation by public and private actors in global society means that
official diplomats are no longer the only people who accomplish such tasks.
In the next chapter, we turn our attention to rhetorical discourses of South

African statesmen.
193

A REMINDER
• There is a difference between political negotiation and political
bargaining.
• Each negotiation encounter is potentially unique.
• A joint problem-solving approach to negotiation is the ideal.
• Diplomacy is an exercise in persuasion, and there are
complicating factors in diplomatic persuasion.
• The popularisation of representation and negotiation by public
and private actors in global society has changed the dynamics
of diplomacy today.
194

Rhetorical discourses of South African statesmen
chapter ELEVEN
Rhetorical discourses of South

African statesmen
LOOKING AHEAD
• revisit selected rhetorical discourses of FW de Klerk, Nelson
Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma
• contextualise these discourses in their political eras
• identify and explain selected approaches to rhetorical criticism
• engage in rhetorical criticism with regard to each discourse
• write your own critique of the discourses offered.
195

11.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the full text of six selected speeches of South African
statesmen over the past some 25 years, in order to give the reader an idea of
the rhetoric prevalent at different points in recent South African political
history. Each speech is preceded by a brief outline of the context in which the
speech was originally presented.
We also explore four significant ways of qualitatively critiquing political

speeches, by way of focusing on:
1. the structure of the speech
2. the use of the Aristotelian artistic proofs
3. the worth of the speech, with specific regard to Nilsen’s four-part method
of considering the long-range possibilities of speeches for all members of
society
4. the outcomes of that which had been promised.
These methods are illustrated selectively in this chapter as a concise guide to

the dynamics of the performance dimension of persuasive communication in
political oratory. More about this is provided in Section 11.7.
11.2 FW DE KLERK’S HISTORIC SPEECH, FEBRUARY 1990

Frederik Willem (FW) de Klerk was elected leader of South Africa’s ruling
National Party (NP) on 2 February 1989 and sworn in as State President of
the Republic of South Africa on 20 September 1989. Exactly a year after his
election as NP leader, on 2 February 1990 he made his first Parliamentary
opening address, an address that surprised even the most informed political
commentators and observers at home and overseas. In fact, he shook the
entire South African nation.
Apartheid South Africa had been a society in transition since the late 1970s,
in the sense that it had been in the process of getting rid of its policy of
institutionalised racial discrimination. But from the day the NP gained power
in 1948, no NP leader had given real substance to the idea of moving South
Africa to a full democratic society for all its people. FW de Klerk changed all
that.
By 1990, South Africa had been in a state of violent evolution for some years.
Apartheid was undoubtedly one of the major causes. There was no support
from overseas. The international community consistently applied punitive
measures, such as economic sanctions, against South Africa. The South
African economy was in deep trouble. Something drastic had to be done, not
least the possibility of taking part in rational dialogue with the major political
196

players inside the country and with those in exile. President De Klerk took up
the challenge and gambled with his political life.
11.2.1 The text of De Klerk’s opening address

Retrieved as recorded in Hansard of the Second Session of the Ninth
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa.
Mr Speaker, Members of Parliament:
The general election of 6 September 1989 placed our country irrevocably on the road of
drastic change. Underlying this is the growing realisation by an increasing number of
South Africans that only a negotiated understanding among the representative leaders
of the entire population is able to ensure lasting peace.
The alternative is growing violence, tension and conflict. That is unacceptable and in
nobody’s interest. The well-being of all in this country is linked inextricably to the
ability of the leaders to come to terms with one another on a new dispensation. No one
can escape this simple truth.
On its part, the Government will accord the process of negotiation the highest priority.
The aim is a totally new and just constitutional dispensation in which every inhabitant
will enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity in every sphere of
endeavour – constitutional, social and economic.
I hope that this new Parliament will play a constructive part in both the prelude to
negotiations and the negotiating process itself. I wish to ask all who identify yourselves
with the broad aim of a new South Africa, and that is the overwhelming majority:
• Let us put petty politics aside when we discuss the future during this session.
• Help us build a broad consensus about the fundamentals of a new, realistic and
democratic dispensation.
• Let us work together on a plan that will rid our country of suspicion and steer it
away from domination and radicalism of any kind.
During the term of this new Parliament we shall have to deal, complementary to one
another, with the normal processes of legislation and day-to-day government, as well
as with the process of negotiation and renewal.
Within this framework I wish to deal first with several matters more closely concerned
with the normal process of government before I turn specifically to negotiation and
related issues.
197

FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Government is aware of the important part the world at large has to play in the
realisation of our country’s national interests.
Without contact and co-operation with the rest of the world we cannot promote the
well-being and security of our citizens. The dynamic developments in international
politics have created new opportunities for South Africa as well. Important advances
have been made, among other things, in our contacts abroad, especially where these
were precluded previously by ideological considerations.
I hope this trend will be encouraged by the important change of climate that is taking
place in South Africa.
For South Africa, indeed for the whole world, the past year has been one of change and
major upheaval. In Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union itself, political and
economic upheaval surged forward in an unstoppable tide. At the same time, Beijing
temporarily smothered with brutal violence the yearning of the people of the Chinese
mainland for greater freedom.
The year 1989 will go down in history as the year in which Stalinist Communism
expired. These developments will entail unpredictable consequences for Europe, but
they will also be of decisive importance to Africa. The indications are that the countries
of Eastern and Central Europe will receive greater attention, while this will decline in
the case of Africa.
The collapse, particularly of the Marxist economic system in Eastern Europe, also serves
as a warning to those who insist on persisting with it in Africa. Those who seek to force
this failure of a system on South Africa should engage in a total revision of their point of
view. It should be clear to all that it is not the answer here either. The new situation in
Eastern Europe also shows that foreign intervention is no recipe for domestic change. It
never succeeds, regardless of its ideological motivation. The upheaval in Eastern Europe
took place without the involvement of the Big Powers or of the United Nations.
The countries of Southern Africa are faced with a particular challenge: Southern Africa
now has a historical opportunity to set aside its conflicts and ideological differences
and draw up a joint programme of reconstruction. It should be sufficiently attractive to
ensure that the Southern African region obtains adequate investment and loan capital
from the industrial countries of the world. Unless the countries of Southern Africa
achieve stability and a common approach to economic development rapidly, they will
be faced by further decline and ruin.
The Government is prepared to enter into discussions with other Southern African
countries with the aim of formulating a realistic development plan. The Government
198

believes that the obstacles in the way of a conference of Southern African states have
now been removed sufficiently.
Hostile postures have to be replaced by co-operative ones, confrontation by contact,

disengagement by engagement, slogans by deliberate debate.
The season of violence is over. The time for reconstruction and reconciliation has
arrived.
Recently there have, indeed, been unusually positive results in South Africa’s contacts
and relations with other African states. During my visits to their countries I was
received cordially, both in private and in public, by Presidents Mobutu, Chissano,
Houphouet-Boigny and Kaunda. These leaders expressed their sincere concern about
the serious economic problems in our part of the world. They agreed that South Africa
could and should play a positive part in regional cooperation and development.
Our positive contribution to the independence process in South West Africa has been
recognised internationally. South Africa’s good faith and reliability as a negotiator
made a significant contribution to the success of the events. This, too, did not go
unnoticed. Similarly, our efforts to help bring an end to the domestic conflict situations
in Mozambique and Angola have received positive acknowledgement.
At present the Government is involved in negotiations concerning our future relations

with an independent Namibia and there is no reason why good relations should not
exist between the two countries. Namibia needs South Africa and we are prepared to
play a constructive part.
Closer to home, I paid fruitful visits to Venda, Transkei and Ciskei and intend visiting
Bophuthatswana soon. In recent times there has been an interesting debate about the
future relationship of the TBVC countries with South Africa, and specifically about
whether they should be re-incorporated into our country.
Without rejecting this idea out of hand it should be borne in mind that it is but one of
many possibilities. These countries are constitutionally independent. Any return to
South Africa will have to be dealt with not only by means of legislation in their
parliaments, but also through legislation in this Parliament. Naturally this will have to
be preceded by talks and agreements.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Some time ago the Government referred the question of the protection of fundamental
human rights to the South African Law Commission. This resulted in the Law
Commission’s interim working document on individual and minority rights. It elicited
substantial public interest.
199

I am satisfied that every individual and organisation in the country has had ample
opportunity to make representations to the Law Commission, express criticism freely
and make suggestions. At present, the Law Commission is considering the
representations received. A final report is expected during the course of this year.
In view of the exceptional importance of the subject of human rights to our country
and all its people, I wish to ask the Law Commission to accord this task high priority.
The whole question of protecting individual and minority rights, which includes
collective rights and the rights of national groups, is still under consideration by the
Law Commission. Therefore it would be inappropriate of the Government to express a
view on the details now. However, certain matters of principle have emerged fairly
clearly and I wish to devote some remarks to them.
The Government accepts the principle of the recognition and protection of the
fundamental individual rights which form the constitutional basis of most Western
democracies. We acknowledge, too, that the most practical way of protecting those
rights is vested in a declaration of rights justifiable by an independent judiciary.
However, it is clear that a system for the protection of the rights of individuals,
minorities and national entities has to form a well-rounded and balanced whole. South
Africa has its own national composition, and our constitutional dispensation has to
take this into account. The formal recognition of individual rights does not mean that
the problems of a heterogeneous population will simply disappear. Any new constitution
which disregards this reality will be inappropriate and even harmful.
Naturally, the protection of collective, minority and national rights may not bring
about an imbalance in respect of individual rights. It is neither the Government’s policy
nor its intention that any group – in whichever way it may be defined – shall be favoured
over or in relation to any of the others.
The Government is requesting the Law Commission to undertake a further task and
report on it. This task is directed at the balanced protection in a future constitution of
the human rights of all our citizens, as well as of collective units, associations, minorities
and peoples. This investigation will also serve the purpose of supporting negotiations
towards a new constitution.
The terms of reference also include:

• the identification of the main types and models of democratic constitutions which
deserve consideration in the aforementioned context;
• an analysis of the ways in which the relevant rights are protected in every model;
and
• possible methods by means of which such constitutions may be made to succeed
and be safeguarded in a legitimate manner.
200

THE DEATH PENALTY
The death penalty has been the subject of intensive discussion in recent months.
However, the Government has been giving its attention to this extremely sensitive
issue for some time. On 27 April 1989 the Hon the Minister of Justice indicated that
there was merit in suggestions for reform in this area. Since 1988, in fact, my predecessor
and I have been taking decisions on reprieves which have led, in proportion, to a drastic
decline in executions.
We have now reached the position in which we are able to make concrete proposals for
reform. After the Chief Justice was consulted, and after the Government had noted the
opinions of academics and other interested parties, the Government decided on the
following broad principles from a variety of available options:
• that reform in this area was indicated;
• that the death penalty should be limited as an option of sentence to extreme cases,
and specifically through broadening judicial discretion in the imposition of
sentence; and
• that an automatic right of appeal be granted to those under sentence of death.
Should these proposals be adopted, they should have a significant influence on the
imposition of death sentences on the one hand and, on the other, should ensure that
every case in which a person has been sentenced to death will come to the attention of
the Appellate Division.
These proposals require that everybody currently awaiting execution be accorded the
benefit of the proposed new approach. Therefore all executions have been suspended
and no executions will take place until Parliament has taken a final decision on the new
proposals. In the event of the proposals being adopted, the case of every person
involved will be dealt with in accordance with the new guidelines. In the meantime, no
executions have taken place since 14 November 1989.
New and uncompleted cases will still be adjudicated in terms of the existing law. Only
when the death sentence is imposed will the new proposals be applied, as in the case of
those currently awaiting execution.
The legislation concerned also entails other related principles which will be announced
and elucidated in due course by the Minister of Justice. It will now be formulated in
consultation with experts and be submitted to Parliament as soon as possible.
I wish to urge everybody to join us in dealing with this highly sensitive issue in a
responsible manner.
201

SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS
Constitutional reform implies far more than political and constitutional issues. It cannot
be pursued successfully in isolation from problems in other spheres of life which demand
practical solutions. Poverty, unemployment, housing shortages, inadequate education
and training, illiteracy, health needs and numerous other problems still stand in the way
of progress and prosperity and an improved quality of life.
The conservation of the physical and human environment is of cardinal importance to

the quality of our existence. For this the Government is developing a strategy with the
aid of an investigation by the President’s Council.
All of these challenges are being dealt with urgently and comprehensively. The
capability for this has to be created in an economically accountable manner.
Consequently, existing strategies and aims are undergoing a comprehensive revision.
From this will emanate important policy announcements in the socio-economic sphere
by the responsible Ministers during the course of the session. One matter about which
it is possible to make a concrete announcement is the Reservation of Separate Amenities
Act, 1953. Pursuant to my speech before the President’s Council late last year, I wish to
announce that this Act will be repealed during this session of Parliament.
The State cannot possibly deal alone with all of the social advancement our
circumstances demand. The community at large, and especially the private sector, also
have a major responsibility towards the welfare of our country and its people.
THE ECONOMY
A new South Africa is possible only if it is bolstered by a sound and growing economy,
with particular emphasis on the creation of employment. With a view to this, the
Government has taken thorough cognizance of the advice contained in numerous
reports by a variety of advisory bodies. The central message is that South Africa, too,
will have to make certain structural changes to its economy, just as its major trading
partners had to do a decade or so ago.
The period of exceptionally high economic growth experienced by the Western World
in the sixties was brought to an end by the oil crisis in 1973. Drastic structural
adjustments became inevitable for these countries, especially after the second oil crisis
in 1979, when serious imbalances occurred in their economies. After considerable
sacrifices those countries which persevered with their structural adjustment
programmes recovered economically so that lengthy periods of high economic growth
and low inflation were possible.
202

During that particular period South Africa was protected temporarily by the rising
gold price from the necessity of making similar adjustments immediately. In fact, the
high gold price even brought great prosperity with it for a while. The recovery of the
world economy and the decline in the price of gold and of other primary products
brought with them unhealthy trends. These included high inflation, a serious weakening
in the productivity of capital and stagnation in the economy’s ability to generate
income and employment opportunities. All of this made a drastic structural adjustment
of our economy inevitable.
The Government’s basic point of departure is to reduce the role of the public sector in
the economy and to give the private sector maximum opportunity for optimal
performance. In this process preference has to be given to allowing market forces and
a sound competitive structure to bring about the necessary adjustments.
Naturally, those who make and implement economic policy have a major responsibility
at the same time to promote an environment optimally conducive to investment, job
creation and economic growth by means of appropriate and properly co-ordinated
fiscal and monetary policy. The Government remains committed to this balanced and
practical approach.
By means of restricted capital expenditure in parastatal institutions and privatisation,

deregulation and curtailing Government expenditure, substantial progress has already
been made towards reducing the role of the authorities in the economy. We shall persist
with this in a well-considered way.
This does not mean that the State will forsake its indispensable socio-economical
development role, especially in our particular circumstances; on the contrary, it is the
precise intention of the Government to concentrate an equitable portion of its capacity
on these aims by means of the meticulous determination of priorities.
Following the progress that has been made in other areas of the economy in recent
years it is now opportune to give particular attention to the supply side of the economy.
Fundamental factors which will contribute to the success of this restructuring are:
• the gradual reduction of inflation to levels comparable to those of our principal
trading partners;
• the encouragement of personal initiative and savings;
• the subjection of all economic decisions by the authorities to stringent financial
measures and discipline;
• rapid progress with the reform of our system of taxation; and
• the encouragement of exports as the impetus for industrialisation and earning
foreign exchange.
203

These and other adjustments which will require sacrifices, have to be seen as
prerequisites for a new period of sustained growth in productive employment in the
nineties.
The Government is very much aware of the necessity for the proper co-ordination and
consistent implementation of its economic policy. For this reason the establishment of
the necessary structures and expertise to ensure this co-ordination is being given
preference. This applies both to the various functions within the Government and to
the interaction between the authorities and the private sector. The Government also
notes with appreciation the way in which the Reserve Bank is carrying out its special
responsibility in the pursuit of our common objectives.
This is obviously not the occasion for me to deal in greater detail with our total
economic strategy or with the recent course of the economy. I shall confine myself to a
few specific remarks on one aspect of fiscal policy that has been a source of criticism of
the Government for some time, namely State expenditure.
The Government’s financial year ends only in two month’s time, and several other
important economic indicators for the 1989 calendar year are still subject to refinements
at this stage. Nonetheless, several important trends are becoming increasingly clear. I
am grateful to be able to say that we have apparently succeeded to a substantial degree
in achieving most of our economic aims in the past year.
In respect of Government expenditure, the Budget for the current financial year will
be the most accurate in many years. The financial figures will show:
• that Government expenditure is thoroughly under control;
• that our normal financing programme has not exerted any significant upward
pressure on rates of interest; and
• that we will close the year with a surplus, even without taking the income from the
privatisation of Iscor into account.
Without pre-empting this year’s main Budget, I wish to emphasise that it is also our
intention to co-ordinate fiscal and monetary policy in the coming financial year in a
way that will enable us to achieve the ensuing goals, namely:
• that the present downturn will take the form of a soft landing which will help to
make adjustments as easy as possible;
• that our economy will consolidate before the next upward phase so that we will be
able to grow from a sound base; and
• that we shall persist with the implementation of the required structural adjustments
in respect, among other things, of the following: easing the tax burden, especially
on individuals; sustained and adequate generation of surpluses on the current
account of the balance of payments; and the reconstruction of our gold and foreign
exchange reserves.
204

It is a matter of considerable seriousness to the Government, especially in this particular

period of our history, to promote a dynamic economy which will make it possible for
increasing numbers of people to be employed and share in rising standards of living.
NEGOTIATION
In conclusion, I wish to focus the spotlight on the process of negotiation and related
issues. At this stage I am refraining from discussing the merits of numerous political
questions which undoubtedly will be debated during the next few weeks. The focus
now has to fall on negotiation.
Practically every leader agrees that negotiation is the key to reconciliation, peace and
a new and just dispensation. However, numerous excuses for refusing to take part are
advanced. Some of the reasons being advanced are valid. Others are merely part of a
political chess game. And while the game of chess proceeds, valuable time is being lost.
Against this background I committed the Government during my inauguration to

giving active attention to the most important obstacles in the way of negotiation.
Today I am able to announce far-reaching decisions in this connection.
I believe that these decisions will shape a new phase in which there will be a movement
away from measures which have been seized upon as a justification for confrontation
and violence. The emphasis has to move, and will move now, to a debate and discussion
of political and economic points of view as part of the process of negotiation.
I wish to urge every political and community leader, in and outside Parliament, to
approach the new opportunities which are being created constructively. There is no
time left for advancing all manner of new conditions that will delay the negotiating
process.
The steps that have been decided on are the following:

• The prohibition of the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, the
South African Communist Party and a number of subsidiary organisations is being
rescinded.
• People serving prison sentences merely because they were members of one of these
organisations or because they committed some other offence which was merely an
offence because a prohibition on one of the organisations was in force, will be
identified and released. Prisoners who have been sentenced for other offences such
as murder, terrorism or arson are not affected by this.
• The media emergency regulations as well as the education emergency regulations
are abolished in their entirety.
• The security emergency regulations will be amended to continue to make provision
for effective control over visual material pertaining to scenes of unrest.
205

• The restrictions in terms of the emergency regulations on 33 organisations are

being rescinded. These organisations include the following:
– National Education Crisis Committee
– South African National Students Congress
– United Democratic Front
– COSATU
– Die Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging van Suid-Afrika.
• The conditions imposed in terms of the security emergency regulations on 374
people upon their release are being rescinded and the regulations which provide
for such conditions are being abolished.
• The period of detention in terms of the security emergency regulations will be
limited henceforth to six months. Detainees also acquire the right to legal
representation and a medical practitioner of their own choosing.
These decisions by the Cabinet are in accordance with the Government’s declared
intention to normalise the political process in South Africa without jeopardising the
maintenance of good order. They were preceded by thorough and unanimous advice by
a group of officials which included members of the security community.
Implementation will be immediate and, where necessary, notices will appear in the
Government Gazette from tomorrow.
The most important facets of the advice the Government received in this connection
are the following:
• The events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, to which I have referred already,
weaken the capability of organisations which were previously supported strongly
from those quarters.
• The activities of the organisations in respect of which the prohibitions are now
being lifted no longer hold the same degree of threat to internal security which
initially necessitated the imposition of the prohibitions.
• There have been important shifts of emphasis in the statements and points of view
of the most important of the organisations concerned, which indicate a new
approach and a preference for peaceful solutions.
• The South African Police Force is convinced that it is able, in the present
circumstances, to combat violence and other crimes perpetrated also by members
of these organisations and to bring offenders to justice without the aid of prohibitions
on organisations.
About one matter there should be no doubt. The lifting of the prohibitions on the said
organisations does not signify in the least the approval or condonation of terrorism or
crimes of violence committed under their banner or which may be perpetrated in the
future. Equally it should not be interpreted as a deviation from the Government’s
stance in principle, among other things, against their economic policy and aspects of
their constitutional policy. This will be dealt with in debate and negotiation.
206

At the same time I wish to emphasise that the maintenance of law and order dare not
be jeopardised. The Government will not forsake its duty in this connection. Violence
from whichever source will be fought with all available might. Peaceful protest may
not become the springboard for lawlessness, violence and intimidation. No democratic
country can tolerate that.
Strong emphasis will also be placed on even more effective law enforcement. Proper
provision of manpower and means for the police and all who are involved in the
enforcement of the law will be ensured. In fact, the Budget for the coming financial
year will begin to give effect to this.
I wish to thank all the members of our security forces and related services for the
dedicated service they have rendered the Republic of South Africa. Their dedication
makes reform in a stable climate possible.
On the state of emergency I have been advised that an emergency situation which
justifies these special measures which have been retained still exists. There is still
conflict which is manifesting itself mainly in Natal, but also as a consequence of the
countrywide political power struggle. In addition, there are indications that radicals
are still trying to disrupt the possibilities of negotiation by means of mass violence.
It is my intention to terminate the state of emergency completely as soon as

circumstances justify it, and I request the co-operation of everybody towards this end.
Those responsible for unrest and conflict have to bear the blame for the continuing
state of emergency. In the meantime, the state of emergency, as now amended, is
inhibiting only those who use chaos and disorder as political instruments. Otherwise
the rules of the game under the state of emergency are the same for everybody.
Against this background the Government is convinced that the decisions I have
announced are justified from the security point of view. However, these decisions are
justified from a political point of view as well.
Our country and all its people have been embroiled in conflict, tension and violent
struggle for decades. It is time for us to break out of the cycle of violence and break
through to peace and reconciliation. The silent majority is yearning for this. The youth
deserve it.
With the steps the Government has taken it has proven its good faith and the table is
laid for sensible leaders to begin talking about a new dispensation to reach an
understanding by way of dialogue and discussion.
The agenda is open and the overall aims to which we are aspiring should be acceptable
to all reasonable South Africans.
207

Among other things, those aims include a new, democratic constitution, universal
franchise, no domination, equality before an independent judiciary, the protection of
minorities as well as of individual rights, freedom of religion, a sound economy based
on proven economic principles and private enterprise and dynamic programmes
directed at better education, health services, housing and social conditions for all.
In this connection Mr Nelson Mandela could play an important part. The Government
has noted that he has declared himself to be willing to make a constructive contribution
to the peaceful political process in South Africa.
I wish to put it plainly that the Government has taken a firm decision to release Mr
Mandela unconditionally. I am serious about bringing this matter to finality without
delay. The Government will take a decision soon on the date of his release. Unfortunately,
a further short passage of time is unavoidable.
Normally there is a certain passage of time between the decision to release prisoners
and their actual release because of logistical and administrative requirements. In the
case of Mr Mandela there are factors in the way of his immediate release, not the least
of which are his personal circumstances and safety. He has not been an ordinary
prisoner for quite some time. Because of this his case requires particular circumspection.
Today’s announcements in particular go to the heart of what Black leaders – also Mr

Mandela – have been advancing over the years as their reason for having resorted to
violence. The allegation has been that the Government has not wished to talk to them
and that they have been deprived of their right to normal political activity by the
prohibition of their organisations.
Without conceding that violence has ever been justified, I wish to say today to those
who have argued in this manner:
• The Government wishes to talk to all leaders who seek peace.
• The unconditional lifting of the prohibition on the said organisations places
everybody in a position to pursue politics freely.
• The justification for violence which has always been advanced therefore no longer
exists.
These facts place everybody in South Africa before a fait accompli. On the basis of
numerous previous statements there is no longer any reasonable excuse for the
continuation of violence. The time for talking has arrived and whoever still makes
excuses does not really wish to talk.
208

Therefore I repeat my invitation with greater conviction than ever:
Walk through the open door and take your place at the negotiating table together with
the Government and other leaders who have important power bases inside and outside
of Parliament.
Henceforth everybody’s political points of view will be tested against their realism,
their workability and their fairness. The time for negotiation has arrived.
To those political leaders who have always resisted violence I say: Thank you for your
principled stands. This includes all the leaders of parliamentary parties, leaders of
important organisations and movements such as Chief Minister Buthelezi, all of the
other Chief Ministers and urban community leaders.
Through their participation and discussion they have made an important contribution
to this moment in which the process of free political participation is able to be restored.
Their places in the negotiating process are assured.
CONCLUSION
In my inaugural address I said the following:
“All reasonable people in this country – by far the majority – anxiously await a message
of hope. It is our responsibility as leaders in all spheres to provide that message
realistically and with courage and conviction. If we fail in that, the ensuing chaos, the
demise of stability and progress, will forever be held against us.
“History has thrust upon the leadership of this country the tremendous responsibility
to turn our country away from its present direction of conflict and confrontation.
“Only we, the leaders of our people, can do this.
“The eyes of responsible governments throughout the world are focused on us. The
hopes of millions of South Africans are centred around us. The future of Southern
Africa depends on us. We dare not falter or fail!”
This is where we stand:

• Deeply under the impression of our responsibility.
• Humble in the face of the tremendous challenges ahead.
• Determined to move forward in faith and with conviction.
I ask Parliament to assist me on the road ahead. There is much to be done.
209

I call on the international community to re-evaluate its position and to adopt a positive
attitude towards the dynamic evolution which is taking place in South Africa.
I pray that the Almighty Lord will guide and sustain us on our course through
uncharted waters and will bless our labours and deliberations.
MR SPEAKER AND HONOURABLE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
I now declare this Second Session of the Ninth Parliament of the Republic of South
Africa to be duly opened.
11.3 M
ANDELA AND DE KLERK ON RECEIVING THE
NOBEL PEACE PRIZE, DECEMBER 1993
‘Carrying the torch of peace. FW, Mandela pledge to lead their flock to a new
dawn’ ran the front-page headline in The Star, one of South Africa’s largest
daily newspapers, on 11 December 1993. This was one day after Nelson
Rolihlahla Mandela and FW de Klerk had addressed kings and ordinary
citizens on being jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway.
They were the third and fourth South Africans to be honoured in this way
since the inception of the prize in 1895. Former African National Congress
(ANC) president Albert Luthuli received it in 1960 and Archbishop Desmond
Tutu in 1984.
The Republic of South Africa had been a society in fast-paced transition since
2 February 1990, when President De Klerk announced major reforms in his
first Parliamentary opening address. He unbanned, among others, the ANC,
the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South African Communist Party
(SACP). Nelson Mandela, the ANC leader who had been imprisoned for 27
years, was released unconditionally on 11 February 1990.
Unfortunately, government political reforms were accompanied by

widespread violence, especially in the Black communities on the East Rand
and in KwaZulu-Natal, as political organisations increasingly tried to uphold
and/or expand their traditional power bases. Much violence also took place as
a result of resistance within the far right White community against the
movement to install a multiracial government of national unity. In fact, by the
time Mandela and De Klerk received the Nobel Peace Prize, more than 3 000
people had died in political violence in 1993 alone. The total number of deaths
since 1990 stood at approximately 13 000 (Volksblad 11 January 1994:1).
Clearly, the idea of building a South African community had not filtered
through to many people on the streets.
210

11.3.1 The text of Mandela’s acceptance speech

Retrieved from http://www.anc.org.za/content/acceptance-speech-president-
nelson-mandela-nobel-peace-prize-award-ceremony
Your Majesty the King,
Your Royal Highness,
Honourable Prime Minister,
Madame Gro Brundtland,
Ministers,
Members of Parliament and Ambassadors,
Esteemed Members of the Norwegian Nobel Committee,
Fellow Laureate, Mr F.W. de Klerk,
Distinguished guests,
Friends, ladies and gentlemen:
I am indeed truly humbled to be standing here today to receive this year’s Nobel Peace
Prize.
I extend my heartfelt thanks to the Norwegian Nobel Committee for elevating us to the
status of a Nobel Peace Prize winner.
I would also like to take this opportunity to congratulate my compatriot and fellow
laureate, State President F.W. de Klerk, on his receipt of this high honour.
Together, we join two distinguished South Africans, the late Chief Albert Luthuli and
His Grace Archbishop Desmond Tutu, to whose seminal contributions to the peaceful
struggle against the evil system of apartheid you paid well-deserved tribute by awarding
them the Nobel Peace Prize.
It will not be presumptuous of us if we also add, among our predecessors, the name of
another outstanding Nobel Peace Prize winner, the late African-American statesman
and internationalist, the Rev Martin Luther King Jr.
211

He, too, grappled with and died in the effort to make a contribution to the just solution
of the same great issues of the day which we have had to face as South Africans.
We speak here of the challenge of the dichotomies of war and peace, violence and non-
violence, racism and human dignity, oppression and repression and liberty and human
rights, poverty and freedom from want.
We stand here today as nothing more than a representative of the millions of our people
who dared to rise up against a social system whose very essence is war, violence, racism,
oppression, repression and the impoverishment of an entire people.
I am also here today as a representative of the millions of people across the globe, the
anti-apartheid movement, the governments and organisations that joined with us, not
to fight against South Africa as a country or any of its peoples, but to oppose an
inhuman system and sue for a speedy end to the apartheid crime against humanity.
These countless human beings, both inside and outside our country, had the nobility of
spirit to stand in the path of tyranny and injustice, without seeking selfish gain. They
recognised that an injury to one is an injury to all and therefore acted together in
defence of justice and a common human decency.
Because of their courage and persistence for many years, we can, today, even set the
dates when all humanity will join together to celebrate one of the outstanding human
victories of our century.
When that moment comes, we shall, together, rejoice in a common victory over racism,
apartheid and white minority rule.
That triumph will finally bring to a close a history of five hundred years of African
colonisation that began with the establishment of the Portuguese empire.
Thus, it will mark a great step forward in history and also serve as a common pledge of
the peoples of the world to fight racism wherever it occurs and whatever guise it
assumes.
At the southern tip of the continent of Africa, a rich reward is in the making, an invaluable
gift is in the preparation, for those who suffered in the name of all humanity when they
sacrificed everything – for liberty, peace, human dignity and human fulfilment.
This reward will not be measured in money. Nor can it be reckoned in the collective
price of the rare metals and precious stones that rest in the bowels of the African soil
we tread in the footsteps of our ancestors. It will and must be measured by the happiness
and welfare of the children, at once the most vulnerable citizens in any society and the
greatest of our treasures.
212

The children must, at last, play in the open veld, no longer tortured by the pangs of
hunger or ravaged by disease or threatened with the scourge of ignorance, molestation
and abuse, and no longer required to engage in deeds whose gravity exceeds the
demands of their tender years.
In front of this distinguished audience, we commit the new South Africa to the
relentless pursuit of the purposes defined in the World Declaration on the Survival,
Protection and Development of Children.
The reward of which we have spoken will and must also be measured by the happiness
and welfare of the mothers and fathers of these children, who must walk the earth
without fear of being robbed, killed for political or material profit, or spat upon because
they are beggars.
They too must be relieved of the heavy burden of despair which they carry in their
hearts, born of hunger, homelessness and unemployment.
The value of that gift to all who have suffered will and must be measured by the
happiness and welfare of all the people of our country, who will have torn down the
inhuman walls that divide them.
These great masses will have turned their backs on the grave insult to human dignity
which described some as masters and others as servants, and transformed each into a
predator whose survival depended on the destruction of the other.
The value of our shared reward will and must be measured by the joyful peace which will
triumph, because the common humanity that bonds both black and white into one human
race, will have said to each one of us that we shall all live like the children of paradise.
Thus shall we live, because we will have created a society which recognises that all
people are born equal, with each entitled in equal measure to life, liberty, prosperity,
human rights and good governance.
Such a society should never allow again that there should be prisoners of conscience
nor that any person’s human rights should be violated.
Neither should it ever happen that once more the avenues to peaceful change are
blocked by usurpers who seek to take power away from the people, in pursuit of their
own, ignoble purposes.
In relation to these matters, we appeal to those who govern Burma that they release
our fellow Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi, and engage her and those she
represents in serious dialogue, for the benefit of all the people of Burma.
213

We pray that those who have the power to do so will, without further delay, permit that
she uses her talents and energies for the greater good of the people of her country and
humanity as a whole.
Far from the rough and tumble of the politics of our own country, I would like to take
this opportunity to join the Norwegian Nobel Committee and pay tribute to my joint
laureate, Mr F.W. de Klerk.
He had the courage to admit that a terrible wrong had been done to our country and
people through the imposition of the system of apartheid.
He had the foresight to understand and accept that all the people of South Africa must,
through negotiations and as equal participants in the process, together determine what
they want to make of their future.
But there are still some within our country who wrongly believe they can make a
contribution to the cause of justice and peace by clinging to the shibboleths that have
been proved to spell nothing but disaster.
It remains our hope that these, too, will be blessed with sufficient reason to realise that
history will not be denied and that the new society cannot be created by reproducing
the repugnant past, however refined or enticingly repackaged.
We live with the hope that as she battles to remake herself, South Africa will be like a
microcosm of the new world that is striving to be born.
This must be a world of democracy and respect for human rights, a world freed from
the horrors of poverty, hunger, deprivation and ignorance, relieved of the threat and
the scourge of civil wars and external aggression and unburdened of the great tragedy
of millions forced to become refugees.
The processes in which South Africa and Southern Africa as a whole are engaged,
beckon and urge us all that we take this tide at the flood and make of this region a living
example of what all people of conscience would like the world to be.
We do not believe that this Nobel Peace Prize is intended as a commendation for
matters that have happened and passed.
We hear the voices which say that it is an appeal from all those, throughout the universe,
who sought an end to the system of apartheid.
We understand their call, that we devote what remains of our lives to the use of our
country’s unique and painful experience to demonstrate, in practice, that the normal
condition for human existence is democracy, justice, peace, non-racism, non-sexism,
214

prosperity for everybody, a healthy environment and equality and solidarity among
the peoples.
Moved by that appeal and inspired by the eminence you have thrust upon us, we
undertake that we too will do what we can to contribute to the renewal of our world so
that none should, in future, be described as the wretched of the earth.
Let it never be said by future generations that indifference, cynicism or selfishness

made us fail to live up to the ideals of humanism which the Nobel Peace Prize
encapsulates.
Let the strivings of us all, prove Martin Luther King Jr to have been correct, when he
said that humanity can no longer be tragically bound to the starless midnight of racism
and war.
Let the efforts of us all, prove that he was not a mere dreamer when he spoke of the
beauty of genuine brotherhood and peace being more precious than diamonds or silver
or gold.
Let a new age dawn!
Thank you.
11.3.2 The text of De Klerk’s acceptance speech

Retrieved from http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1993/
klerk-lecture.html
Your Majesties, your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen.
It is a little more than six years to the end of this century and to the dawning of the new
millennium. In three years we will mark the centenary of Alfred Nobel’s death and in
eight the hundredth year of this award.
The intervening years have witnessed the most dreadful wars and carnage in the long
and violent history of mankind. Today as we speak,
the shells rain down on beleaguered communities in Bosnia;

there is bitter conflict in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan;
there are devastating wars and conflicts in Africa – in Angola, in Somalia and
recently in Burundi; and
in my own country, notwithstanding the tremendous progress which we have
made, more than 3 000 people have died in political violence since the beginning of
this year.
215

As always, it is the innocent – and particularly the children – who are the main victims
of these conflicts.
Above all, we owe it to the children of the world to stop the conflicts and to create new
horizons for them. They deserve peace and decent opportunities in life. I should like to
dedicate this address to them and to all those – such as UNICEF – who are working to
alleviate their plight.
The question that we must ask is whether we are making progress toward the goal of
universal peace. Or are we caught up on a treadmill of history, turning forever on the
axle of mindless aggression and self-destruction? Has the procession of Nobel Peace
laureates since 1901 reflected a general movement by mankind toward peace?
When considering the great honour that has been bestowed on us as recipients of this
Peace Prize, we must in all humility ask these questions. We must also consider the
nature of peace.
The greatest peace, I believe, is the peace which we derive from our faith in
God Almighty; from certainty about our relationship with our Creator. Crises
might beset us, battles might rage about us – but if we have faith and the
certainty it brings, we will enjoy peace – the peace that surpasses all
understanding.
One’s religious convictions obviously also translate into a specific approach

towards peace in the secular sense. I have time only for a few perspectives on
peace in this world and its effect on human relationships.
Peace does not simply mean the absence of conflict:
Throughout history, there has been an absence of conflict in many repressive

societies. This lack of conflict does not have its roots in harmony, goodwill or
the consent of the parties involved – but often in fear, ignorance and
powerlessness.
There can thus be no real peace without justice or consent.
Neither does peace necessarily imply tranquility.
The affairs of mankind are in incessant flux. No relationship – between

individuals or communities or political parties or countries – remains the
same from one day to the next. New situations are forever arising and demand
constant attention. Tensions build up and need to be defused. Militant radical
minorities plan to disrupt peace and need to be contained.
216

There can thus be no real peace without constant effort, planning and hard work.
Peace, therefore, is not an absence of conflict or a condition of stagnation.
Peace is a frame of mind.
It is a frame of mind in which countries, communities, parties and individuals

seek to resolve their differences through agreements, through negotiation
and compromise, instead of threats, compulsion and violence.
Peace is also a framework.
It is a framework consisting of rules, laws, agreements and conventions – a

framework providing mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of the inevitable
clashes of interest between countries, communities, parties and individuals.
It is a framework within which the irresistible and dynamic processes of
social, economic and political development can be regulated and
accommodated.
In our quest for peace we should constantly ask ourselves what we should do to create
conditions in which peace can prosper. It is easy to identify those forces and conditions
which militate against it and which must be eradicated:
Peace does not fare well where poverty and deprivation reign.
It does not flourish where there is ignorance and a lack of education and
information.
Repression, injustice and exploitation are inimical with peace.
Peace is gravely threatened by inter-group fear and envy and by the unleashing
of unrealistic expectations.
Racial, class and religious intolerance and prejudice are its mortal enemies.
Since the vast proportion of human history has been characterised by such conditions,
it should not surprise us that much of history has been a lamentable tale of violence and
war.
But there is reason for optimism.
Around the world forces which favour peace are on the move. Amongst those, economic
development is fundamentally important. Economic growth, generated by the free
market, is transforming societies everywhere:
217

It is helping to eliminate poverty and is providing the wealth which is required

to address the pressing needs of the poor.
It is extending education and information to an unprecedented portion of the
global population.
It is changing social and economic relationships and is placing irresistible
pressure on archaic political and constitutional systems – whether these are
of the left or of the right.
And hand in hand with economic development goes democracy. Wherever economic
growth occurs it promotes the establishment of representative and democratic
institutions – institutions which invariably develop a framework for peace.
It is highly significant that there has never been a war between genuine and universal
democracies. There have been countless wars between totalitarian and authoritarian
states. There have been wars between democracies and dictatorships – most often in
defence of democratic values or in response to aggression. But there are no instances of
truly free and democratic peoples taking up arms against one another. The reasons for
this are evident:
It is difficult to incite people to aggression if they are educated and informed,

if their basic rights are properly protected.
It is difficult to persuade people who have achieved a degree of material well-
being to risk all in unnecessary conflict.
Such people will not easily be seduced by militarism or allow themselves to
become canon fodder.
The media – and particularly television – have stripped war and conflict of
any of the glory or illusions which it might once have held.
Through these forces good progress is being made. The present worldwide constitutional
development toward democracy, underpinned by economic development, augurs well
for peace.
It was also these forces which, more than any other, were responsible for the
transformation of my own country and for the awakening of hope for all our people.
The basis for the fundamental reforms in South Africa was established, not by
external pressure, but primarily by social changes which economic growth
generated.
In as much as apartheid was broken down by pressure, that pressure primarily
came – not from an armed struggle – but from the millions of peace-loving
people moving to our cities and becoming part of our economy.
The realisation that far-reaching change had become inevitable was primarily
influenced, not by political speeches and manifestos, but by the exposure to
realities which were brought into millions of homes by television and radio.
218

However, the single most important factor which became the driving force towards a
totally new dispensation in South Africa, was a fundamental change of heart. This
change occurred on both sides which had been involved in conflict over decades.
It was not a sudden change, but a process – a process of introspection, of soul-searching;

of repentance; of realisation of the futility of ongoing conflict, of acknowledgement of
failed policies and the injustice it brought with it.
This process brought the National Party to the point of making a clean break with
apartheid and separate development – a clear break with all forms of discrimination – for
ever.
Thus, we came to the point where we, as South Africans, could begin to bridge the
generations of prejudice, enmity and fear which divided us. This process brought us to
the negotiating table where we could begin to develop the frame of mind and
frameworks for peace to which I referred earlier. They prepared the way for the new
South African Constitution now being debated in Parliament. It inter alia provides for:
• the establishment of a rechtstaat, a constitutional system where the law – the

Constitution and a Bill of Rights – will be sovereign;
• the protection of the basic rights of all individuals, communities and cultural
groups through a Bill of Rights, in accordance with that which is universally
acceptable;
• an independent Constitutional Court, that will act as the guardian of the

Constitution and the Bill of Rights;
• clearly defined constitutional principles with which any future constitution will
have to comply;
• a balanced division of functions and powers between strong provincial

governments based on federal principles, and a strong central government; and
• special majorities and mechanisms for constitutional amendments.
I believe that this transitional constitution provides a reasonable framework of

agreements and rules, of checks and balances, which are necessary for peace in our
complex society.
It ensures full participation in all fields of endeavour to all South Africans. It

does not discriminate in any way on the basis of colour, creed, class or gender.
It contains all the major safeguards which all our communities will need to
maintain their respective identities and ways of life. It also provides adequate
guarantee for the political, social, cultural and economic rights of individuals.
219

I also believe that this framework for peace will succeed if we can now establish the
frame of mind, to which I referred, which is necessary for peace – the frame of mind
which leads people to resolve differences through negotiation, compromise and
agreements, instead of through compulsion and violence.
I believe that such a frame of mind already exists in South Africa at the moment,
however fragile it might be. All our leaders, including Mr Mandela and I, will have to
lead by example in an effort to consolidate this frame of mind. We will need great
wisdom to counteract the strategies of minority elements, threatening with civil
conflict. We will have to be firm and resolute in defending the framework for peace
which we agreed upon.
There is no room for complacency. All of us who believe in peace must redouble our
efforts to reassure all our countrymen that their rights and security will be assured.
I have no doubt that we will succeed. There is a growing awareness among all South
Africans of our interdependence – of the fact that none of us can flourish if we do not
work together – that all of us will fail if we try to pursue narrow sectional interests.
Five years ago people would have seriously questioned the sanity of anyone who would
have predicted that Mr Mandela and I would be joint recipients of the 1993 Nobel
Peace Prize.
And yet both of us are here before you today.
We are political opponents.
We disagree strongly on key issues and we will soon fight a strenuous election campaign
against one another. But we will do so, I believe, in the frame of mind and within the
framework of peace which has already been established.
We will do it – and many other leaders will do it with us – because there is no other road
to peace and prosperity for the people of our country. In the conflicts of the past, there
was no gain for anyone in our country. Through reconciliation all of us are now
becoming winners.
The compromises we have reached demand sacrifices on all sides. It was not easy for
the supporters of Mr Mandela or mine to relinquish the ideals they had cherished for
many decades.
But we did it. And because we did it, there is hope.
220

The coming election will not be about the past. It will be about the future. It will not be
about Blacks or Whites, or Afrikaners and Xhosas. It will be about the best solutions
for the future in the interests of all our people. It will not be about apartheid or armed
struggle. It will be about future peace and stability, about progress and prosperity,
about nation-building.
In my first speech after becoming Leader of the National Party, I said on February the
8th, 1989:
“Our goal is a new South Africa:

A totally changed South Africa;
a South Africa which has rid itself of the antagonism of the past;
a South Africa free of domination or oppression in whatever form;
a South Africa within which the democratic forces – all reasonable people – align
themselves behind mutually acceptable goals and against radicalism, irrespective
of where it comes from.”
Since then we have made impressive progress, thanks to the cooperation of political,
spiritual, business and community leaders over a wide spectrum. To Mr Mandela I
sincerely say: Congratulations. And in accepting this Peace Prize today I wish to pay
tribute to all who are working for peace in our land. On behalf of all South Africans
who supported me, directly or indirectly, I accept it in humility, deeply aware of my
own shortcomings.
I thank those who decided to make the award for the recognition they have granted in
doing so – recognition of a mighty deed of reformation and reconciliation that is taking
place in South Africa. The road ahead is still full of obstacles and, therefore, dangerous.
There is, however, no question of turning back.
One of the great poets in Afrikaans, N P van Wyk Louw, wrote:
“O wye en droewe land, alleen

onder die groot suidersterre.
Sal nooit ’n hoe blydskap kom
deur jou stil droefenis? …
Sal nooit ’n magtige skoonheid kom
oor jou soos die haelwit somerwolk
wat uitbloei oor jou donker berge,
en nooit in jou ’n daad geskied
wat opklink oor die aarde en
die jare in hul onmag terge, …”
221

Translated freely it means:
“Oh wide and woeful land, alone

Beneath the great south stars.
Will soaring joy ne’er rise above
Your silent grief?
Will ne’er a mighty beauty rise
above you, like the hail-white summer clouds
that billow o’er your brooding peaks
and in you, ne’er a deed be wrought
that over the earth resounds
and mocks the ages in their impotence?”
What is taking place in South Africa is such a deed – a deed resounding over the
earth – a deed of peace. It brings hope to all South Africans. It opens new horizons for
Sub-Saharan Africa. It has the capacity to unlock the tremendous potential of our
country and our region.
The new era which is dawning in our country, beneath the great southern stars, will lift
us out of the silent grief of our past and into a future in which there will be opportunity
and space for joy and beauty – for real and lasting peace.
11.4 N
ELSON MANDELA’S INAUGURAL ADDRESS,
MAY 1994
Nelson Mandela, who trained as a lawyer, joined the ANC in 1944. He was
sent to prison for high treason in 1963, where he remained for the next 27
years. After his release in 1990, he took leadership of the ANC and worked
tirelessly to negotiate an end to apartheid and White minority rule.
Mandela led the ANC to a resounding victory in the April 1994 election. He
was inaugurated as the first Black president of the Republic of South Africa
on 10 May 1994. He succeeded President FW de Klerk.
The occasion at the Union Buildings in Pretoria was indeed historic. The eyes
and ears of all South Africans and millions overseas were on Mandela, who
had become a world icon in the struggle for freedom. The inauguration was
the largest gathering ever of international leaders on South African soil.
222

11.4.1 The text of Mandela’s inaugural speech

Retrieved from https://public.wsu.edu/~brians/world_civ/worldcivreader/
world_civ_reader_2/mandela.html
Your Majesties, Your Highnesses, Distinguished Guests, Comrades and Friends:
Today, all of us do, by our presence here, and by our celebrations in other parts of our
country and the world, confer glory and hope to newborn liberty.
Out of the experience of an extraordinary human disaster that lasted too long, must be
born a society of which all humanity will be proud.
Our daily deeds as ordinary South Africans must produce an actual South African
reality that will reinforce humanity’s belief in justice, strengthen its confidence in the
nobility of the human soul and sustain all our hopes for a glorious life for all.
All this we owe both to ourselves and to the peoples of the world who are so well
represented here today.
To my compatriots, I have no hesitation in saying that each one of us is as intimately

attached to the soil of this beautiful country as are the famous jacaranda trees of
Pretoria and the mimosa trees of the bushveld.
Each time one of us touches the soil of this land, we feel a sense of personal renewal.
The national mood changes as the seasons change.
We are moved by a sense of joy and exhilaration when the grass turns green and the
flowers bloom.
That spiritual and physical oneness we all share with this common homeland explains
the depth of the pain we all carried in our hearts as we saw our country tear itself apart
in a terrible conflict, and as we saw it spurned, outlawed and isolated by the peoples of
the world, precisely because it has become the universal base of the pernicious ideology
and practice of racism and racial oppression.
We, the people of South Africa, feel fulfilled that humanity has taken us back into its
bosom, that we, who were outlaws not so long ago, have today been given the rare
privilege to be host to the nations of the world on our own soil.
223

We thank all our distinguished international guests for having come to take possession
with the people of our country of what is, after all, a common victory for justice, for
peace, for human dignity.
We trust that you will continue to stand by us as we tackle the challenges of building
peace, prosperity, non-sexism, non-racialism and democracy.
We deeply appreciate the role that the masses of our people and their political mass
democratic, religious, women, youth, business, traditional and other leaders have
played to bring about this conclusion. Not least among them is my Second Deputy
President, the Honourable F.W. de Klerk.
We would also like to pay tribute to our security forces, in all their ranks, for the
distinguished role they have played in securing our first democratic elections and the
transition to democracy, from bloodthirsty forces which still refuse to see the light.
The time for the healing of the wounds has come.
The moment to bridge the chasms that divide us has come.
The time to build is upon us.
We have, at last, achieved our political emancipation. We pledge ourselves to liberate

all our people from the continuing bondage of poverty, deprivation, suffering, gender
and other discrimination.
We succeeded to take our last steps to freedom in conditions of relative peace. We

commit ourselves to the construction of a complete, just and lasting peace.
We have triumphed in the effort to implant hope in the breasts of the millions of our
people. We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South
Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their
hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity – a rainbow nation at peace
with itself and the world.
As a token of its commitment to the renewal of our country, the new Interim
Government of National Unity will, as a matter of urgency, address the issue of amnesty
for various categories of our people who are currently serving terms of imprisonment.
We dedicate this day to all the heroes and heroines in this country and the rest of the
world who sacrificed in many ways and surrendered their lives so that we could be free.
224

Their dreams have become reality. Freedom is their reward.
We are both humbled and elevated by the honour and privilege that you, the people of
South Africa, have bestowed on us, as the first President of a united, democratic, non-
racial and non-sexist South Africa, to lead our country out of the valley of darkness.
We understand it still that there is no easy road to freedom.
We know it well that none of us acting alone can achieve success.
We must therefore act together as a united people, for national reconciliation, for
nation building, for the birth of a new world.
Let there be justice for all.
Let there be peace for all.
Let there be work, bread, water and salt for all.
Let each know that for each the body, the mind and the soul have been freed to fulfil
themselves.
Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience
the oppression of one by another and suffer the indignity of being the skunk of the
world.
Let freedom reign.
The sun shall never set on so glorious a human achievement!
God bless Africa!
Thank you.
225

11.5 T
HABO MBEKI ON NEPAD AND THE AU, OCTOBER
2001
In this most important and definitive address to the Joint Sitting of the South
African National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) on
31 October 2001, the then President Thabo Mbeki sets out his views on the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the then soon to be
established African Union (AU). The AU was launched in Durban in June
2002 and replaced the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).
Both NEPAD and the AU are logical results of Mbeki’s vision of an African
Renaissance in the 21st century. The idea of an African Renaissance was first
put forward by Mbeki in June 1999, soon after he succeeded Nelson Mandela
as the president of the Republic of South Africa.
11.5.1 The text of Mbeki’s speech on NEPAD and the AU

Retrieved from http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/address-joint-sitting-
national-assembly-and-national-council-new-partnership-africas-develop
Honourable Premiers,
Honourable Members,
Ladies and Gentlemen:
A recent publication of the World Bank asks the question – Can Africa claim the 21st
century? It is our firm view that together, as Africans, we must answer that question
with a resounding – Yes. Africa’s time has come.
When, at the end of the century historians cast their eyes back over this the 21st and
African Century, what will they see!
They should see that Africa has at last emerged from a long period of darkness and fear
into one of light and a dream fulfilled.
They should see that through our persistent efforts we have redefined ourselves into
something other than a place of suffering, a place of wars, a place of oppression, a place
of hunger, disease, ignorance and backwardness.
They should see the reality of a new African, who, having refused to be conditioned by
circumstances imposed by a past of slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and
apartheid, has succeeded to create a new world of peace, democracy, development and
prosperity.
226

These are Africans who have chosen to define themselves in action. They had grown
tired of being told who they are, where they come from, where they ought to go and
how they should proceed with their journey.
Because they had decided to become the masters and mistresses of their own destiny,
to sing their own songs and dance to their own tune, they had succeeded to claim the
21st century as their own.
The historians should see that at last an age-old dream of the unity of Africa has been
realised among the millions on our continent who are bound together by the oldest and
most enduring land-mass, who breathe the same air, till the same soil, dream the same
dreams and awake together from a long night rocked by terrifying nightmares.
They should see walking their continent and the common globe proud Africans who,
by reclaiming their place as equals with other human beings, would have banished
from the earth the scourge of racism and racial discrimination.
The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development constitute the
ways and means we have chosen to take us forward decisively towards the realisation
of all these goals.
Madam Speaker of the National Assembly and Chairperson of the Council of Provinces:
I would like to thank you most sincerely for providing all of us this opportunity to
discuss the initiatives critical to Africa’s future, of the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development and the African Union.
It is important that our discussion is taking place in this parliament, which is the home
of our elected representatives and a symbol of the fulfilment of the struggles and
sacrifices of the masses of our people in our quest for the realisation of our collective
demand that – The People Shall Govern!
Undoubtedly, the creation of a new Parliament in our country, reflecting the will of the
people, was one of the important foundations for us to come together and declare in
unison that – Africa’s time has come!
It is therefore obvious that a new partnership for the development of our continent
would not have been possible if part of Africa was still under the yoke of colonial or
white minority rule.
Accordingly, one of the important preconditions for the renewal of Africa is necessarily
the complete liberation of the peoples of the continent.
227

Secondly, the Africans themselves, particularly the leadership, had to arrive at a

common perspective that democracy is fundamental to the regeneration of our
countries and continent, and, that responding to the correct demand for democracy is
being true and faithful to the people on whose behalf we aspire to govern.
Thirdly, a new partnership for development was possible when many of our people on
the continent, came to the common determination that proper adherence to good
economic governance, aimed at the emancipation of our people from poverty, is as
important as ensuring political democracy. As with our approach to political processes,
the time since Africa’s independence has offered valuable lessons about what we should
do and not do if we are to pull ourselves from the quagmire of poverty and
underdevelopment, as we must.
Fourthly, we are able to take practical steps in the renewal of the continent because we
have resolved that we should find the ways to use our natural riches to improve the living
conditions of all our people, instead of these riches benefiting outsiders and a small elite.
Fifthly, the renaissance of the continent is possible because the process will involve the
mass of our people, in their various formations and from different stations in life as
conscious agents of change. The business people, the women, the intelligentsia, the
youth, the workers, the politicians, the media workers – all of us – have crucial and
specific roles that we can and must play to ensure that the renewal of our continent
becomes a reality.
Lastly, the African Renaissance is possible because we have entered into a new
partnership with the rest of the world on the basis of what we, as Africans, have
determined is the correct route to our own development.
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development states that:
“The resources, including capital, technology and human skills, that are required to
launch a global war on poverty and underdevelopment exist in abundance, and are
within our grasp. What is required to mobilise these resources and to use them
properly, is bold and imaginative leadership that is genuinely committed to a sustained
effort of human upliftment and poverty eradication, as well as a new global partnership
based on shared responsibility and mutual interest.
“Across the continent, Africans declare that we will no longer allow ourselves to be
conditioned by circumstance.
“We will determine our own destiny and call on the rest of the world to complement
our efforts. There are already signs of progress and hope.
228

Democratic regimes that are committed to the protection of human rights, people-centred
development and market-oriented economies are on the increase. African peoples have
begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and political leadership. These
developments are, however, uneven and inadequate and need to be further expedited.
“The (New Partnership) is about consolidating and accelerating these gains.
It is a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international
community, especially the highly industrialised countries, to overcome the
development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations.”
In this regard, we are not asking for favours, but for fairness and justice, a better life for
Africans and a secure future for all humanity.
This programme is premised on African ownership, African control of the projects and
programmes, with African leaders accepting openly and unequivocally that they will
play their part in ending poverty and bringing about sustainable development.
We are agreed that we must strengthen democracy on the continent; we must entrench
a human rights culture; we must end existing conflicts and prevent new conflicts. We
have to deal with corruption and be accountable to one another for all our actions.
Clearly, these measures of ensuring democracy, good governance and the absence of
wars and conflicts, are important both for the well-being of the people of Africa and for
the creation of positive conditions for investment, economic growth and development.
We cannot make the required progress and realise the necessary achievements in the
process of the regeneration of our continent if the people of Angola, Burundi, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone are engaged in endless conflicts.
To end these conflicts and find a lasting solution to their causes is something that must
seize the collective mind of Africans, and, participating in a practical programme of
their resolution is the joint responsibility of each and every African patriot.
In this respect, Honourable Members, I would like to extend our best wishes and
thanks to the members of our National Defence Force who are being deployed in
Burundi to assist that sister country to transform itself into one of peace, democracy
and prosperity.
Our Deputy President has left for Burundi to represent our country as a new government
is sworn in tomorrow. Again, I would like to salute the Facilitator of the Burundi Peace
Process, Nelson Mandela, his team and the political leadership of Burundi for the
important steps they are taking to expand the frontiers of liberty and peace.
229

To return to the New Partnership, there are important measures that we have to
undertake to mobilise the required resources so that we achieve better economic
growth. To halve the incidence of poverty by the year 2015, we need to achieve high
and sustained rates of growth. Among other things, this will require increased domestic
savings and better revenue collection.
We also have to strengthen the Public-Private-Partnerships and ensure that there are
sufficient means and capacity to implement infrastructural and social programmes.
The African Development Bank will play a central role in this regard.
Further, the programme is going to assist countries to improve their individual

financial markets as well as address the challenge of better co-ordination and
harmonisation of cross-border flows through the Financial Markets Integration Task
Force.
In addition, the capital flows initiative seeks to focus on debt reduction and forgiveness,
reforming development assistance for Africa and working on mechanisms to increase
private capital inflows into Africa.
One of the most important challenges is to address the negative perception amongst
investors who see Africa as a ‘high risk’ area. While we need to address the genuine
concerns raised by potential investors, we have a responsibility to communicate better
and correctly about the concrete improvements we continue to make.
In many instances the investors get a wrong message from those who do not wish
Africa to succeed. The voice of the majority of the people of Africa, who have stabilised
their political as well as the socio-economic situations, needs to be heard.
Africa is rich in agricultural, mineral and aquatic raw materials that must now be used
to develop the continent’s economies and peoples.
But Africans themselves must add the value to these natural resources, through
beneficiation so that the rest of the world receives them as manufactured goods and not
merely as raw materials.
Through the market access initiative we seek to advance diversified market access for
African exports to developed countries of the North.
The programme also seeks to nurture the vast, complex and rich African environment
for the benefit of all humanity. In this regard, there will be a coherent environmental
programme, where we will have to make strategic choices and determine particular
priorities.
230

The Environment Initiative will deal, amongst others with programmes around the
combating of desertification, wetland conversation and water management, global
warming, transfrontier conservation and environmental governance.
The New Partnership has also set important priorities in the area of infrastructure
development so as to speed the process of the modernisation and industrialisation of
the continent and ensure that Africa rises to the levels of the developed countries.
Clearly, the lack of infrastructure constitutes a serious handicap to social and economic
development.
Another priority area is the Information and Communication Technology. We have to

improve the ICT infrastructure, ensure that there is clear policy and strong regulatory
mechanisms. Africa needs adequate access to affordable telephones, computers, the
Internet and broadcasting. To double teledensity by the year 2005, the continent needs
in excess of US $8 billion in core infrastructure alone.
Attracting investment needs, therefore, a comprehensive integrated strategy that will

be supported by all the people of Africa.
In addition, there will be a programme of human development so that our people gain
the necessary knowledge and skills and enjoy better and healthier lives.
We have to work on a multipronged strategy to overcome the widespread incidence of

communicable diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and AIDS.
Amongst others, we have to improve the quality of nutrition so as to contribute to the

well-being of our people as well as increased productivity.
We also need the improvement of the education systems if we are to! compete equally
with the rest of the world. In this regard, we need to improve facilities and ensure that
primary and secondary schools are available in all our villages and rural areas. Further,
we have to strengthen the university system including the creation of specialised
universities where needed and establish institutes of technology.
Clearly, the success of the New Partnership will only be guaranteed if all the people see
themselves as part of the process not only of deepening democracy, but also as activists
in projects and programmes that they engage in partnership with government.
Furthermore, the development of the African continent will happen when we have
practical programmes and workable partnerships with the developed countries.
Already, there have been extensive engagements with various developed countries as
well as multilateral organisations. These include the G-8, the EU, United Nations, the
Nordic countries, the World Bank, the IMF.
231

Honourable Members;
As you know, this parliament, like others on our continent, adopted the Constitutive
Act of the African Union which Union will replace the OAU as from next year, when
the OAU will hold its last assembly and the AU its first, here in our country.
Again as the Honourable Members know, the African Union will be based on the
following objectives and principles, among others:
The need to achieve greater unity and solidarity amongst the countries and peoples of
the continent;
The acceleration of the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
Promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent;
Promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good

governance;
Promotion and protection of human and people’s rights in accordance with the African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
The establishment of the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its
rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations; and
The promotion of co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living
standards of African peoples.
Clearly, we see the transformation of the OAU into the African Union as an important
process because we need a continental structure better suited to the challenges of the
21st century and better geared to the goal of the realisation of the objective of Africa’s
renaissance.
Madam Speaker and the Chairperson of the NCOP;
As you will recall, our parliament made important observations when considering the
request for approval of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
Amongst the important observations you made are that the Constitutive Act appears
to contain:
various clauses that could be open to different interpretations;
various clauses that appear to be contradictory; and
232

clauses that may be interpreted as impinging upon the sovereignty of Member States,
in the executive, legislature or judicial spheres, more than is usual in the case of the
formation of such a Union.
The report is valuable as it assists in focusing our collective mind on the areas that may
pose problems as we try to form an important body that is critical to our renewal as a
continent.
In appreciating the work that parliament did, I would like to make a request for
Members to elaborate on the areas they have identified, and propose possible remedies.
Furthermore, we need to spell out what form we think the various Organs mentioned
in the Constitutive Act should take, the protocols, the rules and regulations that should
govern these structures.
Our parliament should assist in giving more content and meaning to the African Union
so that the elected representatives of South Africa also make their humble contribution
to the form, content and direction of the African Union as the Union is being defined
more precisely, prior to its launch.
This should be done in conjunction with other people in society who are willing and
able to make a contribution, be they NGO’s, Universities, research bodies, business
organisations, trade unions, women and youth organisations.
Similarly, we should encourage our counterparts in other parts of the continent to

engage in this process of shaping and participating in the African Union and in the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development in such a manner that there is a clear
response to the needs and demands of all our people as well as active involvement by
the people.
In this way, we will ensure that, both the Union and the Programme, are owned by all
our people in all our countries.
We will ensure that the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development do not belong to the elites, but are products of our people and benefit in
a practical way, the poor of our continent wherever they may be.
We have embarked on these extra-ordinary measures represented by the AU and the

New Partnership because we have to eradicate the destructive effects of slavery,
colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, wars, conflicts, disease and poverty that have
characterised the African continent for the last few centuries. None but ourselves can
do it!
233

The establishment of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development have come at a new time of new possibilities and new hopes for the
African people.
These initiatives are laying the groundwork for a prosperous Africa that will triumph
over poverty, disease, underdevelopment and despair. Their success is dependent on an
effective partnership between governments and people, with the co-operation of the
private sector and a true partnership with the developed nations that also have Africa’s
interests at heart.
Africa has decided to take the high road. The tasks we have set ourselves are ambitious.
But the challenges we face no longer permit timidity. Nor do they allow that we should
merely entertain hopes and do nothing to turn those hopes into reality.
The African Presidential Implementation Committee has already been established. So

have the other institutions we need to translate our common vision into practical
implementable programmes.
Our country has been charged with the task of hosting the Secretariat of the New
Partnership, chairing its Steering Committee and convening the group that must
elaborate the specific steps we need to take to ensure peace, security and stability
throughout our continent. We have an obligation to discharge these responsibilities
successfully, driven by a sense of urgency.
The G8 have also constituted the special task force that will work together with our
Steering Committee and Secretariat. The European Commission is ready immediately
to engage these organs of the New Partnership. The World Bank, the IMF and the
International Finance Corporation have already joined in the New Partnership.
The work has started to give meaning to a bold vision whose realisation will for us, at
last, turn into reality the concept that all people are born equal and that all of us inhabit
a global village.
95 years ago, in 1906, Pixley ka Isaka Seme, the great African, patriot and freedom
fighter, looking far into the future cried out:
“Oh, for that historian who, with the open pen of truth, will bring to Africa’s claim the
strength of written proof.
“He will tell of a race whose onward tide was often swelled with tears, but in whose
heart bondage has not quenched the fire of former years.
“He will write that in these later days when Earth’s noble ones are named, she has a roll
of honour too, of whom she is not ashamed.
234

“The giant is awakening!”
Together we must make this the African Century and, as the historian of whom Seme
spoke, “with the open pen of truth” inscribe a joyous, triumphant Africa onto the
history book of the world.
Honourable members:
I am pleased to commend to you the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, our
own programme made in Africa for the renewal of Africa.
I urge you to make it your own, to turn into reality the assertion that Africa’s time has
come.
I thank you.
11.6 JACOB ZUMA’S INAUGURAL ADDRESS, MAY 2009

Jacob Zuma was inaugurated as the fourth president of the democratic
Republic of South Africa on 9 May 2009 after he led the ANC to a resounding
victory in the 27 April election. Zuma succeeded Kgalema Motlanthe, who
had served as president for a brief period after Thabo Mbeki was recalled (by
the ANC) in September 2008. In fact, Motlanthe was always regarded as a
caretaker president while Zuma was sorting out legal battles over allegations
of corruption.
Zuma was elected president of the ANC at the party’s 52nd National
Conference, held at Polokwane in December 2007. He replaced President
Mbeki, who had become increasingly unpopular in the ANC ranks. Some
months later, the recall of Mbeki as president led to a split in the ANC, with
former Mbeki allies being instrumental in forming a new political party: the
Congress of the People (COPE). COPE did well in the April 2009 election,
coming in third after the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA).
While political commentators never doubted Zuma’s populist appeal, there

were wide questions and fears about his ability to be a statesman for all the
people of South Africa.
235

11.6.1 The text of Zuma’s inaugural speech

Retrieved from http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=762&%20t=79
Your Majesties,
Your Royal Highnesses,
Your Excellencies Heads of State and Government and Leaders and Members of
delegations,
Chairpersons of the African Union and the African Commission,
Esteemed Members of the Order of Mapungubwe, our icon the Hon Nelson Mandela,
and the Hon Thabo Mbeki,
Your Excellencies, Ambassadors and High Commissioners
Speaker of the National Assembly, Max Sisulu,
Chief Justice, Pius Langa
Members of the Diplomatic corps,
Mama Albertina Sisulu and all veterans of our struggle,
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,
On this day, a decade and a half ago, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela was formally elected
as the first President of a democratic South Africa.
At that moment a new nation was born, a nation founded on the fundamental principles
of human dignity and equal rights for all.
A nation founded on the promise that “never, never and never again” would this land
experience the oppression of one by another.
Today, a decade and a half later, we gather here to reaffirm the promise of that
great day.
We gather here determined to renew that most solemn undertaking, to build a society
in which all people are freed from the shackles of discrimination, exploitation, want
and disease.
We gather here determined that the struggles and sacrifices of our people over many
decades shall not be in vain.
Instead, they shall inspire us to complete the task for which so much blood was shed,
and so much hardship endured. This is a moment of renewal.
236

When Madiba took the oath of office on the 10th of May 1994, it was one of the greatest
historic moments of our country, Africa and the African diaspora.
Madiba healed our wounds and established the rainbow nation very firmly.
He set us on the path of nation building and prosperity and made us a respected
member of the world community of nations. He taught us that all South Africans have
equal claim to this country, and that there can be no lasting peace unless all of us, black
and white, learned to live together in harmony and peace.
He made reconciliation the central theme of his term of office.
We will not deviate from that nation-building task. Thank you Madiba, for showing us
the way.
I would also like to acknowledge the former second Deputy President of the democratic
republic, the Hon FW de Klerk, who worked with Madiba in the resolution of the
apartheid conflict, and participated in shaping a new South Africa.
Your Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen,
In June 1999, former President Mbeki came to this very podium to take the oath of
office, as the second President of the Republic. He took the country forward as a true
statesman.
He made a remarkable contribution towards strengthening our democracy, and laid a

firm foundation for economic growth and development.
He made our country an integral part of the continent and worked tirelessly for an
African rebirth. Through his leadership, South Africa’s stature grew in the continent
and globally.
In his last address to the nation as Head of State in September last year, he demonstrated
his patriotism, and put the interests of the country above his personal interests.
Thank you Zizi for demonstrating a character that the ANC had always embodied since
1912.
Your Excellencies, ladies and gentleman, the nation is equally indebted to my friend,
comrade and brother, President Kgalema Motlanthe.
He came into office during a period of great anxiety, and brought about calm, stability
and certainty. He has led us in a very capable manner and the transition has become
remarkably smooth and well managed.
237

On behalf of the nation, let me express our sincerest gratitude to President Motlanthe
for patriotic service to the nation. Motlanthe! Bakone! Mmadiboka, seboka, dikgomo
lebatho!
Today, as I take this solemn Oath of Office as the Fourth President of the Republic of
South Africa, I do so deeply conscious of the responsibilities that you, the people of our
country are entrusting in me.
I commit myself to the service of our nation with dedication, commitment, discipline,
integrity, hard work and passion.
There is a lot to be done. More than 11,6 million South Africans voted for the ANC,
based on the programme put before them.
We are now called upon to implement our Manifesto. The dreams and hopes of all the
people of our country must be fulfilled. There is no place for complacency, no place for
cynicism, no place for excuses.
Everything we do must contribute in a direct and meaningful way to the improvement

of the lives of our people.
Your Majesties, Your Royal Highnesses, Your Excellencies,
We make a commitment here and now, before the eyes of the world, that:
For as long as there are South Africans who die from preventable disease;
For as long as there are workers who struggle to feed their families;
For as long as there are communities without clean water, decent shelter or proper
sanitation;
For as long as there are rural dwellers unable to make a decent living from the land on
which they live;
For as long as there are women who are subjected to discrimination, exploitation or
abuse;
For as long as there are children who do not have the means nor the opportunity to
receive a decent education;
For as long as there are people who are unable to find work,
we shall not rest, and we dare not falter.
238

As we apply ourselves to these and other tasks, we must acknowledge that we find
ourselves in difficult economic times.
Jobs are being lost in every economy across the world. We will not be spared the
negative impact, and are beginning to feel the pinch.
However, the foundations of our economy are strong and we will need to continue to
build on them.
This will require more hard work than ever before.
To achieve all our goals, we must hold ourselves to the highest standards of service,
probity and integrity. Together we must build a society that prizes excellence and
rewards effort, which shuns laziness and incompetence.
We must build a society that draws on the capabilities, energy and promise of all its
people.
Fellow South Africans, this is indeed a moment of renewal.
It is an opportunity to rediscover, that which binds us together as a nation.
The unity of our nation should be a priority for all sectors of our society.
We are a people of vastly different experiences, of divergent interests, with widely

different views.
Yet we share a common desire for a better life, and to live in peace and harmony.
We share a common conviction that never shall we return to a time of division and
strife.
From this common purpose we must forge a partnership for reconstruction,

development and progress.
In this partnership there is a place for all South Africans, black and white.
It is a partnership founded on principles of mutual respect and the unfettered expression

of different views. We do not seek conformity.
We seek a vibrant, dynamic partnership that is enriched by democratic debate that

values diverse views and accommodates dissent.
239

Therefore, we need to make real the fundamental right of all South Africans to freely
express themselves, to protest, to organise, and to practice their faith.
We must defend the freedom of the media, as we seek to promote within it a greater
diversity of voices and perspectives.
We must deepen the practice of participatory democracy in all spheres of public life.
We must strengthen the democratic institutions of state, and continually enhance their
capacity to serve the people.
We must safeguard the independence and integrity of those institutions tasked with
the defence of democracy, and that must act as a check on the abuse of power.
Compatriots, today, we enter a new era in the history of our nation, imbued with a
resolve to do everything within our means to build a better life for all our people.
Today, we renew our struggle to forge a nation that is at peace with itself and the world.
As we rejoice in being surrounded by our friends from all over the world, we reiterate
our gratitude for the sterling contribution of the international community to our
struggle for freedom.
We single out the African continent, for refusing to rest until the southern tip of Africa
was free.
We recommit ourselves to continue to be an active member of the international

community.
We will continue to use multilateral and bilateral forums and relations to take forward
the goals of eradicating global poverty, strengthening peace and security and to
promote democracy.
We will promote international friendship and cooperation through amongst others the
2010 FIFA World Cup. South Africa will deliver a world class event that will forever
change the perceptions of the international community, and also ensure a lasting
legacy for the people of Africa.
Fellow South Africans, let us move forward decisively, together.
Let us build a nation that remains forever mindful of its history, of those who have
sacrificed so much, and the many who put down their lives so we can be here today.
A nation filled with the laughter and joy of children.
240

A nation filled with a hope born of the knowledge that if we work together, we will
achieve our dreams.
Your Majesties, Your Royal Highnesses, Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, thank
you for gracing this occasion today.
I thank you.
11.7 CRITIQUING POLITICAL DISCOURSES

There are various ways in which we can critique a political speech, and thus
engage in rhetorical criticism. The subject matter of rhetorical criticism has
been a much neglected area of study in South Africa. But many approaches to
rhetorical criticism are found in the literature, especially in American
literature, where the field of study developed substantially in the 20th century
(see Burgchardt, 2010; Kuypers, 2005).
Rhetorical criticism is a qualitative communication research method that

combines close reading with contextual analysis in order to arrive at normative
judgements (cf. Iversen 2014). Qualitative communication research in turn
may be conceptualised broadly as a non-numerical analysis and interpretation
of human (communication) action (cf. Babbie & Mouton, 2001).
While rhetoric is today defined and used variously, it is most often associated
with the practice of using language to persuade others, that is, to achieve
something predetermined and directional with others (O’Sullivan, Hartley,
Saunders & Fiske, 1983). For the purposes of this discussion, rhetoric is
defined as the art of speaking persuasively.
Criticism demands a standard to separate it from mere comment. More

specifically, what separates a critic from a commentator is simply the fact that
a critic expresses judgements based on some standard of comparison, whereas
a commentator either reports observations or gives opinions.
Therefore, when we attempt to describe and evaluate – by means of functional

standards – communicators’ efforts to persuade recipients, we engage in
rhetorical criticism (De Wet & Rensburg, 1989:17).
By far the most useful standard for evaluating rhetorical discourse is the
artistic standard. This standard is concerned with how well the communicator,
or rhetor, applied the principles of effective rhetorical discourse – in other
words, how well or artistically (creatively) the available means of persuasion
were employed in such discourse.
241

Cathcart (1988:30) presents a summary of the idea of applying the artistic

standard to evaluate speech-making effectiveness in general, a summary that
is relevant for evaluating other forms of rhetorical discourse as well:
When using the artistic standard as the measure of speech effectiveness,

critics do not ignore results, truth or ethics. They study and try to account for
audience response, insofar as it can be determined. More importantly, they
establish as nearly as possible the responses the speaker sought and analyze
the methods used to achieve them. Then they judge whether the means are
commensurate with the desired responses. Critics may not be sure what the
results of the speech will be. But they can judge the potential for achieving
desired results, given the rhetorical methods employed.
Critics using this standard evaluate arguments to see whether truth is falsified.
They look for insufficient or incredible data, errors and fallacies in reasoning,
and improper motivational appeals. They do not judge truth as an absolute.
Rather, they judge how near the speaker comes to establishing truth within
the rhetorical situation.
The same holds true for the speaker’s ethics. Critics analyze and judge the
means by which the speaker reveals sincerity, trustworthiness, and
knowledge. They do not make judgements about the speaker as a person, but
instead as a speaker. They condemn the speaker who exaggerates his or her
expertness or authority. Equally condemned is the speaker who is an authority
but fails to say so. Both speakers deprive listeners of one of the means they
have of deciding how to respond.
The artistic standard for speech criticism sets as its goal the ideal performance
of the art. That ideal has been derived from those speeches that have stood
the test of time and from the rhetorical principles that have been developed
by speakers, researchers and critics. Using this standard, the critic attempts
to ascertain the highest achievement possible in any rhetorical situation and
then judges the speech accordingly.
As the very long history of public speaking shows, rhetorical or persuasive

communication (and therefore rhetorical criticism) is a demanding art. After
all, we cannot predict that if a communicator follows steps a, b and c, he/she
will always achieve results x, y and z. If this were the case, there would be
little need for critical assessment in political discourse. In fact we would need
just to know the so-called formulas and to apply them correctly to produce
the ‘right’ communication.
Having said this, we may critique a speech by focusing only on a particular

element: its structure, its artistic proofs, its worth or its outcomes.
242

11.7.1 Focusing on structure

The arrangement or structure of political discourse must always be kept in
mind – by critics and speechwriters alike. The guidelines offered by Aristotle,
as outlined in Chapter 8 Section 8.2.3.2, are still valid today.
Two examples of how structure can be illustrated in a text are provided by the
first speech of De Klerk (Section 11.2.1) and Mbeki’s speech on NEPAD and
the AU (Section 11.5.1).
11.7.1.1 D
e Klerk’s first parliamentary opening address, February
1990
In considering De Klerk’s February 1990 speech, we may ask how effective is
the arrangement of messages or arguments in the speech’s introduction,
purpose statement, body and conclusion.
The opening address has a long introduction, although it is formally presented

only up to the heading ‘FOREIGN RELATIONS’. It may be argued that
everything leading up to the section on negotiation constitutes the
introduction, even though this section starts with: ‘In conclusion, I wish to
focus the spotlight on the process of negotiation and related issues’.
This statement (‘I wish […]’), then, is also the purpose statement of the speech.
The purpose or intention of De Klerk’s overall message should be clear. He
seeks to persuade the audience – the whole South African nation (with the
exception, arguably, of those citizens who still believe firmly in the apartheid
ideology) – that it is time for South Africa to move urgently towards a new
democratic constitutional dispensation through negotiation with all widely
recognised Black leaders within South Africa and in exile.
The section on negotiation is the body of the speech.
The conclusion is quite clearly identified by its heading, and it starts with: ‘In
my inaugural address I said the following:’.
There may be divergent views about the way in which De Klerk introduces
the main part of his speech. Since his decisions and views on negotiation are
the climax of the speech, the idea of presenting them near the end seems
appropriate. In neo-Aristotelian fashion, he moves from the general to the
specific, from the whole to the finer detail.
However, the use of the phrase ‘in conclusion’ to start the body of his speech
seems inappropriate, except if we argue that he wants to play down the
243

momentous decisions he is to announce very soon. But in his own words, the
announced decisions are ‘far-reaching’. Therefore, it could be said that De
Klerk should rather have begun the body of his speech with a phrase such as
‘most importantly’. The actual conclusion of the speech tries, appropriately,
to make the audience sympathetic towards him and unsympathetic towards
so-called unreasonable people, to make his side of the arguments look strong
and those of the opponents weak, and to put the audience in the desired
emotional state.
11.7.1.2 Mbeki’s speech on NEPAD and the AU, October 2001

Mbeki’s speech is well structured. He begins with a long introduction in
which he foresees a new African in the 21st century, one who has chosen to
define him-/herself in action on the continent.
The purpose statement of the speech is clear: ‘The African Union and the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development constitute the ways and means we
have chosen to take us forward […]’.
The argumentation follows logically. Mbeki:

• lists the preconditions for Africa’s renewal
• summarises what NEPAD could do
• emphasises among other matters that democracy, good governance and
the absence of wars and conflicts are important both for the wellbeing of
Africans and for creating positive conditions for investment, economic
growth and development
• deals with the Constitutive Act of the AU
• sets out the principles and objectives on which the AU would be based
• calls for working relationships with the developed world.
Mbeki’s argumentation concerns the unknown future, but he projects it very

positively.
In the conclusion, Mbeki recalls the moving words of Pixley ka Isaka Seme,
one of the ANC founders, and tries to put the immediate audience in the
desired state of emotion, that is, make them proud to be African and proud to
be part of a potentially joyous and triumphant continent.
11.7.2 Focusing on the use of the Aristotelian artistic proofs

One of the foremost approaches to rhetorical criticism that follows the artistic
standard is the neo-Aristotelian approach. This approach has been used so
extensively by scholars of rhetoric that it is most often referred to as the
‘traditional’ approach to rhetorical criticism. Within the neo-Aristotelian
244

approach, there is, among other things, a focus on an appreciation of the use
of the artistic proofs (ethos, pathos and logos) that a communicator may use.
The creative use of the artistic proofs is intertwined with democratic

leadership. In an article entitled ‘Democracy and leadership’, the American
historian Arthur M Schlesinger Jr reminds us that leadership – the ability to
inspire and mobilise masses of people – requires creativity, and that creativity
in democratic statecraft has to meet five basic requirements. As Schlesinger
(1988:22 – own emphasis) explains:
The first requirement on the list is observation, the ability to observe with
accuracy things as they are in themselves, to know whether the things
depicted be actually present. Next, reflection, which teaches the value of
actions, images, thoughts and feelings; and assists the sensibility in perceiving
their connection with each other. Then imagination, to modify, to create and
to associate; then invention; and finally judgment, to decide how and where,
and in what degree […].
We pay attention to the fourth requirement: invention. The word ‘invention’

is derived from the Latin inventio, which in persuasive public speaking
terminology refers to the discovery and analysis of subject matter and proofs.
In fact, inventio is one of the five canons of rhetoric, as developed by the

ancient Greeks and Romans (see Chapter 2 Section 2.4). In dealing with
inventio the focus here is on the artistic proofs that a speaker may display
when he/she tries to persuade others to his/her point of view.
The use of ethos, pathos and logos is considered also in the 1990 speech by De
Klerk, and in Mandela’s presidential inaugural address of 1994 (see Section
11.4.1). As we remember from Chapter 2 Section 2.3.2, democratic leadership
demands a certain credibility from the leader (ethos), along with an
appreciation of the emotions of followers (pathos) and the use of logic in a
speech (logos).
11.7.2.1 D
e Klerk’s first parliamentary opening address, February 1990
At the outset, we should recognise the need for ethos in the opening address.
Ethos is brought into play because:
• De Klerk is relatively new in office
• new political developments are introduced
• the audience is of diverse political persuasions.
The question of rhetorical constraints on the speaker should also be clarified.

We cannot appreciate De Klerk’s display of ethos without considering the
245

position in which he found himself at the time. Communication takes place

within circumstances, and circumstances influence communication.
There were three rhetorical constraints on De Klerk:

1. In trying to persuade the ‘whole’ South African nation, he must have
realised that he could essentially only speak on behalf of the majority of
Whites. Up to this point his credibility among the Black majority had not
been established, except for the fact that he was the most powerful person
in South Africa.
2. He had to bear in mind the reaction of the international community to his
address. There was generally a reformist mood in the nation, and to
contemplate a step backwards might well have invited an international
backlash – as experienced after former State President PW Botha’s
infamous Rubicon speech at the NP’s Natal Provincial Congress in
Durban in August 1985. We need to remember that economic sanctions
had deeply hurt the South African state.
3. The NP had fought the September 1989 election to the House of Assembly
under the banner of new and dynamic leadership under De Klerk. His
opening address would be a test to see whether the promise of dynamic
leadership could be fulfilled.
Generally speaking, in his speech De Klerk tries to enhance his credibility

among the majority of South Africans by adopting a democratic approach to
critical issues. Without being guided by the approach he adopts, we cannot
really make (relatively) objective judgements on the merits of his rhetorical
performance.
The opening address confirms the underlying principles of the concept of

(Western) democracy: freedom (or the right to choose) and equality (as it
relates to political equality, equality before the law and equality of
opportunity). South Africans will henceforth actively participate in any
political party of their choosing, as long as they do so responsibly – without
resorting to physical violence. Eventually, everyone will have the vote and
equality of opportunity in a future South African democracy.
De Klerk explicitly states that his decisions (such as the unbanning of the
ANC) can be justified from security and political points of view. The political
viewpoint relates to the yearning for democracy in South Africa. The security
viewpoint establishes the idea that change will not be allowed to threaten the
security of the people – again, in other words that the exercise of freedom
should be combined with responsibility.
De Klerk conveys expertness or intelligence in his speech when discussing

critical issues related to South Africa’s foreign relations, human rights, the
246

death penalty, socio-economic development, economy and future

negotiations. He seems to know the subject matter well, and he deals
appropriately with the various topics, as shown in the following examples of
his statements:
• On foreign affairs. ‘The year 1989 will go down in history as the year in
which Stalinist Communism expired. These developments will entail
unpredictable consequences for Europe, but they will also be of decisive
importance to Africa. The indications are that the countries of Eastern
and Central Europe will receive greater attention, while this will decline
in the case of Africa.’
• On human rights. ‘The Government accepts the principle of the recognition
and protection of the fundamental individual rights which form the
constitutional basis of most Western democracies. We acknowledge, too,
that the most practical way of protecting those rights is vested in a
declaration of rights justifiable by an independent judiciary.
However, it is clear that a system for the protection of the rights of
individuals, minorities and national entities has to form a well-rounded
and balanced whole. South Africa has its own national composition, and
our constitutional dispensation has to take this into account. The formal
recognition of individual rights does not mean that the problems of a
heterogeneous population will simply disappear. Any new constitution
which disregards this reality will be inappropriate and even harmful.’
• On negotiation. ‘Practically every leader agrees that negotiation is the key
to reconciliation, peace and a new and just dispensation. However,
numerous excuses for refusing to take part are advanced. Some of the
reasons being advanced are valid. Others are merely part of a political
chess game. And while the game of chess proceeds, valuable time is being
lost.’
The above statements enhance De Klerk’s trustworthiness in so far as he

thereby indicates that, as State President, he knows what he is talking about
and that democrats will share and respect the values he advocates. His
declaration (in the conclusion) of standing, humbled, before the Almighty
Lord complements his trustworthiness, given the contention that the majority
of South Africans are confessed Christians.
De Klerk conveys goodwill towards the majority of South Africa’s people in

several ways:
• By announcing the unbanning of the ANC, the SACP and the PAC.
• By lifting restrictions on 33 organisations, abolishing the media emergency
regulations, and so on.
• By deciding to release Nelson Mandela unconditionally and as soon as
possible (the release took place on 11 February 1990).
247

His goodwill is further demonstrated in a number of statements, such as ‘rapid

progress with the reform of our system of taxation’ is a prerequisite, and ‘it is
time for us to break out of the cycle of violence and break through to peace
and reconciliation. The silent majority is yearning for this. The youth deserve
it’. De Klerk most certainly shows the majority of citizens that he is at least a
possible friend to them and their interests.
Throughout the opening address, De Klerk comes across as a sincere person.

His frequent use of personal pronouns (‘I’, ‘we’ and ‘us’) is appropriate. ‘I’ is
used to confirm authority, while ‘we’ and ‘us’ function to make others (also
the general public) feel involved in the great task ahead. He projects the image
of a reasonable and democratic leader who is quite capable of leading the
nation through major reforms.
De Klerk’s verbal pronouncements create an identification with all

democrats – real and potential. For example, he suggests that ‘hostile postures
have to be replaced by co-operative ones, confrontation by contact,
disengagement by engagement, slogans by deliberate debate’ (the use of
binary oppositions), following with: ‘The season of violence is over [the use of
metaphor]. The time for reconstruction and reconciliation has arrived’.
The general development of the text also contributes to De Klerk’s credibility.

His introduction emphasises that ‘only a negotiated understanding among
the representative leaders of the entire population is able to ensure lasting
peace’. And having set the climate for negotiations with his mention of ‘far-
reaching decisions’ to remove ‘the most important obstacles in the way of
negotiation’, he concludes with, among other things, an appeal to the leaders
of the people to turn South Africa ‘away from its present direction of conflict
and confrontation’. This appeal was also made, he acknowledges, in his
inaugural address in September 1989. Surely these ideas reflect good taste,
sincerity and common sense.
A critique of De Klerk’s display of ethos would be naive if it were simply to glorify

his artistry without recognising that the government had very few non-violent
alternatives left – and that the most fruitful option was probably to engage in
negotiations with credible Black leaders. Moreover, as an astute politician, De
Klerk avoids highlighting, for example, the problems of rising expectations and
further power struggles that his call for negotiations will cause.
With regard to pathos, or emotional proof, we must remember that the emotive
power of speech is not unreasonable (nor do reasons fail to appeal to human
desire). For Aristotle, the deliberative speaker can appeal to calmness,
friendship, confidence and kindness among people, and can ask for something
(for example, democracy) to be imitated. De Klerk does that in his speech.
248

De Klerk continually uses logos, or logical proof. He does so by systematically

structuring his arguments, by frequently providing reasons for claims and
decisions made, and by appealing to people’s reasonableness and sense of
responsibility.
To complement logos, De Klerk uses enthymemes appropriately –

the
statements that leave out one of the two premises on which a conclusion is
based. For example: ‘The time for talking has arrived [premise] and whoever
still makes excuses does not really wish to talk [conclusion]’. (It is assumed
that it is common knowledge that there are people who will make excuses for
not talking.) Enthymemic reasoning is most often found in political discourse
because in politics there are few clear-cut cause-and-effect relations. Usually,
arguments are only probably ‘true’.
11.7.2.2 Mandela’s inaugural address, May 1994

When presenting his first official speech as president of South Africa, Mandela
brought with him almost automatic credibility (ethos). His reputation as a
person of integrity and intelligence was of the highest order, both inside the
country and overseas.
Mandela shows his goodwill towards all South Africans almost from the beginning
when he states: ‘To my compatriots, I have no hesitation in saying that each one
of us is as intimately attached to the soil of this beautiful country as are the famous
jacaranda trees of Pretoria and the mimosa trees of the bushveld’. And in this
statement: ‘The time for healing of the wounds has come. The moment to bridge
the chasms that divide us has come. The time to build is upon us’.
Mandela displays ethos in the speech, even though to many listeners, viewers
and readers his trustworthiness was yet to be confirmed. This is not to suggest
that his trustworthiness was doubted – he had kept his promise to work for
peace throughout the transitional period (1990–1994) – only that he was now
the most powerful person in the country. His term of office had just begun;
there was still some convincing to do.
Mandela’s speech does, however, emphasise his apparent burning desire to

put the past away and to work towards a progressive future that aims high in
terms of peace and brotherly love. He could have had harsh words for those
individuals and groups who had been responsible for his long incarceration.
Instead, he makes a point of showing appreciation for the role played by his
‘Second Deputy President, the Honourable F.W. de Klerk’ in bringing about
the conclusion of apartheid.
249

The emphasis in Mandela’s speech is the use of pathos to make psychological

appeals to the wide audience. For example, he impresses upon the audience
that ‘glory and hope’ is being conferred by the occasion ‘to newborn liberty’,
that there is a ‘common victory for justice, for peace, for human dignity’, and
that South Africa can look forward to ‘non-sexism, non-racialism and
democracy’ – all highly emotive concepts.
Pathos is in evidence from the first to the last paragraph of the speech. This
should be quite understandable, given the magnitude of the occasion. It was a
highly emotional event.
Mandela also shows logos in pointing out that South Africa has moved away
from being the ‘skunk of nations’ to one that is looked upon to give guidance
to conflict-ridden states. His reference to the role played by the security forces
in securing the first democratic election in the land also bears testimony to
the logic in the speech.
Moreover, logos is prevalent in the admissions that ‘there is no easy road to

freedom’; that ‘none of us acting alone can achieve success’; and that ‘[w]e
must therefore act together as a united people, for national reconciliation, for
nation building, for the birth of a new world’.
A logical balance is established in the text by Mandela’s statement that while

South Africa is now a democracy, only a collaborative effort will do to
reconstruct the lives of ordinary South Africans. Fundamentally, the logic of
the speech is perhaps to be found in the acceptance that there is much work to
be done on the road to transforming South African society, and that impressive
facts and figures are not necessary to prove the point.
11.7.3 Focusing on worth and Nilsen’s four-part method

Another way to evaluate verbal persuasive messages is to focus on their worth
or long-range possibilities for all members of society. This is proposed by a
most renowned speech communication scholar, Thomas R Nilsen, in an essay
entitled ‘Criticism and social consequences’.
Cathcart (1988:121) supports Nilsen’s suggestion that the rhetorical critic use
a four-part method based on the extent to which the speech:
1. is consistent within itself and with the observed events of the time
2. arouses in the minds of its hearers, and later its readers, a concept of the
events with which it deals that is as accurate as possible
3. sees the ultimate goals of society as being most important, and relates its
immediate purpose to these goals
250

4. examines explicitly, as far as is reasonably possible, the direct and indirect

social consequences of the actions it may urge.
This approach requires the rhetorical critic to look beyond the moment of
discourse and show, through argumentation, how rhetoric works to promote
or denigrate important social values. This is a critical issue, especially for a
society such as South Africa, which has been and is in the process of major
social transformation, as well as for Africa, a continent long plagued by war
and starvation.
Nilsen’s four-part method for considering the long-range possibilities of

speeches for all members of society can be used in critique of the Nobel Peace
Prize acceptance speeches of Mandela (Section 11.3.1) and De Klerk (Section
11.3.2) in 1993, as well as of Mbeki’s 2001 address on NEPAD and the AU
(Section 11.5.1).
11.7.3.1 Mandela and De Klerk’s acceptance speeches, December 1993

The two speeches are consistent within themselves and with observed events of the
time, in so far as both Mandela and De Klerk seem determined to rid South
Africa of violence, racism and oppression.
As leaders, individually and as a team they advance South Africa along the
road to democracy (in the sense of recognising the related principles of
political freedom and equality), despite the considerable obstacles presented
by the great ideological diversity among the various social groups in the
nation.
They do this from the perspective and within the confines of the predominant
culture that they represent – the African culture in the case of Mandela, and
the Afrikaner (Western) culture for De Klerk. This is the reason why their
frames of reference, with regard to the call from the past for democracy, focus
on the words of Martin Luther King Jr and NP van Wyk Louw, respectively.
Does each speech arouse in the minds of its hearers, and later its readers, as
accurate as possible a concept of the events with which it deals? Strictly speaking,
of course, the answer depends on the ideological disposition of the recipients.
But the general idea would be clear to everyone that South Africa was moving
away from its oppressive past of institutionalised racism towards democracy
through collective negotiation and a one-person/one-vote election in April
1994.
Both speeches deal with the ultimate goals of South African society as Mandela
and De Klerk see them, that is, peace through democracy. However, the
251

method by which to achieve this differs. For Mandela, the total destruction of
apartheid structures through negotiations among all South Africans – in
which they find themselves as equal participants in the process – will do the
job. De Klerk acknowledges this, but follows the relational problems among
South Africans to a root cause: Many South Africans do not recognise that
peace is ‘a frame of mind’. De Klerk rightly suggests that the individual, rather
than ideologies or structures, is the starting point for moving away from
violence. The idea is for the human being to choose a course of action, to
adopt peace as a frame of mind and as a framework. The choice is existential.
For De Klerk, an individual’s outlook on life seems, above all, the decisive
factor, a factor that Mandela – in this speech of his, we should emphasise – does
not seem to appreciate to the same extent.
In their speeches, Mandela and De Klerk address the social consequences of the
movement towards a democracy in South Africa. Mandela emphasises that
human dignity, liberty and human rights, and freedom from want must
prevail in the end, especially for the children of South Africa. De Klerk also
indicates that new horizons will be created for the children, and that
‘opportunity and space for joy and beauty’ can be established in a South
African democracy.
However, both speeches fail to take into account the immense diversity of
interests among the social groups in the country. Nor do they consider the
danger that the inevitable power play among political organisations and
interest groups in the transitional period and thereafter could lead to much
further physical, structural and psychological violence. If this occurred, the
idea and promise of building a South African community, in which fellowship
prevailed, would not be fulfilled.
Nevertheless, in their speeches both Mandela and De Klerk give millions of

South Africans cause for hope against the background of the deep wounds of
the past. As the Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, Francis
Sejersted (1993), stated at the time: Mandela and De Klerk ‘have given peace
a chance. Whether peace will prevail, time will have to show’.
11.7.3.2 Mbeki’s address on NEPAD and the AU, October 2001

Mbeki’s love and high regard for Africa comes through strongly in this deeply
emotional speech in the charismatic mould. The introduction and conclusion
bear witness to this. But the speech is also supported by reasoned argument
(the statesman’s oratory), which is consistent within itself and with the observed
events of the time. There is no doubt that Africa needs renewal. Initiatives and
structures have to be put in place, and given their aims as put forward
pointedly by Mbeki, NEPAD and the AU provide sound platforms.
252

NEPAD and the AU are also consistent with the idea of an African Renaissance
that Mbeki proposed on becoming president of the Republic of South Africa
in 1999. He was a credible speaker on the topic, having taken a leading role in
NEPAD and the formation of the AU. As Salazar (2002:51) notes:
The African Renaissance is a concerted effort to introduce a wide-ranging

ideological coherence into public deliberation, to anchor empowerment
within an ideological terrain. Behind this effort is a belief and fear that once
the first and founding phase of the democracy is removed, citizens may lose
their direction and waste their efforts; the goal then is to induce citizens to
speak a common idiom – the language of the African Renaissance – in spite of
their differences in political beliefs.
It is more problematic whether the speech arouses in the minds of its hearers,
and later its readers, as accurate as possible a concept of the events with which it
deals.
Ideology comes into play, and while we would not argue that Mbeki is
inaccurate, he does tend to underemphasise two massive challenges facing
Africa before it can think of renewal: AIDS and poverty.
Mbeki downplays the huge AIDS problem in Africa, particularly in southern

Africa, with especially Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Zambia,
Namibia and South Africa being seriously affected (cf. Time 12 February
2001). Of the 36 million adults and children in the world living with HIV/
AIDS in 2000, more than 70 per cent were in sub-Saharan Africa. Worst of all,
South Africa had the largest number of people living with the disease in this
region. Surely AIDS would have to be controlled before Africa could
realistically believe in renewal.
Moreover, poverty in Africa was virtually out of control. International

statistics show how Africa grew ever poorer in the last two decades of the
20th century. As noted by Time (30 December 2002/6 January 2003:113): ‘If
the breadline is accepted as $1 a day, World Bank figures show that some 46%
of the total population of sub-Saharan Africa was living below the breadline
in the late 1990s. Almost every second person’. Millions of Africans (also in
southern Africa) were and still are facing starvation, not only because of
drought or floods but through political scheming and the greed of those in
power.
But the general idea suggested by Mbeki, that there is an awakening in Africa
among a core group of leaders to rid the continent of misery, seems to hold
true.
253

There is no doubt that Mbeki gives first priority to the ultimate goals of African
society in his speech, and that he relates its immediate purpose to these goals.
Wanting to make the 21st century the African century, and to create a new
African who walks the path of peace, democracy, development and prosperity,
are certainly lofty ideals, or ultimate goals.
Two critical issues are also highlighted: communication and development.

There must be accurate communication about developmental needs and
improvements. Development (ultimately also implying renewal) in Africa
goes hand in hand with change and growth.
Development must be emancipatory. So genuine dialogue among the role

players must predominate. When one group (First World interest groups)
dominates the right to use words and name the world, imposing its named
world on the others (African interest groups), dialogue stops and one-way
communication in the form of monologue or manipulation begins (Mowlana
& Wilson, 1990:74). For this reason, Mbeki states:
We will determine our own destiny and call on the rest of the world to
complement our efforts. There are already signs of progress and hope.
Democratic regimes that are committed to the protection of human rights,

people-centred development and market-oriented economies are on the
increase. African peoples have begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept
poor economic and political leadership. […]
This programme [NEPAD] is premised on African ownership, African control

of the projects and programmes, with African leaders accepting openly and
unequivocally that they will play their part in ending poverty and bringing
about sustainable development.
With regard to whether Mbeki examines explicitly, as far as is reasonably

possible, the direct and indirect social consequences of the actions that he urges, it
seems that he fully understands the central idea. For an African Renaissance
to occur and, in turn, for NEPAD and the AU to be successful, the collective
mind of Africans must be applied.
In other words, the starting point is human beings, who must ultimately
govern Africa’s moving away from darkness, from ‘a place of oppression, a
place of hunger, disease, ignorance and backwardness’. Mbeki seems adamant
about this – and rightfully so. To put the philosophy of renaissance into
practice would require continual originality and productivity on the part of
Africans. The mindset of all (including the masses) has to be focused, and the
process of renewal managed creatively through meaningful message
254

transmissions in group and corporate settings – featuring messages that are

rational and credible (reflecting common sense and sincerity), and that take
the necessary emotional dimension into account.
An outcomes-based approach must be taken. Furthermore, renewal demands

excellent facilitators, managers and educators to be successful at a macro
level, where quality control is a prerequisite.
In his desire for the 21st century to unfold as the African century, Mbeki in
effect calls on all Africans to acquire a ‘sociological imagination’, as Mills
(1959) would say. This sociological imagination is a quality of mind or mental
attitude that will help Africans to understand their circumstance in terms of
the meaning it has for them as individuals and others on the continent.
Mbeki thus advocates a form of self-consciousness that promises our

understanding of our intimate realities in connection with larger social
(African) realities. Once such self-consciousness has been formed, each of us
or all of us must want to do something about the poor state of affairs. In
Mbeki’s terms:
Clearly, the success of the New Partnership will only be guaranteed if all the
people see themselves as part of the process not only of deepening democracy,
but also as activists [own emphasis] in projects and programmes that they
engage in partnership with government.
Furthermore, the development of the African continent will happen when

we have practical programmes and workable partnerships with the developed
countries.
Mbeki’s ideas on NEPAD and the AU are very ambitious, but commendable.
Africa needs investment – especially from the United States, United Kingdom,
Germany, France, India and China – and democracy. Success with NEPAD
and the AU should go a long way in promoting the proverbial ‘better life for
all’ on the continent.
In his speech, Mbeki gives hope despite Africa’s poor achievements in the
past, if only because there is recognition of and dialogue about the extreme
difficulty in which Africa finds itself.
11.7.4 Focusing on outcomes

When focusing on outcomes, the critic examines an important speech to see
whether the promises made in the speech have been fulfilled over time. This
focus on outcomes can be the subject of study of all the speeches dealt with so
255

far, but we use Zuma’s inaugural address (see Section 11.6.1) as the text for
critique here.
While the critic intentionally aims for objectivity, he/she can never entirely
avoid subjectivity. But in seeking consistency in an argument, the critic
normally opens him-/herself up to the meanings of the text and may well set
aside his/her own preconceptions about the subject matter (cf. Iser [1974:274–
294] on the interpretation of a text).
11.7.4.1 Zuma’s inaugural address, May 2009

After welcoming important guests and thanking his predecessors, Zuma
insists that it is (again) a time of renewal. Among other things, he vows to:
• prioritise unity in the country – in other words, try to end division and
strife
• address poverty
• work towards good service delivery
• provide better education for all
• free government of corruption
• ensure the fundamental right of freedom of expression.
Zuma commits himself to the service of South Africa ‘with dedication,

commitment, discipline, integrity, hard work and passion’.
Let us look at some of the events and circumstances that have characterised
and continue to characterise South Africa since Zuma became president. We
do this in order to see whether the promises he makes in his inaugural address
are being fulfilled over time.
Division and strife have increased in contemporary South Africa – within the

ruling Alliance (ANC, COSATU and SACP) itself, and between the ANC and
opposition parties on various issues ranging from land restitution, the
Marikana massacre and the Gupta scandal to the Nkandla report.
Poverty remains a critical issue in the land. The majority of Black South
Africans are still poor (cf. Schoeman, 2011:222). As Boesak (2010:6) notes:
‘Poverty means the absence of dignity, confidence and self-respect; of security
and the safety of parenthood and family life. These are persons who remain
excluded, and their exclusion ranges from basic needs to justice in the courts.
For them, the difference between apartheid South Africa and post-apartheid
South Africa does not exist’.
Service delivery is lacking in many parts of the country, especially in the

underdeveloped rural areas. ‘How is it possible,’ Ramphele (2010:6) wonders,
256

‘that our own democratic government can tolerate the humiliation,

deprivation and abuse of so many poor people by officials who do not seem to
understand that they are accountable to citizens for proper execution of their
public duties?’ As she points out: ‘We now know that it is not lack of capacity
to deliver on promises, but lack of commitment to serve the public’ (Ramphele,
2010:6). And in the aftermath of the killing of Andries Tatane in Ficksburg in
a demonstration against poor service delivery, Mahabane (2011) indicates
that in a country where nearly 50 per cent of people are poor and jobless, with
no real prospect of being employed, Tatane died because he wanted a better
life for his community.
If politics itself is responsible for the failure to address Black poverty, then
there is the ironic conclusion that the contemporary South African state is
also an anti-Black one!
The struggle for mental liberation of the poor Black masses continues (Sesanti,
2011). One way of liberating ourselves mentally is through education, but for
so many in the land the education system is inadequate. Most schools in the
Black rural areas are dysfunctional. There is very little discipline, also on the
part of teachers. In fact, the education system threatens the ideal of providing
a better life for all the people, as, for example, basic principles of reading,
writing and doing arithmetic have been grossly neglected.
Ramphele (2012) notes that according to an international study done on

school performances in 144 countries, South Africa was 140th. As Ramphele
(2012) and Mangcu (in Marais, 2012) claim, the current education system for
the majority in South Africa is a crime against humanity.
Corruption, wasteful spending and general incompetence in the South

African public service and in public entities have not lessened (Sparks, 2015).
Tenders are given to friends and kickbacks are common (Mangcu, 2012).
Corruption is found throughout the system, as highlighted, for instance, by
charges successfully brought against former police commissioners, leading to
their dismissal in recent years.
The fundamental right to freedom of expression enshrined in South Africa’s

liberal-democratic Constitution is under threat. Recent moves by the ANC
government to pass a Protection of State Information Bill without a public
interest clause, and to introduce a media tribunal, have been widely interpreted
as attempts by the ruling party to make the government the watchdog of the
media (Vosloo, 2015; cf. Daniels, 2015).
What South Africa needs, Mangcu (2012:280, 285) argues, is leadership that
puts the community and the nation first, a leadership that ‘speaks and engages
257

with the people – instead of seeing them merely as racial voting cattle’. And as
Mokhele (in Barron, 2015) suggests, the ANC government will be ‘held to
account in the same way the apartheid government was held to account […]
we underestimate at our peril the ability of the population of this country to
draw a line in the sand’.
With regard to the actions of Zuma himself, several commentators have

pointed out that his promise of committing himself with integrity to the
service of all South Africans leaves much to be desired. Since assuming the
presidency, Zuma has stated the following, among other things (see, for
example, Dié man is ANC se Nommer Een [2015:8] – own translation):
• One should physically beat up homosexual people.
• Teenage pregnancy can be addressed by sending these mothers to one or
other island.
• Young women who do not marry create a problem for society – they must
become pregnant and have children because it provides further training
for them.
• African problems should be solved in the African manner and Black people
should not become too clever.
• All South Africa’s problems began with the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in
the 17th century.
• You will go to heaven if you vote for the ANC.
• Businessmen who donate money to the ANC will bear the fruits of their
investments.
• Black people should not spend money on a dog or veterinarian, or walk a
dog, because that is part of White culture.
• The ANC is more important than the Constitution, and South Africa
comes second after the ANC.
It is clear that Zuma’s rhetoric has been unpresidential at times, which has
alienated him from many sectors of society. Moreover, his behaviour causes
many to doubt his ‘dedication, commitment, discipline, integrity, hard work
and passion’ for the office that he promised all South Africans. Examples of
such behaviour are as follows (see Maarman, 2015):
• His silence (or virtual silence) on highly controversial issues such as the
Gupta family landing illegally at the Waterkloof Air Force Base.
• His influence on the appointment of government officials and ministers.
• His outrageous spending of taxpayers’ money on his Nkandla homestead.
• The totally undisciplined proceedings in the post-2014 South African
Parliament.
• His giggling when asked in Parliament in 2015 what his government was
going to do about the vicious drought affecting much of South Africa.
258

(For an insightful critical review of the Zuma presidency, see Malala [2015]
and Mangcu [2014:226ff.].)
However, this is not the entire situation. On the positive side, the 2010 FIFA
World Cup, which Zuma refers to in his inaugural address, was hosted
successfully. Zuma’s tenure in office has seen an advance in gender equality in
so far as more women occupy positions of power in government and in
Parliament. More South Africans have access to housing, water and electricity,
when available. Zuma has arguably also bonded well with poor rural Black
people (the majority in South Africa), who have continued to support him
and the ANC, albeit against the background of the government’s welfare
grants benefiting millions of the poor.
259

A REMINDER
• When critiquing political discourse, we are performing rhetorical
criticism.
• Rhetorical criticism is a qualitative method of research.
• There are various ways in which we can engage in rhetorical
criticism.
• The neo-Aristotelian approach to rhetorical criticism is regarded
as the traditional approach.
• Nilsen’s four-part method can be applied to consider the long-
range possibilities of a discourse for all members of society.
260

Persuasion and the rhetorical imprint of a public rhetor
chapter TWELVE
Persuasion and the rhetorical

imprint of a public rhetor
LOOKING AHEAD
• explain the concept of a rhetorical imprint
• show your understanding that, with their persuasive intention, lines
of argument can be researched to uncover the rhetorical imprint of
a public rhetor
• discuss the process of constructing a rhetorical imprint
• write notes on Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert as a South African
political leader
• consider the provided rhetorical imprint of Dr Van Zyl Slabbert
constructed through his lines of argumentation and within the
stated boundaries.
261

12.1 INTRODUCTION
In the Athenian democracy of the classical period (508–322 bc), the term
‘rhetor’ referred to a person pursuing a leadership role by using rhetoric as a
tool to gain honour and influence (see Cohen, 2006). The term therefore
indicates both the production and the delivery of the rhetorical message. An
orator, by contrast, just stated the rhetorical message, but did not necessarily
help to create it.
When focusing on persuasion and the rhetorical imprint of a public rhetor, we

are involved in the practice and study of rhetoric. And as we know, when we
study and critique a public speaker’s rhetoric, we perform rhetorical criticism
(see Chapter 11 Section 11.7).
Criticism must begin or continue a process that enhances an understanding

of rhetoric in general or of the rhetoric of a specific public speaker. Through
rhetorical criticism, by standing ‘outside’ the critic may focus on one or more
of the four fundamental variables in any rhetorical discourse: the speaker, the
discourse or message, the environment or circumstance, and the audience or
recipients (Cathcart, 1988:34ff.).
When focusing on the speaker, the critic does not ignore the message, since
the message is seen as a way of understanding the speaker’s ideas and values.
Focusing on a multitude of messages provided by a speaker may enable the
critic to form a picture in his/her mind of the foundations on which the
speaker’s messages rest and of the speaker’s persuasive intentions.
But for the critic engaging in rhetorical criticism, it is not enough just to form
a picture of the speaker’s ‘rhetorical imprint’, as Burgchardt (1985) calls it.
The imprint has to be researched and systematically constructed in order for
it to be revealed.
But what is a rhetorical imprint specifically?
12.2 A RHETORICAL IMPRINT

According to Burgchardt (1985:441; in Cawood, 2011:i), a rhetorical imprint
may be defined as ‘the constant, sometimes underlying, patterns of distinctive,
verbal statements that support the content of numerous different topics’ as
well as the ‘deep structure that governs a range of consonant verbal
manifestations on the surfaces of divergent speeches and writings’.
In his study of Wisconsin politician Robert la Follette from 1879 to 1925,

Burgchardt (1985) consults 111 speeches and documents. Cawood (2011)
262

studies 805 speeches given by Nelson Mandela from 1950 to 2004. We do not
need to analyse a set of data as large as these to discover the rhetorical imprint
of a rhetor.
The idea of a rhetorical imprint translates into everyday life. Often, we have a
good idea of how a person well known to us, such as a parent or spouse, would
answer a question. This is because we have continually observed and broadly
memorised the person’s verbal responses. We have also come to know the
framework from which that person approaches life in general. The identified
framework has a theoretical basis, be it existential, dialogical, critical/cynical
or functional/pragmatic.
Apart from this theoretical framework from which ordinary people and
public rhetors alike communicate, we can assume that rhetoric is expected to
fulfil a particular function through the lines of argument offered, among
others, and that a persuasive intention is often involved (see Aristotle
[1932:159–171] on topoi or lines of argument).
We can further assume that the rhetorical imprint of a public rhetor can be
constructed through focusing on the lines of argument (underpinning the
‘deep structure’) offered in a set of data. These lines of argument can persuade,
and convey worldviews (McCroskey, 1972:112ff.).
12.2.1 Focusing on lines of argument

Part of every message are the implicit or explicit arguments upholding the
ideas, beliefs and values that the rhetor feels must be presented in order to
bring the recipients’ perceptions in line with his/her perceptions. The
arguments are in the form of premises or assertions made by the rhetor, as
well as the support for these. Every persuasive message contains a series of
arguments, some in great detail and others implied, which provides the
rational basis for the rhetor’s position.
As Cathcart (1988:44) notes, to be effective every discourse must have a

logical construct – that is, lines of argument which appeal to the reasoning of
recipients. The use of lines of argument and logical proof in a discourse does
not mean that these necessarily follow laws of logical reasoning acceptable to
a logician. Nor does it mean that all recipients will agree on the logical validity
of the reasoning presented. What it does mean is that every message must
have an underlying logical construct that arises from the perspective of either
the rhetor or the recipient – otherwise it will not be believable.
The critic has to locate the lines of argument, which shape the message’s
logical framework, and analyse them. Normally the message contains
263

contentions, reasons and data that would make logical sense. Locating the
lines of argument is important because they form the basis of the rhetor’s
claim to truth, and account for the data he/she presents. The lines of argument
may be inconsistent, circular or obscure, but this should not stop critics trying
to locate them and explain their function.
Let us turn to the process involved in constructing a rhetorical imprint.
12.3 CONSTRUCTING A RHETORICAL IMPRINT

In order to construct a rhetor’s rhetorical imprint, we need to deconstruct the
data under investigation in terms of, as argued here, the lines of argument
offered, and then we need to compile the interpretation (cf. Cawood,
2011:147ff.).
12.3.1 Deconstructing the data

Four steps are involved in deconstructing the data under investigation
(cf. Bezuidenhout & Cronje, 2014:234ff.):
1. Immersing in the data and becoming familiar with it. This entails reading
and re-reading the selected writings and/or speeches, and making
clarifying notes.
2. Inducing the lines of argument of the chosen themes, and unpacking their
meaning.
3. Coding. This occurs at the same time as step four. Coding means attaching
labels to segments of data, such as sentences or paragraphs, that indicate
what the segments are about. Coding involves separating data, sorting
them and comparing them with other segments of data. There are three
phases in coding: initial, focused and conceptual/theoretical. The focused
phase entails looking for correlation in lines of argument (for example,
with regard to South Africa’s political and constitutional future) and
identifying underlying conceptual frameworks (such as freedom and
equality).
4. Elaborating and associating. This involves elaborating on associated lines
of argument and identifying the master conceptual framework(s) (such as
democracy).
12.3.2 Building the interpretation

We need to build an interpretation of the information gained from coding and
associating the lines of argument. Interpretations are written descriptions,
which are initially tentative. A reconsideration, or reconsiderations, of the
deconstruction process should follow, before we come to a final interpretation.
Once we have done this, we need to formulate the rhetorical imprint clearly
264

and concisely, so that it reflects the rhetor’s continual and master lines of
argument throughout the texts and speeches under investigation.
From a pragmatic perspective, the critic considers the rhetorical imprint as a

persuasive plan that expresses a societal vision, and is designed to influence
the perceptions of audiences in the case of a public rhetor (Burgchardt, 1985).
The success or failure of a rhetor’s persuasive efforts depends on the social,
economic and political appropriateness of the rhetorical imprint.
We now turn our attention to the public rhetoric expressed by Dr Van Zyl
Slabbert on South Africa’s political and constitutional future while he took
part in party politics.
12.4 DR VAN ZYL SLABBERT AS A PUBLIC RHETOR

Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (1940–2010) was a contemporary historical
Afrikaner leader. He was also one of South Africa’s most gifted political
rhetoricians and a towering voice of social unity and engaged communication
for decades in the country (cf. Giliomee [2012:214–253] for an extensive
appraisal of his leadership).
Van Zyl Slabbert was born in Pretoria, grew up in Pietersburg (now Polokwane
in Limpopo Province) and studied at the universities of the Witwatersrand
(Wits) and Stellenbosch. He quickly climbed the academic ranks as a
sociologist, lecturing at the University of Stellenbosch, Rhodes University
and the University of Cape Town (UCT), before being appointed in 1972 as
professor and head of the Department of Sociology at Wits at the age of 32.
In 1974, Van Zyl Slabbert was persuaded to join party politics by members
of the Progressive Party (PP). He successfully stood as their candidate for
the Rondebosch, Cape Town constituency in the general elections that year.
After five years in Parliament, in 1979 Van Zyl Slabbert was elected leader
of the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), which had been established in 1975
as successor to the PP. This meant that he became the official leader of the
opposition in the House. (For an in-depth account of his first five years in
Parliament, see Cassar [1984].) As the leader of the PFP, he was at the
forefront in opposing the ruling NP’s apartheid policies. He resigned from
Parliament controversially (citing the uselessness of the institution) in
early 1986.
Van Zyl Slabbert organised and facilitated the groundbreaking Senegal talks
with ANC leaders in exile in 1987. These talks helped to bring about the
transition to democracy in the land. Then he created and helped to build
many civil society institutions, such as the ongoing Open Society Foundation
265

for South Africa, which he founded in 1993. (These were just a few of his
achievements. See a chronology of his life in LeMaitre and Savage [2010].)
Always a sociologist, Van Zyl Slabbert was influenced at first by the Parsonian
systems theory. According to this theory, change in society is slow but
inevitable, given the forces of modernity that all societies (including that of
South Africa) are exposed to. The theory further proposes that a consensus
on basic values is a prerequisite for the smooth functioning of a sustainable
community. Later, Van Zyl Slabbert was also inspired by, among other
scholars, Karl Popper’s ideas and defence of liberal democracy in The open
society and its enemies (see Gagiano, 2010).
Commentators such as Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley (2010) believe

that Van Zyl Slabbert did not preach but coldly analysed; that he had a clear
vision of what was desirable, but distinguished it from what was possible; and
that as a pragmatist, he focused not only on what should happen but on what
was likely to happen as well. He did this all within the framework of a lifelong
passion for the freedom of the individual and the establishment, and for
consolidation of democratic governance in South Africa. As the veteran
journalist Ivor Wilkens (in Giliomee, 2010:91) observes, Van Zyl Slabbert’s
rhetorical style ‘is so utterly different. It is his unique ability to reduce politics
to a series of simple, logical arguments that progress to a single, devastating
conclusion’.
The research question posed here is what was Van Zyl Slabbert’s rhetorical
imprint regarding South Africa’s political and constitutional future while he
was in parliamentary politics? Hence, we focus on a selection of Van Zyl
Slabbert’s public rhetoric on South Africa’s political and constitutional future
during his period in parliamentary politics – from 1974 to 1986 – in order to
uncover his rhetorical imprint as a politician in apartheid South Africa.
The rhetoric under investigation consists of Van Zyl Slabbert’s writing and
thoughts on the topic as recorded in the following:
• South Africa’s options: Strategies for sharing power (1979), which he co-
authored with David Welsh.
• The last white Parliament (1985).
• His parliamentary speeches of 1985. This was his last year as opposition
leader, and the year in which his ideas on South Africa’s political and
constitutional future were finalised – that is, when he made up his mind
about what had to happen next.
• Eight chapters, written while he was active in parliamentary politics, that
are included in The system and the struggle (1989).
266

Van Zyl Slabbert also co-edited South Africa: Dilemmas of evolutionary change
(1980), which was published while he was a member of Parliament and a
Rhodes University fellow at the Institute of Social and Economic Research in
Grahamstown. The book presents the select proceedings of an interdisciplinary
workshop chaired by Van Zyl Slabbert in 1978. In the Introduction, Van Zyl
Slabbert (1980:viii–ix) suggests that with regard to South Africa’s political
and constitutional future, ‘the status quo is untenable’ and ‘change is necessary
if not inevitable’, and that ‘effective constitutional-political change cannot be
a unilateral one-sided affair’, but instead ‘involves the co-operation and
taking into account of a number of strategic actors’.
Van Zyl Slabbert’s other books are The quest for democracy: South Africa in
transition (1992), Comrades in business: Post-liberation policies in South Africa
with Adam and Moodley (1997), Tough choices: Reflections of an Afrikaner
African (1999) and The other side of history: An anecdotal reflection on political
transition in South Africa (2006). These were written and published after he
had left parliamentary politics and moved into the fields of peace-making,
mediation and business (see Adam & Moodley, 2010:50).
We now turn to the predominant lines of argument presented by Van Zyl

Slabbert on South Africa’s political and constitutional future while he was in
party politics. He expressed these views in an environment that was dangerous
and unstable under the apartheid government. This environment was marked
by events such as the 1976 Soweto uprising; the murder of Steve Biko in 1977;
an increase in urban uprisings from the early 1980s, often led by the United
Democratic Front as an internal ANC front organisation (Venter, in Venter &
Landsberg, 2011:7); the adoption of the troublesome Tricameral Parliament
in 1983; and the declaration of a State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts
in the Eastern Cape and (now) Gauteng in July 1985. As Sparks (in Bryson,
2014:45) notes, South Africa was in a ‘virtual state of civil war’ in much of the
1980s.
12.4.1 Van Zyl Slabbert’s lines of argument

Here are Van Zyl Slabbert’s predominant lines of argument in his public
rhetoric that relate to South Africa’s political and constitutional future.
rom South Africa’s options: Strategies for sharing power

12.4.1.1 F
(1979:1–30; 120–153)
A democratic society in South Africa would not only be one of the major feats
of political engineering in the modern world, it would also stand as a beacon
to numerous other societies that are wracked by racial and ethnic conflict.
267

There are basically two general options available for South Africa: the politics of siege
and the politics of negotiation between Whites and Blacks.
The uniqueness of South Africa as a racially divided society lies in the extent to which
its historically determined lines of conflict have been hardened and reinforced by
statutory measures such as the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act.
To a substantial extent the racial conflict in South Africa revolves around its
institutionalised inequalities of power, wealth, opportunity and status, the structure of
which is based on colour.
The easing of racial tension in South Africa will require structural changes.
The dominant white group has real fears: the loss of privileges, the possible
expropriation of property and being swamped by a black majority.
South Africans must think of joint efforts to attain common or superordinate goals
whose realisation will make all groups better off.
The white government will be prepared to negotiate for a more democratic dispensation
when the costs of domination are outweighed by the possible advantages of negotiation.
There must be a clear desire for the government to enter into effective negotiations by
committing itself to the principle of full and equal citizenship for all South Africans
and effective participation in the same government irrespective of race.
Political settlements and constitutions are not intended to eliminate conflict, but to
provide the means of containing and regulating it, and blunting its cutting edge so that
diverse and divided groups can accommodate one another.
As simple majoritarianism has in no deeply divided society had a democratic outcome,

the principle of power-sharing among all groups must be institutionalised.
A democratic political system in South Africa must involve a minority veto in the
legislative process but would operate only in the context of a constitutional dispensation
that outlaws racial discrimination.
rom The last white Parliament (1985:105–143)

12.4.1.2 F
The new Constitution of 1983 has very little to do with power-sharing. It
merely changes the status of the Coloured and Asian minorities from being
repressively dominated to being co-optively dominated.
268

The new constitution could not be supported because it was one party’s (National
Party’s) solution imposed on the rest of the country; it excludes blacks from its workings
and therefore would polarise black/white and promote conflict and dissatisfaction; it
entrenched racial laws which lay at the heart of apartheid as we and the rest of the
world came to know it; and it gave too much power to the new executive President.
The more government prevents peaceful and legitimate protests; the more it uses
arbitrary arrests and detentions, raids and intimidatory tactics, the more certain we
can be that increasing numbers of South Africans, who are at the receiving end of such
methods, will begin to define the domestic situation in such desperate and inflexible
terms that violence will be seen as the only way out.
I believe the very attempt to bring about a “successful” revolution through armed
struggle will fundamentally destroy the societal resources necessary to re-establish an
effective post-revolutionary government.
After all is said and done, rational non-violent change is needed. Violence as an
instrument of change, I believe, increases the unpredictability of the outcome and
therefore the scope of non-rational action.
Whatever the eventual outcome in South Africa, a white minority government will be
an intimate part of the process that brought it about. Any strategy that does not take
this reality into account must budget generously for disillusionment.
I believe it is possible to do away with racial domination in politics; to get rid of racist
laws from the statute books; to create a fairer non-racial provision of social services,
and to have more freedom of movement and bargaining in the economy for the majority
of people than we do at present.
For me it is both ironical and a matter of deep concern at the end of the last white
Parliament that the new one in terms of its composition, structure and political
philosophy does very little to promote the possibility of real negotiation politics in the
area of constitutional development. In fact, it could make it more difficult. But that it
remains necessary to try and promote such politics is for me beyond question. That is
why I have no difficulty trying to explain why I am in Parliament and what I am trying
to do and why I am encouraging others to do the same.
The government can either insist that co-option to the centre is only limited to
Coloureds or Asians (in which case we can prepare for siege and confrontation between
black and non-black); or else the Government can initiate some process to bring about
black co-option to the centre, in which case we may move towards more co-operative
constitutional development.
269

12.4.1.3 F
rom Van Zyl Slabbert’s 1985 parliamentary speeches (in
Hansard: 22–44; 409–411; 686–694; 1282–1283; 3114–3119;
3728; 3862–3867; 4910–4918; 7100–7110)
The dilemma of South Africa is a simple one, namely how we should move from
coercive stability to consensus stability without disintegrating into chaos and anarchy.
My charge against this Government is that its politics is destroying confidence. This
new constitution (with its Tricameral Parliament) is part and parcel of the policy of
apartheid and separate development. There is not one party in this Parliament – in any
of the Chambers – that does not regard this constitution as temporary and inadequate.
No matter how the Government wishes to view it, the new Parliament is regarded as
one which includes Coloureds and Indians and which excludes Blacks. One of the most
difficult challenges of this new Parliament is to prove that reform is a national objective
which includes all the population groups on a systematic and meaningful basis. The
only way forward is fundamental reform – not slogans, not tricks and not short-cuts.
I believe that there are two major political problems that all of us in South
Africa – regardless of which government is in power – have to resolve. I refer to them as
racial discrimination on the one hand, and political domination on the other hand.
There are no external models that can be brought here to solve our problems. We
cannot expect foreigners to come and tell us how to resolve these problems. There are
no formulas that we can impose to solve the problem of domination. We will have to
negotiate ourselves out of that difficulty.
One does not need negotiation to get rid of discrimination. One needs legislation.
Discrimination was created because of legislation. We can legislate ourselves out of
that. In fact, to the extent that the Government legislates discrimination off our Statute
Book it creates a climate conducive to negotiating the problem of domination.
We can take on the world if we want to on the question of domination, but where we
are defenceless is on the question of racial discrimination. We have no argument on
that. That is why I urge this Government, if it really wants to set negotiation going, to
make a declaration of intent committing our country to negotiating a political system
in which people can enjoy the rights of citizenship without racial domination.
The Government should spell out in that declaration of intent a timetable by which it
wants to move away from discriminatory practices and say that it wishes, on the basis
of that, to negotiate a formula whereby a constitutional solution for the country can be
found which is not based on domination and which is not discriminatory.
270

An important aspect of that declaration of intent is the standpoint of the State President
on Mandela and other such prisoners, and also the standpoint that any organisation
which renounces violence, can take part in this process of negotiation. It is an important
step in such a declaration of intent, and I think that all people who wish to oppose
violence, will welcome it. It must be stated clearly in a declaration of intent that it is an
open agenda.
I say that it is the responsibility of this Parliament, and especially of the House of
Assembly, to create a climate to show those who have not yet turned to violence, that
there is more profit in negotiation politics than in confrontation politics. That is our
responsibility.
If this politics of negotiation is to succeed, then at least three things are essential:
Firstly, the Government must recognise that there will be only one constitution for the
Republic of South Africa. In that one constitution, common citizenship without
domination will have to be worked out. Secondly, they must realise that there can be
no statutory discrimination in such a constitution. Thirdly, we shall have to recognise
that there must be voluntary association of individuals and groups.
We must create conditions under which eventually a national convention will work.
We have to give a declaration of intent in which other people can believe. We (the PFP
members) say: the same South African citizenship for all and participation in the
politics of South Africa without one group dominating the other. We say that there can
be no statutory discrimination on the Statute Book; there can be no influx control – we
say that it will have to go and we shall have to replace it with an orderly process of
urbanisation. We say that is our declaration of intent.
A common citizenship structure that has to be created, does not mean “one man, one
vote” or a unitary state, but in terms of that common citizenship we must then negotiate
a constitution.
When this new tricameral system came into being, after we (the PFP) had vigorously
opposed it – and I have had no reason to have reconsidered my fundamental objections
to it – we said that this was the final constitutional instrument available to this society
to bring about change and we decided that we would participate in it. Even though we
had objections to the previous one and we also had objections to this one, we would
participate in it in order to promote further constitutional change.
I am prepared to approach anybody in the United Democratic Front to tell them that
they should not opt for violence or protest politics; they should come to negotiate.
The group nature of South African society can serve as a point of departure providing
it can take place by means of negotiation and providing it is clear that the groups
involved in that process of participation are doing so voluntarily.
271

There must be one joint constitution. One can say that one dismisses a unitary
Westminster majority system, and that I can understand, but there can be no doubt
about the fact that there must be one constitution for South Africa and that in that one
constitution the final seat of authority should be accessible to all the important political
groups, whatever the nature of such a federal structure may be, because I do not think
it is merely a matter of what we have to say in this House.
Therefore the logical conclusion is that if one constitutional dispensation is to come

into being for all South Africa’s inhabitants, we can accept that it will involve common
citizenship within that one constitutional dispensation. The only alternative is a form
of radical partition, which of course cannot work.
No matter how a declaration of intent on South Africa’s constitutional future comes

into being, what its eventual rhetorical content is going to be, and also what its appeal
is going to be, there is one thing we cannot have any doubts about, and that is that that
declaration of intent will have to state – and this is specifically the Government’s
responsibility – that people must come along to negotiate a single joint constitution, a
single common citizenship, in which there is no domination, and the complete
elimination of influx control.
12.4.1.4 From The system and the struggle (1989:7–22; 44–83) (which
includes chapters written between 1975 and 1985)
The common denominator of white political contentment is the level of privilege and
prosperity enjoyed. At the same time the lack of privilege and prosperity experienced
by blacks is the most prevalent source of political discontent.
The forces of circumstance will increasingly confront the white minority with two
options only: withdraw into the politics of siege or promote the politics of negotiation.
To settle for siege is to accept that confrontation and violence is inevitable in white-
black co-existence. If it is to be negotiation, then superficially at least the following
conditions will have to be present: effective and representative leadership and
organisations on both sides; a common declaration of intent to avoid massive violence
as a no-win situation for the interests of both; a genuine search for compromise through
a process of bargaining and, of course, joint decision-making and action in effecting
compromises. The issues over which negotiation will take place will, predictably,
involve the nature of political participation; the role of the state as distributing agent,
and the social, economic and civil rights of individuals and groups.
As long as white is associated with entrenched privilege and black with structured
deprivation a dimension of irrationality becomes part of the conflict and this does not
easily lend itself to peaceful resolution.
272

In order to bring about effective and fundamental reform and reconstruction, black/
white dialogue and co-operation are essential and one level where such dialogue is
absolutely necessary is between those who are in Parliament and those who by law are
denied access to Parliament. This is so because any possibility of evolutionary change
will also involve the initiative of Parliament which, as a matter of fact, happens to be
the white power base at the moment.
Sham reform can take place in different spheres and in different ways. For example,
in the constitutional field, a typical example of sham reform would be to try and
create a different constitutional dispensation for coloureds, whites and Asians on the
one hand and to persist with separate development for blacks on the other hand and
then think that one had addressed the problem of genuine constitutional reform
effectively.
The present constitution is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy in the sense that it cannot
rely on the support and co-operation of the majority of the people.
Whatever whites may think who support and vote “yes” for this new constitution on
2 November 1983, if the yes-vote is going to be successful, blacks have made it quite
clear they see such a step as condoning their permanent exclusion from a constitution
in South Africa; as condoning their permanent loss of South African citizenship;
as condoning the pass laws, black removals to homeland areas and the break-up of
black family life.
Ever since I entered politics I have repeatedly and often said that there is only one
constitutional issue of major consequence in South Africa, and that is that the manner
in which black South African citizenship is settled will determine the prospects and
extent of violence or relatively peaceful stability in South Africa.
If the government, even at this late hour, does not recognise and reward this patience
(by black people) by committing itself to work towards one constitution based on one
common South African citizenship and to eradicate all forms of statutory and official
discrimination, then I am afraid there is no way in which that patience can endure
through a period of inconclusive violence or a prolonged State of Emergency.
12.4.2 Discussion and summation

In 1979, as the leader of the PFP, Van Zyl Slabbert argued that there were ‘two
general options available for South Africa: the politics of siege and the politics
of negotiation between Whites and Blacks’. He proposed that South Africa
should take the route of negotiation between Whites and Blacks.
His proposal was in line with the PFP’s constitutional plan adopted by its
Federal Congress in November 1978. Van Zyl Slabbert had been the chairman
273

of the Constitutional Committee, which concluded that South Africa needed

the following (see Cassar, 1984:270–271):
• A national convention where a new constitution for the Republic would be
drawn up, negotiated and agreed upon by representatives of all sections of
the people.
• A structure of government (in the new constitution) consisting of:
– a federal government with separation of the legislative, executive and
judicial arms
– strong self-governing states
– proportional representation on all levels of government, and consensus
government with a minority veto on the vital levels of political decision-
making – the PFP therefore rejected majority rule government, in
which a majority group has the monopoly of political power
– a bill of rights, guarded by a strong independent judiciary.
In the plan it is stated that the minority veto simply recognises the fact that,
without any formal entrenchment of ethnicity, South Africa is a culturally
diverse society and that to ignore the political significance of such diversity is
to promote conflict rather than contain it.
At the time, Van Zyl Slabbert pointed out that:

• ‘simple majoritarianism [had never] in a deeply divided society had a
democratic outcome’
• the ‘principle of power-sharing among all groups [had to] be
institutionalised’
• a ‘democratic political system in South Africa [had to] involve a minority
veto in the legislative process but would operate only in the context of a
constitutional dispensation that outlaws racial discrimination’.
Giliomee (2010:97–98) notes:
The interesting thing about South Africa’s Options is that Slabbert expunged it
from his subsequent speeches, articles and books. No extract from it is
included in the anthology of his writings of the 1980s, entitled The System and
the Struggle (1989). At some point between 1979 and 1986, Slabbert seems to
have discarded the idea of minority rights and a minority veto. In all
probability, the main reason was that the NP government had hijacked the
concept of minorities and minority rights. During the 1950s it replaced the
term “races” with “ethnic groups”, and in the 1980s it substituted “minorities”
for “ethnic groups”, but all within the context of the apartheid system.
Two years later, Giliomee (2012:31) gives other explanations for Van Zyl
Slabbert’s discarding of the idea of minority rights and a minority veto. He
suggests that Van Zyl Slabbert wanted to avoid polarising Black leaders, and
274

that he moved closer to the idea of a fully integrated society, especially after
the introduction of the Tricameral Parliament, which he opposed but
participated in (Giliomee, 2012:31). A number of erstwhile PFP caucus
members told him in interviews, Giliomee (2012:31) further indicates, that it
was the prerogative of the leader (Van Zyl Slabbert) to underplay certain
approved policies.
A little later, Van Zyl Slabbert suggested that the new Constitution of 1983,
with the related Tricameral Parliament, was ‘part and parcel of the policy of
apartheid and separate development’, and had ‘very little to do with power-
sharing’, as it had ‘merely changed the status of the Coloured and Asian
minorities from being repressively dominated to being co-optively dominated’.
For Van Zyl Slabbert, replacing the last white Parliament with the new
(Tricameral) one ‘in terms of its composition, structure and political
philosophy [would do] very little to promote the possibility of real negotiation
politics in the area of constitutional development’. ‘In order to bring about
effective and fundamental reform and reconstruction,’ he proposed, ‘black/
white dialogue and co-operation [were] essential and one level where such
dialogue [was] absolutely necessary [was] between those who [were] in
Parliament and those who by law [were] denied access to Parliament’.
In 1985, Van Zyl Slabbert went on to argue, among other things, that South
Africa could ‘legislate itself out of discrimination and that to the extent that
the Government [legislated] discrimination off the Statute Book, it [created]
a climate conducive to negotiating the problem of domination’. He urged the
government: ‘[I]f it really [wanted] to set negotiation going, it should make a
declaration of intent (with a timetable and an open agenda) committing South
Africa to negotiating a political system in which all people [could] enjoy the
rights of citizenship without racial domination’.
If ‘the politics of negotiation [was] to succeed’, certain things were furthermore

needed: ‘one constitution’ with ‘common citizenship’ – that was ‘without
domination’, ‘statutory discrimination’ or ‘influx control’ –
and with
‘voluntary association of individuals and groups’.
Finally, Van Zyl Slabbert emphasised a year later that since entering politics he
had ‘repeatedly and often said that there [was] only one constitutional issue of
major consequence in South Africa, and that [was] that the manner in which
black South African citizenship [was] settled [would] determine the prospects
and extent of violence or relatively peaceful stability in South Africa’.
He added that ‘if the government [did] not commit itself to working towards
one constitution based on one common South African citizenship, and to
275

eradicate all forms of statutory and official discrimination, there [would] be

no way that patience by black people [could] endure through a period of
inconclusive violence or a prolonged State of Emergency’.
12.5 Van Zyl Slabbert’s rhetorical imprint

In returning to Burgchardt’s (1985:441) concept of a rhetorical imprint with
regard to Van Zyl Slabbert’s public rhetoric as a politician, the challenge is to
condense Van Zyl Slabbert’s patterns of distinctive, verbal statements (which
constitute lines of argument) into a single statement about South Africa’s
political and constitutional future.
From a pragmatic and rhetorical criticism perspective, we have considered

the rhetorical imprint as a persuasive plan that expresses a societal vision and
is designed to influence large numbers of South Africans. Here we are also
dealing with (qualitative) historical research (see Steinberg, 2007:31–32;
Strydom & Bezuidenhout, 2014:192), and with critical issues in communication
and identity in the context of understanding that rhetors’ (politicians’)
identities are often being formed as they make choices and respond to
situations around them.
From the start of his political career, Van Zyl Slabbert argued that racial
discriminatory laws had to be removed by the apartheid government. He
always favoured the politics of negotiation between Whites and authentic
Black leaders such as Mandela, as opposed to the politics of siege. Joint
(White/Black) efforts to attain common goals for South Africa’s political and
constitutional future were emphasised. There had to be a form of political
power-sharing, though he did not define it consistently, among White and
Black (inclusive of Coloured and Indian). However, he did consistently argue
that Black South African citizenship as a constitutional issue would have to be
settled to ensure relatively peaceful stability in the country in future, and that
a constitutional solution – of one constitution for South Africa – must not be
based on domination by one group over the other(s).
Thus, the rhetorical imprint of Van Zyl Slabbert as a politician from 1974 to
1986, specifically with regard to South Africa’s political and constitutional
future, may be identified as follows:
The South African apartheid government must revoke institutionalised racial

discrimination and engage in rational negotiation with authentic Black leaders to
establish a single joint democratic constitutional dispensation.
In closing, we may wonder whether this rhetorical imprint had an impact on

subsequent developments. In 1984 the apartheid government started testing
276

the waters in dealing with the iconic Nelson Mandela while he was in
Pollsmoor Prison. It took five years before he could meet presidents PW
Botha and FW de Klerk in July and December 1989, respectively, with a view
to paving the way for a democratic dispensation (Mandela, 1994:611–668).
Whether Van Zyl Slabbert’s continual call, in the years before 1984, for the
government to negotiate with authentic Black leaders such as Mandela had
been persuasive, we cannot say for sure.
However, Van Zyl Slabbert’s rhetorical imprint reflects his appeals for ending
institutionalised racial discrimination, for negotiating with authentic Black
leaders, and for establishing a single joint democratic constitutional
dispensation. These were certainly answered in South Africa, albeit in 1996
with the adoption of the new Constitution, 10 years after he had resigned as a
politician.
277

A REMINDER
• In researching the rhetorical imprint of a public rhetor, we
perform rhetorical criticism.
• Lines of argument have a persuasive intention.
• The lines of argument of a public rhetor on a given topic over a
period of time can form the foundation of his/her rhetorical
imprint.
• The rhetorical imprint of a public rhetor has to be constructed
systematically.
• The rhetorical imprint of a public rhetor can have persuasive
effects.
278

References
Adam H & Moodley K. 2010. Slabbert’s opening of the apartheid mind: Portrait of an
unrecognised patriot. In A LeMaitre & M Savage. (eds). Van Zyl Slabbert – The passion
for reason. Essays in honour of an Afrikaner African. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball. 50–
71.
Adam H, Van Zyl Slabbert F & Moodley K. 1997. Comrades in business: Post-liberation
policies in South Africa. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
Ajzen I. 1991. The theory of planned behaviour. Organizational Behaviour and Human
Decision Processes, 50:179–211.
Albert J. 1986. Negotiation skills. A handbook. Cape Town: Centre for Intergroup Studies,
University of Cape Town.
Alfreds D. 2014. Reduced role for social media in SA elections. Available: http://www.
news24.com/Technology/News/Reduced-role-for-social-media-in-SA-elections-
20140513 (Accessed 1 September 2016).
Altheide DL & Johnson JM. 1980. Bureaucratic propaganda. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Arblaster A. 1984. The rise and decline of Western liberalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Argyle M. 1988. Bodily communication. 2nd ed. London: Methuen.
Aristotle. 1932. The rhetoric of Aristotle. An expanded translation with supplementary
examples for students of composition and public speaking by L Cooper. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Aristotle. 1984. The rhetoric and poetics of Aristotle. Introduced by EPJ Corbett. New
York: Random House.
Arnhart L. 1981. Aristotle on political reasoning. A commentary on the ‘Rhetoric’. DeKalb,
Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press.
Aron R. 1970. An essay on freedom. Translated by H Weaver. New York: World Publishing.
Atkinson M. 1984. Our masters’ voices. The language and body language of politics.
London: Methuen.
Auger GA. 2013. Fostering democracy through social media: Evaluating diametrically
opposed non-profit advocacy organisations’ use of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.
Public Relations Review, 39:369–376.
Babbie E & Mouton J. 2001. The practice of social research. Cape Town: Oxford University
Press.
Barbrook A. 1975. Patterns of political behaviour. London: Martin Robertson.
Barron C. 2015. It is up to the people to say: no further. Business Times, 1 November:9.
Barston RP. 2006. Modern diplomacy. 3rd ed. Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman.
Beck RN. 1979. Handbook in social philosophy. New York: Macmillan.
Benoit WL & Benoit PJ. 2008. Persuasive messages. The process of influence. Malden,
MA: Basil Blackwell.
Berger PL. 1963. Invitation to sociology. A humanistic perspective. Harmondsworth:
Penguin.
Berger PL & Luckmann T. 1976. The social construction of reality. Harmondsworth:
Penguin.
Berkman R & Kitch LW. 1986. Politics in the media age. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Berridge GR. 2005. Diplomacy. Theory and practice. 3rd ed. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
279

Bettinghaus EP & Cody MJ. 1994. Persuasive communication. 5th ed. New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston.
Bezuidenhout R-M & Cronje F. 2014. Qualitative data analysis. In F du Plooy-Cilliers, C
Davis & R-M Bezuidenhout. (eds). Research matters. Cape Town: Juta. 228–251.
Blommaert J. 1997. Language and politics, language politics and political linguistics. In J
Blommaert & C Bulcaen. (eds). Political linguistics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
1–10.
Boesak AA. 2010. Creating moments, sustaining momentum. CR Swart Memorial
Lecture, 26 August, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein.
Bogart L. 1976. Premises for propaganda: The United States Information Agency’s
operating assumptions in the Cold War. New York: Free Press.
Boraine A. 1991. Democracy. Video production. Cape Town: Idasa.
Bostrom RN. 1983. Persuasion. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Bowers J & Ochs D. 1971. The rhetoric of agitation and control. Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley.
Brandes PD. 1985. Printings of Aristotle’s Rhetoric during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. Communication Monographs, 52(4):368–376.
Brock BL. 1972. Rhetorical criticism: A Burkian approach. In RL Scott & BL Brock.
(eds). Methods of rhetorical criticism. A twentieth century perspective. New York:
Harper & Row. 185–193.
Brockriede WE. 1966. Toward a contemporary Aristotelian theory of rhetoric. Quarterly
Journal of Speech, 52:33–40.
Brown HAC. 1963. Techniques of persuasion. From propaganda to brainwashing.
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Bryant DC. 1953. Rhetoric: Its functions and its scope. Quarterly Journal of Speech,
39(4):401–424.
Bryson D. 2014. It’s a Black White thing. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
Burgchardt CR. 1985. Discovering rhetorical imprints: La Follette, ‘Iago’, and the
melodramatic scenario. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 71:441–456.
Burgchardt CR. (ed). 2010. Readings in rhetorical criticism. 4th ed. State College,
Pennsylvania: Strata.
Burton MJ & O’Shea DM. 2010. Campaign craft: The strategies, tactics and art of political
campaign management. 4th ed. Santa Barbara: Praeger.
Cannon L. 1977. Reporting: An inside view. Sacramento, California: California Journal
Press.
Cassar P. 1984. The emergence and impact of Dr F. Van Zyl Slabbert in South African
opposition politics 1974–1981. Unpublished master’s dissertation, University of the
Orange Free State, Bloemfontein.
Casse P. 1981. Training for the cross-cultural mind. Washington, DC: Society for
Intercultural Education, Training and Research.
Cathcart RS. 1988. Post communication. Rhetorical analysis and evaluation. 2nd ed. New
York: Macmillan.
Cawood S. 2011. The rhetorical imprint of Nelson Mandela as reflected in public speeches
1950–2004. Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein.
Chakhotin S. 1942. The rape of the masses. The psychology of totalitarian political
propaganda. London: Labour Book Service.
280

References
Chilton P. 2004. Analysing political discourse. Theory and practice. London: Routledge.
Choukas M. 1965. Propaganda comes of age. Washington, DC: Public Affairs.
Christians CG. 1976. Jacques Ellul and democracy’s ‘vital information’ premise.
Lexington, Kentucky: Association for Education in Journalism.
Christians CG. 1977. Jacques Ellul’s concern with the amorality of contemporary
communications. Communications, 3(1):62–80.
Christians CG. 1981. Ellul on solution: An alternative but no prophecy. In CG Christians
& JM van Hook. (eds). Jacques Ellul: Interpretive essays. Urbana: University of Illinois
Press. 91–107.
Christians CG & Real MR. 1979. Jacques Ellul’s contributions to critical media theory.
Journal of Communication, 29(1):83–93.
Cockcroft R & Cockcroft SM. 1992. Persuading people. An introduction to rhetoric.
London: Macmillan.
Coetzee EJS. 2014. Directions for the application of social media as computer-mediated
communication in South African higher education. Unpublished doctoral thesis,
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein.
Cohen BC. 1963. The press and foreign policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Cohen D. 2006. The politics of deliberation: Oratory and democracy in classical Athens.
In W Jost & W Olmsted. (eds). A companion to rhetoric and rhetorical criticism.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 22–37.
Connolly WE. 1983. The terms of political discourse. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Cox RH. 1969. Ideology, politics and political theory. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Cutlip SM, Center AH & Broom GM. 1985. Effective public relations. 6th ed. Englewood
Dahnke GL & Clatterbuck GW. (eds). 1990. Human communication theory and research.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Dahrendorf R. 1961. Democracy without liberty: An essay on the politics of other-
directed man. In SM Lipset & L Lowenthal. (eds). Culture and social character. The
work of David Riesman reviewed. New York: Free Press. 175–206.
Dahrendorf R. 1979. Life chances. Approaches to social and political theory. London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Daniels G. 2015. Two clashing gazes on reining in media. Mail & Guardian, 23 to 29
October:27.
Davis A. 2010. Political communication and social theory. London: Routledge.
De Klerk W. 1991. F.W. de Klerk. The man in his time. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.
De Volder PN. 1957. De communistische propaganda. Theorie, strategie en methode.
Antwerpen: Uitgeversmij NV Standaard Boekhandel.
De Vreese CH. 2005. News framing: Theory and typology. Information Design Journal &
Document Design, (13)1:51–62.
De Wet JC & Rensburg RS. 1989. Evaluation of public speaking. Cape Town: Juta.
Dewey J. 1927. The public and its problems. London: Allen & Unwin.
Dewey J. 1963. Freedom and culture. First published in 1939. New York: Capricorn.
Dié man is ANC se Nommer Een. Volksblad, 28 May 2015:8.
Du Plessis M. 2009. Charismatic and transformational leadership. In E van Zyl. (ed).
Leadership in the African context. Cape Town: Juta. 126–146.
Edelman M. 2001. The politics of misinformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
281

Eisenberg AM & Illardo JA. 1980. Argument. A guide to formal and informal debate.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Ellul J. 1964. The technological society. New York: Vintage.
Ellul J. 1967. The political illusion. New York: Alfred A Knopf.
Ellul J. 1973. Propaganda. The formation of men’s attitudes. New York: Vintage.
Ellul J. 1976. International propaganda and myths. In H Fischer & JC Merrill. (eds).
International and inter-cultural communication. New York: Hastings House. 273–279.
Ellul J. 1981a. Perspectives on our age. New York: Seabury.
Ellul J. 1981b. The ethics of propaganda; propaganda, innocence, and amorality.
Communication, 6:159–175.
Engel ES. 1973. Plato on rhetoric and writing. Unpublished doctoral thesis, University
Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Esterhuyse W. 2004. ’n moord in Amsterdam … en ’n les oor vrye spraak. Rapport, 21
November: Perspektief 3.
Evans S. 2015. #FeesMustFall: Lessons in speeding up change. Mail & Guardian, 30
October. Available: http://mg.co.za/article/2015-10-29-feesmustfall-lessons-in-speeding-
up-change (Accessed 1 September 2016).
Fauconnier G. 1975. Mass media and society. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Finn SM, Weich HM & Rensburg RS. 1983. Professional persuasion. Durban: Butterworths.
Fischer L. 1982. The life of Mahatma Gandhi. London: Granada.
Fishbein M & Ajzen I. 1975. Belief, attitude, intention and behaviour: An introduction to
theory and research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Fisher R & Ury W. 1981. Getting to yes. Negotiating agreement without giving in. Boston,
MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Ford NA. (ed). 1967. Language in uniform. A reader on propaganda. New York:
Odyssey.
Foss SK, Foss KA & Trapp R. 1985. Contemporary perspectives on rhetoric. Prospect
Heights, IL: Waveland.
Foucault M. 1980. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977.
Translated and edited by C Gordon. New York: Pantheon.
Fourie HP. 1975. Communication by objectives. Isando, Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill.
Fourie PJ. (ed). 2007. Media studies: Media history, media and society. 2nd ed. Cape
Town: Juta.
Fourie PJ. 2015. Die media se ‘beeld’ van die samelewing: ’n Semiologiese perspektief.
Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe, 55(4):570–583.
Fraser L. 1957. Propaganda. London: Oxford University Press.
Freely AJ. 1976. Argumentation and debate: Rational decision-making. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
Gagiano J. 2010. Who we were. In A LeMaitre & M Savage. (eds). Van Zyl Slabbert – The
passion for reason. Essays in honour of an Afrikaner African. Johannesburg: Jonathan
Ball. 18–36.
Gandhi M. 1982. All men are brothers. Life and thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi as told in his
own words. Compiled and edited by K Kripalani. Paris: Unesco.
Gans HJ. 1980. Deciding what’s news. New York: Vintage.
Gelber K. 2002. Speaking back. The free speech versus hate speech debate. Amsterdam:
John Benjamins.
282

References
Gepp GG & Haigh AE. 1935. A Latin/English dictionary. London: Longmans & Green.
Gerbner G. 1973. Cultural indicators: The third voice. In G Gerbner, L Gross & W Melody.
(eds). Communications, technology and social policy. New York: Wiley. 555–573.
Giliomee H. 2010. Golden boy, golden opportunity. In A LeMaitre & M Savage. (eds).
Van Zyl Slabbert – The passion for reason. Essays in honour of an Afrikaner African.
Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball. 87–117.
Giliomee H. 2012. Die laaste Afrikaner-leiers. ’n Opperste toets van mag. Cape Town:
Tafelberg.
Giner S. 1976. Mass society. London: Martin Robertson.
Goffman E. 1974. Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Goffman E. 1982. The presentation of self in everyday life. First published in 1956.
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Graber DA. 1981. Political languages. In DD Nimmo & KR Sanders. (eds). Handbook of
political communication. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 195–224.
Green DP & Gerber AS. 2008. Get out the vote: How to increase voter turnout. 2nd ed.
Washington, DC: Brookings.
Grobler AF & Puth G. 2002. Communication in the management of change: Applications
to the private and public sector. Communitas, 7:1–29.
Habermas J. 2006. Political communication in media society – Does democracy still
enjoy an epistemic dimension? The impact of normative theory on empirical research.
Paper presented at the annual conference of the International Communication
Association, 19–23 June, Dresden, Germany.
Hansard. 1985. Proceedings of the National Assembly. Cape Town: Government Printer.
Hardt H. 1979. Social theories of the press. Early German and American perspectives.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Hennessy B. 1981. Public opinion. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Herrick JA. 2005. The history and theory of rhetoric. An introduction. 3rd ed. Boston, MA:
Allyn & Bacon.
Hickson MI & Stacks DW. 1989. NVC: Nonverbal communication. Studies and
applications. 2nd ed. Dubuque, Iowa: Wm C Brown.
Hitler A. 1939. Mein kampf. Translated by J Murphy. First published in 1933. London:
Hurst & Blackett.
Holsti KJ. 1977. International politics – a framework for analysis. London: Prentice Hall.
Hostettler GF. 1967. Trends in the history of rhetoric. In K Brooks. (ed). The communicative
arts and sciences of speech. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E Merrill. 1–7.
Huxley A. 1958. Brave new world revisited. London: Chatto & Windus.
Huxley A. 1967. Notes on propaganda. In RM Christenson & RO McWilliams. (eds).
Voice of the people: Readings in public opinion and propaganda. New York: McGraw-Hill.
324–331.
Iser W. 1974. The implied reader. Patterns of communication in prose fiction from Bunyan
to Beckett. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Iversen S. 2014. Narratives in rhetorical discourse. In P Hühn, J Pier, W Schmid & J
Schönert. (eds). The living handbook of narratology. Available: www.Ihn.uni-hamburg.
de/article/narratives-rhetorical-discourse (Accessed 2 September 2016).
283

Jamieson KH. 1987. Television, presidential campaigns, and debates. In JL Swerdlow.

(ed). Presidential debates: 1988 and beyond. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.
27–33.
Jamieson KH & Birdsell DS. 1988. Presidential debates. The challenge of creating an
informed electorate. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jandt FE & Gillette P. 1985. Win-win negotiating. Turning conflict into agreement. New
York: Wiley.
Janowitz M & Hirsch PM. (eds). 1981. Reader in public opinion and mass communication.
New York: Free Press.
Jansen EM. 1983. Plato’s concept of dialogue in Gorgias and Phaedrus. Pretoria:
Academica.
Jansen N. 1980. C. Wright Mills. Social critic. Pretoria: Academica.
Jaspers K. 1961. The future of mankind. Translated by EB Ashton. First published in 1958.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jensen KB. 2010. Media convergence. The three degrees of network, mass, and interpersonal
communication. London: Routledge.
Johannesen RL. 2013. Perspectives on ethics in persuasion. In CU Larson. Persuasion.
Reception and responsibility. 13th/int ed. Brazil: Wadsworth. 39–70.
Joseph JE. 2006. Language and politics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Karrass CL. 1974. Give & take. The complete guide to negotiation strategies and tactics.
New York: Thomas Y Crowell.
Katz E, Blumler JG & Gurevitch M. 1973. Uses and gratifications research. Public Opinion
Quarterly, 37:509–523.
Kemp F. 1989. Vetmae wen – baardmanne verloor! Huisgenoot, 24 August:14–17.
Kennedy GA. 1980. Classical rhetoric and its Christian and secular tradition from ancient
to modern times. London: Croom Helm.
Kraus S. 1987. Voters win. Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 4(2):214–216.
Kraus S & Davis OK. 1981. Political debates. In DD Nimmo & KR Sanders. (eds).
Handbook of political communication. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 273–296.
Kruger F. 2006. Journalistic censorship? The Media, April:31.
Kuper L. 1956. Passive resistance in South Africa. London: Jonathan Cape.
Kuypers JA. (ed). 2005. The art of rhetorical criticism. Boston: Pearson.
Laqueur W. (ed). 1973. A dictionary of politics. London: Pan.
Larrain J. 1982. The concept of ideology. London: Hutchinson.
Larson CU. 2013. Persuasion. Reception and responsibility. 13th/int ed. Brazil:
Wadsworth.
Lee AM & Lee EB. 1972. The fine art of propaganda: A study of Father Coughlin’s speeches.
New York: Octagon.
LeMaitre A & Savage M. (eds). 2010. Van Zyl Slabbert – The passion for reason. Essays in
honour of an Afrikaner African. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.
Levi AW. 1959. The value of freedom: Mill’s liberty (1859–1959). Ethics, 70:37–46.
Levine TZ. 1984. From Socrates to Sartre. The philosophic quest. Toronto: Bantam.
Lippmann W. 1956. Public opinion. First published in 1922. New York: Macmillan.
Lipson L. 1986. The philosophy of democracy. Dialogue, 2:11–15.
Littlejohn SW & Foss KA. 2008. Theories of human communication. 9th ed. Boston, MA:
Wadsworth.
284

References
Louw PE. 1994. Shifting patterns of political discourse in the new South Africa.
Communication, 20(1):26–43.
Luntz F. 2007. Words that work: It’s not what you say, it’s what people hear. New York:
Hyperion.
Maarek PJ. 1995. Political marketing and communication. London: Libbey.
Maarman J. 2015. Wat kielie dan die President? Volksblad, 23 November:6.
Machiavelli N. 1963. The prince. New York: Washington Square.
Mahabane I. 2011. Is dit waartoe ons gedaal het? Rapport, 17 April:3.
Malala J. 2015. We have now begun our descent: How to stop South Africa losing its way.
Cape Town: Jonathan Ball.
Maletzke G. 1976. Intercultural and international communication. In H Fischer & JC
Merrill. (eds). International and inter-cultural communication. New York: Hastings
House. 409–416.
Mandela NR. 1994. Long walk to freedom. London: Abacus.
Mangcu X. 2012. Biko. A biography. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
Mangcu X. 2014. The arrogance of power. South Africa’s leadership meltdown. Cape Town:
Tafelberg.
Marais D. 2012. Wat sou Biko sê? 35 jaar later. Volksblad, 22 September:By 4–5.
Marcuse H. 1966. One-dimensional man. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Martel M. 1983. Political campaign debates. Images, strategies and tactics. New York:
Longman.
Marx K & Engels F. 1939. The German ideology. New York: International Publishers.
Mauser LA. 1983. Political marketing: An approach to campaign strategy. New York:
Praeger.
Mbeki T. 2001. Africa define yourself. Cape Town/Johannesburg: Tafelberg and Mafube.
Mbeki T. 2007. State of the Nation address, 9 February. Cape Town: Hansard.
Mbembe A. 2009. Africa Day lecture, 25 May, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein.
McCroskey JC. 1972. An introduction to rhetorical communication. 2nd ed. Englewood
McGuire WJ. 1961. The effectiveness of supportive and refutational defenses in
immunizing and restoring beliefs against persuasion. Sociometry, 24:184–197.
McLuhan M & Fiore Q. 1967. The medium is the message. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
McNair B. 2007. An introduction to political communication. 4th ed. London: Routledge.
McQuail D. 1975. Communications. London: Longman.
Meadow RG. 1980. Politics as communication. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Meadow RG. 1987. A speech by any other name. Critical Studies in Mass Communication,
4(2):207–210.
Merrill JC. 2004. Global press philosophies. In AS de Beer & JC Merrill. (eds). Global
journalism. Topical issues and media systems. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. 3–18.
Mill JS. 1975. On liberty. First published in 1959. New York: Norton.
Mills C Wright. 1959. The sociological imagination. London: Oxford University Press.
Mills C Wright. 1963. Power, politics and people. The collected essays of C. Wright Mills.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Mills C Wright. 1978. The power elite. London: Oxford University Press.
Moffitt MA. 1999. Campaign strategies and message design: A practitioner’s guide from
start to finish. Westport: Praeger.
285

Molotch HL & Lester M. 1974. News as purposive behaviour. American Sociological

Review, 39:101–112.
Monroe AH. 1962. Principles and types of speech. 5th ed. Chicago: Scott Foresman.
Morris D. 1999. The new prince. New York: St Martin’s Griffin.
Mowlana H & Wilson LJ. (eds). 1990. The passing of modernity. Communication and the
transformation of society. New York: Longman.
Mueller C. 1973. The politics of communication. A study in the political sociology of
language, socialization, and legitimation. London: Oxford University Press.
Negrine R & Stanyer J. (eds). 2007. The political communication reader. New York: Routledge.
Neubaum G & Kramer NC. 2015. Let’s blog about health! Exploring the persuasiveness
of a personal HIV blog compared to an institution HIV website. Health Communication,
30(9):872–883.
Ngai EWT, Tao SSC & Moon KKL. 2015. Social media research: Theories, constructs,
and conceptual frameworks. International Journal of Information Management,
35:33–44.
Niebuhr R. 1932. Moral man and immoral society. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Nieuwmeijer L. 1988. Negotiation: Methodology and training. Pinetown, Durban: Owen
Burgess.
Nimmo D. 1970. The political persuaders. The techniques of modern election campaigns.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Nimmo D & Savage RL. 1976. Candidates and their images. Concepts, methods, and
findings. Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear.
Noelle-Neumann E. 1973. Return to the concept of powerful mass media. Studies of
Broadcasting, 9:67–112.
O’Sullivan T, Hartley J, Saunders D & Fiske J. 1983. Key concepts in communication.
London: Methuen.
Packard V. 1986. The hidden persuaders. First published in 1957. Harmondsworth:
Penguin.
Perloff RM. 2010. The dynamics of persuasion. Communication and attitudes in the 21st
century. 4th ed. New York: Routledge.
Perloff RM. 2014. The dynamics of political communication. Media and politics in a digital
age. New York: Routledge.
Pfau M & Parrott R. 1993. Persuasive communication campaigns. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Picard RG. 2015. The humanisation of media? Social media and the reformation of
communication. Communication Research and Practice, 1(1):32–41.
Pigman GA. 2010. Contemporary diplomacy. Cambridge: Polity.
Plato. 1971. Gorgias. Translated with an introduction by W Hamilton. Harmondsworth:
Penguin.
Plato. 1973. Phaedrus and letters VII and VIII. Translated with an introduction by W
Hamilton. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Plato. 1979. The republic. Translated with an introduction by D Lee. Harmondsworth:
Penguin.
Popper KR.1963. The open society and its enemies, Vol. 1, Plato. First published in 1945.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Poulakos J. 1983. Towards a sophistic definition of rhetoric. Philosophy and Rhetoric,
16(1):35–48.
286

References
Puth G. 2002. The communicating leader. The key to strategic alignment. 2nd ed. Pretoria:
Van Schaik.
Qualter TH. 1965. Propaganda and psychological warfare. New York: Random House.
Qualter TH. 1985. Opinion control in the democracies. New York: St Martin’s.
Ramphele M. 2010. Daring to dream of a South Africa without racism. Paper presented
at the 5th colloquium of the Anti-Racism Network in Higher Education and the
International Institute for Studies in Race, Reconciliation and Social Justice, 4 August,
Ramphele M. 2012. The foundations of education and training the 21st century SA
citizen: Making the most of a thousand days. Education prestige lecture, 25 October,
Raphael DD. 1979. Problems of political philosophy. London: Macmillan.
Raphael DD. 1981. Moral philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Real MR. 1981. Mass communications and propaganda in technological societies. In CG
Christians & JM van Hook. (eds). Jacques Ellul: Interpretive essays. Urbana: University
of Illinois Press. 108–127.
Reardon KK. 1981. Persuasion. Theory and context. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Redman R. 1979. Political campaigning and image building. In RW Budd & BD Ruben.
(eds). Beyond media. New approaches to mass communication. Rochelle Park, NJ:
Hayden. 197–211.
Richmond VP & McCroskey JC. 2004. Nonverbal behaviour in interpersonal relations.
5th ed. Boston, MA: Pearson.
Robins K, Webster F & Pickering M. 1987. Propaganda, information and social control.
In J Hawthorn. (ed). Propaganda, persuasion and polemic. London: Edward Arnold.
1–18.
Rogers W. 1984. Communication in action. Building speech competencies. New York:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Rogers W. 2007. Persuasion. Messages, receivers, and contexts. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Rogers EM & Storey JD. 1987. Communication campaigns. In CR Berger & SH Chaffee.
(eds). Handbook of communication science. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 817–846.
Roshcoe B. 1975. Newsmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ross R. 1985. Understanding persuasion. Foundations and practice. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Rutherford W. 1978. Hitler’s propaganda machine. New York: Grosset & Dunlap.
Sadie Y. 2011. Political parties and elections. In A Venter & C Landsberg. (eds).
Government and politics in South Africa. 4th ed. Pretoria: Van Schaik. 184–212.
Salazar P. 2002. An African Athens: Rhetoric and the shaping of democracy in South Africa.
Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Scherer M. 2012. 2012 Person of the year: Barack Obama, the President. Time, 19
December. Available: http://poy.time.com/2012/12/19/person-of-the-year-barack-
obama/print/ (Accessed 2 September 2016).
Schlesinger AM Jr. 1988. Democracy and leadership. Dialogue, 1:20–25.
Schoeman M. 2011. The political economy of South Africa in a global context. In A
Venter A & C Landsberg. (eds). Government and politics in South Africa. 4th ed.
Pretoria: Van Schaik. 213–230.
287

Schramm W & Porter WE. 1982. Men, women, messages and media. Understanding
human communication. 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Row.
Schulz EB. 1977. Democracy. Woodbury, NY: Barron’s Educational Series.
Scruton R. 1982. A dictionary of political thought. London: Macmillan.
Sejersted F. 1993. Award ceremony speech. Available: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_
prizes/peace/laureates/1993/presentation-speech.html (Accessed 1 September 2016).
Senghor LS. 1998. Negritude and African socialism. In PH Coetzee & APJ Roux. (eds).
Philosophy from Africa. A text with readings. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
438–448.
Sesanti S. 2011. An open letter to Bantu Stephen Biko. Cape Times, 12 September:11.
Severin WJ & Tankard JW. 1992. Communication theories: Origins, methods, and uses in
the mass media. 3rd ed. New York: Longman.
Sharp G. 1973. The politics of nonviolent action. Boston, MA: Porter Sargent.
Sharp G. 1990. Nonviolent action: An active technique of struggle. In RL Holmes. (ed).
Nonviolence in theory and practice. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 149–157.
Shaw C. 2010. The campaign manager: Running and winning local elections. 4th ed.
Philadelphia: Westview.
Smuts D & Westcott S. (eds). 1991. The purple shall govern. A South African A to Z of
nonviolent action. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
‘Soos ’n paartjie op huweliksnag.’ Kenners gee hul menings oor stryd op TV. Beeld, 1
March 1998:11.
South African Government. 2013. National development plan 2030. Available: http://
www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030 (Accessed 1 September 2016).
Sparks A. 2015. ANC se prioriteite onder verdenking. Volksblad, 28 October:7.
Stearns M. 1981. Diplomacy vs propaganda. In E Plischke. (ed). Modern diplomacy. The
art and the artisans. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
Steinberg S. 2007. An introduction to communication studies. Cape Town: Juta.
Stengel R. 2008. Mandela: His 8 lessons of leadership. Time, 21 July:23–28. Also available:
http://www.gmptrainingsystems.com/images/pdfs/Mandela_0.pdf (Accessed 4 September
2016).
Strydom A & Bezuidenhout R-M. 2014. Qualitative data collection. In F du Plooy-
Cilliers, C Davis & R-M Bezuidenhout. (eds). Research matters. Cape Town: Juta. 173–
194.
Swart G. 2016. Anti-Imperialist yolk: What we have here is a failure to communicate.
Daily Maverick, 5 May. Available: http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-
05-05-anti-imperialist-yolk-what-we-have-here-is-a-failure-to-communicate/#.
V8lykZh96Uk (Accessed 2 September 2016).
Teng S & Khong KW. 2015. Conceptualizing cues in social media. International Journal
of Internet Marketing and Advertising, 9(3):233–253.
Terblanche FH. 1989. Die klassieke retoriek as basis vir hedendaagse spraak-
kommunikasieleerinhoude. Communicare, 8(2):15–26.
Tocqueville A De. 1951. Democracy in America. Vol I and II. Edited with introductions,
editorial notes and bibliographies by P Bradley. First published in 1835 (Vol I) and
1840 (Vol II). New York: Alfred A Knopf.
Toulmin SE. 1958. The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Toulmin SE, Rieke R & Janik A. 1979. An introduction to reasoning. New York: Macmillan.
288

References
Tubbs SL & Moss S. 1981. Interpersonal communication. 2nd ed. New York: Random
House.
Tuchman G. 1978. Making news. A study in the construction of reality. New York: Free
Press.
Turkington J-R & De Wet JC. 2012. An evaluation of COPE’s communication strategy
for the 2011 municipal elections campaign in the Northern Cape. Communitas, 17:93–
112.
Vancil DL & Pendell SD. 1984. Winning presidential debates: An analysis of criteria
influencing audience response. Western Journal of Speech Communication, 48:62–74.
Van den Berg MD. 1986. The role of negotiation in solving relational problems: A
communication study. Unpublished master’s dissertation, University of South Africa,
Pretoria.
Van Dijk TA. 1997. What is political discourse analysis? In J Blommaert & C Bulcaen.
(eds). Political linguistics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 11–52.
Van Schoor M. 1979. The idea of communication. Bloemfontein: PJ de Villiers.
Van Schoor M. 1985. Die kommunikasiekunde van Augustinus. Communicatio, 11(1):3–8.
Van Zyl E. (ed). 2009. Leadership in the African context. Cape Town: Juta.
Van Zyl Slabbert F. 1985. The last white Parliament. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.
Van Zyl Slabbert F. 1989. The system and the struggle. Reform, revolt and reaction in South
Africa. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.
Van Zyl Slabbert F. 1991. Democracy. Video production. Cape Town: Idasa.
Van Zyl Slabbert F. 1992. The quest for democracy: South Africa in transition. London:
Penguin.
Van Zyl Slabbert F. 1999. Tough choices: Reflections of an Afrikaner African. Cape Town:
Tafelberg.
Van Zyl Slabbert F. 2006. The other side of history. An anecdotal reflection on political
transition in South Africa. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.
Van Zyl Slabbert F & Opland J. (eds). 1980. South Africa: Dilemmas of evolutionary
change. Grahamstown: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University.
Van Zyl Slabbert F & Welsh D. 1979. South Africa’s options. Strategies for sharing power.
Cape Town: David Philip.
Venter A. 2011. The context of South African government and politics. In A Venter & C
Landsberg. (eds). Government and politics in South Africa. 4th ed. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
3–19.
Vosloo T. 2015. Vertrou geen regering. Volksblad, 3 November:7.
Watson A. 2013. Diplomacy: The dialogue between states. London: Routledge.
Weber M. 1982. From Max Weber. Essays in sociology. Edited with an introduction by
HH Gerth & C Wright Mills. First published in 1948. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul.
Williams D. 2013. Party funding to go up R114.8m. Sowetan, 15 April:1.
Williams R. 1981. The analysis of culture. In T Bennett, G Martin, C Mercer & J
Woollacott. (eds). Culture, ideology and social process. A reader. London: Open
University. 43–52.
Williams R. 1983. Culture. Glasgow: Fontana.
Wilson FG. 1962. A theory of public opinion. Chicago: Henry Regnery.
289

Wilson JF & Arnold CC. 1983. Public speaking as a liberal art. 5th ed. Boston, MA: Allyn
& Bacon.
Wolheim R. 1975. Democratism. In A de Crespigny & J Cronin. (eds). Ideologies of
politics. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 109–130.
PERSONAL COMMUNICATION
Goldstuck A. 2014. Personal conversation. 26 September, Johannesburg.
290

Name index
Name index
Adam, H, 266, 267 Brock, BL, 40
Adams, J, 101 Brockriede, WE, 78
Ajzen, I, 67, 68 Broom, GM, 91
Albert, J, 180, 182, 186 Brown, HAC, 5, 99, 103
Albig, W, 102 Bryant, DC, 5
Alexander the Great, 31 Bryson, D, 267
Alfreds, D, 157 Burgchardt, CR, 241, 262, 265, 276
Altheide, DL, 102, 106, 107 Burke, KA, 39, 40
Amyntus II, 31 Burton, MJ, 154
Arblaster, A, 8, 12 Cacioppo, J, 74
Argyle, M, 59 Campbell, G, 39
Aristotle, 7, 165 Cannon, L, 83
on argumentation 52, 55, 263 Capella, J, 82
on formal political speech 147, 148–151, 243 Cassar, P, 265, 274
on functions of political language 132–133 Casse, P, 181
view of rhetoric 31–36, 38 Cathcart, RS, 40, 242, 250, 262, 263
Arnhart, L, 34, 36 Cawood, S, 262, 264
Arnold, CC, 31, 39 Center, AH, 91
Aron, R, 17 Chakhotin, S, 104
Atkinson, M, 169 Chilton, P, 120, 132, 133
Auger, GA, 88 Choukas, M, 99, 101, 113
Augustine, St, 37 Christians, CG, 110, 111, 113, 114
Augustus, 100 Cicero, 33, 36, 37
Babbie, E, 241 Clatterbuck, GW, 38, 39
Bacon, F, 38 Cockcroft, R, 44
Bandura, A, 68, 70 Cockcroft, SM, 44
Barbrook, A, 8 Cody, MJ, 4, 60, 66, 179
Barron, C, 258 Coetzee, EJS, 86, 87
Barston, RP, 188 Cohen, BC, 82
Beck, RN, 12 Cohen, D, 262
Benoit, PJ, 4, 22, 66, 74, 96, 121, 122, 152 Connolly, WE, 8
Benoit, WL, 4, 22, 66, 74, 96, 121, 122, 152 Corax of Syracuse, 29
Berger, PL, 25, 86 Cox, L, 38
Berkman, R, 165 Cox, RH, 9
Berridge, GR, 186, 193 Cronje, F, 264
Bettinghaus, EP, 4, 60, 66, 179 Cutlip, SM, 91
Bezuidenhout, R-M, 264, 276 Dahnke, GL, 38, 39
Biko, S, 267 Dahrendorf, R, 15, 17, 18
Birdsell, DS, 163, 166 Daniels, G, 257
Blair, H 39 Davis, A, 88
Blommaert, J, 132 Davis, OK, 165
Blumler, JG, 81 De Klerk, W, 180
Boesak, AA, 123, 130, 256 De Klerk, FW, 123, 131, 277
Bogart, J, 83 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech (1993)
Bogart, L, 106 210, 215–222, 251–252
Bonaparte, N, 9 Parliamentary opening address (1990) 196,
Boraine, A, 15 197–210, 243–244, 245–249
Bostrom, RN, 22, 93 Treurnicht debate 163, 164, 174
Bowers, J, 127, 146 De Klerk, W, 180
Brandes, PD, 38 De Tracy, D, 9
291

De Volder, PN, 104 Habermas, J, 9

De Vreese, CH, 82 Haigh, AE, 2
De Wet, JC, 152, 241 Hardt, H, 89, 90
Dewey J, 15, 91 Hartley, J, 241
Doob, L, 102 Heider, F, 70, 71
Du Plessis, M, 118 Hennessy, B, 89
Edelman, M, 89, 133, 134, 136 Herrick, JA, 37, 40
Eisenberg, AM, 54 Hickson, MI, 57, 58
Ellul, J, 10, 102, 105 Hirsch, PM, 89
on democracy’s need of propaganda 112–113 Hitler, A, 101, 102, 105, 114
ideas on propaganda 114 Holsti, KJ, 188
reconceptualisation of propaganda 114 Hostettler, GF, 36, 37, 38
treatise on propaganda 113 Hovland, C, 66
view of propaganda 107–112 Huxley, A, 104, 109
Engel, ES, 30 Illardo, JA, 54
Engels, F, 9 Iser, W, 256
Esterhuyse, W, 20 Isocrates, 29
Evans, S, 131 Iversen, S, 241
Fauconnier, G, 79, 102, 103 Jamieson, KH, 82, 163, 166
Festinger, L, 70, 72 Jandt, FE, 125
Finn, SM, 5 Janik, A, 51, 52, 53
Fiore, Q, 80 Janowitz, M, 89
Fischer, L, 129 Jansen, EM, 30
Fishbein, M, 67 Jansen, N, 26
Fisher, R, 184, 187 Jaspers, K, 90
Fiske, J, 241 Jensen, KB, 92
Ford, NA, 99 Johannesen, RL, 22
Foss, KA, 39, 40, 66, 71 Johnson, JM, 102, 106, 107
Foss, SK, 39, 40 Joseph, JE, 133
Foucault, M, 41, 136 Karrass, CL, 125
Fourie, HP, 153 Katz, E, 81
Fourie, PJ, 79, 92 Kemp, F, 164
Fraser, L, 100, 102, 104 Kennedy, GA, 29, 32, 36, 37, 38
Freely, AJ, 49, 163 Kennedy, JF, 163
Gagiano, J, 266 Khong, KW, 88
Gandhi, M, 128, 129 King, ML Jr, 128, 129, 211, 251
Gans, HJ, 84 Kitch, LW, 165
Gelber, K, 19 Kramer, NC, 88
Gepp, GG, 2 Kraus, S, 165, 166
Gerber, AS, 154, 155 Kruger, F, 19
Gerbner, G, 79 Kuper, L, 130
Giliomee, H, 265, 266, 274, 275 Kuypers, JA, 241
Gillette, P, 125 La Follette, R, 262
Giner, S, 79 Laqueur, W, 129
Goebbels, J, 102, 114 Larrain, J, 9, 132
Goffman, E, 83, 129, 140–143, 145 Larson, CU, 47, 49, 88, 146
Goldstuck, A, 157 Lasswell, H, 102
Gorgias 29 Lee, AM, 102, 103, 104
Graber, DA, 122 Lee, EB, 102, 103, 104
Green, DP, 154, 155 LeMaitre, A, 266
Gregory XV, 99 Levi, AW, 14
Grobler, AF, 118 Levine, TZ, 99
Gurevitch, M, 81 Lippmann, W, 79, 90
292

Name index
Lipson, L, 18 Mueller, C, 131, 132

Littlejohn, SW, 66, 71 Mussolini, B, 105
Louw, PE, 121 Napoleon, 9
Luckmann, T, 86 Negrine, R, 82
Lumley, FE, 102 Neubaum, G, 88
Luntz, F, 153 Newcomb, T, 70, 71
Luthuli, A, 210, 211 Ngai, EWT, 87
Maarek, PJ, 153, 154 Nicomachus, 31
Maarman, J, 258 Niebuhr, R, 129
Machiavelli, N, 100 Nieuwmeijer, L, 179
Mahabane, I, 257 Nilsen, TR, 196, 250, 251
Maimane, M, 123 Nimmo, D, 122, 140, 147, 152
Malala, J, 259 Nixon, R, 163
Malema, J, 123, 157 Noelle-Neumann, E, 80
Maletzke, G, 23 Nzimande, B, 136
Mandela, NR, 118, 236, 247, 277 Obama, B, 156, 157
eight lessons 119–120, 158, 208, 210 Ochs, D, 127, 146
inaugural address (1994) 222–225, 245, 249–250 Olbrechts-Tyteca, L, 40
Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech (1993) Olivier, G, 130
211–215, 251–252 Osgood, C, 70, 71
Mangcu, X, 257, 259 O’Shea, DM, 154
Marais, D, 257 O’Sullivan, T, 241
Marcuse, H, 111 Packard, V, 45, 46
Martel, M, 159, 163, 165, 166, 167, 169, 171 Paine, T, 101
Marx, K, 9 Parrott, R, 158
Maslow, A, 46, 46, 47 Pavlov, I, 68, 69
Mauser, LA, 147 Pendell, SD, 174, 175
Mbeki, T, 10, 11, 21, 91, 123, 186 Perelman, C, 39, 40
address on NEPAD and AU (2001) 226–235, Perloff, RM, 66, 67, 68, 82, 174
244, 251, 252–255 Petty, R, 74
recall of 235 Pfau, M, 158
Mbembe, A, 11 Philip the Great 31
McCarthy, J, 106 Picard, RG, 89, 93
McCroskey, JC, 39, 57, 60 Pickering, M, 112
McGuire, WJ, 24 Pigman, GA, 190
McLuhan, M, 80 Pixley ka Isaka Seme, 234, 244
McNair, B, 120 Plato, 7, 29–31, 99, 163
McQuail, D, 79 Popper, KR, 99, 266
Meadow, RG, 133, 156, 166 Porter, WE, 60
Merrill, JC, 20 Poulakos, J, 29
Mill, JS, 13, 14, 15, 163 Protagoras of Abdera, 29
Mills, C Wright, 26, 79, 255 Puth, G, 118
Moffitt, MA, 153 Qualter, TH, 89, 101, 102, 105
Molotch, HL, 86 Quintilian, 33, 36, 37
Monroe, AH, 93, 95–96 Ramaphosa, C, 123
Moodley, K, 266, 267 Ramphele, M, 256, 257
Moon, KKL, 87 Ramus, P, 38
Morris, D, 153 Rank, H, 93, 94
Moss, S, 57 Raphael, DD, 8, 11, 12, 15
Motlanthe, K, 235, 237, 238 Real, MR, 110, 113, 114
Mouton, J, 241 Reardon, KK, 66
Mowlana, H, 254 Redman, R, 147, 148
293

Rensburg, RS, 5, 241 Terblanche, FH, 36

Richards, IA, 39 Tisias, 29
Richmond, VP, 57, 60 Tocqueville, A De, 14, 16–17, 111
Rieke, R, 51, 52, 53 Toulmin, SE, 51, 52–54
Robins, K, 112 Trapp, R, 39, 40
Rogers, EM, 145, Treurnicht, A, 163, 164, 174
Rogers, W, 46, 56, 57, 66, 75, 93 Trump, D, 123
Rokeach, M, 70, 72, 73 Tubbs, SL, 57
Roshcoe, B, 84 Tuchman, G, 83, 84, 86
Ross, R, 146 Turkington, J-R, 152
Rousseau, J-J, 8 Tutu, D, 130, 210, 211
Rutherford, W, 101, 104 Ury, W, 184, 187
Sadie, Y, 147 Van den Berg, MD, 185
Salazar, P, 253 Van Dijk, TA, 120
Saunders, D, 241 Van Schoor, M, 2, 37
Savage, M, 266 Van Wyk Louw, NP, 221, 251
Savage, RL, 140 Van Zyl, E, 118
Scherer, M, 156, 157 Van Zyl Slabbert, F, 7, 136
Schlesinger, AM Jr, 245 lines of argument 267–273
Schoeman, M, 256 public rhetoric of 265–276
Schramm, W, 60 rhetoric imprint of 276–277
Schulz, EB, 15 Vancil, DL, 174, 175
Scruton, R, 8, 11, 89 Venter, A, 267
Sejersted, F, 252 Vosloo, T, 257
Senghor, LS, 10 Watson, A, 190, 191, 192, 193
Sesanti, S, 257 Weber, M, 13, 105, 106
Severin, WJ, 66, 80 Webster, F, 112
Sharp, G, 128, 129, 130 Weich, HM, 5
Shaw, C, 154 Welsh, D, 266
Sheridan, T, 38 Westcott, S, 130
Sherif, M, 73 Whateley, R 39
Sisulu, A, 236 Wichelns, HA, 39
Sisulu, M, 236 Wilkens, I, 266
Skinner, BF, 68 Williams, D, 156
Smuts, D, 130 Williams, R, 23
Sparks, A, 257, 267 Wilson, FG, 90
Speer, A 101 Wilson, JF, 31, 39
Stanyer, J, 82 Wilson, LJ, 254
Stearns, M, 192 Wilson, T, 38
Steinberg, S, 276 Winans, JA 39
Stengel, R, 119 Wink, W, 130
Storey, JD, 145 Wolheim, R, 7
Strydom, A, 276 Woolbert, CH, 39
Swart, G, 136 Xaba, A, 158
Tankard, JW, 66, 80 Zille, H, 123, 124, 157
Tannenbaum, P, 70, 71 Zuma, J, 131, 158
Tao, SSC, 87 inaugural address (2009) 235, 236–241, 256–259
Teng, S, 88
294

Subject index
Subject index
Note: Numbers in italics refer to pages with figures.
A Aristotelian artistic proofs 196, 244–250

absolute freedom 13 creative use of 245
acceptance stage, of the message appeal 66 art, rhetoric as 32–34
accountability 165 articulation 36
actuality 10 artistic
Ad herennium 36, 37 proofs 34–36, 196, 242
advertising (political) 156–159 standard (for rhetorical criticism) 241, 242, 244
definition of 156 assembly debate setting 126
frequency of message exposure 157, 158 association 94
media used in 157–158 attitude change theory 66–67
social media used 157 attitude–belief–value triad 72, 73
in South Africa 158 attitudes, role in persuasion 44–45
advocacy organisations 88 attribution of responsibility 82
affirmation of value 45 AU see African Union (AU)
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 232 audience
African nationalism 135 in political persuasion 121–122
African Renaissance 135, 226, 228, 232, 253, 254 in rhetorical criticism 262
African Union 226 role of 31
objectives and principles 232 audiopolations 164
Africanisation 136 audio-visual medium 81
Africanism 135 authoritarian
Afrikaans language 94, 119, 131, 221 societies 24, 38
AfrikaansMustFall 131 systems 8, 39
Afrikaner nationalism 134 theory 68
agenda-setting, theory of 80, 81 authoritarianism 8
agitation
propaganda of 127 B
strategy of 127, 128, 129 backing 53, 54, 54
American presidential debates 163, 173 balance theory 71
American Revolution 8, 101 bandwagon 104
analytical negotiating style 181, 182 bargaining 125, 126
ANC front organisation 267 concept of 179
ANC, key words and phrases used by the 135–136 language 124
anchor points 73 basic needs 46, 47, 183
anti-apartheid movement 212 behavioural
apartheid 130, 134, 135, 196, 212, 214 change 44, 67, 68, 69
apathetic audience 122 control 68
argument, lines of 263–264 belief 10, 12, 66, 72, 132
argumentation 51–54 belief hierarchy 72–73
credibility of persuader 55 believability, of expression 30
elements of 52–54, 54 belonging, need for 47, 184
limits to 52 bilateral diplomacy 188
model for 52–54, 54 Bill of Rights 219, 274
principal aim 51 black economic empowerment 136
use of language 51, 52 black/white dialogue 273, 275
argumentative use of language 51, 52 blackmail 5
arguments, instruments for analysing 35 Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging van Suid-Afrika 206
295

blogs 87 colonialism 11, 226, 233

body movement 36 common citizenship 271, 272, 273, 275
British writers 39 communication
Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (Act definition/meaning 2, 4
53 of 2003) 136 forms of 2–3
bureaucracy 78, 106 of image 128
bureaucratic propaganda 105–107 levels of 3
principles (in political negotiation) 185–186
C process of 4
campaign management 151–160 science 2, 4, 51
advertising 156–159 structure 2, 78
campaign messaging 153 triptych 2, 4, 29, 78
canvassing 154, 155 communicator 2, 3, 4, 29, 30, 183
communication strategy 152, 154 role in forms of persuasion 5–6
credibility 153 credibility of 55
debate planning 159–160 see also persuader; speaker
endorsement 155 communicological
events 155 idea 15, 17
fund-raising 156 imagination 26
research 151 communism 9, 198, 247
rules in overall party strategy 152 composition 94, 94, 95
strategy formulation 152–155 conflict 82, 83
targeting of voting districts 153, 154 conformity 15, 17, 108, 111, 112
techniques for voter contact 154, 155 confrontation politics 271
candidate (in election campaign) 147–148 confusion 95
abilities of 147 congruity theory 71
canvassing 154, 155 consensus 10, 124, 197, 266
card-stacking 104 decisions 184
casual evidence 49 government 274
censorship 100, 104 stability 270
central route to persuasion 74 consistency
charismatic oratory 123 theories 70–73
chronemics 58 and verbal messages 47–48
circumstantial evidence 48 consonance, 47, 48
citizenship 135 Constitutional Committee 274
common 271, 272, 273, 275 Constitutional Court 219
equal 268 content strategies 167
loss of 273 context of communication 2, 3
rights of 270, 275 corruption 11, 165, 167, 256, 257
claims 51, 52, 54 COSATU 206, 256
classical covert violence 127
conditioning 68 creative outlets 45
rhetoric 36, 37 credibility 34, 44, 49
climate of opinion 80 crime
climate-setting, theory of 80, 81 against humanity 212, 257
coalition process 10 in South Africa 21, 165, 167
coercion 24 critic
coercive stability 270 description of a 241
cogency 51 and objectivity 256
cognitive dissonance theory 71–72 critiquing De Klerk’s first parliamentary opening
Cold War 106 address (1990)
296

Subject index
credibility 248 culture

display of ethos 245, 248 concept of 23
expertness or intelligence 246 definitions of 23
focusing on the use of the Aristotelian artistic and ethics 23–24
proofs 245–249 relevance in ethics and persuasion 23
focusing on structure 243–244
goodwill 247, 248 D
image 248 data 52, 54, 54
logos 249 de facto equality 16
pathos 148 De invention 36, 37
rhetorical constraints on De Klerk 246 de jure equality 16
sincerity 248 De Klerk–Treurnicht debate 163, 164, 174
trustworthiness 247 death penalty (in De Klerk’s 1990 address) 201,
use of enthymemes 249 246
critiquing Mandela and De Klerk’s Nobel Peace debate setting 126
Prize acceptance speeches (1993); focusing on debates (political) 159–160
worth and Nilsen’s four-part definition of 159
method 251–252 goals of 159, 160
behaviour 258 debunking motif 25
critiquing Mandela’s inaugural address (1994); deductive reasoning 50
focusing on the use of the Aristotelian artistic Defiance Campaign (1989) 130
proofs 249–250 dehortation 33
display of ethos 249 deliberative rhetoric 33, 35, 148
goodwill 249 delivery 37, 38, 39, 50, 151
integrity and intelligence 249 demagogic oratory 123
logos 250 democracy
trustworthiness 249 African conception of 10, 11
use of pathos 250 in African philosophy 10, 11
critiquing Mbeki’s speech on NEPAD and the AU approaches to 11
(2001); focusing on worth and Nilsen’s four-part characteristics of 7
method 252–255 concept of 7, 8, 91
critiquing Zuma’s inaugural address (2009) and equality 15–17
256–259; focusing on outcomes as form of government 7–9
behaviour 258 and freedom 11–15
corruption, wasteful spending and general as ideology 9–11
incompetence 257 and individual freedoms 12–13
division and strife 256 liberal ideas associated with Western 12
education system 257 political systems 8–9, 39, 132, 268, 274, 275
media tribunal 257 relationship with liberalism 12
positive outcomes 259 Western conception of 8, 10, 11
poverty 256, 257 democratic
Protection of State Information Bill 257 leadership, requirements for creativity in 245
right to freedom of expression 257 propaganda 104, 105
service delivery 256, 257 public opinion 90
struggle for mental liberation 257 democratic state 11, 17, 18, 19, 104
welfare grants 259 propaganda in 105, 112, 113
crowdpreneur 87 demonstrative rhetoric 33
cultural deontological theories 22
diversity 274 dialectic 35, 38
imperialism 25 vs rhetoric 32
indicators research 79, 80 dialogue 10, 183, 185, 192, 196, 207, 254, 273, 275
297

dialogues, Plato’s 29–30 economy, the (in De Klerk’s 1990 address) 202–205
dictatorships 101, 105 education 5, 37, 73, 157
diplomacy education system 257
definition of 188 educational debates 163, 164, 175
and news media 143 efficiency, ethic of 109
traditional 193 egalitarian society 17, 93, 118
diplomatic persuasion 190–193 ego satisfaction 45
role of ideology 191–192 ego-involvement 73
role of interests 190–191 elaboration likelihood theory (ELT) 74–76
role of power 191 election 8, 10, 164, 165, 197, 222, 235, 246
role of propaganda 192–193 election campaign (in South Africa) 83, 121, 145–160
role of trust 193 electoral will 8
direct ELT see elaboration likelihood theory
democracy 8 elocutio 36
evidence 48 elocution 38
directed communication 133 elocutionary movement 38, 39
definition of 131 emotional
in political systems 132 proof 34, 248
see also political language security 45
directive persuasive techniques 103 endorsement 155
discourse 32, 34, 92, 134 English Renaissance 38
forms of 106, 123, 124, 137 Enlightenment, ideas of 8, 39
lines of argument in 263 enthymeme 34, 35, 36, 149, 151, 249
logical proof in 263 environment, in persuasion 57
structure and arrangement of 36 environment/circumstance (in rhetorical
discussion forums 87 discourse) 262
dishonour 33 epideictic rhetoric 33, 35
dispositio 36 equal opportunity in the land 20
disposition 36, 38 equality 7, 9, 11
dissonance before the law 15–16, 17, 246
sources of 47–48
of circumstances 17
theory 71–72
challenges in South Africa 20, 21
distance, in persuasion 57
of character 17
diversion 95
and democracy 12, 15–17
diversity 14
vs freedom 17–18,
cultural 274
of opportunity 7, 16, 17, 20, 246
ideological 251
of political opportunity 7
of interests 252
principle of 16, 17
of needs 18
and sameness 16, 17, 18
of perspectives 240
and Tocqueville’s warning 16–17
political significance of 274
escalation 147
domination 11, 221, 268, 269, 270, 275
ethic of efficiency 109
downplay 95
ethical discourse 151
dramatic evidence 49
ethical persuasion 22–24
dramaturgical pentad (of image management)
approaches to 22
141–143, 145
and culture 23–24
DRIP FUED BE MAP formula 185–186
ethical proof 34
dyadic communication 2, 3, 5
ethics 11
E and culture 23–24
economic consequences 82 macro theories relating to 21–22
economic sanctions 192, 246
298

Subject index
in persuasion 21–24 French Renaissance 38

and persuasive communication 22, 23 French Revolution 8, 101
ethos 34–36 fund-raising 156
European socialism 10
events 155 G
evidence 48–50 gender 40
classification of 48 equality 259
generalisations 49–50 gesticulation, in persuasion 58, 59
types of 49 gestures, in persuasion 58, 59
exhortation 33 glittering generality 103
expediency 33 Goffmanian dramaturgical pentad of image
experience (in rhetoric) 23, 26, 33, 37 management 141–143, 145
expert evidence 49 goodwill, of communicator/speaker 34, 55
expertness, of communicator/speaker 34, 55 Gorgias 30
eye behaviour, in persuasion 59 government
spending 257, 258
F surveillance 88, 89
Facebook 87, 88 guilt, sense of 48
power of 157 Gupta scandal 167, 256, 258
facial expression, in persuasion 58
fascist propaganda 68 H
FeesMustFall 88, 131 haptics 58
First World War 99, 101 hate speech 19
first-hand evidence 49 Hellenistic rhetoric 36
foreign policy 188, 193 honour 33
foreign relations (in De Klerk’s 1990 address) horizontal
198–199, 243 communication 3
forensic rhetoric 33, 34, 35 propaganda 108
framing of the media 82, 83 hortatory style 122, 123
free word, the 20 hostile audience 121
freedom 8–9, 11 human
of assembly 9, 12 emotions, in verbal messages 44–48
of association 9, 12 freedom and equality 11
as the absence of restraint 11 interest 82, 83
from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment 9 motivation 44
connotations 11 needs see needs
constraints on 19 human rights 10, 128, 131, 160
and democracy 11–15 in De Klerk’s first parliamentary opening
and equality 11 address (1990) 199, 200, 246, 247
vs equality 17–18 in Mandela’s Nobel Peace Prize acceptance
of the individual 7, 12, 13 speech (1993) 211, 213, 214, 252
of individual to choose 13 in Mbeki’s speech on NEPAD and AU (2001)
and liberty 12 229, 232, 254
meaning of 11, 12 I
of the press 9, 12, 13, 19, 20 ideas 2
principle of 19 adaptation of 5
from restraint 12 in American and French revolutions 8
of speech, information and the press 8, 12 and democracy 10
of thought and expression 13–15 in the ELT 74
Freedom Charter 135 of Enlightenment 8
French philosophers 38, 101, 105 in persuasion 5
299

regeneration of 5, interconnective discourse 92

science of 9, 10 intercultural
and Western democracy 12 harmony 19
identification sensitivities 20
concept of 40 interests, role in diplomatic persuasion 190–191
in electoral campaigns 146, 152 Interim Government of National Unity 135, 224
ideological movement, strategies used by 146–147 international dialogue 192
ideologues 9 international political negotiation 187–193
ideology basic formal pattern of 188–189
meaning of 9, 10 and diplomacy 188
role in diplomatic persuasion diplomatic persuasion 190–193
191–192 new media forums 190
image (of political party) purpose of 188
content of 140, international political relations 188
goals, strategies to attain 167–168 interpersonal level 3
image management 140 interviews 124
art of 140–141 intrapersonal communication 2, 4
defensive measures in the art of 142 intrapersonal level 3
elements and terms of Goffmanian intuitive negotiating style 181, 182
dramaturgical pentad of 141–143, 145 inventio 36, 245
news media in 143, 144 invention 36, 37, 38, 39, 245
organisational needs for 142 irrational propaganda 108
policy 143
protective measures in the art of 142–143 J
immortality 46 journalists 84, 85, 86
impression management see image management judiciary 9, 200, 208, 247, 274
incompetence in public service 257 justice 33, 128, 214
indirect K
democracy 8 kinesics 58–59
evidence 48 knowledge, levels of 32–33
individual
expression 18, 91 L
freedom 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 La technique 109, 113
individuality 14, 16, 18 land 165
indoctrination 5, 6 reform 167
inductive reasoning 50 restitution 135, 256
Industrial Revolution 101 language
inequalities 16, 20, 136 appropriate use of 32, 36
influx control 271, 272, 275 of political persuasion 120
information and communication technology 79 style and settings 122, 126, 131–137
information explosion 111, 112 uses in argumentation 51, 52
injustice 33 late-modern democratic society 78
inoculation theory 24 lay evidence 49
Institute for Propaganda Analysis 102, 103 leaders, functions of effective 118
Institutes of oratory 37 leadership
Institutio oratoria 37 definition of 118
instrumental Mandela’s eight lessons on 119–120
uses of language 51, 52 transformational 118–120
values 73 legal
intensification 94–94 equality 15, 16, 129
intensify/downplay scheme 94, 94, 159 rhetoric 33
300

Subject index
legislature 9, 156 mediator (in political negotiation)

les ideologues 9 attributes of 187
liberal democracy 12, 115, 266 responsibilities of 186
liberalism, relationship with democracy 12 mediocrity 17
life medium 2, 4, 29
chances 15 in technical determinism theory 80–81
insurance 46 technology of the 85
lines of argument 263–264, 267 in traditional propaganda 107
literature drop 155 in uses and gratifications theory 81
logic 35, 37 see also message
logical proof 34, 249, 263 memoria 36
logos 34–36, description 35 memory (in rhetoric) 32, 33, 36, 38
lose-lose strategy 184 mental liberation, struggle for 257
love objects 46 message 2, 3, 29
conclusions 61
M effectiveness of 61
majoritarianism 274 expression 4
manipulation 5, 102, 114, 165, 254 interpretation 4
manipulative communication, characteristics of in rhetorical criticism 262
183 in Sophistic rhetoric 30
Marikana massacre 167, 256 timing of 61
Maslow’s levels of needs 46, 46, 47 see also medium
mass communication 3, 78, 79, 102, 103 minimum effects tradition 173
concept of 3 minority
effect of 79 rights 135, 199, 200, 274
technologies of 190 rule 8, 212, 222, 227
mass veto 268, 274
consumption 78 mirror approach 85
education 110, 111 model
level 3 definition 6
mass media of persuasion 6, 7
growth of 25 modern transport 78
persuasive function of 79 Monroe’s motivated sequence 95–97
and role models 80 moral conduct 21
traditional 78 morality 82
mass persuasion 6, 78, 91 and propaganda 100
see also propaganda motif of unrespectability 25
mass persuasive practices, effect on formation of motivated
public opinion 93–96 audience 122
mass sequence 95–97
production 78 motivation, means of 44
society theory 108 multilateral
society, characteristics 78 conferences 188
violence 207 diplomacy 188
media multimedia and file sharing 87
frames 82, 83 multiracial government of national unity 210
framing 82, 83 mutual respect 17, 239
priming 81, 82
tribunal 257 N
in mass communication 3 name-calling 103
mediation (in political negotiation) 186–187 National Council of Provinces (NCOP) 226
301

national democratic revolution 136 non-violent resistance

National Development Plan 136 effect on opponent’s authority 130
National Education Crisis Committee 206 in ideological movement 147
National Planning Commission 136 image in 129
National Socialist (Nazi) propaganda 68, 101, 102 setting 127–131
national unity 135, 210 in South Africa 130
nationalism 9, 134 as a strategy of agitation 127, 128
natural rights 10, 12 and social media 131
Nazi propaganda 68, 101, 102 normative negotiating style 181, 182
NCOP see National Council of Provinces novelty in the news business 83
needs 184 NP government, key words and phrases used by
for consistency 44 the 134–135
hidden 45–46
O
Maslow’s levels of 46, 46, 47
OAU see Organisation of African Unity
in persuasion 45–47, 46
objectics 57
negotiation
oculesics 59
in De Klerk’s 1990 address 205–209
official propaganda 104, 105
main purpose of political 188
omission 95
in management of news media 144
one-text procedure (decision-making) 187
politics 269, 271, 275
online systems 78
neo-Aristotelian approach 244, 245
Open Society Foundation for South Africa
neo-colonialism 226, 233
265–266
NEPAD see New Partnership for Africa’s opinion 15, 17
Development and attitudes 44
networking services 87 climate of 80
New Partnership for Africa’s Development in mass media 80
(NEPAD) 10, 135, 226, 243, 244, 252–255 and propaganda 102, 107
new rhetorics 39, 40 and self-interest 92
news opportunity, equality of 7, 16, 17, 20, 246
approaches to selection of 84–86 opposing arguments, dealing with 61
definition of 83–84 oratory settings 122–124, 126, 148
frame 84 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 226
news media 81, 84 original evidence 49
diplomacy 144–145
and image management 143–145 P
and political parties 83 paralanguage 59
role of 83–86 Parsonian systems theory 266
Nilsen’s four-part method 196, 250, 251 pathos 34–36, description 35
Nkandla 167, 256, 258 peaceful protests (in South Africa) 130, 131
Nobel Peace Prize 210, 251 people, meaning of term 7
non-artistic proofs 34 perception, definition of 140
non-profit advocacy organisations 87 Perfect Orator 37
non-verbal communication/messages 3, 19, 56–60 Peripatetic School of Philosophy 31
meaning of 56–57 peripheral route to persuasion 74
study areas of 57–60 personal
non-verbal tactics (in political campaigns) 172–173 behaviour 258
non-violence 127, 129 evidence 49
non-violent persuadee 4, 24, 66
action 128 attitude of 44
protest 127 see also recipient
persuader 4, 6
credibility of 55
302

Subject index
effectiveness of 61 Phaedrus 30
encoding verbal messages 44–48 philosophical rhetoric 29, 32
and ethical issues 22 podcasting 87
and Plato’s principles of persuasive polarisation 147
communication 30 political
in Western culture 57 campaign debate 159–160
see also speaker; communicator; rhetor communication 120
persuasion conflict 179, 180
argumentation in process of 51–54 political debates
definition/description of 4, 5 advantages of/arguments for 166
ethical evaluation of 22 concept of winner of 174–175
ethical issues in 21–24 disadvantages of/arguments against 166
evidence in process of 48–50 effects of 173–176
forms of 5 format of 163, 164
function/purpose of 4, 5, 7 guidelines for televised 164
in the functioning of a democracy 7 image in 165, 166
and group membership/decisions 62–63 issues focused on 167
implications of 26 non-verbal tactics 172–173
inoculation against 24 strategies to attain image goals 167–168
means of 34 on television 165
model of 6, 7 use of topics in 163, 164, 165
proof in 48 verbal tactics 169–172
Rank’s model of 93–95, 94 political
rational factors in 48 discourse 34, 123, 134
reasoning in process of 48, 50–51 domination 270
relevance in modern society 24 political election campaign 145
resistance to 24–26 advertising 156–159
role of attitudes in 44–45 candidate in 147–148
role of recipient variables in 62 description of 145–146
as art and science 6 kinds of voters in 147–148
self-consciousness of 24, 25–26 management of 151–160
social consciousness of 24, 25–26 vs political movement 146
theories of interpersonal 66–75 social media used 157
theory of 6, 7 speeches 149–151
persuasive stages of 146
advertising 156–159 political
bargaining 125 equality 16, 17, 20, 246
persuasive communication frames, impact on individuals 82
effects in interpersonal setting 60–61 institutions 104, 120
Greek roots of 29 leadership 119–120
study of 29 political language 122, 126, 131–137
see also rhetoric ambiguity in 134
persuasive functions of 132–133
discourse 148 as instrument of power 136–137
intention of 262, 263 key words and phrases used by the ANC
message appeals, pattern for 95, 96 135–136
messages, settings of 122–131 key words and phrases used by the NP
oratory 29, 31, 35 government 134–135
techniques 22 role of ideology in 132
petition 146 see also directed communication
PFP see Progressive Federal Party political movement 146–147
303

political negotiation political/rhetorical discourse

between states 187–193 critiquing of 241–259
communication principles in 185–186 standard for evaluating of 241, 242
definition of 179 politically persuasive messages, settings of 122–131
guidelines 181–182 politico-ideological resistance 128
importance of power in 180 Politics 132
joint problem-solving approach to 182–186 politics
phases of 182, 183 communicative dimension of 120
and political conflict 179, 180 description of 120
preconditions for 180 verbal messages in 120, 121
rational dialogue in 183 postures, in persuasion 58, 59
role of mediation 186–187 poverty 20, 217, 218, 228, 253, 256, 257
styles of 181 power 15, 16, 100, 101
political participation 90 abuse of 93, 240
political party centralisation of 135
identity of 140 of Facebook 157
image management 140–145 of government 8, 9
image of 140 of individual 13
and news media 83 of individual expression 18
personality of 140 and the law 9
rules in overall strategy of 152 of the majority 17
political persuasion 121 of mass media 80
aims of 121 of people 7
contemporary settings of 122–131 of political language 136, 137
guidelines for addressing audiences 121–122 in political negotiations 180
language of 120, 121–131 principles in political negotiations 180
language style of 122 relationships 129
political role in diplomatic persuasion 191
propaganda 108 role of 191
relations 188 of the rulers 130
rhetoric 33, 34, 265 sense of 46
rights 8, 16 sharing of 266, 267, 268, 274, 276
political speeches 148 sources of 146, 147
arrangement of 150–151 of speech 248
characteristics of good style of 149 prearranged evidence 49
methods of qualitatively critiquing of 196 predictability, demonstration of 48
parts of 150 press
political stability 20, 136 conferences 123, 131
political systems freedom 9, 12, 13, 19, 20
and directed communication 131, 132 prestige, loss of 47, 48,
democratic 39 primacy versus recency 62
in South Africa 268, 270, 274, 275 primary evidence 49
normative assumptions 8–9 private dialogue 192
political transformation 20 Progressive Federal Party (PFP) 265
political violence 11, 127, 180, 193, 215 promulgation 146
after 1990 (during political reforms) 210 pronunciation 38
and De Klerk’s speech (1990) 205, 206, 207, 208 pronuntiatio 36
and Mandela’s Nobel Peace Prize acceptance proof
speech (1993) 212 components of 48, 49
and Van Zyl Slabbert’s public rhetoric 269, 271, kinds of 34
272 Propaganda Analysis, Institute for 102, 103
304

Subject index
propaganda 5, 6 fluid state of 90

of agitation 108 formation of 91
basic techniques 103–104 gaseous state of 90
concepts of 104–105 generalisations about 91–92
of conformity 108, 111 role of mass media in 89
definitions of 102–103 solid state of 89
in a democracy vs in a totalitarian state 104–105 public relations 5, 7, 85, 144
in a dictatorship 101, 105 public rhetoric, of Van Zyl Slabbert 265–276
effects/influence of 108, 113 discussion and summation 273–276
Ellul on democracy’s need of 112–113 lines of argument 267–273
Ellul’s treatise on 113 public
Ellul’s view of 107–112 sentiment 14, 15
ideas on 114 worth 90
and information 111, 112 Public-Private-Partnerships 230
of integration 108, 109
and mass media 107, 110, 111, 115 Q
meaning of 99, 102 qualifiers 53, 54, 54
medium 107 qualitative communication research method 241
methods/techniques 99, 100, 102, 103, 110 qualitatively critiquing of political speeches,
objective of 103 methods of 196
opposing types of 108 R
purpose of 107, 112–113 racial domination 11, 221, 268, 269, 270, 275
reconceptualisation of 114 Rank’s model of persuasion 93–95, 94
and revolution 101 tactics for downplay 95
role in diplomatic persuasion 192–193 tactics for intensification 94–95, 94
Roman examples of 100 rational
target 107 dialogue 183, 185, 196
techniques in totalitarian states 105 evidence 49
theory 68 propaganda 108
traditional vs bureaucratic 107 real evidence 49
used by the Third Reich 101, 102 reasoning 48, 50–51
Protection of State Information Bill 257 classification of 50
protest 131, 207, 269 types of 51
marches 127, 130 rebuttals 53, 54, 54
politics 271 rechtstaat 219
Protestant ministers 39 recipient variables, role in persuasion 62, 95
Protestant reformation 99 recipient 2
proxemics 57 attitude and behaviour 4, 22
psychological criteria in voting decisions of 174–176
manipulation 102 critical 93
tension 72 in motivated sequence 96
warfare 5, 6 number of 3
public and opposing arguments 61
communication 3 resistance of 24
dialogue 192 in rhetorical discourse 262
discourse 123, 124, rights of 11, 24
public opinion 9, 20 role in forms of persuasion 5–6
categories of 89 in Sophistic rhetoric 30
in democracies 90, 91 see also persuader
description of 89 relational strategies 168
effect of social media on 92, 93 relativising motif 25
305

religious issues, in South Africa 19 role of audience 31

religious role of speaker 31
approach to ethics 22 the speech 31
convictions 216 Rhetorica ad herennium 36
freedom 9, 12, 19 rhetorical criticism 241
intolerance 217 approaches to 244, 245
renaissance 14, 36, 38 artistic standard in 241, 242, 244
African 135, 226, 228, 232, 253, 254 definition of 241, 242
philosophy of 254 of De Klerk’s first parliamentary opening
repetition 94 address (1990) 243–244, 245–249
representative democracy 8 focusing on four fundamental variables in
resistance to persuasion 24–26 rhetorical discourse 262
respect 10, 55, 103 focusing on outcomes 255–259
for audience 118, 121, 122 focusing on structure 243–244
of individual rights 200, 214 focusing on the use of Aristotelian artistic proofs
mutual 17, 145, 239 244–250
revolution (in ideological/political movements) 147 focusing on worth and Nilsen’s four-part
revolutionary movements 127 method 250–255
rewards, use of 48 of Mandela and De Klerk’s acceptance speeches
rhetor (1993) 251–252
meaning in Athenian democracy 262 of Mandela’s inaugural address (1994) 249–250
vs orator 262 of Mbeki’s address on NEPAD and the AU
persuasive intention of 262, 263 (2001) 252–255
premises or assertions by 263 of Mbeki’s speech on NEPAD and the AU (2001)
and Plato’s principles of persuasive 244
communication 30 of Zuma’s inaugural address (2009) 256–259
rhetorical imprint of 262 rhetorical discourse 34
see also persuader four fundamental variables in 262
rhetoric rhetorical imprint
Aristotle’s definition of 32, 33 building the interpretation 264–265
Aristotle’s view of 31–36 constructing of a 264–265
as an art 32–34 deconstructing the data 264
classification of 29 definition of 262
vs dialectic 32 formulating of 266
essential element of 34 locating lines of argument 263–264
five canons of 36, 245 logical proof 263
four uses of 32 theoretical framework 263
Greek roots of 29 of Van Zyl Slabbert 276–277
kinds of speeches 33, 35 rhetorical speeches, types of 33, 34, 35
in the Middle Ages 37, 38 right
new approaches to the study of 39, 40 to choose 12
Plato’s principles of 30–31 to freedom of expression, under threat 257
and the Renaissance 38 roots, need for 46
use of the enthymeme 34, 35, 36 rule of law 9, 10
see also persuasive communication rule of technique 109
Rhetoric, the 31, 32, 33, 38
Book I 31, 32 S
Book II 31, 32 Sacra congregation 99
Book III 31, 32, 148, 151 sanctions 5, 192, 196
guidelines on style and arrangement of speeches satisfaction 96
148–151 science of ideas 9
306

Subject index
Second Sophistic 37 Sophistic rhetoric 29, 30, 37, 99

secondary evidence 49 believability of expression 30
security 47, 184 description of 29
emotional 45 Plato’s criticism of 29–31
reassurance of 48 South African Law Commission 199, 200
seduction 5 South African National Students Congress 206
self-actualisation needs 47, 184 Soweto uprising (1976) 267
self-consciousness of persuasion 24 space, in persuasion 57
creating of 25–26 speaker 29
self-direction 15 as focus in rhetorical criticism 262
self-persuasion 4 qualities of 34
Senegal talks (1987) 265 reputation of 34
sensory perception 32 role in rhetoric 31–32, 34, 35, 36, 37
service delivery 152, 165, 167, 256, 257 role of 31
Skinnerian behaviourism 69–70 see also communicator, persuader
small group bargaining setting 124–126 speeches, kinds of 33
small group communication 2 spiral of silence theory 80
social spontaneity 14, 17, 143, 166
affiliation 73 Stalinist communism 198, 247
circumstance 2, 19, 23, 78, standard (for rhetorical criticism) 241, 242, 244
conformity 112 State of Emergency 207, 267, 273
social consciousness of persuasion 24 statesperson’s oratory 123
statutory discrimination 271, 275
creating of 25–26
stimulus–response relationship 68
dimensions of 25
structural violence 127
concomitant motifs 25
style 36, 37
social
stylistic rhetoric 38
control (social media as a means of ) 93
SWOT evaluation 151
freedom 12
syllogism 35, 52
judgement–involvement theory 73
learning theory 70 T
social media 78, 86–89 technical rhetoric 29, 37
applications of 87 technological
description of 79, 86 determinism theory 80
effect on formation of public opinion 92, 93 innovation 25
effects of 88 theories 21
features of 87 technology 78
functions of 92, 93 telepolations 164
and non-violent resistance 131 televised political debate 164
use of 88 tenders 257
social unity 265 tension reduction 72
socialism 9, 10, 94 terminal values 73
social-psychological theory 173, 174 testimonial 103
socio-economic aspects (in De Klerk’s 1990 The republic 99
address) 202 theory
socio-economic resistance 128 definition of 6
sociological of persuasion 7
imagination 25 of planned behaviour (TPB) 68
propaganda 108, 109, 110 of reasoned action (TRA) 67–68
socio-political ideas 9, 10, 191 Third Reich 101
solidification 146 thought
freedom of 13–15, 16
307

rational 34, 37, 39 judgements 21, 81, 123

rise of scientific 38 types of 73
time, in persuasion 58 verbal
topoi 263 see lines of argument ornamentation 30
totalitarian political messages 120, 121
concepts of propaganda 104–105 tactics (in political campaigns) 169–172
propaganda 104, 105 vertical
regime 18 communication 3, 4
systems 132 propaganda 108
totalitarianism 18, 109 violence 11, 51, 127, 180, 193, 271
touch, in persuasion 58 after 1990 (during political reforms) 210
Toulmin model and De Klerk’s speech (1990) 205, 206, 207, 208
six elements 52–54, 54 and Mandela’s Nobel Peace Prize acceptance
using the 54 speech (1993) 212
TPB see theory of planned behaviour and Van Zyl Slabbert’s public rhetoric 269, 271,
TRA see theory of reasoned action 272, 273
traditional virtual worlds 87
debate 163 visualisation 96
diplomacy 193 vocal behaviour, in persuasion 59, 60
transformational leader 118–120 vocalics 59–60
Mandela’s eight lessons on political leadership vodcasting 87
119–120 voter contact, techniques for 154, 155
qualities of 118–119 voters
transport 78 criteria in decisions of 174–176
Tricameral Parliament 134, 164, 267, 270, 275 image of political party 140
triptych, of communication 2, 4, 29, 78 war 6, 193, 212
trust, role in diplomatic persuasion 193 and religion 19
trustworthiness, of communicator/speaker 34, 55
W
tyranny of the majority 17
warrants 52–53, 54, 54
U wasteful government spending 257
undecided voters 148 welfare grants 259
unemployment 165, 167, 202, 213 Western democracy
uniformity 17 ideas 12
United Democratic Front 206, 267, 271 liberal ideas associated with 12
United States Information Agency (USIA) 106 principles of 246
unity 135 white minority rule 212, 222, 227
of Africa 227, 232 wikis 87
in the country 239, 256 win-lose strategy 183
through consensus and dialogue 10 win-win strategy 183–186
universal peace (in De Klerk’s acceptance speech) communication principles in 185–186
216, 217 tactics in 184–185
unrespectability, motif of 25 women
unwritten evidence 49 emancipation of 135
urban uprisings 267 in positions of power 259
uses and gratifications theory 80, 81 written
evidence 49
V medium 81
valuation 10, 121
value
Y
Yale Communication and Attitude Change
affirmation of 45
Program 66
308

The Art of Persuasive Communication, Fourth Edition

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

The Art of Persuasive Communication, Fourth Edition

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

The art of The art of

www.jutaacademic.co.za Johann C. de Wet

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 1 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 3 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

First edition 1988

Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd

© 2017 Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd

ISBN 978 1 48511 713 1 (Print)

ISBN 978 1 48512 459 7 (WebPDF)

Project manager: Seshni Kazadi

Typeset in Adobe Text Pro 11pt on 13pt

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 4 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

Chapter one: Communication and persuasion: A democratic setting ..... 1

Chapter two: Persuasive communication: The historical context ........... 28

Chapter three: Broad starting points of interpersonal persuasion .......... 43

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 5 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

3.2.2 Be rational ........................................................................................................ 48

Chapter four: Theories of interpersonal persuasion ....................................... 65

Chapter five: Persuasion, mass and social media, and public

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 6 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

5.5 Public opinion ............................................................................................................ 89

Chapter six: Perspectives of propaganda ............................................................ 98

Chapter seven: Leadership, persuasive language and politics ................. 117

Chapter eight: Image and persuasive political campaign

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 7 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

8.2.4 Campaign management .............................................................................. 151

Chapter nine: Persuasion and political debates ............................................... 162

Chapter ten: Persuasion and political negotiation ........................................... 178

Chapter eleven: Rhetorical discourses of South African statesmen ...... 195

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 8 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

11.4 Nelson Mandela’s inaugural address, May 1994 ............................................ 222

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 9 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

12.4.1.4 From The system and the struggle (1989:7–22; 44–83)

References ............................................................................................................................ 279

Name index ........................................................................................................................... 291

Subject index ....................................................................................................................... 294

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 10 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

This fourth edition of The art of persuasive communication – A process is a

A large part of this edition is devoted to persuasive communication in politics.

Many years ago, a critical reader of an earlier edition reminded me that I

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 11 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

How does this edition differ from the third edition?

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 12 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

Communication and persuasion:

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 1 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

1.1 INTRODUCTION: ON COMMUNICATION

Our focus is on the first meaning of communication. The linking of ‘making

The concept of communication is defined and used in different ways in the

Such a basic understanding implies the presence of a timeless and durable

Communication always takes place within a given social circumstance or

Communication has various forms: intrapersonal, dyadic, small group, public,

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 2 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

• Public communication refers to a situation in which a communicator (for

This book speaks of forms of communication rather than contexts of

The literature sometimes refers to levels of communication. The forms of

Communication can take place with or without words. When we communicate

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 3 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

1.2 PERSUASION AS A PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION

Moreover, persuasion pervades human communication in all its forms: in

Of course, persuasion can be studied in various other disciplines and sub-

Like communication, persuasion is defined and used in various ways.

The following words and phrases in this working definition need to be

A situation becomes persuasive through the focus on accomplishing something

JUTA_Art_of_Persuasive_Comm_4_01.indd 4 2016/11/30 1:47 PM

Chapter five: Persuasion, mass and social media, and public

Chapter eight: Image and persuasive political campaign

11.4 Nelson Mandela’s inaugural address, May 1994 ............................................ 222

12.4.1.4 From The system and the struggle (1989:7–22; 44–83)

1.3.3.3 Freedom in a democracy: The underlying communicological idea