STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 9 (FULL TEXT)
CHAPTER 9
PROSCPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES
A. IN GENERAL
1. SEGOVIA VS. NOEL 47 PHIL 543(1925)
2. GREGO VS COMELEC 274 SCRA 481 (1997)
3. CO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 227 SCRA 444 (1993)
4. IBURAN VS LABES 87 PHIL 234 (1950)
B. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT
5. NUÑEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN GR 50581
6. PEOPLE VS. FERRER GR 32613
7. PEOPLE VS. PAREL GR L-18260
8. ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO GR 32743
9. MUNICIPALITY OF STA. FE VS. MUNICIPALITY OF ARITAO
GR NO. 148308
10. PEOPLE VS. PATALIN JRR. 311 SCRA 186 (1999)
11. PEOPLE VS ZETA GR L-7140
12. BUYCO VS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK 112 PHIL 588
(1961)
C. STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
13. SUBIDO JR. VS SANDIGANBAYAN 266 SCRA 379 (1997)
14. TAN, Jr. VS. COURT OF APPEALS GR 136368
15. FRIVALDO VS COMELEC 257 SCRA 727 (1996)
16. BILLONES VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GR
17566
17. PEOPLE VS MORAN 44 PHIL 387 (1923)
18. PAVON VS. PHIL. ISLAND TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH
CO. 9 PHIL 247 (1907)
19. UN PAK LEUNG VS. NIGORRA 9 PHIL 486 (1908)
G.R. No. L-23226 March 4, 1925
VICENTE SEGOVIA, petitioner-appellee, vs. PEDRO NOEL,
respondent-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The question to be decided on this appeal is whether that portion
of Act No. 3107 which provides, that justices of the peace and
auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until
they have reached the age of sixty- five years, should be given
retroactive or prospective effect.
Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of Dumanjug,
Cebu, on January 21, 1907. He continuously occupied this position
until having passed sixty-five mile- stones, he was ordered by the
Secretary of Justice on July 1, 1924, to vacate the office. Since that
date, Pedro Noel, the auxiliary justice of the peace has acted as
justice of the peace for the municipality of Dumanjug.
Mr. Segovia being desirous of avoiding a public scandal and of
opposing physical resistance to the occupancy of the office of
justice of the peace by the auxiliary justice of the peace, instituted
friendly quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu to inquire into the right of Pedro Noel to occupy the office of
justice of the peace, to oust the latter therefrom, and to procure
reinstatement as justice of the peace of Dumanjug. To this
complaint, Pedro Noel interposed a demurrer on the ground that
it did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,
because Act No. 3107 was constitutional and because Mr. Segovia
being sixty-five years old had automatically ceased to be justice of
the peace. On the issue thus framed and on stipulated facts,
judgment was rendered by Honorable Adolph Wislizenus, Judge of
First Instance, overruling the demurrer, and in favor of petitioner
and against respondent.
Proceeding by way of elimination so as to resolve the case into its
simplest factors, it will first be noted that the petitioner abandons
the untenable position, assumed by him in one portion of his
complaint, to the effect that section 1 of Act No. 3107 is
unconstitutional in that it impairs the contractual right of the
petitioner to an office. It is a fundamental principle that a public
office cannot be regarded as the property of the incumbent, and
that a public office is not a contract.
It will next be noted that, while the respondent as appellant
assigns three errors in this court, the first two relating to
preliminary matters are ultimately renounced by him in order that
there may be an authoritative decision on the main issue. The
third error specified and argued with ability by the provincial fiscal
of Cebu, is that the trial judge erred in declaring that the limitation
regarding the age of justices of the peace provided by section 1 of
Act No. 3107 is not applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary
justices of the peace appointed and acting before said law went
into effect.
Coming now to the law, we find on investigation the original
provision pertinent to the appointment and term of office of
justices of the peace, in section 67 of Act No. 136, wherein it was
provided that justices of the peace shall hold office during the
pleasure of the Commission. Act No. 1450, in force when Vicente
Segovia was originally appointed justice of the peace, amended
section 67 of the Judiciary Law by making the term of office of
justices and auxiliary justices of the peace two years from the first
Monday in January nearest the date of appointment. Shortly after
Segovia's appointment, however, the law was again amended by
Act No. 1627 by providing that "all justices of the peace and
auxiliary justices of the peace shall hold office during good
behavior and those now in office shall so continue." Later
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 9 (FULL TEXT)
amended by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2617, the law was ultimately
codified in sections 203 and 206 of the Administrative Code.
Codal section 203 in its first paragraph provides that "one justice
of the peace and one auxiliary justice of the peace shall be
appointed by the Governor-General for the City of Manila, the City
of Baguio, and for each municipality, township, and municipal
district in the Philippine Islands, and if the public interests shall so
require, for any other minor political division or unorganized
territory in said Islands." It was this section which section 1 of Act
No. 3107 amended by adding at the end thereof the following
proviso: "Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace
shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of
sixty-five years." But section 206 of the Administrative Code
entitled "Tenure of office," and reading "a justice of the peace
having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during
good behavior unless his office be lawfully abolished or merged in
the jurisdiction of some other justice," was left unchanged by Act
No. 3107.
A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates
prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative
intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express
terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Following the
lead of the United States Supreme Court and putting the rule
more strongly, a statute ought not to receive a construction
making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear,
strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to
them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be
otherwise satisfied. No court will hold a statute to be retroactive
when the legislature has not said so. As our Civil Code has it in
article 3, "Law shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein
otherwise provided." (Farrel vs. Pingree [1888], 5 Utah, 443; 16
Pac., 843; Greer vs. City of Asheville [1894], 114 N.C., 495; United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. vs. Struthers Wells Co. [1907],
209 U.S., 306; Montilla vs. Agustinian Corporation [1913], 24 Phil.,
220; In re will of Riosa [1918], 39 Phil., 23.)
The same rule is followed by the courts with reference to public
offices. A well-known New York decision held that "though there
is no vested right in an office, which may not be disturbed by
legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office.
If that right is to be taken away by statute, the terms should be
clear in which the purpose is stated." (People ex rel. Ryan vs.
Green [1874], 58 N.Y., 295.) In another case, a new constitutional
provision as to the advanced age which should prevent the
incumbents of certain judicial offices from retaining them was
held prospective; it did not apply to persons in office at the time
of its taking effect. (People vs. Gardner, 59 Barb., 198; II Lewis'
Sutherland Statutory Construction, Chap. XVII, particularly pages
1161, 1162; Mechem on Public Officers, sec. 389.)
The case at bar is not the same as the case of Chanco vs. Imperial (
[1916], 34 Phil., 329). In that case, the question was as to the
validity of section 7 of Act No. 2347. The law under consideration
not only provided that Judges of First Instance shall serve until
they have reached the age of sixty-five years, but it further
provided "that the present judges of Courts of First Instance ...
vacate their positions on the taking effect of this Act: and the
Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine
Commission, shall make new appointments of judges of Courts of
First Instance ... ." There the intention of the Legislature to vacate
the office was clearly expressed. Here, it is not expressed at all.
The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section 203 of the
Administrative Code, gives no indication of retroactive effect. The
law signifies no purpose of operating upon existing rights. A
proviso was merely tacked on to section 203 of the Administrative
Code, while leaving intact section 206 of the same Code which
permits justices of the peace to hold office during good behavior.
In the absence of provisions expressly making the law applicable
to justices of the peace then in office, and in the absence of
provisions impliedly indicative of such legislative intent, the courts
would not be justified in giving the law an interpretation which
would legislate faithful public servants out of office.
Answering the question with which we began our decision, we
hold that the proviso added to section 203 of the Administrative
Code by section 1 of Act No. 3107, providing that justices and
auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until
they have reached the age of sixty-five years, should be given
prospective effect only, and so is not applicable to justices of the
peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed before Act No.
3107 went into force. Consequently, it results that the decision of
the trial court is correct in its findings of fact and law and in its
disposition of the case.
Judgment affirmed, without costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-2671. August 30, 1950.
ANICETA IBURAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAGDALENO LABES,
Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RICE TENANCY LAW HAS NO
RETROACTIVE EFFECT. — Statutes are presumed to be prospective
only in their operation rather retrospective or retroactive, unless
the contrary clearly appears, or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied. (59 C.J., 1169,
1170.) So where, by it terms, a statute is to apply "hereafter" or
thereafter," or is to take effect at a fixed future date, or
immediately, or which contains, in the enacting clause, the phrase
"from and after the passing of this Act," or contains the words
"shall have been made," or from and after," a designated date . . .,
it is prospective only ion the operation (Idem, 1159.)
2. ID.; ID.; PENDING CASES AT ITS ENFORCEMENT. — The
presumption is stronger against retroactivity of a statute with
reference to pending actions or proceedings. It has been generally
held that "no statute shall be construed as to give it retroactive
effect so as to affect pending litigation." Statutes which affect or
change a remedy are presumed intended to exempt pending cases
and proceedings their operation unless the contrary appears.
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
This was an action of unlawful detainer begun in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Carcar, Cebu. The single question presented on
appeal has to do with the Justice of the Peace’s jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case as one of unlawful detainer, as he did. It is
the contention of the defendant and appellant that the allegations
in the complaint bring the case within the provisions of Act No.
4054, known as Tenancy Law, and its amendments.
It should be stated that section 29 of Act No. 4054, which was
approved on February 27, 1933, provides "That this Act shall take
effect only in the provinces where the majority of the municipal
councils shall, by resolution, have petitioned for its application to
the Governor-General, who thereupon shall, by proclamation, fix
the date when this law shall take effect in said provinces," and
that it was only on November 12, 1946, when that Act as
amended was declared in full force and effect in Cebu by
Executive Proclamation No. 14 of the President. It should be also
stated that on the date of the proclamation, the present case had
been decided by the Justice of the Peace against the defendant,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 9 (FULL TEXT)
the latter had appealed to the Court of First Instance, the plaintiff
had reproduced her complaint and the defendant had filed his
answer in the latter court, and execution of the Justice of the
Peace’s judgment had been issued although the execution
apparently had not been carried out. It thus only remained for the
Court of First Instance to hear and decide the action.
Statutes are presumed to be prospective only in their operation
Statutes are presumed to be prospective only in their operation
rather than retrospective or retroactive, unless the contrary
clearly appears, or is clearly, plainly, and unequivocally expressed
or necessarily implied. (59 C. J., 1169, 1170.) So where, by its
terms, a statute is to apply "hereafter" or "thereafter", or is to
take effect at a fixed future date, or immediately, or which
contains, in the enacting clause, the phrase "from and after the
passing of this Act," or contains the words "shall have been
made," or "from and after," a designated date . . ., it is prospective
only in operation. (Idem, 1159.) .
The presumption is stronger against retroactivity of a statute with
reference to pending actions or proceedings. It has been generally
held that "no statute shall be so construed as to give it retroactive
effect so as to affect pending litigation." (Idem, 1174 75.)
"Statutes which affect or change a remedy are presumed intended
to exempt pending cases and proceedings from their operation
unless the contrary appears." (Idem, Note 55-b, 1175.) .
Proclamation No. 14 declared "The Philippine Rice Share Tenancy
Act to be in full force and effect from and after the date of this
proclamation throughout the Philippines." These words clearly
import an intent to make the proclamation prospective.
The provision of Act No. 4045 that the date of its effectivity in a
given province was to be fixed by the Chief Executive depending
upon the wishes of the majority of the municipal councils thereof,
is the strongest argument against the theory that such
proclamation when issued should cover previous cases. Obviously
there was in the mind of the Legislature no pressing need for the
application of this legislation, when it was passed, to all the
provinces. Hand in hand with this idea was the notion that the
conditions affecting the relations between landlords and tenants
in a given province did not demand the operation of the law
therein before Proclamation No. 14 was promulgated.
Judge Moscoso denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that
the case "refers to undelivered share of the products of the land in
question by the tenants to the owner of the land," adding that "it
is clear that the Tenancy Act which was made applicable to the
Province of Cebu by Proclamation No. 14 dated November 12,
1946, only, does not cover the present action." Yet in giving
judgment for the plaintiff "declaring here with right to the
possession of the lands in question and ordering the defendant to
vacate and restore it to her, to pay to her the products from 1945
to 1946 amounting to eight (8) cavanes of palay to the total value
of P200," the Judge declined to "make pronouncement as to the
products for 1947 in view of the aforesaid executive proclamation.
Closely analyzed, this decision seems to us self-contradictory, and
if totally allowed to stand, might lead to conflicts,
misunderstandings and anomalies. In adjudicating to the plaintiff
the possession of the land and the landlord’s share of the crop for
two years and refusing to make any adjudication with respect to
the rent or share for the subsequent years, the decision does not
explain how and where the latter rent or share should be
recovered. Apparently the intention of the lower court was that
this matter should be brought before an agency created by the
Land Tenancy Act. If this be the case, the action of the
Department of Justice or its representative would be confined to
the fixing of the share, which might be different from that found
by the court for 1945 and 1946, but that department would have
no authority to determine the right of the landlord to dismiss the
tenant. If, on the contrary, the court contemplates that the
Department of Justice or its representative should take
jurisdiction of the case in all its aspects, then that should carry the
authority to annul the decision of the lower court, which would be
an incongruity — it should be from the standpoint of the trial
court.
It is quite plain that the court erred in granting part of the relief
asked for and refusing to take jurisdiction over another part of it.
Jurisdiction over remedies of the same nature arising from the
same cause of action is indivisible. It is the policy of the courts to
determine the entire controversy between litigants. Accordingly,
jurisdiction carries with it the power to hear and determine every
issue or question properly arising in the case, to do any and all
things with reference thereto authorized by law, and to grant full
and complete relief. (21 C. J. S., 135, 136.) Where a court originally
obtains and exercises jurisdiction, jurisdiction will not be
overturned and impaired by any legislative enactment unless
express prohibitory words are used, and jurisdiction duly acquired
under an existing statute is not taken away by a subsequent
statute prescribing a different method of commencing an action.
(Idem. 148.)
However, the plaintiff has not appealed from the lower court’s
decision and we are not at liberty to modify it in her favor. Under
the circumstances, we only can, and do hereby, reserve her right
to claim whatever rent or share of the crop who may be entitled
to for 1947 and/or subsequent years, in a separate action at law,
not in the Department of Justice or through any of its
instrumentalities.
With this reservation and modification of the appealed decision,
judgment is affirmed with costs against the Appellant.
G.R. No. L-18260 January 27, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NORBERTO PAREL, defendant-appellant.
OSTRAND, J.:
Upon an information filed nearly two years after the commission
of the offense, the defendant was found guilty of having, as an
election inspector, aided illiterate voters in preparing their ballots
at the general election held June 3, 1919, without being
accompanied by an election inspector of the opposite political
party and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for the term of
three months under section 2639 of the Administrative Code,
which makes an election official "who wilfully declines or fails to
perform any duty or obligation imposed by the Election Law"
criminally liable and provides a penalty therefor of imprisonment
for not less than one month and not more than one year or a fine
of not less than P200 and not more than P500 or both.
The case is now before us upon a motion to quash the
proceedings on the ground that the action is barred through the
retroactive effect of section 71 of Act No. 3030, which provides for
a period of prescription of one year for offenses resulting from the
Act.
The Election Law is contained in Chapter 18 and parts of Chapter
65 of the Administrative Code. Act No. 3030 is entitled "An Act to
amend certain sections and parts of sections of chapter eighteen,
known as the Election Law, and chapter sixty-five, on penalties for
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 9 (FULL TEXT)
violations of certain administrative laws, of Act Numbered
Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, entitled 'An Act amending the
Administrative Code,' to make more effective the provisions and
purpose of said Election Law, and for the other purposes." All of
its sections, except the last two, are by their terms amendatory of
the corresponding sections of the Election Iaw as embodied in the
Administrative Code. The last two sections of the Act read:
SEC. 71. Offenses resulting from violations of this Act shall
prescribe one year after their commission.
SEC. 72. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Previously to the enactment of Act No. 3030 there was no
limitation to action for violations of the Election Law and the
question presented for our consideration is whether section 71 of
the later Act is retroactive to the extent of making the period of
limitation or prescription there provided for applicable to
violations of the Election Law committed before March 9, 1922,
the date upon which the later, or amendatory, Act No. 3030 went
into effect.
In most states of the American Union the rule prevails that a
statute of limitations of criminal actions is on a parity with a
similar statute for civil actions and has no retroactive effect unless
the statute itself expressly so provides, and practically all of the
authorities cited in support of the theory that such is also the rule
here, are upon that point. As from our point of view the rule
stated does not obtain in the Philippine Islands, these authorities
have, in our opinion, no bearing whatever upon the question here
at issue and we shall therefore devote neither time nor space to
their further discussion.
In our opinion, the determination of the present case clearly
hinges upon the construction of articel 22 of the Penal Code,
which reads as follows:
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor
the person guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving same.
This article is of Spanish origin, is based on Latin principles, and it
seems, indeed, too obvious for arguments that we, in its
interpretation, must have recourse to Spanish or Latin
jurisprudence. In the case of United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil., 241),
this court held that "neither English nor American common law is
in force in these Islands, nor are the doctrines derived therefrom
binding upon our courts, save only in so far as they are founded
on sound principles applicable to local conditions, and are not in
conflict with existing law." In that case the Spanish doctrine
invoked was more unfavorable to the accused that the common
law rule, but was, nevertheless, adopted by the court. In the
present case, the Spanish doctrine is more favorable to the
accused and considering the well-known principle that penal laws
are to be construed most liberally in favor of the accused, we have
stronger reasons here than existed in the Cuna casae for rejecting
the American doctrine as to the irretroactivity of penal statutes.
Both consistency and sound legal principles, therefore, demand
that we, in this case, seek our precedents in Latin rather than in
American jurisprudence.
For a long period it has been the settled doctrine in countries
whose criminal laws are based on the Latin system that such laws
are retroactive in so far as they favor the accused. (Fiore,
Irretroactividad e Interpretacion de las Leyes, p. 401.) In Spain and
in the Philippine Islands this doctrine is, as we have seen, re-
inforced by statutory enactment, and is even made applicable to
cases where "final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving same."
But it is argued (1) that the Election law is a special law to which
the provisions of article 22 of the Penal Code are not applicable;
(2) that the subject of prescription or limitation of actions falls
within the domain of adjective law and cannot be considered
penal law within the meaning of article 22, and (3) that the period
of prescription provided for in section 71 of Act No. 3030 is, by the
terms of that section, limited to offenses resulting from the
violation of that Act and does not affect offenses made punishable
by prior legislation.
(1) The first point mentioned must be considered settled by
previous decisions both of this court and of the supreme court of
Spain. In the case of United States vs. Hocbo (12 Phil., 304), article
22 was applied to Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Commission; in
United States vs. Parrone (24 Phil., 29) and United States vs.
Almencion (25 Phil., 648), to Acts Nos. 1189 and 2126; and in
sentences of the supreme court of Spain of July 13, 1889 and April
26, 1892, it was held applicable to the penal provisions in the
Spanish Electoral Law. All of these decisions are well supported
both by reason and by authorities and must now be regarded as
the law of the land upon this subject.
(2) In regard to the second point that the subject of prescription of
penalties and of penal actions pertains to remedial and not to
substantive law, it is to be observed that in the Spanish legal
system, provisions for limitation or prescription of actions are
invariably classified as substantive and not as remedial law; we
thus find the provisions for the prescription of criminal actions in
the Penal Code and not in the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal. This
is in reality a more logical classification than the one obtaining in
the American criminal law. In criminal cases prescription is not,
strictly speaking, a matter of procedure; it bars or cuts off the
right to punish the crime and, consequently, goes directly to the
substance of the action. We are confident that no Spanish lawyer
will be found to assert that criminal procedure is not a branch of
criminal or penal law. Moreover, we might simply call attention to
the fact that in the case of United States vs. Hocbo, supra, article
22 of the Penal Code was applied to what, in the American law,
would be considered a remedial provisions, and there let the
matter rest. But it is argued that the decision in the case of United
States vs. Hocbo, supra, is erroneous and that the term "Leyes
Penales" employed in article 22 of the Penal Code has reference
merely to laws providing for penalties, this contention being
based largely on the fact that the chapter in which article 22 is
found bears the title or heading "Penalties in General," and we
shall therefore enter more fully into the discussion of this point,
especially as it, in our opinion, is the turning point of the case.
It may be conceded that if the arrangement of the various
subjects or topics contained in the Code were more logical or
rigid, there might be some force in the contention that the
retroactivity provided for in article 22 relates only to penalties,
and not to prescription, in criminal cases. But examining the
chapter embracing article 22, we find that of the four articles
therein contained, only one, article 24, relates expressly to
penalties; article 21 provides that no crime shall be punishable by
any penalty not prescribe by law prior to its commission and is, in
a certain sense, a limitation upon criminal actions; article 23 deals
with the effect of pardons and with civil liability. Under these
circumstance, it is difficult to find room for the conclusion that the
intermediate article 22 must relate only to penalties and not to
limitations upon the imposing of penalties or upon the bringing of
penal actions.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 9 (FULL TEXT)
Fiore, whose work on the irretroactivity of statutes is regarded as
a legal classic in Latin countries, in discussing the question under
consideration says:
Indeed when the new law reduces the period of prescription
of criminal actions or establishes easier requirements to give
the prescription effect, it is event that the reduction conceded
by the new implies an acknowledgment on the part of the
sovereign power that the more severe requirements of the
former law were unjust in regard to the essence of the
criminal action. Consequently, if the sovereign power should
enforce its right under the former law it would be guilty of an
inconsistency in view of its implied admission that the old law
was too severe and consequently unjust. The necessity
therefore of applying the less severe new law rests upon the
principle that the sovereign power cannot exercise its right to
punish except only within those limits of justice which that
sovereign power has established as being just and equitable at
the time of exercising that right.
On the other hand, when the new prespective law is more
rigid than the former, whether as to the admissibility of the
prescription itself or as to the conditions and time required for
its effectiveness, care must be taken that that law is not
applied to crimes committed before its enactment, not
because the accused has acquired any right so to prevent its
application, but for the reasons that we have already stated.
What right right can the accused have to endeavor to prevent
that which the sovereign power has the right to do in order to
preserve public order? Let us not talk therefore of vested
rights of the accused, but let us say it, and with emphasis, that
the reason for the irretroactivity of the more severe law is
found in the principle that the sovereign power cannot,
without committing an injustice, apply the more severe
prescriptive provisions; and those provisions cannot be justly
applied if they have not been previously promulgated. And the
rights itself to punish does not arise except by virtue of a law
promulgated and in force at the time of the commission of the
crime. The more rigid the prescriptive law the more enlarged
the field of criminal prosecution and this affects the substance
thereof, because it fixes the basis and the sphere of the right
to punish. And can all of these be done by the sovereign
power without any law? Can that power, without doing an
injustice, extend the effects of the new law to said acts
committed before its enactment? For the same reasons which
prevent the sovereign power from punishing those acts that
have not expressly been made punishable as crimes by the
former law or from imposing the more severe penalties
provided in the new law when such acts have been committed
before those penalties were established by legislative
enactment, so also it cannot enlarge the criminal action (that
is to say, its right to punish) by a subsequent law and apply to
acts executed before its enactment the less favorable
provisions of prescription therein established. . . .
For the reasons stated, we come to the conclusion that, as a
matter of justice which must regulate all the elements of a
criminal action, that the accused must be given the benefit of
the provisons of the new law when more favorable to him and
that, unless there should be final and conclusive judgment at
the time, we must also admit in matters of prescription that
the new law, when less severe, should be applied. The same
principle applies when the modifications introduced by the
law refer to the prescription of the penalty, because in its
substance the prescription of the penalty is equivalent to the
prescription of the criminal action. (Fiore, Irretroactividad e
Interpretacion de las Leyes, pp. 426-428.)
We have here quoted the leading Latin authority on the
retroactive of statutes and there can be no doubt that the
doctrine stated by him is of general acceptance in countries whose
legislation is founded on Latin principles; at least, we have found
nothing to the contrary. Considering that the men who prepared
the Penal Code were steeped in the principles of Latin law, it is
impossible to escape the conclusion that they had these principles
in mind in formulating article 22 and intended it to apply to
criminal law in general and not merely to the branch thereof
which deals with the duration or measure of penalties. It is very
true that due, perhaps, to the fact that there have been no
changes in the provisions of the Penal Code in regard to the
prescription of actions, there are no direct adjudications by the
supreme court of Spain upon the subject and the Spanish
commentators on the Code have generally discussed article 22 in
its relation to the measure of penalties merely, but this
circumstance does not, of course, affect the principle involved and
is not necessarily of any special significance.
It may be interesting to note in passing that the same principle has
also met with the approval of high American authority. Wharton,
in his work on Criminal Pleading and Practice, 9th ed., says in
section 316:
While, as will be hereafter seen, courts look with disfavor on
prosecutions that have been unduly delayed, there is, at
common law, no absolute limitation which prevents the
prosecution of offences after a specified time has arrived.
Statutes to this effect have been passed in Englang and in the
United States, which we now proceed to consider. We should
at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying
to statutes of limitations in criminal suits the construction that
has been given to statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two
classes of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil
suits the statute is interposed by the legislature as an impartial
arbiter between two contending parties. In the construction of
the statute, therefore, there is no intendment to be made in
favor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other;
there is therefore no grantor against whom the ordinary
presumptions of construction are to be made. But it is
otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the State.
Here the State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its
rights to prosecute, and declaring the offence to be no longer
the subject of prosecution. The statute is not a statute of
process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty,
declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over
the offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to
his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that
from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his
innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it
is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in
favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of
construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but
because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and
notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it
gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it
fixed and positive periods in which it destroy proofs of guilt.
Independently of these views, it must be remembered that
delay in instituting prosecuting is not only productive of
expense to the State, but of peril to public justice in the
attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of
memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law that
prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes enforcing
such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are
not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State
upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 9 (FULL TEXT)
secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be
obtained.
Now, considering the genesis of article 22 of the Penal Code and
its underlying principles as above stated, can there be any doubt
as to its meaning in regard to any particular offense? It can only
mean what it in slightly different language says; namely, that
whenever a new statute dealing with crimes establishes
conditions more lenient or favorable to the accused in regard to a
certain offense, the statute becomes retroactive as to the offense
and the accused must receive the benefit of the new conditions
no matter whether the offense was committed before or after the
enactment of the new statute.
That the article is still in force is beyond question. As long as it so
remains in force it is of general application to all penal statutes,
past, present, and future, and furnishes the rule for determining
to what extent they are retroactive or merely prospective. It
follows that unless a penal or criminal statute expressly, or by
necessary implication, provides that it shall not be regarded as
retroactive, it becomes subject to the rule laid down by that
article.
(3) We will now turn to the third point raised, i. e., that section 71
of Act No. 3030 by its terms is applicable only to offenses resulting
from that Act and cannot be given retroactive effect.
In view of the fact that Act No. 3030 is only amendatory of the
Election Law, we think it is fair to presume that section 71 was
intended by the Legislature as an amendment to the Election Law
in order to remedy an obvious and quite serious defect in that
law. From this point of view, there can, of course, be no doubt
that the period of prescription fixed by the section applies to all
election offenses alike whether committed before Act No. 3030
went into effect or not.
But it is vigorously argued that the language of the section is so
plain as to make any interpretation unnecessary and that when a
section of the Act says "this Act" it means the Act in which it
occurs and no other. As far as the present case is concerned, both
theories will lead to the same result if article 22 of the Penla Code
is taken into consideration and we shall, therefore, for the
purposes of the argument, take the language of the section
literally and assume that the period of prescription it establishes
relates only to offenses defined and penalized in Act No. 3030.
Comparing the penal provisions of the Election Law with those of
Act No. 3030, it will be found that practically all of the offenses
defined in the former law are also defined in the same language in
Act No. 3030, the only difference being that the penalties have
been increased.
We repeat that article 22 of the Penal Code applies to all penal
statutes alike and furnishes our only guidance in determining the
extent to which a penal statute is retroactive. Unless the statute is
taken out of its operation either by express provisions of law or by
necessary implication, the article applies. There is, as far as we can
see, absolutely nothing in Act No. 3030 indicating that it is not
subject to exactly the same measure of retroactivity as any other
penal statute. Retroactivity, as we here speak of it, means of
course, retroactibity as to particular penal offenses, and bearing
this in mind in connection with the provisions of article 22, does it
not, then, seem obvious that if an offense was defined and made
punishable by the Election Law as contained in the Administrative
Code and is defined in exactly the same language in the
amendatory Act No. 3030 with merely an increase in the penalty,
article 22 of the Penal Code must be held to be applicable and that
in all in which the new law is more favorable to the accused it
becomes retroactive as to that offense?
An illustration, by way of analogy, may, perhaps, make this even
clearer: Let us suppose that a statute is enacted defining the crime
of murder in the same language in which it is defined in the Penal
Code, but providing that the maximum penalty for the crime
defined in the new statute shall be life imprisonment, the statute
containing no provision that it shall not be retroactive in its effect.
Would anyone then maintain that the death penalty might still be
imposed for murder committed before the new statute was
enacted? For a court to so hold would obviously amount to a
judicial repeal of the article. And in this respect there can be no
difference in principle between the offense of murder and an
election offense.
In the present case we have a situation identical in principle with
the state of facts we have assumed in our illustration. The
defendant was convicted by the Court of First Instance under
section 2639 of the Administrative Code of the offense of having
failed, as an election inspector, "to perform any duty or obligation
imposed by the Election Law." Section 49 of Act No. 3030, in
amending section 2639 of the Administrative Code, defines the
offense in question in exactly the same language as failing "to
perform any duty or obligation imposed by the Election Law," and
only increased the penalty; the offense is exactly the same under
both sections. Consequently, if we hold that the prescription
provided for in section 71 applies to all offenses defined and
penalized in Act No. 3030 and not merely to offenses there
defined and made punishable for the first time and we further
hold, as we must, that article 22 of the Penal Code is applicable to
all penal statutes, including those for the limitation of penal
actions, and not merely to the measure of the penalty, the
conclusion is irresistible and unaviodable that the present action,
not having been instituted within the prespective period fixed by
section 71 of Act No. 3030, must be dismissed.
A strong appeal has been made to our emotions by describing in
rather vivid colors the disastrous consequences which will result
from the dismissal of action in which the accused have already
been convicted of election offenses by the trial courts and it has
been intimated that for us to impute to the Legislature the
intention of bringing about such a state of affairs would constitute
a serious reflection not only on the honor of the Legislature but
also on this court.
As to this we can only say that it is our duty to apply the law as we
find it; that it is also our duty to observe the rule that the
defendant in a criminal case is entitled to the benefit of all
reasonable doubts, both as to the facts and as to the law; and that
we believe that the interests both of justice and of the public
welfare will be best served by this court doing its duty without
fear or favor. We should, indeed, be recreant to that duty were
we to allow our zeal for the punishment of crime to lead us to
distort the language of plain provisions of the law in a sense
adversely to the accused. In regard to the presents case, we also
believe that the disadvantages of the uncertainly and confusion
which would eventually result from a forced construction of the
law would much more than offset the advantages of securing the
convictions and imprisonment for a few months of a relatively
small number of infractors of the Election Law. The decision of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Weems vs. United
States (217 U.S., 349) had much more serious consequences in
this respect, yet, that court did not hesitate there to interpret the
law according to its best judgment.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 9 (FULL TEXT)
In the same connection, but speaking for myself only, I will frankly
confess that not only do I not share the gloomy forebodings of
some of the members of this court as to the practical effect of our
interpretation of law, but that neither am I convinced that the
action of the Legislature in making the one year period of
prescription retroactive was wholly inadvisable.
Where political parties represent personal followings rather than
divergent political principles, changes in political allegiance are
frequent and it is therefore especially important that election
offenses be brought before the courts promptly. If several years
are allowed to elapse before the prosecution is instituted, many of
the voters may, in the meantime, have become dissatisfied with
their former party connections or, in effect, resentful towards the
leading members of the party. Such persons are usually willing
witnesses for the prosecution of their former party associates, are
particularly dangerous to the accused by reason of the inside
information they are supposed to possess, and their testimony is
likely to be given greater credit than that of persons known to
have belonged to a party opposed to that of the accused. And it is
no reflection on the ability and integrity of the judiciary to say that
judges, knowing as they do that irregularities have, unfortunately,
been quite common in past elections, are frequently inclined to
look with suspicion upon an election official accused of an
infraction of the Election Law and to turn the usual presumption
of innocence into a presumption of guilt. Under such circumstance
it is not to be expected that the motives prompting the witnesses
for the prosecution will be very closely scrutinized. It therefore
seems to me that the Legislature has acted wisely in providing a
short period of prescription of elections offenses, so that unless
the offense is sufficiently obvious and grave to attract the
attention of the prosecuting authorities within that period, the
matter will be allowed to rest. What is true as to future offenses is
also, to some extent, true of similar offenses in the past, and I can
therefore see no very serious objections to the retroactivity of the
prescription. It is, of course, to be regretted if guilty persons
escape well-deserved punishment, but it is more important that
no innocent man be made to suffer punishment unjustly.
For an illustration I need not to go beyond the present case: The
accused was an election inspector in the elections of June, 1919.
In the precinct where he was acting there were two inspectors of
the Partido Democrata and only one of the Partido Nacionalista.
The law required an inspector in writing the ballots of illiterate or
incapacitated voters. The defendant is accused of having written
ballots without being so accompanied and is prosecuted under
section 2639 of the Administrative Code, which makes it a penal
offense "to wilfully decline or fail to perform any duty or
obligation imposed by the Election Law." As will be seen, in order
to constitute a penal offense the refusal or failure must be wilful.
Wilfulness is therefore an element of the crime and must be
alleged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
In penal statutes the word " 'wilfully' means with evil intent or
with legal malice or with a bad purpose" (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary), and I have been unable to find anything in the
evidence which can even raise a presumption of that kind of
wilfulness on the part of the accused, though there is, perhaps,
sufficient proof that each of the three inspectors wrote ballots or
parts of ballots for illiterate or disabled voters without being
accompanied by another inspector.
The principal witness for the prosecution is the Nacionalista
inspector. He piously asserts that he protested against the
practice followed by the board of inspectors and that he, for his
part, always had Norberto Parel, the accused, accompany him in
writing ballots. He admits, however, that after having written, the
first few names on the ballots, Parel would leace with, but that he,
the witness, continued to write the rest of the names on the
ballots unaccompanied. He further states that he did not offer to
accompany the other inspectors because he was too busy writing
ballots himself and continued to be so occupied until late in the
afternoon. The protest he alleges to have made does not appear
upon the returns and the other inspectors deny that he made any
protest whatever. The testimony of the other witnesses for the
prosecution is limited to statements that they saw the two
Democrata inspectors write ballots for illiterate persons without
being accompanied by other inspectors. There is no evidence in
the record that any frauds were committed in the writing of the
ballots.
Exhibit D of the prosecution shows that there were 277 voters
unable to write their ballots, an unusually large number. In view of
the fact that there was only one Nacionalista inspector, a full
compliance with the law would have required his presence at the
writing of every one of the 277 ballots, a practical impossibility
when it is considered that the writing of ballots did not commence
until 8 a. m. (see testimony of Justino Pre, witness for the
prosecution) and that the polls must close at 6 p.m. Any attempt
to carry out the letter of the law would have led to the closing of
the polls before the termination of the voting. As far as the record
shows this may very well have been the reason for the failure of
the inspectors to strictly observe the law and they may have acted
in good faith.
The trial court found the defendant guilty and in view of the fact
that the word "wilfully," depending on the context, is sometimes
used as a synonym for "intentionally" and that it, in the Spanish
text of the Election Law, is transfered into "voluntariamente," I am
not so sure but that this court would have affirmed the judgment.
It may be noted that the facts in case R.G. No. 182611 are exactly
the same as in the present case. Personally, I view the dismissal of
the case with complete equanimity; we cannot purify elections by
giving penal statutes a harsher interpretation than evidently
intended by the lawmakers. An attempt on our part to do so may
possibly have the opposite effect by making it more difficult to
secure competent election officials and will produce the inevitable
reaction, either in the form of executive clemency or in over-
lenient legislation. We have had instances of such reactions in the
past.
Including the present, there are eleven cases before this court
which will be affected by this decision; according to information
furnished by the Attorney-General, there are also three cases
pending decision in the Courts of First Instance and fourteen cases
pending trial in which prosecution has not been instituted within a
year from the date of the discovery of the alleged offense. In
some of these cases the prosecution is, no doubt, meritorious,
but, in view of the delay in presenting the complaints, it is not
unreasonable to assume that most of them are more or less of the
character of the present case.
It may be stated, in this connection, that the accuracy of the
figures here given as to cases pending and involving the principle
under discussion has been questioned on the strength of a list of
cases furnished Mr. Justice Malcolm by the Attorney-General. An
examination of the sources of this list, consisting of
communications from the clerks of the various Courts of First
Instance, reveals, however, that the great majority of the cases
there enumerated involve prosecutions for offenses committed in
connection with the general elections of 1922 and are not
affected by the present decision. Such examination also shows
that the figures here qouted are correct.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 9 (FULL TEXT)
More than three years have passed since the elections of 1919
and the Election Law has since been so amended as to remedy
many of the defects which offered temptations and opportunities
for infractions of the law and rendered the placing of the
responsibility for such infractions difficult. Under the
circumstances, it is by no means certain that the Legislature has
acted unwisely in wiping the state clean and casting oblivion over
election offenses the prosecution of which has not, after so many
years, been brought to a conclusion. In any event, the impending
alleged calamity is not so grave a nature as to justify a court in
misinterpreting the law in order to avert it.
For the reasons stated, the motion is granted and the present case
is hereby dismissed, with all costs de oficio. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Avanceña, Villamor, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-7140 December 22, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESTEBAN
ZETA, defendant-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Samar, finding Esteban Zeta guilty of a violation of Republic Act
No. 145 (which took effect on June 14, 1947), for having solicited,
charged demanded and collected a fee or compensation of P300
for assisting on Eugenio Albiza in the preparation, presentation
and prosecution of his claim for benefits under the laws of the
United States.
Eugenio Albiza, an enlisted man of the Philippine Army and later
of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE),
suffered disability in the course of rendering services for the army
in Aparri, Cagayan in the year 1942. On November 6, 1946, he
promised to pay Mr. Esteban Zeta 5 per cent of any mount he may
receive as a result of his claim for backpay, insurance or any other
privileges granted by law (Exhibit 1). Zeta prepared the necessary
papers for disability compensation and as a result Albiza received
the sum of P5,919 from the United States Veterans
Administration. In pursuance of the contract, Albiza paid Zeta the
sums of P200 on June 7, 1951 and P100 on June 11, 1951.
The law in force at the time of the execution of that agreement
(Exhibit 1) was Commonwealth Act No. 675, section 11 of which
provides as follows:
No attorney, agent, or other person in charge of the
preparation, filing, or pursuing of any claim for arrears in pay
and allowances under this Act shall demand or charge for his
services fees more than five per centum of the total money
value of such arrears in pay and allowances, and said fees shall
become due and demandable only after the payment of the
said arrears in pay and allowances is received by the widow or
orplan entitled thereto. The retention or deduction of any
amount from any such arrears in pay and allowances for the
payment of fees for such services is prohibited A violation of
any provision of this section shall be punished by
imprisonment of from 6 months to 1 year, or by a fine of from
six hundred to one thousand pesos, or by both such
imprisonment and fine,
But on June 14, 1947, Republic Act No. 145 was passed. It
provides:
Any person assisting a claimant in the preparation,
presentation and prosecution of his claim for benefits under
the laws of the United States administered by the United
States Veterans Administration who shall, directly or
indirectly, solicit, contract for, charge, or receive,m or who
shall attempt to solicit, contract for, charge, or receive any fee
or compensation exceeding twenty pesos in any one claim, or
who shall collect his fee before the claim is actually paid to a
beneficiary or claimant, shall be deemed guilty of an offense
and upon conviction therof shall for every offense be fined not
exceeding one thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding
two years or both, in the discretion of the court.
The trial court held that upon the passage of Republic Act No. 145,
the agreement for the payment of a 5 per cent fee on the amount
collected was voided and compliance therewith became illegal; so
it sentenced the defendant-appellant to pay a fine of P200, to
indemnify Eugenio Albiza in the sum of P280, or suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
On this appeal, defendant-appellant's counsel contends that the
application of Republic Act No. 145 to the defendant-appellant for
having charged and collected the fee of 5 per cent is an
infringement of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws. And the case of U.S. vs. Diaz Conde, et al., 42 Phil., 766, is
cited for the principle that law impairing the obligations of a
contract is null and void; that a law must be construed
prospectively, not retroactively, so that if it is legal at its
inceptionit can not be declared illegal by subsequent legislation,
otherwise the sanctity of contracts will be impaired in violation of
the organic law. In this case the defendant-appellant had collected
interest in the years 1915 and 1916 at the rate of 5 per cent per
month, an interest in excess of that authorized by the Usury Law
(Act No. 2655), which took effect In May, 1916, and the court held
that the collection of the said interest was legal at the time it was
made and that it cannot be declared illegal by any subsequent
legislation. This case is not exactly in point, because when the
Usury Law was passed the interest had already been collected;
whereas in the case at bar the collection of the fee was effected
after Republic Act No. 145 had been passed. The claim that said
Act is an ex post facto law is not fully justified because although
the services were rendered before the Act took effect, collection
for said services did not take place until after the law became
effective.
In defense of the judgment of conviction, the Solicitor General
argues that contracts are not beyond the reach of legislation by
Congress in the proper exercise of the police power of the State,
and as Republic Act No. 145 was enacted in pursuance thereto, its
applicability to the appellant must be sustained; that the rights of
defendant-appellant under the contract, Exhibit 1, had not
become absolute at the time of the enactment of Republic Act No.
154, because the agreed fee had not been collected, so that the
non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution is not
applicable thereto.
Without passing upon the above arguments of both parties, we
note that it does not appear from the language of the law itself, or
from any other circumstances, that the Legislature had intended
to give its provisions any retroactive effect such as to affect
contracts entered into under the sanction of the previous law
(Commonwealth Act No. 675). We must, therefor, consider it
prospective, not retroactive.
. . . The presumption, however, is that all laws operate
prospectively only and only when the legislative has clearly
indicated its intention that the law operate retroactively will
the courts so apply it. Retroactive operation will more readily
be ascribed to legislation that is curative or legalizing than to
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 9 (FULL TEXT)
legislation which may disadvantageously, though legally, effect
past relations and transactions. (2 Sutherland Statutory
Construction, p. 243.).
. . . Beginning with Kent's dictum in Dash vs. Van Kleeck, it has
been continuously reaffirmed that 'The rule is that statutes
are prospective, and will not be construed to have retroactive
operation, unless the language employed in the enactment is
so clear it will admit of no other construction.(Id., p. 135.).
Besides, it should not be interpreted in a manner that would
render its application violative of a constitutional inhibition.
Strict construction to prevent retroactive operation has often
been applied in order that the statute would not violate
contract obligations or interfere with vested rights. The
principal explanation offered by the courts, however, is that
the statute must be construed so as to sustain its
constitutionality and thus prospective operation will be
presumed where a retroactive operation would produce
invalidity. (2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, supra, p.
135.).
It is also argued that the right of appellant to collect the 5 per cent
fee was contingent merely and did not become absolute,
complete and unconditional until the compensation benefits had
been collected and said right is not protected by the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution. A renowned authority on
statutory construction, however states that the distinction
between vested and absolute rights is not helpful, and that "a
better way to handle the problem" is "to declare those statutes
attempting to affect rights which the court finds to be unalterable,
invalid as arbitrary and unreasonable, thus lacking in due process"
some courts having recognized that the real issue in the
reasonableness of the particular enactment (Sutherland Statutory
Construction, Vol. 2, pp. 121-122). The 5 per cent fee fixed in
Commonwealth Act No. 675 is to Us not unreasonable. Services
were rendered thereunder to complainant's benefit. The right to
the fees accrued upon such rendition. Only the payment of the fee
was contingent upon the approval of the claim; therefore, the
right was not contingent. For a right to accrue is one thing;
enforcement thereof by actual payment is another. The
subsequent law enacted after the rendition of the services should
not as a matter of simple justice affect the agreement, which was
entered into voluntarily by the parties as expressly directed in the
previous law. To apply the new law to the case of the defendant-
appellant such as to deprive him of the agreed fee would be
arbitrary and unreasonable as destructive of the inviolability of
contracts, and therefore invalid as lacking in due process; to
penalize him for collecting such fees, repugnant to our sense of
justice. Such could not have been the legislative intent in the
enactment of Republic Act 145.
In resume, we hold that Republic Act No. 145 must be given
prostective application only, and may not be given retroactive
effect such as to affect rights that had accrued under a contract
expressly sanctioned by a previous law (C. A. 675). The judgment
appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant,
acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. 122641 January 20, 1997
BAYANI SUBIDO, JR. and RENE PARINA, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
the petitioners seek to set aside, on ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the following acts of
the respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 22825: (a) the
Resolution 1 of 25 October 1995 which denied the petitioners'
Motion to Quash of 28 August 1995 and Supplementary Motion to
Quash of 7 October 1995; (b) the Order 2 of 10 November 1995
which denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration; and (c)
the Orders3 of 10 November 1995 which entered a plea of not
guilty for the petitioners and set pre-trial on 12 January 1996.
In Criminal Case No. 22825, the petitioners were charged with
Arbitrary Detention, defined and penalized by Article 124 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), under an information dated 17 July
1995 (but filed on 28 July 1995), the accusatory portion of which
reads as follows:
That on or about June 25, 1992, or sometime subsequent
thereto, in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Bayani Subido, Jr., being then a Commissioner
of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) and
accused Rene Parina, being then a BID Special Agent, while in
the performance of their official functions, and conspiring and
confederating with each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cause the issuance and
implementation of a warrant of arrest dated June 25, 1992
against James J. Maksimuk, said accused knowing fully well
that the BID Decision dated June 6, 1991, requiring
Maksimuk's deportation has not as yet become final and
executory considering the pendency of a Motion for
Reconsideration, resulting in the detention of the latter for a
period of forty-three (43) days and, thus, causing him undue
injury.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
The arraignment was originally set for 28 August 1995. 5
On 28 August 1995, however, the petitioners filed a Motion to
Quash, 6 contending that in view of the effectivity of R.A. No. 7975
7 on 6 May 1995, amending §4 of P.D. No. 1606, 8 the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over both the offense charged
and the persons of the accused. They argued that: (1) Arbitrary
Detention did not fall within Chapter II, §2, Title VII of the RPC, but
within §1, Chapter 1, Title II (Crimes Against the Fundamental
Laws of the State), hence, not covered by R.A. No. 7975 and,
therefore, the case should have been filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila; (2) R.A. No. 7975 should be given
prospective application and at the time the case was filed,
petitioner Subido was already a private person since he was
separated from the service on 28 February 1995; while petitioner
Parina did not hold a position corresponding to salary grade "27";
and (3) penal laws must be strictly construed against the State.
In compliance with the order of the Sandiganbayan, the
prosecution filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash 9 on 28
September 1995. It contended that it was clear from §4(b) of R.A.
No. 7975 that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over both the
offense charged and the persons of the accused considering that
"the basis of its jurisdiction . . . is the position of the accused in the
government service when the offense charged was committed
and not the nature of the offense charged, provided the said
offense committed by the accused was in the exercise of his duties
and in relation to his office." The fact then that accused Subido
was already a private individual was of no moment.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 9 (FULL TEXT)
In a Supplement to the Motion to Quash 10 filed on 9 October
1995, the petitioners further asserted that: (1) the allegations in
the information were vague; (2) under §1, Rule VIII of
Memorandum Order (MO) No. 04-92 (Rules of Procedure to
Govern Deportation Proceedings), the grant or denial of bail to an
alien in a deportation proceeding was discretionary upon the
Commissioner, hence could not be subject to a charge of arbitrary
detention; (3) petitioner Subido was separated from the service
before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7975, hence retroactive
application thereof would be prejudicial to him; and (4) at the
time the information was filed, petitioner Parina was not
occupying a position corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher,
as prescribed by R.A. No. 6758. 11
In its Rejoinder 12 filed on 20 October 1995, the prosecution
maintained that with §4 of MO No. 04-92, Salazar v. Achacoso, 13
and Gatchalian v. CID, 14 the only instance when an alien facing
deportation proceedings could be arrested by virtue of a warrant
of arrest was when the Commissioner issued the warrant to carry
out a final order of deportation, which was absent in this case due
to the pendency of the motion for reconsideration timely filed. It
further reiterated that the basis of the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction over the case was the position of the accused when
the crime was committed, not when the information was filed; in
any event, petitioner Subido's position as a Commissioner of the
Bureau of Immigration was classified even higher than grade "27"
under the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989.
In its Resolution15 of 25 October 1995, the Sandiganbayan denied
the petitioners' Motion to Quash and the Supplement thereto,
ruling:
1. [T]he jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan remains not only
over the specific offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. 1606 as
Amended by R.A. 7975 but over offenses committed in
relation to their office, regardless of the penalty provided that
the salary of the accused is at Grade 27 under [R.A. 6758] or
that he is occupying any of the position described in Sec. 4(a)e
of the law, which includes the position of Deputy
Commissioner.
2. [A]t this time the position of the prosecution in response to
this Court's misgivings stated in its Order of August 28, 1995,
appears to be that aliens may not be arrested except upon
execution of a deportation order, a matter which can be taken
up at further proceedings after the arraignment of the
accused.
It likewise set arraignment on 10 November 1995. To abort
arraignment, the petitioners filed on 9 November 1995 a
motion for reconsideration 16 and submitted that under the
vast power of the Commissioner of the Department of
Immigration, he could authorize the arrest and detention of an
alien even though a deportation order had not yet become
final, in light of the preventive, not penal, nature of a
deportation order. 17
On 10 November 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order 18
denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, and a second
Order 19 entering a plea of not guilty in favor of the petitioners
since they objected to arraignment, setting pre-trial on 12 January
1996, and making of record that arraignment was conducted with
the reservation of the petitioners to seek redress with this Court
from the denial of their motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this special civil action, where the parties, in the main,
reiterate the arguments they raised before the Sandiganbayan. In
due time, we resolved to give clue course to the petition and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda, which
they subsequently complied with.
The petition must be dismissed.
Sections 2 and 7 of R.A. No. 7975 pertinently provide as follows:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of [P.D. No. 1606] is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade
"27" and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A..
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in
which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be
referred to the proper courts.
R.A. No. 7975 took effect on 16 May 1995, 20 or one year, ten
months and twenty-one days after the alleged commission of the
crime charged in Criminal Case No. 22825 before the
Sandiganbayan. The provisions of §4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by E.O. No. 184, but prior to their further amendment by R.A. No.
7975, are then the applicable provisions, §4 of P.D. No. 1606 then
pertinently provided as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code;
(2) other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 9 (FULL TEXT)
in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in
this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years or
a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas, 21 and subsequently in Sanchez v.
Demetriou, 22 Natividad v. Felix, 23 and Republic v. Asuncion, 24 we
ruled that for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original
jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officers
or employees under the aforementioned §4(a)(2), it was not
enough that the penalty prescribed therefor was higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of
P6,000.00; it was likewise necessary that the offenses or felonies
were committed in relation to their office. 25
The information in Criminal Case No. 22825 before the
Sandiganbayan charged the petitioners with the crime of arbitrary
detention which was committed "while in the performance of
their official functions," or, evidently, in relation to their office. As
the detention allegedly lasted for a period of 43 days, the
prescribed penalty is prision mayor, 26 with a duration of six years
and one day to twelve years. Indisputably, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 22825.
The petitioners, however, urge us to apply §4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975, the law in force at the time of the
filing of the information in Criminal Case No. 22825. They submit
that under the new law, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged and their persons because at the time of
the filing of the information, petitioner Subido was already a
private individual, while the classification of petitioner Parina's
position was lower than grade "27."
We are not persuaded. The petitioners overlook the fact that for
purposes of §4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, the reckoning point
is the time of the commission of the crime. This is plain from the
last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a), §4 of P.D.
No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 7975.
Petitioner Subido never denied the respondents' claim that as
"commissioner of Immigration and Deportation [now Bureau of
Immigration] at the time of the commission of the crime [he was]
classified as having a position even higher than grade 27." 27 Both
parties are, however, agreed that at such time petitioner Parina
was holding a position with a classification much lower than salary
grade "27." There can, therefore, be no doubt that the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime allegedly
committed by Subido.
That petitioner Parina held a position with a salary grade of less
than "27" at the time of the commission of the alleged arbitrary
detention is of no moment. He is prosecuted as a co-conspirator
of petitioner Subido, a principal accused, who held a position
higher than grade "27." The following provision of §4 of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, then applies:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the
positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758 . . . exclusive
jurisdiction therefor shall be vested in the proper Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant
to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
Finally, the petitioners' invocation of the prohibition against the
retroactivity of penal laws is misplaced. Simply put, R.A. No. 7975
is not a penal law. Penal laws or statutes are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for
their violation; 28 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature,
and provide for their punishment. 29 R.A. No. 7975, in further
amending P.D. No. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction, mode of appeal, and other procedural matters, is
clearly a procedural law, i.e., one which prescribes rules and forms
of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their
invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by which
courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 30
Moreover, the petitioners even suggest that it is likewise a
curative or remedial statute: one which cures defects and adds to
the means of enforcing existing obligations. 31 As noted by the
petitioners, previous to the enactment of R.A. No. 7975:
As before, not [sic] matter what kind of offense, so long as it is
alleged that the crime is committed in relation to the office of
the public official, the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try
and hear the case, such that in many cases accused persons
even from the far away parts of the country, Mindanao,
Visayas and the northern parts of Luzon had to come
personally to Manila to attend and appear for cases filed
against them, considering that the Sandiganbayan has its
office/court in Manila.
The said R.A. No. 7975 changed this lamentable situation. For
no as so provided in the said law, there ha[s] been a
modification that benefits [the] accused . . . in the sense that
now where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher as
prescribed by Republic Act No. 6758 . . . exclusive jurisdiction
there shall be vested now in the proper Regional Trial and
Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as
the case may be . . . 32
All told, as a procedural and curative statute, R.A. No.
7975 may validly be given retroactive effect, there being
no impairment of contractual or vested rights. 33
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, and the
questioned resolution and orders of the respondent
Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
G.R. No. L-3128 December 19, 1907 1
UN PAK LEUNG, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN NIGORRA, ET AL,
defendants-appellants.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was originally commenced in the court of the justice of
the peace of the city of Manila for the purpose of recovering of
the defendants the sum of P443.35. Upon a consideration of the
facts adduced during the trial of said cause in the court of the
justice of the peace, the justice of the peace rendered a judgment
against the defendants and in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
P443.35, with interest from the 23rd day of March, 1905, and the
costs. From this decision of the justice of the peace the
defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance and the case
was tried de novo in said court.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause,
the judge of the Court of First Instance on the 2d day of
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 9 (FULL TEXT)

December, 1905, found that the defendants were indebted to the Court of First Instance, as well as this court, and interest upon said
plaintiff in the sum of P443.35, and rendered a judgment against amount at the rate of 6 percent from the 23rd day of March,
the defendants and in favor of the plaintiff for the said sum, 1905. So ordered.
including the said costs incurred in the Court of First Instance.
From this decision of the Court of First Instance the defendant,
Juan Nigorra, only, appealed to this court, after having made a
motion for a new trial in the lower court, and made six
assignments of error in this court. All of these assignments of
error, except the sixth, relate to the sufficiency of the proof
adduced during the trial of the cause in the lower court.

Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant Juan Nigorra made a

motion for a new trial in the Court of First Instance, for the
purpose evidently of enabling this court to examine the evidence
adduced during the trial, he has failed to bring to this court all of
the evidence, a part of the evidence only being brought here. We
therefore refuse to examine part of the evidence only, for the
purpose of ascertaining what facts were presented to the lower
court. We must confine ourselves to the facts stated in the
complaint and answer presented in the lower court, together with
the facts found in the decision of the court, for the purpose of
ascertaining what the facts were. (Ferrer vs. Abejuela.) 2 If parties
desire this court to examine the evidence adduced in causes in
the lower courts they must make a motion for a new trial, basing
the same upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to
support the finding of facts of the lower court, and then they
must bring all of such evidence to this court.

The sixth assignment of error made by the appellant, Juan Nigorra,

is "that the lower court committed an error in decreeing that both
of the defendants "como razon social," and each of them were
individually liable for the payment of the amount claimed by the
plaintiff." The lower court found as a fact from the proof adduced
during the trial of the cause that the defendants were partners in
the management of the bakery La Isleña and from this finding of
facts held that the defendants were jointly and individually liable
for the payment of the sum claimed by the plaintiff. This finding of
fact must be accepted by us inasmuch as the proof is not here.

The lower court made no finding of fact which in any way shows
that the defendants were individually liable by virtue of any
agreement, or contract, between the defendants and the plaintiff,
whereby they became jointly and individually liable. Upon the
finding of facts of the lower court the defendants were liable only
for their respective share of said obligation. Article 1137 of the
Civil Code provides that parties to a contract are not severally
liable for the obligation created thereby in the absence of an
express agreement to that effect. Said article 1137 provides:

The concurrence of two or more creditors, or of two or more

debtors in a single obligation, does not imply that each one of
the former has a right to ask, nor that each one of the latter is
bound to comply in full with the things which are the object of
the same. This shall only take place when the obligation
determines it expressly, being constituted as a joint obligation.

In the absence of a finding of facts therefore that the defendants

made themselves individually liable for the debt incurred, they are
each liable for one-half of said obligation.

For these reasons the judgment of the lower court, holding that
the appellant was individually liable to the plaintiff for the full
amount of the obligation incurred by the defendants, is hereby
modified as to this appellant and it is hereby ordered that a
judgment be rendered against the appellant, Juan Nigorra, for
one-half of the sum claimed by the plaintiff, together with one-
half the costs incurred in the court of the justice of the peace, the