EN BANC other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed
was the same — a split in the ranks of the military establishment that
G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R.
MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS
MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR
YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG,
SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL
RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration
Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff,
respectively, respondents
CORTES, J.:
Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national importance. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and
other aspects of national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from
the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced
into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the
Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and
consilidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel
coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of
television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the
support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unseccessful plot of the Marcos
spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard an
aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30,
1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble
even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in
the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory
of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings
of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges
to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of
the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left
scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several
thraetened civilian supremacy over military and brought to the fore the
realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious
military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided
elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the
communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao
which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the
communists have set up a parallel government of their own on the areas
they effectively control while the separatist are virtually free to move about
in armed bands. There has been no let up on this groups' determination to
wrest power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but also
to through the use of propaganda have they been successful in dreating
chaos and destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign
debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies
left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years
after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in
alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to
the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to
rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Mr. Marcos and his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of
political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short
space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the
respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The Issue
Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on
the resolution of the following issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of
former President Marcos and family to the Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former
President Marcos and his family from returning to the
Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public
safety or public health
a. Has the President made a finding that the return of
former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines
is a clear and present danger to national security, public
safety or public health?
b. Assuming that she has made that finding
(1) Have the requirements of due process
been complied with in making such finding?
(2) Has there been prior notice to
petitioners?
(3) Has there been a hearing?
(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may
be dispensed with, has the President's
decision, including the grounds upon which
it was based, been made known to
petitioners so that they may controvert the
same?
c. Is the President's determination that the return of former
President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear
and present danger to national security, public safety, or
public health a political question?
d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the
return of former President Marcos and his family is a clear
and present danger to national security, public safety, or
public health, have respondents established such fact?
3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the
President's decision to bar the return of former President
Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting without
jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively
bar the return of former President Marcos and his family to
the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7;
Rollo, pp. 234-236.1
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following
provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within
the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to
travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view
that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency
of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr.
Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including
his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement
and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including
his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are
necessary to protect national security, public order (order
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms
of others, and are consistent with the other rights
recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter
his own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in
this case involves a political question which is non-justiciable. According to
the Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply
whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his
family have the right to travel and liberty of abode.
Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in
vacuo without reference to attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the
issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos
and family have the right to return to the Philippines and
reside here at this time in the face of the determination by
the President that such return and residence will endanger
national security and public safety.
It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the
question is not a political question as it involves merely a
determination of what the law provides on the matter and
application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
family. But when the question is whether the two rights
claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family
impinge on or collide with the more primordial and
transcendental right of the State to security and safety of
its nationals, the question becomes political and this
Honorable Court can not consider it.
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the
right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which
this Honorable Court can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their
right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here even if their return and residence here will
endanger national security and public safety? this is still a
justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Is there danger to national security and public safety if
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to
the Philippines and establish their residence here? This is
now a political question which this Honorable Court can not
decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and
competence of the President of the Philippines.
[Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-
299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national
security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the
Constitution, to wit:
 Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve
and protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family
from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and public
safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala,
Fulgencio batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez
Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were
among the deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was
prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs
Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents,
pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope
of presidential power and its limits. We, however, view this issue in a
different light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of
the issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution
to the controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the
confines of the right to travel and the import of the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78
SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766,
69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel and recognized
exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.
These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the
right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right
under international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to
freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to
leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and
distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)]
separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant
guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country,
including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws
as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health
or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily
deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as
those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode
and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to
return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land
[Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from
the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily
deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of
passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not
determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they
relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected
right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in
Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence.
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether
or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the absence of
legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for
its resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to
explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of the issue will
involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the
President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the
express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1,
whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined
that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the
three great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel
in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution
has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that
"[the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines"
Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of
the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation of
powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also
confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to
limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court
in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the
legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the
judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be
exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the
legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined
membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power
which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the
executive power which is vested in one official the President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However,
it does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e.,
the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices,
the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the
commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to
enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the
budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-
23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the
President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall
exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se enumerated
powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance
the view that the President's powers are limited to those specifically
enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President
has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied
to her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum for Petitioners,
p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind the institution of the U.S.
Presidency after which ours is legally patterned.**
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States
grappled with the same problem. He said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the
Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought
to settle everything beforehand it should be a nightmare;
by the same token, to those who think that constitution
makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future
play of political forces, it should be a vision realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening
words: "The executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America." . . .. [The President: Office
and Powers, 17871957, pp. 3-4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the
different persons who held the office from Washington to the early 1900's,
and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship,
he concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment
depends in important measure on who is President." [At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal
institution. it remained of course, an agency of government
subject to unvarying demands and duties no remained, of
cas President. But, more than most agencies of
government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos
according to the man in charge. Each President's
distinctive temperament and character, his values,
standards, style, his habits, expectations, Idiosyncrasies,
compulsions, phobias recast the WhiteHouse and
pervaded the entire government. The executive branch,
said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from
the character and personality of the President. The thrust
 of the office, its impact on the constitutional order, therefore
altered from President to President. Above all, the way
each President understood it as his personal obligation to
inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the
confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to
the nation and posterity determined whether he
strengthened or weakened the constitutional order. [At
212- 213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what
she does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and the
development of presidential power under the different constitutions are
essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to
the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution
created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S.
President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the system of
government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere
figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became
even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature.
The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of
government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and
judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of
government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the
power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as
head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain
to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do
not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said
to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In
other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated,
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that
is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark
decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189
(1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the
Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the
Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and the
Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power
of the Governor-General to do so, said:
...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a
majority of the "board" and "committee" respectively, are
not charged with the performance of any legislative
functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of
performance of any such functions by the legislature.
Putting aside for the moment the question whether the
duties devolved upon these members are vested by the
Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they
are not legislative in character, and still more clear that they
are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the
authority of either of these two constitutes logical ground
for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining
one among which the powers of government are
divided ....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring
words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be
a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only
what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish
and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific
of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading
gradually from one extreme to the other. ....
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however
we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot
carry out the distinction between legislative and executive
action with mathematical precision and divide the branches
into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to
do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the
Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime
duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he
maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment
by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace
and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action.
But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise
of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing
implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in
making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to
consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the
Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a
decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the
Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to
protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest.
It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an
allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have
surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good.
Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers
delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become
rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who
seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at
whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of
dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The
constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible.
For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and
ofexpression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and
must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests
[Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and
the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The
power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward
of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power
of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the
Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See
Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to
preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power
implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author
advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable
in any government and is best lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers
as protector of the peace. Rossiter The American Presidency].The power
of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in
fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished
by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the
enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling
of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain
public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the
Marcose's from returning has been recognized by memembers of the
Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of
Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to
allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish
gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our
collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under
the Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1
The Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the
President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in
his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses
to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the
right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly
never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those
residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and
protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President
to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
The Extent of Review
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree
with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question
which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments
to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's
jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for
Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum.
We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign
government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may
appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear
to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we
amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought
before us because the power is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination
thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers
intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts
of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by
its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would
appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution, defining "judicial power," which specifically empowers the
courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government,
incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R.
No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle
of separation of powers underlying our system of
government, the Executive is supreme within his own
sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the
Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in
hand with the system of checks and balances, under which
the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the
privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere
alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the
Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority,
the function of the Court is merely to check — not to
supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he
has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction,
not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there
exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such
postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily
or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National
Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented,
there exist factual bases for the President's decision..
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the
country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist
insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to
grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men,
police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented
history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the
country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that
the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify
the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be
contained. The military establishment has given assurances that it could
handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of
the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw
that would break the camel's back. With these before her, the President
cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in
determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the
national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President
did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time
and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines
will cause the escalation of violence against the State, that would be the
time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief
powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such
violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from
taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still
nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection
of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation
of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the
highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the
Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from
that responsibility.

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning
to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy
attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many
of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the
country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to
speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the
Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually
increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign
borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates
development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all
its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of
common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return
of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few
years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our
individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot
argue with that determination.