REPUBLIC vs.

CORTEZ

FACTS:
 Respondent, Rev. Cortez, a missionary by vocation, claimed that since 1962, he has been in possession of 50
hectares of land in western portion of Palaui Island, Cagayan. In which he helps Aetas and other people for
agricultural purposes in order to support his charitable works.

 On 1967, President Marcos, issued Proclamation 201- reserving for military purposes a parcel of the public
domain situated in Palaui Island. Wherein, southern half of the island were withdrawn from sale or settlement and
reserve for the use of Phil. Navy.

 On 1994, President Ramos, issued Proclamation 447- declaring Palaui Island as marine reserve.

 Respondent Cortez, filed a petition against Commanding Officer of Phil. Naval Command Binas for the use of force
and intimidation to vacate the area in Palaui Island. Thus, he filed for petition to RTC to restore to him the possession
of the 50 hectares of land in the said island.

 RTC- grant the petition of Cortez, however, subject to 5 hectares only and not the whole 50 hectares claimed by
Cortez.

 OSG filed an appeal to CA, however, CA upheld the RTC’s decision.

 Petition brought by OSG on behalf of the Republic of the Phils. to the SC, on the ground that Cortez has no right
over the 5-hectares portion of Palaui Island.

 However, Cortez avers that since he has been in peaceful and continuous possession of the subject land, he has
the right of possession over the same.

ISSUE: W/N the parcel of land claimed by Cortez is ALIENABLE and DISPOSABLE.

HELD:
NO, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and
disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same.
Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore
not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. His possession of the subject area, even if the same
be in the concept of an owner or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot
be lawfully possessed in the first place.
The Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he, nevertheless, failed
to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public domain and therefore can be the proper
object of possession.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. Hence, "[a]ll lands not appearing to
be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons." To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be
established.

NAVY OFFICERS VILLAGE vs. REPUBLIC

August 3, 2015

FACTS:
 NOVAI has a parcel of land situated inside the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR), which was previously
formed part of Fort William McKinley under the name of the Republic of the Phils.

 On 1957, President Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 423- reserving for military purposes certain of parcel of the
public domain situated in Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque and Pasay.

 On 1965, President Diosdado Macapagal, issued Proclamation No. 461- excluded from Fort Mckinley a certain
portion of land embraced in Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque and Pasay and declared excluded area as “AFP Officer’s
Village” to be disposed under the provision of RA 274 and 730.

 After a month, Pres. Macapagal, issued Proclamation No. 478- reserving for veteran’s rehabilitation, medicare
and training center site purposes that land previously declared as “AFP Officer’s Village”.

 On 1991, the property was subject of a deed of sale between the Republic of the Phils thru LMB and NOVAI.

 However, Republic sought to cancel NOVAI’s title on the ground that the land covers the part of a military
reservation.

 NOVAI counter-argue that the property was no longer part of the public dominion, as the land was segregated from
the military reservation.

 RTC- ruled that the property was alienable and disposable.

 CA- reversed and set aside the decision of RTC, on the ground that the property was inalienable land of the public
domain, thus cannot be disposed or be the subject of sale.
  NOVAI sought for reconsideration but denied by CA.

 NOVAI further contends to the higher court, that the property was no longer part of public domain by virtue of Proc.
No. 461.

ISSUE: W/N the subject land is inalienable land of the public domain.

HELD: YES, from the perspective of the general Civil Code provisions on Property, lands which are intended for public use
or public service such as reservations for public or quasi-public uses are property of the public dominion and remain to be
so as long as they remain reserved.
As property of the public dominion, public lands reserved for public or quasi-public uses are outside the commerce
of man. They cannot be subject to sale, disposition or encumbrance; any sale, disposition or encumbrance of such property
of the public dominion is void for being contrary to law and public policy.

DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION vs. REPUBLIC

July 14, 2013

FACTS:
 Petitioner Dream Village, occupying a lot in Taguig City since 1985, which lot used to be part of the Hacienda de
Maricaban.

 Following the purchase of Maricaban by the government of USA to convert into the military reservation known as
Fort McKinley. However, USA ceded Fort McKinley to the Republic of the Phils.

 On 1992, RA 7227 was passed creating the BCDA to oversee and accelerate the conversion of camps to productive
civilian uses. The law expressly authorized the President of the Philippines to sell the above lands, in whole or part,
which are declared alienable and disposable government properties.

 Dream Village was subject to summary demolition by BCDA, which resulting in unrest and tensions among
residents.

 Dream Village filed a complaint in COSLAP asserting that the subject property as alienable and disposable. Thus,
claiming that they are occupying the area for 30years in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and
notoriously for several years.

 COSLAP resolved that Dream Village lies was outside of BCDA and directed the application of Dream Village for
sale patent noting the length of concept of an owner.

 BCDA filed motion for reconsideration to COSLAP, however, it was denied.

 BCDA filed for petition in CA, that the land of Dream Village also belongs to BCDA and form part of public domain.

ISSUE: W/N the Fort Bonifacio remains property of the public domain of the state although declared ALIENABLE and
DISPOSABLE.

HELD: YES, The Court then explained that it is only upon their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA
law that they become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.

For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property
of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

USERO v CA
GR NO. 152115 & 155055 | JANUARY 26, 2005

FACTS:
This is a consolidated petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). Petitioners and the private respondent
are registered owners of neighboring parcels of land wherein between the lots is a low-level strip of land with stagnant
body of water. Whenever there is a storm or heavy rain, the water therein would flood thereby causing damage to houses
of the Polinar’s prompting them to build a concrete wall on the bank of the strip of land about 3meters from their house
and riprapped the soil in that portion.
The Usero’s claimed ownership of the strip, demanded the halt of the construction but the Polinar’s never heeded
believing that the strip is part of a creek. However, the Polinar’s offered to pay for the land. As the parties still failed to
settle, both filed separate complaints for forcible entry. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, while the
regional trial court reversed and ordered the dismissal of the complaint and confirmed the existence of the creek between
the lots.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the disputed strip of land is part of the creek hence part of public domain

HELD:
YES. Art. 420 of the New Civil Code (NCC) provides for properties which are part of public domain. A creek is included in
the phrase "and others of similar character". A creek, which refers to a recess or arm of a river is a property belonging to
the public domain, therefore not susceptible of private ownership. Being a public water, it cannot be registered under the
Torrens system under the name of any individual.
 OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY v. MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS
G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010

FACTS:

 Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land in Parañaque City covered by Tax in the
name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.

 Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez,
which was given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied
and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He also
paid taxes for the land.

 Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 and in October
1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house
within the land. On April 21, 1987, Pedro transferred his rights over the land in favor of Ebio.

 On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990
seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut
Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez
Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents immediately opposed and the project
was suspended.

 In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and the city
planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.

 On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within
the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting their
claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. The request remained unheeded.

 Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a
writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.

HELD:
 No. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled
along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil
Code.
 ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by
accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
 Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.

 It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form
part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may
have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register
the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
 In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession
of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public domain.
Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.
 Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and
imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear
provision of law.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002

FACTS:
 Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a wholly government-owned and –controlled corporation which is the primary
implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public
domain. By virtue of a Special Patent issued by President Corazon Aquino, the Register of Deeds of the
Paranaque, in April 1988, issued certificates of title, in the name of PEA, covering three reclaimed islands known
as the Freedom Islands located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paranaque City. The
Freedom Islands have a total land area of 157.841 hectares.
 In April 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop
the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas
surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-Manila Cavite Coastal Road Reclamation Project. The JVA was later amended giving AMARI
an option to reclaim an additional 350 hectares of submerged area. Part of the consideration for AMARI’s work is
the conveyance of 70% of the total net usable reclaimed area – equivalent to 367.5 hectares, title of which will be
in AMARI’s name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed
foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay

HELD:
 No. AMARI as a private corporation cannot acquire the reclaimed Freedom Islands, though alienable lands of the
public domain, except by lease, as provided under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The still submerged
areas (i.e., the more or less additional 250 and 350 hectares of submerged areas) in Manila Bay are inalienable
lands of the public domain; as such, they are beyond the commerce of man, as provided under Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.
 The reclaimed Freedom Islands: The assignment to PEA of the ownership and administration of the reclaimed areas
in Manila Bay, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands,
is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. They also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service.
The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession
to qualified parties.
 The submerged areas: The mere reclamation of foreshore and submerged areas by PEA does not convert these
inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a
law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the
law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
 PEA’s authority to sell: In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands, in view of the requirement under
CA No. 141. Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and
submerged alienable lands of the public domain. PEA’s Charter grants it such express legislative authority to sell
its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority
granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban
on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could
only benefit private individuals.
 Registration of alienable lands of the public domain: Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does
not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership
but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership.
Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the registration. The
registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private
lands. Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable
land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like
PEA.
 Lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the
public domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws. Several laws authorize lands of the public domain
to be registered under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public
lands. For instance,
 Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, private property purchased by the National Government for
expansion of an airport may be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer the airport. Private
property donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in the name
of the municipality. All these properties become properties of the public domain, and if already registered under
Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no requirement or provision in any existing law for
the de-registration of land from the Torrens System.
 Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain become unquestionably
part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in
the name of the National Government new certificates of title covering such expropriated lands.

Roman Santos v. Sec. Florencio Moreno, Public Works and Communication, and Julian Cargullo

FACTS:

 Ayala y Cia owned a big tract of land, the Hacienda San Esteban, in Macabebe, Pampanga, used for alcohol
business. To provide access to different parts of the property, the Company dug interlinking canals, which through
erosion, gradually acquired the characteristics of rivers. The company sold part of the Hacienda to Santos, who
closed some of the canals and converted them into fishponds.

 Some portion of the lands were sold to the Petitioner who also transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In doing
so, he built dikes and closed the man-made canals in property. The residents of the surrounding barrios (now
barangays) complained that the closure deprived them of their means of transportation, as well as of their fishing
grounds. The Petitioner acquired a larger portion of Hacienda San Esteban where 25 streams were located and
which were closed by Ayala y Cia.

 The Congress enacted RA 2056 which was against fishpond owners in the province of Pampanga who have closed
rivers and appropriated them as fishponds. Sec. Moreno ordered the opening and restoration of the channel of all
the streams on the ground that said streams belong to the public domain. The Petitioner filed an injunction with the
CFI Pampanga which rendered its decision in his favour and declared all the streams under litigation private. Hence,
the respondents appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the streams involved in this case belong to the public domain, or to the owner of Hancienda San
Esteban, and, thus, may be ordered open.

RULING:

 No, because said canals are of private ownership.

  Under Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters, “The water-beds of all creeks belong to the owners of the estates
or lands over which they flow.” and Article 408 (5) of the Spanish Civil Code provides that “The channels of
flowing streams, continuous or intermittent, formed by rain water, and those of brooks crossing estates which are
not of public ownership.” The channels, therefore, of the streams in question which may be classified creeks, belong
to the owners of Hacienda San Esteban.
 The said streams, considered as canals, of which they originally were, are of private ownership in contemplation of
Article 339(l) of the Spanish Civil Code. Under Article 339, canals constructed by the State and devoted to public
use are of public ownership. Conversely, canals constructed by private persons within private lands and devoted
exclusively for private use must be of private ownership.
 In this case, Eliseo Panopio, surveyor in the Bureau of Public Works, who was designated to conduct hearing and
investigation, stated in his report that all the streams in Hacienda San Esteban, except Sapang Cansusu, have
been constructed, deepened, widened and lengthened by the owners. They have been used as means of
communications, exclusively for the employees of the said Hacienda and that they have never been used by the
public for navigation without express consent of the owners of the said Hacienda.
 Hence, all the streams, except Sapang Cansusu which is a natural stream and continuation of the Cansusu River
admittedly a public stream and, thus, belongs to the public domain, are considered private owned.

Republic of the Philippines, represented by The Director of Lands

vs. Rosario De Guzman VDA. De Joson

FACTS:

The Respondent filed an application for land registration in the CFI in Bulacan for the Riceland she inherited from her
mother, owning and possessing it openly and in the concept of owner since then, which land had been declared in her name
for taxing purposes. However, Fiscal Liberato L. Reyes interposes an opposition in behalf of the Director of Lands and
Bureau of Public Works averring that said the land applied for, being a portion of the Labangan Channel operated by the
Pampanga River Control System, could not be subject of appropriation or land registration. The OSG also filed an opposition
insisting that the land was within unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan and were denominated as forest lands and,
thus, fell under the control and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development, and that CFI had no jurisdiction over the
same. The CFI rendered its decision in favour of the respondent on the ground that she had sufficiently established her
open, public, continuous and adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years of the said land. The
Republic appealed to the CA which the latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land subject of the application of registration is susceptible of private acquisition.

RULING:

 No. Section 14 (1) of the PD 1529 provides two requisites for application for land registration: the applicant must
prove: (1) the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) she, by herself or
through her predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership.

 In this case, on the first requisite, the respondent did not present evidence that the land have been declared
alienable and disposable by the State. She only relied on a surveyor engineer’s notation indicating that the survey
was inside alienable and disposable land. However, such notation does not constitute positive act government act
validly changing the classification of the land in question. A mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of
the public domain. As held in Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties Inc, “land of public domain, to be subject of
appropriation, must be declared alienable and disposable either by the President or the Secretary of the DENR.”
Hence, by relying solely on the surveyor’s assertion, respondent have not sufficiently proven that the land in
question has been declared alienable. On the second requisite, as correctly stated found by the Court of Appeals,
the respondent unquestionably complied with the second requisite. However, as stated in Heirs of Mario Malabanan
vs. Republic, “property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the
object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. Lands of the public domain, whether declared
alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.”

 Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." there must be an express
declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration,
the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. Hence, there must be an express declaration by
the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2),
and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. In other words, the period of possession prior to the reclassification
of the land, no matter how long, was irrelevant because prescription did not operate against the State before then.

 Hence, the application for land registration of the respondent was denied.
 Adriano Maneclang, Julieta, Ramona, Victor, Antonina, Lourdes, Teodoro and Myrna, all surnamed Maneclang
vs. IAC and Alfredo Maza et al.

FACTS:

Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et. al. filed before the CFI of Pangasinan a complaint for quieting of title over a certain
fishpond belonging to them situated Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the annulment of Resolutions Nos. 38 and 95 of the
Municipal Council of said municipal. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the body of water traversing
the titled properties of petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore public in nature and not
subject to private appropriation. The lower court likewise held that Resolution No. 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the
Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and Resolution No. 95 authorizing public
bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries, including the fishpond under consideration, were passed by
respondents herein as members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise of their legislative powers.
Petitioners appealed said decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the same on April 29, 1983. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not fishpond, originally a creek, can be subject of private appropriation.

RULING:

 No. As held in Mercado vs. Municipal President of Macabebe, “A creek is a recess or arm extending from a river
and participating in the ebb and fl ow of the sea. It is a property belonging to the public domain. It is not susceptible
to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. As a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens
System in the name of any individual.”

 In this case, it was clearly found that the fishpond was originally a creek. Neither the mere construction of irrigation
dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which prevents the water from flowing in and out of a fishpond, nor
its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain.

 Hence, a compromise agreement recognizing the ownership of an individual to a fishpond, which is originally a
creek, is null and void.

Republic of the Philippines vs. CA

November 25, 1998

FACTS:

 On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake
and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands
bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor
facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance
and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

 On May 6, 1958, invoking RA 1899, the Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of Three
Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City, empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into
reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said Ordinance was amended on April
21, 1959 by Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) to reclaim
foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions.

 Republic of the Philippines filed a Complaint questioning the agreement between Pasay City Council and the RREC.
It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of
the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.

 Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives
a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.

 RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with
modifications.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area.
II. Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.

HELD:

 The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term
“foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:

o The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according
to the flow of the tide.
 A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line
usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by
a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary)

 The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much
less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have
 provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the
term “foreshore lands.”

 It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and
the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore
ultra vires and null and void.

CITY OF LAPU LAPU vs. PEZA

November 26, 2014

FACTS:

In 1995, the PEZA was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 7916 or “the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995” to operate,
administer, manage, and develop economic zones in the country. The PEZA was granted the power to register, regulate,
and supervise the enterprises located in the economic zones. By virtue of the law, the export processing zone in Mariveles,
Bataan became the Bataan Economic Zone and the Mactan Export Processing Zone the Mactan Economic Zone.

The City contends that due to the enactment of the LGC, specifically withdrawing all tax exemptions and with the PEZA law
of 1995 which did not have any provisions on tax exemptions, it maintains that PEZA is liable for real property tax.

ISSUE: Whether or not PEZA should be exempted from real property taxation.

HELD:
 Yes. Under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, real properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines
are exempt from real property taxes. Properties owned by the state are either property of public dominion or
patrimonial property as per Art. 420.

 Citing Manila International Airport Authority: Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to
levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction
sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop
if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale.

 In this case, the properties sought to be taxed are located in publicly owned economic zones. These economic
zones are property of public dominion. The City seeks to tax properties located within the Mactan Economic Zone,
the site of which was reserved by President Marcos under Proclamation No. 1811, Series of 1979.

 Reserved lands are lands of the public domain set aside for settlement or public use, and for specific public purposes
by virtue of a presidential proclamation.282 Reserved lands are inalienable and outside the commerce of man,283
and remain property of the Republic until withdrawn from public use either by law or presidential proclamation.284
Since no law or presidential proclamation has been issued withdrawing the site of the Mactan Economic Zone from
public use, the property remains reserved land.

 The Local Government Code exempting instrumentalities of the national government from real property taxes was
already in force when the PEZA’s charter was enacted in 1995. It would have been redundant to provide for the
PEZA’s exemption in its charter considering that the PEZA is already exempt by virtue of Section 133(o) of the
Local Government Code.

 Real properties under the PEZA’s title are owned by the Republic of the Philippines

MIAA vs. CA and City of Paranaque

July 20, 2006

FACTS:

 MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992
to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The City of Parañaque, through its City
Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real
estate tax delinquency.

 MIAA filed a petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and
auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.

 The City of Parañaque contended that Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax
exemption privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the Local
Government Code. Thus, MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.

 MIAA argued that Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax itself. The
reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in such
a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the City of Parañaque can impose real tax, levy against and auction for public sale the Airport Lands and
Buildings.
HELD:

 MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation. A GOCC is not exempt from real estate tax. The
deletion of the phrase "any government-owned or controlled so exempt by its charter" in Section 234(e) of the Local
Government Code withdrew the real estate tax exemption of GOCCs.

 However, MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with
corporate powers. A government instrumentality like the MIAA is not subject to local taxation

 The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines. No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the
Civil Code, like “roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,” are owned by the State.
The term “ports” includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port”
constructed by the State.

 Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and
thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public
use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the
MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands
and Buildngs as properties for public use. The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of
the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion
as one “intended for public use.”

 The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the
subject of an auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance
or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of
public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public
dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque
can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate
tax.

Laurel vs. Garcia

 FACTS:
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government
under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots being:
 The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which has an area of approximately
2,489.96 square meters, and is at present the site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery;
 The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area of around 764.72 square meters and
categorized as a commercial lot now being used as a warehouse and parking lot for the consulate staff; and
 The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a residential lot which is
now vacant.
 The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national
development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and
their suffering during World War II.
 The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in twenty (20) years
in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments
(Article 2, Reparations Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on
procurement and utilization of reparations and development loans. The procurements are divided into those for use
by the government sector and those for private parties in projects as the then National Economic Council shall
determine. Those intended for the private sector shall be made available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one
hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities in national development projects.
 The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule and listed
under the heading "Government Sector", through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The Roppongi
property consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to Memorandum
for Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government
to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.
 A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J.
Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation — which
shall construct two (2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine
Chancery in Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction would be the lease to the foreign corporation of one
(1) of the buildings to be constructed in Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other building in
Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all the three
leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine government. No change of ownership or title shall
occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to Comment) The Philippine government retains the title all throughout the lease
period and thereafter. However, the government has not acted favorably on this proposal which is pending approval
and ratification between the parties. Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study
the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through Administrative
Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.
 On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan
including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.
 Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor,
its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for
bidding at a minimum floor price of $225 million. The first bidding was a failure since only one bidder qualified. The
second one, after postponements, has not yet materialized. The last scheduled bidding on February 21, 1990 was
restrained by his Court. Later, the rules on bidding were changed such that the $225 million floor price became
merely a suggested floor price.
ISSUES:
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?; and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?

RULING:
 The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to
the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the
State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule
of lex situs does not apply.
 The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is
misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the
existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the
Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that
the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned
by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. Why should we
discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no showing that it can be sold?
 The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation by the investigating
committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the
public character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval does not have the force and effect of law since
the President already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a year.
 It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched
by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos — veterans and civilians
alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination
where both the President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value,
the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.

RP VS. RTC ROXAS CITY

FACTS:
 On September 14, 1984, said RTC rendered a decision in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-785 granting the
Application for Registration of Title4 dated June 20, 1977 filed by Rizal Recio for himself and in behalf of his brother
Oscar Recio and sisters Teresita Recio and Paciencia Recio. The RTC decreed:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the confirmation and registration of title to land, Lot No. 900
of Pilar Cadastre, LRC Cadastral Record No. 50963 situated in Marita, Municipality of Pilar, Province of Capiz,
Island of Panay, described in the technical description (Exhibit "E") and the approved plan AP-06-000028 (Exhibit
"X") in the names of the applicants Rizal Recio, of legal age, married to Alita B. Lañada, with residence in Loctugan
Hills, Roxas City; Teresita L. Recio, of legal age, Filipino, married to Pio Acelentaba and a resident of Panay, Capiz;
Paciencia L. Recio, of legal age, Filipino, married to Nestor Donado and a resident of Dayao, Roxas City, and to
the only heir of Oscar L. Recio, his mother Harriet Villanueva Vda. de Recio, who is of legal age, Filipino, a widow
and a resident of Roxas City, and a decree may issue after this decision shall have become final.
 The abovementioned decision became final, and pursuant thereto, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-
21076covering the 11,189-square meter piece of land, was issued in the Recios’ names on April 17, 1985.
 In 1997, a number of occupants of Lot No. 900, namely Joselito Alba, Virginia Bengora, Teodosia Alba, Celso
Bullos, Elizabeth Barrosa, Noel Gallardo, Paquita Ducit and Arturo Borleo filed a protest before the DENR, Roxas
City against the issuance of OCT No. 0-2107 on the ground that the land covered therein is within forest lands or
timberlands, hence it cannot be the subject of private appropriation.

ISSUE:
Whether the property in dispute cannot be the subject of private appropriation because it is within forest lands or
timberlands?

RULING:
 Dismissed. After going over the evidence offered by both parties, the Court finds it proper to dismiss the petition.
 Petitioner failed to sufficiently prove its allegation that Lot 900 forms part of the forest lands of the public domain.
The evidence offered by the petitioner that Lot 900 falls within forest lands consists only of the testimonies of its two
witnesses, the written report of Lorna Jomento (Exhibit A), and the ordinary photocopy of the sketch plan of Lot 900
(Exhibit E) and the verification (Exhibit E-1) appearing on it.
 The mere photocopy of the sketch plan of Lot 900 (Exhibit E) as well as the verification (Exhibit E-1) appearing
thereon is without probative value and inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the best evidence rule. In Philippine
Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held:
 "The Best Evidence Rule provides that the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its
nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. Absent a clear showing that the original
writing has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy must be disregarded, being unworthy
of any probative value and being an inadmissible evidence."
 Thus, for failure of the petitioner to adduce sufficient evidence to prove its allegation that Lot 900 falls within the
forest lands the petition has to be dismissed.

ALCANTARA VS. COSLAP

Facts:
Sometime in 1993, petitioner Nicasio Alcantara was granted Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542 (FLGLA No.
542) by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Under said FLGLA, Alcantara was allowed to lease
Nine Hundred Twenty-Three (923) hectares of public forest land at Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City for
grazing purposes for a period of twenty-five (25) years to expire on 31 December 2018.
As early as 1990, however, private respondent Rolando Paglangan together with Esmael Sabel and Lasid Acop filed a
letter-complaint with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No.
542 and the reversion of the entire 923 hectares to the Blaan and Maguindanaoan tribes.
Petitioner filed his Answer questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP over the case, since the dispute involved a claim for
recovery of ancestral land. Petitioner claimed that the case should have been filed with the DENR since it is the latter which
has jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands, including grazing lands.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that he had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the COSLAP
over the case. He stated further that the appellate court should have considered that the COSLAP does not possess the
historical, genealogical and anthropological expertise to act on ancestral land claims, and that it is the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), under the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 [4] which has jurisdiction over such
claims. Petitioner thus submits that the COSLAPs decision ordering the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and declaring the
area being claimed by private respondent as ancestral land is void for having been issued by a body which does not have
jurisdiction over said matters.

ISSUE: Whether DENR or COSLAP has the jurisdiction in cases involving lease of public forest lands?

RULING:
 COSLAP has the jurisdiction over lease of public forest lands.
 The Court finds no reason to disturb the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
 The Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in the assailed decision. The Court agrees with the
appellate court that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP since he participated
actively in the proceedings before said body by filing an Answer, a Motion for Reconsideration of the COSLAPs
decision and a Supplement to Respondents Motion for Reconsideration.The Court also notes the appellate courts
observation that petitioner began to question the jurisdiction of the COSLAP only when he realized that his period
to appeal the COSLAPs decision had already lapsed. [10] It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the active
participation of a respondent in the case pending against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body is tantamount
to a recognition of that courts or bodys recognition and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will
bar said party from later on impugning the courts or bodys jurisdiction. [11]
 Moreover, Executive Order No. 561 creating the COSLAP, the law then prevailing when private respondents filed
their complaint for cancellation of FLGLA No. 542, provides in Section 3, paragraph 2(a) thereof that said
Commission may assume jurisdiction over land disputes involving occupants of the land in question and pasture
lease agreement holders:
 Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. -- The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
 xxx
 2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or
dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission, may, in the following cases, assume
jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for
instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other
similar critical situations requiring immediate action:
 Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;
 Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
 Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;
 Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and
 Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.
 The Commission shall promulgate such rules of procedure as will insure expeditious resolution and action on the
above cases. The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on any of the foregoing cases shall have the
force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision and shall be binding upon the parties therein
and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same. Said resolution, order or decision shall become final and
executory within thirty (30) days from its promulgation and shall be appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme
Court.

 The Court of Appeals also stated that based on the records, the the land area being claimed by private
respondents belongs to the Blaan indigenous cultural community since they have been in possession of,
and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time immemorial, a fact has not been disputed by
petitioner.[12] It was likewise declared by the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542 granted to petitioner
violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410[13] which states that all unappropriated agricultural lands
forming part of the public domain are declared part of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups
occupying the same, and these lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed
exclusively among the members of the indigenous cultural group concerned.
 The Court finds no reason to depart from such finding by the appellate court, it being a settled rule that
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court absent any
showing that such findings are not supported by the evidence on record.

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE V. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, ET AL

L-24440, MARCH 28, 1968

FACTS:

After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga Del Norte and Zamboanga Del Sur), Republic Act 3039 was
passed providing that--

"All buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of
Zamboanga are hereby transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga."

Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was unconstitutional because it deprived the province of
property without due process. Included in the properties were the capital site and capitol building, certain school sites,
hospital and leprosarium sites, and high school playgrounds.

ISSUES:

1. Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or patrimonial property?
 2. Should the city pay for said properties?

HELD:

1. If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school playgrounds are for public use (in the sense that
generally, they are available to the general public), and all the rest are PATRIMONIAL (since they are not devoted
to public use but to public service; since they are not for public use, under Art. 424 of the Civil Code, they are
patrimonial.

But if we follow the law on Municipal Corporations, as long as the purpose is for a public service, the property should
be considered for PUBLIC USE.

2. If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the properties involved are patrimonial, the law would be
unconstitutional since the province would be deprived of its own property without just compensation.

If the law on Municipal Corporations would be followed, the properties would be of public dominion, and therefore
NO COMPENSATION would be required.

It is the law on Municipal Corporations that should be followed. Firstly, while the Civil Code may classify them as
patrimonial, they should not be regarded as ordinary private property. They should fall under the control of the State,
otherwise certain governmental activities would be impaired. Secondly, Art. 424, 2nd paragraph itself says "without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws."

EVY D. MACASIANO VS. HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO,MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE,METRO MANILA,

PALANYAG KILUSANG BAYAN FOR SERVICE GR No. 97764 August 10, 1992

FACTS:
 On June 13, 1990, the municipality of Paranaque passed an ordinance authorizing the closure of some streets
located at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. By virtue of this
Paranaque Mayor Ferrer was authorized to enter into a contract to any service cooperative for the establishment,
operation, maintenance and management of flea market and/or vending areas. Because of this purpose, respondent
Palanyag entered into an agreement with the municipality of Paranaque with the obligation to remit dues to the
treasury. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.

 On September 30, 1990, Brig. Gen Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of Metropolitan Traffic Command ordered the
destruction and confiscation of the stalls. These stalls were later returned to Palanyag. Petitioner then sent a letter
to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea market otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled.
Hence, respondents filed with the court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for
preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. The court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his letter
pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether an ordinance issued by the municipality of Paranaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or
thoroughfares as sites for flea market is valid?

HELD:
 Article 424 lays down the basic principle that properties of public domain devoted to public use and made available
to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed or leased by the local government
unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due process, the closure of the road should be for the sole
purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such
property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from
public use, the property becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned. It is only then that
respondent municipality can use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local
unit concerned might lawfully used or conveyed.

 Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still
considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power to use it for
another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons. Hence the ordinance is null and void.

HEIRS OF PARAGAS vs. REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF TARLAC CITY

G. R. No. 171304 October 10, 2007

FACTS:
 The Petitioners claim that their ascendants were the original pioneers/settlers/occupants of the land in question
since 1843 as its indigenous inhabitants. In 1910, however, officials of the Municipal Government of Paniqui,
headed by Maximo Parazo, built a school, a public market, and a cemetery on an untitled parcel of land, by virtue
of the judicial confirmation of its title in 1911 and 1915 to the subject property. However, a former Board Member
of the municipality inadvertently showed a close friend of the petitioners the cancelled OCTs No. RO-532 (O-116)
and No. 338 covering the lot where the public market is located. The said OCTs allegedly named the petitioners’
ascendants as the former owners of the subject property. Petitioners filed the Petition for Annulment of Judgment
with the Court of Appeals, praying for the cancellation of the TCTs and for the reconveyance in their favor of the
title to the parcels of land, but was dismissed, as well as the motion for reconsideration that was filed thereafter.

 Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property, covered by said title, being claimed by petitioners is a patrimonial property.

HELD:
 It is a patrimonial property. The schools, public markets and cemeteries are not for the free and indiscriminate use
of everyone. The determination of the persons allowed to study in such schools, or put up stalls in the public market,
or bury their dead in public cemeteries are regulated by the government. As such, the subject property is, under the
Civil Code classification, patrimonial property, and the Municipality may have the same registered in its name. It
was likewise affirmed that the claim of petitioners had already been barred by laches.

VILLANUEVA vs. CASTANEDA

G.R. No. L-61311, September 2l, 1987

FACTS:
 In 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing 24 members of Fernandino
United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the subject property within the
vicinity of the public market. The Resolution was protested and Civil Case No. 2040 was filed. CFI issued writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent the construction of stalls.
 While the case was pending, the municipal council adopted Resolution No. 29 which declared the subject area as
a parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality. CFI decided Civil Case No. 2040 and held that the
subject land was public in nature and was beyond the commerce of man. The preliminary injunction was made
permanent.
 The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not evicted from the place. They were assigned
specific areas and were made to pay daily fees to the municipal government for use of the area.
 On January 12, 1982 (more than 13 years after CFI decision), the Association of Concerned Citizens and
Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore the
subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza.
 After investigation was conducted by the municipal attorney, Macalino, officer-‐in--charge of the office of the mayor,
issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the stalls in the subject area.
 Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the CFI, which was denied.
 Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. Petitioners argued that they had right to occupy the
area by virtue of lease contracts entered into with the municipal government, and later, by virtue of space allocations
made in their favor for which they paid daily fees. The municipality denied that they entered into said agreements.
It argued that even if the leases were valid, the same could be terminated at will because rent was collected daily.

ISSUE: Whether or not the vendors had the right to occupy and make use of the property.

HELD:
 No. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual
undertaking. The town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that
such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public
dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the
common of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.
 Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed
premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts.
 Since the occupation of the place by the vendors, it had deteriorated to the prejudice of the community. Stalls, being
made of flammable materials, became a potential fire trap; access to and from the market was obstructed; there
were aggravated health and sanitation problems; flow of traffic was obstructed; stallholders in the public market
were deprived of a sizable volume of business; the people were deprived of the use of the place as a public plaza.
 The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the police power as delegated
to the municipality under the general welfare clause. This authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances
and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." This authority was validly exercised in this
case through the adoption of Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, by the municipal council of San Fernando.
 Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the
agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of
a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an
implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at any
time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the
general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the
paramount police power.
 The CFI judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for prohibition. Petition dismissed.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. No. 179987; April 29, 2009)
FACTS:
 Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang Cavite. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land
for more than thirty (30) years. Malabanan presented his witness, Aristedes Velazco, who testified that the property
originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four
sons, two of which were Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his
sons inherited and divided the property among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become
the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban
and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including the lot which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
 Malabanan also presented, among other documentary evidence, a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by
CENRO-DENR, which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-
1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan.
 The Republic interposed an appeal, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect
title.
 The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan, ruling
that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of
the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that
the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos’ possession prior to
that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. Malabanan died while the case was
pending with the Court of Appeals; hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not it is sufficient that the classification of land as alienable and disposable occurs at any time prior to the
filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier
(2) As for purposes of Section 14(2) of the PD 1529, whether or not a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable
may be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription

HELD:
(1)In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes
and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands
based on the length and quality of their possession.
Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of
his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as
a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation
that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under
Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
Clearly, the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject
property as there is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession,
according to their own evidence is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as
alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject
property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

EDUARDO SANCHEZ VS. MUNICIPALITY OF ASINGAN, Province of Pangasinan

G.R. No. L-17635, March 30, 1963
FACTS:

Municipality of Asingan is the owner of a triangular strip of land situated between the site of the municipal school building
and the provincial road wherein petitioner Sanchez occupied and paid its rental to the municipal.
When the new local administration took effect in 1959, the municipal passed a resolution notifying the occupants that the
land was needed for certain public purposes (e.g parking space, pedestrians among others), and that the occupants were
advised to vacate the land within 5 months.
Instead of moving, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition to prevent the municipality from ejecting them from the land and
with an alternative prayer that if they will be ejected, appellee be ordered to reimburse to them the rents which they have
paid for total of P1,178.20 plus damages and attorney’s fees.
Petition was dismissed, and the court orders the appellants to vacate the land.

ISSUE:
(1) W/N the land in question belongs to the Province of Pangasinan and therefore appellee has no right to
order their ejectment?
(2) (2) W/N appellants are entitled to reimburse the rental they have paid?

HELD:
(1) The premise of the contention is incorrect for the clear and specific finding of the court a quo is that the said land belongs
to Municipality of Asingan. The statement that “it is part of a broad shoulder of the provincial road” does not make the land
provincial property, such statement being merely a descriptive of its location and not indicative of its ownership. The land is
patrimonial property of the municipality.
(2) No. Appellee’s position herein is that the land in question is patrimonial character, not being included in any of the
categories of municipal properties for public use enumerated under Art. 424 namely “streets, squares, fountains, etc.”
Consequently, the implied agreement of lease between them was not null and void, although terminable. That being so,
there is no ground on which reimbursement of the rents may be ordered. Even if the land in question is for public use, we
see no justification for the stand maintained by the appellants that having occupied said land and benefit therefrom they
should be entitled to recover what they have paid as a condition for their ejectment. That would be to enrich them unduly to
the prejudice of appellee.

JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124293 January 31, 2005

Facts:

The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government

corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, Ltd. of Kobe, Japan (KAWASAKI) for the construction, operation and
management of the Subic National Shipyard Inc., (SNS) which subsequently became
the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO).
Under the JVA, the NDC and KAWASAKI will contribute P330M for the capitalization
of PHILSECO in the proportion of 60%-40% respectively. One of its salient features
is the grant to the parties of the right of first refusal should either of them decide to
sell, assign or transfer its interest in the joint venture.
NIDC transferred all its rights, title and interest in PHILSECO to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB). Such interests were subsequently transferred to the National
Government pursuant to an Administrative Order.

When the former President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 50 establishing the
Committee on Privatization (COP) and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to take
title to, and possession of, conserve, manage and dispose of non-performing assets
of the National Government, a trust agreement was entered into between the
National Government and the APT wherein the latter was named the trustee of the
National Government’s share in PHILSECO.
In the interest of the national economy and the government, the COP and the APT
deemed it best to sell the National Government’s share in PHILSECO to private
entities. After a series of negotiations between the APT and KAWASAKI , they
agreed that the latter’s right of first refusal under the JVA be “exchanged” for the
right to top by 5%, the highest bid for the said shares. They further agreed that
KAWASAKI would be entitled to name a company in which it was a stockholder,
which could exercise the right to top. KAWASAKI then informed APT that Philyards
Holdings, Inc. (PHI) would exercise its right to top.
At the public bidding, petitioner J.G. Summit Holdings Inc. submitted a bid of Two
Billion and Thirty Million Pesos (Php2,030,000,000.00) with an acknowledgement of
KAWASAKI/PHILYARDS right to top.

As petitioner was declared the highest bidder, the COP approved the sale “subject
to the right of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. / PHILYARDS Holdings Inc. to top JG’s
bid by 5% as specified in the bidding rules.”
On the other hand, the respondent by virtue of right to top by 5%, the highest bid
for the said shares timely exercised the same.
Petitioners, in their motion for reconsideration, raised, inter alia, the issue on the
maintenance of the 60%-40% relationship between the NIDC and KAWASAKI arising
from the Constitution because PHILSECO is a landholding corporation and need not
be a public utility to be bound by the 60%-40% constitutional limitation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is prohibited to possess the disputed property

considering the prohibition stipulated in the 1987 Constitution against foreign
owned companies.

RULING:

The court upheld the validity of the mutual rights of first refusal under the JVA
between KAWASAKI and NIDC.
The right of first refusal is a property right of PHILSECO shareholders, KAWASAKI
and NIDC, under the terms of their JVA. This right allows them to purchase the
shares of their co-shareholder before they are offered to a third party. The
agreement of co-shareholders to mutually grant this right to each other, by itself,
does not constitute a violation of the provisions of the Constitution limiting land
ownership to Filipinos and Filipino corporations. As PHILYARDS correctly puts it, if
PHILSECO still owns the land, the right of first refusal can be validly assigned to a
qualified Filipino entity in order to maintain the 60%-40% ration. This transfer by
itself, does not amount to a violation of the Anti-Dummy Laws, absent proof of any
fraudulent intent. The transfer could be made either to a nominee or such other
party which the holder of the right of first refusal feels it can comfortably do
business with.

Alternatively, PHILSECO may divest of its landholdings, in which case KAWASAKI, in

exercising its right of first refusal, can exceed 40% of PHILSECO’s equity. In fact, in
can even be said that if the foreign shareholdings of a landholding corporation
exceeds 40%, it is not the foreign stockholders’ ownership of the shares which is
adversely affected but the capacity of the corporation to won land—that is, the
corporation becomes disqualified to own land.
This finds support under the basic corporate law principle that the corporation and
its stockholders are separate judicial entities. In this vein, the right of first refusal
over shares pertains to the shareholders whereas the capacity to own land pertains
to the corporation. Hence, the fact that PHILSECO owns land cannot deprive
stockholders of their right of first refusal. No law disqualifies a person from
purchasing shares in a landholding corporation even if the latter will
exceed the allowed foreign equity, what the law disqualifies is the
corporation from owning land.

LEDESMA v MUNICIPALITY OF ILOILO

FACTS:

Concepcion Lopez owns lot 228. In March 1915, Lopez sold to the City of Iloilo a PART of said lot, now numbered 537 and
703, payable in 10 years
A TCT was issued in favor of Lopez, including 537 and 703 (The inclusion of said lots in said TCT was evidently an error
on the part of someone connected with the office of the registrar of titles)
Lopez sold to Maximo Kalaw and wife said lot 228, including lots 537 and 703 evidently by mistake. It is said that the
inclusion of said lots 537 and 703 was a mistake because Lopez as well as Kalaw and wife were ignorant of the fact that
said lots were included in that TCT.

Lopez, representing. Kalaw, sold said lots (228, 537 and 703) to Julio Ledesma, which sale was ratified by the
couple. Later a TCT was issued in favor of J. Ledesma. According to the admissions of J. Ledesma lots 537 and 703 were
included by mistake.
J. Ledesma sold a portion of the lot. Lot 228 was made into two lots, 228-A and 228-B. Lot 228-A remained the property of
J. Ledesma. Said lots 537 and 703, according to said TCT, remained the property of J. Ledesma.
J. Ledesma sold to the appellant herein lots Nos. 228-A, 537, and 703. Again, according to J. Ledesma, lots 537 and 703
were included in the transfer of lot No. 228-A to C. Ledesma by mistake.

This action was commenced in CFI of Iloilo. Its purpose was to recover from defendant the municipality of Iloilo a sum as
the value of the two lots Nos. 537 and 703 which, the plaintiff claimed, the defendant municipality had illegally appropriated,
together with damages and costs. The recovery of said sums was opposed by the defendants upon the ground that the
plaintiff and appellant was not and never had been the owner of said lots Nos. 537 and 703. The other defendants answered
the petition and supported the contention of the municipality.

After hearing the evidence upon the issue presented, the CFI absolved the defendants from all liability under the complaint.
From that judgment the plaintiff appealed
The theory of the appellant is that, by reason of the fact that said lots 537 and 703 had been included in the registered title
of Lopez in 1915, and Lopez included in each succeeding transfer of title to him said lots, that he was the indisputable owner
thereof, and because the City of Iloilo had appropriated said lots, that he was entitled to recover the value of said lots
together with damages.

ISSUE: WON the inclusion of lots 537 and 703 in the TCT of C. Ledesma made him the owner of such properties

HELD:
NO . An examination of the records shows that as early as April, 1915, said lots had been turned over by Lopez to the City
of Iloilo under a contract of sale for street purposes. That fact was well known. The said lots had been included as a part of
the streets in the City of Iloilo. The same were therefore illegally included, in accordance with the provisions of section 39
of Act No. 496, in the certificate of title issued to Lopez. That fact was recognized by Lopez as well as by each of the
subsequent purchasers of said lots.

The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens system, does not necessarily make the possessor a true
owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which include by mistake
or oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone,
becomes the owner of the lands illegally included.

The inclusion of public highways in a certificate of title does not thereby necessarily give to the holder of such certificate
said public highways. The appellant, therefore, even though a part of said streets (lots 537 and 703) had been included in
the original certificate of title and in the subsequent transfer of title, did not become the owner of said lots and is not therefore
entitled to recover their value from the City of Iloilo nor the damages prayed for.

MUN. OF CAVITE v. ROJAS

FACTS:

The defendants Hilaria Rojas and her husband Tiung Siuko, by virtue of a lease secured from the municipality of Cavite,
occupied a parcel of land in the area that forms part of the public plaza (Plaza Soledad) belonging to the municipality for
payment of a fee.
Plaintiff municipality demanded that defendants vacate said land within 60 days, but defendants Rojas and Siuko failed to
do so.
The provincial fiscal filed a complaint alleging that the lease secured from the municipality is null and void, for thesaid land
is part of public domain and the municipal council of Cavite had no power to withdraw it from public useand to lease it to a
private party for its own use.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the land belonged to public domain making the lease null and void.

RULING:

Land formed and integral portion of Plaza Soledad, which is for public use and reserved for the common benefit. The lease
is null and void, and defendants are ordered to vacate. Municipality must return the rent collected.

Properties of Public Dominion – Leases on properties classified as part of the public domain are null and void as they are
outside the commerce of man, and the thing leased (land belonging to public domain) cannot be the object of a contract.

MUNICIPALITIES; LEASES OF PUBLIC PROPERTY BY.—A municipal council cannot sell or lease communal or public
property, such as plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, bridges, etc.,because they are outside the commerce of man; and
if ithas done so by leasing part of a plaza the lease is null and
void, for it is contrary to the law, and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract. (Civil Code, arts. 344,1271.)

RESTORATION BY LESSEE.—On the hypothesis that such a lease is null and void for the reason that a municipal council
cannot withdraw part of a plaza from public use, the lessee must restore possession of the land by vacating it and the
municipality must thereupon restore to him any sums it may have collected as rent.
(Civil Code, art. 1303.)

UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTRIES v SEBASTIAN

FACTS:

The only question to be resolved is the identity and eligibility of the beneficiary in the light of the pertinent constitutional
provisions and the evidence of record. David Jacobson was an American citizen who had been a resident of the Philippines
for more than thirty years and up to the time of his death in 1970. He left a will in which he "devised and bequeathed" to the
Brokenshire Memorial Hospital 60% of his shares of stocks in the Tagdangua Plantation Co., Inc. which was incorporated
under Philippine law in 1948. This corporation was the registered owner of a tract of land in Pantuhan, Davao del Norte,
acquired by virtue of a sales patent issued to it in 1953.

In Special Proceeding No. 1695 of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte, Judge Alejandro E. Sebastian disallowed
the above-described legacy on the ground that it was in effect an alienation of private agricultural land in favor of a transferee
which was not qualified under the Constitution of 1935. The finding was that the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was owned
by the United Church Board for World Ministries (UCBWM), the herein petitioner, which was a non-stock corporation
organized in the United States by virtue of a charter granted by the state legislature of Massachussets. The basis of this
ruling was Article XII, Sections 1 and 5 of the 1935 Constitution, which barred foreigners, including Americans, from
acquiring agricultural lands in this country except only by hereditary succession. The court directed that a copy of its order
be sent to the Solicitor General so he could take the proper action, in view of the invalidity of the transfer, for the escheat of
the subject property to the State.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner came to this Court, contending that the above-cited
constitutional provisions were not applicable because the object of the legacy was not land but shares of stocks. Moreover,
even assuming that what was really involved was a transfer of land, the petitioner was nonetheless qualified to acquire it
under the provisions of the Parity Amendment and the Laurel-Langley Agreement.
The Solicitor General disagreed at first, insisting that the legacy was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution and did not come
under any of the allowed exceptions. During the protracted exchange of pleadings among the parties, however, certain
events transpired to considerably change the original situation and, consequently, also the position of government.

It now appears from the voluminous documents submitted in this case that at the time the will was executed in 1966, the
land on which the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was situated was already registered in the name of the Mindanao District
Conference, an affiliate of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP). It was this non-stock corporation, organized
in 1949 under Philippine law with a 100% Filipino membership, that owned and was operating the Hospital at the time of
Jacobson's death. Later, the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was itself incorporated as a charitable institution, with Filipinos
constituting the majority of its membership,[9] and on December 16, 1970, became the successor-in-interest of the UCCP
to the devised parcel of land.

In proof of these circumstances, the new counsel for Brokenshire presented, among many other documents, the articles of
incorporation of the UCCP and the Hospital and their corresponding certificates of registration issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the licenses issued by the Board of Medical Sciences for the operation of the Hospital to the UCCP
from 1968 to 1972 and to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. from 1973 to 1974, and the certificate of title over the
subject land in the name of the "Mindanao District Conference, commonly known as the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital."

These facts were not brought earlier to the attention of the probate court by the former counsel of the Hospital, Atty. Juan
V. Faune, for reasons that do not appear in the record. It was for such omission (the new counsel would call it
"misrepresentation") that Atty. Faune was replaced by Atty. Rodolfo D. de la Cruz, who disavowed his predecessor's
representations. At any rate, the above-stated documents have now made it clear that the United Church for Christ in the
Philippines and not the United Church Board for World Ministries was the owner of the Hospital at the time of the execution
of the will in 1966 and of the testator's death in 1970. It is also not disputed that such ownership passed to the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital itself upon its incorporation in 1970 when it thus became the proper party-in-interest to claim the property
directly devised by Jacobson to it.

Parenthetically, it should be observed, in fairness to Judge Sebastian, that he was unaware of those circumstances when
he declared the legacy invalid to enforce the nationalistic provisions of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. For his vigilance
in the protection of the national patrimony, he should be, as he is hereby, commended.
Even on the assumption that the UCBWM was really the owner of the Hospital at the time of the effectivity of the will and
that the devise was for that reason unenforceable, the defect in the will should be deemed rectified by the subsequent
transfer of the property to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. Our consistent ruling on this matter is that if land is
invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

ISSUE: WON a land invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfer it to a citizen is cured
and the title of the transferee is rendered valid thereafter.

RULING:

This action has been pending for quite some time now because of the confusion regarding the status of the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital as the ultimate beneficiary of the challenged legacy. The curious thing is that this case was mired in
factual and legal complications caused by needless misunderstanding among the parties which, it now appears, were never
in any substantial disagreement over the ownership of the Hospital. Their common concern for its welfare, in line with the
charitable spirit and purposes of the testator, should have avoided all this tedious and acrimonious dispute.

Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. is hereby substituted for the United Church Board for World Ministries as petitioner in
this case and DECLARED to be qualified to accept the legacy of the late David Jacobson.