ARTICLE XV

The Family

SECTION 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.

PT&T vs. NLRC

272 SCRA 596

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as “Supernumerary
Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went
on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2
periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary
period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was
single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage,
its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy.
Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for
employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision
on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of
a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by
reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and
employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of
unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

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PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the
right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record
discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that
married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that
upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.”

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to
be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to
good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in
an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence,
ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation.
Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory
of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

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Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the
house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same thing
happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but
Gina’s relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long
walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept
together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted
themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical
examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed.
There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the
country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he
loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their
relationship is still young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another
physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital obligations and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children
thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

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Republic v Molina

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo
manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with
friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with
his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later,
Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity
is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties
must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some
psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would
comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her
husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence
nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined

such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage

such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of
marriage

such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code

decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected

court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state..

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Obergefell v Hodges

The landmark case of Obergefell vs Hodges upheld the rights of same-sex couples to marry. The US Supreme Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex
based on the following principles and premises:

(1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices

defining personal identity and beliefs.

(2) Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply
with equal force to same-sex couples.

(a) The first premise of this Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.

(b) A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-
person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals. The intimate association protected by
this right was central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of married couples to
use contraception.

(c) A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning
from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.

(d) Finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social
order. States have contributed to the fundamental character of marriage by placing it at the center of many facets of
the legal and social order. There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this
principle, yet same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage and
are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same-sex
couples out of a central institution of the Nation’s society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of
marriage.

The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with
the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.

(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights
implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always
coextensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.

(4) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex

may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.

(5) While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, individuals who are
harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental

right.

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CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-CADIZ vs. BRENT HOSPITAL AND COLLEGES, INC.

FACTS:

Christine Joy Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the
time of her indefinite suspension from employment in 2006. The cause of suspension was Cadiz's Unprofessionalism
and Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. It appears that Cadiz became pregnant out of wedlock, and
Brent imposed the suspension until such time that she marries her boyfriend in accordance with law.

Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice, Constructive Dismissal, Non-
Payment of Wages and Damages with prayer for Reinstatement. The LA found that Cadiz's indefinite suspension
amounted to a constructive dismissal; nevertheless, the LA ruled that Cadiz was not illegally dismissed as there was
just cause for her dismissal, that is, she engaged in premarital sexual relations with her boyfriend resulting in a
pregnancy out of wedlock. The LA deemed said act to be immoral, which was punishable by dismissal under Brent's
rules and which likewise constituted serious misconduct under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code.

Cadiz appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the LA decision in its Resolution
dated December 10, 2007. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC.

She elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA, however, dismissed her petition outright due to technical
defects in the petition: (1) incomplete statement of material dates; (2) failure to attach registry receipts; and (3) failure
to indicate the place of issue of counsel's PTR and IBP official receipts. Cadiz sought reconsideration but it was
denied. (However, when it comes to these technical defects, the Supreme Court ruled “that despite these defects, the
Court finds that the ends of substantial justice would be better served by relaxing the application of technical rules of
procedure”. These are mere tools to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and if their strict and rigid application
would frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, then it must be avoided).

Hence, the present petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Christine Joy Cadiz’ premarital relations with her boyfriend and the resulting pregnancy out
of wedlock constitute immorality, hence a valid ground for dismissal?

2. Whether or not the stipulation that marriage as a condition for reinstatement is valid?

RULING:

1.

No. To resolve this, the Court makes reference to the recently promulgated case of Cheryll Santos Leus v. St.
Scholastica's College Westgrove and/or Sr. Edna Quiambao, OSB. The Court ruled in Leus that the determination of
whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step process: first, a consideration of the totality of the

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circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-a-vis the
prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable.

In the present case, the surrounding facts leading to Cadiz's dismissal are straightforward - she was employed as a
human resources officer in an educational and medical institution of the Episcopal Church of the Philippines; she and
her boyfriend at that time were both single; they engaged in premarital sexual relations, which resulted into
pregnancy. The labor tribunals characterized these as constituting disgraceful or immoral conduct. They also
sweepingly concluded that as Human Resource Officer, Cadiz should have been the epitome of proper conduct and
her indiscretion "surely scandalized the Brent community."

The foregoing circumstances, however, do not readily equate to disgraceful and immoral conduct. Brent’s Policy
Manual and Employee’s Manual of Policies do not define what constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as a
ground for disciplinary action. Instead, Brent erroneously relied on the standard dictionary definition of fornication as a
form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that Cadiz’ acts fell under such classification, thus constituting
immorality.

Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an act should be gauged - it is public and secular,
not religious. Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or immoral should be made in accordance with the
prevailing norms of conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those conducts which are proscribed because they are
detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. The fact that a particular
act does not conform to the traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to qualify
such act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and secular standards. More importantly, there
must be substantial evidence to establish that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered
disgraceful or immoral. The labor tribunals' respective conclusion that Cadiz's "indiscretion" "scandalized the Brent
community" is speculative, at most, and there is no proof adduced by Brent to support such sweeping conclusion.

Hence, "premarital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other,
and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does
not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS." (Cheryll Santos Lens v. St.
Scholastica’s College Westgrove and/or Sr. Edna Quiambao, OSB).

2.

No. The doctrine of management prerogative gives an employer the right to "regulate, according to his own discretion
and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, the time, place and
manner of work, work supervision, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of
employees."

However, Statutory law is replete with legislation protecting labor and promoting equal opportunity in employment. No
less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that the "State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all." The
Labor Code of the Philippines, meanwhile, provides:

Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon

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getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.

Also, Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women protects women against discrimination in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations, including the right to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only
with their free and full consent.

Therefore, Brent's condition is coercive, oppressive and discriminatory. There is no rhyme or reason for it. It forces
Cadiz to marry for economic reasons and deprives her of the freedom to choose her status, which is a privilege that
inheres in her as an intangible and inalienable right. While a marriage or no-marriage qualification may be justified as
a "bona fide occupational qualification," Brent must prove two factors necessitating its imposition, viz:

(1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and

(2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would
be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. has not shown the presence of these factors. Perforce, the Court cannot uphold the
validity of said condition.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANALO

FACTS: Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by the Japanese court. Manalo was
allowed to testify. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were: (1) Court Order finding the petition
and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance; (2) Affidavit of Publication; (3) Certificate of Marriage
between Manalo and her former Japanese husband; (4) Divorce Decree of the Japanese court; (5)
Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce;
and (6) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.

The Office of the Solicitor’s General, as it appeared for the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, did not present any
controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. It opined that, based on Article of Article 15 of the New Civil Code,
the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in
another country.

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines is
applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former capacitating him to remarry.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad
by the latter?

HELD: Yes. Article 26 of the Family Code which reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on the Philippine Courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree
to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes
our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the
legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care, and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still
be determined by our court.

The Court state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitation him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Moreover, invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15of the Civil Code, is
not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the
State may provide for an exception thereto. Also, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it
would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected
by law.

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The Court, however, asserts that it cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo’s petition to recognize
and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese Court. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.

The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.

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Republic of the Philippines vs. Albios

FACTS

Liberty Albios petitioned the court to declare as nukl and void her marriage with Daniel Lee Fringer. She described
the marriage as one.made in jest, and therefore, null and void ab initio. Moreover, the reason why they got married is
for Albios to acquire American citizenship, but did not materialize for Fringer’s non-compliance with the agreement.
They never lived together as husband and wife.

ISSUE

Whether or not Albios’ petition to nullify their marriage be granted on account of lack of consent or being the marriage
was contracted in jest.

RULING

The Court resolves in the negative. Respondent’s marriage is not void.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable
intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine marriage consent would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid
marriage can support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie albeit for limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

FACTS

Liberty Albios petitioned the court to declare as nukl and void her marriage with Daniel Lee Fringer. She described
the marriage as one.made in jest, and therefore, null and void ab initio. Moreover, the reason why they got married is
for Albios to acquire American citizenship, but did not materialize for Fringer’s non-compliance with the agreement.
They never lived together as husband and wife.

ISSUE

Whether or not Albios’ petition to nullify their marriage be granted on account of lack of consent or being the marriage
was contracted in jest.

RULING

The Court resolves in the negative. Respondent’s marriage is not void.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable
intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine marriage consent would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid
marriage can support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie albeit for limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

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Imbong vs Ochoa

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

ISSUE:

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

Held:

Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing
the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe
upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which
states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section
23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence,
persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as
it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are
not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.

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Rhonda Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College

In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several
pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.

Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her
students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for
appropriate action.

Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their
graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.

The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the
school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:

1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable
expectation of privacy which must be respected.

2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to
STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;

3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened
at STC’s Computer Laboratory;

They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject
data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.

The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.

Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:

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1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced
disappearance; and

2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business of
“gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party”.

First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only
against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)

The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes
use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that
is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.

In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence
would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.

Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile page):

(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and

(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any setting other than
“Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much so that only five people
can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not
refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said
pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.

STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be
considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and
the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a
legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students and
their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).

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Mallilin v Jamesolamin

Facts:

Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.

On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and mental
incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and
responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear
manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the
heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.

Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert who manifested
psychological incapacity in their marriage.

On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment with
the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).

On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on
the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as contemplated by the second paragraph of
Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).

Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.

Issue:

Whether to consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 is proper and
controlling.

Ruling:

No.

To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph of Canon 1095 should also
be covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include. What would prevent members of other
religious groups from invoking their own interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if
not inconsistent, interpretations?

To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be legislating from the
bench.1âwphi1 As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,20 interpretations given by the NAMT of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.

15
Francisco Jr. vs. House of Representatives

Facts:

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress.

On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.

The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House
of Representatives.

Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

Issues:

Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses
under the Constitution.

Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Rulings:

This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court
under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of
the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.

16
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides
for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had
absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.

It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved
by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution

17
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council

Facts:

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to
allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued
that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the
Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the
absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as
the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance
of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a
representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress.

Issue:

1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this case?

2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7
sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?

Held:

1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be
allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act
by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an
official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to have
locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and
question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of
the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the

18
highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the
Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the
nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for
rectification of legal blunders.

2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of
the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and
unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of the
Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second
part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of
the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any
other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative
may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote
may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of
the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s
voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory,
defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to expect that
the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is
the best means to break a voting deadlock.

19
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize
that it was so worded because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a
unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of
Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to
legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process.
The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot
be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the
JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute.
Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It
nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo
the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its
finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
(Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)

20
Poe v Comelec

FACTS:

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May
24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN
KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after
her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized
American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then
eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally
went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA
9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped
using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among others,
that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical
parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in
want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as
candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

21
HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that
only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which are typical
of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99%
probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are
Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on
Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the
1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are
being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the requirements of
ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning
to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace
Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US,
coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for
Presidency was granted by the SC.

22
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

FACTS:

The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for Prohibition against BSP and the
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last provisio
in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

BACKGROUND:

July 3, 1993, RA No 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines
and created a new BSP.

Article II, Section 15 (c) RA 7653: A compensation structure based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and
subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bank Sentrals human resource
development program. Provided that the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible
with the principles provided for under RA No 6758 (Salary Standardization Act). Provided, however, that
compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in
accordance with the rates prescribed under RA No 6758.

7 Subsequent Laws were enacted exempting all other rank-and-file employees of Government Financial Institutions
from the SSL. These are: RA No 7907 (1995) – LBP, RA No 8282 (1997) – SSS, RA No 8289 (1997) – SBGFC, RA
No 8291 – GSIS, RA No 8523 (1998) – DBP, RA No 8763 (2000) – HGC, and RA No 9302 (2004) – PDIC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate
that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the laws”

HELD:

The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional.

23
RULING:

With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other government financial institutions (GFIs),
the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on
the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification between the rank-
and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial distinction that made real
differences between the 2 classes.

The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the
reasonability of the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653. This relates to the
constitutionality of classifications between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The classification must
not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The provisio may be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust
distinctions between persons who are without differences.

The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption rests on the policy
determination by the legislature. The policy determination argument may support the inequality of treatment between
the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file
of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who are similarly situated.

The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress inconsistent and
unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The challenge to the constitutionality of
Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in
its treatment of persons similarly situated.

In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws”
includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly.

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principles is that equal protection and security shall be given to every
person under circumstance which, if not identical are analogous.

24
White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila

On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is
an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes
on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is
a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also
violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The
said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really
there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the
infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The
SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

25
Newsounds Broadcasting Network Inc. vs. Dy, G.R. No. 170270 & 179411, April 2, 2009

Facts:

Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station, and Star FM
DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced
relocation of its broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan
City, Isabela.

On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial structure to be constructed conformed
to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is classified as a “commercial area”. The radio station was
able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.

In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit, City Zoning Administratior-Designate
Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion
papers showing that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel
the issuance of mayor’s permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to
commercial.

In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent
Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds
that they did not have record of the DAR Order.

The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer
of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure
of radio station during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate
before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station
had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections.

Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s permit but both courts denied the petition.

A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke
the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayor’s permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-
004, enacted in 1993. However, nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a mayor’s permit to submit “either
an approved land conversion papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural land
or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification
of property from agricultural to commercial land.

In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial. Petitioners are also armed
with several certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property
taxes based on the classification of property as commercial without objections raised by the respondents.

Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the commercial character of
the property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had
ruled that “the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is
understood to only refer to acts and mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.

Issue:

26
Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels on
the grounds that the state is immune against suits.

Held:

No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of its officials or agents, there is an
exception.

Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances,
and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the
public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the
interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or
capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals

Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the government official
whose acts are being disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of the State, the Supreme Court have
declined to apply State immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the bare
assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City government had previously erred when it certified that the
property had been zoned for commercial use. The absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996
to 2001 certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from asserting
that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.

Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by the Cauayan City
government that the property was commercially zoned unless they had evidence, which they had none, that the local
officials who issued such certifications acted irregularly in doing so. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid
cause at all to even require petitioners to secure “approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the
property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land.”

Respondents closure of petitioner’s radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motvies. Petitioners have been aggressive
in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and his
political dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms that respondent’s denial of the renewal applications on the
ground that property is commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan
City and suppress the latter’s voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is
hereby GRANTED and respondents are directed to immediately issue petitioners’ zoning clearances and mayor’s
permits for 2004 to petitioners.

27
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

Facts:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a
petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their
decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance.
In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner
made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports
by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:

WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;

WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered
under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements
of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government
neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy
of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the

28
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular
purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required
for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the
party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for
which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.

29
City of Manila vs. Laguio

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars,
karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light
district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it
includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that
they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC,
LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is
to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations
thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at
bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.

30
Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein
abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a
“monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong
then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the
RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese
businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he
should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection
clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute
must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained
away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his
market stalls in the Pasay city market.

31
Gualberto vs. Gualberto

Article 211 of the Family Code: The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over their children.
In the case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. A
mother's authority is subordinated to the father's. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and
foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child, taking into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parties.

Article 213 of the Family Code: No child under seven years of age shall be separated from his mother unless the
Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Case Summary:

Background:

The court consolidated and considered two appeals by former husband and wife Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V and
Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto regarding their divorce and the custody of their child.

Crisanto had filed for divorce and custody of their child - Rafaello. Joycelyn failed to appear at the court proceedings
and the judge awarded custody to Cristiano after having considered evidence that Jocelyn was having extramarital
lesbian relations and that she did not care for and was witnessed slapping her child. It was further held that her
parental authority was subordinated to that of Crisanto under Article 211 of the Family Code. Jocelyn challenged this
decision, which was reversed and she was granted custody on the basis that, according to Article 213 of the Family
Code, a minor child shall not be separated from his mother unless a court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.

At the next instance, the Court of Appeal annulled the second court order on procedural grounds and returned
custody to Crisanto until Jocelyn’s motion was decided on again. In the current case, both parties petitioned the
Supreme Court against the Court of Appeal's ruling.

Issue and resolution:

Custody of child after parental separation. Whether the Court of Appeal violated Article 213 of the Family Code when
it awarded custody of the child to Crisanto and was it Article 213 or Article 211 which applied in this case. The
Supreme Court held that in cases concerning minor children below the age of 7, Article 213 of the Family Code takes
priority as it is in the best interests of a young child to be cared for by his mother unless 'compelling' reasons are
presented for a court to order otherwise. As no such reasons were presented or proved, custody was awarded to the
mother.

Court reasoning:

The Supreme Court said that the general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their
mother finds its reason in the basic need of minor children for their mother’s loving care and that this rule is
recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a mother has her baby torn away from her. Any exception to this rule
can only be made for ‘compelling reasons’ for the good of the child, but such cases must indeed be rare.

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Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of
custody. The mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody, but sexual
preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is
a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child.

It was held that in order to deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have
had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted her from exercising proper parental care. It was,
therefore, not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian, but he had to also demonstrate that
she had carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under
circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development. However, in the current case, there was no
evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and
psychological development suffered as a result.

Excerpts citing CRC and other relevant human rights instruments:

The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that “in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”

The principle of “best interest of the child” pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support,
personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that in
choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the paramount
consideration. Courts are mandated to take into account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the
children’s well-being and development. Aside from the material resources and the moral and social situations of each
parent, other factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the capability to attend to the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the children. Among these factors are the previous care and devotion shown
by each of the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home environment and time availability; as well
as the children’s emotional and educational needs.

33
BIRAOGO VS PTC

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as
it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body,
it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They
argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-
judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the
other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed
and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A.
No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

34
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a
mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it
is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s
jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and
to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct
injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed
by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the

35
real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing
an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled
to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that
the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President
are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President
granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the
obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws
of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is
no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify
the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has
provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that
would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in
the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for
the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s
power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression
of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

36
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It
is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all
past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to
the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar
as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

37
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers

Facts:

City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on February 9, 2007. The ordinance took effect on March 23,
2007 after its publication in the newspaper Mindanao Pioneer. Pursuant to Section 5 of the ordinance, the ban
against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced three months thereafter.

The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc.(PBGEA) and two of its members, namely: Davao
Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the
RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs through a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal
protection clause; amounted to· the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication
pursuant to Section 5116 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).

On May 8, 2007, the residents living within and adjacent to the banana plantations in Davao City led by Wilfredo
Mosqueda,7 joined by other residents of Davao City,(Mosqueda, et al.) submitted their Motion for Leave to Intervene
and Opposition to the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction. The RTC granted their motion on June 4, 2007.

On June 20, 2007, the RTC granted the prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and subsequently
issued the writ.

On September 22,2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and
constitutional.

The R TC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power. under the General Welfare Clause of
the Local Government Code;

that the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that
aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher
degree of health risk caused by aerial drift;

and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear
showing that it had violated the Constitution. However, the RTC, recognizing the impracticability of the 3-month
transition period under Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07, recommended the parties to agree on an extended
transition period. PBGEA, et al. appealed, and applied for injunctive relief from the CA, which granted the
application and consequently issued a TRO to meanwhile enjoin the effectivity of the ordinance. On January 9,
2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.

It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and
oppressive;

Then, Mosquera et.al. file a motion for certiorari.

38
Estrada v Escritor

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who
is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a
year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a
couple to legalize their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of
religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or
symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner.
Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a
distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming
arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used
the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the
law based on her right to freedom of religion.

39