1. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328 SCRA 836, G.R.

No. 135962 March 27, 2000

Constitutional Law; Political Subdivision; Police Power; Definition of Police Power.—Police power is an inherent
attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties
or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive,
reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.

Same; Same; Same; Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature which may delegate the power to
the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units.—It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328 SCRA 836, G.R. No. 135962
March 27, 2000Constitutional Law; Political Subdivision; Police Power; Definition of Police Power.—Police power
is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and
pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.

Same; Same; Same; Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature which may delegate the power to
the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units.—It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot
be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature,
however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

Same; Same; Same; Definition of Local Government.—A local government is a “political subdivision of a nation or
state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.” The Local Government Code of 1991
defines a local government unit as a “body politic and corporate”—one endowed with powers as a political
subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory.
Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. They are also the territorial and
political subdivisions of the state.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Police power delegated to the local government units in the Local Government Code
of 1991.—Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code of
1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies.—Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative
body of the provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the
sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is
the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality]
provided under the Code x x x.” The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to “enact ordinances
as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the
general welfare of the inhabitants thereon.”

Same; Same; Same; There is no syllable in Republic Act No. 7924 that grants the Metro Manila Development
Authority police power, let alone legislative power.—It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to
the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the
MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924
that empowers the MMDA or its Council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a “development
authority.”

Same; Same; Same; Metro Manila Development Authority is not a political unit of government.—Clearly, the
MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila
Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA’s functions. There
is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolis.

Same; Same; Same; Metro Manila Development Authority is not a local government unit or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power.—It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a
public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a “special metropolitan political subdivision” as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a “special metropolitan political
subdivision” requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. R.A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the
MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a
cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the
President, whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.

Same; Same; Same; Unlike the Metro Manila Commission, the Metro Manila Development Authority has no power
to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.—Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same
entity as the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the
welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils,
that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City
did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by
petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.

2. Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Gambling; The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.—The
morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical
to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling
or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the
exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it
may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it
has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices,
Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has
it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political
departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not
addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide,
they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and
not to the courts of justice.

Local Governments; Tests of a valid ordinance.—The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It
must not contravene the constitution or any statute; 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) It must not be
partial or discriminatory; 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) It must be general and consistent with
public policy; 6) It must not be unreasonable.

Same; Gambling; Statutory Construction; Local Government Code; Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or
phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated, and,
since the word “gambling” is associated with “and other prohibited games of chance,” under Sec. 458 of the Local
Government Code, the word should be read as referring only to illegal gambling.—We begin by observing that
under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, “gambling and other prohibited games of chance.” Obviously, this provision excludes games of
chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming
that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section
is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation
to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word
“gambling” is associated with “and other prohibited games of chance,” the word should be read as referring to
only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The ordinances in question contravene P.D. 1869 which has not been repealed
by the Local Government Code.—The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D.
1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred
on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They
deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a
statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also
enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code,
but merely “modified pro tanto” in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the
local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 of the Local Government Code is permissible
because one law can change or repeal another law. It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words.
While insisting that the decree has only been “modifiedpro tanto,” they are actually arguing that it is already dead,
repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize
and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government
unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word “shall”
as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent
and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners’ view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this
construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited
by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation,
PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able
to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Implied Repeals; It is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed
in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention.—It is noteworthy that the petitioners have
cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly
mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D.
1869 is not one of them. x x x Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute
against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them,
remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the
government.—There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private
respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to
wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust
punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power
crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not
been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more
responsive to the fiscal problems of the government. It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one
statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile
them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the
government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold
one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case
before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local
government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except
only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the Code, to
make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary.

Same; Same; Same; There are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law.—This
approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized
by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more
so. The petitioners’ suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the
distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature.
Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San
Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.
Same; Same; The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious as
municipal governments are only agents of the national government and that the delegate cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.—In light of all the above considerations, we see
no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On
the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well
as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition
of gambling in general. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot
be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the
local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place,
and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Same; Same; Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now
than under the previous Constitutions.—This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of
local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of
the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions.
The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold
or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however,
the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or
violate it.

3. Alvarez vs. Guingona, Jr., 252 SCRA 695, G.R. No. 118303 January 31, 1996

Constitutional Law; Local Governments; Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local
Government Units.—In this regard, we hold that petitioners’ asseverations are untenable because Internal
Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.

Same; Same; The IRA’s are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local
government unit.—The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the
local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any
further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government
can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

Same; Same; A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and
possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.—A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the
State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an
intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the
local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and
resources. Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially
the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own
resources and assets.

Same; On the side of every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.—It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential
rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of constitutionality. Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful
and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who
petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify
such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail.

4. Basco vs. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52, G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991

Constitutional Law; Taxation; Municipal Corporations; Municipal corporations have no inherent power to tax; their
power to tax must always yield to a legislative act.—The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has
no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337;
Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, “the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to
confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it” (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its “power to tax”
therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which
has the “inherent power to tax” (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress has the power of control over local governments; if Congress can grant a
municipal corporation the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the
power.—The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress” (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the
power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers” (Asuncion v. Yriantes,
28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over local
governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power
to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

Same; Same; Same; License Fees; The power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of
franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD 771, it is now vested exclusively on the National
Government.—The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as
1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of “franchise, licenses or permits” was
withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. xxx xxx Therefore, only the
National Government has the power to issue “licenses or permits” for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the
power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of “licenses or permits” is no
longer vested in the City of Manila.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government;
PAGCOR, being an instrumentality of the Government, is therefore exempt from local taxes.—Local governments
have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.
xxx xxx PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental,
which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government. “The states have no power by taxation
or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by
Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government.” (MC Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat
316, 4 L Ed. 579) This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local
governments. “Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power
on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States
(Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal
instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously
burden it in the accomplishment of them.” (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, italics supplied).
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities
may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as “a tool for regulation” (U.S. v.
Sanchez, 340 US 42). The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the “power to destroy” (Mc Culloch
v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the
inherent power to wield it.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations
which Congress may provide by law.—The power of local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject
to “limitations” which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an “operative” law until “amended,
repealed or revoked” (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its “exemption clause” remains as an exception to the
exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather
is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

Same; Same; Same; Local Autonomy; The principle of local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign
within the state, it simply means decentralization.—Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means “decentralization” (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as
cited in Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make
local governments sovereign within the state or an “imperium in imperio.” Local Government has been described
as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.
In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments
can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local
government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (italics
supplied)

Same; Equal Protection Clause; The “equal protection” clause does not preclude classification of individuals who
may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.—
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because “it
legalized PAGCOR—conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug
trafficking and other vices” (p. 82, Rollo). We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The
petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause
does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as
the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to
operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS
v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989). The “equal protection clause” does not prohibit the Legislature
from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G.
2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827). Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted
by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes,
lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are
prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional. “If the law presumably hits
the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have
been applied.” (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827) “The equal protection clause of the 14 th Amendment does not
mean that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can
to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less
than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact.” (Dominican
Hotel v. Arizana, 249 U.S. 2651).

Same; Statutes; Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, for a law to be nullified, it must be
shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.—Every law has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82
SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the
grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition
this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration.
Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality
of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this
petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of
“morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of
youth and educational values” being raised, is up for Congress to determine.

5. Limbona vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786, G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989

Constitutional Law; Due Process in Administrative Proceedings; Access to Judicial Remedies; No one may be
punished for seeking redress in the courts, unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution.—In the second
place, the resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblyman against the
petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be obduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the
resolution) speaks of “a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question
which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly—an act which some members claimed
unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as representative of the people,” an act that cannot
possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, and, unless the recourse
amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.

Same; Autonomous Regions; Administrative Law; The autonomous governments of Mindanao are subject to the
jurisdiction of our national courts.—An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense,
that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the
first place, mandates that “[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions.” In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge
chiefly administrative services. x x x Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity
of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner’s removal as Speaker.

Same; Same; Same; Decentralization; Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of

power.—Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivision in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments
“more responsive and accountable,” and “ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.” At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises “general supervision” over them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law.” He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Decentralization of power involves an abdication of political power in favor of
local government units declared to be autonomous.—Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to “self-immolation,”
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.

6. Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 271, G.R. No. 93252, G.R. No. 93746, G.R. No. 95245 August 5,
1991

Local Governments; Power to discipline local officials.—It is the considered opinion of the Court that
notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of
its right—or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative
sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of “as may be provided by law”) signifies
nothing more than to underscore local governments ‘autonomy from congress and to break Congress’ “control”
over local governments affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to
deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.

Same; Same; Local autonomy explained.—It is noteworthy that under the Charter, “local autonomy” is not
instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax
law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to realize
autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
governments under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows
Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that
Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise
to the President.

Same; Same; Supervision and control, meaning of.—The petitioners are under the impression that the
Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression
because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. x x x “Control” has been defined as
“the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter.” “Supervision” on
the other hand means “overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties.”

Same; Same; Suspension.—The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit
another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is
facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event
that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office
(assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600
days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. x x x.

Same; Same; Same.—The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, x x x because it is out
of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, x x x is simply “to prevent
the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible
witnesses” or to keep him off “the records and other evidence.” It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors
in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed
sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and
which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.

7. Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 399, G.R. No. 93252, G.R. No. 93746, G.R. No. 95245 November
8, 1991

Administrative Law; Local government officials; Service of suspension orders.—We agree with petitioner that he
can be allowed the benefit of simultaneous service of the third and fourth suspension orders, for the following
reasons. If simultaneous service of two (2) suspension orders is allowed, this would work in favor of the petitioner
(an elective local official) as the balance of his third preventive suspension would, in effect, be reduced from 46
days to 17 days. It will be recalled that, in the main decision, noting that successive suspensions have been inflicted
on Mayor Ganzon, we stated that what “is intriguing is that respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to
speak, on the Mayor piecemeal—apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent
Secretary could have pursued a consolidated effort.” Surely, allowing petitioner to serve simultaneously the
overlapping third and fourth suspensions will favor him, (and presumably the local constituency) and certainly
lessen if not offset the harsh effects of whatever motive may be behind the intriguing action of the respondent
Secretary in issuing those successive suspension orders.

Local Government Code of 1991; Preventive suspension of local elective officials.—We may already take judicial
notice of the recently-approved Local Government Code of 1991 (recently signed into law by the President) which
provides (as to imposition of preventive suspensions) as follows: “SEC. 63. Preventive Suspension x x x x x x b) x x
x that, any single preventive suspension of local elective official shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided,
further that in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be
preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing
and known at the time of the first suspension.” (italics ours) Since we can allow, as we here allow, x x x petitioner
to serve the third and fourth orders simultaneously (insofar as they overlap), this means that, as explained earlier,
petitioner shall serve only 17 days more (not 46 days) to complete the service of the third order, that is, starting
from 3 September 1991 and ending on 20 September 1991. Hence, as of this latter date, petitioner has complied
with the mandate of the main decision for he has already fully served the third preventive suspension which ended
on 20 September 1991.

8. Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, 429 SCRA 736, G.R. No. 152774 May 27, 2004

Actions; Parties; Locus Standi; The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has “alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”—The gist
of the question of standing is whether a party has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a
party assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. Such party must be able to show, not
only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason
of the statute or act complained of.

Same; Same; Same; Local Autonomy; Local Government Code; A local government unit (LGU), seeking relief in
order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs, pertaining to their interest in their
share in the national taxes or the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), has the requisite standing to bring suit.—The
Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present suit. The petitioner, a
local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.
This interest pertains to the LGUs’ share in the national taxes or the IRA. The petitioner’s constitutional claim is,
in substance, that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions contravene
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, mandating the “automatic release” to the LGUs of their share in the
national taxes. Further, the injury that the petitioner claims to suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA, as
provided under Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, occasioned by the implementation of the
assailed measures. These allegations are sufficient to grant the petitioner standing to question the validity of the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions as the petitioner clearly has “a
plain, direct and adequate interest” in the manner and distribution of the IRA among the LGUs.

Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The rule on hierarchy of courts may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction.—Considering that these
facts, which are necessary to resolve the legal question now before this Court, are no longer in issue, the same
need not be determined by a trial court. In any case, the rule on hierarchy of courts will not prevent this Court
from assuming jurisdiction over the petition. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court’s primary jurisdiction. The crucial legal issue submitted for
resolution of this Court entails the proper legal interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions.
Moreover, the “transcendental importance” of the case, as it necessarily involves the application of the
constitutional principle on local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The nature of the present controversy, therefore,
warrants the relaxation by this Court of procedural rules in order to resolve the case forthwith.

Same; Moot and Academic Questions; Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the
Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution; Another reason justifying the
resolution by the Court of the substantive issue now before it is the rule that courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”—Granting arguendo that, as
contended by the respondents, the resolution of the case had already been overtaken by supervening events as
the IRA, including the LGSEF, for 1999, 2000 and 2001, had already been released and the government is now
operating under a new appropriations law, still, there is compelling reason for this Court to resolve the substantive
issue raised by the instant petition. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court
from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events
had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public. Another reason justifying the resolution by
this Court of the substantive issue now before it is the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is “capable of repetition, yet evad ing review.” For the GAAs in the coming years may contain
provisos similar to those now being sought to be invalidated, and yet, the question may not be decided before
another GAA is enacted. It, thus, behooves this Court to make a categorical ruling on the substantive issue now.

Municipal Corporations; Local Autonomy; Local Government Code; Consistent with the principle of local
autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which
provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.—Consistent with the principle of local autonomy,
the Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision. This provision has
been interpreted to exclude the power of control. The distinction between the two powers was enunciated in
Drilon v. Lim: An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in
his discretion, order the act undone or redone by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.
If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules.
He may not prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it
that the rules are followed.

Same; Same; Same; When parsed, it would be readily seen that Section 6, Article X of the Constitution readily
mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share” in the national taxes, (2) the “just share” shall be determined
by law, and (3) the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs.—Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution reads: Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to them. When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision
mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share” in the national taxes; (2) the “just share” shall be determined
by law; and (3) the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the “just share”
accruing to them from the national coffers—the “just share” of the LGUs shall be released to them “without need
of further action”; “Automatic” means “involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the
will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automation.”—
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “automatic” as “involuntary either wholly or to a major
extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or
suggestive of an automaton.” Further, the word “auto matically” is defined as “in an automatic manner: without
thought or conscious intention.” Being “automatic,” thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and
perfunctory. As such, the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the “just share” accruing to them
from the national coffers. As emphasized by the Local Government Code of 1991, the “just share” of the LGUs
shall be released to them “without need of further action.”

Same; Same; Same; Internal Revenue Allotments; Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF); Statutory
Construction; The entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible—to subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations,
including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time,
makes the release not automatic; Where the law, the Constitution in this case, is clear and unambiguous, it must
be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.—To
the Court’s mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its
distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and
mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant
violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the “just share” of the LGUs “shall be automatically
released to them.” The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee. Where the law, the
Constitution in this case, is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have
no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. Moreover, as correctly posited by the petitioner, the use of
the word “shall” connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over the
distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is an anathema to and subversive of the principle of
local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution; The Oversight Committee’s authority is undoubtedly limited to
the implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991, not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can
it exercise control over the IRA, or even a portion thereof, of the LGUs.—Indeed, the Oversight Committee
exercising discretion, even control, over the distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is an
anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution. Moreover, it finds
no statutory basis at all as the Oversight Committee was created merely to formulate the rules and regulations
for the efficient and effective implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991 to ensure “compliance with
the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution.” In fact, its creation was placed under the title
of “Transitory Provisions,” signifying its ad hoc character. According to Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the principal
author and sponsor of the bill that eventually became Rep. Act No. 7160, the Committee’s work was supposed to
be done a year from the approval of the Code, or on October 10, 1992. The Oversight Committee’s authority is
undoubtedly limited to the implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991, not to supplant or subvert the
same. Neither can it exercise control over the IRA, or even a portion thereof, of the LGUs.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The assailed provisos in the Gen-eral Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000
and 2001, and the Oversight Committee on Devolution (OCD) resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion
of the IRA—they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs and must be struck down.—In
like manner, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a
“withholding” of a portion of the IRA. They put on hold the distribution and release of the five billion pesos LGSEF
and subject the same to the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms
prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time. Like Section 4 of A.O. 372, the assailed provisos in the
GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by
the LGUs and must be struck down. They cannot, therefore, be upheld.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs’
IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections
of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate
amount of the collections for the current fiscal year.—Thus, from the above provision, the only possible exception
to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs’ IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current
fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should
be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The
adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal
revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year. In the instant case, however, there is no allegation that
the national internal revenue tax collections for the fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001 have fallen compared to the
preceding three fiscal years.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Appropriations Bills; Amendments and Repeals of Laws; While it is
conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions of the Local Government Code, a substantive law, it
may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs—any amendment to the Local Government Code should be
done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, because Congress cannot include in a general appropriations
bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.—The respondents argue that this
modification is allowed since the Constitution does not specify that the “just share” of the LGUs shall only be
determined by the Local Government Code of 1991. That it is within the power of Congress to enact other laws,
including the GAAs, to increase or decrease the “just share” of the LGUs. This contention is untenable. The Local
Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law. And while it is conceded that Congress may amend any of the
provisions therein, it may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the Local
Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, because Congress
cannot include in a general appropriation bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate
legislation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Inappropriate Provisions; Words and Phrases; A general
appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated
to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit—any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is
considered an “inappropriate provision.”—A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose
content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit. Any
provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate provision.” The
category of “inappropriate provisions” includes unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to
amend other laws, because clearly these kinds of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. Increasing or
decreasing the IRA of the LGUs or modifying their percentage sharing therein, which are fixed in the Local
Government Code of 1991, are matters of general and substantive law. To permit Congress to undertake these
amendments through the GAAs, as the respondents contend, would be to give Congress the unbridled authority
to unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs, and thus put the same in jeopardy every year. This, the Court
cannot sanction.

Same; Same; It is well to note that the principle of local autonomy, while concededly expounded in greater detail
in the present Constitution, dates back to the turn of the century when President William McKinley, in his
Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission dated 7 April 1900, ordered the new Government “to devote
their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments in which the natives of the
slands, both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own
affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of supervision and control
in which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent
with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.”—In closing, it is well to note that the principle of local autonomy,
while concededly expounded in greater detail in the present Constitution, dates back to the turn of the century
when President William McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission dated April 7, 1900,
ordered the new Government “to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal
governments in which the natives of the Islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall be afforded
the opportunity to manage their own affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the
least degree of supervision and control in which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings
of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.” While the 1935
Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy, nonetheless, it limited the executive power over local
governments to “general supervision . . . as may be provided by law.” Subsequently, the 1973 Constitution
explicitly stated that “[t]he State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially
the barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.” An entire article on Local
Government was incorporated therein. The present Constitution, as earlier opined, has broadened the principle
of local autonomy. The 14 sections in Article X thereof markedly increased the powers of the local governments
in order to accomplish the goal of a more meaningful local autonomy.

Same; Same; The value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy
that they enjoy—our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local
autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.—Indeed, the
value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy.
As eloquently put by M. De Tocqueville, a distinguished French political writer, “[l]ocal assemblies of citizens
constitute the strength of free nations. Township meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they
bring it within the people’s reach; they teach men how to use and enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free
governments but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty.” Our national
officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate
the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.

9. Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154, G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997

Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Certiorari; The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the
remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without prejudice to
reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.—As to the first set of petitioners, this special
civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action. There is no
showing that said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have filed motions to quash the informations
therein and that the same were denied. The ground available for such motions is that the facts charged therein
do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are unconstitutional. It cannot then be said that
the lower courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion to justify recourse to
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It must further be stressed that even if petitioners did file
motions to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but
for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said
motion, and if, after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law. And, even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial may be the subject of a special
civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the court concerned an
opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may be dispensed with because of existing exceptional
circumstances. Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65
is still unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof. For obvious reasons, the
petition at bar does not, and could not have, alleged any of such grounds.

Same; Same; Same; While the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of
Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence gives petitioners no unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.—Even granting arguendo that
the first set of petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear
disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or exceptional and compelling
circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to us should be allowed. While we have concurrent
jurisdiction with Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.

Same; Same; Same; The judicial policy that the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment
of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of a primary jurisdiction.—In Santiago v. Vasquez, this Court
forcefully expressed that the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must be put
to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court, but also because of the
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped
to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We reiterated “the judicial policy that this Court will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its]
primary jurisdiction.”

Same; Same; Declaratory Relief; Supreme Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.—As to the second set of petitioners, the instant
petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the Ordinances in question are a
“nullity. . . for being unconstitutional.” As such, their petition must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of
original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved, it being settled
that the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions.
Constitutional Law; Statute; Statutory Construction; It is settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local
government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.—It is of course settled that laws (including
ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this
presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.

Same; Same; Same; Court finds petitioners’ contentions baseless and holds that the Ordinances do not suffer from
any infirmity both under the Constitution and applicable laws.—After a scrutiny of the challenged Ordinances and
the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, we find petitioners’ contentions
baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable
laws.

10. Mondano vs. Silvosa, etc., et al., 97 Phil., 143, No. L-7708 May 30, 1955

1.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DEPARTMENT HEAD AS AGENT OF THE PRESIDENT HAS DlRECT CONTROL ONLY OVER
BUREAUS AND OFFICES UNDER His JURISDICTION BUT NOT OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.—The department head
as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as
provided for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to
order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over
which the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law (section 10, paragraph 1, Article
VII of the Constitution). If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed
as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for
malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, article
VII, of the Constitution.

2.ID.; ID.; CONTROL AND SUPERVISION, DISTINGUISHED.—In administrative law supervision means overseeing or
the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect
to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.

3.ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF SUPERVISION OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OVER MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS; INSTANCE WHERE
INVESTIGATION OF PROVINCIAL BOARD is ILLEGAL.—The provincial supervision over municipal officials is lodged
in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and
conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." (Section 2188, Revised Administrative Code).
If the charges are serious he shall refer the matter to the provincial board and "may in such case suspend the
officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting
the official integrity of the officer in question." (Ibid.) But where, as in the present case, the municipal officer was
charged with rape and concubinage which have nothing to do with the perf ormance of his duties as mayor of the
municipality nor do they constitute or involve neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of
maladministration of office, as provided for in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the investigation
of such charges by the provincial board is unauthorized and illegal. Hence, his suspension as mayor of the
municipality is unlawful and without authority of law.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE BEFORE CHARGES OF RAPE AND CONCUBINAGE MAY BE FlLED AND TRIED BY PROVINCIAL
BOARD.—It is true that the charges of rape and concubinage may involve moral turpitude of which a municipal
official may be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of section 2188 of the Revised Administrative
Code but before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed against the municipal official, a conviction
by final judgment must precede the filing by the provincial governor of the charges and trial by the provincial
board. Even the provincial fiscal cannot file an information for rape without a sworn complaint of the offended
party and the crime of concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon a sworn complaint of the offended spouse
(Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code).