Project Completion Report

FLOOD EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Flood Emergency Reconstruction Project (FERP), set up to handle the reconstruction of
infrastructure damaged in the severe flooding that occurred in 2010 and 2012, effectively consisted of two
parts – firstly, a number of earlier contracts that were awarded and supervised by local consultants, and
secondly, the major part of 11 contracts that was managed under a Project Management Consultant
(PMC) arrangement. This report is primarily based on the latter arrangement, but the Interim Contract
Completion Reports of the early contracts are included in this report. The major components and
recommendations of this report have evolved from the PMC.
FERP was funded through a loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which originally had an
expiry date of 30 September 2014. However, when it became obvious that only one of the PMC contracts
would be completed by that date, the expiry date of the ADB loan was extended from 30 September 2014
to 25 May 2015 providing a more practical and attainable completion for the project. Then with the
proviso that all work had to be completed by 25 May 2015, a three month ‘period of grace’ was granted
by ADB to allow the maximum expenditure of loan funds to be achieved by the clearance of claims
(Statements at Completion, payments of retention) from the Contractors.
Eight construction contracts were awarded prior to the advent of PMC – five of these were supervised by
EGC and three by ACE.
The PMC contract agreement between the National Highway Authority (NHA) and the Snowy Mountains
Engineering Corporation Pty Ltd (SMEC), together with its four associated local consulting engineering
companies, was signed on 10 June 2013, and the Notice to Commence issued on 26 June 2013. The two
year contract encompassed the supervision of construction and administration of eleven contracts. The
completion date was revised from 26 June 2015 to 25 August 2015 to bring the PMC contract in line with
the ADB period of grace referred to above. A further extension to the PMC contract was granted to 25
October 2015.
Seven of the eleven PMC contracts involved reconstruction of the N5 Highway in Sindh between Hala
and Dharki, whilst of the remainder, two were in the Swat River valley in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK),
one was a bridge contract in Punjab near DG Khan, and the final contract spanned the Sindh/Balochistan
border at Jacobabad.
The pavements of five of the N5 contracts were hybrid – in a two lane carriageway, one lane was rigid
and one lane flexible.
All PMC contracts were satisfactorily completed, and although minor items and ancillary work continued
after the completion dates, the main aim of the contracts was achieved in that all were under traffic by the
end of the contract periods, and prior to the ADB loan expiry date of 25 May 2015. There was no
requirement to apply Liquidated Damages to any of the contracts.
All contractors performed satisfactorily and are recommended for future work with NHA.
SMEC International Pty Ltd Project Completion Report 1

Contractual problems mainly concerned processing claims for extensions of time and variations. Only
three claims were placed in dispute and required action through a Dispute Board, but the claims were
subsequently withdrawn.
Various technical problems arose that required either resolution at site, or a request to the designer for
further input. These included:
a. Full width pavement for two urban areas (Ranipur and Qazi Ahmad) and the Toll Plaza at
Saeedabad;
b. A re-assessment of drainage and culvert design (in two N5 contracts – Rohri-Panu Aqul and
Panu Aqil-Dherki);
c. Re-design after discovering that existing road formations were not adequate (Panu Aqil-
Dherki);
d. Inclusion of additional guard rail, additional safety features and signage – all contracts.
PMC problems in the main concerned obtaining and mobilizing qualified and competent staff.
Lessons learnt from the project have been distilled into a series of recommendations for the benefit of
future projects.

2.0 BACKGROUND
The monsoon rains which started in mid-July 2010 were devastating for Pakistan. Covering vast areas all
over the country including Azad Jammu and Kashmir, the rains led to severe floods assessed to be the
worst since 1929. According to the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), the rains and
floods affected over 20 million people with over 1,600 reported deaths, with scores injured. As at late
August 2010, flash floods and landslides triggered by the monsoon rain caused severe damage to
infrastructure all across the country. Over 80 out of the 110 districts were affected throughout - all 24
districts in KPK Province; 19 out of 20 in the Province of Sindh; 12 out of 24 in Punjab; and 8 out of 12
in Balochistan. Azad Jammu Kashmir, Gilgit Baltistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) were also affected. In total, about 160,000 square kilometers or 1/5th of the country-equivalent to
the size of England-- were hit by the floods and rains. The inundation map of Pakistan for Flood 2010 is
shown below.
Extensive flooding then occurred in 2012 in Sindh, resulting in further disruption and damage to
agriculture and infrastructure.
The National Highways were

extensively affected. These are the
main transport corridors providing
inter-provincial linkages and
connections to the neighboring
countries. NHA restored traffic on
most of the highways as an
emergency response but the
requirement was that the highways
had to be rehabilitated to the pre
flood standards. NHA conducted a
primary Damage Need Assessment
(DNA), which determined that the
National Highway network required
a wide range of rehabilitation,
reconstruction and improvement
with a view to ensure a smooth flow
of traffic. NHA initiated FERP to
help meet urgent reconstruction
priorities, focused on transport
(primarily roads and bridges) and
irrigation.
The project was funded by ADB with the money advanced as an Emergency Loan for the reconstruction
and rehabilitation of 446 km of national highways including bridges. All work was to be undertaken in a
series of contracts that were procured in accordance with joint ADB/NHA procedural rules. The design of
the various packages was entrusted to local consultants using the standard NHA design procedures,
including review.
Eight construction contracts were awarded prior to the advent of PMC – five of these were supervised by
EGC and three by ACE.

The original intent in accordance with the loan requirements was that all work had to be completed by
March 2014. However, at the “kick-off” meeting in July 2013, the expiry date of the loan was clearly
enunciated as 30 September 2014. The break-up for payments to contractors was split ADB
90%/Government of Pakistan (GOP) 10%.
The original intention was that the PMC would be involved in managing 32 contract packages, and the
proposal was based on this scope of work, but at the time of signing the PMC contract the scope of work
was reduced to 19 packages, and finally at the ‘Kick Off’ Meeting in July 2103 the scope of work was
reduced to 11 construction contracts.

3.0 AIM
The aim of this report is three-fold
a. To provide a history of the project during the period of the PMC involvement;
b. To provide details of the involvement of two other supervision consultants who worked
independently of PMC on other contracts under FERP;
c. To provide recommendations for improvements that would assist in the management of
future similar projects.
This report is divided into four parts:
Part A deals with the construction contracts;

Part B deals with the PMC contract;
Part C covers the financial aspects of the project; and
Part D provides a conclusion and recommendations.

PART A – CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
4.0 CONTRACT ARRANGEMENTS
4.1 PMC Contracts
There were eleven contracts under the PMC located in four provinces – two in KPK, one in the Punjab,
and eight in Sindh, with one of these extending into Balochistan. The table below lists the various
contracts and Contractors:
Length
Serial Contract Road Type Contractor
[km]
1 Chakdara – Kalam [Package I] N95 7.70 Road Zahir Khan & Brothers-JV-Techno Time Construction Co
2 Chakdara – Kalam [Package II] N95 7.61 Road Zahir Khan & Brothers-JV-Techno Time Construction Co
3 Jacobabad – Dera Allah Yar N65 15.70 Road Umer Jan & Co in JV with Muhammad Ramzan & Co
4 Halo – Moro [Package I] N5 27.80 Road Sachal in JV with Xuchang
5 Halo – Moro [Package II] N5 27.50 Road Sachal in JV with Xuchang
6 Halo – Moro [Package III] N5 26.70 Road Sachal in JV with Xuchang
7 Ranipur – Rohri [Package I] N5 28.19 Road Xinjiang Beixin Road & Bridge Group Co Ltd
8 Ranipur – Rohri [Package II] N5 28.29 Road Xinjiang Beixin Road & Bridge Group Co Ltd
9 Rohri – Panu Aqil N5 27.96 Road Zarghoon Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd
10 Panu Aqil - Dherki N5 34.60 Road Frontier Works Organization
11 Vidoor Nullah N70 0.75 Bridge Techno Time Construction Co
Total 232.80
The locations of each contract are shown on the map in Annex 1. The locations of the contracts had a
direct bearing on the subsequent organisation of the PMC.
Five of the eleven contracts were open for international bidding (the three packages between Hala and
Moro, and the two packages between Ranipur and Rohri), and the remainder were classified for national
or local contractor bidding.
The details of each contract are provided from Annex 2 to Annex 12. These details were provided in the
Interim Contract Completion Reports, separately issued.
4.2 EGC and ACE Contracts
Engineering General Consultants (Pvt) Ltd (EGC), in association with Techno-Consult International and
AA Associates, was given the responsibility for five contracts:
Length
No Contract Road Type Contractor
[km]
1 Kohala-Dulai [Package I] S2 19.25 Road Xinjiang Beixin Road & Bridge Group Co Ltd
2 Dulai-Muzaffarabad [Package II] S2 14.30 Road AM Associates & Coy
3 Chattar Kalas & Dulai Bridges [Pkg III] S2 1.45 Bridge Habib Rafiq (Pvt) Ltd
4 Basian-Balakot [Pkg I] N15 3.65 Road Rustam Associates in JV with Dynamic Constructor
5 Mahandri-Kaghan & Naran N15 30.08 Road Rustam Associates in JV with Dynamic Constructor
Total 68.73
Details of each contract are provided from Annex 13 to Annex 17, submitted separately by EGC.

Associated Consulting Engineers (Pvt) Ltd (ACE), in association with Associated Consultancy Centre
(Pvt) Ltd (ACC) and Osmani & Company (Pvt) Ltd, had the responsibility for three contracts:
Length
No Contract Road Type Contractor
[km]
1 Chakdara Bridge N45 2.54 Bridge Mohmand Construction Company (Pvt) Ltd
2 Shahdadkot-Quba Saeed S11 12.77 Road Umer Jan & Co in JV with Muhammad Ramzan & Co
3 Sarhad Bypass-Dharki Bypass N5 24.00 Road Sardar M Ashraf D Baluch (Pvt) Ltd
Total 39.31
Details of each contract are provided from Annex 18 to Annex 20, submitted separately by ACE.
4.3 Design
The design of the various contract packages was entrusted to local consultants using the standard NHA
design procedures, including review. PMC was not involved in either design or design review.
A major feature of the N5 design was that five of the contract packages provided for one lane rigid
pavement/one lane flexible in the two lane carriageway of the divided highway.
Designs of the various packages were undertaken as follows:
Designer Contract Package

ACE in JV with ACC & Osmani Hala-Moro, Ranipur-Rohri, Rohri-Panu Aqil, Panu Aqil-Dherki, Jacobabad-Dera Allah Yah
NESPAK Chakdara-Kalam
CECON Vidoor Nullah Bridge
The following design issues arose during the project:
Contract Design Issue Remarks

Chakdara Kalam Pkg II Redesign of 300 m previously excluded section Design by NESPAK
PMC also recommended that river training work be examined River training to be included in future
by hydrologist construction contract on N45
Vidoor Nullah Bridge Guide banks reviewed Redesign undertaken by CECON
Panu Aqil Dharki Review of shoulders, culverts and milling depth Redesign undertaken by ACC
Rohri Panu Aqil Review of culverts Redesign undertaken by ACC
Ranipur Rohri Pkg I Both carriageways through town of Ranipur redesigned to
full width rigid pavement, including drainage Redesign undertaken by ACE
Hala Moro All Pkgs Contractor submitted a proposal for the design to be altered
from one lane rigid/one lane flexible to full width rigid Proposal rejected
Hala Moro Pkg III Both carriageways through town of Qazi Ahmad redesigned
to full width rigid pavement Redesign undertaken by ACE
Hala Moro Pkg I Both carriageways through Saeedabad Toll Plaza redesigned
to full width rigid pavement Redesign undertaken by ACE
The consultants involved in the above issues performed satisfactorily.
However, it was considered that part of the design by NESPAK, involving a retaining wall in the
redesigned section of the Chakdara Kalam Road Pkg II, would have proved unsuitable because there had
been no geotechnical investigation conducted, and the foundation of the proposed wall was therefore

suspect. A separate technical report was prepared by the CRE, which advocated investigation and design
of river training work (refer to the table in paragraph 12.3 below).
4.4 Construction/Contractual Problems Arising from Designs
On the Hala Moro and Ranipur Rohri drawings, the designers had instructed or inferred that the flexible
pavement had to be constructed before the rigid pavement. However, this approach is impractical
because:
a. The rigid pavement is 500 mm deep (lean plus pavement), compared to the flexible pavement
of 360 mm thickness. If the AC (both base and wearing courses) is constructed first, whilst
the AC can be ‘cut’ vertically, the two underlying aggregate layers cannot. Even if this is
attempted, the vibration from machinery in preparing the sub-base under the rigid pavement
would cause the aggregate under the AC to spill out, and weaken the support for the AC.
b. The inner side plate on the concrete paving machine would have to be removed thereby
reducing stability and control. Secondly, the vibration from the paver would affect the
aggregate under the AC in front of the paver, again causing spillage of material from under
the AC.
In two packages (Jacobabad - Dera Allah Yar and Vidoor Nullah), quite substantial re-designs were
undertaken after the award of the contracts. Quite obviously, the construction effort was delayed, and
claims for extensions of time resulted.

5.0 NHA RELATED ISSUES
5.1 Time Factor at Commencement
An analysis of the time between the closing of tenders and the issue of the Notice to Commence to a
Contractor reveals a troubling statistic. This time factor is derived as follows:
Date
Date of
Serial Contract Tenders Days Start Date Days
Award
Closed
1 Chakdara – Kalam [Package I] 13 June 12 31 Aug 12 79 1 Apr 13 233
2 Chakdara – Kalam [Package II] 13 June 12 8 Nov 12 148 1 Apr 13 164
3 Jacobabad – Dera Allah Yar 12 Nov 12 19 Feb 13 99 1 May 13 73
4 Halo – Moro [Package I] 17 Dec 12 23 May 13 157 11 Sep 13 111
5 Halo – Moro [Package II] 17 Dec 12 23 May 13 157 11 Sep 13 111
6 Halo – Moro [Package III] 17 Dec 12 23 May 13 157 11 Sep 13 111
7 Ranipur – Rohri [Package I] 19 Dec 12 16 May 13 148 15 Aug 13 91
8 Ranipur – Rohri [Package II] 19 Dec 12 16 May 13 148 15 Aug 13 91
9 Rohri – Panu Aqil 13 Sep 12 15 Jan 13 124 7 Aug 13 204
10 Panu Aqil - Dherki 23 Jul 12 27 Jun 13 339 30 Sep 13 95
11 Vidoor Nullah 14 May 12 27 Jul 12 44 21 Jan 13 178
Average 145.5 132.9
The average number of days between the closing date for tenders and the date of commencement is 278
days, or nine months. For the eleven contracts in this project, the shortest period between the closing date
and notice to commence was 172 days (approximately six months) whilst the longest was 328 days
(approximately eleven months).
Further, in accordance with the Instructions to Bidders Clause 18.1, the period for which a potential
contractor “normally” guarantees his price – the period of validity – is 120 days. From the above table, it
can be seen that only three contracts were awarded within this validity period.
This time factor is important for two major reasons:

a. The work which the Employer requires is delayed;
b. For contracts with construction periods less than twelve months, a Contractor is not entitled
to price adjustment or escalation. The Contractor faces reduced margins for long gestation
periods, or potential contractors will increase their prices to counter this perceived delay in
commencing work.
5.2 Delays in Decisions
It is appreciated that due consideration must be given to various problems or claims that arise during the
currency of a contract. However, the following are examples of decisions that could and should have been
made earlier:
a. Sachal – Xuchang JV gave a presentation on 28 August 2013, followed by a detailed formal
submission, that the design be altered from one lane rigid-one lane flexible to full width rigid
pavement for the three Hala-Moro contracts. The proposal was initially rejected on 10
October 2013, but the Contractor on 26 October 2013 requested that the proposal be
reconsidered. After further submission of details and meetings between the Employer, the
Contractor and the Engineer, the lengthy process involving a total time period of 176 days, or
just under six months, resulting from a lack of key information required from the Contractor,

was finally rejected on 20 February 2014. The Contractor was directed to proceed with the
original design.
b. Xinjiang Beixin proposed on 12 January 2015 that a 1.0 m dia RCP be installed for the side
drains in Ranipur in lieu of the designed cast in situ concrete drains. A formal rejection of the
proposal was given on 20 February 2015. This was a relatively simple case that should not
have taken six weeks for a decision to be made.
c. FWO submitted a claim for idle plant, equipment and labour that was reviewed by SMEC
and a resolution recommended to NHA on 17 February 2015. There has been no response as
at the date of this report.
5.3 Variation Orders
VOs in general took an inordinate time for review and approval. In many cases, these were returned to the
Consultant for correction, sometimes for minor infringements or corrections, but even so the time factor
caused problems to the Contractors because IPCs containing items and/or quantities relating to the VO
would not be processed until the VO had been approved. The table below details the time involved.
VO Submit Approve
Serial Contract Days Remarks
No Date Date
1 Chakdara – Kalam [Package I] 1 11 Sep 14 11 May 15 242
2 Chakdara – Kalam [Package I] 2 29 Jun 15 14 Oct 15 97 Being processed
3 Chakdara – Kalam [Package II] 1 11 Nov 13 17 Feb 14 98
4 Chakdara – Kalam [Package II] 2 29 Jun 15 14 Oct 15 97 Being processed
5 Jacobabad – Dera Allah Yar 1 20 Aug 14 4 Dec 14 106
6 Jacobabad – Dera Allah Yar 2 25 May 15 25 Aug 15 92
7 Halo – Moro [Package I] 1 31 Mar 15 19 Jun 15 80
8 Halo – Moro [Package I] 2 23 Jun 15 14 Oct 15 103 Being processed
9 Halo – Moro [Package II] 1 11 Feb 15 19 Jun 15 128
10 Halo – Moro [Package II] 2 17 Jun 15 14 Oct 15 109 Being processed
11 Halo – Moro [Package III] 1 29 Jan 15 19 Jun 15 141
12 Halo – Moro [Package III] 2 17 Jun 15 14 Oct 15 109 Being processed
13 Ranipur – Rohri [Package I] 1 31 Mar 15 14 Oct 15 187 Being processed
14 Ranipur – Rohri [Package I] 2 26 Aug 15 14 Oct 15 49 Being processed
15 Ranipur – Rohri [Package II] 1 9 Mar 15 24 May 15 76
16 Ranipur – Rohri [Package II] 2 9 Sep 15 14 Oct 15 35 Being processed
17 Rohri – PanuAqil 1 15 Sep 14 12 Dec 14 88
18 Rohri – Panu Aqil 2 3 Apr 15 19 Jun 15 77
19 Rohri – Panu Aqil 3 31 Aug 15 21 Sep 15 21
20 Panu Aqil - Dherki 1 2 Apr 15 20 Aug 15 140
21 Panu Aqil - Dherki 2 28 Sep 15 14 Oct 15 16 Being processed
22 Vidoor Nullah 1 20 Nov 13 16 Jun 14 208
23 Vidoor Nullah 2 12 Jan 15 24 Aug 15 224
Average Time to Approve 110
Note: Dates and numbers in italics not final at date of submission of this report.
An average of four months to provide approval for a VO does seem too long when cash flow may be
interrupted.
5.4 Utilities
The late removal and/or relocation of utilities were the grounds for extensions of time on four contracts
(Chakdara Kalam Package I, Chakdara Kalam Package II, Vidoor Nullah Bridge and Rohri Panu Aqil).

If the long lead times are considered in procurement and then mobilisation, even before construction
commences, the removal and/or relocation of utilities should be instigated early such that delays are not
imposed on a Contractor.
5.5 Standard Drawings
It would appear axiomatic that NHA would have standardized drawings for road signs, guard rail,
kilometre posts, lane marking, reflectors, etc, for use on every national highway. However, in this project,
where designs were produced by differing consultants, the details of these items varied from one contract
to another, yet all schemes had been approved by NHA.
5.6 Land Acquisition
Delays were experienced in three contracts because of delays involved in acquiring land – both Chakdara-
Kalam packages and Vidoor Nullah bridge. The problem in Chakdara-Kalam Package II was exacerbated
because a house on the land had to be separately purchased before it could be demolished.
5.7 Possession of Site
The contracts on the N5 suffered because of controls imposed by the National Highway and Motorway
Police (NH &MP) in restricting access to the various sites with reaches of varying lengths, but not
exceeding five kilometres. The NH & MP then dictated when a Contractor could be granted another
reach, and in some cases, diverted traffic onto incomplete reaches without informing the Contractor
involved. Unfortunately, this type of restriction had not been incorporated in the contract documents.
5.8 Sub-Contractors
The General Conditions of Contract are clear as to the employment of sub-contractors, but not one
Contractor in the entire project gave notice or obtained consent for such employment. Even though the
contract specifically states that a “…Contractor shall not subcontract the whole of the works…”, the
Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) in fact did just that. No penalty provisions apply in the contract for
the flouting of this requirement, and therefore consideration should be made to either delete the relevant
sub-clause from the General Conditions of Contract, or to provide for the imposition of a monetary
deduction.

6.0 TECHNICAL ISSUES
6.1 Grooving/Milling of Existing Pavement
Where reconstruction involves raising the finished level of a road, embankment or pavement material can
be placed over an existing road surface. To ensure adequate bonding of the new work to the existing
formation, the existing asphalt surface is roughened. This could be undertaken by either grooving (using
the tooth of an excavator’s bucket to cut a groove) or by milling. However, the Bill of Quantities (BOQ)
for Hala-Moro and Ranipur-Rohri specifically nominate grooving, a lengthy time consuming process that
denies traffic usage, whereas if milling is carried out, traffic usage may continue until the contractor
commences placing new embankment or pavement material.
6.2 Asphalt
Asphalt mix design or the Job Mix Formula (JMF) was carried out according to the NHA General
Specifications of which the current version is dated 1998. Even version 1998 is virtually identical with
previous versions.
The specification directs that bitumen to be mixed with the aggregate for producing asphaltic wearing (or
surface) and base courses shall have penetration grade 40-50, 60-70 or 80-100, dependent on the climatic
zone. Penetration grade 40-50 is designated for the hottest zone, the Sibi-Jacobabad-Sukkur-Nawabshah
climatic corridor, where the main part of the FERP projects is situated. However, the designers of the
roads in this project prescribed the use of penetration grade 60-70 for the Sindh contracts. A 60-70
penetration grade is more prone to rutting than 40-50 penetration grade, and instances of rutting have
occurred on this project on the N5.
It is also recommended that climatic indicators for binder selection be re-evaluated using weighted mean
annual pavement temperature in lieu of the less reliable average air temperature.
The use of 40-50 penetration grade bitumen is highly recommended for very hot climatic zones. It is
appreciated that its availability is a problem because of very low production from the local refineries, but
if specified, the manufacturers would be obliged to meet the demand. Polymer modified bitumen (PMB)
could be an alternate for 40-50 penetration grade bitumen.
The following improvements in the specification for wearing course are suggested:
a. The Superpave method of designing bituminous mixes should be used to minimize the present
situation of having failures of flexible pavements. In the USA, the Superpave system and
gradation types have been used successfully for the past almost 20 years. The Superpave
system however requires specialized new testing equipment that is unknown in Pakistan
outsides a few research institutes.
b. The Marshall method of mix design has almost lost its usefulness but it is still being used
internationally. If at all, it could be continued but with following amendments:
 To resist rutting, a binder needs to be stiff and elastic and to resist fatigue cracking; the
binder needs to be flexible and elastic. The balance between these two requirements is
critical. The selection of optimum bitumen content should be based on the following
criteria:
Percentage Air Voids in the mix should be 3.5 to 5.5% instead of 4 to 7%.
By adopting median of air voids of 4 to 7 % and compacting the mat up to 97% could
result in above 8% interconnected field air voids. This would give rise to oxidation
and stripping due to ingress of air and water besides premature rutting under very hot
climatic conditions due to secondary compaction by heavy uncontrolled traffic.

 The present practice of extended Marshall Hammer blows should be replaced with the
British Standard Test BS 598 for determining the Percent Refusal Density (PRD). 200, 300
and 400 Marshall hammer blows on each face of the briquette of ACWC should be applied
instead of present practice of 100, 200 and 300 blows. This number of blows may not reach
the refusal density stage.
Voids in the mix at refusal density should be a targeted minimum of 3%.
Details of these tests are given in Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) Overseas Note 31.
c. For the prevailing conditions in Pakistan, the following should be considered for ACWC
specifications of NHA:
Category and Blows of Marshall Minimum VIM at optimum VIM at refusal

Flow VFB
design traffic compaction stability bitumen content density
(mm) (%)
(million esals) hammer (N) (%) (%)
Very Heavy (>5) 75 9000 2 – 3.5 65 – 73 5 3
The aggregate gradation requirements of the asphaltic concrete paving mixtures are:
a. Base Course - Class A and Class B where Class A is a coarse gradation (0-50 mm) and Class
B is a finer gradation (0-38 mm). On the FERP project, base course was classified as Class B,
except on the Panu Aqil–Dharki contract where it was Class A. The coarser gradation should
have been designated for the N5 contracts. However, where rutting has occurred, it has been
observed that it did not extend into base courses.
b. Wearing Course - Class A and Class B where Class A is a coarse gradation (0-25 mm) and
Class B is a finer gradation (0-19 mm). Class A is generally recommended for high traffic
areas. The N5 between Karachi and Lahore is the main artery in Pakistan, but the designers
prescribed Class B for all roads in the contract.
Experience in Pakistan in the hotter zones show that Class B asphalt is more prone to rutting as the
gradation is very close to the maximum density line resulting in very little space for the air voids. It
would therefore seem that a change of specifications for bituminous mix design (especially for wearing
courses) should be considered.
The Marshall mix system could be improved and still correspond to MS-2 with the following practical
steps during the preparation of the JMF:
a. Aggregate grading should be diverted to the coarse side of the allowable grading envelope
(Local Materials Engineers always put the grading in the middle of the allowable range, thus
having a grading curve close to maximum density grading and therefore more prone to
rutting).
b. Local Materials Engineers always determine the bitumen content as the middle point of the
acceptable limits (stability, flow, air voids, VFA, etc.). Instead, the bitumen should be set on
the lean side of the middle value, but still be inside specifications. This would reduce the
bitumen content by 0.2 to 0.5% and thus considerably reduce the risk of rutting.
6.3 Rutting in Asphalt
The most serious problem on the FERP contracts occurred on the Rohri – Panu Aquil contract where
rutting developed in May and June 2014.
Rutting occurs as a result of the combination of a number of effects;

a. Excessive axle loading, exacerbated in Pakistan with little or no control over truck loading;

b. Extremely high temperatures;
c. Slow moving vehicles, thereby increasing the heat of the pavement;
d. Excess bitumen in the asphalt;
e. An inadequate JMF which should provide for a more coarse material in high temperature
zones, and/or aggregates that may not be angular or hard enough.
Control can only be exercised over the last two factors when the JMF is being formulated.
The situation on the Rohri-Panu Aqil contract resulted from a fault in the asphalt batching plant that
allowed more bitumen to be added to the mix than designated (later rectified when discovered), using a
local ‘soft’ aggregate (but which complied with the specifications), the diversion of all traffic (two lanes
northbound and two lanes southbound) onto recently completed carriageway sections, vehicles travelling
at a very slow speeds because of the traffic congestion, and extreme temperatures (ambient temperatures
close to and over 50°C). These conditions combined to create excessive rutting of the asphalt pavement.
To avoid such problems, where newly laid and not yet cured and hardened asphalt is subjected to
excessive conditions, it is recommended that projects be planned in such a way that both carriageways of
a divided highway (northbound and southbound) are not rehabilitated in the same year.
As a direct result of the rutting that occurred, SMEC mobilised its in-house pavement specialist, Mr
Vince Crosdale, who visited Pakistan from 3 to 12 September 2014, and produced the FERP Site
Inspection Report – Pavements.
6.4 Full Width Rigid Pavement
It appears traditional to construct only asphalt roads in Pakistan. The major problem of rutting with
asphalt pavements can be attributed to a failure to adequately control heavily overloaded vehicles coupled
with extremely high temperatures. The construction of rigid pavements (especially for the hottest regions
and the most important roads) should be considered.
Pakistan has to import bitumen but cement is produced locally, the first factor in favor of the construction
of concrete roads.
There is a common notion that the cost of construction of roads with concrete pavement is higher when
compared to flexible pavement as it requires large quantity of cement and other aggregate materials. The
cost of construction of pavement is a major criterion for choice of pavement type, whether flexible or
rigid, particularly when funds are scarce and government funding is limited. However, the economics of
various pavement types not only for the initial construction cost but also for the life cycle costs, which
includes maintenance and design life of the pavement, should be examined. The cost of pavement thus
includes
a. Initial construction
b. Maintenance and rehabilitation/strengthening
c. Highway user costs
d. Salvage value
Maintenance includes the upkeep of the pavement during its design life. For flexible pavements this
includes sealing of cracks, repair of potholes, and renewal or strengthening of existing asphalt layers. For
rigid pavements, concrete spalling may occur, together with repair of small cracks and resealing of joints.
Concrete pavements typically require less maintenance than flexible pavements. The life of a flexible
pavement varies depending on location and traffic density, but on heavily trafficked roads overlay should
take place after, say, ten years. Rigid pavements can continue in service for up to thirty to forty years.

User costs involve the sum of motor vehicle running costs, the value of vehicle user travel time, traffic
accident cost and environmental issues such as noise, equivalent for both pavement types
.
Salvage value is the value of the pavement at the end of the analysis period, either because the pavements
have a remaining life or the materials in the pavement can be reused. The salvage value of a rigid
pavement is lower than of a flexible pavement, but the life of a concrete is typically thirty to forty years,
where the life of a flexible pavement typically is twenty years.
Life cycle cost analysis can be defined as a procedure by which a pavement design alternative will be
selected which will provide a satisfactory level of service at the lowest cost over design life. The
economic analysis methods used most commonly for this purpose include present worth, annualized cost,
and rate of return. The analysis is most sensitive to the factors of inflation, discount rate, and analysis
period.
6.5 Longitudinal Joint between Rigid and Flexible Pavements
The pavement structure on the Hala–Moro contracts and the Ranipur–Rohri contracts is a hybrid type,
with a rigid slow outer lane and a flexible fast inner lane. A longitudinal joint between the two pavement
types was devised as the basic reason to prevent the ingress of water to the underlying pavement.
The joint between the rigid and flexible pavements presents particular difficulties. The thicknesses of
each pavement type will differ, and deflections and settlement will be different, which can lead to
cracking between the two, thereby allowing water to enter the pavement structure and subsequently
accelerate the deterioration of the pavement. Over time, a height differential between the rigid and the
flexible pavement may occur, because there will be no further movement with the concrete, but the
asphalt being flexible could be further compacted by traffic, especially with high ambient temperatures.
Asphalt is typically compacted to 97-98 % during construction, and from the effect of traffic this
compaction will increase to 100–104 % or more, thus leading to a possible height differential between the
two pavement types.
To overcome the unavoidable longitudinal cracking between the flexible and rigid lanes, the designers
prescribed a joint, sealed with a bitumen sealant, to be cut and installed. Cutting a functional joint
between asphalt (visco-elastic “soft” material) and concrete (rigid “hard” material) is not possible.
Asphalt is visco-elastic and a relative soft material (E-value around 3000 MPa at 20°C and 1000 MPa at
50°C). Concrete has an E-value of around 35000 MPa (unchanged by temperature). For a joint to be
functional, it needs to have hard and inflexible walls. Part of the asphalt deformation from loading is
recoverable (elastic part), but part of the deformation is permanent (plastic part). The joint when cut
would have one hard inflexible wall, and one flexible wall.
The joint material (sealant) then has to be considered. The sealant is very soft. The flexible pavement, by
its very nature, will tend to migrate towards the joint, and squeeze the sealant out, resulting in a
drawdown of the flexible asphalt in relation to the adjoining concrete pavement. It is considered that the
migration of the asphalt and the resultant squeezing out of the sealant could result in the joint not being
waterproof, and secondly to a differential in level between the rigid and the flexible pavements.
This drawdown, and resultant differential in levels between the two types of pavement, was observed very
early in the construction contract, resulting in an instruction being issued to the Contractors to finish the
asphalt wearing course 10 to 15 mm above the concrete finished level on all further work on the Ranipur-
Rohri and Hala-Moro contracts. As a further result of this instruction, the action of traffic has caused the
asphalt, being higher than the concrete, to migrate across the joint between the two types of pavement,

and in effect, because of the overall pavement cross-fall, producing the requirement of not allowing water
to enter the joint.
It was recommended that the longitudinal joint be deleted.
6.6 Shoulders
Road shoulders have two specific purposes:

a. To provide protection to the pavement, by ensuring that the ingress of water to the underlying
pavement material is restricted;
b. To provide a safety refuge for vehicles that may break down, thereby allowing normal traffic
flow to be unimpeded.
Unfortunately, particularly on the N5, traffic laws are not followed or enforced, and overtaking by using
the shoulders is a common practice. The construction of shoulders in the FERP project is generally
specified to be Triple Surface Treatment (TST), which deteriorates under heavy traffic. It is recommended
that shoulders should be made of asphalt mix material to a thickness of 50 mm. Asphalt mixes are much
more resistant to high volumes of traffic than TST.
6.7 Finished Surface Tolerance
In all the contracts in this project, pavement surface finish has had to be judged by testing with a straight
edge. However, it is considered that a much better approach would be have any surface irregularities
tested by a rolling straight edge of the type designed by the Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) of the
UK, along any line or lines parallel to the edge of pavement on sections selected by the Engineer. No
irregularity exceeding 10 mm, or other criteria to be established by NHA, should be permitted.
6.8 Re-use of Material
On four of the N5 contracts, where the finish surface level of the reconstructed road was the same or close
to that of the original, demolition and removal or milling of the existing asphalt pavement was required.
No re-use of the removed asphalt material was included in the contracts, and all such material was
removed to spoil.

The aggregate used in asphalt mixes are normally of the very finest and most durable quality, and the
existing asphalt layers therefore have a high salvage value that should not be wasted. Several proposals of
re-use could be considered as set out below:
a. Cold recycling of old asphalt. NHA has already trialed recycling technology and has
successfully re-used the existing asphalt in two of N5 contracts on the Grand Trunk (GT)
Road. The cold in place recyclers, imported from Wirtgen GmbH, Germany, are readily
available with local contractors. The main advantages of this technology are that it is
considerably more cost-efficient than conventional methods, the time required is cut
considerably, and traffic is only obstructed for a short period of time. However, it does have a
disadvantage in that it requires very tight quality control and testing, and is technologically
demanding.
Cold recycling train
b. Reuse of old asphalt as a granular base course material. The steps are:
 Mill the existing asphalt off with a deep recycler and transport the milled product to
temporary stockpile(s);
 Correct the longitudinal profile road with a sand/sand-gravel layer of appropriate
(varying) thickness and compact;
 Transport the stockpiled milled asphalt product and add new crushed stone base material
in a 50/50 ratio and spread on the road;
 Mix and blend the old milled asphalt product and the crushed stone base with a deep
recycler, and compact;
 Place the asphalt/concrete layer on top (Thicknesses of asphalt layers/concrete layers will
be reduced as the E-value of the combined old milled asphalt/crushed stone layer will be
higher than a traditional crushed stone base layer).
The advantage is that this is a very straightforward and easy process, but the disadvantage is
that a large space for storage/stockpile is required.
c. Recycling with foamed bitumen through a batching plant. The mix produced can be used as a
flexible base course material.
d. Reuse milled material on minor roads as asphalt. The milled existing asphalt product can be
re-used as a top layer on secondary gravel roads. If the process is done in hot weather and
compactor rollers used, the result would be almost like an asphalt pavement. On low-volume
gravel roads, the life of such pavement s could be up to 10 years.

6.9 Pavement Marking
Clear guidelines had not been established on pavement marking, and painting of lines on asphalt was
undertaken, in some cases, as soon as the asphalt was laid. Unfortunately, discolouration or ‘fading’
occurred. The cause of the discolouration is wheel tracking of bitumen from the newly laid asphalt. The
bitumen binder in new asphalt is very active and ductile, or soft, and readily attracted to tyres moving
over the pavement. There is also a large proportion of coated aggregate at the pavement surface with
active binder on the exposed aggregate surface.
It is recommended that painting not be undertaken for some time to allow the asphalt to harden or cure.
In hotter areas, this takes longer than in cooler climate zones, and bitumen binder may indeed not actually
completely cure or set. Paint manufacturers generally recommend that pavement marking should be left
for a minimum period of one month after asphalt is laid.
In the Sindh area, because of the extremely high summer temperatures, painting should only be
undertaken in the winter season.

7.0 CONTRACTUAL ISSUES
7.1 Claims and Disputes
A Contractor is entitled to submit claims for additional cost, or for extensions of time, if he considers that
reasons for such claims exist. All claims submitted by the Contractor are reviewed as follows:
a. For Validity. Each claim is assessed for compliance with the Conditions of Contract. If a
claim is not valid, it is not processed, and the Contractor is advised that his claim is rejected.
b. For Quantum. If a claim is valid, it is reviewed for quantity and cost. This includes not only a
verification of measurement, but also an assessment of any new rate that may be part of the
claim.
A recommendation is then made to the Employer when the above is completed, if the Engineer considers
that a claim is valid.
Only thirteen claims were submitted for all contracts working under the PMC. Only one was considered
to be acceptable, and a recommendation made to NHA for payment. Details are given in Annex 21.
If a Contractor is not satisfied with the rejection of a claim, he is entitled to place the matter in dispute. In
this project, only three issues were raised to Dispute Board level. Details are given in Annex 21.
7.2 Variations to the Scope of Work
The scope of work can only be varied by the Employer. The scope of practically every contract in this
project was varied with the major alterations shown in the table below. There were some minor changes
common to all contracts – the inclusion of more signage, changing the requirement for guardrail (reducing
the ruling embankment height from 2.5 to 2.0 metres), additional reflectorised safety features, etc which
do not feature in the table.
Serial Contract Variation
1 Chakdara – Kalam [Package I] Inclusion of two previously excluded areas totaling 1175 m stretch
Inclusion of a 300 m long stretch of road that had not been included in the
2 Chakdara – Kalam [Package II]
original contract because the land had to be acquired and a house demolished
Inclusion of additional 21 extra culverts and raising of height of embankment
3 Jacobabad – Dera Allah Yar
Inclusion of three causeways
4 Halo – Moro [Package I] Inclusion of full width rigid pavement at Saeedabad Toll Plaza
5 Halo – Moro [Package III] Inclusion of full width rigid pavement through Qazi Ahmad urban area
6 Ranipur – Rohri [Package I] Inclusion of full width rigid pavement plus drainage through Ranipur urban area
Deletion of new culverts as deemed unnecessary – existing culverts adequate
7 Rohri – Panu Aqil
Additional milling because of unsuitable existing road base
Deletion of 11 No culverts as deemed unnecessary – existing culverts adequate
8 Panu Aqil - Dherki
Increase in milling depth from 70 to 140 mm, with subsequent increase in AC
The bridge length was increased from 120 to 160 m – resulting from 2012 flood
8 span bridge increased from 6 spans
9 Vidoor Nullah
Height of bridge increased resulting in additional earthworks in approaches
Re-design of guide banks in stream bed
10 Kohala-Dulai [Package I] Landslides
The financial impact of any variation, whether to increase or decrease the scope of work, is then
calculated by the Engineer, and recommendations made to the Employer for approval.

7.3 Extensions of Time
Extensions of time to a contract period are granted for three basic reasons:
a. An increase in the scope of work;
b. Matters outside the Contractor’s control (eg excessive weather conditions, delay in relocation
of utilities, delay in land acquisition, landslides, etc). Note that for excessive weather
conditions a Contractor has to provide historical data for comparison;
c. Latent conditions (some unknown factor that only becomes evident after construction has
started – only one case in this project involved the discovery in Panu Aqil-Dherki that there
were faults in the underlying existing pavement that did not become evident until after milling
had taken place).
Summaries of the extensions of time approved for the contracts are given in the tables below.
 PMC
Original Revised Date

EOT
Serial Contract Date for for
Days
Completion Completion
1 Chakdara – Kalam [Package I] 31 Mar 14 232 19 Nov 14
2 Chakdara – Kalam [Package II] 31 Mar !4 333 28 Feb 15
3 Jacobabad – Dera Allah Yar 30 Apr 14 320 16 Mar 15
4 Halo – Moro [Package I] 11 Mar 15 60 10 May 15
5 Halo – Moro [Package II] 11 Mar 15 56 6 May 15
6 Halo – Moro [Package III] 11 Mar 15 60 10 May 15
7 Ranipur – Rohri [Package I] 15 Feb 15 74 30 Apr 15
8 Ranipur – Rohri [Package II] 15 Feb 15 - 15 Feb 15
9 Rohri – Panu Aqil 6 Aug 14 268 30 Apr 15
10 Panu Aqil - Dherki 19 Dec 14 127 25 Apr 15
11 Vidoor Nullah 20 Oct 13 278 25 Jul 14
 EGC

EOT
Days
1 Kohala-Dulai [Package I] 4 Jan 15 361 31 Dec 15
2 Dulai-Muzaffarabad [Package II] 25 Sep 13 120 23 Jan 14
3 Chattar Kalas & Dulai Bridges [Pkg III] 21 May 14 117 15 Sep 14
4 Basian-Balakot [Pkg I] 22 Jul 13 - 22 Jul13
5 Mahandri-Kaghan & Naran 7 Aug 14 284 20 May 15
 ACE

EOT
Days
1 Chakdara Bridges 4 Dec 13 120 4 Apr 14
2 Shahdadkot-Quba Saeed 29 Apr 13 - 29 Apr 13
3 Sarhad Bypass-Dharki Bypass 29 May 13 316 31 Mar 14
Details are provided in the Annexes dealing with each contract. All contracts were completed such that
there was no cause to apply Liquidated Damages.

8.0 QUALITY
8.1 Quality Management
It is important to understand the difference between “Quality Assurance” and “Quality Control”.
Quality Assurance is a means of preventing mistakes or defects, and focuses on providing confidence
that quality requirements will be fulfilled. Defect prevention in quality assurance differs subtly from
defect detection and rejection in quality control
Quality Control is a procedure or set of procedures intended to ensure that a product complies with a set
of quality criteria, or meets the requirements of the Employer or Client. Quality control emphasizes
testing of components to ensure compliance, and reporting to senior management for approval or
rejection. Recording of test results is therefore an essential aspect of quality control.
Quality control is the management tool used on this project.
All contract work had to be undertaken to ensure that the quality criteria designated in the General
Specifications was attained. Three manuals were prepared for use by the PMC supervision staff on each
site which set out the procedures to be followed in the day to day management of work:
 Contract Administration Manual
 Quality Control and Assurance Manual
 Laboratory Manual
8.2 Procedures
Quality procedures adopted for this project are separated for convenience into the following four
categories:
a. Earthworks: This included survey, setting out, clearing and grubbing, excavation for road
works, material classification, embankment construction and preparation of sub grade. Testing of
various materials was undertaken for compliance with the Specification with a summary of
relevant test data.
b. Pavement: This section included sub-base, base course, rigid concrete pavement, asphaltic
concrete (AC), shoulders and SST, DBST or TST. Testing of the various materials was
undertaken for compliance with the Specification.
c. Structures: This section included all work associated with setting out, structural excavation,
bridges, culverts, concrete kerbs, drains, barriers and causeways. Sampling of materials to ensure
compliance with the Specification, and sampling or testing of concrete being placed, admixtures
used, etc, were carried out during operations in accordance with laboratory procedures. Sufficient
concrete cylinders were taken to ensure test results at 7 and 28 days.
d. General: Finally, traffic control, traffic signs, roadside furniture, and bus shelters had to be
checked. A daily check was made on the temporary traffic signs and warning devices at
diversions. Testing of specific items (eg bearing pads for bridges, paint used for lane marking)
was carried out by an acceptable commercial testing facility. Site Inspectors carried out regular
checks to ensure that the Contractor had complied with the Environmental Management Plan
(EMP) and the results included in each Monthly Report.
8.3 Site Arrangements
Testing was conducted under the supervision of the Material Engineer on each site. A summary of tests
undertaken is detailed in Annex 22.

a. Laboratory Equipment. The construction contracts required the Contractors to provide a
testing laboratory with the requisite equipment, and their own testing personnel. The
Contractor submitted a list of laboratory equipment for approval. In some cases, notably at
Jacobabad, NHA assisted by supplying items that had been used on previous contract work.
This equipment on completion of the contract was handed over to the NHA.
b. Materials. Before any new material, be it fill for embankments, aggregate, sand, cement,
reinforcing steel etc, was used in construction, it had to be approved by the Engineer, a
responsibility delegated to the Material Engineer. Test Certificates had to be submitted and
approved to ensure compliance with the specification. However, the responsibility for
approval of the mix designs for concrete, and the JMF for bituminous products, rested solely
with the Engineer, following due review and recommendation from the LME. The JMF for
asphalt were prepared jointly under the direct supervision of the LME. The issue of asphalt
and JMFs is dealt with in greater detail in paragraph 5.2 above.

PART B – PROJECT MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT CONTRACT
9.0 INTRODUCTION
9.1 Proposal and Procurement
NHA on 1 October 2011 requested interested consulting engineering firms to submit proposals to provide
services as the PMC for FERP.
SMEC in association with EGC, ACE, Indus Associated Consultants (Pvt) Ltd and Technical Resources
Services (TRS), submitted its proposal on 11 November 2011. The original proposal was based on the
management of 32 contracts. An inordinate period of time ensued before notice was given that the
consortium had been successful in its proposal.
Representatives from SMEC, following a request from NHA, made a presentation in support of their
submission in May 2012.
It took twelve months before a final decision was made and the PMC agreement was signed on 10 June
2013. The Notice to Commence was issued by NHA on 26 June 2013.
The PMC contract details are as follows:
Item Description
Fund Details ADB Loan No 2742-PAK

Flood Emergency Reconstruction Project
Contract Title Project Management Consultant (PMC) for

Flood Emergency Reconstruction Project (FERP)
Employer National Highway Authority
Consultant SMEC International Pty Ltd, in association with the following as sub-consultants:
Engineering General Consultants [Pvt] Ltd
Associated Consulting Engineers [Pvt] Ltd
Indus Associated Consultants [Pvt] Ltd
Technical Resource Services [Pvt] Ltd
Engineer The Consultant
Effective Date 26 June 2013
Contract Duration 24 months
Completion Date 26 June 2015
Contract Price USD 3,240,445

AUD 1,137,318
Rs 574,455,575

9.2 Scope of Work
At the contract signing stage, a total of 32 contracts were listed for administration and supervision under
this project. However, notice was provided at the Kick-Off Meeting on 26 June 2013 that the number of
contracts had been reduced to 11, a reduction that was not formally notified by NHA. No changes to the
contract for the personnel and concomitant costings, submitted to cover the operation of 32 contracts,
have been made.
The intention at the time of the submission of the proposal was that the contract would involve the PMC
in the following scope of work:
a. Assist NHA in the procurement of civil works as per ADB procurement guidelines, by
preparing the procurement notices, PQ documents, PQ evaluation reports, bid documents, bid
evaluation reports and contract agreements.
b. The Consultants will prepare the EIA reports, SIA reports, evolve LARP/EMP, implement
and monitor the LARP and EMP.
c. The Consultant will be designated as the “Engineer/Project Manager” for civil and ancillary
works financed under the project. The Consultant will administer the civil works contracts,
make engineering decisions, be responsible for quality assurance, provide general guidance
and furnish timely responses to the Contractors in all matters relating to civil works, and
ensure that all clauses of the contract agreement between the civil works Contractors and
NHA are respected.
d. The Consultant will advise NHA on all matters relating to the efficient and successful
execution of the civil works contracts, and will act at all times to protect the interests of the
project and will take all reasonable steps to keep the construction costs to a minimum,
consistent with sound economic and engineering practices; and will prepare a “Contract
Administration and Construction Supervision Manual” outlining routines and standard
operating procedures to be applied in contract administration and contract supervision, based
on sound internationally recognised practice.
However, in the time taken before the PMC contract was awarded, NHA had finalised design reviews and
had awarded contracts on all but one package. As a result, the first item above in the scope of work for the
PMC was made redundant.
The scope of work, in summary, involved

 Supervision and administration of the construction contracts, with emphasis on quality and
progress;
 Monitoring and evaluation of the environmental and social agenda management plans;
 Providing advice to NHA on all contractual issues that arose.

10.0 ORGANISATION
10.1 PMC Main Office
The PMC main office was located in Islamabad, to ensure ready access to NHA. The office was
established on the top floor (4th floor) of the ICCI Building in G-8/1. The organisation chart for the PMC
is shown in Annex 23.
The Head Office staff consisted of the following personnel:

Foreign Members
CRE (Also designated as the Project Manager and Team Leader, who acted as the ‘Engineer’)
LME
LCE
LES
Local Personnel
2 x SRE (or DTL)
SQS
CE
Project Coordinator
Environmental Specialist
Resettlement Specialist
Social Coordinator
Chief Accountant
Chief Clerk
Office Manager
Plus junior engineers, clerical and office boys.
10.2 Residencies
Residencies were established at locations to service the various contracts, as mentioned in Paragraph 4.1
above. These were arranged as follows:
Serial Residency Location Contract Road Length Type

1 Chakdara – Kalam [Road Package I] N95 7.70 Road
1 Madyan
2 Chakdara – Kalam [Road Package II] N95 7.61 Road
3 2 Jacobabad Jacobabad – Dera Allah Yar N65 17.00 Road
4 Halo – Moro [Package I] [SB] N5 27.80 Road
5 3 Sakrand Halo – Moro [Package II] [SB] N5 27.50 Road
6 Halo – Moro [Package III] {SB] N5 26.70 Road
7 Karamabad Ranipur – Rohri [Package 1] [NB] N5 28.00 Road
4
8 & Ranipur Ranipur – Rohri [Package II] [NB] N5 35.00 Road
9 Sukkur Rohri – Panu Aqil [SB] N5 28.00 Road & Bridges
5
10 & Ghotki Panu Aqil - Dherki [NB] N5 35.00 Road
11 6 DG Kahn Vidoor Nullah N70 Bridge
Total 240.31
A Resident Engineer (RE) was placed in charge of each Residency from No 1 to No 5, but an Assistant
Resident Engineer (ARE) was in charge of the smallest contract, the Vidoor Nullah Bridge.

The supervision staff on each contract then consisted of
AREs (Highway and Structure Engineers),
Materials Engineer (ME),
Quantity Surveyor (QS)
One or more inspectors
Surveyor
Laboratory Technician
Office staff (computer operator and office boy).
Vehicles in the Residencies were supplied by the Contractors as part of their construction contracts.
10.3 Associated Consultants
Agreement was reached with the associated consultants as to which consultant firm would supply
personnel to which residency, and although there was some overlap, in general the split was as follows:
Residency 1 – ACE
Residency 2 – TRS
Residency 3 – ACE
Residency 4 – IAC
Residency 5 – EGC
Residency 6 – ACE
Meetings at approximately two monthly intervals were held with the senior managers of the associated
consultants to ensure that all were kept appraised of progress and problems. Associated consultant
representatives were encouraged to visit the sites, and in fact assisted with design problems.

11.0 PERSONNEL
11.1 International Staff
At the time of award, it was intended that there would be eight international staff members, with varying
lengths of tenure.
The details are shown below:
Tenure Actual
Position Name Remarks
(Months) Time
Chief Resident Engineer 24 Dan Simpkins 24

Kwaku Akoto 6
Lead Material Engineer 23
Bent Larsen 15
Lead Contract Specialist 15 Victorino St Domingo 9
Lead Environmental Engineer 6 Geza Teleki 1.5
Senior Highway Design Engineer 3 Bhupendra Man Shakya 0 Not required
Structures Engineer 3 Upali Glenville Fernando 0 Not required
Geotechnical Engineer 5 Abed Hossain 0 Not required
Hydrologist 8 Om Bahadur Raut 0 Not required
The actual dates of tenure are shown in Annex 24.
The lower four specialists shown as “Not required” in the table above were excluded because the original
intent was that the PMC would be involved in design review, but this activity had been completed with
the use of other local consultants by NHA prior to the award of the PMC contract.
Three of the contracts in the project, viz the two packages in Chakdara – Kalam and the Vidoor Nullah
Bridge, are located in security sensitive areas, and access by foreigners requires Federal government
approval. No arrangements had been made for international staff to visit these locations, and the only staff
member to inspect the contracts was the CRE, limited to two visits to the Swat Valley after obtaining the
requisite security clearances, and one to Vidoor Nullah.
11.2 Local Staff
A total of 256 local personnel have served on this project. The details of positions and tenures are shown
in Annex 24, together with details of their parent firms.
Factors that impinged on the selection and performance of staff included:
a. ADB insisted that all local site personnel be mobilized immediately. Whilst it is accepted that the
RE and surveyors are essential at the start of a contract, to undertake an immediate survey jointly
with the contractor to ensure that there can be no dispute later in the calculation of earthworks
quantities, the remainder of the technical site staff (highway and structure engineers, inspectors,
quantity surveyors and laboratory technicians) could join during the period of the contractor’s
mobilisation. This rush to place personnel on site, with little or no work being done by the
contractor, meant that salaries were paid for no production, in some cases junior staff arrived
before the RE with a resultant lack of leadership and control, and a lazy attitude to work could
have developed.

b. NHA decreed that personnel who had previous experience on the National Highways
Improvement Project (NHIP) that had been under the control of SMEC, would not be accepted on
this project. This automatically meant that a pool of experienced people that could have been
considered for appointments was closed.
c. A number of those named in the proposal for this project had previous experience on NHIP, and
as pointed out above, were barred from appointment. However, ADB threatened to have a ‘case’
registered against SMEC for misrepresentation, citing the fact that when the PMC contract was
signed, the Consultants had stated that those named in the proposal were available for work.
However, at the time the proposal for FERP was submitted, the NHA ban on NHIP personnel was
not known.
d. NHA decreed that REs, highway and structural engineers, material engineers and quantity
surveyors had to be approved by an NHA selection committee. This edict required a degree of
organisation in that nominees had to be brought to Islamabad, and in some cases had to wait for
days for the selection committee to be convened.
e. Eight of the eleven contracts are in the Sindh Province. There have been security problems in
Sindh, and not all possible contenders for positions wished to work in the province. This further
reduced the number of personnel available for appointment.
f. Local consultancy firms in Pakistan have a poor record for paying staff on time. The law in the
country is clear in that employees are to receive payment for services by the tenth day of the
month following, yet this is often ignored. The result can be that the affected employee if not paid
on time may turn to the contractor for money, which can have untoward results whereby the
contractor will require a ‘favour’ in terms of approval or acceptance of work.
g. In some cases, the NHA appointed project directors (PDs) had little or no experience in working
with international consultants. From their own limited experience, the PDs considered that the
supervision staff ‘belonged’ to them and issued directions, resulting in a conflicting situation for
PMC staff thinking that they were reporting to two bosses.
11.3 Material Engineer (Local)
NHA current practice is that local Materials Engineers shall have a Masters Degree in Geology.
The majority of all material problems on road projects are not related to geology. The problems
encountered are engineering aspects including asphalt mix design (JMF), concrete mix design, laboratory
management and testing, provision of advice to senior consultant staff and contractors, etc.
Quality matters related to materials (aggregate, sand, etc) are duly covered in the testing requirements in
the specification and need no additional input from a geologist. Geologists tend to see any arising
problem as caused by geological conditions and this is very rarely the case.
Material Engineers should be engineers, with sufficient knowledge and experience of road construction.
Geologists are used in the search for resources (minerals, oil, gas, etc) and the study of volcanic activity,
earthquakes, slope stability and landslides, etc.

12.0 PMC MANAGEMENT
12.1 The Engineer
In the Contract Agreement between NHA and SMEC, the Consultant is designated as the
Engineer/Project Manager for the project. In each of the construction contracts, in accordance with FIDIC
terminology, NHA nominated the CRE as the Engineer. All those powers defined in the FIDIC General
Conditions of Contract, and those in the Technical Specifications, as belonging to the Engineer remained
unchanged except for matters pertaining to time, cost and the issue of certificates. These matters, after due
review and consideration, had to be referred to NHA with appropriate recommendations for approval by
NHA.
The Engineer has no authority to alter a contract, or to relieve a Contractor of any of his obligations under
the contract.
12.2 Construction Supervision
The following documents were prepared for use during construction:

 Contract Administration and Contract Supervision Manual
 Quality Assurance and Control Manual
 Laboratory Manual
Tasks required with contract administration and supervision are as shown below – the former relates to
contractual and legal aspects, and the latter relates to technical and quality assurance.
Contract Administration Contract Supervision

Issue Notice to Commence Conduct joint survey prior to work commencing
Check insurance policies and bank guarantees Check locations of utilities – take action for relocation
Check performance bonds Check equipment on site compared to tender
Advise Employer on providing Possession of Site Inspect and approve borrow areas and quarries
Review Method Statements and approve Test and approve materials before incorporation
Review Programme of Work Assist, review and approve concrete mix designs and asphalt JMF
Review Shop Drawings and approve Check survey set outs as work progresses
Review and approve Test Certificates for materials Check any off site fabrication
Initiate and maintain filing system Maintain daily diaries to encompass all work activities
Convene and chair site meetings, and issue minutes Undertake sampling and testing of completed work
Check statements of claim for interim payment Issue site instructions
Certify and issue interim progress certificates Monitor environmental procedures
Prepare and issue Variation Orders (cost & time) Conduct joint measurement of work as required
Review claims submitted by Contractor, and where valid, Monitor safety procedures
make recommendations to the Client Issue defects list before start of DNP
Review “As Built” Drawings Check compliance before issue of Performance Certificate
Undertake joint inspection with NHA of completed work
Issue Taking Over Certificate
Issue Performance Certificate
The REs in each Residency allocated staff for the various tasks, and were responsible for the maintenance
of records and oversight of quality.
Senior staff from the Islamabad office – the CRE, SREs, LME and others delegated for specific tasks –
undertook site visits and inspections. The LME spent longer periods on site to ensure that testing
procedures were being followed, to undertake audits of laboratories, and to assist in the preparation of
JMFs for asphalt and mix designs for concrete.

A schedule of the visits by to site by the PMC senior officials is given in Annex 25.
12.3 Reports
In accordance with the contract agreement, the following reports were a feature of this project:
Report Submission Date Remarks

To include methodology, staff mobilisation plan, and cash flow
Inception Report End of Month 1
forecast
Monthly Reports Tenth day of Details of Consultant’s and Contractors’ activities
following month Progress on construction contracts
Annual Report Ten days after Details of Consultant’s and Contractors’ activities
anniversary of Progress on construction contracts
contract signing
Environmental Monitoring Report To be included as Annex to Monthly Report
LARP Monitoring Report To be included as Annex to Monthly Report
Technical Reports As required
Interim Contract Completion Three weeks after Summary of implementation and financial history
Report issue of TOC Includes defects list and any outstanding contractual claims
Final Project Completion Report 90 days after Comprehensive report on construction methods, as built record,
issue of TOC of clean-up of defects, financial record of each contract, level of
last contract construction supervision, and recommendations for future projects
of a similar nature
Project Documentary Report At end of Project Documentary showing
 Placing different pavement layers
 Operation of asphalt and concrete batching plants
 Operation of quarries and laboratories
 Completed road sections
 Stages during construction of structures
 Other major activities
Revised PC-1 [If required] When required Details changes to scope of work if requested during currency of
contract (80 copies)
Because land acquisition was of a minor nature and there was no resettlement involved, there was no
requirement for the LARP Monitoring Report.
A direction was issued that there was no requirement for a Revised PC-1.
Technical Reports included:
Date
Report Prepared by
Submitted
Environmental Safeguards Requirements Monitoring Report Lead Environmental Engineer 6 Mar 14
Rutting in Asphalt CRE 12 Jun 14
Due Diligence Report – Ranipur Resettlement Specialist 12 Sep 14
Due Diligence Report – Qazi Ahmad Resettlement Specialist 6 Sep 14
Review of Proposed Retaining Wall Design Km 91+250
CRE 22 Oct 14
Chakdara Kalam Pkg II
FERP Site Inspection Report - Pavements Vince Crosdale, SMEC Pavement Expert 23 Oct 14
Report on Bus Accident 11 Nov 14 CRE 12 Nov 14
Taking Over Completed Contract Work CRE 19 Mar 15

12.4 Meetings with Contractors
A schedule of all meetings conducted during the currency of the project is attached in Annex 26. Minutes
were recorded of all formal meetings convened by the PMC with the various contractors. These included:
a. Pre-Start Meetings. The agenda for these meetings is included in Annex 27. This meeting is
essential because it sets the tone of the relationship that will exist between the Contractor and
the Consultant.
b. Site Meetings. The agenda for these meetings always commenced with a review of progress,
and then moved on to discussion on any technical problems.
c. Meetings in Islamabad. Initially in the contract period meetings were called at NHA
Headquarters to review progress attended by representatives from ADB, NHA, senior PMC
representatives, and all Contractors. These meetings were unwieldy and inefficient in that
representatives would sit for long periods, sometimes hours, before discussion arose on their
own contract. It is noteworthy that these large meetings were dropped after the first six months
of the project. However, most of the meetings in Islamabad were called by the NHA to address
specific problems that had arisen with individual contractors.
12.5 Survey.
A joint survey, undertaken by surveyors from the Contractor and Consultant, was conducted before the
commencement of contract work, this being the most critical activity to ensure that all measurements
during the progress of the contract had a mutually agreed reference base. During construction the set out
of major work activities had to be approved. A final joint survey completed the contract activity as a basis
for the compilation of the ‘As Built’ drawings.
12.6 Method Statements.
Before the commencement of any new major activity, the Contractor was required to submit a Method
Statement – his plan, with details of equipment, manpower and materials, to undertake the particular
section of work. The Method Statements were reviewed and approved after any necessary revisions, by
the Engineer.
12.7 Shop Drawings
Before commencing any new major activity that required fabrication, or where the contract drawings did
not include sufficient detail, the Contractor was required to submit Shop Drawings. The Shop Drawings
were reviewed and approved after any necessary revisions, by the Engineer.
12.8 Site Facilities.
The Contractors were responsible for the provision of site offices and office furniture and equipment, site
accommodation and furniture, vehicles and standby generators. Items purchased under the contract (office
and residential furniture and equipment) on completion of the contract were handed over to the NHA.
12.9 Social Agenda
Items on the social agenda included:
a. Land Acquisition and Resettlement. Only three cases arose during the period of the project:
 Initially, it was thought for the construction of the full width concrete pavement through
the urban areas of Ranipur and Qazi Ahmad that a full LARP would be required, which

would require considerable time for review and approval in accordance with ADB
requirements. A slight change in the design meant that a Due Diligence Report for each
of the urban areas would be adequate, which were submitted and approved.
 A 300 m long section of road in Package II of Chakdara Kalam could not be completed
until an adjoining piece of land had been acquired. Some delay was experienced because
payment had to be made to the owner of the house on the land that had to be demolished.
b. HIV/AIDS. Although a requirement in the contracts, no efforts were made by any of the
Contractors to take measures for the reduction of the incidence of HIV/AIDS.
c. Child Labour. No child labour was employed on any of the contracts.
12.10 Environment
Prior to the start of the loan implementation, ADB classified this project as Category B, meaning that it
required the completion of an Initial Environmental Examination, public consultation and an associated
Environmental Management Plan (EMP). The IEE specified a requirement for the PMC to enforce and
undertake regular compliance monitoring audits of each contract.
The Initial Environmental Examination prepared as part of the project preparation an EMP defining
potential impacts and mitigative measures likely to occur during the preconstruction, construction and
operating period of the project. The contract documents were prepared using that generic EMP.
The PMC prepared site specific EMPs for each contract and issued to the contractors for implementation.
A monthly environmental compliance checklist was included in the EMP, and results collated and
included in the Monthly Reports. A completed sample of the monthly compliance checklist is attached as
Annex 28.
12.11 Health and Safety
No health problems were reported from any of the sites.
However, two PMC employees died from natural causes:

Mr Muhammad Taimur, RE in Residency 1, suffered a heart attack in the site office and died on 3
November 2014;
Mr Saleem Qureshi, RE in Residency 4, was admitted to hospital on 1 June 2015, placed in
intensive care but died of kidney failure on 9 June 2015.
Only one death occurred during construction work. A workman on the Vidoor Nullah Bridge, while
carrying a long length of reinforcing steel, was electrocuted when the steel bar contacted an overhanging
live power cable. The incident occurred on 16 February 2014.
Two workmen were killed in a mine detonation on the By-pass section of the Jacobabad to Dera Allah
Yar package on 4 March 2014. It is assumed that the mine had been planted by terrorists of the
Balochistan Liberation Army or similar anti government organisation in the floor of culvert excavation,
and exploded when four workmen arrived to commence their tasks. Those not killed were severely
wounded. NHA arranged for a detachment of Frontier Corps to be stationed fulltime on the By-pass and
no further incidents of this nature took place.
On 11 November 2014, an horrific bus accident occurred at Km 456+400 on the N5 near Sukkur,
resulting in the death of 57 passengers. The accident occurred at approximately 4.45 am when the bus and
a truck collided. The reason would appear to be that the bus driver, travelling at speed, failed to appreciate
that he had to negotiate a diversion from one carriageway to the other. Despite the fact that the bus was

overloaded (licenced to carry 46 passengers but with actually 72 on board) and speeding (the driver had
been stopped approximately one hour before the accident by the NH & M Police and issued a chalan for
speeding, but allowed to continue), an FIR was issued against the NHA Project Director, the PMC
Resident Engineer and the Contractor associated with the Rohri-Panu Aqil contract. The matter has been
further compounded by an observation from the Ombudsman that the Contractor (Zarghoon) should be
‘blacklisted’. This constitutes a grave miscarriage of justice in that warning signs were in place, traffic
had been using the diversion all night prior to the accident without mishap, and if any fault is to be
attributed it must lie with the bus driver (whom it is understood survived the crash) and/or with the Police
in not exercising proper control over errant traffic.

PART C – FINANCIAL
13.0 CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
13.1 Contract Values
The contracts have been varied as shown in the tables below:
 PMC
Original Contract Final Contract

Contract Name VOs Difference +/- %
Value Value
Chakdara – Kalam Pkg I 912,455,000 1&2 1,083,074,574 170,619,574 18.70

Chakdara – Kalam Pkg II 861,417,500 1&2 743,627,707 (-) 117,789,793 -13.67
Jacobabad – Dera Allahyar 566,105,784 1&2 706,560,500 140,454,716 24.81
Hala – Moro Pkg I 1,957,715,418 1&2 1,849,431,097 (-) 108,284,321 -5.53
Hala – Moro Pkg II 1,875,203,622 1&2 1,692,147,722 (-) 183,055,900 -9.76
Hala – Moro Pkg III 1,979,423,442 1&2 1,773,935,683 (-) 205,487,759 -10.38
Ranipur – Rohri Pkg I 1,386,334,000 1&2 1,503,130,860 116,796,860 8.42
Ranipur – Rohri Pkg II 1,296,188,742 1&2 1,160,625,759 (-) 135,562,983 -10.46
Rohri – Panu Aqil 1,004,599,990 1, 2 & 3 965,956,793 (-) 38,643,197 -3.85
Panu Aqil - Dherki 1,291,999,736 1&2 994,150,012 (-) 297,849,725 -23.05
Vadoor Nullah Bridge 127,302,427 1&2 187,139,907 59,837,480 47.00
Total 13,258,745,661 12,659,780,614 -598,965,048 - 4.52
 EGC
Original Final Contract

Contract Value Value
Kohala – Dulai [Pkg I] 1,716,002,100 1, 2 & 3 2,566,305,327 850,303,227 49.55

Dulai – Muzaffarabad [Pkg II] 782,961,000 1&2 899,003,195 116,042,195 14.82
Chattor Kalas & Dulai Bridges [Pkg III] 433,918,427 1 368,963,869 (-) 64,954,558 -14.96
Besian - Balakot 93,739,500 1 94,603,739 864,239 0.92
Mahandri – Kaghan & Nara 844,545,925 1&2 1,039,319,171 194,773,246 23.06
Total 3,871,166,952 4,968,195,301 1,097,028,349 28.34

 ACE
Original Final Contract

Contract Value Value
Chakdara Bridges 480,505,449 1, 2 & 3 410,960,475 (-) 69,544,974 -14.47

Retodero – Shadadkot-Qubasaeed Khan 450,421,000 1&2 405,713,000 (-) 44,708,000 -9.93
Sarhad Bypass – Dherki Bypass 583,599,000 1 566,243,878 (-) 17,355,122 -2.97
Total 1,514,525,449 1,382,917,353 (-) 131,608,096 -8.69
13.2 Financial Status
The financial status of the PMC contracts as at the date of this report is as follows:
Original Revised Total Value

%age Last
Contract Contract Value Contract Value Certified
Achieved IPC No
(Rs) (Rs) (Rs)
Chakdara-Kalam Pkg I 912,455,000 1,083,074,574 1,078,613,430 99.59 19
Chakdara-Kalam Pkg II 861,417,500 743,627,707 726,004,677 97.66 20
Jacobabad-Dera Allah Yar 566,105,784 706,560,500 697,801,403 98.76 14
Hala-Moro Pkg I 1,957,715,418 1,849,431,097 1,797,820,758 97.21 17
Hala-Moro Pkg II 1,875,203,620 1,692,147,722 1,622,023,245 95.86 18
Hala-Moro Pkg III 1,979,423,442 1,773,935,683 1,736,996,913 97.92 20
Ranipur-Rohr Pkgi I 1,386,334,000 1,503,929,344 1,498,037,631 99.96 30
Ranipur-Rohri Pkg II 1,296,188,742 1,175,148,584 1,146,863,164 98.81 23
Rohri-Panu Aqil 1,004,599,990 972,630,752 960,720,808 99.46 19
Panu Aqil-Dharki 1,291,999,736 1,146,605,609 984,624,821 99.04 10
Vidoor Nullah Bridge 127,302,427 187,139,907 177,564,821 94.88 14
Totals 13,258,745,659 12,834,231,479 12,659,780,614 98.16
This indicates that there will be some minor payments to be made at the time of the Final Certificates at
the end of the Defects Notification Period for each contract.

14.0 PMC CONTRACT
14.1 Consultant Contract
The financial details of the PMC contract are given in Clause 8.1 above.
Details of invoicing and the status of the PMC contract as at the date of this report are given in Annex 29.
14.2 Payment
In March and May 2014, 20% of the local currency invoice payment was capriciously withheld by the
action of an NHA GM without reason, simply stating “poor performance”.
Clause 6.4 (c) of the PMC Contract Agreement is quite unambiguous “... The Client shall pay the
Consultant’s statements within sixty (60) days after the receipt by the Client of such statements with
supporting documents. Only such portion of a statement that is not satisfactorily supported may be
withheld from payment...” The statements of claim have been submitted with full supporting documents,
and no mention has been given by NHA staff that there was a deficiency in this respect.
Clause 2.54 of the ADB Guidelines on the Use of Consultants by Asian Development Bank and its
Borrowers provides that payment to Consultants is to be made promptly in accordance with the contract
provisions.
It should also be pointed out that the PMC is obliged to conform to the Contract Agreement Scope of
Work, which includes the statement (Appendix A, Clause 6 (c)) “...The Consultant will ... ensure that all
clauses of the contract agreement between the civil works contractors and NHA are respected...” On the
one hand, this means that the PMC has to ensure that the construction contract conditions are respected
such that the Employer’s position is safeguarded, whilst on the other hand, the PMC contract conditions
are ignored.

PART D – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS3
15.0 CONCLUSION
The Flood Emergency Reconstruction Project has been satisfactorily completed.
All contract work was satisfactorily completed, and although minor items and ancillary work continued
after the completion dates, the main aim of the contracts was achieved in that all were under traffic by the
end of the contract periods. There was no requirement to apply Liquidated Damages to any of the
contracts.
All contractors performed satisfactorily and are recommended for future work with NHA.
The early insistence by ADB that the loan expiry date would not be extended led to excessive pressure on
contractors to try and complete within a restricted time period, a situation that could not be sustained.
However, the later extension of the loan period with a revised expiry date of 25 May 2015 proved to be
the best possible solution.
NHA is an organization designed to administer infrastructure on a national basis. In order o streamline

contract administration and overcome the delays resulting from normal internal procedures, it is
recommended that a Project Management Unit be established within NHA for particular projects with the
requisite authority to ensure that Employer delays are reduced to a minimum.

16.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
16.1 Contractual
 Design reviews should take into account practical construction matters (eg the issue of placing
asphalt before rigid pavement is not practical as intended on this project)
 There is a need to reduce the time factor from the closing date of tenders to the date of award (the
average for this project was 145 days or 4.8 months)
 There is a need to reduce the time factor from the date of award to the issue of the date for
commencement (the average for this project was 133 days or 4.4 months)
 There is a need to provide decisions more quickly to obviate delays on site
 There is a need to process VOs much more quickly than at present
 If utilities have to be removed or relocated, the process should commence at the time when tenders
are called.
 There is a need to standardize common designs/drawings (eg kilometre posts, guard rail, etc)
 If police involvement is required for traffic management/diversions, the limits of control and
authority should be included in the contract documents
 Consideration should be made to either delete the sub-contractor sub-clause from the FIDIC
General Conditions of Contract, or to provide for the imposition of a monetary deduction for non
compliance.
16.2 Technical
 The specification for asphalt in the hotter climatic areas should be revised to be Class A for wearing
course and Penetration Grade 40-50 bitumen binder
 NHA should continue to examine ways in which to enforce legal load limits for trucks in
conjunction with the trucking and transport industry
 Consideration should be given to the construction of full width rigid pavements for the main arterial
roads in Pakistan
 Longitudinal joints are not considered to be essential between flexible and rigid pavements,
providing the flexible asphalt pavement is finished 10 to 15 mm higher than the adjoining rigid
pavement
 Shoulders on the N5 should be sheeted with asphalt and not TST
 The finished surface of pavements should be checked using a rolling straight edge of the type
devised in the UK instead of the specified 3.00 m straight edge
 Consideration should be given for the re-use of milled asphalt instead of disposal to spoil
 Pavement marking on fresh asphalt should be left for a minimum period of one month, and even
longer in hotter climatic areas
16.3 PMC
 The time between submission of proposals for PMC contracts and the signing of the agreement
must be reduced (in this project, the proposal was submitted in November 2011, and the agreement
signed in June 2013)
 Approval must be promptly arranged for senior foreign PMC staff to visit all contract areas
 Mobilisation of PMC staff should be staggered, and not directed to take place all at once. The RE
and Surveyor are required immediately, but others may join as the contractor commences work
 The closure of access to FERP from staff previously involved with NHIP should be rescinded

 There is a need to make better arrangements for interviewing senior site staff – to call a candidate
forward and then have him wait for two days is not acceptable
 There is a need to select PDs that have had previous experience in working with consultancies, or to
provide training. Both parties have a job to do, but there has to be a better understanding of each
other’s role
 Local Material Engineers should be civil engineers, and not necessarily have a masters degree in
geology
 The arbitrary deduction of money from a PMC invoice should not take place. Firstly, this type of
action is not allowed under the contract, and secondly when it did occur, no valid reasons were
provided in support

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FLOOD EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SMEC International Pty Ltd Project Completion Report 1

SMEC International Pty Ltd Project Completion Report 2

The National Highways were

SMEC International Pty Ltd Project Completion Report 3

SMEC International Pty Ltd Project Completion Report 4

The aim of this report is three-fold

This report is divided into four parts:

Part A deals with the construction contracts;

SMEC International Pty Ltd Project Completion Report 5

4.0 CONTRACT ARRANGEMENTS

4.1 PMC Contracts

4.2 EGC and ACE Contracts

SMEC International Pty Ltd Project Completion Report 6

Designs of the various packages were undertaken as follows:

Designer Contract Package

The following design issues arose during the project:

Contract Design Issue Remarks

The consultants involved in the above issues performed satisfactorily.

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4.4 Construction/Contractual Problems Arising from Designs

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5.1 Time Factor at Commencement

This time factor is important for two major reasons:

5.2 Delays in Decisions

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5.3 Variation Orders

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5.5 Standard Drawings

5.6 Land Acquisition

5.7 Possession of Site

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6.1 Grooving/Milling of Existing Pavement

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Category and Blows of Marshall Minimum VIM at optimum VIM at refusal

Very Heavy (>5) 75 9000 2 – 3.5 65 – 73 5 3

6.3 Rutting in Asphalt

Rutting occurs as a result of the combination of a number of effects;

SMEC International Pty Ltd Project Completion Report 13

6.4 Full Width Rigid Pavement

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6.5 Longitudinal Joint between Rigid and Flexible Pavements

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It was recommended that the longitudinal joint be deleted.

Road shoulders have two specific purposes:

6.7 Finished Surface Tolerance

6.8 Re-use of Material

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Cold recycling train

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7.1 Claims and Disputes

7.2 Variations to the Scope of Work

Serial Contract Variation

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Original Revised Date

Original Revised Date

Original Revised Date

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8.1 Quality Management

Quality control is the management tool used on this project.