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FACTS:
ISSUE: W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas
data is proper
HELD:
No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of
habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The
petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand,
is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not,
is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous
and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and
the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that
every petition for the issuance of the Writ must be supported by
justifying allegations of fact.
CARAM VS SEGUI
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero.
Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said
pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from
“marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu
RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still
barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the
photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of
the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of
the children’s right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of
extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in
the business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest
that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy
tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable
expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be
respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such
privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published
as “Public”.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his
“wall” (profile page):
(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;
(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose
any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts
subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how
come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In
fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said
pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook
hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the
pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students
who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures,
merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is,
to discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students
and their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their
children there).
RAZON VS TAGITIS
FACTS:
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu.
Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early
morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY
Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to
Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. The receptionist
related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key
with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based
secretary who did not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply
wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies
and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police
Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the
circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.
ISSUE:
RULING:
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.
There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually
disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out
of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk
and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion,
however, from all concerned – the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and even
the police authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious
circumstances and was never seen again.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall
allege, among others (in terms of the portions the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent,
and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete
in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s
rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state
the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary
details.76 In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read
in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a
situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to
kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained,
because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those
who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level
of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to
read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial
concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and
security.
The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s knowledge about
Tagitis’ disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this
disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide
sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation
of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in
its statement of a cause of action.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were
the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government completely
failed to exercise the extral.'
To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for
appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the
PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results
through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct.
ROXAS VS GMA
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with
torture.[23] The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to
abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to the fold.[24] The
torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and
suffocating the petitioner.[25]
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely
on the cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitionerwho, they claim,
was less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts.[131]
While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would
have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJANs investigation, this
Court believes that the formers reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse
for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues from
which they could obtain relevant leads.[132] Indeed, while the allegations
of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up
as adequate evidence before a court of lawthey are, nonetheless, a vital
source of valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if
only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo
Rule in the conduct of investigations.
Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR
finds that the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos
had transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life liberty
and security were violated by the Government have been fully
determined.
Ruling:
Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of the CA
that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and its
determination of the entities responsible for the enforced disappearance of
Jonas, we resolve to deny the petitioner's prayer to issue the writ
of Amparo anew and to refer the case to the CA based on the newly
discovered evidence. We so conclude as the petitioner's request for the
reissuance of the writ and for the rehearing of the case by the CA would be
redundant and superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation being
conducted by the DOJ through the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed
by the Court in this Resolution; and (3) the continuing investigation directed
by the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision.
We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court
a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address an enforced disappearance, it
cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of Amparo as a summary
remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that would
complicate and prolong rather than expedite the investigations already
ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined with finality that Jonas
was a victim of enforced disappearance.
DECISION
fACTS: On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot),
together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the
officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition
for continuing mandamus, damages and attorney's fees with the RTC of
Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.[4] The petition contained
the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested
the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises,
Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore
in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of
Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and
there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation
of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides,
and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard,
liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard;
(4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have
the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his
predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit,
which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the
Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to
protect the interest of the people of Matnog;[5]and (7) the respondents
violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the
Local Government Code.[6] Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1)
the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the
mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a
temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an
inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4)
award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.[7]
Issue: The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
in the Resolution[10] dated October 18, 2011. Aside from sustaining the
dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC[11] further ruled that:
(1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public
officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of
the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the
petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3)
they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the
complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the
rules.
Ruling: In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the RTC
further ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following grounds: (1)
there is no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials
allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to attach judicial
affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or
appropriate agency.[29] The respondents, and even the Office of the Solicitor
General, in behalf of the public respondents, all concur with the view of the
RTC.
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC
actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually
render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which
judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity
with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing
court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government
agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to
monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full
satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the
writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has
been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the
court docket.[34] A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command
of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to
retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful
implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court's decision."[35]
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners
should have first filed a case with the Panel of Arbitrators (Panel), which
has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942.
J. Carpio-Morales
Facts:
Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and
that the petition wasn’t in order.
In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an
aggrieved party’s person, family or home
Ratio:
It’s a forum for enforcing one’s right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data
was a response to killings and enforced disappearances.
Castillo v Cruz- and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property
or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
LEE VS ILAGAN
FACTS: Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of
Habeas Data against Joy, her former common law partner. According to
him, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joy†™s condominium and rested
for a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera
missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex
video she discovered from the digital camera showing him and another
woman. He denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but
she refused. They had an altercation where Neri allegedly slammed
Joy†™s head against a wall and then walked away. Because of this, Joy
filed several cases against him, including a case for violation of Republic Act
9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilising the said
video. The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy
and that of the other woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition
for issuance of the writ of habeas data. RTC issued the writ and directed Joy
to appear before the RTC and produce Neri†™s digital camera, as well as
the original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days
from receipt. In her return,. Joy admitted keeping the memory card of the
digital camera and reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in the
cases she filed against Neri.
Neri†™s petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed
at suppressing the evidence in the cases she filed against him; and she is
not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the
person of Neri. The RTC granted Neri†™s petition and ordered the turn-
over of the video to Neri and enjoined Joy from reproducing the same. It
disregarded Joy†™s defense that she is not engaged in the collection,
gathering and storage of data, and that her acts of reproducing the same
and showing it to other persons (Napolcom) violated Neri†™s right to
privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the return of
the video and not on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the
instant petition before the Supreme Court.
HELD: A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
(Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective
and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances[1]. It was conceptualized as a judicial
remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals[2], which is defined as †œ the right
to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about
oneself[3].†• As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of
habeas data now stands as †œ a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.†• Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance
of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the
petition sufficiently alleges, among others, †œ [t]he manner the right to
privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty
or security of the aggrieved party.†• In other words, the petition must
adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other[4].
Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim[5]. In this relation, it bears pointing out
that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague and doubtful[6]. In this case, the Court finds
that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While
Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video †“
which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the
internet for public consumption †“ he to failed to explain the connection
between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or
security.
vs.
FACTS:
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its
next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m.
while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of
South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of
Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no
reports of leaking fuel or oil.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this
case.
HELD:
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any
request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may
require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage
to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or
other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the
laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the
territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of
international law.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the
UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound
by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as
codified in UNCLOS.
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-
membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the
rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and
territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility”
under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which
adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that
our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting
the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk
from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while
transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a
Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to
comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global
task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article
197 of UNCLOS
Facts:
Issues:
The question then... is, can the validity of an ECC be challenged via a writ of
kalikasan?
Ruling:
CA resolved to invalidate the ECC... for failure of Luis Miguel Aboitiz (Mr.
Aboitiz), Director of RP Energy, to affix his signature in the Sworn
Statement of Full Responsibility,... invalidated the LDA entered into by
SBMA and RP Energy. We answer in the affirmative subject to certain
qualifications.
The Casiño Group failed to contest, with proof, the adequacy of the
mitigating measures stated in the aforesaid EMP.
None of these alleged experts testified before the appellate court to confirm
the pertinent contents of the Final Report.
After due consideration, we find that, based on the statements in the Final
Report, there is no sufficiently compelling reason to compel the testimonies
of these alleged expert witnesses for the following reasons.
First, the statements are not sufficiently specific to point to us a flaw (or
flaws) in the study or design/implementation (or some other aspect) of the
project which provides a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection
between the construction and operation of... the project vis-à-vis potential
grave environmental damage.
Second, some of the concerns raised in the alleged statements, like acid
rain, warming and acidification of the seawater, and discharge of pollutants
were, as previously discussed, addressed by the evidence presented by RP
Energy before the appellate court.
Third, the key observations of Dr. Cruz, while concededly assailing certain
aspects of the EIS, do not clearly and specifically establish how these
omissions have led to the issuance of an ECC that will pose significant
negative environmental impacts once the project is... constructed and
becomes operational.
The appellate court ruled that the ECC is invalid because Mr. Aboitiz failed
to sign the Statement of Accountability portion of the ECC.
A review of the voluminous records indicates that the matter of the lack of
signature was discussed, developed or surfaced only in the course of the
hearings, specifically, on clarificatory questions from the appellate court,...
At any rate, we shall disregard the procedural defect and rule directly on
whether the lack of signature invalidated the ECC in the interest of
substantial justice.
The question then is, was the absence of the signature of Mr. Aboitiz, as
representative of RP Energy, in the Statement of Accountability sufficient
ground to invalidate the ECC?
Accountability.
As previously noted, the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised
that the issue relative to the lack of signature would be decisive in the
determination of the validity of the ECC.
appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack of
signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the ECC's Statement of Accountability relative to
the copy of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the appellate court
This brings us to the next logical question, did the EPRMP provide the
necessary information in order for the DENR-EMB to assess the
environmental impact of RP Energy's request relative to the first
amendment?
We answer in the affirmativ... it does not follow that the ECC is the
"license" or
In the case at bar, we find, applying this rule of action, that the SBMA
should have first secured a CNO before entering into the LDA with RP
Energy for the following reasons.
First, the Subic area is historically known to be the home of our brothers
and sisters belonging to the Aeta communities
Second, SBMA and RP Energy claim that the SBMA Ecology Center verified
with the NCIP that the project site does not overlap with an ancestral
domain.
Third, that the project site was formerly used as the firing range of the U.S.
Armed Forces does not preclude the possibility that a present or future
claim of ancestral domain may be made over the aforesaid site
Fourth, that the project site was subsequently classified by the SBMA as
forming part of an industrial zone does not exempt it from the CNO
requirement.
Fifth, SBMA argues that the CNO issued to HHIC should, for all intents and
purposes, be applicable to RP Energy.
All in all, we find, applying the foregoing rule of action, that SBMA should
have secured a CNO before entering into the LDA with RP Energy.
We, thus, limit the discussion as to whether the approval of the concerned
sanggunian requirement should have been complied with prior to the
consummation of the LDA, considering that the LDA is part of the
implementation of the subject project and already vests in RP
Energy the right to the use and enjoyment of the project site, as in fact
horizontal clearing activities were already undertaken by RP Energy at the
project site by virtue of the LDA
In sum, we find that the implementation of the project is not subject to the
prior approval of the concerned sanggunians, under Section 27 of the LGC,
and the SBMA's decision to approve the project prevails over the apparent
objections of the concerned sanggunians... of the LGUs, by virtue of the
clear provisions of RA 7227. Thus, there was no infirmity when the LDA
was entered into between SBMA and RP Energy despite the lack of
approval of the concerned sanggunians.
Principles:
If the petition is granted, the court may grant the reliefs provided for under
Section
15 of Rule 7, to wit:
Section 15. Judgment... sixty (60) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision,... granting or denying the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan.
cease and desis... protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the
environment;... monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of
the court;... periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and...
people to a balanced and healthful ecology... non-exhaustive... damage that
will occur if the power plant project is implemente
The laws governing the ECC, i.e., Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151 and PD
1586, do not specifically state that the lack of signature in the Statement of
Accountability has the effect of invalidating the ECC.
R... eview of EIA Reports normally entails an EMB procedural screening for
compliance with minimum requirements specified dur... ing Scoping,
followed by a substantive review
Decision Making involves evaluation of EIA recommendations and the draft
decision document, resulting to the issuance of an ECC, CNC or Denial
Letter.
PD 1151 set the Philippine Environment Policy. Notably, this law recognized
the right of the people to a healthful environment.[160] Pursuant thereto,
in every action, project or undertaking, which significantly affects the
quality of the... environment, all agencies and instrumentalities of the
national government, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations, as well as private corporations, firms, and entities were
required to prepare, file and include a statement (i.e., Environmental
Impact
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented;
Facts:
In 2002, the Department of Energy entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract
with JAPEX, a 100% Japanese corporation, which was later converted to a service contract,
known as SC-46, for the exploration, development and utilization of petroleum resources in an
area that basically affects the Tanon Strait. The President at that time was not a signatory to the
SC-46 and such contract was not submitted to the Congress for review.
Tanon Strait is a narrow passage of water in Cebu which harbors a biodiversity of marine life
and is declared by laws as a protected seascape. When JAPEX started its seismic surveys and
drilling activities over the area, petitions were filed assailing the constitutionality of SC-46. One
petition protesting the activities for its ecological impact was in the name of “Resident Marine
Mammals” – which are literally toothed whales, turtles and such, joined in by human petitioners
referred to as “Stewards”, in their representative as well as personal capacity. Pres. Arroyo was
also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner, purportedly because of her express declaration
and undertaking under the ASEAN Charter to protect habitats and other environmental
concerns.
FIDEC, an organization committed to the welfare of marginal fisherfolk in the area, also
questioned the SC-46 on the ground that service contracts are no longer allowed under the 1987
Constitution, and that if it were, SC-46 is still null and void because it did not comply with the
Constitution, most especially the safeguards that the Court laid down in La Bugal B’laan case.
Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the “Resident Marine Mammals”, or animals in general, have standing as the real
party-in-interests in this suit
Yes. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen’s suit. A citizen’s
suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of
environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a
representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in interest to institute actions on
behalf of the real party in interest.
Dissent
Issue 2: W/N the name of former President Arroyo impleaded in the petition as an unwilling co-
plaintiff is proper
No. The name of Pres Arroyo as an unwilling plaintiff impleaded in the petition should be
stricken from the title of the case.
First, under Rule 3, Sec 10 of the ROC, when the consent of a party who should be joined as
plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant. This will put the
unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the court, which may properly implead him or her
through its processes. The unwilling party’s name cannot be simply included in the petition
without her knowledge or consent, as this would be a denial of due process.
Second, impleading the former President for an act she made in performance of the functions of
her office is contrary to the public policy against embroiling Presidents in suits.
The two pipelines were supposedly designed to provide more than double the standard safety
allowance against leakage, considering that they are made out of heavy duty steel that can withstand
more than twice the current operating pressure and are buried at a minimum depth of 1.5 meters,
which is deeper than the US Department of Transportation standard of 0.9 meters.
In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West
Tower Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the condominium. A search made on July
10, 2010 within the condominium premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its
Basement 2. Owing to its inability to control the flow, WestTower’s management reported the matter to
the Police Department of Makati City, which in turn called the city’s Bureau of Fire Protection.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the
sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of
contaminated water into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the
residents of WestTower to abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo’s power was
shut down.
Petitioner FPIC initially disowned any leak from its oil pipeline. Thus, the residents of WestTower
shouldered the expenses of hauling the waste water from its basement, which eventually required the
setting up of a treatment plant in the area to separate fuel from the waste water.
On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan[2] with a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members of their Boards of Directors
to file their respective verified returns.
Issue:
Ruling:
1. The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper.
Hence, We required FPIC to obtain the adverted DOE Certification in
Our July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said
certification from the DOE considering that the core issue of this case
requires the specialized knowledge and special expertise of the DOE
and various other administrative agencies. On October 25, 2013, the
DOE submitted the certification pursuant to the July 30, 2013
Resolution of the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE
Secretary Carlos Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending
certain activities and the timetable for the resumption of the WOPL
operations after conducting a dialogue between the concerned
government agencies and FPIC.
2. The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the
individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to
the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases
that in a petition for a writ of kalikasan,the Court cannot grant the
award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the
CA, the civil case and criminal complaint filed by petitioners against
respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate and determine
the individual liability of respondents, if any, on their exercise of
corporate powers and the management of FPIC relative to the dire
environmental impact of the dumping of petroleum products
stemming from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati
City.
Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of
the FPIC and FGC officials which can, however, be properly resolved
in the civil and criminal cases now pending against them.