Agra_Midterms

Header Topic Content

I. HISTORICAL Spanish Era:
BACKGROUND Civil Code Provisions for Rural Leases governed the relationship between landowners and tenants.

American Regime:
Philippine Rice Share Tenancy Act (on rice lands)
Sugar Tenancy Act (lands planted to sugarcane)

Commonwealth Period:
CA No. 53 - Recognized the testimony of the tenant as prima facie evidence of the terms of the tenancy contract that was not reduced in writing in a language
known to him
CA No. 178 amended the provisions of the Philippine Rice Share Act
CA No. 271 - amended the provisions of the Sugar Tenancy Act; extended application to sugar farm workers
CA No. 461 - provided security of tenure to agricultural tenants
CA No. 608 - amended CA No. 461

After the grant of Philippine independence:

RA No. 34 - introduced changes in crop division
Agriculture Tenancy Act of the Philippines - repealed all the earlier tenancy act laws except the Sugar Tenancy Act
RA No. 2263 amended RA No. 34
Land Reform Act of 1955 - expropriation of private agricultural lands in excess of 300 hectares of contiguous area (natural persons) and 600 hectares
(corporations)
Agricultural Land Reform Code - abolished share tenancy; instituted the agricultural leasehold system
Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines - amended the Agricultural Land Reform Code

Martial Law:
Tenant Emancipation Law - provided for the transfer of lands primarily devoted to rice and corn to the tenants
PD No. 946 - reorganized Court of Agrarian Relations
PD No. 1038 - to strengthen the security of tenants in non-rice or corn agricultural lands
PD Nos. 251, 444, 1039, 1817 later amended the code of agrarian reform of the country

Cory Aquino Administration:

EO No. 228, EO 229
Proclamation No. 131 - instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program

June 10, 1988 - Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 - to cover all public and private agricultural lands (later amended by RAs 7881, 7905, 8532,
9700)

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II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A. Definition of Essential Terms ESSENTIAL TERMS

AGRARIAN REFORM B. Constitutional Basis
AGRARIAN LAW
C. Constitutionality of the CARL – all laws that govern and regulate rights and relationship between tenants, agricultural workers, lessees or landowners (tall), over agricultural lands

AGRARIAN REFORM
- Physical redistribution of lands and the totality of factors and support services designed to lift the economic status of beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution
of the lands, such as
o production or profit sharing,
o labor administration, and
o distribution of shares of stock

AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISE OR AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY

- cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm products and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such
farming operations
done by persons whether natural or juridical

AGRICULTURAL LAND
- land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land

AGRARIAN DISPUTE
- any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements;
- includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.

IDLE OR ABANDONED LAND

- any agricultural land not cultivated, tilled or developed to produce any crop nor devoted to any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of three (3) years immediately prior to the receipt
of notice of acquisition by the government as provided under this Act, o does not include land that has become permanently or regularly devoted to nonagricultural purposes. o does not include land
which has become unproductive by reason of force majeure or any other fortuitous event, provided that prior to such event, such land was previously used for agricultural or other economic purpose.

FARMER
- a natural person whose primary livelihood is cultivation of land or the production of agricultural crops, livestock and/or fisheries either by himself/herself, or primarily with the assistance of his/her
immediate farm household, whether the land is owned by him/her, or by another person under a leasehold or share tenancy agreement or arrangement with the owner thereof.

FARMWORKER
- a natural person who renders service for value as an employee or laborer in an agricultural enterprise or farm • regardless of whether his compensation is paid on a daily, weekly, monthly or
"pakyaw" basis • includes an individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a pending agrarian dispute and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular
farm employment.

REGULAR FARMWORKER
- a natural person who is employed on a permanent basis by an agricultural enterprise or farm.

SEASONAL FARMWORKER
- a natural person who is employed on a recurrent, periodic or intermittent basis by an agricultural enterprise or farm, whether as a permanent or a non-permanent laborer, such as "dumaan",
"sacada", and the like.

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF CARL:

- Sec. 2, Art. 2. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.

- Sec. 1 (2), Art. 12. The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of
human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices.

- Sec. 4, Art. 13. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they
till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

- Sec. 6, Art. 13. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including
lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.

- Sec. 8, Art. 13. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation, and privatization of public
sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.

- Sec. 22, Art. 13. At the earliest possible time, the Government shall expropriate idle or abandoned agricultural lands as may be defined by law, for distribution to the beneficiaries of the agrarian
reform program.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CARL
- it is based on the valid exercise of State's police power and eminent domain

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Association of Small Landowners
vs. DAR, 175 SCRA 343
Agra_Midterms
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and
to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later,
E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law,
while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small
Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands
and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under
R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the
specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the
form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they
belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land
reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In
any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is
abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just
compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can
determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined
by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the
latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
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III. THE SCOPE OF THE See Sec. 4, CARL, as amended
CARL by R.A. No. 9700 (adding an
exclusion)
A. As to covered lands Luz Farms vs. Sec. of DAR G.R.
No. 86889, December 4, 1990
Agra_Midterms
Section 3. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4.Scope. -The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture:
Provided, That landholdings of landowners with a total area of five (5) hectares and below shall not be covered for acquisition and distribution to qualified
beneficiaries.
"More specifically, the following lands are covered by the CARP:
"(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural
lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;
"(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
"(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and
"(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.
"A comprehensive inventory system in consonance with the national land use plan shall be instituted by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
in accordance with the Local Government Code, for the purpose of properly identifying and classifying farmlands within one (1)year from effectivity
of this Act, without prejudice to the implementation of the land acquisition and distribution."
Luz Farms vs Sec of DAR
FACTS:
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions of
CARP.
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as
compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive xxx
ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage
HELD:
Said provisions are unconstitutional.
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of
the Government.
Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery,
poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and
swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian
reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.
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Alita vs. CA, 170 SCRA 706, 1989 FACTS:

The case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.
Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316
and appurtenant regulations issued by DAR.
On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and
General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands. RTC denied petition, and CA affirmed it.

ISSUE:
WON lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27

HELD:
NO. It is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso
supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading,
Section 6. Retention Limits. ...
... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of
the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such
contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest
house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes
and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human
beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog,
112 SCRA 45)

In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian
Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides:
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of
other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small
settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

Paris vs. Alfeche, et. al. G.R. No. THIRD DIVISION

139603, 30 August 2001. [G.R. No. 139083. August 30, 2001]
FLORENCIA PARIS, petitioner, vs. DIONISIO A. ALFECHE, JUAN L. ALFECHE, MAXIMO N. PADILLA, DIONISIO Q. MATILOS, Heirs of GREG A. ALFECHE,
DIONISIO W. MATILO, SIMPLICIO L. ADAYA, TEOFILO M. DE GUZMAN, FRANCISCO B. DINGLE and MARIFE NAVARO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 10.6146 hectares, more or less, and another property with an area of 13.2614
hectares. The said parcels are fully tenanted by private respondents herein who are recipients of Emancipation Patents in their names pursuant to Operation
Land Transfer under P.D. 27 notwithstanding the fact that neither the tenants nor the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) has paid a single centavo for the said
land.

Petitioner contends that since she is entitled to a retention of seven (7) hectares under P.D. 27 and/or 5 hectares and 3 hectares each for her children under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the tenants are not supposed to acquire the subject land and the Emancipation Patents precipitately issued
to them are null and void for being contrary to law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the original homesteads issued under the public land act are exempted from the operation of land reform (thus, allowing the landowner
to retain an area of not more than 7 hectares)

HELD: NO. The right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be
retained or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law.

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B. As to controversy Stanfilco Employees Agrarian Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion

Reform Beneficiaries Multi- FACTS:
Purpose Cooperative vs. DOLE On January 29, 1998, petitioner as seller, and respondent as buyer, entered into a Banana Production and Purchase Agreement (BPPA). The BPPA provided
Philippines, G.R. No. 154048, 27 that SEARBEMCO shall sell exclusively to DOLE, and the latter shall buy from the former, all Cavendish bananas of required specifications to be planted on the
November 2009 land owned by SEARBEMCO.

On December 11, 2000, DOLE filed a complaint with the RTC against SEARBEMCO, the spouses Elly and Myrna Abujos (spouses Abujos), and Oribanex
Services, Inc. (Oribanex) for specific performance and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and of a temporary restraining
order. DOLE alleged that SEARBEMCO sold and delivered to Oribanex, through the spouses Abujos, the bananas rejected by DOLE, in violation of paragraph
5(p), Article V of the BPPA which limited the sale of rejected bananas for "domestic non-export consumption." DOLE further alleged that Oribanex is likewise an
exporter of bananas and is its direct competitor.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint of DOLE, considering that the case involves an agrarian dispute within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB

RULING:
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. x x x. In Vda. De Tangub v. Court of Appeals (191
SCRA 885), we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a.) adjudication of all matters involving implementation
of agrarian reform; b.) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and c.) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. (Heirs of the Late Hernan Rey Santos v. CA)

The parties in the present case have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relationship that could bring their controversy within the ambit of agrarian
reform laws and within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. In fact, SEARBEMCO has no allegation whatsoever in its motion to dismiss regarding any tenancy
relationship between it and DOLE that gave the present dispute the character of an agrarian dispute.

We have always held that tenancy relations cannot be presumed. The elements of tenancy must first be proved by substantial evidence which can be shown
through records, documents, and written agreements between the parties. A principal factor, too, to consider in determining whether a tenancy relationship
exists is the intent of the parties.29

SEARBEMCO has not shown that the above-mentioned indispensable elements of tenancy relations are present between it and DOLE. It also cannot be
gleaned from the intention of the parties that they intended to form a tenancy relationship between them. In the absence of any such intent and resulting
relationship, the DARAB cannot have jurisdiction. Instead, the present petition is properly cognizable by the regular courts, as the CA and the RTC correctly
ruled.

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People of the Philippines vs.
Valenzuela, G.R. No. 178266, 21
July 2008
Agra_Midterms
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SAMUEL and LORETA VANZUELA, respondents.
G.R. No. 178266 | July 21, 2008 | Nachura, J.
FACTS
Veneranda S. Paler is the wife of the late Dionisio Paler, Sr. who is the registered owner of a parcel of irrigated riceland, containing an area of more than four (4) hectares, situated in Surigao del
Norte, and covered by an Original Certificate of Title (OCT). One (1) hectare of this riceland (subject property) was cultivated by the respondents as agricultural tenants for more than ten (10) years,
with an agreed lease rental of twelve and one half (12) cavans of palay, at 45 kilos per cavan, per harvest. The respondents allegedly failed to pay the rentals since 1997. Initially, Veneranda brought
the matter before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Office in Mainit, Surigao del Norte, but no amicable settlement was reached by the parties. Thus, Veneranda filed a criminal complaint for
estafa against the respondents. Consequently, respondents were charged in an information.
During pre-trial, the parties agreed that the respondents had been the agricultural tenants of Veneranda for more than ten (10) years; and that the palay was harvested twice a year on the subject
property. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, the respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal case be dismissed for failure of the
petitioner to establish the culpability of the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition arguing that the respondents, as agricultural tenants, were required by law to
hold the lease rentals in trust for the landowner and thereafter turn over the same to the latter.
The RTC dismissed the criminal case, opined that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the controversy had the character of an agrarian dispute.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the RTC of Surigao City has jurisdiction over the charge of estafa even if involves agricultural tenants of the private complainant
2. Whether or not an agricultural tenant, who fails to pay rentals on the land tilled, can be succesfully be prosecuted for estafa
RULING - YES and NO
1. The three important requisites in order that a court may acquire criminal jurisdiction are (1) the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) the court must have jurisdiction over the
territory where the offense was committed; and (3) the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
First. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter of an action is conferred by law. It is determined by the material allegations of the complaint or information
and the law at the time the action was commenced. In the instant case, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter because the law confers on it the power to hear and decide cases involving
estafa. The allegations in the Information are clear -- Criminal Case No. 6087 involves alleged misappropriation of the amount of P80,000.00.
Second. The RTC also has jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
Third. The RTC likewise acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents because they voluntarily submitted to the RTC's authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve.
Thus, the RTC erroneously concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter on the premise that the case before it is purely an agrarian dispute.
Accordingly, the RTC had to confine itself to the determination of whether private respondents were guilty of the crime. Thus, while a court may have authority to pass upon the criminal liability of the
accused, it cannot make any civil awards that relate to the agrarian relationship of the parties because this matter is beyond its jurisdiction and, correlatively, within DARAB's exclusive domain.
2. While we do not begrudge a party's prerogative to initiate a case against those who, in his opinion, may have wronged him, we now remind landowners that such prerogative of instituting a criminal
case against their tenants, on matters related to an agrarian dispute, must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the pursuit of truth and justice. Thus, even as
we uphold the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the instant criminal case, we still deny the petition.
Herein respondents were charged with the crime of estafa, which refers to fraud committed by misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, the cases they have cited are inapplicable, for they involved a relationship of agricultural share tenancy between the landowner and the accused. In such relationship, it
was incumbent upon the tenant to hold in trust and, eventually, account for the share in the harvest appertaining to the landowner, failing which the tenant could be held liable for misappropriation. As
correctly pointed out by the respondents, share tenancy has been outlawed for being contrary to public policy as early as 1963, with the passage of R.A. 3844 (The Agricultural Land Reform Code).
What prevails today, under R.A. 6657, is an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship, and all instances of share tenancy have been automatically converted into leasehold tenancy. In such a
relationship, the tenant’s obligation is simply to pay rentals, not to deliver the landowners share. Given this dispensation, the petitioner’s allegation that the respondents misappropriated the
landowners share of the harvest as contained in the information is untenable. Accordingly, the respondents cannot be held liable under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
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Mendoza vs. Germino, G.R. No. G.R. No. 165676November 22, 2010
165676, 22 November 2010 JOSE MENDOZA, Petitioner vs. NARCISO GERMINO and BENIGNO GERMINO, Respondents.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:
On June 27, 1988, the petitioner and Aurora C. Mendoza (plaintiffs) filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija against
respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry.
The plaintiffs claimed that they were the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel of land in Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property) under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34267. Sometime in 1988, respondent Narciso unlawfully entered the subject property by means of strategy and stealth, and without
their knowledge or consent. Despite the plaintiffs repeated demands, respondent Narciso refused to vacate the subject property.
On August 9, 1988, respondent Narciso filed his answer, claiming, among others, that his brother, respondent Benigno Germino, was the plaintiffs agricultural
lessee and he merely helped the latter in the cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household.
After several postponements, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the
tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso.
Without conducting a hearing, and despite respondent Narcisos objection, the MTC issued an order on October 27, 1995, remanding the case to the DARAB,
Cabanatuan City for further proceedings.
On December 14, 1995, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), impleading respondent Benigno as
additional defendant.
The plaintiffs alleged that Efren Bernardo was the agricultural lessee of the subject property. Respondent Benigno unlawfully entered the subject property in
1982 or 1983 through strategy and stealth, and without their knowledge or consent. He withheld possession of the subject property up to 1987, and
appropriated for himself its produce, despite repeated demands from the plaintiffs for the return of the property.
Petitioner insists that the jurisdiction lies with the DARAB since the nature of the action and the allegations of the complaint show an agrarian dispute.

ISSUE:
Whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
We deny the petition.
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. It is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties, or acquired
through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the court
nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character.
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer. The RRSP governs the remedial aspects of these suits.
Under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, as well as Section 34 of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other agrarian
laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, among others, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture.[31] For a case to involve an agrarian
dispute, the following essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the
subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvest or
payment of rental.
Allegation of tenancy does not divest the MTC of jurisdiction. Amended complaint did confer jurisdiction on the DARAB

8

Bumagat, et. al. vs. Arribay, G.R.
No. 194818, 09 June 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Complete: Mariano del Castillo
Agra_Midterms
Quickie: A case involving agricultural land does not immediately qualify it as an agrarian dispute. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto
make the possessor an agricultural lessee or tenant. There are conditions before he can qualify as an agricultural lessee or tenant, and the subject being
agricultural land constitutes just one condition. In order to qualify as an agrarian dispute, there must likewise exist a tenancy relation between the parties.
FACTS:
Bumagat and others are the registered owners of about eight hectares of agricultural land. They filed a complaint for forcible entry against Arribay before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) alleging that with the aid of armed goons and through the use of intimidation and threats of physical harm, the latter
entered the former’s parcels of land and ousted them from their lawful possession. Arribay sought for the dismissal of the complaint, claiming that the subject
properties are agricultural lands – which renders the dispute an agrarian matter and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) denied the motion for failure to show the existence of a tenancy or agrarian
relationship between the parties. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) found that no tenancy or other agrarian relationship existed between the parties. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and agreed that the dispute fell under the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
ISSUE:
Is the dispute within the jurisdiction of DARAB?
RULING:
No. The CA failed to realize the fact that as between the parties, there is no tenurial arrangement, not even an implied one. For the DARAB to acquire
jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relation between the parties. “In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is essential
to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:
1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
In the present case, it is quite evident that not all of these conditions are present. For one, there is no tenant, as both parties claim ownership over the property.
9
 Agra_Midterms

Islanders vs. Lapanday, G.R. No. FACTS:

159089 On March 8, 1993, a certain Ramon Cajegas entered into a Joint Production Agreement for
Islanders Carp-Farmer Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. with Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation. Almost three years after, petitioner], represented by its alleged chairman,
Manuel K. Asta, filed a complaint with the RTC for Declaration of Nullity, Mandamus, Damages, with
prayer for Preliminary Injunction against respondent. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended
complaint with leave of court alleging that the persons, who executed the contract were not authorized by it. Respondent then filed a Motion to
Dismiss stating that the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has primary, exclusive, and original jurisdiction. On August 21, 1996, respondent then filed a case at the DARAB for
Breach of Contract, Specific Performance, Injunction with Restraining Order, Damages and Attorney’s Fees. The DARAB decided the case in favor
of respondent declaring the Joint Production Agreement as valid and binding. The RTC then issued its decision on October 18, 1999 dismissing the case.
Finding the relationship between the parties to be agricultural leasehold, the Court of Appeals held that the issue fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the
DARAB. Hence, the appellate court ruled that the RTC had correctly dismissed the Complaint filed by petitioner. Petitioner contends that, there being
no tenancy or leasehold relationship between the parties, this case does not constitute an agrarian dispute that falls within the DARAB’s jurisdiction

ISSUE: WON DARAB has jurisdiction over the controversy.

HELD:
Yes. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with the primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform.

Through Executive Order 129-A, the President of the Philippines created the DARAB and authorized it to assume the powers and functions of the DAR
pertaining to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. I
In the present case, the fifth element of personal cultivation is clearly absent. Petitioner is thus correct in claiming that the relationship between the parties is not
one of tenancy or agricultural leasehold. Nevertheless, we believe that the present controversy still falls within the sphere of agrarian disputes. An agrarian
dispute "refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements -- whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise -- over lands devoted to
agriculture. The assailed Joint Production Agreement is a type of joint economic enterprise. Joint economic enterprises are partnerships or
arrangements entered into by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) land beneficiaries and investors to implement agribusiness enterprises in
agrarian reform areas. Jurisdiction over the present controversy lies with the DARAB. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED

10

Cubero, et. al. vs. Laguna West
Multipurpose Cooperative, G.R.
No. 166833
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Conchita Carpio-Morales
Cuba vs. Cuenco, G.R. 154490,
19 September 2006; compare with - The Court ruled that the dispute is agrarian in nature falling within the jurisdictional domain of the DARAB as this is in line with the doctrine of primary
Mendoza vs. Germino
Agra_Midterms
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Individual petitioners are the registered owners of various parcels of land covered by 12 TCTs. The properties cover a total land area of about 78,178 square
meters located in Barangay Suplang, Tanauan, Batangas.
In August 2003, each of the individual petitioners entered into a Joint Venture Development Agreement with co-petitioner Belle Corporation to develop the
properties as part of an agricultural farm lot subdivision project known as Plantation Hills at Tagaytay Greenlands Phase I (the Project) for eventual sale to the
public.
With the development of the Project in full swing in mid-2004, respondent Laguna West Cooperative filed 9 ex-parte petitions with the RTC of Tanauan City, for
inscription of an adverse claim, the annotation of which the Registrar of Deeds allegedly failed to carry over to the TCTs of individual petitioners under the
Property Registration Decree.
In its petitions before the RTC, respondent Laguna West Cooperative claimed that as early as April 1996 it entered into separate Joint Venture Agreements
(JVAs) with the herein individual petitioners predecessors-in-interest and that it registered the JVAs in August 2000 on the previous owners titles by way of an
adverse claim.
Getting wind of the petitions filed by Laguna West Cooperative, petitioners also filed a Complaint with the RTC of Tanauan for Annulment of JVAs against
herein respondents Laguna West Cooperative and Atty. Abraham Bermudez, as Registrar of Deeds of Tanauan.
Petitioners asserted that the April 1996 JVAs between Laguna West Cooperative and individual petitioners predecessors-in-interest are void ab initio since they
were executed within the 10-year prohibitory period under Republic Act No. 6657 (CARL OF 1988); that the JVAs fall under management contracts prohibited
under RA 6657.
Invoking Article 1409[13] of the Civil Code, petitioners urged the RTC to declare the JVAs inexistent and void for being contrary to law and public policy.
The RTC dismissed petitioners complaint, finding that [as] the JVAs cover or involve land grants under the PD 27 and allied agrarian reform laws, the
Department of Agrarian Reform, through its adjudication board (DARAB), has primary jurisdiction to determine the validity or invalidity thereof.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON DARAB has jurisdiction over the complaint?
Ruling: YES.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, with exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
The DARAB has been created to assume the adjudicative powers and functions of the DAR. Thus, the DARAB has been vested with jurisdiction to try and
decide all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Its jurisdiction encompasses cases involving the rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation
and use of all agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 and other agrarian laws.
The JVAs subject of the petition for annulment of petitioners precisely involve the development and utilization of the subject agricultural lands. As successors-
in-interest of the beneficiaries of the agricultural lands, individual petitioners seek to nullify the JVAs. Since the controversy involves the rights and obligations of
persons engaged in the management, cultivation and use of an agricultural land covered by CARP, the case falls squarely within the jurisdictional ambit of the
DAR.
CUBA vs. CUENCO (Ponente: AJ ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ)
jurisdiction which precludes the regular courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has been lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. That, the grant of a home lot to an agricultural tenant is further provided for in Section 24 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, which states that the agricultural lessee shall have the right to continue in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may have
upon the effectivity of this Code, which shall be considered as included in the leasehold. Significantly, it also held that tenants are entitled to a home lot as an
incident of their tenancy rights. Therefore, DARAB should take cognizance of the controversy.
MENDOZA vs GERMINO (Ponente: AJ ARTURO D. BRION)
- The Court ruled that DARAB has NO JURISDICTION over the disputes. The plaintiffs alleged in the amended complaint that the subject property was
previously tilled by Efren Bernardo, and the respondents took possession by strategy and stealth, without their knowledge and consent. In the absence of any
allegation of a tenancy relationship between the parties, the action was for recovery of possession of real property that was within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. That, the CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB decision. While the Court laments the lapse of time this forcible entry,
case has been pending resolution, it is not in a position to resolve the dispute between the parties since the evidence required in courts is different from that of
administrative agencies.
11

Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines et. al., vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.
R. No. 79310, July 14, 1989 (175
SCRA 343)
Agra_Midterms
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is
comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7
hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In
short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the
specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the
form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they
belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land
reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In
any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is
abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just
compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can
determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined
by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the
latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
12

Roxas vs. CA (G.R. No. 127876,
Dec. 17, 1999)
Agra_Midterms
G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999
ROXAS & CO., INC. vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:(1) Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway,
all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares inHacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area.
Hacienda Caylaway is 867.4571hectares in area. (2) Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary
offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under
compulsory acquisition by . . . DAR in accordance with the CARL.(3) Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, [Roxas & Co.], through its President, EduardoJ. Roxas,
sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly
authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying
for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.
ISSUE: Whether the Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all situated in Nasugbu, Batangas, are non-agricultural and outside the scope of
Republic Act No. 665
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that The DAR itself has issued administrative circulars governing lands which are outside of CARP and may not be
subjected to land reform. Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1996 declares in its policy statement what landholdings are outside the coverage
of CARP. The AO is explicit in providing that such non-covered properties shall be reconveyed to the original transferors or owners. T
These non-covered lands area.
a. Land, or portions thereof, found to be no longer suitable for agriculture and, therefore, could not be given appropriate valuation by the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP)
b. Those were a Conversion Order has already been issued by the DAR allowing the use of the landholding other than for agricultural purposes in accordance
with Section65 of R.A. No. 6657 and Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1994;
c. Property determined to be exempted from CARP coverage pursuant to Department of Justice Opinion Nos. 44 and 181; ord. Where a Presidential
Proclamation has been issued declaring the subject property for certain uses other than agricultural. In the present case, Proclamation 1520 dated November
20, 1975 is part of the law of the land. It declares the area in and around Nasugbu, Batangas, as a Tourist Zone. It has not been repealed, and has in fact been
used by DAR to justify conversion of othercontiguous and nearby properties of other parties. Furthermore, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, affirmed
by the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Batangas, expressly defines the property as tourist, not agricultural.The power to classify its territory is given by law to
the local governments.
https://vdocuments.site/roxas-vs-ca-56709263ecd49.html
13
 Agra_Midterms

IV. VARIATIONS ON LAND Hacienda Luisita Inc. vs. Facts:

ACQUISITION Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council, et. al., G.R. No. 171101, The SC en banc voted 11-0 dismissing the petition filed by HLI Affirm with modifications the resolutions of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC for
5 July 2011 brevity) revoking Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI for brevity) Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject land in HL under compulsory coverage of the
CARP of the government.

Thereafter, the SC voting 6-5 averred that there are operative facts that occurred in the premises. The SC thereat declared that the revocation of the SDP
shall, by application of the operative fact principle, give the 5296 qualified Farmworkers Beneficiaries (FWBs for brevity) to choose whether they want to remain
as HLI stockholders or choose actual land distribution. Considering the premises, DAR immediately scheduled a meeting regarding the effects of their choice
and therefrom proceeded to secret voting of their choice.

The parties, thereafter, filed their respective Motion for Reconsideration regarding the SC’s decision.

Issue:

1) Whether or not operative fact doctrine is applicable in the said case.

2) Whether or not Sec. 31 of R.A. 6657 unconstitutional.

3) Whether or not the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999, since Hacienda Luisita were placed
under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989, and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda
Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?

4) Whether or not qualified FWBs shall be entitled to the option of remaining as stockholder be reconsidered.

Ruling:

1) Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable to the instant case. The court ruled that the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional law but also to
decisions made by the president or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws, especially if the said decisions produced acts and
consequences that must be respected. That the implementation of PARC resolution approving SDP of HLI manifested such right and benefits favorable to the
FWBs;

2) The SC said that the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of R.A. 6657 is not the lis mota of the case and it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and did not rule
on the constitutionality of the law;

3) The SC ruled that it has not yet lapsed on May 10, 1999, and qualified FWBs are not allowed to sell their land interest in HL to third parties; That the start of
the counting of the prohibitive period shall be ten years from the issuance and registration of the Emancipation Patent (EP for brevity) or Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA for brevity), and considering that the EPs and CLOAs have not yet been issued, the prohibitive period has not started yet.

4) The SC ruled in the affirmative, giving qualified FWBs the option to remain as stockholder

YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified
FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the
HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will
never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying
the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided
by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by
the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

The SC PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al., The 6,296 original FWBs shall forfeit and relinquish their rights
over the HLI shares of stock issued to them in favor of HLI. The HLI Corporate Secretary shall cancel the shares issued to the said FWBs and transfer them to
HLI in the stocks and transfer book. The 4,206 non-qualified FWBs shall remain as stockholders of HLI.

14
 Agra_Midterms

V. RETENTION RIGHTS, Roman Catholic Archbishop of PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.:

EXEMPTIONS, Caceres vs. Sec. of Agrarian
EXCLUSIONS (LANDS NOT Reform, G.R. No. 139285, 21 FACTS:
COVERED BY LAND December 2007 Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines Sur planted with rice and corn, while the remaining hectares are planted with coconut
ACQUISITION) trees.
Archbishop filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office everal petitions for exemption of certain properties from the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27.2 Two of these petitions were denied by the Regional Director of DAR.
The matter was then raised to the CA via Petition for Review on Certiorari. Archbishop argued that even if the lands in question are registered in his name, he
holds the lands in trust for the benefit of his followers as cestui que trust, and that deeds of donation by which the lands were transferred to him imposed
numerous fiduciary obligations, such that he cannot sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber, or mortgage the subject lands. By this reasoning, Archbishop
concluded that he is not the "landowner" contemplated by PD 27 and Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, the CARL of 1988. He then prayed that the assailed orders
of the DAR be reversed, or in the alternative, that the alleged beneficiaries of the trust be each allowed to exercise rights of retention over the landholdings. The
petition was dismissed by the CA. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON Archbishop is not the “landowner” contemplated in the statutes, and thus exempts the lands from their coverage and the conditional donation
prohibiting the sale of the land exempts them from PD 27 and RA 6657.

HELD:
NO. The laws simply speak of the "landowner" without qualification as to under what title the land is held or what rights to the land the landowner may exercise.
There is no distinction made whether the landowner holds "naked title" only or can exercise all the rights of ownership. Archbishop would have us read deeper
into the law, to create exceptions that are not stated in PD 27 and RA 6657, and to do so would be to frustrate the revolutionary intent of the law, which is the
redistribution of agricultural land for the benefit of landless farmers and farmworkers. Nothing in either law supports Archbishop’s claim to more than one right of
retention on behalf of each cestui que trust. The provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657 are plain and require no further interpretation––there is only one right of
retention per landowner, and no multiple rights of retention can be held by a single party.
The twin process of expropriation under agrarian reform and the payment of just compensation is akin to a forced sale, which has been aptly described in
common law jurisdictions as "sale made under the process of the court and in the mode prescribed by law," and "which is not the voluntary act of the owner,
such as to satisfy a debt, whether of a mortgage, judgment, tax lien, etc." The term has not been precisely defined in this jurisdiction, but reference to the
phrase itself is made in Articles 223, 242, 237 and 243 of the Civil Code, which uniformly exempt the family home "from execution, forced sale, or attachment."
Yet a forced sale is clearly different from the sales described under Book V of the Civil Code which are conventional sales, as it does not arise from the
consensual agreement of the vendor and vendee, but by compulsion of law. Still, since law is recognized as one of the sources of obligation, there can be no
dispute on the efficacy of a forced sale, so long as it is authorized by law.13
Archbishop would claim exemption from the coverage of agrarian reform by stating that he is a mere administrator, but his position does not appear under the
list of exemptions under RA 6657. His claimed status as administrator does not create another class of lands exempt from the coverage of PD 27 or RA 6657,
and The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc.14 does not create another definition for the term "landowner."

15
 Agra_Midterms

Natalia Realty et. al. vs. DAR, G. PONENTE: BELLOSILLO, J.:

R. No. 103302, August 12, 1993
FACTS:
On 15 June 1988, R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988" (CARL, for brevity), went into effect. Respondent
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity), a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision. NATALIA immediately
registered its objection to the notice of Coverage.
NATALIA and EDIC both impute grave abuse of discretion to respondent DAR for including underdeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the
coverage of the CARL. They argue that NATALIA properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in the areas reserved by
presidential fiat Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 which set aside hectares of land located in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as
townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. for the townsite reservation.

ISSUE: WON lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its
precursor agencies1 prior to 15 June 1988, covered by R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988

HELD: NO. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." 16 The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are
only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands."
These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to
the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural
Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, 18 DAR itself defined "agricultural land" thus —
. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.

16
 Agra_Midterms

Luz Farms vs. Sec. of Agrarian Ponente: Justice Ricardo M. Paras, Jr.
Reform, G.R. No. 868889, FACTS:
December 4, 1990 Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business. It questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as
they are made to apply to it:

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 —

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as
compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or
entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.

In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other
farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ."

ISSUE: W/N CARL should include the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage

RULING:
NO. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of
the Government.

Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent
(5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers.

Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or
consideration in productivity in this industry.

Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and
poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to
distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for
being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process

17

Department of Agrarian Reform
vs. Delia T. Sulton, et. al., G.R.
No. 162070, October 19, 2005
Agra_Midterms
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, petitioner, vs. DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T. SUTTON, respondents.
G.R. No. 162070 | October 19, 2005 | Puno, J.
FACTS
Respondents inherited a land in Aroroy, Masbate, which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. Pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents
made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect, which included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
An en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR, ruled that land devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land.
In view of the Luz Farm ruling, respondent filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage
of the CARL. Petitioner ignored their request.
DAR issue A.O No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portion of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the
coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded the A.O fixed the following retention limits, viz 1:1 animal-land ratio and the ration of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure
for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operation of the CARL.
Then DAR Secretary Garilao issue an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL applying the retention limit outlined in the DAR A.O No. 9.
Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents’ landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
In October 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993,
void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government.
ISSUE
Whether or not DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising, is unconstitutional
RULING - YES
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to
them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and
regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review. They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no
grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The
rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative
agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their
regulations.
In the case at bar, SC found that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of “agriculture” or
“agricultural activity.” The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity.
Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
Respondents’ family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the
Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the
enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-
agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the
other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881 which amended certain
provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms “agricultural activity” and “commercial farming” by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.
18

Milestone Farms, Inc., vs. Office Milestone Farms vs Office of the President - Sorry mahaba talaga!
of the President, G.R. No.
182332
NACHURA, J.:
Antonio Eduardo Nachura
Agra_Midterms
FACTS:
- Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are 1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; 2) to breed, raise, and sell
poultry; and 3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock
- June 10, 1988, CARL took effect
- May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.
- December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of 1993, setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock,
poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage.
- Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO.
- DAR’s Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) conducted an ocular inspection on petitioner’s property and recommended the exemption of
petitioner’s 316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP.
- DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCEC’s recommendation
- The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug. Hence,
they filed an appeal with DAR Secretary
Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the MCTC.
MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone
RTC reversed the decision of MCTC
CA ruled in favor of Milestone
- DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug,
and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.
- Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director Dalugdug but when the farmers filed a motion for reconsideration, Office of the President
reinstated the decision of Director Garilao.
- CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from the coverage of CARP. However, six months earlier, without the knowledge of
the CA – as the parties did not inform the appellate court – then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR conversion order granting petitioner’s application to convert
portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The portions converted was with a total area of 153.3049
hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the controversy was effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.
- With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villa’s Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that the property subject of the
controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. - CA, in its amended decision, states that the subject landholding from the coverage of
CARP is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby declared covered by the CARP.
ISSUE: Whether or not Milestone’s property should be exempted from the coverage of CARP
HELD:
No. When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or
gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full force and effect.
As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial pieces of
evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising.
19
 Agra_Midterms

Central Mindanao University vs. Facts:

DARAB (215 SCRA 85, 1992) vis On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 467 reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, now the CMU, a piece of land to
a vis be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU embarked on a project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein parcels of land were leased to its faculty members
and employees. Under the terms of the program, CMU will assist faculty members and employee groups through the extension of technical know-how, training
CAMPOS, JR., J.: and other kinds of assistance. In turn, they paid the CMU a service fee for use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided that there will be no tenancy
relationship between the lessees and the CMU.
Jose C. Campos, Jr. When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status as tenants under the CARP. In
its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the segregation of 400 hectares of the land for distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage on
the basis of DAR's determination that the lands do not meet the condition for exemption, that is, it is not "actually, directly, and exclusively used" for educational
purposes.

Issue & Held:

- Whether or not the complainants are tenants of CMU, hence, beneficiaries of CARP
Court: We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to
the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and
the faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU
collected was a nominal service fee and land use participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by the CMU. Again, the
agreement signed by the participants under the CMU-IEP clearly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed, and that the participants are not share
croppers nor lessees, and the CMU did not share in the produce of the participants' labor.
Obrique is not a landless peasant. The facts showed he was Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible position was separated from the service on
account of certain irregularities he committed while Assistant Director of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the moment, own
no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the record to show that they are
landless peasants.
In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.
The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) was leased long before the CARP was passed. The
agreement with the Philippine Packing Corporation was not a lease but a Management and Development Agreement, a joint undertaking where use by the
Philippine Packing Corporation of the land was part of the CMU research program, with the direct participation of faculty and students. Said projects were
directly connected to the purpose and objectives of the CMU as an educational institution.

- Whether or not CMU is subject to CARP

Court: It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is
not covered by the CARP because:
1. It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
2. The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress;
3. It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU;
4. It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
school site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production
centers

- Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP
Court: DARAB has no jurisdiction. Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters
involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of the
aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes,
school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc
In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants are not share tenants or lease holders of the CMU, yet it ordered the "segregation of a suitable
compact and contiguous area of Four Hundred hectares, more or less", from the CMU land reservation, and directed the DAR Regional Director to implement
its order of segregation. Having found that the complainants in this agrarian dispute for Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to claim as beneficiaries
of the CARP because they are not share tenants or leaseholders, its order for the segregation of 400 hectares of the CMU land was without legal authority.

20

Department of Agrarian Reform
vs. Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), G.R.
No. 158228, March 23, 2004
Agra_Midterms
FACTS:
Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D which were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS (formerly Bureau of Education).
Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in the name of respondent DECS .Respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10
agricultural crop years, commencing from 1984-1994. The contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10agricultural crop years or until 2005. On
June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante. After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piñosa,
sent a "Notice of Coverage" to respondent DECS, stating that the subject lands are now covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with
the farmer beneficiaries. The recommendation for coverage was approved by DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres approved the r, the dispositive
portion of which reads: Respondent DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director.
Respondent DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant
petition for review.
ISSUE:
WON the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657,otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998
(CARL).
HELD:
No While respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural
Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs and renovations of schools in the nearby locality, the
court is inclined with the petitioner’s argument that the lands subject hereof are not
exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to
Anglo Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived therefrom, that must be actually, directly
and exclusively used for educational purposes. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as
well as the purposes of their exemption specifying those “lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school
sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes…,shall be exempt from the coverage
of this Act.”
Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage:
1) the land must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary; "and
2) the purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes."
21
 Agra_Midterms

Province of Camarines Sur vs. Facts:

CA, 222 SCRA 173 (1993) This is an appeal for certiorari on the decision on the issue on whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGU is subject to prior approval of the DAR.

December 1988, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of CamSur authorized the provincial governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial
capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.

Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin. Upon motion for the
issuance of writ or possession, San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing.

San Joaquins later moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The court denied the motion to dismiss
and authorized the province to take possession of the properties.

San Joaquins filed for motion for relief, but denied as well. In their petition. Asked by the CA, Solicitor General stated that there is no need for the approval of
the president for the province to expropriate properties, however, the approval of the DAR is needed to convert the property from agricultural to non-agricultural
(housing purpose).

CA set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession and expropriation of the property until th province has acquired the approval of DAR.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGU is subject to prior approval of the DAR

Ruling:
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the
authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the
expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or
tenant beneficiaries.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads,
bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these
projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation
is for a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public,
the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has
no real or substantial relation to the public use.

22
 Agra_Midterms

Samahan ng Magsasaka sa San SAMAHAN NG MAGSASAKA SA SAN JOSEP, represented by DOMINADOR MAGLALANG, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA VALISNO, et. al.
Josep vs. Valisno, et. al., G.R. No.
Ponente: Justice Consuelo Ynares Santiago
158314, 03 June 2004
FACTS:
The original 57-hectare property, situated in La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, was formerly registered in the name of Dr. Nicolas Valisno, Sr. under Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-38406. Before
the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 27, the land was the subject of a judicial ejectment suit, whereby in 1971, the Valisnos tenants were ejected from the property. Among these tenants was
Dominador Maglalang, who represents the SMSJ in the instant proceedings.

Meanwhile, on October 20 and 21, 1972, Dr. Valisno mortgaged 12 hectares of his property to Renato and Angelito Banting.Thereafter, the property was subdivided into ten lots and on November 8,
1972, individual titles were issued in the name of the eight children of Nicolas, Angelito Banting, and Renato Banting.

After the mortgage on the 12 hectare portion was foreclosed and the property sold at public auction, four grandchildren of Dr. Nicolas Valisno, namely: Maria Cristina F. Valisno, daughter of Romulo D.
Valisno; and Leonora Valisno Yujuico, Benedicto Valisno Yujuico and Gregorio Valisno Yujuico, children of Marietta Valisno redeemed the same from the mortgagees.[5] At the time of the redemption,
Maria Cristina, Leonora and Gregorio were all minors; only Benedicto was of legal age, being then 26 years old. The redemption was made on October 25, 1973, but the titles to the land were not
transferred to the redemptioners until November 26, 1998.

Subsequently, the entire 57-hectare property became the subject of expropriation proceedings before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). In 1994, Dominador Maglalang, in behalf of the
SMSP, filed a petition for coverage of the subject landholding under the CARL, which petition was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Office of the Regional Director issued an Order dated January 2, 1996, declaring the Valisno property exempt from the coverage of PD 27 and RA 6657.[11] This was reversed by then
Secretary Garilao, who held that the property is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, subject to the retention rights of the heirs of Nicolas, Sr. The Valisno heirs filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said order, but the same was denied.

On September 25, 1997, the Valisno heirs filed a Consolidated Application for Retention and Award under RA 6657. The SMSJ, through Dominador Maglalang, opposed the Consolidated Application
for Retention, specifically objecting to the award in favor of the Grandchildren-Awardees because they are not actually tilling nor directly managing the land in question as required by law.

In November 1999, Regional Director Renato F. Herrera issued an Order GRANTING the application for retention of the heirs of Dr. Nicolas Valisno, Sr.; placing the excess of 19.0 hectares, more or
less, under RA 6657 and acquiring the same thru Compulsory Acquisition for distribution to qualified farmer-beneficiaries taking into consideration the basic qualifications set forth by law; DENYING
the request for the award to children of the applicants for utter lack of merit; and DIRECTING the applicants-heirs to cause the segregation and survey of the retained area at their own expense and to
submit within thirty (30) days the final approved survey plan to this Office.

On appeal, the DAR Secretary affirmed the Order of the Regional Director with the following relevant ratiocination: (A) appellants faulted the Regional Director for not giving due consideration to the
two (2) mortgages constituted by the original owner over a portion of his landholding in 1972 and redeemed by the latters grandchildren in 1973, when the 12-hectare land subject of the mortgages
were ordered to be distributed to CARP beneficiaries, and (B) The alleged redemption of the mortgaged property by the four (4) grandchildren of Nicolas Valisno, Sr., namely Ma. Cristina, Leonora,
Gregorio and Benedicto, is not likewise worthy of any credence. The mortgaged property was allegedly redeemed on October 25, 1973. From the evidence on record, three (3) of the alleged
redemptioners represented to be of legal age in the Discharge of Mortgage were still minors, hence, without any legal capacity at the time the redemption was made.

Respondent heirs filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals and the appellate court reversed the reversed the Orders of the DAR Secretary. Petitioners filed a partial motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
- Whether or not the grandchildren of the late Dr. Nicolas Valisno Sr. are entitled to retention rights as landowners under CARL

HELD:

YES. The Court held that each of the four Redemptioner-Grandchildren is thus entitled to retain a parcel of land with a ceiling of five hectares, for a total of 20 hectares. The parcels of land in question
total only 12 hectares, or only three hectares each, which is well within the statutory retention limits. That, as owners in their own right of the questioned properties, Redemptioner-Grandchildren
enjoyed the right of retention granted to all landowners. This right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of
compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.
A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to leave the landowners dominion, thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the
landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process.

The retention rights of landowners are provided in Sec. 6 of RA 6657, which reads in relevant part:

SECTION 6. Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according
to factors governing a viable family-size, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder,
but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose land have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be
allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, Provided further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner. Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is
tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant
chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another
agricultural land, he loses his right as a lease-holder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests
his choice of the area for retention.

This section defines the nature and incidents of a landowners right of retention. For as long as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and it does not exceed the retention ceiling of five
hectares, a landowners choice of the area to be retained must prevail.

Wherefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the CA.

23

VI. LAND VALUATION Association of Small Landowners
vs. DAR
Agra_Midterms
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and
the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined
by the court, as the just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with
guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just
compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is
not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps
local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention
limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of
the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole
territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present
generation of Filipinos.
24
 Agra_Midterms

Land Bank vs. Natividad, G.R. No. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando,
127198, May 16, 2005 Pampanga, and JOSE R. CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE T. BARTOLOME and VICTORIO MANGALINDAN, respondents.
TINGA, J.:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005]

FACTS:
On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in
Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and
Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the registered tenants of the land. The judgment is rendered in favor
of petitioners and against respondents.

Land Bank presented several issues such as procedural, private respondents alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the question of just
compensation.

ISSUE: WON coourts have jurisdiction in determining just compensation.

HELD: YES.
Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with
the trial court.
The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land
valuation summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter,
however, was left unanswered prompting private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court.

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation
for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation
cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.

Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.
Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just
compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the
President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals,[21] we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but
would take effect on the payment of just compensation.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to
be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657)[22] before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect,
conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche

It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to
determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27
or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their
property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessors value and the volume and value of its produce.
This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by,
RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

25

Lubrica vs. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 170220,
November 20, 2006
Agra_Midterms
JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAY TAEDO and EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioners, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 170220 | November 20, 2006 | YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 27, 2005 Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530, which vacated its May 26,
2004 Decision affirming (a) the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court, in Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, dated
March 31, 2003 directing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD); (b) the May
26, 2003 Resolution denying LBPs motion for reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to comply with the March
31, 2003 Order.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326) of the Registry of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed
under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972) and Executive Order No. 228 (1987). The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.
On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro
covered by TCT No. T-128 of the Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or
a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at P1,512,575.05.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for determination of just
compensation. On January 29, 2003, the PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation at P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares
(TCT No. T-128).
Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17, 2003, two separate petitions for judicial determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
acting as a Special Agrarian Court, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT No. T-128, and raffled to Branch 46 thereof.
Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary Valuation Under Section 16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (1988) and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that LBP deposit
the preliminary compensation determined by the PARAD.
On March 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order granting petitioners motion, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land Compensation Department I (LCD I), Land Bank of the Philippines, is hereby ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 in relation to Section
2, Administrative Order No. 8, Series of 1991, to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the PARAD in cash and bonds, as follows:
1. In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P 51,800,286.43, minus the amount received by the Landowner;
2. In Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P 21,608,215.28, less the amount of P 1,512,575.16, the amount already deposited.
Such deposit must be made with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Manila within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this order and to notify this court of her compliance within such period.
Let this order be served by the Sheriff of this Court at the expense of the movants.
SO ORDERED.
LBPs motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated May 26, 2003. The following day, May 27, 2003, the trial court issued an Order directing Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land
Compensation Department Manager, to deposit the amounts.
Thus, on June 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77530.
On June 27, 2003, the appellate court issued a 60-day temporary restraining order and on October 6, 2003, a writ of preliminary injunction.
On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Order dated March 31, 2003, Resolution
dated May 26, 2003, and Order dated May 27, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. The preliminary injunction We previously issued is hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered LBP to deposit the amounts provisionally determined by the PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to make a deposit pending
the fixing of the final amount of just compensation. It also noted that there is no reason for LBP to further delay the deposit considering that the DAR already took possession of the properties and
distributed the same to farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.
LBP moved for reconsideration which was granted. On October 27, 2005, the appellate court rendered the assailed Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a different formula in the case of Gabatin which We hold as cogent and compelling justification necessitating Us to effect the reversal of Our judgment herein
sought to be reconsidered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED, and Our May 26, 2004 Decision is hereby VACATED and ABANDONED with the end in view of giving way to and
acting in harmony and in congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the case of Gabatin. Accordingly, the assailed rulings of the Special Agrarian Court is (sic) commanded to compute and fix the just
compensation for the expropriated agricultural lands strictly in accordance with the mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our May 26, 2004 judgment in the case of Gabatin.
SO ORDERED.
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the immediate deposit of the preliminary value of the expropriated properties is improper because it was erroneously computed. Citing Gabatin
v. Land Bank of the Philippines, it held that the formula to compute the just compensation should be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross Production x Government Support Price. Specifically, it held
that the value of the government support price for the corresponding agricultural produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the legal taking of the subject agricultural land, that is, on
October 21, 1972 when landowners were effectively deprived of ownership over their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27. According to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts of
P500 and P300 which are the prevailing government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at the time of payment, instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price at the time
of the taking in 1972.
26
 Agra_Midterms

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

A. THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LATEST DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R. NO. 127198, PROM. MAY 16, 2005; and

B. THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, DECIDING
ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.

Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated properties at the time of payment. Respondent LBP, on the other hand, claims that the
value of the realties should be computed as of October 21, 1972 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.

The petition is impressed with merit.

In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, the Court ruled thus:

Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of
the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the
landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.

The Natividad case reiterated the Courts ruling in Office of the President v. Court of Appeals that the expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21,
1972 but seizure would take effect on the payment of just compensation judicially determined.

Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, we held that expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act
on June 15, 1988, but on the payment of just compensation.

In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the just compensation therefor. The parcels of land were already subdivided and distributed to the
farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately depriving petitioners of their use. Under the circumstances, it would be highly inequitable on the part of the petitioners to compute the just compensation using
the values at the time of the taking in 1972, and not at the time of the payment, considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land although ownership
thereof have not yet been transferred in their names. Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can
be taken away from its owners. The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by
the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.

Our ruling in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform is instructive, thus:

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized
farm except that no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative. It was understood,
however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. x x x

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.

We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the instant case was initiated under P.D. No. 27 but the agrarian reform process is still incomplete considering that the just compensation to be paid
to petitioners has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the
said law. Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having only suppletory effect.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that:

RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless. And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act
should be adhered to.

Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be finally
determined by the court as the just compensation for the land. In determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers
and the farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.

Corollarily, we held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada that the above provision was converted into a formula by the DAR through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to wit:

Land Value (LV) = (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x 0.3) + (Market Value per Tax Declaration x 0.1)

Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet received just compensation. Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based
on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in
accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming (a) the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit
the just compensation provisionally determined by the PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita V.
Tengco, respondents Land Compensation Department Manager to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46,
acting as Special Agrarian Court is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, and to compute the final valuation of the subject properties based on the
aforementioned formula.

SO ORDERED.

27

Land Bank vs. CA and Pedro Yap PONENTE: FRANCISCO, R., J.:
(G.R. No. 118712, October 6,
1995)
Agra_Midterms
FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in the names of
farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with a certification of the Landbank and amounts have been earmarked for
Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of and issued in without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA
6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank.
Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land registered in the name of the late Emiliano
F. Santiago; that without notice to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking to pay rentals to the
LandBank for the use of their farm lots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest; that DAR Regional Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay
the landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund, the Landbank reserved in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago, the beneficiaries stopped
paying rentals to the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the LandBank
Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges — with respect to its properties which consist two parcels of
land; that a summary administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the property was conducted by the DARAB without notice to the landowner; that
a decision was rendered fixing the compensation for the parcel of land and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for said amount in the
name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account With respect to petitioner AMADCOR's another property in it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR that
emancipation patents were issued but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for said land, a trust account in the name of
AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83', three notices of acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR.
ISSUES:
1. WON DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, should be declared null and void, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of
deposit in cash or in bonds be declared void
2. WON private respondents were correct in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of
the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation.
HELD:
1. YES. It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the
deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made
express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity
in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit".
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands —
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of
the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . .
(emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of
the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
2. NO. The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation
under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for
their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such
properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But
petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the
"Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must rectify.
. . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to
the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
28

Estribillo vs. DAR and Hacienda
Maria, Inc., G.R. No. 159674,
June 30, 2006
VIII. RESOLUTION OF
AGRARIAN DISPUTES
Agra_Midterms
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Estribillo v DAR
Facts:
Private respondent Hacienda Maria Inc. requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under Agrarian
Reform Program. In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the
entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons. In December 1997, HMI filed with RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of
erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either
rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. RARAD rendered a decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs
awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and
petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB which affirmed the RARAD Decision. On appeal to the CA, the same was dismissed. Petitioners contended that
the EPs became indefeasible after the expiration of one year from their registration.
Issue:
Whether or not EPs have become indefeasible one year after their issuance
Held:
After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree where the DAR
is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27, the TCTs
issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. Lands covered by such title may no
longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person.
29