In the case of PEOPLE vs.

IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, the Court strongly supports the

campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our
law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it
cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the
liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in
the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.

In the case of Peolple v Dela Cruz, the court held that given the flagrant procedural
lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary
gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the
performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof.
The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers
deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act
is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise.
Ombudsman vs. andutan jurisdiction over retired personnel

G.R. No. 109638 March 31, 1995

PNP SUPT. FLORENCIO D. FIANZA, petitioner,

vs.
THE PLEB (PEOPLE' S LAW ENFORCEMENT BOARD) of the CITY OF BAGUIO; the NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
(NAPOLCOM), SPO3 FERNANDO TAFALENG, PO3 OCTAVIO PAWINGI, PO2 FERDINAND SEGUNDO, PO3 METODIO AQUINO, PO3
BENJAMIN NAKIGO, PO3 SALVADOR GALISTE, PO3 ROMEO BAUTISTA and PO3 ALFREDO MATIAS, respondents.

G.R. No. 109639 March 31, 1995

PNP SUPT. JULY CORDOVIZ, petitioner,

vs.
The PLEB (PEOPLE'S LAW ENFORCEMENT BOARD) of the CITY OF BAGUIO, the NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM)
and PAT. RAY EKID respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for prohibition and declaratory relief with a prayer for temporary restraining order involving the issue of
whether the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) has jurisdiction over complaints filed by PNP personnel against their superiors.

a person claiming right to position in the civil service must institute the
proper proceedings to assert his right within the period of one year from the date of
separation, otherwise he will be considered as having abandoned his office, or even
acquiesced or consented to his removal, and, therefore, not entitled to bring action
for reinstatement (G.R. No. L-13523 May 31, 1960, ANICETO MADRID,
Petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL and/or THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents)
 The Supreme Court held in the landmark case of People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
(1943) and along its plethora of decisions, that policeman in the performance of duty is
justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the
offender., overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes,
and protect himself from bodily harm. In case injury or death results from the
policeman’s exercise of such force, the policeman could be justified in inflicting the
injury or causing the death of the offender if the policeman had used necessary force.
Since a policeman’s duty requires him to overcome the offender, the force exerted by
the policeman may therefore differ from that which ordinarily may be offered in self-
defense.

As held also in the case of Salma vs. Miro, 512 SCRA 724 which held that
where a person to be arrested offered resistance against the arresting officers
compelling the latter to use reasonable force, any resulting ridicule or injury upon the
former is merely an incidental consequence which is not actionable.

DUE PROCESS

Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity
to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Unarguably, this rule, as it is stated, strips down administrative due process to its most
fundamental nature and sufficiently justifies freeing administrative proceedings from the
rigidity of procedural requirements. In particular, however, due process in
administrative proceedings has also been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect
a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend
one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to
afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or
made known to the parties affected.

Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not

strictly bound by procedural requirements, they are still bound by law and equity to
observe the fundamental requirements of due process. Notice to enable the other party
to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any
administrative or judicial proceedings. In the application of the principle of due process,
what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the
opportunity to be heard.

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional

rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded
at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. The rule must
be equally true for quasi-judicial administrative bodies, for the constitutional guarantee
that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is
unqualified by what type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) he stands
to lose the same.
 We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Stayfast Philippines Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 81480, February
9, 1993, 218 SCRA 596; Villareal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97505, March
1, 1993, 219 SCRA 293; Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. vs. Torres, G.R.
No. 98050, March 17, 1994, 231 SCRA 335.

And any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. Abalos vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 95861, April 19,
1991, 196 SCRA 81; PNOC-Energy Development Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
79182, September 11, 1991, 201 SCRA 487.

A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. Stayfast Philippines
Corp. vs. NLRC, supra, citing Llora Motors, Inc.vs. Drilon, 179 SCRA 175.

What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing. There is no denial
that the essence of due process was sufficiently complied with in the present case.

BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 12, (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

“Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right, to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of a counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of a counsel.”

The Supreme Court ruled:

“The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating officer starts to ask
questions to illicit information on the crime from the suspected offender. It is at this
point that the law requires the assistance of a counsel to avoid the pernicious practice
of extorting forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the person undergoing
interrogation. In other words, the moment there is a move or even an urge of said
investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may
appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there
be assisted by counsel unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in
writing and in the presence of counsel.” (Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642, 648,
651[1988])

CONFESSIONS/ADMISSIONS

When made without bias or improper influence, confessions are admissible in

evidence as the highest and most satisfactory proof because it is fairly presumed that
no man would make such a confession against himself if the facts confessed were not
true. But they are excluded if unfairly obtained.
 Confessions should be received with great caution, as they are liable to many
objections. There is danger of error from the misapprehension of witnesses, misuse of
words, failure of a party to express his own meaning, a prisoner being oppressed by his
unfortunate situation and influenced by hope, fear and sometimes a worse motive, to
make an untrue confession.

A confession must be made: Voluntarily; By the party himself; To another person.

1. It must be voluntary. A confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope or
the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape, when it is to be considered as
evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it. This is the principle, but what
amounts to a promise or a threat is not so easily defined. A confession will be
considered as voluntarily made, although it was made after a promise of favor or threat
of punishment, by a person not in authority over the prisoner. If, however, a person
having such authority over him be present at the time and he express no dissent,
evidence of such confession cannot be given.

2. The confession must be made by the party to be affected by it. It is evidence only
against him. In case of a conspiracy, the acts of one conspirator are the acts of all
while active in the progress of the conspiracy, but after it is over, the confession of one
as to the part he and others took in the crime is not evidence against any but himself.

3. The confession must be to another person. It may be made to a private individual or

under examination before a magistrate. The whole of the confession must be taken,
together with whatever conversation took place at the time of the confession.

Confession is also when a prisoner being arraigned for an offence confesses or

admits the crime with which he is charged, whereupon the plea of guilty is entered.

Confessions are classed into judicial and extra judicial. Judicial confessions are
those made before a magistrate or in court in the due course of legal proceedings;
when made freely by the party with a full and perfect knowledge of their nature and
consequences, they are sufficient to found a conviction. These confessions are such as
are authorized by a statute, as to take a preliminary examination in writing; or they are
by putting in the plea of guilty to an indictment. Extra judicial confessions are those
which are made by the party elsewhere than before a magistrate or in open court.

Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or
those allowed by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise
by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt (Rules of
Court, Rule 130, Section 27). Under the circumstances obtaining, appellant’s plea
for forgiveness should be received as an implied admission of guilt.

The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt freely,
voluntarily and with full knowledge and understanding of the precise nature of the
crime charged in the information as well as the consequences of his plea. People v.
Formentera, No. L-30892, 29 June 1984, 130 SCRA 114

It is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It

forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no
alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. People v.
Balicasan, No. L-26376, 31 August 1966, 17 SCRA 1119; People v. Ng Pek, 81
Phil. 563 (1948). Thus, under the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may
receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed. Rule 116,
Sec. 4.

BURDEN OF PROOF (ONUS PROBANDI)

“xxx when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by
presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in the
Information, or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of
evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in
order to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, that prima facie evidence.” ( PP vs.
Villanueva, 506 SCRA 280)

Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of Court Burden of Proof means the Duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim by the
amount of evidence required by law. This is also known as the Onus Probandi.

He who alleges must prove. Well-settled is the rule that allegations do not prove
themselves unless substantiated. Thus, respondent-movant’s allegation has no
probative value since there is no evidence other than his self-serving allegation to
exempt administrative liability under circumstances.

Although plaintiff’s causes of actions are couched in the strongest terms and
most persuasive language, the allegations are of no consequence unless they are
substantiated. Similarly, in criminal cases, the offense and the aggravating
circumstances charged in an Information remain just accusations until they are shown
to be true by the presentation of evidence. Defendant is not relieved from liability
simply because the raises a defenses.

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to
overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence
required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on the strength of its own evidence
and must not rely on the weakness of the defense People v. Suan, G.R. No.
184546, February 22, 2010, p. 14. And if the prosecution fails to meet its burden of
proof, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In such
cases the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be
acquitted. People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 177222, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA
273, 286-287.

“all things are presumed to have been done regularly and with due formality
until the contrary is proved” (Omniapraesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta
donec probetur in contrarium).

RETIREMENT

BENEFIT CLAIMS

“The directive to deliver one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefits to private

respondent makes the default judgment doubtly illegal because retirement benefits
have been adjudged as gratuities or reward for lengthy and faithful service of the
recipient and should be treated as separate property of the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the
monetary benefits are given gratis by the government because of previous work (like
the retirement pay of a provincial auditor in Mendoza vs. Dizon, L-387, October 25,
1956) or that of a Justice of the Peace (Elcar vs. Eclar, CA-40 O.G. 12th Supp. No.
18, p. 86), this is a gratuity and should be considered separate property (Art. 148, Civil
Code).”

In Pirovino vs La Rama Steamship Co., 96 Phil 335, the Supreme Court

stated that: “Retirement gratuity is a mere bounty given by the government in
consideration or in recognition of meritorious services and springs from appreciation
and graciousness of the government.” It is also enunciated in Peralta vs Auditor
General, 100 Phil 105, that “it is paid to the beneficiary for post services rendered
purely out of generosity of the giver or grantor.”

Clearly, the benefits are personal to the retiree and thus, in the
absence of any authority by him in favor of another person and during his
lifetime, only he is entitled to receive the same from the PNP.

The moral and civil obligation of SPO2 Valdez to give support to his legitimate
family is also personal to him, the performance of which the PNP is a third party or not
a party interest. If he refuses to perform with what is incumbent upon him, the remedy
of the complainant is to file a civil action, a special proceeding for support pendente lite
pursuant to Article 203 of the Family Code and to Rule 61, Revised Rules of Court. Still,
the best remedy is for the complainant and the respondent to amicably settle the issue
by themselves.

Their agreement dated August 25, 2005, administered at the Office of the WCCD,
ODIDM is of no moment as the same contravenes the very essence of the purpose of
retirement benefits which is to “help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life,
lessening the burden of worrying for his financial support” (Aquino vs NLRC, 206
SCRA 118).

WITH PENDING INVEST/ADMIN/CRIM

PENDING PROSECUTION

Pursuant to Section 12 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, “no public
officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending prosecution against him, for any offense under
this Act or under the provision of the revised Penal Code on Bribery.” This is
also the tenor of Section 8, Rule XVIII of the CSC Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of EO 292, which prescribes that employees under administrative investigation are not
allowed to resign.

NAPOLCOM Circular 93-012: issued allowing members of the PNP who has
pending criminal and/or administrative case to resign or retire subject to the following
conditions, to wit:
i. That such resignation or retirement, as the case maybe, shall be without
prejudice to the continuation of the criminal/administrative proceedings against him x x
x.
ii. The payment of all benefits due to retiring/resigning PNP officer shall be
withheld until final disposition of the case.

PUBLIC OFFICE
 REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

NAPOLCOM MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR 2007-001 defines neglect of duty as follows:

“Section 1. Neglect of Duty is the omission or refusal, without sufficient excuse, to

perform an act or duty, which it was the officers’ legal obligation to perform; it implies
a duty as well as its breach and the fact can never be found in the absence of duty.”

Rule 21 Sec1 subparagraph 2 NAPOLCOM MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR 2007-001

so provides:

Irregularities in the Performance of Duty or Misfeasance- is the improper

performance of some act which might lawfully be done.

“Public Office is a Public trust. Public Officers and Employees must all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.”

Public office is a public trust. A public officer or employee does not merely have
an obligation to obey and respect the law; it is his sworn duty to do so. Assumption of
public office is impressed with the paramount public interest that requires the highest
standards of ethical conduct. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty,
candor and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. This ideal
standard ensures that only those of known probity, competence and integrity are called
to the challenge of public service.

Section 1, Article XI
1987 Constitution

The image of the PNP is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or

otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat. As such, it becomes the sacred
duty of each and every one in the PNP organization to maintain its good name and
standing as the premier law enforcement agency (Legal Opinion, Re: PO2 Ramin
Vasquez, July 10, 2002).

“The essence of the fulfillment of duty of police officers, who are the frontliners
in the implementation of peace and order, consists in taking the risk involving their very
existence- the safety of helpless citizens cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the police,
otherwise, we would only have cowards in our law enforcement agencies” People vs
Salimbago, 314 SCRA 282.

“The accused allegation of the irregularity, maltreatment and torture has not
been proven, ergo, the investigation is presumed to have performed their duties
regularly and in good faith.” (People vs. Arapok, G.R. No. 134974, Oct. 8, 2000;
People vs. Mataro, G.R. No. 1300378, March 8, 2001)

Omniapraesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium.

All things are presumed to have been done regularly and with due formality until the
contrary is proved.

Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and satisfactory if
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence. The presumption, however, is not
absolute (Eulogio vs. Sps. Apeles, G.R. No. 167884, 20 January 2009). To
overcome this presumption, clear and convincing evidence to the contrary must be
presented (BPI vs. Sps. Evangelista, et al., G.R. No. 146553, 27 November
2002). Section 1 thereof states that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law. In contesting the regularity of an official act, it is
the one challenging the regularity who has the burden of proof to prove otherwise.

It is a self-evident fact that officers are duty bound to uphold the law. The
imperative of ensuring the smooth functioning of the government machinery grounds
the evidentiary presumption that public officers have performed their duties regularly.
True, this presumption is not conclusive, but it is also not meaningless. It takes more
than a bare tale of an individual to overcome it. To accept as presumption-overcoming
dubious tales purveyed by someone contesting the regularity is to leave the smooth
functioning of our government to the mercy of the fertile imagination of litigants, free
to concoct all sorts of devious plots and attribute them to unnamed civil servants. “The
Supreme Court thus, could not imagine a more insidious way to slowly paralyze state
apparatuses of governance” (Hon. Miro vs. Dosono, G.R. No. 170697, 30 April
2010).

A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the

context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or
duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies
when nothing in the record suggests that the officers deviated from the standard
conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face,
the presumption cannot arise (People vs. Kamad,G.R. No. 174198, 19 January
2010).

The failure to observe the proper procedure negates the operation of the
presumption. When the performance of duties is tainted with failure to comply with the
procedure and guidelines prescribed, the presumption is effectively destroyed (People
vs. Kamad,G.R. No. 174198, 19 January 2010). It was never intended that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty will be applied even in
cases where there is no showing of substantial compliance with the requirements of the
rules of procedure. Under this circumstance, the party assailing the regularity is no
longer duty-bound to adduce further evidence to overcome the presumption, which no
longer holds (BPI vs. Sps. Evangelista, et al., G.R. No. 146553, 27 November
2002). The presumption cannot be made to apply to a case where the regularity in the
execution of official act is challenged and where its prima facie validity was overthrown
by highly questionable circumstances under which it was supposedly executed, as well
as the testimonies of witnesses (Lazaro,et al. vs. Agustin, et al., G.R. No. 152364,
15 April 2010).

The presumption of regularity may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong

and convincing as to exclude all controversy. Absent such, the presumption must be
upheld. The burden of proof to overcome the presumption lies on the one contesting
the same (Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc., G.R. No. 125283, 10 February
2006).

CONDUCT UNBECOMING
 Webster defines "unbecoming" conduct as "improper" performance. Such term
"applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of
ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary, 1971 at 426, 964.

“Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer refers to any behavior or action of a

PNP member irrespective of rank, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or
otherwise disgracing himself as a PNP member, seriously compromised his character
and standing as a gentleman in such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt
state of moral character; it may also refer to acts or behavior of any PNP member in an
unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing himself personally as a
gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a PNP member and exhibits himself
as morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organization ”. (Section 3 C of
NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 94-022)

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

The respondent’s act of _________________was a flagrant disregard of a

customary rule that had existed since time immemorial- that intimate physical contact
between individuals must be consensual (Teresita G Narvasa vs Benjamin A
Sanchez Jr, GR No. 169449, March 26, 2010). Respondent’s defiance of custom
and lack of respect for the opposite sex more appalling because he was a married man.
Respondent’s act showed a low regard for women and disrespect for the private
complainants’ honor and dignity.

RESOLUTION NO. 01-0940

RULE IV.
FORMS OR SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Section 5. The following are illustrative forms of sexual harassment:

(a) Physical

i. Malicious Touching;

ii. Overt sexual advances;

iii. Gestures with lewd insinuation.

(b) Verbal, such as but not limited to, requests or demands for sexual favors,
and lurid remarks;

(c) Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or writing notes with sexual
underpinnings;

(d) Other forms analogous to the foregoing.

RULE V.
PERSONS LIABLE FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Section 6. Any government official or employee, regardless of sex, is liable for sexual
harassment when he/she:
 (a) directly participates in the execution of any act of sexual harassment as
defined by these Rules;

(b) induces or directs another or others to commit sexual harassment as defined

by these Rules;

(c) cooperates in the commission of sexual harassment by another through an

act without which the sexual harassment would not have been accomplished;

(d) cooperates in the commission of sexual harassment by another through

previous or simultaneous acts.

RAPE
As has been repeatedly held, "no young girl would concoct a sordid tale of
so serious a crime as rape at the hands of her own father, undergo medical
examination, then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public
trial, if her motive [was] other than a fervent desire to seek justice People v.
Isang, G.R. No. 183087, December 4, 2008, 573 SCRA 150, 161.

MISCONDUCT-CORRUPTION as element of GM

Misconduct or Malfeasance is any wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct

motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It usually refers to
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left
except where necessity may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or
criminal intention (NMC 2007-001);

Grave Misconduct on the other hand, was defined by jurisprudence as “ a

malevolent transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer or employee
which threatens the very existence of the system of administration of justice.”
(Fernandez vs. Gatan, A.M. No. P-03-1720 May 28, 2004).

In Arcenio vs. Pagorogon, the Court defined misconduct as “a transgression

of some established rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer.” As differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifested.

Thus, in an action for grave misconduct, there must be substantial evidence

showing that the acts complained of are corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate
the law, or constitute flagrant disregard of well-known legal rules. The evidence should
be competent and be derived from direct knowledge.

Moreover, it should be emphasized that “ corruption as an element of grave

misconduct consists in the act of an official who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his
station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary
to duty and the rights of others” (CSC vs. Belagan, 440 SCRA 578).
 The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Espanol vs. Mupas [November 11,
2004] that, ‘xxx Mere imputation of misconduct in the absence of sufficient
proof to sustain the same will never be countenanced. If a respondent should
be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him should be
competent’.

Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists of the act of an official or

fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others
(Civil Service Commission vs Peter E Nierras, GR No. 165121, February 14, 2008).

FAILURE TO PROSECUTE

Under Sec. 12, Rule 17 of NAPOLCOM MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR

2007-001 (NMC 07-001), it provides that the failure to prosecute the case
during the hearing, despite due notice, shall be a sufficient ground to drop the
complaint where the culpability of the respondent could not be established or
proven without the testimony of the complaining witness. In cases where the
culpability of the respondent can be established by evidence other than the
testimony of the complainant, non-appearance of the latter shall not be a ground
to terminate the proceedings.”

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

The Supreme Court ruled: “Indeed, for evidence to be believed, it must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.” (People vs. Alcantara, 240 SCRA 122 [1995])

The High Tribunal pronounced that “a complainant in administrative case is

considered a mere witness for the government, thus, adjudication on the merits of the
case can proceed even without the participation of the complainant as long as there are
other evidence to substantiate the allegations in the complaint.”

“The rule is settled that where there is nothing to indicate that a witness is
actuated by improper motive, his positive and categorical declarations on the stand,
made under solemn oath, should be given full faith and credence.” (People vs Dela
Cruz, 349 SCRA 124)

“Where there is no showing that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by any
improper motive, the presumption is that they are not so actuated and their testimony
is entitled to full faith and credit.” (People vs Mataro, 354 SCRA 27)

“EI INCUMBIT PROBATIO QUI DICIT, NON QUI NEGAT” , he who allege, not he
who denies, must prove.

"the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or

such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Complainants have the burden of proving, by substantial evidence the allegations in the
complaints.” (Ebero vs. Camposano, 425 SCRA 420)
 The Supreme Court held that denial of an accused cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of credible witnesses also testifying on
affirmative matters. People vs. Pabalan, 266 SCRA 602

The credibility of complaining witness is not diminished by minor inconsistency of

her statement during the incident. A person telling the truth is not always expected to
give an error-free testimony considering the treachery of human memory-honest
inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy,
the credibility of witnesses, specially of witnesses to crimes shocking to conscience and
numbing to senses. (People vs. Paule, 267 SCRA 649).

The Supreme Court held that the categorical identification made by eye
witnesses should be given full faith and credit, especially in the total absence of ill
motive, grudge or animosity on their part (People vs De Mesa, 188 SCRA 48,
1990).

In case of contradictory declarations and statements, the greater weight is

generally given to positive testimonies than to the denial by the accused (People vs
Clores, 184 SCRA 638, 1990).

In all administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by

substantial evidence, the allegations of the complaint (Lorena vs. Encomedia, 302
SCRA 632). It is not the duty of the respondent, in an administrative proceeding, to
disprove what the complainant failed to prove.

Further required under the law is the quantum of evidence in administrative

proceedings. The law requires that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt
in administrative cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (San Juan, Jr. v.
Sangalang, Adm. Matter No. P-00-1437, 06 February 2001, 351 SCRA 210)

While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial

evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one (1) fair and reasonable conclusion
that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding the possibility of error
and producing absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" is required People v. Dela Cruz, G.R.
No. 187683, February 11, 2010.

It is well settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the evidence

offered to support the particular contention. (Jose vs CA, 322 SCRA 25)

AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE

People vs Alvarez, 169 SCRA 730 it also ruled that “If the affiant failed to
testify in court under oath, his affidavit shall not be considered as competent evidence
for the party presenting the affidavit. The affidavit is inadmissible being hearsay.”
 Paulin vs Gimenez, et. al. G.R. 103323, January 31, 1995 ruled that
“Submission of affidavit does not warrant the inference that the prosecution had
already finished presenting its evidence because the affiants are still required to testify
and affirm the contents thereof otherwise these affidavits cannot serve as competent
evidence for the prosecution.”

Jurisprudence also declared that “An affidavit of desistance is understood to be a

sworn statement executed by a complainant in a criminal or administrative case that he
or she is discontinuing the action filed upon his or her complaint for whatever reason
he or she may cite. The court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance especially
when executed as an afterthought.” (People v. Romero, 224 SCRA 749, 757
[1993]. “However, as in retractions, an affidavit of desistance calls for a reexamination
of the records of the case.” (Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 135 SCRA
620, 631 [1985].

“Desistance is generally unreliable and will not ipso facto result to

acquittal/exculpation. It is an afterthought which should not be given probative value.
Viewed with suspicion and reservation. Jurisprudence, has invariably regarded such
affidavits exceeding unreliably, because it can easily be secured from poor and ignorant
witness, especially through intimidation of monetary consideration. (People vs
Florante O Ramirez, Jr. GR No. 12150079)

Bulado vs Tiu, Jr, that “Withdrawal of the complaint will not free the
respondent from his administrative liability, particularly because administrative
proceedings against public employees are imbued with public interest, public office
being a public trust”.

In Florendo vs. Enrile, 239 SCRA 22 (1994) it was ruled that proceedings
against a public officer or employee for misconduct, malfeasance cannot just be
withdrawn at any time by complainants and should not be made to depend on their
whims and caprices since the complainants are, in a real sense, only witnesses.

Also, in Aguilar, Jr. vs. Fernandez, 356 SCRA 162 it was ruled that
desistance made by complainant is of no moment. Administrative actions can not be
made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act.

“an affidavit of desistance executed by complainant in an administrative case will

not result in dismissal thereof where the there are documentary evidence to support
the complaint” (Celis vs. Marquez, 138 SCRA 256).

“Witnesses or pieces of evidence are still needed to substantiate and to satisfy

the quantum of proof in administrative proceedings. In the absence of such, it is but
proper to discharge the respondent from the present controversy in the interest of fair
play and justice. The reason for this is that an accused has the constitutional right to
meet the witnesses face to face or to confront witnesses against him.”

WARRANTLESS SEARCH

A Search may validly be conducted without a search warrant when (a) with
consent of the person searched (People vs Malasugui, 63 Phil 221) and (b) when
the search is incidental to a lawful arrest (Rule 126, Section 13, Rules of Court).
 WARRANT OF ARREST

In People vs. Givera (GR No. 132159, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 513),
the Supreme Court said: “Unless specifically provided in the warrant, the same remains
enforceable until it is executed recalled or quashed. The ten-day period provided in
Rule 113, Sec. 4 is only a directive to the officer executing the warrant to make a
return to the court.”

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Circumstantial evidence is that which tends to prove a disputed fact by proof

of other facts which have a legitimate and natural tendency to lead the mind into
conclusion that the fact exists which is sought to be established . Examples of this are:
fingerprints, possession of stolen property or the weapon used and the opportunity and
motive of the accused. Time and again, settled is the rule that “conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.” (People vs. Espina, 326
SCRA 753)

DISHONESTY

Office of the Court Administrator v. Ibay, 393 SCRA 212 (2002) This
Court has defined dishonesty as the “(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle;
lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.

Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO
29227 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, dishonesty and falsification of public
document are considered grave offenses for which the penalty of dismissal is prescribed
even at the first instance. Section 9 of said Rule likewise provides that "The penalty of
dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits, and
retirement benefits, and the disqualification for re-employment in the government
service. This penalty is without prejudice to criminal liability of the respondent." (CSC v.
Sta. Ana, A.M. No. P-03-1696, 30 April 2003, p. 11)

This Office is duty bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline errant
employees and to weed out those who are undesirable. Respondent’s admission and
claim of good faith, however, cannot be given due course as a mitigating circumstance
since in dishonesty, there is bad faith (Arca vs Lepanto, GR No. 17679, November 24,
1958). Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was appreciated in
his favor, the imposable penalty is in the medium which is one rank demotion pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 22 of NMC 2007-001.

An employee, such as respondent, who falsifies an official document to gain

unwarranted advantage over other more qualified applicants to the same position and
secure the sought-after promotion cannot be said to have measured up to the
standards required of a public servant. De Guzman v. Delos Santos, A.M. No. 2002-8-
SC, 18 December 2002, 394 SCRA 210, 218.
 Under Section 2326, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO
29227 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, dishonesty and falsification of public
document are considered grave offenses for which the penalty of dismissal is prescribed
even at the first instance. Section 9 of said Rule likewise provides that "The penalty of
dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits, and
retirement benefits, and the disqualification for re-employment in the government
service. This penalty is without prejudice to criminal liability of the respondent." 28
Public office is a public trust. A public officer or employee does not merely have
an obligation to obey and respect the law; it is his sworn duty to do so. Assumption of
public office is impressed with the paramount public interest that requires the highest
standards of ethical conduct. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty,
candor and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. This ideal
standard ensures that only those of known probity, competence and integrity are called
to the challenge of public service.

Under the laws governing our civil service, Republic Act No. 6713 and CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989. dishonesty is classified as a grave offense
the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction. For having
misrepresented the fact that he was a college graduate when in reality he was not, we
are constrained to hold respondent liable for dishonesty by misrepresentation and
falsification of an official document. As an accessory penalty, his retirement benefits are
forfeited due to the falsehood and deceit that have marked his assumption into office,
traits that are undesirable and unbecoming of a public officer or employee.

We have repeatedly said that persons involved in the dispensation of justice,

from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of
integrity, probity, uprightness, honesty and diligence in the public service. This Court
will not tolerate dishonesty for the judiciary expects the best from all its employees who
must be paradigms in the administration of justice. Office of the Court Administrator v.
Sumilang, A.M. No. MTJ-94-989, 18 April 1997, 271 SCRA 316, 326; Eamiguel v. Ho,
A.M. No. 98-1263-P, 6 March 1998, 287 SCRA 79, 83; Ibay v. Lim, A.M. No. P-99-1309,
11 September 2000, 340 SCRA 107, 112. An employee who falsifies an official
document to gain unwarranted advantage over other more qualified applicants to the
same position and secure the sought-after promotion cannot be said to have measured
up to the standards required of a public servant. While we commiserate with
respondent who has been in the judiciary for twenty-six (26) years and who may have
been simply motivated by a desire to improve his family�s lot, we simply cannot
condone the means resorted to which was not justified by its end. As this Court
declared in Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana 1 August 2002. -
While we recognize that respondent committed the acts complained of out of an
extreme desire to be promoted for the benefit of his family, the Court cannot turn a
blind eye to what is clearly a transgression of the law. Dishonesty and falsification are
malevolent acts that have no place in the judiciary. Because of his conduct, the Court
seriously doubts respondent�s ability to perform his duties with the integrity,
uprightness and honesty demanded of an employee of the judiciary.

We recently ruled that making a false statement in a Personal Data Sheet

required under Civil Service Rules and Regulations for employment in the government
amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document which warrant dismissal
from the service upon commission of the first offense. Civil Service Commission NCR v.
Sta. Ana, A.M. No. OCA-01-5, 1 August 2002. The Court reasoned that the
"accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet being a requirement under the Civil
Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government, the
making of an untruthful statement therein was therefore intimately connected with such
employment x x x x"

MR RE COMPLAINANTS

NAB-NAPOLCOM vs Mamaug GR NO. 149999, August 12, 2005 “in an

administrative case, the complainant is relegated to the status of a mere witness
because no private interest is involved as the offense is committed against the
government. Hence, the private complainant has no right to appeal the decision of the
Disciplinary Authority exonerating the respondent or dismissing the complaint filed
against him.”

SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

In the case of MERALCO vs. BARLIS, En Banc, G.R. No. 114231, June 29,
2004, it was held that Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, provides that a motion
for reconsideration of a decision may be filed within fifteen days from notice thereof;
that under Section 10, Rule 51, if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is
filed within the time provided in the Rules, the judgment shall forthwith be entered by
the clerk in the book of entries of judgments; and that Section 2, Rule 52 further
provides that no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by
the same party shall be entertained, thus:

“Indeed, in Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, we held that a
second motion for reconsideration of a decision or a final order is prohibited, except
for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first
obtained. We explained, thus:

…The propriety or acceptability of such a second motion for reconsideration is

not contingent upon the averment of “new” grounds to assail the judgment, i.e.,
grounds other than those theretofore presented and rejected. Otherwise, attainment of
finality of a judgment might be staved off indefinitely, depending on the party’s
ingeniousness or cleverness in conceiving and formulating “additional flaws” or “newly
discovered errors” therein, or thinking up some injury or prejudice to the rights of the
movant for reconsideration. “Piece-meal” impugnation of a judgment by successive
motions for reconsideration is anathema, being precluded by the salutary axiom that a
party seeking the setting aside of a judgment, act or proceeding must set out in his
motion all the grounds therefor, and those not so included are deemed waived and
cease to be available for subsequent motions.

For all litigation must come to an end at some point, in accordance with
established rules of procedure and jurisprudence. As a matter of practice and policy,
courts must dispose of every case as promptly as possible; and in fulfillment of their
role in the administration of justice, they should brook no delay in the termination of
cases by stratagems or maneuverings of parties or their lawyers.”

Moreover, a second motion for reconsideration, which merely rehashes and

recycles old allegations and arguments deserves scant consideration. A long line of
jurisprudence on this doctrine has been enunciated by the Supreme Court, thus:
 The rest of petitioner’s arguments deserve scant consideration, the same being
mere rehash of those raised in the petition, which have been fully passed upon in our
Decision. METROBANK vs. WONG, G.R. No. 120859. January 23, 2002.

Indeed, we cannot permit a losing party to further delay or thwart the execution
of judgment against it by continuously rehashing allegations that have long been
rejected. SEVEN BROTHERS SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. ORIENTAL ASSURANCE
CORP., GR 140613, October 15, 2002.

The bottom line in the instant case is that petitioner lost his right to appeal
before this Court and now seeks to resurrect the same via the instant petition, which he
admits finds no support in the rules. The time-honored rule is that the failure to perfect
an appeal in the manner and within the period fixed by law renders the decision final
and executory. Consequently, no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review
such decision. It is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be
attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest
court of the land.[i] Upon the other hand, the extraordinary action to annul a final
judgment is limited to the grounds provided by law and cannot be used as a stratagem
to reopen the entire controversy and thereby make a complete farce of a duly
promulgated decision that has long become final and executory. TEODORO vs. CA, et
al., GR 140799, September 10, 2002.

Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential
to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must,
therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted
as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to
prolong them. TEODORO vs. CA, et al., GR 140799, September 10, 2002.

This Court takes note of petitioner’s fierce determination to evade the execution
of a judgment, which has long become final, per our entry of judgment on May 16,
2001. A perusal of the records indicates that no new matters or arguments were raised
by petitioner in his urgent motion to elevate the case to the en banc. Rather the issues
and grounds cited were a mere rehash of the issues already more than sufficiently
passed upon in his petition for review and petition to refer the case to the en banc. It is
clear to this Court that petitioner is making a mockery of justice and trifling with the
judicial processes to evade the final judgment against him. MOLL vs. CA, et al., GR
145425, December 9, 2002.

A cursory look at petitioner’s arguments readily discloses that the same are a
mere rehash of the issues and arguments raised in the original petition. The first
procedural issue raised, which parenthetically, was resolved by us in our January 30,
2002 decision, is whether or not it was proper for petitioner to resort to a petition for
certiorari, instead of appealing the decision of the trial court. X x x. As to the contention
that the contract is worth billions of pesos, thereby requiring Presidential approval for
validity, this is a mere rehash of the issues already answered in our January 30, 2002
decision. MMDA vs. JANCOM ENV’L. CORP., et al., G.R. No. 147465. April 10, 2002.
 AT BOTTOM, private respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration presents no new
or substantial arguments which have not been presented in his prior pleadings and
which have not been taken up in our Decision. His present allegations and
asseverations are mere rehashes of arguments previously presented to us or are mere
restatements of the Separate and Dissenting Opinions which were already adequately
discussed in our Decision. In short, private respondent has not given any compelling
reason to warrant a reversal or modification of our earlier rulings. GOV’T OF THE USA,
etc. vs. HON. PURGANAN, etc., et al., G.R. No. 148571. December 17, 2002.

Concededly, there were occasions when this Court treated a petition for
certiorari as one filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the circumstances
prevailing in the instant case do not justify a deviation from a general rule. Notably, the
instant petition was filed way beyond the reglementary period allowed under Rule 45
without any justifiable reason therefor nor any reasonable explanation being proffered
by petitioner. In addition, the arguments she cited are without merit and are in fact
mere rehash of the issues raised before and judiciously resolved by the courts a quo.
The issues require a review of the factual findings, which, verily, could not be done
because this Court is not a trier of facts. More importantly, a reading of the records of
the case strengthens our disposition that both the trial and the appellate courts did not
abuse their discretion in assessing their factual findings. We find their conclusions
amply supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. CONEJOS vs. CA, et
al., GR 149473, August 9, 2002.

An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration

shows that the same [are] a mere rehash of his averments contained in his Verified
Answer and Memorandum. Neither did respondent raise new matters that would
sufficiently warrant a reversal of the assailed resolution of the Second Division. This
makes the said Motion pro forma. X x x. Indeed, in the cases where a motion for
reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was a
second motion for reconsideration,[ii] or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the
motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not
supported by the evidence,[iii] or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors,[iv] or
(4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law,[v] or (5) the
adverse party was not given notice thereof.[vi] The 16-page motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the foregoing defects,
and it was error for the COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was pro forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere
“rehash” of his earlier pleadings or did not raise “new matters.” Hence, the filing of the
motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case,
which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law.
COQUILLA vs. COMELEC, GR 151914 EN BANC, July 31, 2002.

A close perusal of the above issues and the discussions thereof shows that they
are a mere rehash of arguments and positions already raised and discussed extensively
in the 246-page Resolution of December 1, 2004, penned by Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban; as well as in the 125-page Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio,
the 100-page Dissenting Opinion of Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, the 29-page
Separate Opinion of Justice Dante O. Tinga, and the 10-page Concurring Opinion of
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario. Further discussion of these issues would not serve any
useful purpose, as it would merely repeat the same justifications and reasons already
taken up in the foregoing Opinions, which tackled precisely those matters and even
more; any further elucidations, disquisitions and disputations would merely reiterate the
same points already passed upon. LA BUGAL vs. RAMOS, G.R. No. 127882. February 1,
2005.

After a careful perusal of the testimony of the witnesses in this case and a
review of the findings and conclusions of the trial court, we find no reason to depart
from this doctrine nor apply its exceptions. The first five errors assigned are but a mere
rehash of the accused’s arguments in his memorandum filed with the trial court. The
trial court ably and correctly disposed of them in the challenged decision as shown in
the portions thereof earlier quoted. We adopt the trial court’s resolution on those issues
and commend the trial judge for her exacting analysis of the facts. PEOPLE vs. SGT.
MORENO BAYANI, G.R. No. 120894. October 3, 1996.

The accused failed to realize that the trial court even extended him a special act
of liberality when it did not consider his motion for new trial as pro-forma. The alleged
newly discovered evidence in support of the motion for new trial are but photocopies of
the affidavits of Aurea Reyes and Ponciano Reyes which were already attached to the
motion for reconsideration in support of one of its grounds. Put a little differently, the
motion for new trial was merely a rehash of one of the grounds of the motion for
reconsideration. Being, pro-forma, the former did not stop the running of the period to
appeal. Besides, the motion for reconsideration was filed forty-one days after
promulgation of the judgment. The accused should then be grateful to the trial court
for its liberality when it gave due course to the notice of appeal. PEOPLE vs. ROMULO
SORIA y GALLETES , G.R. No. 119007. October 4, 1996.

ALIBI

A review of the evidence extant on record revealed that the testimonies of the
complainant and his witnesses were candid, straightforward, categorical, and unmarred
by any inconsistency or contradiction. Taken together, their testimonies are not only
consistent in all material respects but also abound with uniform details on the
perpetration of herein respondent. This harmony in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses leads to the conclusion that they were telling the truth hence, the
conglomeration of the circumstances yielded no conclusion other than that respondent
was guilty of the offense being imputed against him. The defense of bare denial and
alibi is inherently weak. Furthermore, respondent’s version of the whole incident is
doubtful and replete with questionable details.

Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi must be established by positive, clear
and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused-appellant to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that
he was somewhere else. (People v. Manzano, G.R. No. 138303, November 26,
2001; People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 136094, April 20, 2001.)

Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the
accused-appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. It must be
demonstrated that the accused-appellant was so far away that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. (People v. Navales, 266 SCRA 569, 587 [1997]).
 All told, denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative
and self-serving evidence undeserving of any weight in law People v. Preciados, 349
SCRA 1, 23 [2001], citing People v. Fajardo, 315 SCRA 283, 293 [1999].

In comparison with the clear and straightforward testimony of the prosecution

witnesses, the defenses of denial and alibi, which accused-appellant relies upon, are
discredited and shopworn. People v. Pili, 289 SCRA 118, 140 [1998].

A litany of jurisprudence states:

“Alibi and denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving evidence that deserve no weight in law.” (People vs
Viernes 372 SCRA 231)

It has been stressed, moreover, that the bare denials and uncorroborated alibis
of an accused cannot overcome the positive identification of the accused and
straightforward recounting of the accused’s commission of a crime. In People v. Nieto,
this Court held:

It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong

evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of
the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense
of alibi is likewise unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is
easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing
proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.
Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by
a credible witness. Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove
that the accused has been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must
also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the
vicinity of the crime scene.

JUST DEBTS

Willful failure to pay just debts is classified as a light offense, punishable by

reprimand for the first infraction, suspension for 1-30 days for the second, and
dismissal for the third offense. (Bago vs. Feraren, A.M. No. P-01-1466, Sept 3,
2003)

The term "just debts" applies to claims the existence and justness of which are
admitted by the debtor.10

Grantoza does not deny his indebtedness to Reliways. He even claims that he
has made partial payments on his obligation. However, his claim is not supported by
any evidence. Thus, while we commiserate with his unfortunate situation, we cannot
condone his failure to pay his just debt which stands at P19,427.05 as of May 30, 2003.
His administrative liability under the foregoing provision of the Revised Administrative
Code is undisputed. The penalty therefore is not directed at his private life but at his
actuations unbecoming a public official.11

The Omnibus Rules implementing the provisions on the Civil Service of the
Revised Administrative Code of 198712 classifies willful failure to pay just debts as a
light offense and prescribes the penalty of reprimand for the first offense. Given that
this is Grantoza’s first offense since his employment in 1979, he should be
reprimanded, although not severely as recommended by the OCA, considering his
position as a Process Server.

Finally, Vendivel’s contention that Reliways was "forced" to lend money to

Grantoza because of its criminal case pending in the court where Grantoza is stationed
deserves no sympathy. Between the two of them, Reliways had the upper-hand. What
manner of enticement could Grantoza, a mere process server, have dangled to "force"
Reliways to extend him a loan? Other than his bare allegation, Vendivel does not
elaborate. We certainly cannot give credence to his unsubstantiated claim.

In the same vein, it was promounced in the case of Villaseñor vs De Leon,

Supreme Court Decision A.M. No. P-03-1685, March 20, 2003 that,
“Respondent's willful failure to pay her just debt is unbecoming of a public employee
and a ground for disciplinary action against her. Her unethical conduct has diminished
the honor and integrity of her office, stained the image of the judiciary and caused
unnecessary interference directly or indirectly in the efficient and effective performance
of her functions. Certainly, to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel
must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical
standards. Like all court personnel, respondent is expected to be a paragon of
uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in her
personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid
becoming her court's albatross of infamy.”

ADMISSIONS

“There being no evidence to be presented to show that said confession were

obtained as a result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise
of reward or leniency nor the investigating officer could have been motivated to
concoct the facts narrated in said affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to be
true, correct and freely or voluntarily given.” (People vs Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249)

RES JUDICATA

A litany of jurisprudence states : “Material facts which were in issue in a former

action and were admitted or judicially determined therein become res judicata and may
not again be litigated in a subsequent action between same parties or their privies.”
(Herrera vs. Canlas, 310 SCRA 318)

The doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two (2) concepts: the first is “bar
by prior judgment” and the second is “conclusiveness of judgment.” (Mata vs CA, 318
SCRA 416)

“Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided;
a thing or matter settled by judgment” (Mirpuri vs CA, 318 SCRA 516)

GRAVE COERCION

Merely talking in a loud voice, expressing an intention to take possession of a

certain property with or without the consent of the alleged owner, when not
accompanied by demeanor or gestures showing a determination to use violence does
not constitute coercion (Zabello, 13 Phil. 405).
 For Grave Coercion to exist, Revised Penal Code, Article 286 provides for the
following essential requisites:

1. That any person be prevented by another from doing something

not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it
right or wrong;

2. That the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either

by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and
control the will of the offended party, and;

3. That the person who restrained the will and liberty of another had no
right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint was not made under authority
of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right.

“Art. 286. Grave coercions. – The penalty of prision correccional and a fine not
exceeding six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without authority
of law, shall, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent another from doing
something not prohibited by law or compel him to do something against his will,
whether it be right or wrong.

If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage

or for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act or to prevent him
from exercising such right or from doing such act, the penalty next higher in degree
shall be imposed.”

APPEAL

”The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provision of law.” (Mendez vs. CSC, 204
SCRA 965 <1991>)

“If no appeal is perfected on time, the decision becomes final and executory by
operation of law after the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal.” (Estoesta vs.
CA, 179 SCRA 203 <1989>)

INDISCRIMINATE FIRING

As to the first issue, paraffin test is used to determine the presence or absence
of gunpowder nitrates. The test conducted on May 26, 2008 yielded a negative result
on the presence of gunpowder nitrates on the paraffin cast taken from the hands of the
respondent. However, this is not a clear implication that respondent did not fire a gun.
Dr. Raquel Fortun, Associate Professor of the UP Department of Pathology, said that
results of paraffin tests conducted hours after the incident are already irrelevant.

In G.R. No. 129933 February 26, 2001, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs. FEDERICO BALTAZAR y PIMENTEL, forensic chemist Angela Baldeviesco
testified that “a paraffin test is not conclusive owing to several factors including wind
direction, using a glove, firing at a hard object, using a long barrel gun or a low caliber
gun and profuse perspiration.” Indeed, the Court has held that, "the negative findings
of the paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person did not discharge a firearm
at the time the crime was committed for the absence of nitrates is possible if a person
discharged a firearm with gloves on, or if he thoroughly washed his hands thereafter.”

The respondent therefore, shall not be held liable for the act complained of
because his guilt was not proven by any evidence. The Affidavits submitted by the
complainant and her witnesses were not even affirmed by them. These served as the
basis of RIAS1 in their Motu Propio Investigation. RIAS1 also failed to substantiate their
allegation that herein respondent was the one who fired his firearm on the said date
and time. The empty cartridges gathered were alleged to have come from the firearm
of PO1 Pastores, but the same was not subjected for ballistic test to meet that quantum
of proof needed in administrative proceedings.

In the absence of complainant and concrete evidence to link the empty

cartridges to PO1 Pastores, this administrative case should be dismissed. Dismissing
him from the police service as the RIAS1 recommended is too harsh when in fact the
act being complained of was not even substantiated by strong evidence. It is violative
of his constitutional rights. More so, of fair play and justice.

NEGLECT OF DUTY

Rule 15, section 4 of PNP Standard Operational Procedures provides that

“Detention prisoner shall be locked up as may be necessary to secure his safety and
prevent his escape. To violate such office regulation results to an administrative
offense of Less Grave Neglect of Duty.”

LENGTH OF SERVICE

As recently declared by the Supreme Court in the case of CSC vs. Cortez, G.R.
No. 155732, June 3, 2004, “Length of service is not a magic word that, once
invoked, will automatically be considered as a mitigating circumstance in favor of the
party invoking it.

Length of service can either be a mitigating or aggravating circumstance

depending on the factual milieu of each case. Length of service, in other words, is an
alternative circumstance. That this is so clear in Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which amended the Omnibus Civil Services
Rules and Regulations dated 27 December 1991.” In the other cases, like the case of
University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 89454, 20
April 1992, 208 SCRA 174, and other related case, the length of service of the
respondent was not considered in his favor because the seriousness of the offense
charge, that is dishonesty.

“Neither would his length of service justify his dishonesty or mitigate his liability”
(Cosmopolitan vs. Maalat, 187 SCRA 108).

PASSION AND OBFUSCATION

AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
 Likewise, this court finds that passion and obfuscation attended the commission
of the crime. The accused arrived at their conjugal dwelling only to find her live-in
partner for 18 years and the father of her 3 children engaging in sexual intercourse with
the victim. Obviously, accused lost her sense of reason and self-control upon seeing the
man with whom she had lived for 18 years was not only unfaithful to her but had the
gall to do such immoral and bestial act in the sanctity of their very home. Accused
action was of course generated by the feeling of desperation and betrayal by the man
whom she shared many years of her life, regarded as her husband and father of her
children. There can be no doubt, therefore, that this occasion seen by the accused
created ‘an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation’
(People v. Salonga, 49 Phil. 385; People v. de la Cruz, 22 Phil. 429).

Filipinos by tradition are passionate in love. They are romantic and have many
customs about courtship and weddings, such as the harana or serenade, the
pamamanhikan, and the paninilbihan. But this is just the sweet side of love. What
happens when love is not answered, or worse, is betrayed? Many people will try to get
over the pain. But a few will view the rejection as a humiliation and make it into such a
major issue that cannot be resolved except by revenge.

In a “crime of passion”, a person commits a crime against a spouse or loved one,

or another person, because of anger or heartbreak. When a person becomes very
jealous or disappointed, it can produce such strong emotions that he cannot think
rationally and may act on his impulses without thinking about the consequences. In
many jurisdictions, mostly in Latin countries, the perpetrator of a crime of passion or
“crime passionel” is usually acquitted because “he couldn’t help himself.” Because of
this reasoning, the Philippine justice system considers “having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation” a circumstance that
mitigates criminal liability. Not only that, but Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
expressly provides that if a person catches his spouse in flagrante delicto with another
person and kills one or both of them as a consequence, he shall only suffer the penalty
of destierro, or exile, and this only to protect him from the vengeance of the relatives of
his victims. This provision, which makes the Philippines one of the few jurisdictions
which recognize the “crime of passion” defense, is a holdover from the old Spanish
Penal Code, which was in force in the Philippines from 1886 to 1930, a revised form of
which became the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.

AWOL CASES/ABSEEINTISM

Section 52-A, Rule IV of Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999,

classifies habitual absenteeism as a grave offense with the following corresponding
penalties: for the first offense -- suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one
(1) year; and for the second offense -- dismissal.

Rule XVI, Section 63 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, as
amended by Circular No. 14, s. 1999, provides:

Section 63. Effect of absences without approved leave . – An official or

employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for at least
thirty (30) calendar days shall be considered on absence without official
leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or dropped from the
rolls without prior notice. He shall, however, be informed, at his address appearing
on his 201 files, of his separation from the service, not later than five (5) days from its
effectivity. x x x (emphasis supplied)
 It must be stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with
an office charged the implementation of the law should be circumscribed with heavy
burden of responsibility. Public officials must in accordance with the Constitution and
Ethical Standard Law, exemplify the ideals of integrity, efficiency and particularly
proficiency in the law. “A public office is a public trust; public officers and employees
must serve with highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and
they must at all times remain accountable to the people.” (Gacho vs. Fuentes, Jr., 291
SCRA 474). A public office is a public trust that enjoins all public officers and employees
to respond with highest degree of dedication often even beyond the personal interest.
Foregoing facts clearly established that respondent is no more interested to continue
his service as such he is not worthy to remain in the police service.

NEGLIGENCE
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE
Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that
which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred
(Calimutan v. People, G.R. No. 152133, 9 February 2006, 482 SCRA 44, 60; Lambert v.
Heirs of Roy Castillon, G.R. No. 160709, 23 February 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 291; St.
Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos, 426 Phil. 878, 886 (2002); Raynera v. Hiceta, 365 Phil.
546, 553 (1999). In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation
of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such
negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a
substantial contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximate
cause of an injury. (8 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles §426, citing Branstetter v. Gerdeman,
364 Mo. 1230, 274 S.W.2d 240 (1955) and Salerno v. LaBarr, 159 Pa. Commw. 99, 632
A.2d 1002 (1993).

REPENTANCE
As the Supreme Court held in the case Apiag vs. Judge Cantero A.M. No. MTJ-
95-1070. February 12, 1997:

“Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may commit a mistake. But we
should not look only at his sin. We should also consider the man’s sincerity in his
repentance, his genuine effort at restitution and his eventual triumph in the reformation
of his life.”

DELAY IN THE FILING OF A CASE

As to the delay of the filing of the case, in Carlos G Libres vs National Steel
Corporation, et. Al., GR No. 123737, May 28, 1999, the delay on the filing of the
case could be expected since the respondent was private complainants’ immediate
superior. Fear retaliation and backlash, not to forget the social humiliation and
embarrassment that victims of this human frailty usually suffer, are all realities that the
private complainants had to contend with. Moreover, the delay did not detract from the
truth derived from the facts.

DISMISSAL OF PO1=SUSPENSION
 However, since the respondent cannot be demoted because his rank is PO1, he
should be meted six (6) months suspension. Any doubt as to the application of this
penalty must be resolved in his favor. In fact, in the case of People vs Deleverio,
352 Phil 382, the Supreme Court stressed that: “it is an established principle in
statutory construction that penal laws are strictly construed against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused.” We can apply this by analogy in administrative
proceedings.

PERFECTION OF APPEAL
It is important to note that the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of
due process, it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provision of the law. Thus perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional and failure to interpose a timely appeal renders the assailed Decision or
Order final and executory and deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter
the final judgment (Petilla vs CA, 429 SCRA 254).

Accordingly, in a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court defined laches as the
failure or neglect for an unreasonable length of time, to do which by exercising due
diligence could or should have done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
has neither abandoned it or declined to assert it (Heirs of Ernesto Biona vs. CA, 362
SCRA 29). Applying now the aforementioned doctrinal missive of the Supreme Court,
it clearly indicates that the right of herein respondent-appellant to any relief under the
law has already been barred by reason of laches.

Thus, on this score alone, the instant appeal ought not be given due course and
respondent-appellant cannot escape the onset of prescription and finality of judgment
by arguing now that he was denied due process mush less bark on to the excessiveness
of the penalty imposed.

All things judiciously considered, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed
Resolution.

SELF-DEFENSE
REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

SPO2 Ruperto Cabanlig vs Sandiganbayan, GR No. 148431, July 28,

2005, “Self-defense and fulfillment of duty operate on different principles. Self-
defense is based on the principle of self-preservation from mortal harm, while
fulfillment of duty is premised on the due performance of duty. The difference between
the two justifying circumstances is clear, as the requisites of self-defense and fulfillment
of duty are different.”

In another case, the same Court said, “The availability of the justifying
circumstance of fulfilment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under Article 11
(5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the
performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury
caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance
of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. (People v. Oanis, 74 hil.
257, 262-263 (1943). The justification is based on the complete absence of intent
and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that
it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence. (People v. Fallorina,
G.R. No. 137347, March 4, 2004). In this instant case, the respondent’s action in
shooting the subject victim is was justified.

INSERT REQUISITES OF SELF-DEFENSE

REQUISITES OF FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY:

1) The accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office; and
2) The injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of
due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.

three-fold responsibility

“public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of

duty or for a wrongful act or omission- a public officer may be held civilly, criminally,
and administratively liable for a wrongful doing xxx. ” (Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan,
318 SCRA 80).

FIREARM (MO/LO)

Pursuant to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential

Decree No. 1866 dated 29 June 1983 as amended, “No Mission Order shall
be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to carry firearms outside
residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of the government
agency involved in law enforcement and is receiving regular compensation for
the services he/she is rendering in the agency. Further, the civilian agent must
be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or
special project which specifically requires the use of firearm(s) to insure its
accomplishment and that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional
Command level or its equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP
and NBI, or at higher level of command.”

Indubitably, no PNP officer is authorized to issue letter order authorizing

civilians to possess firearms and/or to carry firearms outside residence even if in
the performance of official duty as confidential agent of the PNP especially when
the firearms covered by the Letter Order was tagged as Wanted/Lost based on
the Firearms Information Management System of FED.

HEARSAY
By “hearsay” is meant that kind of evidence which derives its value, not solely
from the credit to be attached to the witness himself, but also in part because of the
veracity and competency of some other person from whom the witness may have
received his information. (Jones on Evidence, Vol. I, Section 297, p. 559). Evidence that
consists in something that has been told to a witness rather than something he has
himself observed or of which he has personal knowledge. Its value therefore depends
not on the veracity of the witness himself, but on that of an absent person. Since such
absent person is not available for cross-examination, the general rule at the common
law is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. (Compendium on Evidence, Fourth
Edition by Sibal and Salazar, Jr, p. 203);

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

Simple Neglect of Duty based on the Doctrine of Command Responsibility. To be

liable based on the above-mentioned Doctrine, there are elements which should be
satisfied, (1) he has knowledge that a crime or an offense has been committed, is being
committed, or has been committed by his subordinates or by others within his area of
responsibility and (2) despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective
action either before, during or immediately after its commission.

Executive Order 226

Ann B. Ching, Evolution of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in Light of the

Celebici Decision of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 167 (1999)

Article 28 of International Criminal Court (ICC) of Rome Statute

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY is defined as the accountability or responsibility or

answerability of the commander of a military force or unit for the acts of his men,
inclusive of authority to order; to direct, to prevent or control the acts of his men. It is
present and required in all levels- from any government official or supervisor, or PNP
and AFP officer including platoon leaders. Its concept reflects the culture in the
uniformed service: men in the lower ranks carry out orders of their superiors, thus
commanders are obliged not only to discipline their troops but also to take full
responsibility for actions emanating from their orders.

If commanders and public officials violate command responsibility doctrine, they

are held liable for neglect of duty, based on the orders.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
IN RELATION TO RA 4200

"A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly

privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable
even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly
privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless
found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre
belong ‘private communications’ and ‘fair and true report without any comments or
remarks." (Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, 14 January 1999, 301
SCRA 1)

US v. Bustos, 37 Phil. Rep. 731 defined the concept of private communication

thus: "A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if
made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained
criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. A
pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good
faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when
addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter."

LACHES VS PRESCRIPTION

Laches is based on the legal maxim "Equity aids the vigilant, not those who
slumber on their rights."

In Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277, 281, this Court laid down a rule
that is here squarely applicable:

“Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained

to find, however, that while no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in
favor of the defendant and that is, the equitable defense of laches. We hold that the
defense of prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the title of the registered
owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of laches.
Otherwise stated, we hold that while defendant may not be considered as having
acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors' long continued possession for 37
years, the original owner's right to recover back the possession of the property and title
thereto from the defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by patentee's
inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.”

As in the Gamponia case, the four elements of laches are present in the case at
bar, namely: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the
complaint seeks a remedy; (b) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having
been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on the
part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his
suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.

The difference between prescription and laches was elaborated in Nielsen & Co.,
Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601, 17 December 1966, 18 SCRA p.
1040, as follows:

Appellee is correct in its contention that the defense of laches applies

independently of prescription. Laches is different from the statute of limitations.
Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the
effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of
inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some
change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is
statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law.
Prescription is based on fixed time laches is not, (30 C.J.S., p. 522. See also
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, 5th ed., p. 177) (18 SCRA 1053).

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Under existing law and jurisprudence, breach of promise to marry per se is not
an actionable wrong, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. (BUNAG, JR., vs. CA, et al, G.R. No.
101749, 1992 July 10, 2nd Division) As gleaned from the facts presented, there
was enough proof that expenses were made to the detriment of the private
complainant. The calling off of the wedding despite previous preparations and
expenses prelude to the wedding is uncalled for a gentleman and an officer. Hence, the
acts of respondent constitute Grave Misconduct and in utter disregard or contrary to
morality, good customs and public policy and have placed the private complainant in
shame and in bad reputation.

Love is not totally alien to law. The Supreme Court once quoted the truism that
“the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know.” Now, what if someone
you love promises to marry you but then refuses to honor that promise?
This, of course, is a breach of promise to marry. However, a breach of promise to marry
does not automatically entitle the offended party to an award of damages. This is the
issue in the 1964 case of Wassmer vs. Velez (G.R. No. L-20089). Let’s briefly discuss
the case.

In the words of the Supreme Court, the facts that culminated in that case started
with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but
terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.

A couple, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
a date for the wedding. They applied for and was issued a marriage license. Invitations
were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be’s
trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased.
Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed,
with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then,
with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply
left a note for plaintiff stating: “Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes
it … ” He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: “Nothing changed rest assured returning soon.” But he
never returned and was never heard from again. The would-be bride sued the runaway
groom.

The case is not merely for a breach of promise to marry, which is not an
actionable wrong. In fact, Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new
Civil Code the provisions that would have it so. It must not be overlooked, however,
that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is
not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

To formally set a wedding and go through all the preparations and publicity, only
to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This
is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be
held answerable in damages.

A man’s promise to marry another is treated as a legally binding contract. When

a breach is committed to such promise, an action will lie for damages. An action for
breach of a promise to marry is predicated upon the proposition that a defendant has
breached an existing valid contract to marry.

A breach of a promise to marry arises from one party’s unwillingness to perform

a promise. The contractual relation in a marriage agreement is different from other
agreements. In re Marriage of Mehren & Dargan, the California Supreme Court
 differentiated the contractual relation in commercial contracts from that in marital
contracts.[i] Generally, commercial contracts have a specific object and the parties
enter into such contracts to achieve their objects. Marital contracts are entered into
with the expectation that the contract will never be revoked. Moreover, marriage itself
is a highly regulated institution of undisputed social value. Parties intending to recover
for breach of marriage must show that a valid contract existed for the purpose of
marriage and parties had an intention to make a binding contract.

Like any other contract, the primary elements for the creation of a marriage
contract are offer and acceptance. When a promisor makes an offer, a promisee can
give assent expressly or impliedly. The essential element for the creation of a marriage
contract is that both the parties must understand each other’s intention to enter into
the marriage relation. Parties incapable of entering into a contract cannot make an
agreement to enter into a contract for marriage. Incapacity to enter into a marriage is
a valid defense to breach of a promise to marriage. Additionally, a promise to marry a
married person is invalid. A promisor to such an agreement will be held liable for
breach of a promise, in the event of termination of prior marriage by divorce,
annulment, or death of the former spouse. For a contract to be valid and enforceable,
there must be a meeting of minds between the promiser and the promisee. In a
marriage contract, one party’s promise is adequate consideration for the other party’s
promise. The only condition is that the consideration must not be illegal.

Parties to a marriage contract can rescind the contract by mutual consent. A

contract can also be rescinded on the basis of vitiating elements like fraud, duress,
incapacity, coercion, or misrepresentation.

In a marriage contract, a breach of promise results from the unwillingness to

perform one’s promise to marry. Mere postponement of the marriage will not amount
to breach of promise. However, arbitrary postponement without any valid reason will
amount to a refusal to comply with the promise.

The defenses generally available in an action for breach of promise are:

 invalidity of promise;
 plaintiff’s refusal to marry the defendant;
 Awareness subsequent to promise of the defendant’s physical incapacity or
disease making it unsafe or improper to enter into marriage;
 termination of the marriage contract; and
 lack of capacity.

Moreover, if a plaintiff had an invalid divorce, a defendant cannot be held liable for
breach of the marriage promise.

Following are the defenses that cannot be used in an action for breach of a promise:
 he/she subsequently offered to marry the plaintiff;
 the engagement of the plaintiff to another individual at the time of entering into
a contract with the defendant;
 the marriage of the plaintiff to another party subsequent to the defendant’s
breach;
 unappealing personality traits or offensive conduct;

Damages are recoverable if there is a breach of the promise to marry. The nature
and form of an action for breach of the promise to marry is contractual. A plaintiff in a
claim for damages can recover compensatory damages also. Damages can be
recovered for financial loss. Compensatory damages are awarded for injury to health,
feelings, and reputation.
In common law, an action may be brought to recover damages for a breach of a
promise to marry.[ii] However, when a statute provides that a breach of contract to
marry shall not constitute an injury or damages, then no action, suit or proceeding can
be maintained. Such a statute abolishes both the right of action for breach of promise
and any right of action, whatever its form, based upon such breach.[iii]
[i] 118 Cal. App. 4th 1167 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2004)
[ii] Bibelhausen v. Bibelhausen, 159 Wis. 365 (Wis. 1915)
[iii] Thibault v. Lalumiere, 318 Mass. 72 (Mass. 1945)

Why is there no success in claiming damages for breach of promise to marry?

Because it has no source of obligation, marriage is purely voluntary and not
compulsory. It should be freely entered into without any threat. People marry because
of love, so it cannot be imposed and thus there is no legal basis for action.

Breach of promise to marry is a quasi-delict (A quasi-delict is like a delict or

crime because of the damage or injury caused to another when there is no pre-existing
contractual relation, there being fault or negligence. A quasi-contract is seemingly, but
not actually, a contract since, despite the non-existence of a contract, a person is
bound to compensate another for a benefit or advantage)

GROSS NEGLIGENCE

Gross negligence is a legal concept which means serious carelessness.

Negligence is the opposite of diligence, or being careful. The standard of ordinary
negligence is what conduct one expects from the proverbial "reasonable person". By
analogy, if somebody has been grossly negligent, that means they have fallen so far
below the ordinary standard of care that one can expect, to warrant the label of being
"gross".

ADMISIBBILITY OF EVIDENCE

Section 3 Rules of Court. Admissibility of evidence- Evidence is admissible when

it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by law or these rules.

I. Introduction.
A. Admissibility- the character or quality which any material must necessarily
possess for it to be accepted and allowed to be presented or introduced as evidence in
court. It answers the question: should the court allow the material to be used as
evidence by the party?

B. Weight- the value given or significance or impact, or importance given to the

material after it has been admitted; its tendency to convince or persuade. Hence a
particular evidence may be admissible but it has no weight. Conversely, an evidence
may be of great weight or importance but it is not admissible.

II. Conditions for admissibility (Axioms of admissibility per Wigmore)

 A. RELEVANCY (None but facts having rational probative value are admissible).
Per section 4, “Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence”.

1. The material presented as evidence must affect the issue or question. It must
have a bearing on the outcome of the case. It requires both:
a). rational or logical relevancy in that it has a connection to the issue and
therefore it has a tendency to establish the fact which it is offered to prove. The
evidence must therefore have probative value
b). legal relevancy in that the evidence is offered to prove a matter which has
been properly put in issue as determined by the pleadings in civil cases, or as fixed by
the pre-trial order, or as determined by substantive law. If so the matter has
materiality.

Illustration: (i). Criminal case: the fact that the crime was committed at
nighttime is rationally or logically relevant to a killing at 12 midnight but evidence
thereon would be not be legally relevant if nighttime was not alleged in the
Information. It would be immaterial. (ii) Civil Case: In an action for sum of money
based on a promissory note, evidence that the defendant was misled into signing the
note would be rationally relevant but if fraud was never alleged as a defense, then
evidence thereof would be legally irrelevant or immaterial.

The components of relevancy are therefore probative value and materiality.

2. Rule as to collateral matters: “Evidence on collateral matters shall not be

allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the facts in issue”

a). collateral matters-facts or matters which are not in issue. They are not
generally allowed to be proven except when relevant.
b) In criminal cases, the collateral matters allowed to be proven, being relevant
include:
(i). Antecedent Circumstances, or those in existing even prior to the commission
of the crime. They include such matters as habit, custom, bad moral character when
self defense is invoked; or plan design, conspiracy, or premeditation, agreement to a
price, promise or reward
(ii) Concomitant circumstances or those which accompany the commission of the
crime such as opportunity to do the act or incompatibility
(iii).Subsequent circumstances or those which occur after the commission of the
crime, such as flight, escape, concealment, offer of compromise

c). Example: Motive is generally irrelevant and proof thereof is not allowed
except: when the evidence is purely circumstantial, when there is doubt as to the
identity of the accused, or when it is an element of the crime.

B. COMPETENCY ( All facts having rational probative value are admissible unless
some specific law or rule forbids). In short the evidence is not excluded by law or rules.

III. Principles which exclude relevant or material evidence:

A. The Exclusionary Rule Principle - the principle which mandates that evidence
obtained from an illegal arrest, unreasonable search or coercive investigation, or in
violation of a particular law, must be excluded from the trial and will not be admitted as
evidence.
 1. The principle judges the admissibility of evidence based on HOW the evidence
is obtained or acquired and not WHAT the evidence proves.
2. The principle is to be applied only if it is so expressly provided for by the
constitution or by a particular law. Even if the manner of obtaining the evidence is in
violation of a certain law but the law does not declare that the evidence is inadmissible,
then such evidence will be admissible.

Example: The accused claimed that information about his bank accounts i.e.
trust funds, was obtained in violation of the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law ( R.A. 1405)
and moved to have them be excluded as evidence. HELD: R.A. 1405 nowhere provides
that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence there from
inadmissible in evidence. If Congress has both established a right and provided
exclusive remedies for its violation, the court would encroaching upon the prerogatives
of congress if it authorizes a remedy not provided for by statute. Absent a specific
reference to an exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the courts to read such a
provision into the act. ( Ejercito vs. Sandiganbayan, 509 SCRA 190, Nov. 30, 2006).

3. The phrase is attributed to Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme and
has its biblical reference to Mathew 7: 17-20.

B. The Doctrine of the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

1. Evidence will be excluded if it was gained through evidence uncovered in an

illegal arrest, unreasonable search or coercive interrogation, or violation of a particular
exclusionary law.
2. It is an offshoot of the Exclusionary Rule which applies to primary evidence.
The doctrine applies only to secondary or derivative evidence. There must first be a
primary evidence which is determined to have been illegally obtained then secondary
evidence is obtained because of the primary evidence. Since the primary evidence is
inadmissible, any secondary evidence discovered or obtained because of it may not also
be used.
a. The poisonous tree is the evidence seized in an illegal arrest, search or
interrogation. The fruit of this poisonous tree is evidence discovered because of
knowledge gained from the first illegal search, arrest, or interrogation or violation of a
law.
b. It is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the state should
not be used to gain other evidence because the original illegally obtained evidence
taints all those subsequently obtained.

C Illustrations:

A suspect as forced to make a confession where he revealed he took shabu from

the room of X. Based on this knowledge the police went to the house of X and with the
consent of X, searched his room and found the shabu. The confession is inadmissible
because of the exclusionary. It is the poisoned tree. The shabu is inadmissible because
knowledge of its existence was based on the confession. It is the fruit.

D. Exceptions to the two principles- when evidence is still admissible despite the
commission of an illegal arrest, search or interrogation, or violation of a particular
exclusionary law.

1. Under the Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery- Evidence is admissible even if

obtained through an unlawful arrest, search, interrogation, or violation of an
exclusionary law, if it can be established, to a very high degree of probability, that
normal police investigation would have inevitably led to the discovery of the evidence

2. Independent Source Doctrine- evidence is admissible if knowledge of the

evidence is gained from a separate or independent source that is completely unrelated
to the illegal act of the law enforcers.

3. Attentuation Doctrine: evidence maybe suppressed only if there is a clear

causal connection between the illegal police action and the evidence. Or, that the chain
of causation between the illegal action and the tainted evidence is too attenuated i.e
too thin, weak, decreased or fragile. This takes into consideration the following factors:

a). The time period between the illegal arrest and the ensuing confession or
consented search
b). The presence of intervening factors or events
c). The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct

E. Remedy : By filing a Motion to Suppress the Evidence

III. Evidence Excluded by the Constitution

A. Under Article III of the Constitution the following evidence are inadmissible
1. evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable search and
seizure
2. evidence obtained in violation of the privacy of communication and
correspondence, except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise
3. evidence consisting of extra-judicial confessions which are uncounselled, or
when the confessant was not properly informed of his constitutional rights, or when the
confession was coerced
4. evidence obtained in violation of the right against self-incrimination

B. Principles:

1. The exclusionary rule in all the foregoing provisions is TOTAL in that the
inadmissibility or incompetency applies to all cases, whether civil criminal or
administrative, and for all purposes.
2. The incompetency applies only if the evidence was obtained by law enforcers
or other authorized agencies of the government. It does not apply if the evidence was
obtained by private persons such as private security personnel or private detectives
even if they perform functions similar to the police whenever a crime was committed.
a). Thus evidence obtained by the following are not covered by the
constitutional provisions: (i) the security personnel or house detectives of hotels or
commercial establishments or schools (ii) private security agencies even if they are
guarding public or government buildings/offices (iii) employers and their agents.

It will be some other appropriate principle on the admissibility of evidence which

will govern.

b). However, by way of exception, the rule of incompetency applies if what are
involved are the private correspondence of an individual. In Zulueta vs. CA ( Feb. 1986)
it was held that pictures and love letters proving the infidelity of the husband, kept by
him in his private clinic, taken by the wife without the knowledge of the husband, are
inadmissible as evidence for being obtained in violation of the husband’s privacy of
communication and correspondence.
“ The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them
breaking the drawers and cabinet of the other and ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his or
her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is
available to him or her”

3. Secondary evidence resulting from a violation of the foregoing provisions is

inadmissible under the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine.

IV. R.A. 4200 ( The Anti Wire Tapping Law) Exclusion as to evidence obtained
through mechanical, electronic or other surveillance or intercepting devises.
(Intercepted communications)

A. Coverage: R.A 4200 declares that evidence is inadmissible if obtained through

any of the following ways:

1. By using any device to secretly eavesdrop, overhear, intercept or record any

communication or spoken word

a. The person who obtained the evidence may be a third person or a participant
in the conversation or communication.

FACTS: Ramirez and Garcia had a confrontation in the office of Garcia. Ramirez
secretly taped their verbal confrontation and used it as evidence in her action for
damages against Garcia who in turn filed a criminal case against Ramirez for violation of
R.A. 4200. Ramirez held that the taping by a participant to a conversation is not
covered by the law.

HELD: 1. The law does not make a distinction as to whether the party sought to
be penalized is a party or not to the private conversation. 2. The nature of the
conversation is immaterial… What is penalized is the act of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording private communications by the devices enumerate under
Section 1. (Ramirez vs. C.A., September 28, 1995)

b. To be admissible the consent of the person speaking or of all the parties to

the conversation. However consent is not necessary if the words which were taped or
recorded were not intended to be confidential as when the were intended to be heard
by an audience or when uttered under circumstances of time, place, occasion and
similar circumstances whereby it may reasonably be inferred that the conversation was
without regard to the presence of third persons.

c. Questions:
i). Does this apply if the recording of the words was unintentional or inadvertent,
such as conversations captured by a moving video camera?
ii). Are conversations in a police entrapment included?
iii). Is lip-reading included?
iv). Are conversations captured in surveillance cameras included?
v). Does this apply to secret taping through spy cameras purposely made to be
aired in television programs, such as “Bitag”, “XXX” and “Cheaters”?
vi). Are the gestures, snores, laughs, weeping, included as communication or
spoken words?
vii). What about satellite discs and similar facilities? Google earth?
 2. By the unauthorized tapping of any wire or cable as to communications used
via telephone/cable, as opposed to verbal communications.

a). There must be a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate

installation of a device or arrangement in order to over hear, intercept, or record the
spoken words.
i). hence over hearing through an extension telephone wire is not included even
if intentional because “ each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the
other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the
conversation ( Ganaan vs. IAC, 1986)
ii). Does the Ganaan ruling apply to overhearing by telephone operators of
hotels, schools, hospitals and similar establishments?

B. Exceptions: when evidence through secret recording or tapping is admissible

1. When Judicial Authorization was granted upon a written petition filed pursuant
to the provisions of R.A. 4200 if the crimes involve (a). treason (b) espionage (c)
provoking war and disloyalty ( d). piracy and mutiny in the high seas (e) sedition,
inciting to sedition (g)kidnapping (h) other offenses against national security.

The list is exclusive and does not include offenses which are equally or more
serious as those enumerated, such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, Trafficking in
Persons, Rape, Murder.

2.When Judicial Authorization is granted upon a written petition under R.A. 9372
( The Human Security Act of 2007) in connection with the crimes of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism. If granted the authority covers written communications.

VI. Exclusion by Certain Rules of Evidence

1. The rule excluding secondary evidence when the primary or best evidence is
available
2. The rule excluding hearsay evidence
3. The rule excluding privilege communications

VII. Kinds of Admissibility

A. Multiple Admissibility: when a material is asked by a party to be admitted as

evidence, the party presenting must inform the court of the purpose which the material
is intended to serve and the court then admits the material as evidence. Multiple
admissibility may mean either (i) the evidence is admissible for several purposes or (ii)
an evidence is not admissible for one purpose but may be admitted for a different
purpose if it satisfies all the requirements of the other purpose
1. Examples of the first concept: (a) a knife may be admitted to prove the
accused was armed with a deadly weapon; to prove the weapon is far deadlier than the
weapon of the victim; to prove it was the weapon of the accused which cause the
wounds and not some other instrument; to corroborate the statement of a witness who
claims he saw the accused holding a bladed instrument.
2. Example of the second concept: (a). the extra judicial confession of one of
several accused may not be admitted to prove there was conspiracy among them or to
prove the guilt of the other co-accused but it maybe admitted to prove the guilt of the
confessant (b) the statement of the victim may not be admitted as a dying declaration
but as part of the res gestae.
 B. Curative admissibility or “fighting fire with fire” or “Opening the Door”
1. This applies to a situation when improper evidence was allowed to be
presented by one party, then the other party may be allowed to introduce or present
similar improper evidence but only to cure or to counter the prejudicial effect of the
opponent’s inadmissible evidence.
2. The party presenting must have raised an objection to the improper evidence,
for if he did not, then it is discretionary for the court to allow him to present curative
evidence
3. The evidence sought to be countered should not refer to those which are
incompetent due to an exclusionary rule
4. Example: P vs. D for sum of money. P was allowed to introduce evidence that
D did not pay his debt as shown by his refusal to pay his indebtedness to X, Y and Z.
Defendant may introduce evidence that he paid his debts to A, B and C.

C. Conditional Admissibility: An evidence is allowed to be presented for the time

being or temporarily, subject to the condition that its relevancy or connection to other
facts will later be proven, or that the party later submit evidence that it meets certain
requirements of the law or rules. If the conditions are not later met, the evidence will
be stricken from the record.

1. Example: A Xerox copy of a document may be allowed to presented subject to

the condition that the original be later presented
2. Example: P vs. D to recover a parcel of land. P presents a document that the
land belonged to X. If D objects to it as being irrelevant, P can state that he will alter
show that X sold the land to Y who in turn sold it to Z and then to P. The Court may
admit the document conditionally.

VIII. Policy on the Admissibility of Evidence

A. Policy of Liberality: In case a question arises as to whether or not a particular

material should be admitted as evidence, Courts are given wide discretion what to
admit and to be liberal in admitting materials offered as evidence, unless the material is
clearly incompetent. The reasons are: (i) so that it may have a substantial range of
facts as basis for deciding the case and (ii) in case of appeal the appellate court may
have before it all the evidence to determine whether the decision appealed from is in
accordance with the evidence, (iii) to minimize any adverse effect of the non-admission
upon the party affected.

B. Limitations:

1. Evidence may be excluded even if relevant if its probative value is outweighed

by the risk that its admission will cause:
a). undue or unfair prejudice
b). confusion of the issues
c). misleads the court
d). undue delay or waste of time

2. The court has the power to limit the presentation of additional evidence which
are but cumulative, or to prove points which a party has already well presented

chain of custody
 Proof of a chain of custody is required when the evidence that is sought to be
introduced at trial is not unique or where the relevance of the evidence depends on its
analysis after seizure. A proper chain of custody requires three types of testimony: (1)
testimony that a piece of evidence is what it purports to be (for example, a litigant's
blood sample); testimony of continuous possession by each individual who has had
possession of the evidence from the time it is seized until the time it is presented in
court; and (3) testimony by each person who has had possession that the particular
piece of evidence remained in substantially the same condition from the moment one
person took possession until the moment that person released the evidence into the
custody of another (for example, testimony that the evidence was stored in a secure
location where no one but the person in custody had access to it).

Proving chain of custody is necessary to "lay a foundation" for the evidence in

question, by showing the absence of alteration, substitution, or change of condition.
Specifically, foundation testimony for tangible evidence requires that exhibits be
identified as being in substantially the same condition as they were at the time the
evidence was seized, and that the exhibit has remained in that condition through an
unbroken chain of custody. For example, suppose that in a prosecution for possession
of illegal narcotics, police sergeant A recovers drugs from the defendant; A gives police
officer B the drugs; B then gives the drugs to police scientist C, who conducts an
analysis of the drugs; C gives the drugs to police detective D, who brings the drugs to
court. The testimony of A, B, C, and D constitute a "chain of custody" for the drugs,
and the prosecution would need to offer testimony by each person in the chain to
establish both the condition and identification of the evidence, unless the defendant
stipulated as to the chain of custody in order to save time.

Chain of custody need not be demonstrated for every piece of tangible evidence
that is accepted into the trial court's record. Physical evidence that is readily identifiable
by the witness might not need to be supported by chain-of-custody proof. For example,
no chain-of-custody foundation is required for items that are imprinted with a serial
number or inscribed with initials by an officer who collected the evidence. Similarly,
items that are inherently distinctive or memorable (for example, a holdup note written
in purple crayon) might be sufficiently unique and identifiable that they establish the
integrity of the evidence.

Art. 224. Evasion through negligence. - If the evasion of the prisoner shall
have taken place through the negligence of the officer charged with the conveyance or
custody of the escaping prisoner, said officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary
special disqualification.

The elements of the crime under the abovementioned article are: [a] that the
offender is a public officer; [b] that he is charged with the conveyance or custody of a
prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment; and [c] that such
prisoner escapes through his negligence. [See Reyes, L.B., Revised Penal Code, Book II,
1977 ed., p. 407].

There is no question that the petitioner is a public officer. Neither is there any
dispute as to the fact that he was charged with the custody of a prisoner who was
being tried for a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The only disputed issue is the petitioner's negligence resulting in the escape of
detention prisoner Zenaida Andres. The negligence referred to in the Revised Penal
Code is such definite laxity as all but amounts to a deliberate non-performance of duty
on the part of the guard It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted
negligently and beyond the scope of his authority when he permitted his charge to
create the situation which led to her escape. The petitioner contends that human
considerations compelled him to grant Zenaida Andres' requests to take lunch and to go
to the comfort room to relieve herself.

As a police officer who was charged with the duty to return the prisoner directly
to jail, the deviation from his duty was clearly a violation of the regulations. In the first
place, it was improper for the petitioner to take lunch with the prisoner and her family
when he was supposed to bring his charge to the jail. He even allowed the prisoner and
her husband to talk to each other at the request of a co-officer.

It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary
precautions to assure the absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these
precautions will make his act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting to
deliberate non-performance of duty. His tolerance of arrangements whereby the
prisoner and her companions could plan and make good her escape should have
aroused the suspicion of a person of ordinary prudence.

The request for lunch and the consequent delay was an opportunity for the
prisoner to learn of a plan or to carry out an earlier plan by which she could escape.
The plan was in fact carried out with the help of the lady who accompanied his prisoner
inside the comfort room. The use of a toilet is one of the most familiar and common
place methods of escape. It is inconceivable that a police officer should fall for this trick.
The arrangement with a lady friend should have aroused the petitioner's suspicion
because the only pretext given by the petitioner was that she was going to answer the
call of nature. It was, therefore, unnecessary for her to be accompanied by anyone
especially by someone who was not urgently in need of a toilet if the purpose was
merely to relieve herself. Despite this, the petitioner allowed the two to enter the
comfort room without first establishing for himself that there was no window or door
allowing the possibility of escape. He even allowed the prisoner's companion to leave
the premises with the excuse that the prisoner was having her monthly period and that
there was a need to buy sanitary napkins. And he patiently waited for more than ten
minutes for the companion to return. This was patent negligence and incredible
naivette on the part of the police officer.

Contrary to what the petitioner claims, the escape was not a confluence of facts
and circumstances which were not foreseen and were not unnatural in the course of
things. Not only should they have been foreseen but they should have been guarded
against.

Considering that the city jail was only a kilometer away and it was only 11:30
a.m., it would not have been inhuman for the petitioner to deny the prisoner's request
to first take lunch. Neither would it have been inhuman if he cleared the toilet of female
occupants and checked all possible exits first and if he did not allow the lady companion
to go with Zenaida Andres to the comfort room. These human considerations, however,
are immaterial because the fact remains that as a police officer, he should have
exercised utmost diligence in the performance of his duty.

The supposed confluence of facts does not alter his liability. That he was not
trained in escorting women prisoners is likewise unacceptable as there are no hard and
fast rules of conduct under all conceivable situations for police officers acting as guards.
However, they are expected to use prudence, diligence, and common sense. That
Judge Pardo did not immediately pronounce judgment so the petitioner could have
immediately brought Zenaida back to jail is inconsequential. In the first place, the
escape would not have materialized had he immediately escorted her back to jail after
the hearing. That he cannot follow the prisoner inside the comfort room because it
would create a commotion, he being a male, is a lame excuse. There is nothing wrong
in asking the ladies for permission so he could check the comfort room first to insure
that the prisoner cannot escape. The fact that the building is made of concrete and the
outside windows covered with grills should not make a police officer complacent
especially because well-planned escapes are not uncommon. Escapes are, in fact, even
presumed so much so that two [2] guards are usually assigned to a prisoner. [tsn,
August 4, 1981, p. 40].

There appears to have been no genuine effort on the part of the petitioner to
recapture the escapee. Instead of promptly reporting the matter so that an alarm could
immediately be sent out to all police agencies and expert procedures followed, he
allegedly tried to look for her in the latter's house in Caloocan and failing in this,
proceeded to Nueva Ecija. It was only later in the evening that he formally reported the
matter to his superior. This even gave the escapee greater opportunity to make good
her escape because the chances of her being recaptured became much less. Such
action requires concerted police effort, not a one-man job which petitioner should have
been or was probably aware of.

The petitioner further contends that he cannot be convicted because there was
no connivance between him and the prisoner. In support of his claim, he cites the case
of Alberto v. dela Cruz, [98 SCRA 406]. The citation, however, is erroneous. It creates
the impression that for one to be held liable under Art. 224, there must be a showing
that he first connived with the prisoner. This was not the ruling in said case. Conniving
or consenting to evasion is a distinct crime under Art. 223 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petitioner here is not being charged with conniving under Art. 223 but for
evasion through negligence under Art. 224 of the same Code. It is, therefore, not
necessary that connivance be proven to hold him liable for the crime of infidelity in the
custody of prisoners. We quote the Solicitor General that the Sandiganbayan's
observation regarding escaped prisoners is relevant and timely. The Court stated:

It is high time that the courts should take strict measures against law officers to
whom have been entrusted the custody and detention of prisoners, whether detention
prisoners or prisoners serving sentence. Laxity and negligence in the performance of
their duties resulting in the mysterious escapes of notorious criminals have become
common news items, involving as it does, the suspicion that monetary considerations
may have entered into the arrangements which led to the successful escape of such
notorious criminals even from military custody. No quarters should be extended to such
kind of law officers who, deliberately or otherwise, fail to live up to the standard
required of their duties, thus directly contributing not only to the clogging of judicial
dockets but also to the inevitable deterioration of peace and order. (Bondoc vs
Sandiganbayan,et. al. G. R. No. L-58652 May 20, 1988).