LAND TITLES | Cases – Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse
ntinuous, adverse and
Incomplete Titles
1. Susi vs. Razon
2. Republic vs. Noval
3. Republic vs. IAC and ACME Plywood and Veneer Co.
4. Republic vs. Rovancy Realty
5. Republic vs. CA and Naguit
6. Republic vs. Herbierto
7. Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic
8. Republic vs. Bacas
9. Sps. Fortuna vs. Republic
SUSI VS. RAZON
G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon
and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff
the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the
second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the
Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land
is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of
title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay
plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and
every allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that
the land in question was a property of the Government of the United
States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands
before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with
law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff
entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the
Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs
against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took
this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The
holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff
and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is
controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to
recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the
sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering
that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the
Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be
cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the
Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold
the land in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the
same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for about
eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia
and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi
for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A).
Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already
paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the
firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he
had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of
the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza,
public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or
disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913,
commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to
recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after
considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered
judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon,
dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to
obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela
Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on
August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application,
Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915,
asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P).
After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of
Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to
Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of
Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to
Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required
Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do
so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice
of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F
and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions
raised by the appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in
possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and
publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880,
that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry
case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to
Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession
thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the
purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession
thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years.
And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made
said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can
hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the
period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory.
These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Cariño vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of
Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively
and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he
had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and
of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the
public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to
recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had
already become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff,
there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the
right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.
1
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without
special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
REPUBLIC VS. NOVAL
G.R. No. 170316, September 18, 2017
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOEL
AND ANDREA NOVAL, ELLEN N. DELOS REYES, DALE Y.
NOVAL, WINNIE T. REFI, ZENAIDA LAO, AND DAISY N.
MORALES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
When an applicant in the registration of property proves his or her
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of a land for the
period required by law, he or she has acquired an imperfect title that
may be confirmed by the State. The State may not, in the absence of
controverting evidence and in a pro forma opposition, indiscriminately
take a property without violating due process.
This Petition tor Review on Certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside
the August 5, 2005 Decision2 and the October 28, 200 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76912. The Court of Appeals
sustained the Municipal Trial Court April 19, 2002 Judgment in a land
registration case granting the application for registration of title filed by
Spouses Joel and Andrea Noval (the Spouses Naval), Ellen N. delos
Reyes (delos Reyes), Zenaida Lao (Lao), Winnie T. Refi (Refi), Dale Y.
Naval (Dale), and Daisy N. Morales (Morales) (collectively, applicants).
On September 8, 1999, the applicants sought the registration of their
titles over the subdivided portions of a land in Barangay Casili,
Consolacion, Cebu, designated as Lot 4287 of Consolacion Cadastre.
They alleged to have acquired their respective portions of this land by
"purchase, coupled with continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and
peaceful possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years
including [the possession] of their predecessors-in-interest." They also
alleged that they were in actual possession of their respective portions
of the property.4
The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
Opposition on the ground that the applicants failed to prove open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property since
June 12, 1945.5 It also argued that the property sought to be registered
was part of the public domain.6It alleged that the tax declarations and
tax payment receipts attached to the application were not competent to
show bona fide acquisition or open and continuous possession of the
land.7
The applicants' immediate predecessor-in-interest was Cecilia Alilin
Quindao (Cecilia), who was already 73 years old when she testified
before the trial court. She said that she was familiar with Lot 4287
since she was 15 years old. Her grandmother, Flaviana Seno Alilin
(Flaviana), had already possessed and owned this property and
enjoyed the fruits of 15 coconut trees already growing there. Her
grandmother's possession was "peaceful exclusive, adverse, public
and in the concept of [an] owner."8
Cecilia's father, Miguel Alilin (Miguel), inherited the property when
Flaviana died.9 Cecilia was then 20 years old.10 Miguel tilled and
cultivated the land and planted root crops, corn and other
plants.11 Their family enjoyed the fruits of his cultivation of the
land.12 When he died, Cecilia inherited the property.13She also tilled the
land and declared it in her name for taxation.14 She even shared the
produce of the land with her tenant.15 Later, she sold the property to
Joel Noval (Joel) and Elizabeth Messerli (Messerli). 16 Messerli sold her
property to the Spouses Noval and Refi.17 Soon the property was
partitioned as follows: Lot 1 to the Spouses Noval; Lot 2 to Gertrudes
Noval, who later donated hiS, share to delos Reyes; Lot 3 to Lao; Lot 4
to Refi; Lot 5 to Dale; and Lot 7 to Dale and Morales.18 All of them later
on took possession of their respective portions and declared them in
their respective names.19
The Municipal Trial Court granted their application for registration of
title. It declared the applicants to be the absolute owners and
possessors of their respective lots, having established conclusively that
they are the exclusive owners and peaceful possessors of the
properties. The trial court ordered the issuance of decrees of
registration upon finality of its judgment.20
The Republic appealed the Decision of the trial court,21 arguing that the
applicants failed to show open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of alienable and disposable lands for 30 years.22 It
reiterated that tax declarations may not be used as bases for the grant
of the application.23 It added that there was no Department of
Environment and Natural Resources report submitted to show when
the properties were declared alienable and disposable, for the purpose
of computin2 the 30-year period of possession required by law.24
The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed25 the Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court.26
The Court of Appeals found that the required period of possession in
land registration cases was satisfied. It noted that Cecilia was already
73 years old when she testified in 2000 that the property had already
been owned and possessed by Cecilia's grandmother since Cecilia
was 15 years old. It held that at 15 years of age, she was already
competent to perceive that her grandmother's possession was in the
concept of an owner.27
The Court of Appeals also found that while the applicants did not
submit a Department of Environment and Natural Resources report
showing that the property had been declared alienable and disposable,
the Republic was not relieved of the duty to present evidence that the
land belongs to the public domain. It ruled that the burden is upon the
State to prove that land is public domain when it has been possessed
and cultivated by an applicant and his or her predecessors-in-interest
for a considerable number of years without action from the State. The
Court of Appeals added that the open, continuous, adverse, and public
possession of land from time immemorial confers an effective title to
the possessor.28
The Court of Appeals likewise recognized that while tax declarations
are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they may give weight to a
claim of ownership when coupled with open, adverse, and continuous
possession.29
The Republic sought the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
Decision, but this was denied in a Resolution30 dated October 28,
2005.31
Hence, this Petition32 was filed.
Petitioner argues that respondents failed to show that they or their
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land for the period required
by law.33 It also contends that the tax declarations presented by
respondents are not conclusive evidence of ownership and possession
for at least 30 years.34 It likewise asserts that the property may not be
registered without a certification from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources that it has been declared alienable and
disposable.35 Failure to show such certification means that the land
belongs to the State.36 It submits that the burden of proof is upon
respondents to show that Lot 4287 had already been declared
alienable and disposable at the time of their application.37
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that Cecilia's testimony was
sufficient to establish the nature of her possession and that of her
predecessors-in-interest.38 Thy submit that the property has been
declared for tax purposes since 194539 and that while the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources did not issue a certification, it
did approve their survey plan when the property was partitioned.40
For this Court's resolution is the sole issue of whether or not the Court
of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court decision to allow the
Spouses Joel and Andrea Noval, Ellen N. delos Reyes, Dale Y. Noval,
2
Winnie T. Refi, Zenaida Lao, and Daisy N. Morales to register their
respective portions of Lot 4287.
I (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Any person seeking relief under Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the
Public Land Act, admits that the property being applied for is public
land.
Under the Public Land Act, public lands may be disposed of through
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.41 Confirmation of title
may be done judicially or through the issuance of a free patent. 42 The
process for judicial confirmation of title is outlined in Section 48 of the
Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073:43
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any s ch lands
or an interest therein. but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
....
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against
the government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
When a person applies for judicial confirmation of title, he or she
already holds an incomplete or imperfect title over the property being
applied for, after having been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The date "June 12, 1945" is the reckoning date of the applicant's
possession and occupation, and not the reckoning date of when the
property was classified as alienable and disposable.44 In Heirs of
Malabanan v. Republic:45
[T]he choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the
determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the
lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession
and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated
with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court
should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written
by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land
subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant's imperfect or
incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation sine
June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property
subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not
the ownership or title over it.46
Thus, a property applied for judicial confirmation of title may be
classified as alienable and disposable at any time. For the purposes of
judicial confirmation of title, only possession and occupation must be
reckoned from June 12, 1945.
II
The Public Land Act is a special law that applies only to alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain, and not to forests, mineral
lands, and national parks.47Heirs of Malabanan v.
Republic48 categorized alienable and disposable lands into: "(a)
patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private
ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural."49 Thus, for Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act to apply,
the property first, must be agricultural land of the public domain,
and second, must have been declared as alienable and disposable.50
Parenthetically, not all lands and natural resources, by default, belong
to the State.
The theory that all lands belong to the State was introduced in this
jurisdiction. during the Spanish colonization. When Spain transferred
sovereignty of the Philippines to the United States in 1898 through the
Treaty of Paris, the United States opted not to adopt this concept.
Instead, it created new presumptions with respect to land ownership.
This was thoroughly explained in Carino v. Insular Government:51
It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal
feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown, ... It is true also
that, in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against
foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted,
absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of
the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such
power. When, theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of
strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist
upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the pas{, and
how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.
The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor
General, in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never
was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish
Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials
would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to
which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish laws, and which
would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have
been the technical position of Spain, it does not follow that, in the view
of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser
when the present government seized his land. The argument to that
effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an
important part of the island of Luzon, at least, for the want of
ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not
the power to enforce.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the
white race in the United, States. Whatever consideration may have
been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of
the whites in America was to occupy the land. It is obvious that,
however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was
different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent
with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit
their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c.
1369, � 12, 32 Stat. 691, all the property and rights acquired there by
the United States are to be administered "for the benefit of the
inhabitants thereof." It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus
assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably
its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The
same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.
It provides that "no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." �
5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from � 12, it is
hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next
breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet or
that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never
had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by
native custom and by long association - one of the profoundest factors
in human thought - regarded as their own.52 (Emphasis supplied)
The United States chose to limit its sovereign exercise to the fiduciary
administration of the Philippines. Instead of exercising absolute power
3
with respect to property rights, it chose to adopt due process as
embodied in the Bill of Rights. This due process clause is already
found in our present Constitution. Thus, Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution states:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Most notably, however, Carino created a presumption against State
ownership and recognized private property rights independent of State
grant. Thus:
[E]very presumption is and ought to be against the government in a
case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say
that when, as far back testimony or memory goes, the land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land.53
Carino did not qualify that the existence of property rights independent
of State grant and the presumptions on land registration apply only to
the indigenous cultural communities, These principles can be seen in
the present land registration laws.
Under the Public Land Act, ownership is recognized if possession
dates back since June 12, 1945 or earlier.54 The law refers to this as
"judicial legalization," which allows for agricultural public lands to be
disposed of by the, State and acquired by Filipino citizens.55
Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, has
a similar provision, but also recognizes ownership through
prescription.56 Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:�
� (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Section 14(1) does not vest or create a title to public land.57 The
procedure of registering one's title "simply recognizes and documents
ownership and provides for the consequences of issuing paper titles." 58
These provisions are the latest versions of a catena of provisions on
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.59 All these laws
recognize ownership acquired through possession and occupation in
the concept of an owner.
That the law provides for confirmation of titles based on possession
and occupation is an acknowledgment of the existence of property
rights independent of State grants. It is ail. acknowledgment $at
registration is a means only to document ownership already acquired.
Be that as it may, applicants for judicial confirmation of title must still
comply with the requisites stated in Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his
predecessor-in�-interest, has been in possession
and occupation of the property subject of the
application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken
place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.60
III
Petitioner argues that respondents were unable to prove that they and
their predecessor-in-interest were able to prove their open and
continuous possession and occupation of the property for the period
required by law. It describes respondents' and their predecessor-in-
interest's possession as mere casual cultivation, which is not the
possession contemplated by land registration laws.
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Court of Appeals established
that respondents and their predecessor-in-interest were the exclusive
owners and possessors of the land. Both courts affirmed that
respondents have met the required period of possession for land
registration cases.61 They acknowledged the credibility of the testimony
of respondents' predecessor-�in-interest, which established
possession of Lot 4287 in the concept of an owner since 1942 or
earlier.62 This means that respondents and their predecessor-in-
interest have already been in occupation and possession of the land
for more than 50 years at the time of their application for registration.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari.63 This Court has repeatedly said that findings of facts of the
lower courts deserve high respect since they are in the best position to
pass judgment on the credibility of the witnesses and their statements.
This Court rarely questions facts as determined by the lower court,
especially when they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
findings of facts are often conclusive upon this Court, subject only to a
few exceptions:
surmises or conjectures . . .; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible . . .; (3) Where there is a grave abuse
of discretion . . .; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts . . .; (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting . . .; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee . . .; (7) The findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court . . .; (8) When
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition
well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by
the evidence on record . . .64
This case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Since the Court of
Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court, and there is no showing
that the conclusions made by both courts are either made with grave
abuse of discretion or contrary to the evidence presented and the law,
this Court will not disturb these findings.
Respondents' predecessor-in-interest recalled her grandmother to
have already cultivated fruit-bearing trees on Lot 4287 when she was
15 years old. Possession prior to that "can hardly be estimated . . . the
period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory."65
Hence, respondents' and their predecessor-in-interest's possession is,
with little doubt, more than 50 years at the time of respondents'
application for registration in 1999. This is more than enough to satisfy
the period of possession required by law for acquisition of ownership.
IV
The burden of proving that the property is an alienable and disposable
4
agricultural land of the public domain falls on the applicant, not the
State.66 The Office of the Solicitor General, however, has the
correlative burden to present effective evidence of the public character
of the land.67
In order to establish that an agricultural land of the public domain has
become alienable and disposable, "an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute."68 It is settled that the declaration of alienability must
be through executive fiat, as exercised by the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. 69Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties70 provided further:
The applicant for land registration must prove that the [Department of
Environment and Natural Resources] Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the [Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer]
or [City Environment and Natural Resources Officer]. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the [Department of Environment and Natural
Resources] Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records.71
Admittedly, respondents have failed to present any document from the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
certifying that the property is part of the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals
observed, as this Court has, that the Office of the Solicitor General has
failed to "present any evidence, testimonial or documentary evidence
to support its opposition."72
When the State has no effective opposition, except for a pro forma
opposition, to controvert an applicant's convincing evidence of
possession and occupation, presumptions are tilted to this applicant's
favor.73 In Republic v. Barandiaran:74
"[W]here it appears that the evidence of ownership and possession are
so significant and convincing, the government is not necessarily
relieved of its duty from presenting proofs to show that the parcel of
land sought to be registered is part of the public domain to enable [the
courts] to evaluate the evidence of both sides." . . . [W]hen the records
shows that a certain property, the registration of title to which is applied
for has been possessed and cultivated by the applicant and his
predecessors in interest for a long number of years without the
government taking any action to dislodge the occupants from their
holdings, and when the land has passed from one hand to another by
inheritance or by purchase, the government is duty bound to prove that
the land which it avers to be of public domain is really of such
nature.75 (Citations omitted)
Indeed, the Public Land Act itself establishes a conclusive presumption
in favor of the possessor that all conditions essential to a State grant,
including the conversion of a land in the public domain to a private
property, have been performed, entitling him or her to a certificate of
title.76
Therefore, when an applicant is shown to have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of a land for the
period required by law, he or she has acquired an imperfect title that
may be confirmed by the State. The State may not, for the simple
reason that an applicant failed to show documents which the State is in
the best position to acquire, indiscriminately take an occupied property
and unjustly and self-�servingly refuse to acknowledge legally
recognized rights evidenced by possession, without violating due
process.77
The burden of evidence lies on the party who asserts an affirmative
allegation.78 Therefore, if the State alleges that lands belong to it, it is
not excused from providing evidence to support this allegation. 79 This
specially applies when the land in question has no indication of being
incapable of registration80 and has been exclusively occupied by an
applicant or his or her predecessor-in-interest without opposition-not
even from the State.
Hence, when a land has been in the possession of the applicants and
their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial and there is no
manifest indication that it is unregistrable, it is upon the State to
demonstrate that the land is not alienable and disposable. "[A] mere
formal opposition on the part of the [Solicitor General] . . ., unsupported
by satisfactory evidence, will not stop the courts from giving title to the
claimant."81
This Court's previous rulings imposing the burden of overcoming the
presumption that a land is public should only be strictly applied when a
manifestly unregistrable land is in danger of fraudulent titling-not when
it will promote unfairness and violation of due process rights.
Respondents' and their predecessor-in-interest's possession was
never opposed, even at the time of application, by the government
agencies tasked to ensure that public lands remain public. There was
neither indication nor mention that Lot 4287 was forest, timber land, or
belonging to a reservation.
The State also kept silent on respondents' and their predecessor-in
interest's continuously paid taxes. The burden to prove the public
character of Lot 4287 becomes more pronounced when the State
continuously accepts payment of real property taxes. This Court
acknowledges its previous rulings that payment of taxes is not
conclusive evidence of ownership.82 However, it is good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, and when coupled with
continuous possession, it constitutes strong evidence of title.
No person in the right mind would pay taxes on real property over
which he or she does not claim any title.83 Its declaration not only
manifests a sincere desire to obtain title to a property; it may be
considered as an announcement of an adverse claim against State
ownership.84 It would be unjust for the State to take properties which
have been continuously and exclusively held since time immemorial
without showing any basis for the taking, especially when it has
accepted tax payments without question.
However, despite these circumstances, petitioner failed to show any
evidence that Lot 4287 remained public land. Instead, it conveniently
relied on the absence of a Department of Environment and Natural
Resources certification.
Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that respondents' evidence,
coupled with the absence of contradictory evidence from petitioner,
substantially establishes that respondents have complied with the
requisites of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree. The Municipal Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals did not err in approving the registration of the
property.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 5,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76912 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC VS. IAC AND ACME PLYWOOD AND VENEER CO.
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD &
VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
5
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in
favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land
measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as
amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial
court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by
Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines
and registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by
Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to
the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on
the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9),
Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding
was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer
Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are
cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of
1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29,
1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land
relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
dates back before the Philippines was discovered by
Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and
occupied the land from generation to generation until the
same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer
Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from
1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels
who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land
on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already
considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting
absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes
on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether
with the alienable or disposable public land or within the
public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has
introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00)
Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen
by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought
to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to
be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite
from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation
came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of
Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and
which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government
of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special
session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except
as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand.
Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have
been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973
Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable
law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition
not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when
Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was
reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48,
paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a
bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted
findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this
Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of
the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through
their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by
reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of
the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there
any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is
disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any
provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article
XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not
the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be
confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981
when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the
prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the
public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands
at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they
were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the
negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands,
the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company
vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In
that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than
6
60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in
1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had
been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their
predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of
the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title
to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land,
dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical
person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural
persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public
land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the
dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be
public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to
any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it
is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b),
Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to
be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition
makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable
agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an
imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the
public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title
subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we
should not make any distinction or qualification. The
prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a
Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The
proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is
public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30,
1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of
cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down
to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land
and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the
better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a
consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It
was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title
to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time
and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under
the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient
family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or
better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to
mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from all but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in
more categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all
the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter
VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the
grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned
by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the
provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of
the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela
Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made
was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby
acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned,
likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de
Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the
Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
11
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942,
which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and
by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested
on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of
public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the
Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as
specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law,
a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity
of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore,
ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority
of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced
by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land which is of the character and
duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant
from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the
possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be
little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether
the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time;
and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize
a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the
land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already affected by operation of law from the moment the required
period of possession became complete. As was so well put
in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made,
was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred
by the decree, if not by earlier law."
7
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to
which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force
(or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect
later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public"
land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors,
until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate
proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious
question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to
prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public
land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called
"incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in
excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that
confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973
Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public
domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into
effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This
Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no
retroactive application to the sales application of Binan
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a
vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973
Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be
abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to
purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one
thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition
action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested
rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of
a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of
the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police
power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation
to purchase the land in question had become fixed and
established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law
for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the
said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to
obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be
deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands
vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted
by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another
accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than
procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the
right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there
being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels,
under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in
themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the
letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-
in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional
mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds,
that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer
deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the
line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30
years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable
title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's
holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person,
Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under
section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial
and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's
application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows
only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to
apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and
would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming
that there was a technical error not having filed the
application for registration in the name of the Piguing
spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the
land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any
prohibition against the application being refiled with
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and
vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable
acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It
should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the
great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names
and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court
can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See
Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended to
conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to
apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had
acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the
Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the
applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to
the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of
title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names,
deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in
empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and
speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application
of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the
dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively
recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only
reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of
which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in
many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as
well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice
Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the
petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article
XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the
main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
8
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby
affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC VS. ROVANCY REALTY
G.R. No. 190817
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs.
ROVENCY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set
aside the 10 March 2009 Decision1 and the 3 December 2009
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00651,
which affirmed the 7 November 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City, in LRA Case No. N-
2000-084, which granted the application for original registration of title
to land by respondent Rovency Realty and Development
Corporation (RRDC).
THE FACTS
On 22 March 2001, RRDC filed before the RTC an Amended
Application for Registration4 covering a parcel of land identified as Lot
No. 3009 (subject land) situated in Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de
Oro City, described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 3009, Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre) situated
in the Barrio of Carmen, City of Cagayan de Oro, Island of Mindanao.
Bounded on the S., along line 1-2 by Lot 6648; on the NW., along line
2-3 by Lot 30011; along line 3-4 by Lot 301 O; along line 4-5 by Lot
3047; along line 5-6 by Lot 3020; on the N., along line 6-7 by Lot 3007;
on the SE., along line 8-9 by Lot 6645; along line 9-1 by Lot 3008; all of
Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre.
Beginning at the point marked "1" on the plan being N. 51 deg. 24'W.,
1091.05 m. from PBM No. 24, Cad-237, Thence;
1-2 S. 79 deg. 15'W. 260.92 m.
2-3 N. 19 deg. 02'E. 231.49 m.
3-4 N. 13 deg. 32'E. 489.77 m.
4-5 N. 61 deg. 39'E. 302.54 m.
5-6 N. 40 deg. 09'E. 146.06 m.
6-7 S. 82 deg. 14'E. 140.06 m.
7-8 S. 24 deg. 28'E. 152.88 m.
8-9 S. 34 deg. 00'W. 448.33 m.
9-1 S. 33 deg. 26'W. 445.73 m.
beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY FIVE (318,345) square
meters more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and
marked on the ground by Old BL., cyl. cone. mons. 15 x 60 cm.
Bearing true, date of Original Survey August 9 & 13, 1929, and that of
the preparation June 29, 2000, executed by Crisanto M. Bagares,
Geodetic Engineer and approved on August 1, 2000.5
RRDC alleged, among others, that it is a domestic corporation duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines; that it is the absolute owner in fee simple of the
subject land having acquired the same from its previous owner, P.N.
Roa Enterprises, Inc., by virtue of a notarized deed of absolute sale
executed on 05 March 1997; that the subject land was assessed at
₱2,228,000.00 as shown in the Tax Declaration (TD) No. 141011; that
it has registered the subject land for taxation purposes and paid the
realty taxes due therein from its acquisition, to the filing of the
application; that immediately after acquiring the subject land, it took
actual physical possession of the same and has been continuously
occupying the subject land; and that it and its predecessors-in- interest
have been in open, continuous, adverse, and peaceful possession in
concept of owner of the subject land since time immemorial, or for
more than thirty (30) years.
Attached to the application are: original copy of the technical
description of the subject land6; the Tracing Cloth Plan of the survey
plan7; Certification in Lieu of Surveyor's/Geodetic Engineer's
Certificate8 issued by the Chief of the Land Surveys Assistance
Section, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region
X; T.D. No. 141011 in the name of RRDC9 ; and the Deed of Absolute
Sale between RRDC and P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc., dated 5 March
1997.10
On 16 July 2001, an opposition to the application was filed by the Heirs
of Paulino Avancena. They alleged, that the subject land was already
claimed and owned by the late Atty. Paulino Avancena (Paulino), their
father and predecessor-in-interest, as early as 1926; that Paulino had
been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse, and exclusive
possession and occupation of the subject land; that Paulino registered
the subject land for taxation purposes and has paid the taxes due
thereon in 1948; that their parents, Paulino and Rizalina
Neri (Rizalina) merely allowed and tolerated Pedro N.
Roa's (Pedro) possession of the subject land after the latter
approached them and requested that he be allowed to use the subject
land for his businesses; that Pedro is one of RRDC's predecessors-in-
interest; that sometime in 1994, Rizalina demanded the return of the
subject land from the heirs of Pedro, but to no avail; that in 1996,
Rizalina died leaving the private oppositors as the rightful heirs of the
subject land; that their parents never sold the subject land to Pedro nor
to RRDC, and as such, no right or title over the subject land was
passed on to RRDC. Thus, they prayed that RRDC's application be
dismissed, and that their opposition be treated as their own application
for registration.11
On 3 August 2001, the petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed its opposition to the application on the following grounds:
that neither RRDC nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the subject
land exceeds the twelve (12)-hectare limit for confirmation of imperfect
title set by Section 47 of Commonwealth Act (CA.) No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6940; and that the subject land
forms part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and, thus,
not subject to private appropriation.12
During trial, RRDC presented the following documents in support of its
application: (i) Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by notary public
Paulino Avancena showing that the subject land was sold by Catalino
Ebalo to Nicolas Beja and Maximo Amper on 21 June 193713 ; (ii) Deed
of Absolute Sale notarized by notary public Paulino A vancefia showing
that a portion of the subject land consisting of 159, 178.5 square
meters (first portion) was sold by Maximo Amper to Perfecto Virtudazo
on 07 October 194014 ; (iii) Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by notary
public Troadio C. Ubay-ubay showing that the first portion consisting of
15 hectares, 91 ares and 72 centares (159,172 square meters) was
sold by Trinidad Virtudazo, Israel Virtudazo, and Adelina Virtudazo to
Victor D. Beja on 22 April 196115 ; (iv) Deed of Absolute Sale showing
9
that the first portion of the subject land consisting of 159,172 square
meters was sold by Victor D. Beja to Pedro N. Roa on 01 February
19616 ; (v) Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by notary public Troadio C.
Ubay-ubay showing that the other portion (second portion) of the
subject land was sold by Nicolas Beja to Victor Beja on 22 April
196117 ; (vi) Deed of Sale showing that the second portion was sold by
Victor Beja to Pedro N. Roa on 01 February 196718 ; (vii) Deed of
Exchange notarized by notary public Jose L. Sabio, Jr. showing that
the two portions of the subject land were conveyed by Pedro N. Roa in
favor of P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc. on 23 September 1987; 19 and (viii)
Deed of Sale notarized by Rene C. Barbaso showing that the two (2)
portions of the subject land were sold by P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc. to
RRDC on 25 July 1996.20
RRDC also presented a certification21 from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),Cagayan de Oro
City, certifying that the subject land is alienable and disposable and not
covered by any public land application patent and hence, no patent has
been issued thereon. Lastly, RRDC presented several tax declarations
in the name of its predecessors-in-interest, the earliest of which is T.D.
No. 91264, which showed that realty taxes on the subject land have
been paid in 1947.22
On the other hand, to support their claim that a patent over the subject
land had been issued in the name of their father, the private oppositors
presented a certification23 issued by the Records Management Division
of the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources which merely states that " ...according to the
verification made by the Geodetic Surveys Division, survey plan no.
Psu-45882 with an accession no. 284578 is located at Cagayan,
Misamis, as per their EDP listing. It is unfortunate however that as of
this moment, this office (Records Management Division) cannot locate
said records despite diligent search made thereon."
The RTC Ruling
In its decision, dated 7 November 2003, the RTC granted RRDC's
application for registration of the subject land. It opined that the
CENRO certification, stating that the subject land is alienable and
disposable and not covered by any public land application, is sufficient
to show the character of the land. It further ruled, that RRDC and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open and continuous possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership over the subject land based on
the documentary and testimonial evidence offered by RRDC, without
discussing how these pieces of evidence established the required
possession.
The trial court further brushed aside the opposition interposed by the
heirs of Paulino Avanceña. It was not convinced that the evidence they
presented were sufficient to grant the application in their favor. It noted
that the oppositors' claim that they were the rightful owners of the
subject land does not hold water considering that the deeds of sale
presented by RRDC in support of their claim were notarized by Paulino
himself.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court considering the evidence of the applicant,
the reports of the Land Registration Authority, Director of Lands and
the Certification of the CENRO, DENR, Cagayan de Oro City, hereby
declares that the applicant, Rovency Realty & Development
Corporation, have sufficient title proper for registration over the parcel
of land subject of this application. The opposition of the Heirs of
Paulino Avanceña, is hereby ordered dismissed, being lack of merit.
Accordingly, in accordance with the prayer of the applicant herein, the
Commissioner, or anyone acting on his behalf is hereby directed to
ISSUE A DECREE OF REGISTRATION and the CORRESPONDING
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE FOR THE PARCEL OF LAND described in
the instant application in favor of RO VEN CY REAL TY and
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. SO ORDERED.24
Unconvinced, the Republic, through the OSG, and private oppositors
heirs of Paulino Avancena, elevated their respective appeals to the
CA.25
The Republic contended that the trial court erred in granting the
application for registration, considering that the land applied for is in
excess of what is allowed by the Constitution; and that the Corporation
Code further prohibits RRDC to acquire the subject land unless the
acquisition thereof is reasonably necessary for its business. On the
other hand, the Avancena heirs insisted that they are the rightful
owners of the subject land, by virtue of the homestead patent granted
to their predecessor-in-interest.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed decision, dated 10 March 2009, the CA affirmed the 7
November 2003 RTC decision. The appellate court concurred with the
trial court's findings that the subject land is alienable and disposable,
and that RRDC has sufficiently established the required period and
character of possession. Likewise, the appellate court was not
persuaded by the claims of the heirs. It noted that the private
oppositors anchored their claim on the alleged homestead grant to
Paulino, their predecessor-in-interest, which claim was unsupported by
sufficient documentary evidence.
The appellate court also ruled that the 12-hectare limit under the
Constitution was not violated. It explained that Section 3 of Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution, the constitutional provision which provided for
the 12-hectare limit in the acquisition of land, covers only agricultural
lands of the public domain. It ratiocinated that when the subject land
was acquired through acquisitive prescription by RRDC's
predecessors-in-interest, it was converted into a private property and,
as such, it ceased to be part of the public domain. Thus, when RRDC
acquired the subject land by purchase, it was no longer within the
ambit of the constitutional limitation.
As to the contention that the Corporation Code bars RRDC to acquire
the subject land, the appellate court simply stated that while the said
code imposes certain limitations on the acquisition of real property,
there is no such prohibition. It stressed that RRDC is an artificial being
imbued with the power to purchase, hold, and convey real and
personal property for such purposes that are within the objects of its
creation. Considering that RRDC is a corporation engaged in realty
business, it has the power to purchase real properties. The dispositive
portion of said decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed November 7, 2003
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Branch
41, Cagayan de Oro City is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.26
The Republic moved for reconsideration; while the Heirs of Paulino
Avanceña adopted the Republic's motion for reconsideration as their
own. In its resolution, dated 3 December 2009, the CA denied the
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
THE ISSUES
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE AMENDED
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION AND ORDERING THE
ISSUANCE OF A DECREE OF REGISTRATION AND THE
CORRESPONDING CERTIFICATE OF TITLE FOR A PARCEL OF
LAND CONTAINING AN AREA OF THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY FIVE (318,345) SQUARE
METERS IN FAVOR OF ROVENCY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, DESPITE THE FACTS THAT-
(i) THE LAND APPLIED FOR REGISTRATION OF
TITLE IS IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS ALLOWED BY
LAW; AND,
(ii) RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO ACQUIRE THE
SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS FURTHER
LIMITED BY THE CORPORATION CODE.
10
 II.
RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT IT
OR ITS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN,
CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION
UNDER A BONA FIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE JUNE 12,
1945 OR EARLIER AND THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NO LONGER
INTENDED FOR PUBLIC USE OR FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE NATIONAL WEALTH.27
THE COURT'S RULING
The petition is meritorious.
12-hectare limit under Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution
The Republic argues that the trial and appellate courts erred in
granting RRDC's application for the registration of the subject land, as
the same has a total land area of 31.8 hectares, which is way beyond
the 12-hectare limit under Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of
the public domain may be further classified by law according to the
uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not
more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant. [emphasis
supplied]
As can be clearly gleaned from its language, Section 3, Article XII
applies only to lands of the public domain. Private lands are, therefore,
outside of the prohibitions and limitations stated therein. Thus, the
appellate court correctly declared that the 12-hectare limitation on the
acquisition of lands under Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
has no application to private lands.
A case in point is the absolute prohibition on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This
prohibition could be traced to the 1973 Constitution which limited the
alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens
of the Philippines. This constitutional prohibition, however, does not
necessarily mean that corporations may not apply for original
registration of title to lands. In fact, the Court, in several instances,
affirmed the grant of applications for original registration filed by
corporations,28 for as long as the lands were already converted to
private ownership by operation of law as a result of satisfying the
requisite possession required by the Public Land Act.29
In Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court30 (Director of
Lands), the Court granted the application for original registration of
parcels of land filed by a corporation which acquired the lands by
purchase from members of the Dumagat tribe. The Court ratiocinated
that the lands applied for registration were already private lands even
before the corporation acquired them. The Court observed that the
sellers, being members of the national cultural minorities, had by
themselves and through their predecessors, possessed and occupied
the lands since time immemorial. As a consequence of their open,
exclusive, and undisputed possession over the said lands for the
period required by law for the acquisition of alienable lands of the
public domain, said lands ceased to become part of the public land and
were converted, by operation of law, into private ownership. As such,
the sellers, if not for their conveyance of the lands in question to the
corporation, were entitled to exercise the right granted to them by the
Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Considering
further that the lands in question were already private in character at
the time the corporation acquired them, the constitutional prohibition
does not apply to the corporation.
In Republic v. TA.N. Properties 31 (TA.N. Properties), the Court
stressed that what is determinative for the application of the doctrine
in Director of Lands is for the corporate applicant for land registration to
establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private
land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive
period of 30 years had already lapsed.
The pronouncements in Director of Lands and TA.N. Properties apply
with equal force to the 12-hectare limitation, considering that both the
limitation and the prohibition on corporations to acquire lands, do not
cover ownership of private lands. Stated differently, whether RRDC
can acquire the subject land and to what extent, depends on whether
the pieces of evidence it presented before the trial court sufficiently
established that the subject land is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; and that the nature and duration of the possession of its
individual predecessors-in-interest converted the subject land to private
land by operation of law.
Requirements for original registration of title to land
In Republic of the Philippines vs. Cortez,32 the Court explained that
applicants for original registration of title to land must first establish
compliance with the provisions of either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2)
of P.D. No. 1529, which state:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
It must be emphasized that the requirements and bases for registration
under these two provisions of law differ from one another. Section 14
(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14
(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription.33 Thus, it is
important to ascertain under what provision of Section 14 the
registration is sought.
A reading of the application, however, is unavailing. In its application,
RRDC alleged that it and its predecessors-in-interest "had been in
open, continuous, adverse, and peaceful possession in concept of
owner of the subject property since time immemorial or for more than
thirty years." This allegation made it unclear whether registration is
sought under Section 14(1) - possession since 12 June 1945 or earlier;
or under Section 14(2) - possession for more than thirty years.
An examination of the 7 November 2003 RTC decision also proved
futile considering that, and as previously pointed out, aside from
enumerating the exhibits offered by the applicant, the trial court did not
discuss how these pieces of evidence established the requisites for
registration. Thus, for the proper resolution of the issues and
arguments raised herein, it becomes necessary for the present
application to be scrutinized based on the requirements of the
provisions of Sections 14 (1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529
Under Section 14(1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish the following requisites: first, that the subject land forms part
of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the same; and third, that the possession is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, or earlier.34
The first requisite of Section 14(1) entails only that the property sought
to be registered be alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of
the application for registration.35 To prove that the land sought to be
registered is alienable and disposable, the present rule is that the
11
application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a
CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary, and certified as true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records.36This strict
requirement for the registration of lands enunciated in TA.N
Properties had been consistently applied and affirmed by the Court in a
plethora of cases.37
In the present case, to prove that the subject land is alienable and
disposable, RRDC presented a CENRO certification stating that the
subject land is "alienable and disposable and not covered by any
public land application." RRDC, however, failed to present a certified
true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
declaring the subject land alienable and disposable. Clearly, the
evidence presented by RRDC falls short of the requirements in TA.N.
Properties. Thus, the trial and appellate courts erred when they ruled
that the subject land is alienable and disposable part of the public
domain and susceptible to original registration.
Furthermore, RRDC also failed to prove that it and its individual
predecessors-in-interest sufficiently complied with the required period
and nature of possession.
An applicant for land registration must exhibit that it and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. It has been held
that possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious,
and not clandestine; it is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken,
and not intermittent or occasional; it is exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is
so conspicuous, that it is generally known and talked of by the public or
the people in the neighborhood.38
In Republic vs. Remman Enterprises, Inc., 39 the Court held that for
purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,
proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate
the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land
registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual
possession is in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such
nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.
In Republic v. Gielczyk, the Court explained that "possession" and
"occupation" are not synonymous to each other. Possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive possession; whereas
occupation delimits the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Thus, taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious, the word occupation means that for one's title
to land to be judicially recognized, his possession of the land must not
be mere fiction.40
In this case, aside from the deeds of absolute sale covering the subject
land which were executed prior to 12 June 1945, RRDC did not
present any evidence which would show that its predecessors-in-
interest actually exercised acts of dominion over the subject land even
before the cut-off period. As such, RRDC failed to prove that its
possession of the land, or at the very least, its individual predecessors-
in-interest's possession over the same was not mere fiction.
Neither would the tax declarations presented by RRDC suffice to prove
the required possession. To recall, the earliest of these tax
declarations dates back only to 1948. Clearly, the required possession
and occupation since 12 June 1945 or earlier, was not demonstrated.
From the foregoing, it is clear that RRDC failed to prove that its
individual predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier;
and that said possession and occupation converted the subject land
into a private property by operation of law. Consequently, the subject
land cannot be registered in the name of RRDC under Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529.
Requirements under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529
RRDC also failed to establish compliance with the requirements for
registration under Section 14(2).
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic (Malabanan),41 the Court
explained that when Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 provides that
persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably
refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands.
The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the
acquisition by prescription of private lands, including patrimonial
property belonging to the State.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State
may be acquired by private persons through prescription.1âwphi1 This
is brought about by Article 1113, which states that all things which are
within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that
property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.42
Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that when a piece of land
is declared alienable and disposable part of the public domain, it can
already be acquired by prescription. In Malabanan, this Court ruled that
declaration of alienability and disposability is not enough - there must
be an express declaration that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial, thus:
"(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized
as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be
an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development
of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
"43 [emphasis supplied]
The classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. As such, said land,
although classified as alienable and disposable, is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.44
In this case, RRDC did not present any evidence which would show
that the subject land was expressly declared as no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth, or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Hence, it failed to prove
that acquisitive prescription has begun to run against the State, and
that it has acquired title to the subject land by virtue thereof.
In fine, RRDC failed to satisfy all the requisites for registration of title to
land under either Sections 14(1) or (2) of P.D. No. 1529. RRDC also
failed to establish that when it or P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc., also a
corporation and its direct predecessor-in-interest, acquired the subject
land, it had already been converted to private property, thus, the
prohibition on the corporation's acquisition of agricultural lands of the
public domain under Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
applies. RRDC's application for original registration of imperfect title
over Lot No. 3009 must perforce be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 10 March 2009
Decision and 3 December 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 00651, which affirmed the 7 November 2003 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City, in LRA
Case No. N-2000-084, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Application for Registration of Lot No. 3009 filed by Rovency Realty
and Development Corporation is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
12
REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT
G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON
NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth
Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the
Regional Trial Court (RTC),2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February
26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)3 of Ibajay-
Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application
for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the
respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married
to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a
petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy.
Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No.
10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP – 060414-014779, and
contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks
judicial confirmation of respondent’s imperfect title over the aforesaid
land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application.
The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose
Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the
petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a
formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court
issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to
the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was
originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano
(Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July
9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of
Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the
subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956.5Subsequently, the heirs of Maming
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who
thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel
Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator
introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut
and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were
then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the
subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the
subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly
and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private
person or even the government until she filed her application for
registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor
manifested that the government did not intend to present any evidence
while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico
Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September
27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject
parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration
Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto
registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG
stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and
disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from
Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.7 However, the court
denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18,
1998.81awphi1.nét
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the
MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the
RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal.9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the
appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the
Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law
was filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000.10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that
the appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the
government’s prior release of the subject lot from the public domain
before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning
of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No.
10049 in the concept of owner for the required period.11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the
subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the
applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could
even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court12 in arguing that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the
subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit
could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable,
the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original
registration proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly
provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for
registration of title under Section 14(1) – that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation,
and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June
12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of
Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision,
qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership."
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words
or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
13
distantly or remotely located.13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation
nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would
be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which
were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would
not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes
the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify
public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet
even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition,
the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable
and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention
on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of
Appeals .14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject
of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute."15 In that case, the subject land had been
certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the
Court concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by
the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land
even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of
the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the
subject property was released and certified as within alienable and
disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals,17 wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in
possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question
were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at
registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had
filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was
declared alienable and disposable.1awphi1.nét Thus, in this case,
where the application was made years after the property had been
certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not
apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those which form part
of a reservation for provincial park purposes19 the possession of which
cannot ripen into ownership.20 It is elementary in the law governing
natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons.
As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable
and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into
private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable.22 In the case at bar, the property in question
was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the
ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts
on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
which pertains to original registration through ordinary registration
proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives
from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, by reason of the claimant’s open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an
interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided
that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty
(30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was
again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the
reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant
with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands
of the public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the
term "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be
noted though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly, the
subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.25 There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years.26 With such conversion, such property may now
fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and
thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership
through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public
land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such
possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the
possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been
planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old.27 The inherent
nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable,
hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished
by the lower courts.l^vvphi1.net
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit
had been in possession in the concept of owner for the required period.
The argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertion—
shown earlier to be unfounded—that there could have been no bona
14
fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was
declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration
owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-
interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is
primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual findings
made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established
through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time
Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by
Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they
are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the
respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest
which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed
beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which
may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system.
That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an
owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any
private person and the government itself makes her right thereto
undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC VS. HERBIERTO
G.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22
November 2002,1 which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999, 2granting
the application for land registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers,
Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a
single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422
and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots).
They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which
they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and
Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.3 Together with their application for
registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of
respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No.
8423, in the name of respondent David;4
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;5
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for
Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject Lots;6
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on
the absence of certificates of title covering the Subject Lots; 7
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that
the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June
1963;8
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property
(ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of Jeremias,
covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No.
941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423,
also issued in 1994;9 and
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the
Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and
respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No.
8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to
David.10
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents' application for
registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to
comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots
required by law; (2) Respondents' muniments of title were not genuine
and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part
of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to
private appropriation.11
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30
a.m.12 All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent
copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing.13 A copy of the Notice was also
posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as
well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion,
Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located.14 Finally, the Notice was
also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 199915 and The
Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.16
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an
Order of Special Default,17 with only petitioner Republic opposing the
application for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents,
through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary
evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the
Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and to
submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering
the registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias
over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It
subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its
Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and directing
the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a
decree of registration for the Subject Lots.18
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December
1999, to the Court of Appeals.19 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision,
dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment
reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land
sought to be registered has been classified as within the
alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article
1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively
provides that "All things which are within the commerce of
men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of
15
 patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription"
and that "Ownership and other real rights over immovables
also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith."
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their
parents already acquired the subject parcels of lands,
subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they
cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos,
coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21,
1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or
their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed
the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming
arguendo that appellees' possession can be reckoned only
from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had
been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone,
still the argument of the appellant does not hold water.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable
since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23,
1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus
susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of
Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled
to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of
P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any
manner provided by law. Again, even considering that
possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963,
the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable,
herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels
of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner,
for 35 years already when they filed the instant application
for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court
finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.20
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the
basis of the following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of
the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject
Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining
compliance with the periods of possession required by law. The
Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25
June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also alleges that the Court of
Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had
overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,21 where this Court declared
that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that
possession of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or
earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the
subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually
and separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends
that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended,
that the application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a
single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in
case they are co-owners. While an application may cover two parcels
of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of land belong to the
same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are
co-owned) and are situated within the same province. Where the
authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when
the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly
complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the
respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land registration
under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before
the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
I separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC
had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for
registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different from
those presented by petitioner Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents'
application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject
Lots even though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias
and David were actually seeking the individual and separate
registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed
by the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of
jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for registration of
the Subject Lots, based on this Court's pronouncement in Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals,22 to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-
compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule
that said defects have not invested the Court with the
authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the
manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by
the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed,
thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard.
This procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect
the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application
for registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree23 recognizes and expressly allows
the following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several
applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land
sought to be registered;24and (2) the filing of a single application for
registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are
located within the same province.25 The Property Registration Decree
is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants
filed a single application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the
separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their
respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a
situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the
proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree
itself provides that, "[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land
registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient."
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict
accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of
action, then the defect in the joint application for registration filed by the
respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action
and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration,
respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have
filed separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of
jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case. 26 They are
not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.27 Instead, under the
Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve
an implied admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the
power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on
its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of
action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of
causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of
any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with
16
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition
may have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the
petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to
detect the misjoinder when the application for registration was still
pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did
not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for
severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of
misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication
requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the
MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present
Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land
registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a
defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the
MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents'
application for registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,28 and jurisdiction in
rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the
land through publication and service of notice.29
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public
be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the
following manner:
1. By publication. –
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for
initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall
cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the
Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to
all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved
including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all
whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all
persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and
time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall
not be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the
Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v.
Court of Appeals30 that publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm
and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of
the Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail
the requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of
Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of the
Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and
imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this
Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of
the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus
– Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general
circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law
already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette
as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already
been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due
process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as
widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes
delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published
therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In
sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration
cases, the consequences of default orders issued against
the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice
in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and
posting.31
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was
in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice
thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02
August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was
published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in
Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the
rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than
three months after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the
initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever
read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and
had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was
already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the
initial hearing to oppose respondents' application for registration, and
to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as
the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear
before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default
and would forever be barred from contesting respondents' application
for registration and even the registration decree that may be issued
pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default
on 03 September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of
general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the
same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the
Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to
acquire jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration
thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999,
ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents
Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well
as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of
21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA
Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are
both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without
jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of
the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect
or incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have
jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for
registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the
legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to
public land.
Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory
basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that
they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents,
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.
been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner
since 1950.32
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by
respondents themselves, the Subject Lots are "within Alienable and
Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of
Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-
1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran
Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation
No. 932 dated June 29, 1992."33 The Subject Lots are thus clearly part
of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25
June 1963.
17
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired
by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government;34 and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to
public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or
any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.35
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain,
except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands
which reverted to the State.36 It explicitly enumerates the means by
which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).37
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate
chapters of the Public Land Act because there are specific
requirements and application procedure for every mode.38 Since
respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,39 then it can
be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to
land, not exceeding 144 hectares,40 may be availed of by persons
identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads –
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of lands
of the public domain suitable to agriculture
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled
to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents
may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their
imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse
possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present
Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25
June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the
Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership
and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.41 It is
very apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the
period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots
that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was
based on the erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming
title to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration Decree.
According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November
2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows
individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law. It then
ruled that the respondents, having possessed the Subject Lots, by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June
1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have
acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under
Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.42
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property
Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by
the court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is
that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants
and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their
imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.43 As
established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots
respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain and respondents may have acquired title
thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may
acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the
Public Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization
thereof must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree,
for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads –
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal
representatives or successors in right, claiming any lands or
interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in
every case present an application to the proper Court of First
Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim
be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to
them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.44
Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots
must have complied with the substantial requirements under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under
the Property Registration Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership
and other real rights apply in general to all types of land, while the
Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public domain.
Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a
special law45 that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general
law. It is an established rule of statutory construction that between a
general law and a special law, the special law prevails – Generalia
specialibus non derogant.46
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the
MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21
December 1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared
NULL AND VOID. Respondents' application for registration is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
18
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A.
Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated
on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of
Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the
registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang,
Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient
evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of
land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for
land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the
land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated
June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad
452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq.
meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to
be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map
No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting
Malabanan’s application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing
an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four
(71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now
forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age,
Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding
decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the
CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the
RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan.
Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared
that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any
period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable
and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-
DENR certification stated that the property had been declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s
possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of
computing Malabanan’s period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA,
his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine
especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its
declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the
reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public
Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration
Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the
declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as
alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for
lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure
converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of
an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years.
According to them, what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the
application without regard to whether the property sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari
because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence
possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part
of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere
classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed
sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on
the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v.
Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the
reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to
acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith
that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real
owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership
thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article
1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan
filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had
already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned
from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and
disposable by the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a
clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit
and Herbieto.
19
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has
enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its
view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land
subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to
discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing
applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of
public dominion or of private ownership.11Land is considered of public
dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the
State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging
to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character
but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of
the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of
the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and
municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first
introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain
belong to the State.15This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable
primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain
were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and
mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified
lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide
other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification
under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and
mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal
classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the
Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of
public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to
wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of
private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without
limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must
only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber,
mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. 24 A positive act
of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, 25 and
the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is
vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If, however,
public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where
the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify
lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no
longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner
by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e.,
agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be
disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of
Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which
expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of
the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral,
forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the
law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase
"alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b)
to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations
under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-
interest, has been in possession and occupation of the
property subject of the application;
20
 2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place
since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with
the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the
application for registration must have been already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and
overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable
as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However,
emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required
by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the
land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have
been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the
land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal
effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial
social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be
respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning
point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole
prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left
to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the
period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent
appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal
meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land
subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or
incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property
subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not
the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively
during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property
by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this
doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for
as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by
operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason
that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of
the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the
presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to
determine the point at which prescription may run against the State.
The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through
actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor
is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that
a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned
by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to
adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified
Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for
the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we
should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly
recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted
legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33in order to liberalize stringent
requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public
land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to
area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended
for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration
of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into
patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision
concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run
against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the
disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are
rendered alienable and disposable through any of
the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11
of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject
of the application needs only to be classified as
alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicant’s possession
and occupation of the land dated back to June 12,
1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the applicant has performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant
arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of
the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete
title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased
to be part of the public domain and has become
private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently
classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national
wealth are removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership
that may be alienated or disposed through any of
the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription,
whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the
land has been already converted to private
ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive
prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in
observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
21
 that property of the State not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since
June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of
it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against
the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the
land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or
the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC VS. BACAS
G.R. No. 182913 November 20, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO, FELIZA, NEMESIO, ALBERTO, FELICIDAD, RICARDO,
MILAGROS AND CIPRIANO, ALL SURNAMED BACAS; EMILIANA
CHABON, SATURNINO ABDON, ESTELA, CHABON, LACSASA
DEMON, PDERITA CHABON, FORTUNATA EMBALSADO, MINDA
J. CASTILLO, PABLO CASTILLO, ARTURO P. LEGASPI, and
JESSIE I. LEGASPI, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to review, reverse and set aside the November 12, 2007
Decision1 and the May 15, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64142, upholding the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC) , which dismissed
the consolidated cases of Civil Case No. 3494, entitled Republic of the
Philippines v. Antonio, et al. and Civil Case No. 5918, entitled Republic
of the Philippines v. Emiliana Chabon , et al. Said civil cases were filed
by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) for the cancellation and
annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-358 and OCT No.
O-669, covering certain parcels of land occupied and utilized as part of
the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation, Misamis Oriental, presently
the home of the 4th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army.
The Antecedents:
In 1938, Commonwealth President Manuel Luis Quezon (Pres.
Quezon) issued Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect
on March 31, 1938, reserving for the use of the Philippine Army three
(3) parcels of the public domain situated in the barrios of Bulua and
Carmen, then Municipality of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental. The parcels
of land were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for
military purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be."
Land Registration Case No. N-275
[Antonio, Feliza, Nemesio, Roberto, and Felicidad, all surnamed
Bacas, and the Heirs of Jesus Bacas, Applicants (The Bacases)]
The Bacases filed their Application for Registration3 on November 12,
1964 covering a parcel of land, together with all the improvements
found thereon, located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, more
particularly described and bounded as follows:
A parcel of land, Lot No. 4354 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan,
L.R.C. Record No. 1612, situated at Barrio Carmen, Municipality of
Cagayan, Province of Misamis Oriental. Bounded on the SE., along
lines 1-2-3-4, by Lot 4357; and alongline 4-5, by Lot 3862; on the S.,
along line 5-6, by Lot 3892; on the W. and NW., along lines 6-7-8, by
Lot 4318; on the NE., along line 8-9, by Lot 4319, along line 9-10, by
Lot 4353 and long line 10-11, by Lot 4359; and on the SE., along line
11-1, by Lot 4356, all of Cagayan Cadastre; containing an area of
THREE HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY SEVEN (354,377) square meters, more or less, under Tax
Declaration No. 35436 and assessed at ₱3,540.00.4
They alleged ownership in fee simple of the property and indicated in
their application the names and addresses of the adjoining owners, as
well as a statement that the Philippine Army (Fourth Military Area)
recently occupied a portion of the land by their mere tolerance. 5
The Director of the Bureau of Lands, thru its Special Counsel, Benito
S. Urcia (Urcia) , registered its written Opposition6 against the
application. Later, Urcia, assisted by the District Land Officer of
Cagayan de Oro City, thru the Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Misamis Oriental, Pedro R. Luspo (Luspo) , filed an Amended
Opposition.7
On April 10, 1968, based on the evidence presented by the Bacases,
the Land Registration Court (LRC) rendered a decision8 holding that
the applicants had conclusively established their ownership in fee
simple over the subject land and that their possession, including that of
their predecessor-in-interest, had been open, adverse, peaceful,
uninterrupted, and in concept of owners for more than forty (40) years.
No appeal was interposed by the Republic from the decision of the
LRC. Thus, the decision became final and executory, resulting in the
issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate of title over the
subject property.
Land Registration Case No. N-521 [Emiliana Chabon, Estela Chabon
and Pedrita Chabon, Applicants (The Chabons)]
The Chabons filed their Application for Registration9 on May 8, 1974
covering a parcel of land located in Carmen-District, Cagayan de Oro
City, known as Lot 4357, Cagayan Cadastre, bounded and described
as:
A parcel of land (Lot 4357, Cagayan Cadastre, plan Ap-12445),
situated in the District of Carmen, City of Cagayan de Oro. Bounded on
the NE. by property of Potenciano Abrogan vs. Republic of the
Philippines (Public Land); on the SE. by properties of Geronimo Wabe
and Teofilo Batifona or Batipura; on the SW. by property of Teofilo
Batifona or Batipura; and on the NW. by property of Felipe Bacao or
Bacas vs. Republic of the Philippines (Public Land). Point "1" is N. 10
deg. 39’W., 379.88 M. from B.L.L.M. 14, Cagayan Cadastre. Area
SIXTY NINE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY TWO (69,632)
SQUARE METERS, more or less.10
They alleged ownership in fee simple over the property and indicated
therein the names and addresses of the adjoining owners, but no
mention was made with respect to the occupation, if any, by the
Philippine Army. The Chabons likewise alleged that, to the best of their
knowledge, no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affecting said
land with the exception of 18,957 square meters sold to Minda J.
Castillo and 1,000 square meters sold and conveyed to Atty. Arturo R.
Legaspi.11
On February 18, 1976, there being no opposition made, even from the
government, hearing on the application ensued. The LRC then
rendered a decision12 holding that Chabons’ evidence established their
ownership in fee simple over the subject property and that their
possession, including that of their predecessor-in-interest, had been
22
actual, open, public, peaceful, adverse, continuous, and in concept of
owners for more than thirty (30) years.
The decision then became final and executory. Thus, an order13 for the
issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate of title was
issued.
The present cases
As a consequence of the LRC decisions in both applications for
registration, the Republic filed a complaint for annulment of titles
against the Bacases and the Chabons before the RTC. More
specifically, on September 7, 1970 or one (1) year and ten (10) months
from the issuance of OCT No. 0-358, a civil case for annulment,
cancellation of original certificate of title, reconveyance of lot or
damages was filed by the Republic against the Bacases, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 3494. On the other hand, on April 21, 1978
or two (2) years and seven (7) months after issuance of OCT No. 0-
669, the Republic filed a civil case for annulment of title and reversion
against the Chabons, docketed as Civil Case No. 5918.
Civil Case No. 3494 against the Bacases
The Republic claimed in its petition for annulment before the
RTC14 that the certificate of title issued in favor of the Bacases was null
and void because they fraudulently omitted to name the military camp
as the actual occupant in their application for registration. Specifically,
the Republic, through the Fourth Military Area, was the actual occupant
of Lot No. 4354 and also the owner and possessor of the adjoining
Lots Nos. 431815 and 4357. Further, the Bacases failed to likewise
state that Lot No. 4354 was part of Camp Evangelista. These
omissions constituted fraud which vitiated the decree and certificate of
title issued.
Also, the Republic averred that the subject land had long been
reserved in 1938 for military purposes at the time it was applied for
and, so, it was no longer disposable and subject to registration.16
Civil Case No. 5918 against the Chabons
In this case, the Republic claimed that it was the absolute owner and
possessor of Lot No. 4357. The said lot, together with Lots 431817 and
4354, formed part of the military reservation known as Camp
Evangelista in Cagayan de Oro City, which was set aside and reserved
under Presidential Proclamation No. 265 issued by President Quezon
on March 31, 1938.18
In its petition for annulment before the RTC,19 the Republic alleged that
OCT No. 0-669 issued in favor of the Chabons and all transfer
certificates of titles, if any, proceeding therefrom, were null and void for
having been vitiated by fraud and/or lack of jurisdiction.20 The Chabons
concealed that the fact that Lot 4357 was part of Camp Evangelista
and that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
was its actual occupant and possessor.21 Further, Lot 4357 was a
military reservation, established as such as early as March 31, 1938
and, thus, could not be the subject of registration or private
appropriation.22 As a military reservation, it was beyond the commerce
of man and the registration court did not have any jurisdiction to
adjudicate the same as private property.23
Decision of the Regional Trial Court
As the facts and issues in both cases were substantially the same and
identical, and the pieces of evidence adduced were applicable to both,
the cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Thereafter, a joint
decision dismissing the two complaints of the Republic was rendered.
In dismissing the complaints, the RTC explained that the stated fact of
occupancy by Camp Evangelista over certain portions of the subject
lands in the applications for registration by the respondents was a
substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.24 It would
have been absurd to state Camp Evangelista as an adjoining owner
when it was alleged that it was an occupant of the land. 25 Thus, the
RTC ruled that the respondents did not commit fraud in filing their
applications for registration.
Moreover, the RTC was of the view that the Republic was then given
all the opportunity to be heard as it filed its opposition to the
applications, appeared and participated in the proceedings. It was,
thus, estopped from contesting the proceedings.
The RTC further reasoned out that assuming arguendo that
respondents were guilty of fraud, the Republic lost its right to a relief for
its failure to file a petition for review on the ground of fraud within one
(1) year after the date of entry of the decree of
registration.26 Consequently, it would now be barred by prior judgment
to contest the findings of the LRC.27
Finally, the RTC agreed with the respondents that the subject parcels
of land were exempted from the operation and effect of the Presidential
Proclamation No. 265 pursuant to a proviso therein that the same
would not apply to lands with existing "private rights." The presidential
proclamation did not, and should not, apply to the respondents
because they did not apply to acquire the parcels of land in question
from the government, but simply for confirmation and affirmation of
their rights to the properties so that the titles over them could be issued
in their favor.28 What the proclamation prohibited was the sale or
disposal of the parcels of land involved to private persons as a means
of acquiring ownership of the same, through the modes provided by
law for the acquisition of disposable public lands.29
The Republic filed its Notice of Appeal before the RTC on July 5, 1991.
On the other hand, the Bacases and the Chabons filed an Ex-Parte
Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Execution and Possession on
July 16, 1991. An amended motion was filed on July 31, 1991. The
RTC then issued the Order,30 dated February 24, 1992, disapproving
the Republic’s appeal for failure to perfect it as it failed to notify the
Bacases and granting the writ of execution.
Action of the Court of Appeals and the Court regarding the Republic’s
Appeal
The Republic filed a Notice of Appeal on April 1, 1992 from the
February 24, 1992 of the RTC. The same was denied in the RTC
Order,31 dated April 23, 1992. The Republic moved for its
reconsideration but the RTC was still denied it on July 8, 1992. 32
Not satisfied, the Republic filed a petition before the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 28647, entitled Republic vs. Hon. Cesar M.
Ybañez,33 questioning the February 24, 1992 Order of the RTC
denying its appeal in Civil Case No. 3494. The CA sustained the
government and, accordingly, annulled the said RTC order.
The respondents appealed to the Court, which later found no
commission of a reversible error on the part of the CA. Accordingly, the
Court dismissed the appeal as well as the subsequent motions for
reconsideration. An entry of judgment was then issued on February 16,
1995.34
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appeal allowed, the CA docketed the case as CA G.R. CV No.
64142.
On November 12, 2007, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It
explained that once a decree of registration was issued under the
Torrens system and the reglementary period had passed within which
the decree may be questioned, the title was perfected and could not be
collaterally questioned later on.35 Even assuming that an action for the
nullification of the original certificate of title may still be instituted, the
review of a decree of registration under Section 38 of Act No. 496
[Section 32 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529] would only prosper
upon proof that the registration was procured through actual
fraud,36 which proceeded from an intentional deception perpetrated
through the misrepresentation or the concealment of a material
fact.37 The CA stressed that "[t]he fraud must be actual and extrinsic,
not merely constructive or intrinsic; the evidence thereof must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant, because the
proceedings which are assailed as having been fraudulent are judicial
proceedings which by law, are presumed to have been fair and
regular."38
23
Citing the rule that "[t]he fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive
parties of their day in court and, thus, prevent them from asserting their
right to the property registered in the name of the applicant,"39 the CA
found that there was none. The CA agreed with the RTC that there was
substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. The allegation
of the respondent that Camp Evangelista occupied portions of their
property negated the complaint that they committed misrepresentation
or concealment amounting to fraud.40
As regards the issue of exemption from the proclamation, the CA
deemed that a discussion was unnecessary because the LRC already
resolved it. The CA stressed that the proceeding was one in rem,
thereby binding everyone to the legal effects of the same and that a
decree of registration that had become final should be deemed
conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and
determined, but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided
in the land registration proceeding.41
Not in conformity, the Republic filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied on May 15, 2008 for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
GROUNDS RELIED UPON
WARRANTING REVIEW OF THE
PETITION
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE LAND REGISTRATION
COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION
FOR REGISTRATION FILED BY RESPONDENTS
DESPITE THE LATTER’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF INDICATING ALL
THE ADJOINING OWNERS OF THE PARCELS OF LAND
SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A
REGISTRABLE RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS
OF LAND WHICH ARE WITHIN THE CAMP EVANGELISTA
MILITARY RESERVATION.
3. IN G.R. NO. 157306 ENTITLED "REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. ANATALIA ACTUB TIU ESTONILO, ET
AL.," WHICH INVOLVES PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
CLAIMING RIGHTS OVER PORTIONS OF THE CAMP
EVANGELISTA MILITARY RESERVATION, THIS
HONORABLE COURT HELD THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS
COULD NOT HAVE VALIDLY OCCUPIED THEIR CLAIMED
LOTS BECAUSE THE SAME WERE CONSIDERED
INALIENABLE FROM THE TIME OF THEIR RESERVATION
IN 1938. HERE, THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE BEING
SUSTAINED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS WERE
ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE DECISIONS OF THE LAND
REGISTRATION COURT IN APPLICATIONS FOR
REGISTRATION FILED IN 1964 AND 1974. VERILY, THE
COURT OF APPEALS, IN ISSUING THE HEREIN
ASSAILED DECISION DATED NOVEMBER 15, 2007 AND
RESOLUTION DATED MAY 15, 2008, HAS DECIDED
THAT INSTANT CONTROVERSY IN A MANNER THAT IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.42
Position of the Republic
In advocacy of its position, the Republic principally argues that (1) the
CA erred in holding that the LRC acquired jurisdiction over the
applications for registration of the reserved public lands filed by the
respondents; and (2) the respondents do not have a registrable right
over the subject parcels of land which are within the Camp Evangelista
Military Reservation.
With respect to the first argument, the Republic cites Section 15 of P.D.
No. 1529, which requires that applicants for land registration must
disclose the names of the occupants of the land and the names and
addresses of the owners of the adjoining properties. The respondents
did not comply with that requirement which was mandatory and
jurisdictional. Citing Pinza v. Aldovino,43 it asserts that the LRC had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. Moreover, such omission
constituted fraud or willful misrepresentation. The respondents cannot
invoke the indefeasibility of the titles issued since a "grant tainted with
fraud and secured through misrepresentation is null and void and of no
effect whatsoever."44
On the second argument, the Republic points out that Presidential
Proclamation No. 265 reserved for the use of the Philippine Army
certain parcels of land which included Lot No. 4354 and Lot No. 4357.
Both lots were, however, allowed to be registered. Lot No. 4354 was
registered as OCT No. 0-0358 and Lot No. 4357 as OCT No. O-669.
The Republic asserts that being part of the military reservation, these
lots are inalienable and cannot be the subject of private ownership.
Being so, the respondents do not have registrable rights over them.
Their possession of the land, however long, could not ripen into
ownership, and they have not shown proof that they were entitled to
the land before the proclamation or that the said lots were segregated
and withdrawn as part thereof.
Position of the Respondents
The Bacases
The Bacases anchor their opposition to the postures of the Republic on
three principal arguments:
First, there was no extrinsic fraud committed by the Bacases in their
failure to indicate Camp Evangelista as an adjoining lot owner as their
application for registration substantially complied with the legal
requirements. More importantly, the Republic was not prejudiced and
deprived of its day in court.
Second, the LRC had jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the Bacases
had "private rights" over Lot No. 4354 in accordance with, and
therefore exempt from the coverage of, Presidential Proclamation No.
265, as well as to determine whether such private rights constituted
registrable title under the land registration law.
Third, the issue of the registrability of the title of the Bacases over Lot
No. 4354 is res judicata and cannot now be subject to a re-litigation or
reopening in the annulment proceedings.45
Regarding the first ground, the Bacases stress that there was no
extrinsic fraud because their application substantially complied with the
requirements when they indicated that Camp Evangelista was an
occupant by mere tolerance of Lot No. 4354. Also, the Republic filed its
opposition to the respondents’ application and actively participated in
the land registration proceedings by presenting evidence, through the
Director of Lands, who was represented by the Solicitor General. The
Republic, therefore, was not deprived of its day in court or prevented
from presenting its case. Its insistence that the non-compliance with
the requirements of Section 15 of P.D. No. 1529 is an argument that is
at once both empty and dangerous.46
On jurisdiction, the Bacases assert that even in the case of Republic v.
Estonilo,47 it was recognized in Presidential Proclamation No. 265 that
the reservation was subject to private rights. In other words, the LRC
had authority to hear and adjudicate their application for registration of
title over Lot No. 4354 if they would be able to prove that their private
rights under the presidential proclamation constituted registrable title
over the said lot. They claim that there is completely no basis for the
Republic to argue that the LRC had no jurisdiction to hear and
adjudicate their application for registration of their title to Lot No. 4354
just because the proclamation withdrew the subject land from sale and
settlement and reserved the same for military purposes. They cited the
RTC statement that "the parcels of land they applied for in those
registration proceedings and for which certificates of title were issued
in their favor are precisely exempted from the operation and effect of
said presidential proclamation when the very same proclamation in
itself made a proviso that the same will not apply to lands with existing
‘private rights’ therein."48
24
The Bacases claim that the issue of registrability is no longer an issue
as what is only to be resolved is the question on whether there was
extrinsic or collateral fraud during the land registration proceedings.
There would be no end to litigation on the registrability of their title if
questions of facts or law, such as, whether or not Lot No. 4354 was
alienable and disposable land of the public domain prior to its
withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation for military
purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265; whether or not their
predecessors-in-interest had prior possession of the lot long before the
issuance of the proclamation or the establishment of Camp Evangelista
in the late 1930’s; whether or not such possession was held in the
concept of an owner to constitute recognizable "private rights" under
the presidential proclamation; and whether or not such private rights
constitute registrable title to the lot in accordance with the land
registration law, which had all been settled and duly adjudicated by the
LRC in favor of the Bacases, would be re-examined under this
annulment case.49
The issue of registrability of the Bacases’ title had long been settled by
the LRC and is
res judicata between the Republic and the respondents. The findings of
the LRC became final when the Republic did not appeal its decision
within the period to appeal or file a petition to reopen or review the
decree of registration within one year from entry thereof.50
To question the findings of the court regarding the registrability of then
title over the land would be an attempt to reopen issues already barred
by res judicata. As correctly held by the RTC, it is estopped and barred
by prior judgment to contest the findings of the LRC.51
The Chabons
In traversing the position of the Republic, the Chabons insist that the
CA was correct when it stated that there was substantial
compliance52 with the requirements of the P.D. No. 1529 because they
expressly stated in their application that Camp Evangelista was
occupying a portion of it. It is contrary to reason or common sense to
state that Camp Evangelista is an adjoining owner when it is occupying
a portion thereof.
And as to the decision, it was a consequence of a proceeding in rem
and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding and conclusive
against all persons including the Republic who did not appeal the
same. It is now barred forever to question the validity of the title issued.
Besides, res judicata has set in because there is identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action.53
The Chabons also assailed the proclamation because when it was
issued, they were already the private owners of the subject parcels of
land and entitled to protection under the Constitution. The taking of
their property in the guise of a presidential proclamation is not only
oppressive and arbitrary but downright confiscatory.54
The Issues
The ultimate issues to be resolved are: 1) whether or not the decisions
of the LRC over the subject lands can still be questioned; and 2)
whether or not the applications for registration of the subject parcels of
land should be allowed.
The Court’s Ruling
The Republic can question even final and executory judgment when
there was fraud.
The governing rule in the application for registration of lands at that
time was Section 21 of Act 49655 which provided for the form and
content of an application for registration, and it reads:
Section 21. The application shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by
applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. x x x It shall
also state the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also
the names and addresses of all adjoining owners and occupants, if
known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to
find them. x x x
The reason behind the law was explained in the case of Fewkes vs.
Vasquez,56 where it was written:
Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application for
registration of land is required to contain, among others, a description
of the land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and address of
the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of
the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the
steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for
initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all
persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and
the adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and
technical description of the land being registered, shall be published in
the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of
the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of
the jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, for the
proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure
of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over
the res is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and
publication of the hearing that would enable all persons concerned,
who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come forward
and show to the court why the application for registration thereof is not
to be granted.
Here, the Chabons did not make any mention of the ownership or
occupancy by the Philippine Army. They also did not indicate any
efforts or searches they had exerted in determining other occupants of
the land. Such omission constituted fraud and deprived the Republic of
its day in court. Not being notified, the Republic was not able to file its
opposition to the application and, naturally, it was not able to file an
appeal either.
The Republic can also question a final and executory judgment when
the LRC had no jurisdiction over the land in question
With respect to the Bacases, although the lower courts might have
been correct in ruling that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of law when they alleged that Camp Evangelista was an
occupant, the Republic is not precluded and estopped from questioning
the validity of the title.
The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the
existence of actual and extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a
judgment decreeing registration is null and void. In Collado v. Court of
Appeals and the Republic,57the Court declared that any title to an
inalienable public land is void ab initio. Any procedural infirmities
attending the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are
immaterial since the LRC never acquired jurisdiction over the property.
All proceedings of the LRC involving the property are null and void and,
hence, did not create any legal effect. A judgment by a court without
jurisdiction can never attain finality.58 In Collado, the Court made the
following citation:
The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable
properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public
domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of
private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in
the name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or
collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period
provided for by the Statute of Limitations.59
Prescription or estoppel cannot lie against the government
In denying the petition of the Republic, the CA reasoned out that 1)
once a decree of registration is issued under the Torrens system and
the reglementary period has passed within which the decree may be
questioned, the title is perfected and cannot be collaterally questioned
later on;60 2) there was no commission of extrinsic fraud because the
Bacases’ allegation of Camp Evangelista’s occupancy of their property
negated the argument that they committed misrepresentation or
concealment amounting to fraud;61 and 3) the Republic did not appeal
25
the decision and because the proceeding was one in rem, it was bound
to the legal effects of the decision.
Granting that the persons representing the government was negligent,
the doctrine of estoppel cannot be taken against the Republic. It is a
well-settled rule that the Republic or its government is not estopped by
mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals,62 it was written:
In any case, even granting that the said official was negligent, the
doctrine of estoppel cannot operate against the State . "It is a well-
settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic or its government is
usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or
agents (Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. CA, 73 SCRA 166, 186; Republic vs.
Marcos, 52 SCRA 238, 244; Luciano vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769).
Consequently, the State may still seek the cancellation of the title
issued to Perpetuo Alpuerto and his successors-interest pursuant to
Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Such title has not become
indefeasible, for prescription cannot be invoked against the State
(Republic vs. Animas, supra).
The subject lands, being part of a military reservation, are inalienable
and cannot be the subjects of land registration proceedings
The application of the Bacases and the Chabons were filed on
November 12, 1964 and May 8, 1974, respectively. Accordingly, the
law governing the applications was Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
141,63 as amended by RA 1942,64 particularly Sec. 48(b) which
provided that:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
As can be gleaned therefrom, the necessary requirements for the grant
of an application for land registration are the following:
1. The applicant must, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession and
occupation of the subject land;
2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona
fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application; and
4. The subject land must be an agricultural land of the public
domain. As earlier stated, in 1938, President Quezon issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on
March 31, 1938, reserving for the use of the Philippine Army
parcels of the public domain situated in the barrios of Bulua
and Carmen, then Municipality of Cagayan, Misamis
Oriental. The subject parcels of land were withdrawn from
sale or settlement or reserved for military purposes, "subject
to private rights, if any there be."65
Such power of the President to segregate lands was provided for in
Section 64(e) of the old Revised Administrative Code and C.A. No. 141
or the Public Land Act. Later, the power of the President was restated
in Section 14, Chapter 4, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code.
When a property is officially declared a military reservation, it becomes
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.66 It may not be the
subject of a contract or of a compromise agreement. 67 A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership, until there is a formal declaration on the
part of the government to withdraw it from being such. 68 In the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals and De Jesus,69 it was even stated that
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful
settlement on them can be acquired.1âwphi1 The claims 0f persons
who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public land
which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of
protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as
authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands and
warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights
previously acquired in such lands by a person who was settled thereon
in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. And patents for lands
which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or
appropriate, are void.
Regarding the subject lots, there was a reservation respecting "private
rights." In Republic v. Estonilo,70 where the Court earlier declared that
Lot No. 4318 was part of the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation
and, therefore, not registrable, it noted the proviso in Presidential
Proclamation No. 265 requiring the reservation to be subject to private
rights as meaning that persons claiming rights over the reserved land
were not precluded from proving their claims. Stated differently, the
said proviso did not preclude the LRC from determining whether or not
the respondents indeed had registrable rights over the property.
As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had
been segregated from the military reservation, the respondents had to
prove that the subject properties were alienable and disposable land of
the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and
reservation for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No.
265. The question is of primordial importance because it is
determinative if the land can in fact be subject to acquisitive
prescription and, thus, registrable under the Torrens system. Without
first determining the nature and character of the land, all the other
requirements such as the length and nature of possession and
occupation over such land do not come into play. The required length
of possession does not operate when the land is part of the public
domain.
In this case, however, the respondents miserably failed to prove that,
before the proclamation, the subject lands were already private lands.
They merely relied on such "recognition" of possible private rights. In
their application, they alleged that at the time of their application,71 they
had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the subject parcels of land for at least thirty (30) years and became its
owners by prescription. There was, however, no allegation or showing
that the government had earlier declared it open for sale or settlement,
or that it was already pronounced as inalienable and disposable.
It is well-settled that land of the public domain is not ipso facto
converted into a patrimonial or private property by the mere possession
and occupation by an individual over a long period of time. In the case
of Diaz v. Republic,72 it was written:
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before
it was established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still
a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and
her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. x x x.
x x x.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and
the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim
of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious
as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing
livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of
dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing
livestock upon it, without substantial enclosures, or other permanent
improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive
prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the State unless the occupant can prove possession
and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
26
number of years to constitute a grant from the State. [Emphases
supplied]
In the recent case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
Philippines,73 the Court emphasized that fundamental is the rule that
lands of the public domain, unless declared otherwise by virtue of a
statute or law, are inalienable and can never be acquired by
prescription. No amount of time of possession or occupation can ripen
into ownership over lands of the public domain. All lands of the public
domain presumably belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that
are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to
the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed.74
Another recent case, Diaz v. Republic,75 also held that possession
even for more than 30 years cannot ripen into ownership.76 Possession
is of no moment if applicants fail to sufficiently and satisfactorily show
that the subject lands over which an application was applied for was
indeed an alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain. It would not matter even if they declared it for tax purposes. In
Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,77 the rule was reiterated. Thus:
Well-entrenched is the rule that unless a land is reclassified and
declared alienable and disposable, occupation in the concept of an
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title. Consequently, respondents could not have
occupied the Lot in the concept of an owner in 1947 and subsequent
years when respondents declared the Lot for taxation purposes, or
even earlier when respondents' predecessors-in-interest possessed
the Lot, because the Lot was considered inalienable from the time of its
declaration as a military reservation in 1904. Therefore, respondents
failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Lot is
alienable and disposable.
Public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and
disposable land remain part of the inalienable public domain. In view of
the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the Lot was already
classified as alienable and disposable, the Lot applied for by
respondents is inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to
registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 and Section 48(b) of CA
141, as amended by PD 1073. Hence, there is no need to discuss the
other requisites dealing with respondents' occupation and possession
of the Lot in the concept of an owner.
While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the
distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and in
line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes stringent
safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the
wrong hands to the prejudice of the national patrimony. We must not,
therefore, relax the stringent safeguards relative to the registration of
imperfect titles. [Emphases Supplied]
In Estonilo,78 where the Court ruled that persons claiming the
protection of "private rights" in order to exclude their lands from military
reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
properties in question had been acquired by a legal method of
acquiring public lands, the respondents therein failed to clearly prove
that the lands over which they lay a claim were alienable and
disposable so that the same belonged and continued to belong to the
State and could not be subject to the commerce of man or registration.
Specifically, the Court wrote:
Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belongs to the State as part of the public domain.
For this reason, imperfect titles to agricultural lands are subjected to
rigorous scrutiny before judicial confirmation is granted. In the same
manner, persons claiming the protection of "private rights" in order to
exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the pieces of property in question have been
acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands.
In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect title, the
trial and the appellate courts gave much weight to the tax declarations
presented by the former. However, while the tax declarations were
issued under the names of respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, the
earliest one presented was issued only in 1954.19 The Director, Lands
Management Bureau v. CA20 held thus:
"x x x. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership.1âwphi1 They are mere indicia of [a] claim of
ownership. In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:
‘x x x [I]f it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa
Santiago, had been in possession since 1925, why were the subject
lands declared for taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968, and
in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder
had a claim of title over the property.’"
In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession by
Calixto and Rosendo Bacas, from whom respondents’ predecessors
had purportedly bought the property. This alleged prior possession,
though, was totally devoid of any supporting evidence on record.
Respondents’ evidence hardly supported the conclusion that their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since
"time immemorial."
Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
the evidence on record merely established the transfer of the property
from Calixto Bacas to Nazaria Bombeo . The evidence did not show
the nature and the period of the alleged possession by Calixto and
Rosendo Bacas. It is important that applicants for judicial confirmation
of imperfect titles must present specific acts of ownership to
substantiate their claims; they cannot simply offer general statements
that are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
possession.
It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have the burden of
proving that they have an imperfect title to Lot 4318. Even the absence
of opposition from the government does not relieve them of this
burden. Thus, it was erroneous for the trial and the appellate courts to
hold that the failure of the government to dislodge respondents,
judicially or extrajudicially, from the subject land since 1954 already
amounted to a title. [Emphases supplied]
The ruling reiterated the long standing rule in the case of Director
Lands Management Bureau v. Court of Appeals,79
x x x. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land
registered under the Torrens system simply because no one appears
to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must
show, even though there is no opposition to the satisfaction of the
court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not
justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply
because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the
absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the
Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts presented did not show
that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is
attempting to have registered.
The Court is not unmindful of the principle of immutability of judgments
that nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains
finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable.80 Such principle,
however, must yield to the basic rule that a decision which is null and
void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court is not a decision m
contemplation of law and can never become final and executory.81
Had the LRC given primary importance on the status of the land and
not merely relied on the testimonial evidence of the respondents
without other proof of the alienability of the land, the litigation would
have already been ended and finally settled in accordance with law
and jurisprudence a long time ago.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 12, 2007
Decision and the May 15, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. CV No. 64142 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Judgment is rendered declaring the proceedings in the Land
Registration Court as NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Original Certificate of Title Nos. 0-358 and 0-669 issued
27
by the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City are CANCELLED.
Lot No. 4354 and Lot No. 4357 are ordered reverted to the public
domain.
SO ORDERED.
SPS. FORTUNA VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 173423 March 5, 2014
SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the
petitioners, spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna, assailing the
decision dated May 16, 20052 and the resolution dated June 27,
20063 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143. The CA
reversed and set aside the decision dated May 7, 20014 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, in
Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 2372.
THE BACKGROUND FACTS
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for
registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457,
situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The application was
filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC No. 2372.
The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by
Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded by her children,
Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication
dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No.
4457 in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor of
Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the
spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4, 1984.
The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years, and
submitted as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical description, and
certificate of assessment.
Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
opposed the application,5 it did not present any evidence in support of
its opposition. Since no private opposition to the registration was filed,
the RTC issued an order of general default on November 11, 1996
against the whole world, except the Republic.6
In its Decision dated May 7, 2001,7 the RTC granted the application for
registration in favor of the spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared that
"[the spouses Fortuna] have established [their] possession, including
that of their predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to be
registered, has been open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the
whole world and in the concept of an owner since 1948, or for a period
of over fifty (50) years."8
The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the
spouses Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from the
government that the lot has been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses Fortuna’s
evidence – Tax Declaration No. 8366 – showed that possession over
the lot dates back only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945
cut-off period provided under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PRD).
In its decision dated May 16, 2005,9 the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC decision. Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to
establish the alienable and disposable nature of the land,10 they failed
to show that they complied with the length of possession that the law
requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the Republic’s
argument that Tax Declaration No. 8366 only showed that the spouses
Fortuna’s predecessor-in-interest, Pastora, proved that she had been
in possession of the land only since 1948.
The CA denied the spouses Fortuna’s motion for reconsideration of its
decision in its resolution dated June 27, 2006.11
THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the
CA rulings.
They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended
by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942 amended the PLA by
requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession to acquire imperfect title over an agricultural land of the
public domain. This 30-year period, however, was removed by PD No.
1073 and instead required that the possession should be since June
12, 1945. The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in
Section 14(1) of the PRD.12
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on
January 25, 1977 and published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was
issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the
basis of the Court’s ruling in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et
al.,13 they allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed
effective only on May 24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively. By
these dates, they claim to have already satisfied the 30-year
requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastora’s
possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.
They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948,
this does not contradict that fact that Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457
before 1948. The failure to present documentary evidence proving
possession earlier than 1948 was explained by Filma Salazar, Records
Officer of the Provincial Assessor’s Office, who testified that the
records were lost beyond recovery due to the outbreak of World War II.
Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than 1948,
the spouses Fortuna contend that evidence exists indicating that
Pastora possessed the lot even before 1948. First, Tax Declaration No.
8366 does not contain a statement that it is a new tax declaration.
Second, the annotation found at the back of Tax Declaration No. 8366
states that "this declaration cancels Tax Nos. 10543[.]"14 Since Tax
Declaration No. 8366 was issued in 1948, the cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 10543 was issued, at the latest, in 1947, indicating that
there was already an owner and possessor of the lot before 1948.
Third, they rely on the testimony of one Macaria Flores in LRC No.
2373. LRC No. 2373 was also commenced by the spouses Fortuna to
register Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098,15 which were also originally
owned by Pastora and are adjacent to the subject Lot No. 4457.
Macaria testified that she was born in 1926 and resided in a place a
few meters from the three lots. She stated that she regularly passed by
these lots on her way to school since 1938. She knew the property was
owned by Pastora because the latter’s family had constructed a house
and planted fruit-bearing trees thereon; they also cleaned the area. On
the basis of Macaria’s testimony and the other evidence presented in
LRC No. 2373, the RTC granted the spouses Fortuna’s application for
registration of Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098 in its decision of
January 3, 2005.16 The RTC’s decision has lapsed into finality
unappealed.
The spouses Fortuna claim that Macaria’s testimony in LRC No. 2373
should be considered to prove Pastora’s possession prior to 1948.
Although LRC No. 2373 is a separate registration proceeding, it
pertained to lots adjacent to the subject property, Lot No. 4457, and
belonged to the same predecessor-in-interest. Explaining their failure
to present Macaria in the proceedings before the RTC in LRC No.
2372, the spouses Fortuna said "it was only after the reception of
evidence x x x that [they] were able to trace and establish the identity
and competency of Macaria[.]"17
28
Commenting on the spouses Fortuna’s petition, the Republic relied
mostly on the CA’s ruling which denied the registration of title and
prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to sufficiently
prove their compliance with the requisites for the acquisition of title to
alienable lands of the public domain.
The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and
disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established
The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned
by the State.18 Of the four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands,
forest or timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks, only
agricultural lands may be alienated.19 Public land that has not been
classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Thus, it is essential for any applicant for registration of
title to land derived through a public grant to establish foremost the
alienable and disposable nature of the land. The PLA provisions on the
grant and disposition of alienable public lands, specifically, Sections 11
and 48(b), will find application only from the time that a public land has
been classified as agricultural and declared as alienable and
disposable.
Under Section 6 of the PLA,20 the classification and the reclassification
of public lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The
President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can
classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public
domain. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land
classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable. 21
Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for
registration of title acquired through a public land grant must present
incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act
of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was
established by the notation in the survey plan,22 which states:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No.
13 L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or
military reservation.23
It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that
"there is, per record, neither any public land application filed nor title
previously issued for the subject parcel[.]"24 However, we find that
neither of the above documents is evidence of a positive act from the
government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the
covered properties’ alienable and disposable character.25 These
notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved alienable and
disposable area per verification through survey by the proper
government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy
of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable
land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the
President.26 In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,27 the Court ruled that
[t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of
the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area
per verification through survey by the PENRO28 or CENRO. In addition,
the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the
land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR
Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that
the President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the
public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared
these documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of
the issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the
public land as alienable and disposable.29
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has
been reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain
though a positive act of the Executive Department, the spouses
Fortuna’s claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA
should be denied.
In judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947
Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish
the alienable and disposable character of Lot No. 4457 serves as
sufficient ground to deny the petition and terminate the case, we deem
it proper to continue to address the other important legal issues raised
in the petition.
As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and
disposition of alienable agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA,
alienable lands of the public domain may be disposed of, among
others, by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. This
mode of acquisition of title is governed by Section 48(b) of the PLA, the
original version of which states:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. [emphasis supplied]
On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a
30-year period of possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48(b) of the
PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942, read:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. [emphasis and
underscore ours]
On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of
possession by requiring possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of
PD No. 1073 reads:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter
VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru
his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]
29
Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years –
from 1945 up to its enactment in 1977 – is required. This effectively
impairs the vested rights of applicants who had complied with the 30-
year possession required under the RA No. 1942 amendment, but
whose possession commenced only after the cut-off date of June 12,
1945 was established by the PD No. 1073 amendment. To remedy
this, the Court ruled in Abejaron v. Nabasa30that "Filipino citizens who
by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947
may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title
under Sec. 48(b) of the [PLA]." January 24, 1947 was considered as
the cut-off date as this was exactly 30 years counted backward from
January 25, 1977 – the effectivity date of PD No. 1073.
It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073
was enacted; based on the certification from the National Printing
Office,31 PD No. 1073 was published in Vol. 73, No. 19 of the Official
Gazette, months later than its enactment or on May 9, 1977. This
uncontroverted fact materially affects the cut-off date for applications
for judicial confirmation of incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the
PLA.
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take
effect upon its promulgation," the Court has declared in Tañada, et al.
v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.32 that the publication of laws is an
indispensable requirement for its effectivity. "[A]ll statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature."33 Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be
understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon its
publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date
for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words,
applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove
that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947
Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain, the spouses
Fortuna’s application for registration of title would still not prosper for
failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since May 8,
1947.
The spouses Fortuna’s allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation
that Tax Declaration No. 8366 was a new tax declaration and (2) the
notation stating that Tax Declaration No. 8366 cancels the earlier Tax
Declaration No. 10543 both indicate that Pastora possessed the land
prior to 1948 or, at the earliest, in 1947. We also observe that Tax
Declaration No. 8366 contains a sworn statement of the owner that
was subscribed on October 23, 1947.34 While these circumstances
may indeed indicate possession as of 1947, none proves that it
commenced as of the cut-off date of May 8, 1947. Even if the tax
declaration indicates possession since 1947, it does not show the
nature of Pastora’s possession. Notably, Section 48(b) of the PLA
speaks of possession and occupation. "Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to
make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with
the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
his possession must not be a mere fiction."35 Nothing in Tax
Declaration No. 8366 shows that Pastora exercised acts of possession
and occupation such as cultivation of or fencing off the land. Indeed,
the lot was described as "cogonal."36
The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration
No. 8366 by relying on Macaria’s testimony in a separate land
registration proceeding, LRC No. 2373. Macaria alleged that she
passed by Pastora’s lots on her way to school, and she saw Pastora’s
family construct a house, plant fruit-bearing trees, and clean the area.
However, the Court is not convinced that Macaria’s testimony
constituted as the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" required in
cases of this nature.
The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining
parcels of land, all of which are claimed to have previously belonged to
Pastora. These parcels of land were covered by three separate
applications for registration, to wit:
a. LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total
area of 2,961 sq. m., commenced by Emeteria;
b. LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and
27098, with a total area of 4,006 sq. m., commenced by the
spouses Fortuna; and
c. LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457,
with a total area of 2,597 sq. m.
As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to the
same predecessor-in-interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that the
final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373,37 upholding Pastora’s
ownership, be taken into account in resolving the present case.
Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to
have previously belonged to Pastora is 9,564 sq. m. This is too big an
area for the Court to consider that Pastora’s claimed acts of
possession and occupation (as testified to by Macaria) encompassed
the entirety of the lots. Given the size of the lots, it is unlikely that
Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could competently assess and declare that
its entirety belonged to Pastora because she saw acts of possession
and occupation in what must have been but a limited area. As
mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366 described Lot No. 4457 as
"cogonal," thus, Macaria could not have also been referring to Lot No.
4457 when she said that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on her
properties.
The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding
Pastora's possession, do not tie this Court's hands into ruling in favor
of the spouses Fortuna. Much to our dismay, the rulings in LRC Nos.
N-1278 and 2373 do not even show that the lots have been officially
reclassified as alienable lands of the public domain or that the nature
and duration of Pastora's occupation met the requirements of the PLA,
thus, failing to convince us to either disregard the rules of evidence or
consider their merits. In this regard, we reiterate our directive in
Santiago v. De las Santos:38
Both under the 193 5 and the present Constitutions, the conservation
no less than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There
would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not
scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To
be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming,
there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic
assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to
the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights
over the same as do minus.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16,
2005 and the resolution dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71143 are AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed the
spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna's application of registration of title
on the basis of the grounds discussed above. Costs against the
spouses Fortuna.
SO ORDERED.
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