White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta.

Mesa Tourist and

Development Corporation vs City of Manila

Facts:

On December 3, 1992, then Manila City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Ordinance
No. 7774 the title of which is “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-
Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” This
ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and
charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a
day. The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and
Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), own and operate several
hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention. According to them, the ordinance will affect their business
interests as operators. On the other hand, the respondents asserted that the ordinance
is a legitimate exercise of police power. In its ruling, the RTC declared Ordinance No.
7774 as null and void on the bases that it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” The RTC cited provisions from
the Constitution that encourage private enterprises and the right to operate economic
enterprises. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the RTC.
According to the respondents, the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities
the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. They also
contended that under Art. III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to
enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix
penalties for the violation of ordinances. The petitioners, on the other hand, argued that
the said ordinance is unconstitutional since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of
movement. They also asserted that it is an invalid exercise of police power,
unreasonable, and an oppressive interference of their business. In its decision, CA ruled
that the ordinance is constitutional. First, since the ordinance only penalizes the owners
or operators of establishments that allow short time use of motels, it does not violate the
right to privacy or the freedom of movement. Second, the exercise of police is only
constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. As for the
ordinance, its lawful objective is to aim curb immoral activities, and there is a lawful
method since he establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect of
the ordinance to the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in
general

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Ruling:
Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as
such, it is unconstitutional. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line
of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely
wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is
evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units
by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding
right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for
numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of
the State. Yet the desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.

Metro Manila Development Authority vs Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising,

Vending and Promotions, Inc.

Facts:
In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and
Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with
Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957
(Build, Operate and Transfer Law). In the said BLT agreement, MRTC undertook to
build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the
expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the Government. The BLT
agreement also stipulated that, among others, MRTC could build and develop
commercial premises in the MRT3 structures and obtain advertising income from such.

In 1998, Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks)
entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter
installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertizing media in the different
parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the
billboards, signages and other advertizing media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-
009. In the said regulation, MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any
kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk,
center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the request
of MMDA, the latter proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar forms of
advertisement.

Issue:
Whether MMDA has the police power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards,
signages, etc. installed by Trackworks

Ruling:
No, MMDA has no police power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards,
signages, etc. that were installed by Trackworks.

Since MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this
case, its entering into a contract with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership. In
other words, Trackworks has the right to install the billboards, signages, and other
advertising media pursuant to the contract.

As for MMDA, it is futile for it to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling
of Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no
power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other
advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. Previously, the court
had the occasion to rule that MMDA powers were limited to the following: the
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. In other words,
there is no law that grants police power to MMDA.

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs The Honorable Court of Appeals, etc.

Facts:
Petitioner Acebedo Optical Company applied for a business permit at the Office of the
City Mayor of Iligan. After consideration of petitioners application and the opposition
raised by local optometrists, Respondent City Mayor issued issued Business Permit No.
5342. Along with the issuance are the following conditions: (a) Acebedo cannot put up
an optical clinic but only a commercial store; (b) Acebedo cannot examine and/or
prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions
of optical clinics; (c)Acebedo cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a
prescription having first been made by a an independent optometrist or independent
optical clinic; (d) Acebedo cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses but can
advertise Ray-ban and similar eyeglasses; (e) Acebedo is allowed to grind lenses but
only upon the prescription of independent optometrist
On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas
(SOPI), Iligan Chapter, through its Acting President, Dr. Frances B. Apostol, filed a
complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the City Mayor. SOPI alleged that
Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the
cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. In an investigation designated by
Respondent City Mayor, the results showed that petitioner was guilty of violating all the
conditions of its business permit. It was also recommended that petitioner be
disqualified from operating its business in Iligan City. The report further advised that no
new permit shall be granted to petitioner for the year 1989 and should only be given
time to wind up its affairs. Subsequently, on July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent
petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of
said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.
On October 17, 1989, petitioner brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction against the
respondents, City Mayor, City Legal Officer and Samahan ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas-
Iligan City Chapter (SOPI), docketed as Civil Case No. 1497 before the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Branch I. Petitioner alleged, among others, that (3) the City Mayor
had no authority to impose the special conditions on its business permit; and (4) the City
Legal Officer had no authority to conduct the investigation as the matter falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of
Optometry.
Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of said special conditions on petitioner’s business permit
is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power

Ruling:
NO, the imposition of said special conditions by the City Mayor is not a valid exercise of
police power.
First, distinction should be made between the grant of a license or permit to do a
business and the issuance of a license to engage in a particular profession. The first is
usually granted by the local governments and the second is issued the Board or
Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. In the present case, Acebedo
was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry
(the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry).
Second, although the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits,
he must base such conditions on law or ordinances. Not doing such will render the
conditions set as ultra vires. In the case at bar, the conditions set by the mayor are ultra
vires, hence cannot be given any legal application. As such, estoppels do not apply.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY OF DAR

Facts:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions concerning land
reform programs of the government. One of the issues raised include serious
challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988".

To crystallize the cases:

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners questioned P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on
the grounds of, among other things, the separation of powers, due process, equal
protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, on the other hand, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to
provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution
belongs to the Congress and not to the President. They also alleged that Proclamation
No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions
on just compensation, due process and equal protection. Lastly, they contended that the
taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation which such payment is
not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly
issued by the President. According to them, the said executive orders violate the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or
just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.

Lastly, in G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so
are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform
has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the
Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said
rules.

Issue:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power
of Eminent Domain.

Ruling:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there
are traditional distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain,
property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the
compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the
taking of the property in Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires
the payment of just compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.
 PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 which directed newspapers to
provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of
political parties and candidates. Such Comelec space shall be allocated to the
Commission free of charge among all candidates. The purpose of this Comelec space is
to enable the candidates make know their qualifications, their stand on different public
issues, and importantly, their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also
be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper

and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No.
2772 unconstitutional and void. This is on the ground that said Comelec Resolution
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The petitioner
invokes that resolution of the respondent is not a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain.

The Solicitor General, on the other hand and in behalf of respondent Comelec, claimed
that the resolution is a permissible exercise of police power of the Comelec over the
information and operations of print media institutions during the election period for the
purpose of ensuring a fair, impartial, and credible election. The Office of the Solicitor
General also alleged that the resolution does not impose upon the publishers any
obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers. It merely established
guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of “Comelec space”. And if
it is viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the
police power of the State

Issue:
Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held Comelec Resolution2772 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain. To require print media companies to donate
“Comelec-space” is tantamount to “taking” of private personal property for public use or
purposes without the requisite just compensation. The extent of the taking or deprivation
is substantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon
the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory “donation,” measured
by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or
in non-urban areas, may be very substantial. The “necessity of the taking” and the “legal
authority to effect the taking” are the threshold requisites. However, the element of
necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec. There was
no indication that the members of PPI are not willing to sell print space at their normal
rates to Comelec for election purposes. The unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to
buy print space is the crux of the problem. In addition, the Constitution or any legislative
authority does not convey the power of eminent domain towards the Comelec. The
taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but
not without payment of “just compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the
necessity of paying compensation for “Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to be
avoided by respondent Commission.
 Forfom Development Corporation vs Philippine National Railways

Facts:
Petitioner Forfom Developmnet Corporation is a domestic company duly recognized
and existing under Philippine laws. As a corporation, it is the registered owner of several
parcels of lands in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna. The said parcels of land were
originally registered under the name of Felix Limcaoco, predecessor-in-interest of
Forfom. Respondent, on the other hand, is Philippine National Railways (PNR), a
government corporation engaged in proprietary functions with principal office at the
PNR Railway Station, C.M. Recto Avenue, Tutuban, Binondo, Manila. In a cabinet
meeting held on 1 November 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved the
Presidential Commuter Service Project, more commonly known as the Carmona Project
of the President. Per Resolution No. 751 dated 2 November 1972 of the PNR Board of
Directors, its General Manager was authorized to implement the project. The San
Pedro-Carmona Commuter Line Project was implemented with the installation of
railroad facilities and appurtenances.

Immediately after the occupation, or within a reasonable time thereafter, there is no

showing that the same was opposed or questioned by Forfom or its representatives on
the ground that respondent PNR never filed an expropriation proceedings and that no
just compensation was ever paid. Neither is there a showing that Forfom sought to
recover the property because the taking was done forcibly with the aid of armed men.
Instead, and this is borne out by certain communications between the parties through
their respective officers or representatives, what Forfom actually did was to negotiate
with PNR for the purpose of fixing the amount which the latter should pay as just
compensation and, if there be any, damages

On 24 August 1990, 18 years later, Forfom filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Binan, Laguna a complaint for Recovery of Possession of Real Property and/or
Damages. It alleged that PNR, with the aid of military men, and without its consent and
against its will, occupied 100,128 square meters of its property located in San Pedro,
Laguna and installed thereon railroad and railway facilities and appurtenances. It further
alleged that PNR rented out portions of the property to squatters along the railroad
tracks. In its Oct. 29, 1992 decision, the RTC ordered PNR to pay Forfom for just
compensation. However, Forfom’s claim for recovery of possession and other prayers
were in the complaint were dismissed for wanting of merit although the trial court found
that the properties of Forfom were taken by PNR without due process of law and without
just compensation.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Forfom can recover possession of its property because
respondent PNR failed to file any expropriation case and to pay just compensation?

Ruling:
The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State.
Being inherent, the power need not be specifically conferred on the government by the
Constitution. Section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and
just compensation. The fundamental power of eminent domain is exercised by the
Legislature. It may be delegated by Congress to the local governments, other public
entities and public utilities. In the case at bar, PNR, under its charter,has the power of
expropriation.

A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of

eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into
private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the
property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be
devoted to a public purpose or otherwise informally, appropriately or injuriously affected;
and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In the case at bar, with the presence of PNR into the property, Forfom was deprived of
material and beneficial use and enjoyment of the property. It is clear based from the
facts that there was a taking of property within the constitutional sense. The inaction of
Forfom and the acquiescence to the taking of its land without any expropriation case
being filed and at the same time its continued negotiation with PNR on just
compensation for the land prevent him raising any issues regarding the power and right
of the PNR to expropriate and the public purpose for which the right was exercised. In
other words, it is clear that the recovery of possession of property by Forfom can no
longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppels.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PHILIPPINE

ECONOMICZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) vs.
SPOUSES AGUSTIN and IMELDA CANCIO

Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Economic Zone Authority is a government-owned and controlled
corporation created and existing under and by virtue of RA 7916, as amended. It is
vested with governmental functions, one of which is the power of eminent domain. As
such, it is enabled to acquire private land within or adjacent to the economic zone for
consolidation with land for zone development purposes.
On January 15, 1979, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1811 which reserved certain parcels of land of the public domain in Lapu Lapu City in
favor of petitioner (then Export Processing Zone Authority or EPZA) for the
establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone. However, some of the parcels
covered by the proclamation, including that of respondent spouses Agustin and Imelda
Cancio, were private land. Eventually, petitioner laid out the development of economic
zone and subsequently leased out respondents’ 47, 540 sq. m. to Maitland Smith In., a
private investor in the economic zone. On May 19, 2001, petitioner offered to purchase
respondents’ lot at P1,100 per sq. m. or P52,294,000 for the whole property. The letter
containing the offer further instructed respondents "to consider and accept, otherwise
we will initiate expropriation proceedings in the proper court." Instead of accepting the
offer, respondents filed an unlawful detainer case against Maitland in the Municipal Trial
Court of Lapu Lapu City. Thereafter, on August 27, 2001, petitioner commenced
expropriation proceedings for respondents’ property with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Lapu Lapu City, Branch 54. Accordingly, it sought a writ of possession for the
property for which it was willing to deposit 10% of the offered amount or a total of
P5,229,400 with the Land Bank of the Philippines in accordance with Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 50. Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to
comply with RA 8974, specifically Section 4(a) thereof, which requires that, upon the
filing of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing agency shall immediately pay
the owner of the property an amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation
thereof for purposes of the issuance of a writ of possession.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to this case for purposes of the issuance of the
writ of possession

Ruling:
RA 8974 governs this case, not A.O. No. 50 as petitioner insists. A perusal of RA 8974
readily reveals that it applies to instances when the national government expropriates
property for national government infrastructure projects. Undeniably, the economic zone
is a national government project – a matter undisputed by both parties. Also, the
complaint for expropriation was filed only on August 27, 2001 or almost one year after
the law was approved on November 7, 2000. Thus, there is no doubt about its
applicability to this case.

In addition, RA 8974 provides that "the court shall determine the just compensation to
be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case."
In this case, almost eight years have passed since petitioner commenced the
expropriation proceedings on August 27, 2001.The Court, however, hold that it is still
feasible to comply with the spirit of the law by requiring the trial court to make such
determination within sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, in accordance with the
guidelines laid down in RA 8974 and its implementing rules.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs .RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ

Facts:
Respondent Martinez’62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres,
Romblon was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agriculture on November 16,
1993 pursuant to RA 6657. Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines offered
P1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Believing that the proffered amount was unjust
and confiscatory, respondent Martinez rejected it. Thus, the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for the
preliminary determination of just compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the
CARL. The result of the summary administrative proceedings show inconsistencies in
the figures and factors made as bases by LBP in its computation. As such, PARAD
ordered LBP to pay Martinez the amount of P12,179,492.50. A petition for the fixing of
just compensation was then filed by LBP’s counsel before the Special Agrarian Court.
Such petition, however, was filed after the 15-day required period. Respondent, in her
answer, asserted that the orders, rulings and decisions of the DARAB become final after
the lapse of 15days from their receipt and therefore moved for the dismissal of the
petition for being filed out of time. Respondent also filed before the Office of the PARAD
a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution which was eventually granted on Nov.
11, 2003. Ascertaining that the petition before the SAC was filed by LBP 26 days after it
received a copy of PARAD’s decision, the Office of the PARAD denied LBP’s motion for
reconsideration and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution on February 23, 2004.
Aggrieved of these developments, LBP, on March 12, 2004, moved to quash the said
February 23, 2004 PARAD resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains
finality after the lapse of the 15-day period

Ruling:
Yes, the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains finality after the
lapse of the 15-day period, as already established in Philippine Veterans Bank,
reiterated in Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case. Thus, while a
petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the
agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision but an original action, the same has to be filed
within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator’s
decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in accord with law and settled
jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. In other words, the
agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of
the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just
compensation should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with
the SAC within the said period. This conclusion, as already explained in the assailed
decision, is based on the doctrines laid down in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of
Appeals and Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica.

Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et.al vs. Jovito M. Luis, et.al

Facts:
Respondents are the registered owner of the land that the local government of Pasig
City expropriated for public used as a municipal road now known as A. Sandoval
Avenue, Barangay Palitaw Pasig City. However, the appraisal committee of the city of
Pasig, assessed the value of the land only at Php150.00 per square meter.
Respondents send two letters to the mayor requesting that the appraisal committee to
consider first the price of Php5, 000.00, because the petitioner had paid them at the
price of Php2, 000.00 for the property on the same area in the year 1994 also to convert
into a public road. The second letter the amount is Php2, 000.00 per square meter as
the value of their land. The mayor wrote a letter informing the respondents that the city
cannot pay them more than the amount set by the appraisal committee.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the local government of Pasig City made an unjust method in
expropriating the property of the respondents.
2. Whether or not the compensation is just.

Held:
1. Yes, defendant’s action is illegal and unjust in taking the properties of the
plaintiffs, without their consent and without the benefit of an expropriation
proceedings required by law in taking of private property for public use.
2. No. According to the bill of rights, article III, section 9, just compensation is the
just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The appraisal
committee of the city of Pasig for the value of said property is under value for the
compensation for the plaintiff. The property they first expropriated from the
respondent was valued for Php2,000.00 per square meter, but for the other
property that was also owned by respondents in the same area with the other
property that they owned was only assessed with the price of Php150.00 per
square meter, there are big difference between the two price offered by the local
government.

HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION

Facts: On November 21, 1997, the respondents as the owners of land with an area of
221,573 square meters situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for the
recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of
just compensation. They alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the
underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the
operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their
land; that their discovery had occurred in 1995 after Atty. Saidali C. Gandamra,
President of the Federation of Arabic Madaris School, had rejected their offer to sell the
land because of the danger the underground tunnel might pose to the proposed Arabic
Language Training Center and Muslims Skills Development Center; that such rejection
had been followed by the withdrawal by Global Asia Management and Resource
Corporation from developing the land into a housing project for the same reason; that
Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept their
land as collateral because of the presence of the underground tunnel; that the
underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent; that the
presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and
residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe place for
habitation because of the loud sound of the water rushing through the tunnel and the
constant shaking of the ground, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer
grounds. In its answer with counterclaim, NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit
had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which
a mere legal easement on their land was established; that their cause of action, should
they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel having been
constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous
easement, any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years.
Issue: Whether the Heirs of Macabangkits right to claim just compensation.
Held: The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating
agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as inverse
condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain has been attempted by the taking agency. Just compensation is the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not
the takers gain, but the owner's loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of
the word compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. On the other hand,
the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be
actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.

Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano vs. The Republic of the Philippines, the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority

Facts:
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAAs predecessor agency, pursued
a program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators,
NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around the airport, in
the Banilad Estate. As the landowners would later claim, the government negotiating
team, as a sweetener, assured them that they could repurchase their respective lands
should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push through or once the Lahug
Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport. Some of the
landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right of
repurchase. Others, however, including the owners of the aforementioned lots, refused
to sell because the purchase price offered was viewed as way below market, forcing the
hand of the Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA),
as successor agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of the lots
entitled Republic v. Damian Ouano, et al.

Issue:
1. WHETHER ABANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE FOR WHICH THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE EXPROPRIATED ENTITLES PETITIONERS
OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN, ET AL. TO REACQUIRE
THEM.
2. WHETHER PETITIONERS OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN,
ET AL. ARE ENTITLED TO RECONVEYANCE OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES SIMPLY ON THE BASIS OF AN ALLEGED VERBAL PROMISE
OR ASSURANCE OF SOME NAC OFFICIALS THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES WILL BE RETUNRED IF THE AIRPORT PROJECT WOULD BE
ABANDONED.
Held:

1. The MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject
of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they
were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and development
of Lahug Airport.

2. The Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of it
had, in fact, been purchased by a private corporation for development as a
commercial complex.[20]

3. It has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its
team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that they
would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no
longer used for airport purposes.

Arsenio Lumiqued, vs. Apolonio Exevea

Facts:
Arsenio Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by
Jeannette Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas
expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for
reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116, 000.00.
Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after
she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on
the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted
by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to
enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but
neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the
committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee
recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the
recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued. Lumiqued appealed
averring that his right to due process was violated as well as his right to security of
tenure.

Issue:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?

HELD:
No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in
the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a
criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at
bar, Lumiqued invoked the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not
accused of any crime. The investigation conducted by the committee was for the
purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the
complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process
unless required by the Constitution or the law.
“. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers,
while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due
process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is
deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot
validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.”

Secretary of Justice vs. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion

Facts:
On January 13, 1977, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes in a Foreign Country”. The Decree is founded on: the Doctrine of Incorporation
under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state
where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped. On
November 13, 1994, Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “Extradition Treaty between the
Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A.” The Philippine
Senate ratified the said Treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received
from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request
for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Mark
Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wiretapping to
conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US
government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be
extradited there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as
the extradition request by the USA. The DOJ secretary: 1.refused to provide him copy
thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary
investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies; 2. Denied the request for
the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the
Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. Jimenez sued the DOJ Secretary
(Franklin Drilon). The lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process.
HELD: The Petition was dismissed. The human rights of person, whether citizen or
alien, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take
precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with
its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted
principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the
land. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

Government of the United State of America vs. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan

Facts: Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion”. The Secretary
was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it
reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the
Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with
the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his
“immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr Jimenez filed before it an
“Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant
be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr Jimenez submitted his
Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should
issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100, 000. The court ordered the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in
cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. Government of the USA filed a petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of
a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the
court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide
lower court.

Issue:
Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for
bail.

Held: Yes. The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the
Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does
not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows
from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless
his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of
innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended” finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.” That the offenses for which Jimenez is
sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him
one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial
for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts
trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), vs. Comelec

Facts:
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13,
2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the
list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions.
Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI. It was delisted because it failed
to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.
Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional
sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or through
its authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.
Resolution No. 8679 was based on Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941),
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, provides: Section 6. Removal and/or
Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of
the following grounds:
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. PGBI filed its
Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading,
the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization
under the Party-List System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted that:
The COMELEC denied PGBI’s motion/opposition for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI.
Held:
No. The law is clear. The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of
any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to
participate in the last two preceding elections or (b) fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. The word "or" is a
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other
things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.

Telebap vs. Comelec

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.

(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting
companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among
other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened
injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had
the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio
and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of
Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known
as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of
campaign.”

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to
procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides
that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that
Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial
election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this
year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television
stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free
air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in
1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this
year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement
that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due
process of law and without just compensation.

Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by

television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are
frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given
franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use
them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to
operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state
spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide
free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation
of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the
case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for
COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property
is taken
by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

People vs. Jalosjos

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress

who is confined atthe national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and
acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance
at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need
for his constituents to be represented. The victim of rape in this case was a minor
below twelve (12) years of age, who herself narrated the shameful details of the
dastardly act against her virtue. The victim was peddled for commercial sex by her own
guardian whom she treated as a foster father. Because the complainant was a willing
victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several acts of lasciviousness on distinctly
separate occasions. The accused was then Congressman Romeo Jalosjos who, inspite
of his having been charged and convicted by the trial court for statutory rape, was still
re-elected to his congressional office. On December 16, 1996, two (2) informations for
the crime of statutory rape and twelve (12) for acts of lasciviousness, were filed against
accused-appellant. The victim, Maria Rosilyn, grew up in a two-storey apartment in
Pasay City under the care of Simplicio Delantar, whom she treated as her own father.
Simplicio was a fifty-six year old homosexual whose ostensible source of income was
selling longganiza and tocino and accepting boarders at his house. He, however, was
also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp. Osilyn ran away from home with the help of
one of their boarders. They went to the Pasay City Police where she executed a sworn
statement against SimplicioDelantar. Rosilynwas thereafter taken to the custody of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).The National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation, which eventually led to the filing of
criminal charges against accused-appellant He was also convicted on six (6) counts of
acts of lasciviousness.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as

member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite
of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution.
The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec.11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate
one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man
with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes
of the correction system.

Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission

Facts: E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was
signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of
the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial
body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes
between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and
make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public

office and appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like
the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and
vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

Held:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause.
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be
doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department,
to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all
executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by
the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that
the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

Comelec vs. Condrado Cruz

Facts: The constitutional challenge, originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 128 (RTC), against the following highlighted portion of Section 2
of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991):

Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan
officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.

No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the
1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the challenged proviso constitutionally
infirm. The present petition, filed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeks a
review of the RTC decision.

The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA
No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991 or
LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered an ex post facto law. The
three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has been specifically provided in RA No.
7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It further asserts that
laws which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so
provided and when it does not impair vested rights. As there is no vested right to public
office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged
retroactive application of RA No. 9164.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9164 is unconstitutional?

Held: Petition Granted. The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found
under its Section 2, Article III, which provides: Nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality
under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is equality among
equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the
basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or
persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated differently in law.
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the
conclusion that no basis exists in the present case for an equal protection challenge.
The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because
the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials
with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the
Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-
term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the
three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through
legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it
recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal
protection violation can exist under these conditions.

From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a
standard because the challenged proviso did not result in any differential treatment
between barangay officials and all other elective officials. This conclusion proceeds
from our ruling on the retroactivity issue that the challenged proviso does not involve
any retroactive application.

Arroyo vs. DOJ

Facts: The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint
committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004
and 2007 elections.

The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the
Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the
results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South
Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team
recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution

ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et
al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint
Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause?

Ruling: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal protection clause.
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is
the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist that the
Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public
officials linked to the Arroyo Administration.

While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation,
not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were
investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties.
Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended
to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the
existence of real differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It
merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be
treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Petition Dismissed.
 Lim vs. Felix

FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the
airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate
province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts,
namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were
attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of
Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself
suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed.

Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator
filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente
Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with
the airport incident.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that
a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named
accused On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with
a recommendation of no bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the Court
a verified petition for change of venue. The Court issued an en banc Resolution
authorizing the change of venue from the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The cases were raffled
to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix. Petitioners Vicente Lim,
Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations,
among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of
the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of
Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its
determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the
constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself
been personally convinced of such probable cause. Respondent court issued an order
denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest
against the accused including the petitioners herein.

ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply
relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause
exists.

HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case
where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally
determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor.
The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave
abuse of discretion.
The Court reiterated that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not
precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The
extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the
Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no
evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest. Indubitably, the respondent Judge
committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and
issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other
basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.
The instant petitions were GRANTED. The questioned Order of respondent Judge
Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is
declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Orders and
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in the instant Petitions are made
PERMANENT.
 Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: On April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City
Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in
front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen rode the Tamaraw vehicle which
was the official car of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being
made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the
Kalookan City Cemetery. Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen
alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the
cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish
eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the
policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The
policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male
person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what
said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat.
Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He
found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana
contents. The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan
City Police Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for
investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated wallet
and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be Alain Manalili y Dizon.
On 11 April 1988, Manalili was charged by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R.
Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act 6425. Upon his arraignment
on 21 April 1988, Manalili pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. With the agreement of the
public prosecutor, Manalili was released after filing bail bond. After trial in due course,
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal
Court, rendered on 19 May 1989 a decision convicting appellant of illegal possession of
marijuana residue. Manalili remained on provisional liberty. Atty. Benjamin Razon,
counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeal and affirmed the trial court. The appellate court denied reconsideration via its
Resolution dated 20 January 1994. Manalili filed a petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest.

HELD: In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s). In allowing such a search, the interest of
effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in
appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest.
What justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in
taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed
with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. It did not,
however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only
by exigent circumstances. In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search
and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such
search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee. This right, however, is not absolute. People
vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless
search and seizure. Moreover, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another
exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. In the case at hand,
Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had red
eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according
to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a
member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious
behavior was of drug addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient
reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such
investigation, they found marijuana in petitioners possession.The search was valid,
being akin to a stop-and-frisk.

People of the Philippines vs. Edison Sucro

FACTS: Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by
P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. to monitor the activities of Edison Sucro, because of
information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned, Pat.
Fulgencio positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo
Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel.
Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw Sucro enter the chapel, taking something which turned
out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and
then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a
while Sucro went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave
to a group of persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi
and reported the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue
monitoring developments. Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third
buyer, Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with Sucro. At that point, the team of P/Lt
Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at
Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and Sucro. P/ Lt.
Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma
Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw
something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When
confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro in front of
the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and arrest Sucro at the corner of C.
Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana
from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. The teabags of
marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo
City for analysis. The specimens were all found positive of marijuana. Sucro was
charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon
arraignment, Sucro, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense
charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, finding Sucro guilty
of the sale of prohibited. Sucro appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently,
whether the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

HELD: The court ruled in affirmative. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful.
The rule states that "A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it;" An offense is committed in the presence or within the
view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant,
when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances
created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. The failure of the police
officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired from the
surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search
warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed. That searches and seizures
must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions
granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Herein, police officers have
personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier
conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Under the circumstances (monitoring
of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest Sucro
who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband. The court ruled that
there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the
requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest
are admissible in evidence. Premises considered, this Court is convinced that appellant
Edison Sucro had indeed committed the offense charged. The trial court's decision must
be upheld.

People vs. Abe Valdez

FACTS: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya, received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana
plantation, allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to Valdez's hut.
Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya
then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. The team was
composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales,
SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. The following day, the said police team
left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. The police
operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. They found Valdez alone in
his nipa hut. They looked around the area where Valdez had his kaingin and saw 7 five-
foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from
Valdez's hut. PO2 Balut asked Valdez who owned the prohibited plants and the latter
admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the 7 marijuana plants and took photos
of Valdez standing beside the cannabis plants. Valdez was then arrested. One of the
plants was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for analysis. The Crime Laboratory
forensic analyst, testified a positive indication for marijuana from the examined plant.
But Valdez alleged otherwise. At the police headquarters, Valdez reiterated that he
knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police. Still, Valdez was charged
for the cultivation and culture of the 7 fully grown marijuana plants. Valdez was
arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the
merits then ensued. The RTC found Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
charge. Hence, the automatic review by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the seizure of the marijuana plants was made pursuant to warrantless
search and seizure, based on the “plain view” doctrine.

HELD: The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is
deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search
and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and
should be excluded. Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding. Herein, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police
officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least 1 day to obtain a warrant to search
Valdez's farm. But they did not. The Court need not underscore that the protection
against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific
instances are searches allowed without warrants. More so, the Court finds no reason to
subscribe that the case should apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply,
the following elements must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to
be where they are; and (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain
view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. Herein, the police officers
first located the marijuana plants before Valdez was arrested without a warrant. Hence,
there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of Valdez's premises.
The police team was dispatched to Valdez's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot
the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent. Also, upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area"
before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not
"immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants
in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine,
thus, cannot be made to apply. The court held that the confiscated plants were evidently
obtained during an illegal search and seizure and found that said plants cannot, as
products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.
They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on
the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants
as evidence to convict appellant.

People vs. Chua Ho San

FACTS: Chua Ho San was arrested and charged and found guilty by the RTC of San
Fernando, La Union, of transporting, without appropriate legal authority, the regulated
substance methamphetamine hydrochloride. Chua was arrested when Jim Lagasca Cid,
the Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station of La Union and his men were
patrolling the Bacnotan coastline in response to reports of rampant smuggling of
firearms and other contraband. Barangay Captain Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao
requested police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted at
Tammocalao shores. Cid and his men proceeded to Tammocalao beach, and observed
that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When the speedboat landed, the
male passenger alighted, and carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag, and
walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man changed direction.
Badua held Chua’s right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced
themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand what they were
saying. And by resorting of “sign language”, Cid motioned with his hands for the man to
open his bag. The man acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain
several transparent plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later
identified to be shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he
was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights. Chua was
initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride before the
RTC. However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently amended to
allege that Chua was in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended by RA
7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug). At his arraignment, where the amended
complaint was read to him by a Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial finally ensued, with interpreters assigned to Chua. Chua provided a
completely different story, claiming that the bags belong to his employer Cho Chu Rong,
who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they decided to dock when they were low
on fuel and telephone battery; that the police, with only gestures and hand movements,
escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair and so on. In
a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC convicted Chua for transporting
28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. Chua
prays for the reversal of the RTC decision and his acquittal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted
by the Police Officers constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.
HELD: The Court held in negative. The Court is certain that CHUA was arrested and his
bag searched without the benefit of a warrant. The Court explained that Constitution
bars State intrusions to a person’s body, personal effects or residence except if
conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with the Rules of
Court. However, warrantless searches may be permitted in cases of search of moving
vehicles, seizure in plain view, customs searches, waiver or consent searches, stop and
frisk situations, and search incidental to a lawful arrest. But in flagrante delicto, a
permissible warrantless arrests, it is required that the arresting officer must have the
knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause. In the case at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or
demonstrative of Chua's participation in on-going criminal enterprise that could have
spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. Chua was not identified as
a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to
shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark
him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held that there
was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The court ruled
that the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court. The
Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the prosecution
that there was a waiver or consented search. It cannot be inferred from Chua’s alleged
cognizance of the sign language that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously
waived his right against intrusive search. Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject
regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence. Hence, the accused was
acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

People vs. Tangliben

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Third Judicial Region at San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41, finding appellant Medel
Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended). The prosecution's
evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was based narrated
that in the late evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L.
Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario
Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound
located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga. The surveillance mission
was aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place
but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on
informations supplied by informers. Around 9:30 p.m., said Patrolmen noticed a person
carrying a red traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him. The
person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling
bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified
themselves. Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper
and weighing one kilo, more or less. The person was asked of his name and the reason
why he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained
that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves. The
accused was taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further
investigation; and that Pat. Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his
Investigator's Report.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search is incident to a lawful arrest.

HELD: It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a
product of an unlawful search without a warrant and is therefore inadmissible in
evidence. The court ruled that this contention is devoid of merit. One of the exceptions
to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest.
Section 12 (Search incident to a lawful arrest) of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides that "A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant." Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides that "A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." Tangliben was caught in flagrante, since he was
carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the
exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently
valid. The Court is not unmindful of its decision in People v. Aminnudin where the PC
officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused appellant was on board
a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited
for him one evening, approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained
him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The
Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized
illegally, as there was lack of urgency, and thus a search warrant can still be procured.
However, herein, the case presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not
mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who
pointed to Tangliben as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information,
the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search
warrant. The Court cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin in this case. To
require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal
possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers,
etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which
these persons are associated. The court affirmed but modified the judgment of
conviction by the trial court.

People vs. Leila Johnson

FACTS: Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow,
and a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was
naturalized as an American on June 16, 1968 and had since been working as a
registered nurse in the United States. On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines
to visit her son's family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United
States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the
traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at
5:30 p.m. the next day. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as
a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. When she frisked Johnson, she felt
something hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained
she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a
result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the
matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile. She was directed to take Johnson to the
nearest women's room for inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room. Inside the
women's room, Ramirez asked Johnson "to bring out the thing under her girdle."
Johnson brought out three plastic packs which were found by NBI Chemist to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took Johnson and the plastic packs
to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the
NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened.
Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged
of a violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA
7659. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found Johnson guilty. Johnson
appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right
against unreasonable search and seizure.

HELD: The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed
under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just
been committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The
circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph (a) or (b)
of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial
investigation is far from being accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized
from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to
airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a
lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travellers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus
been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence
against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant,
was justified since it was affected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her
person in flagrante delicto.

People vs. Malmstedt

FACTS: Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines as

tourist. On May 7, 1989, accused left for Baguio and stayed in Sagada for two (2) days.
On May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada. At same day,
Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command
(NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, to check all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area
was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group NARCOM officers set up a
checkpoint at the designated area at and inspected all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. Two (2) NARCOM officers inspected from the front going towards the
rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the
rear thereof. CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist; suspecting it to be a gun,
the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused
failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging
on his waist, which turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same
bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped
objects turned out to contain hashish. Malmstedt was invited outside the bus for
questioning. Before alighting, accused get two travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
The officers got the bags and opened them, upon steeping out of the bus. A teddy bear
was found in each bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused
finally presented his passport. Accused was brought to the headquarters of the
NARCOM for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the
teddy bears which also contained hashish. Samples of hashish were taken to PC Crime
Laboratory for chemical analysis. It was established that the objects examined were
hashish, a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, information was filed
against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment,
accused entered a plea of "not guilty." The trial court found the guilt of the accused
Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt. The accused appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search was illegal and, therefore, the prohibited
drugs which were discovered during the search are not admissible as evidence.

HELD: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need
to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
officer or a private person under the following circumstances: (a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs
(hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in
flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers
were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal
effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing
a crime. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by
this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee. The appealed judgment of
conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed.

RICARDO C. VALMONTE ET AL VS GEN. RENATO DE VILLA ET AL

FACTS: National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to
Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried
of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars
and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night
or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Petitioners further
contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make
searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution; and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been
harassed. Petitioners then file a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same
or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the
implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.

ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of checkpoints is unconstitutional / illegal?

RULING: The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a

personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened
to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in
any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of
the circumstances involved.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se
illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their
routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right
against unlawful search and seizure or other rights. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to
be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other
areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for
the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots
to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent
right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's
right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former
should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But,
at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. The petition is
dismissed.

PP vs.ROLANDO DE GRACIA ET AL.

FACTS: The incident took place at the height of the coup d' etat staged in December,
1989. Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, was
conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office, together with his team. A crowd
was gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp
Aguinaldo, then a group of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked
towards the car of the surveillance team. As they passed by the group, the latter
pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the
wounding on one member of the team. As a consequence, a searching team raided
the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16
ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, etc inside one of the rooms. They saw
appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously
peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room.
As a result of the raid, the team arrested appellant and others. No search warrant was
secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so
much disorder and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office,
aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. Appellant Rolando de
Gracia denied the incident. The trial court rendered judgment acquitting appellant
Rolando de Gracia of attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion. The
judgment of conviction is now challenged in this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case?

HELD: The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an
armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is
primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual
quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even
colorably explained. There was general chaos and disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas
were obviously closed.
Under theses circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls
under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first
place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore,
under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and
secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that when
the raid was conducted, the court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the
moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion is more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion. The arrest, therefore, need not follow
the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by
a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of
arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a
judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing
overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but really in
pursuance of the rebellious movement.
Wherefore, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed, but its
recommendation therein for executive clemency and the supposed basis thereof are
hereby deleted.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PDEA.

FACTS: This is a petition alleging the constitutionality of RA 9165 otherwise known as

the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Sec 36, thereof requires mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. In
its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a
registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and
(g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one,
the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For
another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be
used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a
person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed provision of RA 9165 violates the constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizure?
HELD: The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary
and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a
random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and
safeguard in the process the well being of the citizenry, particularly the youth, from the
harmful effects of dangerous drugs.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools
and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor
students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody
and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco
parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may
adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4)
schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair,
just, and non-discriminatory.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has
been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or
intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged
by the balancing of the government - mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy
interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest.
The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and
resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory
random drug test. Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced
expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely
to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug
test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office . The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
"randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before
the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless.
Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec.
2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.
Wherefore, the Court resolves to partially grant the petition by declaring Sec. 36(c) and
(d) of RA 9165 Constitutional, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) unconstitutional.

BRICCIO A. POLLO VS. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID

FACTS: An unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson

which read that an employee of your agency is lawyering to an accused government
employee who have a pending case in the CSC. Chairperson David immediately formed
a team and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically
"to back up all the files in the computers. The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of
computers was witnessed by several employees. Chairperson David made an
observation that most of the draft pleadings found in the computer of petitioner are for
and on behalves of parties gives rise to the inference that the one who prepared them
was knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing interests adverse and
inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government
tasked to discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service.
Petitioner denies allegation and accused CSC officials of conducting a "fishing
expedition" when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer and
these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-
incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. The CSC issued a resolution and
petitioner guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, etc. CA dismissed his appeal and his
motion for reconsideration. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted on petitioner ‘s computer violates his right
against unreasonable searches and seizure?

HELD: Public employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an
effective and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably suffers from
the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of
its employees. Therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at
issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers.

The search conducted on petitioner's computer was justified at its inception and scope.
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no
doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo's computer has
successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the
workplace It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as
a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the
warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was received
recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was "lawyering" for parties
having pending cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of
the imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. Considering the damaging
nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any
possible adverse consequence or fall-out.
The warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any way,
vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial
prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational
effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its
employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search are
deemed admissible.f dismissal with all its accessory penalties, pursuant to existing rules
and regulations.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied.

Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo

Facts:Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are farmer form Bucalan who were suspected of
being members of the New People’s Army (NPA) and were forcibly taken from their
home, detained in various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units. After
several days in captivity, both Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo recognized their
abductors as members of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. While in
captivity, they met with other desaoeracidos including the still-missing University of the
Philippines students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan who were also suspected of
being a member of the NPA. After eighteen months of captivity, torture and other
dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape.Ten days after their escape, they
filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injuction and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the
military officers and agents from depriving them from their right to liberty. While the said
case was pending, the Rule on Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The
Manalo Brothers subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their
existing petition as amparo petition.

Issue:
Whether the grant of the privilege of the writ of Amparo is moot and academic as
both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo have escaped from captivity.

Held:
Not moot and academic. Respondents assert that their cause of action consists
in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and violation of their right to security.
 In context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, “freedom from fear” is the right and
any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state
of mind, a reaction; threat is stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same
stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The
degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy
of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in
the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the “right to security” is actually the
“freedom from threat.”

Robert Reyes vs. Sec. Raul Gonzales

Facts:
Petitioner Robert Reyes together with forty-nine (49) others were arrested in the Manila
Peninsula Hotel siege and brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. The
Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecution conducted inquest proceedings to
ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner the others for trial
on charge of Rebellion and/or inciting to Rebellion. Then upon the request of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul
Gonzales issued and Hold Departure Order (HDO) ordering respondent Commissioner
of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure list of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) the name of the petitioner and 49 others. After finding probable cause
against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion, the DOJ Panel of
Prosecutors filed an Information before the RTC, Makati. The petitioner filed a Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable cause and release of the accused Reyes upon
recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his
specific participation of the crime charged. The RTC dismissed the charge for Rebellion
against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Then petitioners counsel
Atty. Francisco Chavez wrote the DOJ secretary requesting the lifting of HDO in view of
the dismissal of the criminal case against him.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened
with violation by the issuance of the subject to HDO, which would entitle him to the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo.

Held:
No, In order for the him to be entitled to privilege of the Writ of Amparo, the Court
must be preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to
what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party was or is being committed.
The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of
the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has failed to establish
that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a
serious violation of his rights.
 In Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data In Favor
of Noriel H. Rodriguez

Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan
( Kagimugan). An organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
He claims that the military tagged the KMP as enemy of the State under the Oplan
Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly
when refused to confess to his membership in the NPA. Later, Rodriguez was freed
under certain conditions. Were Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he
was neither abducted nor tortured. Then on December 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed before
this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for Writ of Habeas Data with
Prayers for Protection Orders. And on January 6, 2012, respondents filed their Motion
for Reconsideration, Arguing that soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th
Infantry Division of the military cannot be held accountable for authoring the abduction
and torture of the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in Amparo and
Habeas Data cases.

Held:
The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of
Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his
rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command
responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Command responsibility may be
loosely applied to amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that
have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would
issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility
merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights
of the aggrieved party.

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA vs P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN ET AL

FACTS: Former PGMA issued Administrative Order No. 275 "Creating an Independent
Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country. The
body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission, was formed to
investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to
eliminating them and dismantling them permanently in the future. Gamboa alleged that
the PNP–Ilocos Norte conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and
her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the
benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her
to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
The report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG
was published and released in the different form of media. Thus, she was publicly
tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that
the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission. As a result,
she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities
maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters
and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance
operations.
Gamboa filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents.
The trial court ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining
PAGs constituted a violation of her right to privacy However, the RTC dismissed the
petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the
subject information originated from respondents,.

ISSUE: Whether or not the forwarding of information or intelligence report by PNP tot he
Commission was unlawful act that violated petitioner’s right to privacy.

HELD: The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other
armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275
articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the
ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state interest of
dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to the
Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals
suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One
of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained
in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of
the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa
Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in
life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with
the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these
notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to
deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the
power to request assistance from the latter.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the
collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful
mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is denied. The assailed Decision insofar
as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is affirmed.

Navarro vs CA

Facts:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City went to
the police station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment
shows in the City. At the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan
and accused policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters,
lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left
eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment.
The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations
made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight.
During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified. Presented in evidence to
confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at
the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.

Issue:
Whether or not the tape is admissible in evidence under RA 4200,
Held:
Affirmative, the tape is admissible in evidence. RA 4200 prohibits the
overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private and it is done in a public place,
the recording is not prohibited.

Zulueta vs CA

Facts:
On March 26, 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and her husband’s secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between her husband and his alledged
paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, passport and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine. Her husband brought the action
for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages. The trial court rendered
judgment that he is the capital/exclusive owner of the properties describe in the plaintiffs
complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieve party

Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring “ the privacy of communication and correspondence inviolable” is
no less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order from the court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible “ for any proceeding.”
The intimacies between spouses do not justify any one them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and ransacking them for any tell tale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between spouses by
making privileged. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save
for specified exceptions. But one things is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with other. And this has nothing to do
with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Ramirez vs CA

Facts: A case was filed by Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City against private
respondent Esther Garcia alleging that the latter “vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” Ramirez produced a
verbatim transcript to the event alleged. The transcript was taken from a tape recording
during the confrontation. As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging
that the said act of secretly taping the conversation was illegal, Respondent Garcia filed
a criminal case against Ramirez alleging that the recording of the event was illegal and
thus, a violation of RA 4200, entitled “ An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
other related violations of private communication, and other purposes. Ramirez filed a
motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. The
trial court agreed with her and granted motion to quash, reasoning that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under RA 4200; and that the violation punished by
RA 4200 refers to the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to
the communication. The CA reversed the decision of the lower court. Hence the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Anti-Wire tapping Act applies in the recordings by one the
parties in the conversation

Held:
Section 1 of RA 4200 provides “ It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap and
wire or cable, or by using and other device or arrangement to secretly overhear,
intercept or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder,
or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder.
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “ private communication” in Section 1 of
RA 4200 does not include “ private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word communication to point of absurdity.

WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA
CATOLICO

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.
Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the
normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of
P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It
was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp.
opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico. Waterous
Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being
rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s
person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.

Issue: Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence

Ruling: Yes. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its
decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the
Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the
citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel
admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolicos reinstatement
would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to
Catolico.Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one months salary for
every year of service. In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the
separation pay at one-half months salary for every year of service. Catolico did not
oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as
fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision
and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993
and 2 December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED,
except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiters decision, viz., that the evidence
against private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches
and seizures which is hereby set aside.

Lourdes T. Marquez vs. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto,

Facts:
Petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
to produce several bank documents for purposes of in camera inspection relative to
various accounts at Union Bank of the Philippines. The accounts to be inspected were
involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman. The basis of the Ombudsman for
ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts is a trial of managers checks
purchased by one George Trivino, a respondent in the said pending case. The
Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to produce the bank documents
relative to accounts in issue in line of her persistent refusal to comply with the order
which they sais as an unjustified and is merely intended to delay the investigation of the
case; constitutes disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order issued by this office is
punishable as Indirect under R.A 6770. Petitioner together with Union Bank of the
Philippines filed a petition for a declaratory relief, prohibition and injunctions with RTC.
On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her in contempt on
the ground that compliance with Ombudsman by Agapito B. Rosales. Petitioner filed
with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to the motion to cite her in contempt
on the ground that compliance with the Ombudsman’s order would violate R.A. No
1405. But was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as
an exception to the law on bank secrecy of bank deposits.

Held:
An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA 1405) would reveal the
following exceptions:
1. The depositor consents in writing;
2. In impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;
4. Deposit is subject of litigation;
5. In cases of unexplained wealth.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent
authority. What is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In shirt,
what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to
formally charge Amado Lagdameao, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was
no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for
inspection.
 Blas Ople vs. Ruben Torres et. al.
Facts:
On December 12, 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued A.O 308 entitled “
Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System”. Senator Ople
averred that the said AO is unconstitutional because it infringes upon the people’s
privacy and that the said AO is an encroachment of the Legislature’s power to legislate
laws. Ople opined that the said AO is not merely an AO because it partakes of the
nature of a law hence it is beyond the president’s power to issue such. He filed a
petition to enjoin Ruben Torres et al from carrying out such AO. Torres et al. countered
that the AO is not a law for it creates no officer; confers no right; affords no protection
and imposes no duty.

Issue:
Whether or not the implementation of AO no 308 insidiously lays the groundwork
for a system which will violate the bill of rights enshrined in the constitution.

Held:
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass
society. The threats emanate from various sources—governments, journalist,
employers, social scientist, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive
branch of government which by issuing AO no. 308 pressures the people to surrender
their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate
delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that AO no. 308 gives the government the
power to compile a devastating dossier against suspecting citizens.

TELEBAP and GMA Network vs Comelec

Facts:

Telecommunication and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an

organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared
to be without legal standing to sue in this case because it was not able to show that it
suffered from actual and threatened injury. On the other hand, GMA Network operates
radio and television stations in the Philippines and is declared with legal standing to
sue. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92 of B.P.No. 881 on the ground (1)
that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that
it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and
(3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. It
contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time
while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in
newspapers and magazines with payment.

According to petitioners, they suffered losses in millions in providing COMELEC

Time for the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it will suffer
even more if they be required to do so again. Petitioners claim that the primary source
of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers. Thus,
if required to provide free air time to authorize unjust taking of private property.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P.No.881 furthers the system of free expression and
doesn’t violate equal protection clause.

Held:
Yes. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by
the government. In truth, these companies, which are given franchises, do not own the
airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images.
They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a
mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
Art. XII, §11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the
common good." What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one
for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public,
particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? It is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount.
Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government
controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of
views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this
purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an
election.
 ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: The Resolution stating to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop
ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit
survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same was issued by the
Comelec allegedly upon "information from reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group)
has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections x
x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x vote during the elections for national
officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be
[broadcast] immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might conflict
with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National
Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or
deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. On May 9, 1998, this Court
issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not conducting exit poll is a valid exercise of freedom of speech and
press.

HELD: Yes. Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press. In the landmark case Gonzales v. Comelec, this
Court enunciated that at the very least, free speech and a free press consist of the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior
restraint. A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of
such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the
"dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present.
"Present" refers to the time element; the danger must not only be probable but very
likely to be inevitable. The evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify
a clamp over one's mouth or a restraint of a writing instrument. The freedoms of speech
and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is
the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of
suffrage. We cannot support any ruling or order "the effect of which would be to nullify
so vital a constitutional right as free speech.” There can be no free and honest elections
if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly
curtailed. The Comelec's concern with the possible non communicative effect of exit
polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on
them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application
is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not. It then contends that
"an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting
interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that
the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by the
Comelec x x x is ever present. Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly
untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are
selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or
reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second,
the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It
consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general
has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals.
Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are
exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the
reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the
former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the
other. The Court conclude that the interest of the state in reducing disruption is
outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, exit polls --
properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly,
peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud and other
electoral ills.
 Social Weather Station vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Social Weather Station and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election
survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of
such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the
publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the
dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?

Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5) 4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint
on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative
preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as
diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE

SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA

Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request
for permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before
the Sandiganbayan. This motion for reconsideration was filed by the Secretary of
Justice, being one of the petitioners, arguing that there is no conflict between the right of
the people to public information and freedom of the press and the right of the accused
of fair trial. It further contended that if there is conflict between said rights, it must be
resolved in favor of the right of the people because the people are entitled to
information. Also, the coverage is a protection against attempts of any party to exploit
the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests. The former president
Joseph E. Estrada however posed his objection on the ground that its grant will violate
the sub judice rule. He stated that based on his experience with the impeachment trial,
expert commentaries will trigger massive demonstrations that will pressure the
Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other if the live media coverage will
be allowed. The former president further stressed that the right of the people to
information may be served through other means other than the live media coverage, it
being distracting and prejudicial.

Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition of live media coverage of the plunder case against former
president Estrada will violate people’s right to information, press and expression.

Held:
Yes. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important
issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its
decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the
former president. Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of
former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the
Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The
recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only
later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have
promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. There are
several reasons for such televised recording. First, the hearings are of historic
significance. There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the hearings
are of historic significance. Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern
to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their government is
conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio-visual presentation. Third, audio-visual
presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people. Above all,
there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary
purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in
a way that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights and
sounds of events. Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trials
can be served by audio-visual recordings without impairing the right of the accused to a
fair trial. Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such
documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, this Court set aside a lower
court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary film
depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce
Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a
person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public
figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him
constitute matters of a public character.”

NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. vs. HON. CEASAR G. DY

FACTS: Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM
radio broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in
Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its
broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on a property. On July 1996,
the HLURB and OMPDC affirmed and certified that the commercial structure to be
constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is
classified as a “commercial area”. The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly
thereafter. In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit,
Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were
not able to submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural land was converted
to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of mayor’s
permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, DAR Region II office issued to
petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to
commercial. In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s
permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer denied the same,
claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma
Fernandez-Garcia, closed the radio station. Due to the provision of Omnibus Election
Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of election period,
COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004,
but was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio
station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10,
2004 after elections. Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of
mayor’s permit but both courts denied the petition. In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning
decision that classified the property as commercial. Petitioners are also armed with
several certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial area. Also,
petitioners paid real property taxes based on the classification of property as
commercial without objections raised by the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation on exercising the freedom of speech, of
expression or the press.

HELD: Yes. Beginning in 2002, respondents in their official capacities have taken
actions, whatever may be the motive, that have impeded the ability of petitioners to
freely broadcast, if not broadcast at all. These actions have ranged from withholding
permits to operate to the physical closure of those stations under color of legal
authority. While once petitioners were able to broadcast freely, the weight of
government has since bore down upon them to silence their voices on the airwaves.
Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the
respondents, we can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or preventing
their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press.
Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination, while any system of prior
restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality, not all prior
restraints on speech are invalid. The acts imputed against respondents constitute a
prior restraint on the freedom of expression of respondents who happen to be members
of the press is clear enough. There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial
solicitude for free speech, meaning that governmental action directed at expression
must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at most
other forms of behaviour. We had said in SWS v. COMELEC: Because of the preferred
status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure
is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior restraints
of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity. . . . The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the
enforcement of such restraint. There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of
validity that inheres in every legislation. At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes
between a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the
speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined
standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on
the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are generally treated
as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with
discrimination in the regulation of expression. Content-neutral regulations of speech or
of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened
scrutiny.

Hector C. Villanueva vs PDI

Facts: Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during
the May 11, 1992 elections. Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992,
respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Manila Bulletin) published the
following story: The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD
candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases
for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of
the mayor’s office of Bais City. A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992,
respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) also came out with a similar story, The
Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate
for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave
abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was the officer-in-charge of the
mayors office in the city.

On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as scheduled. When
results came out, it turned out that petitioner failed in his mayoralty bid. Believing that
his defeat was caused by the publication of the above-quoted stories, petitioner sued
respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin as well as their publishers and editors for damages
before the RTC of Bais City. He alleged that the articles were maliciously timed to
defeat him. He claimed he should have won by landslide, but his supporters reportedly
believed the news items distributed by his rivals and voted for other candidates. He
asked for actual damages of P270,000 for the amount he spent for the campaign, moral
damages of P10,000,000, an unspecified amount of exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees of P300,000 and costs of suit. Respondents disclaimed liability. They asserted that
no malice can be attributed to them as they did not know petitioner and had no interest
in the outcome of the election, stressing that the stories were privileged in nature. On
April 18, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner that the
defendants Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and Manila [Daily] Bulletin Publishing
Corporation with their respective officers are liable [for] damages to plaintiff.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Amended Decision dated May 25,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54134, reversing the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 44 in Civil Case
No. 206-B, which had awarded damages to petitioner for respondents false reporting.

Issues: Whether or not petitioner is required to prove malice to be entitled to

damages?
Whether or not the respondents are liable for malicious and imputing statements to the
petitioner?

Ruling: YES. The news items derogatory and injurious to petitioner’s reputation and
candidacy. It faulted respondents for failing to verify the truth of the news tips they
published and held respondents liable for negligence, citing Policarpio v. Manila Times
Pub. Co., Inc. the news items lacked truth and fairness, they were not privileged
communications. Although the stories were false and not privileged, as there is no proof
they were obtained from a press conference or release, respondents were not impelled
by malice or improper motive. There was also no proof that petitioner’s supporters
junked him due to the reports. Neither was there any proof he would win, making his
action unfounded. YES. Petitioner argues that his cause of action is based on quasi-
delict which only requires proof of fault or negligence, not proof of malice beyond
reasonable doubt as required in a criminal prosecution for libel. He argues that the case
is entirely different and separate from an independent civil action arising from libel under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. He claims he proffered proofs sustaining his
claim for damages under quasi-delict, not under the law on libel, as malice is hard to
prove. He stresses that nowhere in the complaint did he mention libel, and nothing in his
complaint shows that his cause of action had some shade of libel as defined in the
Revised Penal Code. He also did not hint a resort to a criminal proceeding for libel. PDI
and its officers argue that petitioner’s complaint clearly lays a cause of action arising
from libel as it highlights malice underlying the publications. And as malice is an
element of libel, the appellate court committed no error in characterizing the case as
one arising from libel.

GSIS and Winston Garcia vs. Dinnah Villaviza

Facts:
Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of
the GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth
Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia, Pilar Layco,
and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest. On 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees,
marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation
Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and
Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises. Some of
these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and
defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer
Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from appearing as counsel for Atty.
Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Also, respondent,
together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No. 021316, dated
11 October 2002, otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass
Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some employees and
disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.

Issue:
Whether or not the acts of the respondents fall under prohibited concerted activity or
mass action.

Held:
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to
regulate the political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or
mass action proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work stoppage or
service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession." Wearing
similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with
them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards and
PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service
disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.
Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-
1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not all collective
activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we
would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the
land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights
and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It
would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof
have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated
only but can never be taken away.
Thus, respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSC's
Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has
only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition, respondents'
actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action.

ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND

CLASSIFICATION BOARD

FACTS: Petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano, a television evangelist, hosted the Ang

Dating Daan and a rivalry with another religious television program, the Iglesia ni
Cristos, Ang Tamang Daan, is well known. The hosts of the two shows have regularly
engaged in verbal sparring on air, hurling accusations and counter-accusations with
respect to their opposing religious beliefs and practices. Michael and seven other
ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo lodged a complaint against petitioner Soriano before the
MTRCB. Acting swiftly, the latter preventively suspended the airing of Sorianos Ang
Dating Daan television program for 20 days, pursuant to its powers under Section 3(d)
of Presidential Decree 1986 and its related rules. On April 29, 2009 the Court rendered
a decision, upholding MTRCBs power to impose preventive suspension and affirming its
decision against petitioner Soriano with the modification of applying the three-month
suspension to the program And Dating Daan, rather than to Soriano.
 ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation on the right to exercise the freedom of
speech and expression.

HELD: Primarily, it is obscenity on television that the constitutional guarantee of

freedom of speech does not protect. As the Courts decision points out, the test of
obscenity is whether the average person, applying contemporary standards, would find
the speech, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. A thing is prurient when it
arouses lascivious thoughts or desires or tends to arouse sexual desire. Actually, the
Court concedes that petitioner Sorianos short outburst was not in the category of the
obscene. It was just indecent. Soriano actually exercised some restraints in the sense
that he did not use the vernacular word for the female sexual organ when referring to it,
which word even the published opinions of the Court avoided despite its adult readers.
He referred to it as yung ibaba or down below. And, instead of using the patently
offensive vernacular equivalent of the word fuck that describes the sexual act in which
the prostitute engages herself, he instead used the word gumagana lang doon yung
ibaba or what functions is only down below. At most, his utterance merely bordered on
the indecent. The word puta or prostitute describes a bad trade but it is not a bad word.
The world needs a word to describe it. Evil is bad but the word evil is not; the use of the
words puta or evil helps people understand the values that compete in this world. A
policy that places these ordinary descriptive words beyond the hearing of children is
unrealistic and is based on groundless fear. Surely no member of the Court will recall
that when yet a child his or her hearing the word puta for the first time left him or her
wounded for life. Soriano did not tell his viewers that being a prostitute was good. He
did not praise prostitutes as to make them attractive models to his listeners. Indeed, he
condemned Michael for acting like a prostitute in attacking him on the air. The trouble is
that the Court, like the MTRCB read his few lines in isolation. Actually, from the larger
picture, Soriano appears to have been provoked by Michaels resort to splicing his
speeches and making it appear that he had taught inconsistent and false doctrines to
his listeners.If Michaels sin were true, Soriano was simply defending himself with
justified anger. The Court claims that, since Ang Dating Daan carried a general
patronage rating, Sorianos speech no doubt caused harm to the children who watched
the show. This statement is much too sweeping. The Court relies on the United
States case of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica Foundation, a
1978 landmark case. Here, however, there is no question that Soriano attacked
Michael, using figure of speech, at past 10:00 in the evening, not at 2:00 in the
afternoon. The average Filipino child would have been long in bed by the
time Ang Dating Daan appeared on the television screen. What is more, Bible teaching
and interpretation is not the stuff of kids. It is not likely that they would give up programs
of interest to them just to listen to Soriano drawing a distinction between faith and work
or action. The Court has stretched the child angle beyond realistic proportions. The
MTRCB probably gave the program a general patronage rating simply
because Ang Dating Daan had never before been involved in any questionable
broadcast in the previous 27 years that it had been on the air.

Southern Hemisphere engagement Network vs Anti-Terrorism Council

Facts:
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as
respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Councilcomposed of, at the
time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson,
Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary
Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto
Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance
Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also
impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

Issue:
Whether or Not the petition should prosper?

Ruling:
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality. In the present case, the dismal
absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion
of the last two superfluous. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a
constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injuryas a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the
basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the military;
whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers. Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890
allege that they have been subjected to "close security surveillance by state security
forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark
windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military build." They likewise
claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the State. Even conceding such
gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that
petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported"surveillance" and
the implementation of RA 9372. An actual case or controversy means an existing case
or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged
as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From
these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its
function.

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again,
declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the
petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official
aremerely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. A facial invalidation
of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, ET AL VS EDUARDO ERMITA ET AL

FACTS: Petitioners, Bayan, et al, allege that their rights as organizations and
individuals were violated when the rally they participated was violently dispersed by
policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880. On the other hand,
petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., who allege that they were injured, arrested and
detained when a peaceful mass action was preempted and violently dispersed by the
police. Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., allege that they conduct peaceful mass
actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as
citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa
No. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to
implement it. They argue that B.P. No 880 requires a permit before one can stage a
public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It
also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which
the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to
mass actions in support of the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Batas Pambansa No. 880 is unconstitutional?

RULING: Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
These rights are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed
by the constitutions. But the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so
regulated.
It is very clear that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No.
880 refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference
to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be
for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection.
Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public
assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the
content of the expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on
the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates
the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to
avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to
prevent. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not
relevant to the regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient
standard – the clear and present danger test. The reference to "imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not
an inconsistent standard. The law also provides for an alternative forum through the
creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and
petition at any time.
The petitions are granted in part, and respondents, more particularly the DILG, are
directed to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of
Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one
suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. The
petitions are dismissed in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 is sustained.

IBP VS HON. LITO ATIENZA

FACTS: The IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz),
filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at
the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be
participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral
organizations. Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to
stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of
Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006. Petitioners filed on
June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The petition having
been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on
June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari which assailed the appellate courts inaction or
refusal to resolve the petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act
of 1985. The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge and a criminal
action, was filed against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at
a venue not indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit of
August 3, 2006. , the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the first
assailed issuance, that the petition became moot and lacked merit. The appellate court
also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration by the second assailed issuance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the
venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

HELD: The court reversed the CA decision. It is an indispensable condition to such

refusal or modification that the clear and present danger tests be the standard for the
decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. In modifying the
permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately
inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the
venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the
applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or modification
would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory
any judicial scrutiny thereof.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR,

respondent.

Facts:
Alejandro Estrada wrote a letter-complaint to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, the
presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Piñas City, requesting for an investigation of
rumors that Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of the same city,
has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband and had begotten a
son with him. Soledad Escritor’s husband lived with another woman but died in 1998, a
year before Escritor entered the judiciary. Escritor is a member of the religious sect
Jehhovah’s Witnesses and The Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society. Escritor claims
that her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs.
After ten years of living together, Escritor executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation. The said declaration is
effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union. Gregorio Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and had
been a presiding minister since 1991, testified in such capacity that he is aware of the
rules and regulations of their congregation. He explained the import of and procedure
for executing a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness. Complainant Estrada is not related
to either Escritor and Quilapio. Also, he is not a resident of Las Piñas City but of Bacoor,
Cavite. According to him, respondent Escritor should not be allowed to remain
employed in the judiciary for it will appear that the court allows Escritor’s acts.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s right to religious freedom should carve out an exception
from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are
held administratively liable
Held:
In any event, even if the Court deems sufficient respondents evidence on the
sincerity of her religious belief and its centrality in her faith, the case at bar cannot still
be decided using the compelling state interest test. The case at bar is one of first
impression, thus the parties were not aware of the burdens of proof they should
discharge in the Courts use of the compelling state interest test. It is apparent from the
OCAs reliance upon this ruling that the state interest it upholds is the preservation of the
integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and
decency. However, there is nothing in the OCAs memorandum to the Court that
demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea
of religious freedom nor is it shown that the means employed by the government in
pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondents religious exercise. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the
compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the
proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To
properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be given the
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing
the respondents stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as
it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and
punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts action
would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot
therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but
must instead apply the compelling state interest test. The government must be heard on
the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of
demonstrating the states compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious
belief and practice. In view whereof, the case is remanded to the Office of the Court
Administrator.

ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA

FACTS: On August 10, 2004, petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired
on UNTV 37, made the following remarks: Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae
ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di
ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae
yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. x x x made obscene remarks
against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-
complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s
remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang
Daan. Petitioner argues the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he uttered
was religious speech, adding that words like putang babae were said in exercise of his
religious freedom.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation to freedom of religion.

HELD: No. The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioners utterances in question
can come within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious
freedom. The section reads as follows:
No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
 There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the complaints expressing any
particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact
that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not
automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple
insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech.
Even petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by
anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim,
assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting
amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language
used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his
statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible
defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They
simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-
language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his
detractors, but opted for the low road.

Austria v. NLRC
Facts:
Relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an
employee is purely secular in nature because it has no relation with the practice of faith,
worship or doctrines of the church, such affairs are governed by labor laws. The Labor
Code applies to all establishments, whether religious or not. The Seventh Day
Adventists(SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The petitioner was a
pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were
terminated. On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received
several communications form Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him
to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by
his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. The
petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor
Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he
was very ill to be able to do the collecting. A fact-finding committee was created
to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing:
Misappropriation of denominational funds; Willful breach of trust; Serious misconduct;
Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and Commission of an offense against the person
of employer's duly authorized representative as grounds for the termination of his
services. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and
sued the SDA for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered
in favor of petitioner. SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of
respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical
affair, and, as such, involves the separation of church and state. and Whether or not the
Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner
against the SDA?

Ruling:
No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what
is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an
employee, which is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based
on Art. 282 of Labor Code. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not
religious prerogative) to fire an employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would
have been a different case if Austria was expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.
 ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the Office of the President of the Philippines

Facts:

Before us is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Islamic Dawah Council of

the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) praying for the declaration of nullity of Executive Order (EO)
46, s. 2001 and the prohibition of herein respondents Office of the Executive Secretary
and Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) from implementing the subject EO. Petitioner IDCP,
a corporation that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development
License No. SB-01-085, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary
services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions
petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and
issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001,
respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation.
Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates
and perform other related regulatory activities. As a result, petitioner lost revenues after
food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it. Petitioner contends that the
subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State. It
is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal
certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations,
entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to
petitioner, a food product becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious
ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for
food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a
religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal.

Issue:
Whether or not EO 46 violates the constitutional right of freedom of religion.

Held:
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function
because the standards used are drawn from the Quran and Islamic beliefs. By giving
OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the
religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino
Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself
the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept
its own interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah on halal food. To justify EO 46s
intrusion into the subject religious activity, the Solicitor General argues that the freedom
of religion is subservient to the police power of the State. By delegating to OMA the
authority to issue halal certifications, the government allegedly seeks to protect and
promote the muslim Filipinos right to health, and to instill health consciousness in them.
It is disagreed by the Court. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to
the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat,
State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In the case at bar, we find no compelling
justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of
their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of
Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power
to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos right to
health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government
agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for
human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not
encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.
 Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY

FACTS: On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief (SJS Petition)
before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his co-respondents. SJS, a registered
political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically
on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective
office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact that
alleged that the questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action and that there
was no justiciable controversy.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders

endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their
flock to vote for a specified candidate.

HELD: The Court deems this constitutional issue to be of paramount interest to the
Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and its people. Thus,
despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this Court
still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to
entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits. Counsel for SJS has utterly
failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to
resolve the paramount issue. Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without
factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents below
had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices;
and that such actual or threatened endorsement will enable to elect men to public office
who in turn be forever beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the
government and pose a clear and present danger of serious erosion of the people’s
faith in the electoral process and reinforce their belief that religious leaders determine
the ultimate result of elections, which would then be violative of the separation clause.
Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it
does not suffice to constitute a justiciable controversy. The Petition does not even
allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to
champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to
vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not
give rise to an actionable right. Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS rights
are being subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be
prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts to
settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable
cannot be exercised when there is no actual or threatened violation of a legal right. On
the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as
there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed Decision. We reiterate
that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its
claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no
factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual
findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a
hypothetical question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of
which was beyond the courts constitutional mandate and jurisdiction. Indeed, the
assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made
no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent
.Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just
modify. Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the
paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the
constitutionality of a statute will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is
directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of the parties concerned.
 Dominador L. Taruc vs Bishop Porfirio B. De La Cruz
Facts:
The petitioners are lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in
Socorro, Surigao City. Petitioners led by Taruc clamored for the transfer of parish priest
Rustom Florano for the reason that Fr. Florano s wife s family belonged to a political
party opposed to petitioner Taruc s. Bishop De la Cruz found this reason too flimsy so
he did not give in to the request. Things worsened when Taruc conducted an open
mass for the town Fiesta celebrated by Fr. Ambong who was not a member of the
clergy of the diocese of Surigao. Petitioners were then expelled/excommunicated from
the PIC for the reason of (1) disobedience to duly constituted authority, (2) inciting
dissension resulting in division of the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help and (3)
threatening to forcible occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety among the General
Membership. Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction
against Bishop De la Cruz and impleaded Fr. Florano and a certain Delfin Bordas for
conspiring with the Bishop. They said that their rights to due process were violated
because they were not heard before the order of expulsion was made.

Issue: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution

Ruling: No. Section 5 of Article III y A form of government where the complete
separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not
allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical in nature. y In disputes
involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one area, which the Court
should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences to the power of excluding form
the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters, which are outside the province of civil courts. Comments: records show that
Bishop De la Cruz pleaded with petitioners several times not to commit acts inimical to
the best interests of PIC. They were also warned of the consequences of their actions
yet these pleas and warnings fell on deaf ears.

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. PCGG ET AL.,

Facts:
Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any negotiations
and/or agreements pertaining to the latter's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten
wealth. The respondents argued that the action was premature since he has not shown
that he had asked the respondents to disclose the negotiations and agreements before
filing the case.

Issue:
Does the petitioner have the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition?

Held:
The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to
government records, documents and papers- a right guaranteed under section 7, article
III of the Philippine Constitution. The petitioner a former solicitor general, is a Filipino
citizen, and because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by
decisional law to sustain petitioner's standing i.e
(1) ENFORCEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT
(2) ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN
 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

FACTS:
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to
undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions
of the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as
reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a
private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA
also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD:No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred
to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable
lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay
remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in
a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to
transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay,
such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain.

NERI VS. SENATE G.R. NO. 180643, MARCH 25, 2008

FACTS
Former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified before the Senate for 11 hours
relating to the ZTE-NBN mess. However, when probed further on what he and the
President discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer 3 questions:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it
Unrelenting, the Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to Neri,
requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007. However, Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested the Senate Committees to dispense with Neri’s
testimony on the ground of executive privilege. In his letter, Ermita said “that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with China.” Neri did not appear before the Committees. As a result, the
Senate issued an Order citing him in contempt and ordered his arrest and detention
until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?

ISSUES
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it
HELD:
Yes. The Communications elicited by the 3 Questions are covered by Executive
Privilege. xxx “we are convinced that the communications elicited by the questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate
to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President,
ANSWER: No. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it
does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of
inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.
ANSWER: Yes. The revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of
executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
ANSWER: Yes. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita
satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly
states that “this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege
as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.” Obviously,
he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance.
ANSWER: No. The Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect.

CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT INGOVERNANCE

(CenPEG) v. COMMISSIONON ELECTIONS (2010)

FACTS:
Comelec failed to provide plaintiffs with the source code of identified canvass machines
despite repeated requests and demands. CenPEG is now praying for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus, despite the lapse of the May 2010 elections, claiming that the source
code remained important and relevant "not only for compliance with the law, and the
purpose thereof, but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions of errors and
claims of fraud."

ISSUE:
W/N COMELEC could be compelled to release the source code to CenPEG- YES

HELD:
pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that "once an AES technology is
selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of
that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may
conduct their own review thereof."- The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply
with this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source
code was that it was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently,
that the review had to be done, apparently for security reason, "under a controlled
environment." The elections had passed and that reason is already stale.
 IN RE: EDILLON 84 SCRA 554 (1978)
Facts:
This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his
IBP membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A
and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the
same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession
and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of
the respondent?
Held:
The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar
associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which
is voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a
member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which
includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives
and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does
not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police
power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement.
The name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent
member of the bar.

MALABAN V RAMENTO 129 SCRA 359 (1984)

FACTS:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the
merger of two units of the university. On the scheduled date, the students continued
their meeting beyond the scheduled time and held it in a different place from that
indicated in the permit. They expressed in a vehement language their opposition to the
merger and as a result, classes and office work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed
under preventive suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of holding an illegal
assembly and oral defamation. They were suspended for one academic year. They filed
a petition for certiorari in the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was violative of the
constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?

HELD:
Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving
public interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless
there be a showing of clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an
advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be
sought from its school authorities who are devoid to deny such request. In granting such
permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of an assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of work of non-academic personnel. However, in
violation of terms, penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
 UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU) vs. HON.
BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA

FACTS
Petitioner union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers
at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-
arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that
the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union
membership pursuant to Art. 245 of the Labor Code.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment. Its petition was dismissed by the Third Division for lack of showing
that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. But petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245
of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form,
assist or join unions, contravenes the constitution.
Citing the Court’s ruling in Nasipit Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
petitioner argues that previous administrative determinations of the NLRC do not have
the effect of res judicata in this case, because “labor relations proceedings” are “non-
litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities.”

ISSUES
W/N res judicata applies to administrative proceedings?

HELD:
YES. The doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative
proceedings. As early as 1956, in Brillantes v. Castro, the Court sustained the
dismissal of an action by a trial court on the basis of a prior administrative determination
of the same case by the Wage Administration Service, applying the principle of res
judicata. Recently, in Abad v. NLRC the Court applied the related doctrine of stare
decisis in holding that the prior determination that certain jobs at the Atlantic Gulf and
Pacific Co. were project employments was binding in another case involving another
group of employees of the same company. Indeed, in Nasipit Lumber Co., this Court
clarified toward the end of its opinion that “the doctrine of res judicata applies . . . to
judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative
powers.” Proceedings for certification election are quasi judicial in nature and,
therefore, decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect
for the finding of the Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial employees
as defined by law in the absence of anything to show that such determination is without
substantial evidence to support it. Nonetheless, the Court, concerned that employees
who are otherwise supervisors may wittingly or unwittingly be classified as managerial
personnel and thus denied the right of self- organization, has decided to review the
record of this case.

ACOSTA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila. On various dates
in September and October 1990, petitioners did not report for work and instead,
participated in mass actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the
purpose of petitioning the government for redress of their grievances.

Petitioners were administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct,

gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and
reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave.
Petitioners failed to answer these charges. Following the investigations conducted by
the DECS Investigating committees, Secretary Cariño found petitioners guilty as
charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from the service. Petitioners appealed
and the CSC modified the said orders of Secretary Cariño to six (6) months suspension
without pay.

Appeal to CA: Denied

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner’s participation in the mass actions was an exercise of their
constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances

HELD:
These ‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the
teachers’ sworn duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute,
public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any
purpose.
Further, herein petitioners, are being penalized not because they exercised their right of
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their
successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon
their students for whose education they are responsible.

As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, “It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the manner in which
they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there
are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question,
whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances.”
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably
derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied
government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances
and noble intentions in staging the “mass actions,” but that will not justify their absences
to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not
legalize an illegal work stoppage.

PACIFIC WIDE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.

PUERTO AZUL LAND, INC.,Respondent.

FACTS:
Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex
situated in Ternate, Cavite. In order to finance its operations, it obtained loans from
various banks, the principal amount of which amounted to (P640,225,324.00). PALI and
its accommodation mortgagors, i.e., Ternate Development Corporation (TDC), Ternate
Utilities, Inc. (TUI), and Mrs. Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez, secured the loans.
PALIs business did very well until when the Philippine Stock Exchange rejected the
listing of its shares in its initial public offering which sent a bad signal to the real estate
market. Potential investors and real estate buyers were driven away by the situation.
The decline in business growth was further aggravated by the 1997 Asian financial
crisis. Consequently, PALI was unable to keep up with the payment of its obligations.
One of its creditors, the Export and Industry Bank1[7] (EIB), later substituted by Pacific
Wide Realty and Development Corporation (PWRDC), filed foreclosure proceedings on
PALIs mortgaged properties. Thrust to a corner, PALI filed a petition for suspension of
payments and rehabilitation, accompanied by a proposed rehabilitation plan and three
(3) nominees for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver.
On December 13, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision2[16] approving PALIs petition for
suspension of payments and rehabilitation

ISSUES: Whether the terms of the rehabilitation plan are unreasonable and in violation
of the non-impairment clause;

RULING:
In G.R. No. 180893, the rehabilitation plan is contested on the ground that the same is
unreasonable and results in the impairment of the obligations of contract.
The court, however, does not find nothing onerous in the terms of PALIs rehabilitation
plan. The court also did not find any merit in PWRDCs contention that there is a
violation of the non- impairment clause. The non-impairment clause may not be invoked
since the case does not involve a law or an executive issuance declaring the
modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its creditors and its accommodation
mortgagors. Assuming that the non-impairment clause may be applied in this case, it
must yield to the police power of the State. Property rights and contractual rights are not
absolute thereby making it limited. Such constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State for the common
good of the general public.

HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her

capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Petitioner,
vs. PICOP RESOURCES, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) filed with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources an application to have its Timber License
Agreement (TLA) No. 43converted into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement
(IFMA).

PICOP filed before the (RTC) a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez
for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of
PICOP even if the latter has already complied with all the legal requirements for the
automatic conversion of its TLA No. 43 into an IFMA.

The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus
with the trialcourt is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document
signed by then PresidentFerdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

PICOP filed the MANDAMUS CASE against then DENR Secretary Alvarez on the
ground that Secretary Alvarez’s refusal to issue an IFMA in its favor allegedly violated
its vested right over the area covered by its TLA No. 43 and presidential warranty, and
impaired the obligation of contract under said agreement and warranty.
PICOP, argues that the issue at hand is not on whether the timber license is a mere
license or privilege rather the issue is the unlawful refusal of then DENR Secretary
Alvarez to convert the TLA No. 43 into IFMA.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the non-impairment clause

RULING:
It has been consistently held that licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the
country’s forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. Timber
licenses are not contracts, therefore the non-impairment clause does not apply to it.
PICOP alleged that the DENR Secretaryviolated its constitutional right against non-
impairment of contracts when it did not issue an IFMA. However, it has been
consistently ruled, that the 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the non-
impairment clause, much less a contract specifically enjoining the DENR Secretary to
issue the IFMA. The conclusion that the 1969 Document is not a contract recognized
under the non-impairment clause has even been disposed of in another case decided
by another division of this Court, PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral
Resources Corporation,94 the Decision in which case has become final and executory.
The Petition for Mandamus filed by PICOP should, therefore, be dismissed.
The 1969 Document expressly states that the warranty as to the tenure of PICOP is
"subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with
existing policy on timber concessions." Thus, compliance with statutory and
administrative requirements for the conversion of its TLA into an IFMA still remains to
be proven.

RENATO V. DIAZ and AURORA MA. F. TIMBOL, THE SECRETARY OF

FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

FACTS:
Petitioners Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol filed a petition for
declaratory relief assailing the validity of the impending imposition of value-added tax
(VAT) by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the collections of tollway operators.

Petitioners claim that, since the VAT would result in increased toll fees, they
have an interest as regular users of tollways in stopping the BIR action.

Petitioners meaning of sale of services that are subject to VAT; that a toll fee is a
users tax, not a sale of services; that to impose VAT on toll fees would amount to a tax
on public service; and that, since VAT was never factored into the formula for computing
toll fees, its imposition would violate the non-impairment clause of the constitution.

The government avers that the NIRC imposes VAT on all kinds of services of
franchise grantees, including tollway operations, except where the law provides
otherwise; that the Court should seek the meaning and intent of the law from the words
used in the statute.

Respondent argues that petitioners have no right to invoke the non-impairment of

contracts clause since they clearly have no personal interest in existing toll operating
agreements (TOAs) between the government and tollway operators. At any rate, the
non-impairment clause cannot limit the States sovereign taxing power which is generally
read into contracts.
 It is government’s contention that the non-inclusion of VAT in the parametric
formula for computing toll rates cannot exempt tollway operators from VAT. Respondent
further argues that it cannot be claimed that the rights of tollway operators to a
reasonable rate of return will be impaired by the VAT since this is imposed on top of the
toll rate.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners Diaz and Timbol have legal standing to file the
action.

RULING:
Petitioners have no personality to invoke the non-impairment of contract clause on
behalf of private investors in the tollway projects. Neither will be prejudiced by nor be
affected by the alleged diminution in return of investments that may result from the VAT
imposition against the Tollway operators. There are no interests at all in the profits to be
earned under the TOAs. The interest in and right to recover investments solely belongs
to the private tollway investors.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985

Facts:
The Prisoner was arrested for filling the victim of the occasion of a robbery. He
had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He
consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary.
So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the
prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be
obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. They covered his face with a rag
and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take it
anymore. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities
he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers
wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will,
he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.
This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's Germany. But no it
did not. It happened in the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.

Ruling:
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the
requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the
Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions
and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person
under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he
understands Tagalog. Moreover , at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other
relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was
only about two weeks after he had executed and “salaysay” that his relatives were
allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel
and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed
reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. This gross
violations of his rights.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PACITO ORDOO Y

NEGRANZA alias ASING and APOLONIO MEDINA Y NOSUELO alias POLING,
accused-appellants.

FACTS: In August 5, 1994 a decomposing body of 15 years old name Shirley Victore
was found among the bushes near a bridge in Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union
who 3 days before reported as missing. According to the examination by a medico-legal
officer of NBI the victim was raped and strangle to death. Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio
Medina are the suspects and they were brought to the police station for questioning.
However, for the lack of evidence linking them to the crime so they were allowed to go
home. On August 10, 1994 both of the suspects returned to the police station one after
another and acknowledged that indeed committed the crime. Acting on their admission,
the police immediately conducted an investigation and put their confession in writing.
The investigators however could not get at once get the services of a lawyer to assist
the two accused because there were no practicing lawyer in the municipality of Santol
because it is a remote town of the province of La Union. The investigation was
conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and officers in
the attendance to listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary statements of the two
suspects who admitted their participation in the crime. Also they were interview by radio
reporter and they confessed freely. But in the arraignment the accused pleaded not
guilty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not their confession is inadmissible in evidence mainly the lack of counsel to
assist them during custodial investigation.

RULING:
A review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland Almoite's testimony reveals
that the interview was conducted free from any influence or intimidation from police
officers and was done willingly by the accused. The interview of the reporter is not
considered as part of the investigation as response of the accused was made in answer
to questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the police or any investigating officer.
Hence the accused confess to the radio announcer it will be considered as to talking to
a private citizen although their confession was not with the consent of their lawyers, all
of it does not violate their constitutional rights. The evidence was admissible. The
accused was sentenced guilty of the felony.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLEMENTE JOHN

LUGOD, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
At around 12:30 a.m. on September 15, 1997 Helen Ramos the mother of the victim
Nairube was awaken by her husband because he sense that there is someone going
down to the stairs of their house. She noticed that Nairube was no longer in her place
she was sleeping so she assumed that Nairube is just answering to the call of nature.
Nairube’s blanket was also no longer at the place where she sleep but her slippers were
still there. After 3 minutes waiting Helen stood up and began calling Nairube but there
was no answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and she found out that the backdoor of
their house was open. She found a pair of slippers on the top of the wooden bench
outside the backdoor and it does not belong to any member of her family. In the
morning of September 16, 1997, she went to the police station to report the loss of her
child and also the slippers that she found to SP02 Quirino Gallardo. She then went
home while the police began their search for Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz
requested her to go with the searching, Helen found a panty and she recognized as that
of her daughter. After seeing the panty she cried. She was ordered to go home while
others continued the search. Thereafter, they continued the search and found a black
collared T-shirt with buttons in front hanging on a guava twig. Loreto Veloria informed
him that Clemente John Lugod wore the two items when he went to the house of Violeta
Cabuhat.

ISSUE: WON the Constitutional rights of the accused has been violated.

RULING:
Yes, the rights of the accused-appellant has been violated. The act of confession of the
accused that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of the counsel cannot
be used against him because it will tantamount for violation of his rights under Bill of
Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution, which cannot be disregarded or ignored
no matter how brutal the crime is. On the other hand the act of pointing out of the
accused the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the accused
right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the uncounselled confession and
is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. The accused was acquitted.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment dated October 8, 1998
of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28 in Criminal Case No. SC-
6670 finding the accused, Clemente John Lugod alias HONASAN, guilty of the crime of
rape with homicide is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED from confinement unless held for some other legal cause. No
pronouncement as to costs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EDRALIN TABOGA, accused-

Facts:
That on or about the 1st day of April 1998, in the municipality of Magsingal,
province of Ilocos Sur, Philippines, Francisca Tubon, a widowed, septuagenarian, was
robbed, stabbed and burned beyond recognition by EdralinTaboga. Accused was
charged in Criminal Case no. 1818-k with robbery with homicide and was indicted for
arson in Criminal case no. 1819-k. Police officer rounded up the deceased former farm
workers, while being questioned the barangay captain notice a fresh blood stain in
Taboga’s short. He confronted Taboga and the latter readily admitted that he killed the
victim. He was brought to the police station for further investigation. Police officers
questioned Taboga and they prepared a written extra-judicial confession for Taboga.
During the inquest, however, Taboga refused to sign the confession upon the advice of
his lawyer.Next day a radio announcer went to the police station to interview the
suspect. Again, Taboga admitted killing the deceased and setting her and her house on
fire.Accused-appellant EdralinTaboga raised the defense of denial and alibi. He alleged
that he was in the house of the parents of his live-in partner, Liza Almazan, seventy
meters away from the house of the deceased.Accused-appellant further claimed that he
was maltreated by the policemen and forced to admit the crime. Regarding his
admission to radio announcer Mario Contaoi, he narrated that the interview was held
inside the investigation room of the police station where policemen were present. Thus,
he had to admit the crimes because he was afraid of the policemen. Moreover, relatives
of the deceased beat him up by kicking him, hitting him with a chair, slapping him and
punching him on the head and face.Accused-appellants live-in partner corroborated his
testimony.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, Branch 24, rendered
judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes.
Issue:
Whether or not confession made by the accused to a radio report, a private
person, can be admitted as evidence against him.

Held:
Yes. There is nothing in the record shows that the radio announcer collude with
the police authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against the accuse. Neither is there
anything in the record, which remotely suggests that the police to the extract information
from him on the details of the crime instructed the radio announcer. Indeed the reported
even ask for permission from the officer-in-charged to interview the accused. Nor was
the information obtained under duress. In fact, the accused not only confessed to the
radio reporter but to several others.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUANITO

BALOLOY, accused-appellant. 381 SCRA 31

Facts:
At Barangay Inagasan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of August 3 1996,
the body of 11 years old Genelyn Camacho was found at the waterfalls at the said
barangay. Autopsy report found the Genelyn was raped before she was drowned. The
one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself, Who
claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in the nearby creek.
While in the wake of Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the barangay captain that he only
wanted to frighten the girl but ended up raping and throwing her body in the ravine.
While in the custody of authorities, he was asked incriminating questions by Judge
Dicon who justified his actions saying that Juanito was not yet in custodial investigation.
Based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with circumstantial evidence, the
trail court violated Section 12 (1) of Article III of the barangay captain Ceniza and Judge
Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him of his Constitutional rights before
they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the incriminatory information. It is of no
moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators, for as public officials it was
incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. While these
rights may be waiver executed in the presence of counsel. He concludes that his
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the barangay captain was
amissible.

Ruling:
Yes, as to his confession with the barangay captain Ceniza, it has been held that the
constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it
apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime
before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. In the instant case, Juanito voluntarily
narrated to Ceniza that he rapes Genelyn and thereafter threw her body into the ravine.
This narration was spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinaty
manner. It was given before he was arrested or place under custody for investigation in
connection with the commission of the offense. Moreover, Juanito did not offer any
evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the party of Ceniza, which could have
compelled her testify falsely against him.
 GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G.
PURGANAN, and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO [G.R. No.
148571. September 24, 2002]

Facts:
The Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, filed with the RTC on 18 May 2001, the appropriate Petition for
Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case 01192061. It was alleged in the
said Petition for Extradition that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on 15 April 1999.
Jimenez filed before the Regional Trial Court an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion," which prayed that his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In an
order dated May 23 2001, the RTC granted the said Ex-Parte Motion and set the case
for hearing on the 5th of June 2001. During the hearing, Jimenez manifested his
reservations on the procedure then adopted by the trial court allowing that the accused
in a case of extradition be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Subsequently, through his Memorandum, he sought for permission to be allowed to post
bail in the amount of P100,000.00 in case warrant would be issued against him. The
issue on Jimenez’ manifestation to post bail was set to be heard on 15 June 2001.
In its 3 July 2001 Order, the court directed the issuance of warrant for Mark
Jimenez’arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1 million in cash.
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty after he had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond via the challenged Order dated 4 July 2001. Hence, this
petition.

Issues: Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending

Held: No. The constitutional provision on bail, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. Such provision does not
apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused whose guilt is yet to be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Therefore, itfollows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It cannot be
taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United
States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To emphasize,
extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which
the respondent is charged. Jimenez should apply for bail before the courts trying the
criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
 JOSELITO V. NARCISO V. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, G.R. No.
134504, March 17, 2000PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: An information for parricide was filed against Joselito Narciso for the death of his
wife Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso. After his review asked and motion for
reconsideration was both denied, he asked for reinvestigation of his warrant of arrest.
Prosecutor found no reason to disturb and the case was remand for arraignment and
trial. Thereafter, he filed an ‗Urgent Ex-Parte‘ to allow him to Post Bail‘. The Public
Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the same day. It
was opposed by respondents herein, then they moved for the postponement of the
hearings because no witness was available, Not obtaining any resolution on her
Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail‘ private complainant (respondent
herein) filed this petition before the CA. CA granted the petition. Hence this case.
Petitioner averred that CA erred when it reversed and set aside the order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the petitioner his constitutional right
to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more
especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of the proceedings and
after assessment of the evidence, have themselves recommended the grant of bail.

Issue: Whether the bail granted was valid and CA should not have reversed RTC.

Ruling: No. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
also provides: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. The Court of
Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing had
been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The appellate court
found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused
and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the
trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree with the CA. Stressing in
Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the duty to determine whether the evidence of
guilt was strong, the Court held: x x x x x x x x x "Consequently, in the application for
bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required
hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital
offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of
bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what
he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to
ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether
the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before
whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise
discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor."
Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several case that emphasized the mandatory character
of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties of
the trial judge in such petition:
"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended;
"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
 for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8,
supra);
"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."

The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for
doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and
fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper
cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to
disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof."

Additionally, the court‘s grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own
conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for
both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial
of the application for bail. Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was
laced with grave abuse of discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing
him.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs.CONRADO M. VASQUEZ,

Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN
and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS:On May 13, 1991, an information docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed
against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. An order of arrest
was issued on May 14, 1991 against herein petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at
P15,000.00.
On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago,".On the same day, a resolution
was issued by the Sandiganbayan authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for her
provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest,
unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said
court.
On May 15, 1991, petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the
other legal fees.
Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold
departure order against herein petitioner following her public announcement that she would
be leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that
she would be addressing Filipino communities in the United States in line with her crusade
against election fraud and other aspects of graft and corruption.

ISSUE: Whether or Not there was valid posting of bail bond

HELD: The court finds that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion
for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago"
wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under
the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of
P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having
placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim
otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the
contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to
exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.
Petitioner cannot deny the fact that she has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her
provisional release as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and
which is even attached as Annex C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. The filing
a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for the court to allow her provisional
liberty upon the security of a recognizance is a supporting basis that petitioner indeed
posted a bail bond. The fact that such motions were filed by petitioner, petitioner should
accordingly admit that she had posted a valid bail bond instead of adopting a stance which
ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the courts of justice.
Petitioner argues that she did not personally appear before respondent court therefore
making the bail invalid. However, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance
of the cash bond, who requested respondent court to dispense with the requirement of
personal appearance until she shall have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident.
The court is disappointed that petitioner puts fault upon the respondent court for taking a
compassionate stand on the matter and accommodating her own request for acceptance of
the cash bond posted in her absence. Motion is denied for lack of merit.

ELVIRA AGULLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Charged with, tried and convicted in Criminal Case No. 13579 for malversation of
public funds, herein petitioner Elvira Agullo, erstwhile Disbursing Officer of the then
Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH), Regional Office No. VIII, Candahug,
Palo, Leyte, now comes before the High Court to assail the Decision1 of the
Sandiganbayan promulgated on 16 March 1992, and its Resolution dated 11 March
1998, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On September 1988, petitioner was charged of malversation of public funds after
an audit was conducted which revealed a 26, 404.26 cash shortage on which she was
required to produce immediately. In her written explanation she reasoned out that the
funds might have been stolen or taken due to a fortuitous event on the day she suffered
stroke.
On board MPWH vehicle Agullo together with Benjamin Veridiano, driver of
Finance and Management Division she encashed checks at PNB and on the way back
to office (MPWH) felt dizziness, chest pain and nausea. She requested to be dropped
off near her home and bought with her the bag containing the money. Upon leaving
house she collapsed and was brought to St Paul’s Hospital and was confined for about
a week under attending care of Dr. Juan Abando who issued a medical certificate.
Sandiganbayan struck down such defense as incredible and convicted Elvira as they
found no evidence presenting the link of the loss of government funds with her sudden
heart attack.
In the course of the pre-trial, Agullo conceded the fact of audit and admitted the
findings in the Report of Cash Examination and the facts set forth in the letter of
demand. She admitted fact of shortage but vehemently denied accusation against her.
Hence, Agullo filed this appeal with the High Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan overlooked evidence to convict Agullo violating

her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise.

RULING: The pieces of evidence presented against petitioner do not suffice the test of
moral certainty to support conviction. Records reveal that evidence for the prosecution
consisted solely of the Report of Cash Examination along with a letter of demand signed
by Auditing Examiner Ignacio Gerez. Not a single witness was presented by the
prosecutor rather merely relied on the prima facie evidence of conversion of
malversation.
If the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood
that he had put the funds to property or personal use, the prima facie evidence is
rebuttable. When the absence of funds is not due to the personal use of the accused,
presumption is completely destroyed. Sandiganbayan merely relied on the deficiencies
in the evidence of the defense than on the strength and merit of the prosecution’s
evidence—that which is impermissible to the unprejudiced mind.
As stated in People v. De Guzman, the constitutional presumption of innocence
is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be uneven contest between the lone
individual pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their
command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the
prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free of his guilt cannot be proved
beyond the whisper of doubt.
Sandiganbayan’s decision was reversed and set aside, acquitting Elvira Agullo
on grounds of reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BATO

FACTS:
On May 9, 1988, at about three oclock in the afternoon, Ernesto Flores, Jr.
together with his father Ernesto Flores, Sr., were on their way home when invited by
Sergio and Abraham Bato(Brothers) to join them in a drinking spree in the house of
Paran Lescabo, which Ernesto, Sr. accepted. When his father was already drunk,
appellants tied the victim with his hands placed at the back. Later, Ernesto, Jr. saw
appellants bring his father to somewhere else. Seeing his father being held, he ran
away, as he was afraid he would also be taken by appellants. It was only the following
morning Ernesto, Sr.’s body was found dead at the Binaha-an River. Ernesto Jr.
immediately reported the incident to the Barangay Captain who informed the police
department about the incident.
The two accused raised the defense of denial during arraignment. They
maintained that their identification as the alleged perpetrators of Ernestos murder is
merely an afterthought, necessitated by a death of strong evidence on the part of the
prosecution. After trial, RTC rendered judgment that both are guilty of murder beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court and further
declared that the totality of the prosecution evidence constituted more than sufficient
incriminatory and inculpatory circumstances to reach the conclusion that the appellants
killed the victim. Since penalty is reclusion perpetua. CA refrained judgment and
certified the case to the Supreme Court. Sergio Bato died during the pendency of
appeal from which decision will only pertain to Abraham Bato.

ISSUE: WON the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional right to
presumption of innocence was acheived?

RULING:
In the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused may be established by
circumstantial evidence.Such evidence, however, must still pass the test of moral
certainty. When inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot sustain
a conviction. Specifically, where the states evidence does not constitute an unbroken
chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused, the constitutional
presumption of innocence prevails and the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
“The circumstances proved must be concordant with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and, at the same time, inconsistent with any
hypothesis other than that of guilt.” As a corollary to the constitutional precept that the
accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with his
innocence.
It is also noteworthy that Ernesto Jr. did not attempt to attract the attention of
other people who were nearby at the time, or to seek their aid. His testimony was
grossly insufficient and sorely in need of corroboration. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence which has not been adequately established, much less
corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Where the State fails to meet the quantum
of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to
an acquittal regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his defense.
The Court stressed that acquittal of Abraham does not follow that he did not
participate in the killing of Ernesto, Sr.; it is merely rling that the state failed to present
sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALDO DE GUZMAN y DANZIL

FACTS:
Ronaldo de Guzman was charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs,
punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. This was after a confidential informant
reported to the Chief of Police that De Guzman was engaged in selling prohibited drugs.
The COP immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation, Senior Police
Officer (SPO)1 Daniel Llanillo, was designated as poseur-buyer. The team recovered
from De Guzman two packs of empty transparent sachets, three disposable lighters,
and P3,380.00 in cash, which included the marked money paid by SPO1 Llanillo. The
team then brought De Guzman to the police station in Alcala, Pangasinan.
De Guzman denied charges against him. Trial court found De Guzman guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and was later on affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. De Guzman now comes to this Court on a Petition for Review. He argues
that the prosecution failed to show that the police officers complied with the mandatory
procedures under R.A. No. 9165. Appellant also claims that the unbroken chain of
custody of the evidence was not established. Further, the failure of the police officers to
enter the buy-bust operation in the police blotter before the said operation, the lack of
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and the failure to observe
the requirements of R.A. No. 9165 have effectively overturned the presumption of
regularity in the performance of the police officers duties.

ISSUE: WON the quantum of evidence was overcomed

RULING:
When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, one of which is
consistent with innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of
innocence must prevail, and the court must acquit.
The Constitution mandates that an accused in a criminal case shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is laden
with the burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum
of evidence required.
In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of the
dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the
very corpus delicti of the crime.
The apprehending officers failed to comply with the guidelines, SPO1 Llanillo
himself admitted that the marking of the seized items was done in the police station and
not immediately after the buy-bust operation. Failure to observe proper procedure
negates presumption of regularity. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
The failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the seized
items has been adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is enough
to engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, appellant RONALDO DE
GUZMAN y DANZIL is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the
Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the IMMEDIATE RELEASE of appellant from
confinement, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause, and to REPORT to
this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

PEOPLE VS. MAGSI

FACTS:

On 14 January 1968 in the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, Philippines,

Eloi Magsi, Juan Ponce, Perfecto Arce, along with Gerardo Flores, Opring Olazo, Peter
Doe, and "Doro Doe," subsequently identified as Teodoro del Rosario conspired in the
killing of one Jesus Gallardo outside the latter's house through the use of carbine,
pistols and revolvers. They were charged for murder, with aggravating circumstances of
(1) abuse of superior strength; (2) use of a motor vehicle; (3) the offense was committed
in the dwelling place of the offended party; and (4) that the offense was committed by a
band.
Altogether, the case was actually set and rescheduled for 6 times, where despite
appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, but
moved to withdraw as de officio counsel on accused desired to be represented by a de
parte counsel. On 8 September 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels
to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and
the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On 9
September 1970, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty.
Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only.
Del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he
committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other co-accused.
De officio counsel Atty. Cariaso moved to be relieved as counsel by reason of his close
ties with the deceased but was denied by the court.
The Court motu proprio changed accused's plea of guilty to not guilty. Cariaso,
who appeared in court only after a warrant for his arrest was issued, informed the Court
that those interested in the conviction of the accused opposed his appearance as de
officio counsel. Again, his motion to be withdrawn as counsel was denied and hearing
was re-set. Atty. Cariaso outrightly informed the Court that the accused was ready to
enter an unqualified plea of guilty. Based on accused's plea of guilty without any
evidence for the prosecution on any of the alleged aggravating circumstances nor
accused's evidence on duress, the Court rendered its decision the next day, 20 October
1970, finding del Rosario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. Hence, the mandatory review.

ISSUE: Whether the court had been remiss in its duties to the accused, who was
convicted on an improvident plea of guilty.

HELD: The court should exercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a
plea of guilt especially on offenses with capital punishments. In the instant case, the
accused was not given an opportunity to present evidence on the alleged duress. The
court failed its bounden duty to apprise and advise the accused of the seriousness of
the charges, the meaning of the qualifying and modifying circumstances, and gravity of
the penalty that may be imposed on him despite the plea of guilty, as well as received
prosecution's evidence on the alleged aggravating circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense charged.
Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect
the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of
evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the
accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not
sufficient compliance with the Court's injunctions. The conduct of the trial court clearly
established the fact that it had been remiss in its duties to the accused, who was
convicted on an improvident plea of guilty.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO RIVERA

FACTS: Accused appellant Rolando Rivera was charged with rape sentencing him
penalty of death and pay offended party Erlanie Rivera, his 13 year old daughter.
Complainant Erlanie Rivera testified that sometime in March 1997, her younger
sister, was hospitalized which her mother had to take care of. However his father,
Rolando Rivera went back home and at around 11 oclock in the evening of the same
day. Erlanie was awakened as his father started kissing her and fondling her breasts.
Complainant tried to resist by kicking and pushing him, but her efforts were to no avail.
Accused-appellant removed her shorts and panty, touched her private parts, and then
had sexual intercourse with her. After he was through with her, accused-appellant told
complainant not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill complainant’s
mother and sister. Hence, when her mother came home the following day, Erlanie did
not tell her what had happened because she was afraid of accused-appellant.
After private complainant testified on direct-examination, counsel for accused
attempted to cross-examine her on matters relevant to the complaint for Acts of
Lasciviousness which was objected to by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Arturo G. Santos
on the ground that private complainant did not testify on that matter but limited her
testimony on the rape case only. Counsel for the accused argued that although that is
correct nonetheless because [of] the sworn statement executed by private complainant
identified by said witness in her direct examination and marked as Exhibit C for the
prosecution, he is at liberty to cross-examine the witness on all matters stated in her
sworn statement including that portion touching on the acts of lasciviousness subject
matter of another case before another court.
Rolando denied the accusation against him and invokes his right to due process
of law. Accused-appellant insists that his counsel should have been allowed to ask
questions in relation to the sworn statement executed by complainant. He also contends
that the trial court’s judgment was biased as it was only a day after they passed a
memorandum when the judge promulgated a decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court failed to observe the constitutional right of the
accused-appellant to due process and right to court

RULING: Rivera was not denied of due process of law considering the speed the trial
court rendered judgment against him, which was rendered one day after he filed his
memorandum. The decision rendered by the trial court gives a clear account of the facts
and the law on which it is based. It discusses in full the courts findings on the credibility
of both the prosecution and defense witnesses and its evaluation of the evidence of
both parties.
A review of the trial courts decision shows that its findings were based on the
records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic notes during the trial. The speed
with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the
injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a case
only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and
devotion to duty that a judge studies a case long before the deadline set for the
promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day period between the filing of
accused-appellants memorandum and the promulgation of the decision was sufficient
time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As long as the
trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but
reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with
due dispatch. The decision by the trial court gives a clear account of the facts and the
law on which it is based.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OSCAR ALCANZADO

FACTS: Oscar Alcanzado was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, with
the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of the unidentified victim the sum
of 50,000.00 as moral damages.
In brief, the evidence for the prosecution show that on the early morning of June
17, 1998, the Barangay Tanods of Bel-Air, while on duty, which is adjacent to TGIF
American Bar, heard two (2) shots; when they investigated they found a dead body of
the victim with two (2) gunshot wounds inside the storeroom of TGIF being guarded by
the accused. The accused, who was the security guard of the TGIF, surrendered his
service firearm (Exhibit "D") to policeman Bagon which was found to have spent two (2)
spent shells. The ballistic report states that the two (2) spent shells were fired from the
gun surrendered by the accused to policeman Bagon.
Alcanzado pleaded not guilty during his arraignment and trial ensued. The
prosecution rested its case, upon motion of appellant, the RTC issued an order allowing
appellant to file a demurrer to evidence but that which was opposed by the prosecution.
Subsequently, RTC promulgated herein assailed decision convicting appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense
has been violated

RULING:
The RTC committed a very serious error in promulgating a decision after denying
the demurrer to evidence filed by appellant upon prior leave of court, without first giving
appellant the opportunity to present his evidence.
Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may
dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after
giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed
with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in
his defense. When the accused filed such motion to dismiss without express leave of
court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
Contrary to the RTC’s assertion in its decision that the demurrer to evidence was
denied, the records of the case do not reveal that there was any prior order denying
appellant’s demurrer to evidence before the rendition of the assailed judgment.
The assailed judgment was treated to be a mere resolution denying the demurrer
to evidence and ascertain whether the RTC has committed grave abuse of discretion in
not granting the same. It was later found out that the RTC did not gravely abuse its
discretion over the denial of demurrer to evidence rather it was on convicting Alcanzado
of the crime when he was not given opportunity to adduce evidence.
 Due to the procedural unfairness and complete miscarriage of justice in the
handling of the proceedings in the RTC, a remand of the case for reception of defense
evidence is warranted. The constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his
defense has been violated.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff vs. LODRIGO BAYYA, defendant

Facts: For automatic review here is a judgment handed down by Branch 16 of the
Regional Trial Court in Ilagan, Isabela, finding appellant Lodrigo Bayya guilty of
incestuous rape and sentencing him to the ultimate penalty of DEATH. That on or about
the year 1994 and for sometimes thereafter in the municipality of Burgos, province of
Isabela, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
armed with a knife, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force, intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with his own daughter
ROSIE S. BAYYA for several times against the latters will and consent. At the outset, it
bears stressing that having admitted authorship of the offense charged, appellant does
not dispute the trial courts finding of guilt. However, appellant questions the penalty
imposed below, contending that since the information made no reference to Republic
Act No. 7659, it was a reversible error to convict thereunder. And because the only
penal provision relied upon by the prosecution is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
he could only be sentenced to the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua in
accordance therewith.
Issue: Whether or not there was a transgression of his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him, in view of the fact that the Information is silent
about the applicability of R.A. No. 7659.
Ruling: Yes. While departing from appellants strained reasoning, the Court nonetheless
agrees with and adopts his submission that the trial court erred in imposing the capital
punishment on him. A careful perusal of the Information indicting appellant reveals a
crucial omission in its averments of the minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya.
Instructive in this regard is Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SEC.
6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed. When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of
them shall be included in the complaint or information. The purpose of the above-quoted
rule is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a
right guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law of the land. The Court held
recently that to sustain a conviction under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the prosecution must allege and prove the basic
elements of: 1) sexual congress; 2) with a woman; 3) by force and without consent, and
in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that
4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape; and 5) the offender is a
parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. In the case under
scrutiny, the information does not allege the minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya,
although the same was proven during the trial as borne by the records. The omission is
not merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more
than what he is indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence
of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged in the
Complaint or information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. He has a
right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is
put on trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged in the
Complaint or information on which he is tried would constitute unauthorized denial of
that right. The Information under consideration charges nothing more than simple rape
defined and penalized in the first and second paragraphs of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, that is - having carnal knowledge of a woman by means of force and
intimidation and against her will. The additional allegation that the offender is a parent of
the offended party can only be deemed a generic aggravating circumstance. The failure
of the prosecution to allege the age of the victim has effectively removed the crime from
the ambit of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 prescribing the death penalty "when
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim". Since the appellant had been
informed of the elements of simple rape under the information indicting him and nothing
more, he could only be convicted of simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetuaas
prescribed by law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOEY MANLANSING and

MARIO MANLANSING , accused-appellants.

Facts: For automatic review is the joint decision dated May 2, 1997, of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, in Criminal Cases No. 6150-AF and No.
6151-AF, convicting appellants of two counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of death for each count. Appellants are brothers. For four years they were
tenants of the spouses Magin and Jorja Soriano. That on or about the 27th day of
December, 1994, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery
and taking advantage of night time and with the use of bolo, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
Jorga and Magin Soriano by hacking the latter, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious
injuries which directly caused their death.

Issue: Whether or not the right to be informed of the accuseds was violated when
abuse of superior strength and dwelling were not alleged in the informations.

Ruling: Yes. A review of the informations filed against appellants, in relation to

prevailing law and jurisprudence as well as the newly adopted revisions of the Rules of
Court favorable to the accused will show that the crimes of the brothers could not be
qualified as murder. Pursuant to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000, the information should
state not only the designation of the offense and the acts and omissions constituting it
but shall also specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. So is it with the
present case. None of the aggravating circumstances were alleged in the informations
nor in the amended informations with specificity as a qualifying circumstance elevating
either killing to murder. The offenses committed by appellants only constitute two counts
of homicide and not murder. Since the penalty for homicide under 249 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion temporal, it is incorrect to sentence both appellants to death.
In evaluating the circumstances that qualified the crimes to murder, the trial court
considered, aside from evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime, and use of a deadly
weapon, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and dwelling. We
note that abuse of superior strength and dwelling were not alleged in the
informations. In accordance then with Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, abuse of superior strength and dwelling may not be appreciated to
convict the brothers. Further, should there be a finding of treachery, then abuse of
superior strength is absorbed by the former. We are thus left to review only the
allegation that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, and
nocturnity were present in the commission of the crimes. The court unable to agree now
with the trial court that the offenses committed by appellants could be qualified as
murder. They are guilty only of double homicide. Hence, it is improper now to impose
the death penalty on each of them.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLLIE ALVARADO Y
LLANER, accused-appellant.

Facts: At around 6:30 in the evening of May 26, 1991, Zosimo Estao was stabbed dead
by one of five (5) men who arrived at his house located at Andromeda, municipality of
Angono, Rizal. An information for murder qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation was thereafter filed against herein appellant Rollie Alvarado and four (4)
others whose true names and whereabouts were unknown. As his co-accused all
remained at large, only appellant underwent trial.

Issue: Whether or not the right to be informed of the accused was violated.

Ruling: No. The court however, take exception to the trial courts pronouncement that
what qualified the killing of Zosimo to murder is the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength. As earlier mentioned, the information alleged treachery and evident
premeditation, not abuse of superior strength. It is the existence of treachery which
qualifies the crime to murder since Zosimo was killed after already being in a helpless
condition, it appearing that Zosimos hands were being held by appellants companions
before he was stabbed by appellant. Granting that abuse of superior strength was also
alleged, it is nonetheless absorbed in treachery.

EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA Z. TEVES, petitioners, vs. THE

SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

Facts: Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife
Teresita Z. Teves seeks to annul and set aside the 16 July 2002 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2337 convicting them of violation of Section 3(h)
of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit
and Recreation Center in Valencia. That on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime
subsequent thereto, in Valencia, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in
relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and
conspiring and confederating with his wife, herein accused Teresita Teves, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the issuance of the appropriate business
permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of
one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary
interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and
operated by him and accused Teresita Teves.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against the accuseds was transgressed because they were never
apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that they were being
charged with, and arraigned and tried for, violation of the LGC of 1991.

Ruling: No. In view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to

Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which both read: Sec. 4. Judgment in
case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved. Sec. 5. When an offense
includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in
the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
The elements of the offense charged in this case, which is unlawful intervention in the
issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are 1.
The accused is a public officer; 2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction, whether or not prohibited by law; and
3. He intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest.
On the other hand, the essential ingredients of the offense proved, which is possession
of prohibited interest in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are as follows:
1.The accused is a public officer; 2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction; and 3. He is prohibited from having
such interest by the Constitution or any law.
It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of
those constituting the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of
the offense charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved.
Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds
application to this case, thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for
the offense proved.

G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

FACTS: The cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Estrada
alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
claims she is the President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was
plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His
sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governos, Luis Chavit
Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his
family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for the
resignation of the petitioner filled the air. However, petitioner strenuously held on to his
office and refused to resign. The political temperature rose despite the cold December.
On December 7, the impeachment trial started. The battle royale was fought by some of
the marquee names in the legal profession. The day to day trial was covered by live TV
and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. It’s high and low points were
the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. Then came the fateful day
of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of
the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner
held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The public and
private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling and were met by a spontaneous
outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had
assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the
petitioner and the eleven (11) senators. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted
candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in
Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people’s solidarity in demanding
petitioner’s resignation. The news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer
the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is being deprived of his right to speedy,
impartial and public trial.

HELD: No. We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to
impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media
gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal
trials. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused
right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded
as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x
x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to litigation. Their
mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their
impartiality. At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the
trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of
the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility
of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a
finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of
his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change
even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

94-A Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Maguindanao
Massacre Trial, AM No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011

Facts:
Almost a year after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including
some news reporters , the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual
journalists from various media entities, and members of the academe filed a petition
before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these
criminal cases be allowed, recording devices be permitted inside the courtroom to assist
the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the
broadcast coverage and the use of devices. Petitioners assert the exercise of the
freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly
and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts,
and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court. Hence, this
petition docketed as AM No. 10-11-5-SC.

Issue: Can there be live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court
proceedings?

Ruling:
Yes. The court ruled that there can be live broadcast by television and radio of
the trial court proceeding but subject to some guidelines which addressed also the
concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada. Furthermore, the court held “that the
impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate
all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate
enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the
general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the
courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent
limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public
trial.

CARIAGA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 143561. June 6, 2001

Facts: Aboitiz received reports that some private electricians were engaged in the
clandestine sale of DLPC materials and supplies. He initiated a covert operation with
the following objectives: (1) ascertain how DLPC materials were being stolen, the
frequency of the thefts, who were perpetrating the thefts; and (2) `catch’ at least one (1)
DLPC employee that may be involved. ‘Canuto Duran’, Aboitiz’s undercover struck an
acquaintance with Cariaga and he told the latter that his boss ordered him to buy
electrical materials to be brought to Diwalwal, a gold panning area in Monkayo, Davao.
Ricardo offered to supply ‘Canuto Duran’ with electrical materials, saying that he has a
cousin from whom he can procure the same. Siton’s (Duran) undercover work came to
an abrupt end on February 1, 1989 when members of Sgt. Villasis’ team ‘apprehended’
‘Canuto’ and turned him over, including the electrical wires that he previously purchased
from Jonathan through Ricardo, to the San Pedro Patrol Station. ‘Canuto Duran’
‘confessed’ in order to persuade Ricardo – and the others who were involved – to
likewise come out with the truth. Ricardo revealed that he acted as a fence for his
cousin, Jonathan Cariaga and ‘Canuto Duran’ on November 27, 1988 and again on
January 23, 1989; that the items that ‘Canuto Duran’ bought from Jonathan, thru him,
were DLPC properties. Jamero also confessed that Ricardo was his fence in disposing
of DLPC electrical materials that he pilfered but the items were not sold to ‘Canuto
Duran’ but to someone else. The recitals of Ricardo and Jamero in their sworn
statements are substantially corroborated by entries in the blotter. The accused was
also invited to the San Pedro Patrol Station but he refused to give a statement. The
prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as its witness as the subpoena could not be
personally served upon him. According to the trial court, “the prosecution’s evidence
considered as a whole is strong, clear and convincing. The statements in the
extrajudicial confessions of Ricardo Cariaga implicative of the accused as the source of
the stolen articles, corroborated by Siton’s testimony and the police records are
formidable compared to the mere puny denial of the accused.”

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement
of Ricardo Cariaga without him taking the witness stand since it violates the
fundamental right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face.

Ruling: Yes. The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only
once and did not appear to testify in the criminal case against petitioner. Concededly,
this witness was not deceased or out of the Philippines. It must be emphasized that this
rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases; hence, “mere sending of subpoena and
failure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to testify. The Court must exercise its
coercive power to arrest.” In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to have the
witness arrested which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances where
witnesses who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear. On this score alone, the sworn
statement of Ricardo Cariaga should not have been admitted as evidence for the
prosecution, and we shall no longer delve into the other aspects of this rule.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLIAM ONG

G.R. No. 137348. June 21, 2004

Facts: July 24, 1998 , Quezon City, Philippines, accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other not having been authorized by law
to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale 980.50 grams of Methyl Amphetamine
Hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug. Upon arraignment, the two (2) accused, who
are Chinese nationals, pled not guilty. The records do not show whether they had
sufficient knowledge of the English language. Their trial proceeded. In the course of
the trial, the two (2) accused were given the services of a Chinese interpreter.
Appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused Ong, a Chinese citizen from
the People’s Republic of China, claimed that he came to the Philippines in 1997 to look
for a job. In June 1998, he stopped working at the factory and hunted for another job.
Accused De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the RTW
business. On July 23, 1998 at around 4:30 and 5:00 P.M he was approached by
persons unknown to him. They blindfolded and brought him to a place. After a few
hours, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, they removed his blindfold. He denied knowing
accused Ong and the charge of conspiring with him to deliver shabu in New Manila,
Quezon City. Avelina Cardoz corroborated his story. When they returned to the car,
accused De Ming was nowhere to be found. They saw him next at the Quezon City Jail.

Issue: Whether or not the right to meet witness face to face was violated.

Ruling: Yes. In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation
is incomplete. The confidential informant who had sole knowledge of how the alleged
illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness.
His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of
the same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales’ testimony is hearsay and possesses no
probative value unless it can be shown that the same falls within the exception to the
hearsay rule. To impart probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the
appellant solely on this basis would be to render nugatory his constitutional right to
confront the witness against him, in this case the informant, and to examine him for his
truthfulness. As the prosecution failed to prove all the material details of the buy-bust
operation, its claim that there was a valid entrapment of the appellants must fail.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO BOHOL

G.R. No. 171729 July 28, 2008

Facts: On or about August 2, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused,
without being authorized by law to sell, administer, deliver, transport or distribute any
dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or attempt to
sell, or offer for sale for P100.00 and deliver to PO2 Ferdinand Estrada, a poseur buyer,
one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
commonly known as "shabu" weighing zero point zero five four (0.054) gram, which
substance, after a qualitative examination, gave positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug. Consequently, the police officers brought
Bohol to the police station and the confiscated four plastic sachets of white crystalline
substance were subjected to laboratory examination. The specimens were confirmed to
be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu. Upon arraignment,
Bohol entered a plea of "not guilty" to both charges.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting Bohol despite the absence of proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling: No. Bohol cannot insist on the presentation of the informant. During trial, the
informant’s presence is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. The appellate
court held that police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with
which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will be
over the moment they are presented in court. Further, what is material to the
prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Both
requirements were sufficiently proven in this case. The police officers were able to
testify positively and categorically that the transaction or sale actually took place. The
subject shabu was likewise positively identified by the prosecution when presented in
court. Hence, we agree that Bohol’s guilt has been established by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALICIA A. CHUA, accused-

appellant.

FACTS: In September 1992, accused Chua received a facsimile message from

Harmony Electronics Company in Taiwan.The message was written in Chinese
characters except for the names of To-ong Zenon Tumenlaco and Tercenio Domingo
Fornaliza. Harmony asked her to call up To-ong and Tercenio and tell them that they
were needed in Taiwan. Accused Chua contacted To-ong and told him the message.
In October 1992, To-ong and Tercenio went to the office of accused Chua, and the
latter told them that she could send them to Taiwan upon payment of a placement fee of
P15,000.00 each. She also asked them to secure NBI clearances and medical
certificates. On October 29, 1992, Tercenio, together with private complainant Lonito
Baluis, went back to the office of accused Chua and submitted the requirements.
Tercenio and Lonito Baluis paid P15,000.00 each for which they were issued a receipt
bearing the name Man Tai Trading and General Services with accused Chuas signature.
Accused Chua assured Tercenio and Lonito Baluis that they would be able to leave
for Taiwan soon. Three months passed, but they were not deployed. Tercenio became
apprehensive and told accused Chua that he would withdraw his application and ask for
refund of the placement fee. Accused Chua repeatedly promised that she would give
back the money to him, but she never did. After a few more months, Tercenio could not
anymore locate accused Chua.
Accused Chua used the same modus operandi on the other private complainants.
After requiring each complainant to pay a placement fee of P15,000.00 each, to secure
NBI clearances and to undergo medical examinations, she would go in hiding.
In time, complainants inquired from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA) about accused Chuas activities. The POEA issued a certification that accused
Chua was not licensed to recruit persons/workers for overseas employment.

Chua was convicted of illegal recruitment and estafa. On appeal, the accused
said that she was deprived of her right to compulsory process when the court denied
her motion for the production of the records used as basis for the POEA certification.

ISSUE: WON Chua was deprived of her right to compulsory process

HELD: No. The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expanded the right to compulsory process
which now includes the right to secure the production of evidence in ones behalf. By
analogy, U.S. vs. Ramirez which laid down the requisites for compelling the attendance
of witnesses, may be applied to this expanded concept. Thus, the movant must show:
(a) that the evidence is really material; (b) that he is not guilty of neglect in previously
obtaining the production of such evidence; (c) that the evidence will be available at the
time desired; and (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained.
In the case at bar, the trial court correctly denied appellants motion for the
production of the records which were the basis in issuing the POEA Certification dated
February 3, 1994, as the same would not in any way alter the undisputed fact that
appellant was not issued a license until then.
 PEOPLE VS MALIMIT
FACTS:
On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Batin stepped inside
Malaki’s store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant coming out of the store with
a bolo while his boss, Malaki, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor
"struggling for his life."
Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also
saw appellant Jose Malimit rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a
blood-stained bolo. Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp inside the
store, Rondon clearly recognized Malimit. Afterwards, they noticed together with Beloy,
Malaki’s brother in law, that the store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the
wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket.
Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, was meted by the trial court. Appelant asked for
acquittal for the following grounds:
1. The trial court erred in giving credence to the unreliable testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses on their alleged identification of the accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime despite the fact (sic) they revealed their alleged "knowledge" of
the crime more than five months after the incident.
2. The trial court erred in admitting as evidence the wallet and its contents although the
circumstances which lead to its production was obtained in violation of the constitutional
rights of the accused.
3. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUES: WON the prosecution violated the appellant’s rights

HELD:
1. The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity
immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human
experience.
2. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds
no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs.
United States, ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to
extort communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his
guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence.
3. Time and again, we ruled that there can be a verdict of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the
exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime. In order that
circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with
these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DELFIN RONDERO

On the evening of March 25, 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio
fiesta. When he noticed that his nine year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke
up his parents to inquire about his sisters whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was
missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad
Andong Rondero to search for Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a
Barangay Captain to ask for assistance and also requested their other neighbors in
Pugaro, Dagupan to look for Mylene.
The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00 oclock in the morning of
March 26, 1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary School and the
seashore in vain. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way home. When he was
about five (5) meters away from his house, Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight,
saw herein accused-appellant Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian well about one (1)
meter away. Accused-appellant had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing
his bloodied hands.
Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw
without, however, revealing that the person he saw was the latters own son.
The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found Mylenes
lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. Her right hand was
raised above her head, which was severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was
behind her back. She was naked from the waist down and had several contusions and
abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some
hair strands. A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her
body while the other slipper was found behind her back.
Half an hour later, five (5) policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot
investigation. They found a pair of shorts under Mylenes buttocks, which Maximo
identified as hers. Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he
had seen accused-appellant earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the
artesian well was spattered with blood. After the investigation, the policemen, together
with Maximo, went back to their headquarters in Dagupan City. There, Maximo
disclosed that before they found Mylenes body, he saw accused-appellant washing his
bloodstained hands at the artesian well.

Issues: WON the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is strong

enough to sustain his conviction
WON his right against self incrimination is violated
Held:
1. It is true that to warrant a conviction, direct evidence is not always necessary.
The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on circumstantial evidence to
support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which
proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established
by inference
2. Accused-appellant alleges that while in the custody of police officers, some hair
strands were taken from him without his consent and submitted to the NBI for
investigation, in violation of his right against self incrimination. Consequently,
although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him
and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be
admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial
compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress.
 BENGZON V SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

FACTS:
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate
on the alleged take-over personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged "takeover
of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila Management of Companies or FMMC
by Ricardo Lopa, then President Aquino's cousin, and called upon the Senate to look
into the possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public

Officers [SBRC]) started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa
were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and testify on what they know
regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and
Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that their testimony
may unduly prejudice the defendants and petitioners in another civil case before the
Sandiganbayan.

SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC
continued its investigation of the matter.

The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief,
claiming that the SBRC in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of
its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the
defendants of the civil case.

ISSUES: WON the SBRC violated the appellant's right to self incrimination

HELD:
NO. The Constitution provides the right of an accused of a crime to remain silent;
this extends also to respondents in administrative investigation but only if they partake
of the nature of a criminal proceeding. This is not so in this case. Hence, the petitioners
may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce
evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued
would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution.

MARCELO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
On 17 February 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to
Legaspi Village following a report that the group of Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency
laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor
Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office, would stage a theft of mail matter on
that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles
Vela and two other agents in a private car. They arrived at Legaspi Village at about 1:00
p.m. At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in
front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. The passengers of the postal
delivery jeep were Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the driver, Henry Orindai.
Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside the
jeep. Pasicolan then passed through an alley between Esguerra and Montepino
Buildings going towards Amorsolo St. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the
mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and Lito Marcelo.
The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a
travelling bag. The two then secured the bag to the back of their motorcycle. Meanwhile,
the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St.,
moved their car and started towards Pasicolan just in time to see him handing over the
mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested
Marcelo and Romero. Unaware of the arrest of Romero and Marcelo, Pasicolan went
back to the postal delivery jeep and proceeded toward Pasay Road. The NBI agents
followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.

The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and Romero consisted of 622 letters. The
names of the addressees were listed. They were subsequently notified by the Bureau of
Posts to claim their letters. Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their
signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members
of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business
with the NBI at that time. According to Director Ranin, they required the accused to do
this in order to identify the letters as the very same letters confiscated from them. Arnold
Pasicolan y Mabazza, Ronnie Romero y Santos, and Lito Marcelo y Cruz were charged
with infidelity in the custody of documents. The case was later withdrawn and another
information for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether the exclusion of the admission, made through the signatures on the
envelopes, extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves.

HELD:
The purpose for securing the signature of Marcelo, et. al. on the envelopes was to
authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. This
purpose and their signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the testimony of
prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from Marcelo were those given to him
and Romero, undoubtedly help establish the guilt of Marcelo. Since these signatures
are actually evidence of admission obtained from Marcelo and his co-accused under
circumstances contemplated in Art. III. §§12(1) and 17 of the Constitution, they should
be excluded. For indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused signed following their arrest.
Hence, they were at the time under custodial investigation, where they have the right to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if the person
cannot afford the services of counsel that he must be provided with one. However, the
letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters were validly seized from
Marcelo and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest.

PEOPLE VS. GALLARDE

FACTS:
In the evening of 26 May 1997, Editha went missing but she was last seen talking
with Gallarde. Then the searchers for Editha went back to the house of Gallarde. The
searchers found Gallarde squatting with his short pants at the toilet about 6 meters
away from Gallarde's house; his hands and knees covered with soil. Asked where
Editha was, Gallarde replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her." To the
question, "where did you come from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?"
Gallarde answered "I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the searchers
Mario Bado, got angry and countered that Gallarde's statement was impossible because
Kiko was with him drinking. After the confrontation at the toilet, Exkagawad Fernandez
brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that Gallarde
was the last person seen talking with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the
searchers. Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. The searchers,
thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses, and a wide hole among the disheveled grass.
When Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then Editha's
hand pitted out. Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring
Gallarde to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a
vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of Gallarde, saying: "Here is
the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am
giving him to you." The policemen together with Gallarde proceeded to where the
people found Editha. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was
recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken without any counsel present.

ISSUE: Whether the taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right
against selfincrimination.

HELD:
The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel,
being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and
not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical
acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt,
hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the
right against selfincrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence
against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman
charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine
her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination
and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether
he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine
from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody
footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.

COMELEC vs. TAGLE

FACTS:
During the 11 May 1998 elections, Florentino A. Bautista ran for the position of
mayor in the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite. On 8 July 1998, he filed with the COMELEC
a complaint against then incumbent mayor Atty. Federico Poblete, Bienvenido Pobre,
Reynaldo Aguinaldo, Arturo Ganibe, Leonardo Llave, Diosdado del Rosario, Manuel
Ubod, Angelito Peregrino, Mario Espiritu, Salvador Olaes and Pedro Paterno, Jr., for
violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The complaint was
supported by the separate affidavits of forty-four (44) witnesses attesting to the vote-
buying activities of the respondents and was docketed as E.O. Case No. 98-219.
Subsequently, a complaint for vote-selling in violation of Sec 261 (a) of the
Omnibus Election Code was filed with the Prosecutor’s Office as witnesses in Criminal
Case No. 7034-99 and the Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite filed separate
Informations for vote-selling against said witnesses. On appeal, the COMELEC en banc
declared that the witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 were exempt from criminal
prosecution pursuant to 4th paragraph of Sec 28, RA No. 6646, otherwise known as
“The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987” which grants immunity from criminal prosecution
to persons who voluntarily give information and willingly testify against those liable for
vote-buying or vote-selling. The Law Department of the COMELEC moved to dismiss
the Informations against the said witnesses but the RTC in Imus, Cavite denied the
motion to dismiss.

ISSUES: WON witnesses of vote buying are immune from criminal liability

HELD:
Yes. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and
of prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor
of the party whose vote was bought. This grant of immunity will encourage the recipient
or acceptor to come into the open and denounce the culprit-candidate, and will ensure
the successful prosecution of the criminal case against the latter. However, to avoid
possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers, especially by the latters
opponents, Congress saw it fit to warn vote-sellers who denounce the vote-buying that
they could be liable for perjury or false testimony should they not tell the truth. In this
case, when the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S.
No. 1-99-1080, which was the basis of the informations for vote-selling, it, in effect,
withdrew the deputation granted to the prosecutor. Such withdrawal of the deputation
was clearly in order, considering the circumstances obtaining in these cases where
those who voluntarily executed affidavits attesting to the vote-buying incident and
became witnesses against the vote-buyers now stand as accused for the same acts
they had earlier denounced. What the Prosecutor did was to sabotage the prosecution
of the criminal case against the vote-buyers and put in serious peril the integrity of the
COMELEC, which filed the said case for vote-buying. If the Prosecutor had listened to
the command of prudence and good faith, he should have brought the matter to the
attention of the COMELEC.

G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY

FACTS: On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case affirming the
conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old
daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already
in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death. On
July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of
the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. We find no substantial
arguments on the said motion that can disturb our verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R.
Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal
Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG). On August 23, 1996, we received the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-
appellant. In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main
issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings;
(2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal
question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

ISSUE: whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments.

HELD: No. The Court unchangingly answered this question in the negative in the cases
of Harden v. Director of Prison People v. Limaco, People v. Camano, People v.
Puda and People v. Marcos, In Harden, we ruled: "The penalty complained of is neither
cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States
Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life.'"
Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a
protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law itself
provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the
1951 case of Limaco that: "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly
believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or
ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long
as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions, and this we
have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion. Under the Revised Penal
Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy
during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with
homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in
insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death. The list of capital offenses
lengthened as the legislature responded to the emergencies of the times. In 1941,
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 616 added espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at the
height of the Huk rebellion, the government enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700,
otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, which carried the death penalty for
leaders of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more capital offenses were created by
more laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the
Anti-Carnapping Law. During martial law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was
enacted penalizing with death, among others, crimes involving homicide committed with
an unlicensed firearm.

People vs. Mercado

Facts:
The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the crime of kidnapping
with murder and sentencing them the punishment of death.
The defendants raised the constitutionality of death penalty and the alleged haste
of the trial court in deciding the case resulting in grave and serious errors committed in
convicting the accused.
Issues: Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and "cruel, unjust, excessive or
unusual punishment and Whether or not the trial court’s haste in deciding the case
resulted to grave and serious errors to the prejudice of the defendants.
Ruling:
No. The death penalty is not unconstitutional. As settled in People vs.
Echagaray, death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is
an exercise of the state's power to "secure society against the threatened and actual
evil". Procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application are
established.
No. The contention of the defendants that the speed the trial court decided their
case resulted in grave and serious errors to their prejudice. A review of the trial court's
decision shows that its findings were based on the records of this case and the
transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial. The speed with which the trial
court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious performance of its
function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent
pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge
studies a case long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has
arrived. The one-day period between the filing of accused-appellants' memorandum and
the promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to
incorporate these in the decision. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly
administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he
cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due dispatch. The trial court in
this case committed no reversible errors and, consequently, except for some
modification, its decision should be affirmed.
 Eduardo Cuison vs Court of Appeals
289 SCRA 159

Facts:
Eduardo Cuison was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double
homicide. Aside from imprisonment from six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, accused was
also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao and Rulo Castro the amount of
P30,000.00 each promulgated on February 7, 1989. On appeal, the Court of Appeals on
July 30, 1991, affirmed the decision with modification that civil indemnity was increased
to P50,000.00. On April 4, 1995, the case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan for promulgation of the decision. However, the respondent Judge
promulgated only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not
commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence. The Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s decision as to the penalty of imprisonment. The accused filed a
motion to set aside the promulgation on the ground that there has already been a
promulgation dated April 4, 1995, therefore there is nothing more to promulgate and to
pursue such promulgation will violate the accused’s constitutional right against double
jeopardy.

Issue:Whether or not petitioner’s right against double jeopardy was violated.

Held: No. The Court does not concede with the petitioner’s contentions that the
promulgation by Judge Ramos on April 4, 1995 has effectively terminated the criminal
cases against the petitioner with the effect that the Court has lost jurisdiction over the
case. The Court likewise does not agree with the petitioner’s claim that the first jeopardy
attached at that point. To substantiate the claim of double jeopardy, it must be proven
that (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon valid indictment; (b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; (e) the case was
dismissed of otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action. Hence, a decision in such case
disposes both criminal and civil liabilities. In the present case however, the court
promulgated only the civil aspect, but not the criminal. With this, such promulgation
renders it not only incomplete, but also void. Since the criminal case has not yet been
terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot
prosper as a defense.

ROBERTO P. ALMARIO vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO A. TUASON,

JR., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORP

FACTS: Petitioner is one of the accused in estafa thru falsification of public document,
and in estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended party in both cases. The
informations were filed on October 22, 1992. After petitioner’s arraignment on March 18,
1992, pre-trial was held, which was terminated on October 21, 1994. Thereafter, the
cases were scheduled for continuous trial in December 1994, and in January and
February 1993, but the hearings were cancelled because the Presiding Judge of the
court was elevated to this Court and no trial judge was immediately appointed thereto.
The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to all the
accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, upon request of private
prosecutor, and without objection on the part of petitioner’s counsel, postponed to July
24, 1995. However, for lack of proof of service of notice upon petitioner’s three co-
accused, the hearing set for July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the cases were
reset for trial on September 8 and 25, 1995. On September 8, 1995, private complainant
failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, upon motion of petitioner’s counsel,
respondent court issued the order to dismiss the case of the petitioner for failure to
prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial. Upon motion of the
private prosecutor and despite the opposition of petitioner, respondent court in its Order
dated October 25, 1995, reconsidered the Order of September 8, 1995. Petitioner
sought reconsideration for the said order in the Court of Appeal but denied the same.
Petitioner maintains that the appellate court erred in sustaining the trial court which, in
turn, had gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when it
reconsidered the order which dismissed the criminal cases against him. Petitioner
asserts that this reversal was a violation of the doctrine of double jeopardy, as the
criminal cases were initially dismissed for an alleged violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to a speedy trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right against double jeopardy was violated.

HELD: No. The Court held that a jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2)
before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. In the cases at bar,
the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was made upon
motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of the
accused before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of
a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or
upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule
admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to
speedy trial. Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged
unreasonably, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. There being no
oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we
concur with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that petitioner's right to
speedy trial had not been infringed. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial had
not been violated, there was no reason to support the initial order of dismissal. It follows
that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that
order was reconsidered seasonably. For as petitioner's right to speedy trial was not
transgressed, this exception to the fifth element of double jeopardy - that the defendant
was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused - was not met. The trial court's initial order of
dismissal was upon motion of petitioner's counsel, hence made with the express
consent of petitioner. That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said order,
double jeopardy did not attach.

Manantan vs Ca

Facts: On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging
petitioner Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, allegedly
committed on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago,
Isabela. The said accused being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile
bearing Plate No. NGA-816 willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same while
along the Daang Maharlika of the said municipality, in a negligent manner causing the
automobile to sideswipe a passenger jeepney, thereby causing the said automobile to
turn turtle twice resulting to the death Ruben Nicolas passenger of the said automobile.
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court
decided the criminal case in favor of Manantan. Subsequently, the private respondent
spouses Nicolas filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court’s
judgment. The Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be modified and
that the appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages. On its decision, the Court
of Appeals decided in favor of the private respondents. In finding petitioner civil liability,
the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in a state of
intoxication, due to his having consume all in all a total amount of at least twelve bottles
of beer between 9 a.m. to 11 p.m. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but the
appellate court denied the motion.

Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of the accused also extinguished his civil liability.

Ruling: No. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil
liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of as a felony. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found not to be the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which will
be instituted must be based on ground other than the delict complained of. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this
case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In
the case at bar, the accused’s acquittal is based on reasonable doubt. The decision of
the trial court did not state in clear and equivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly
imprudent or negligent. Hence, impliedly, the trial court acquitted him on reasonable
doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases if the accused acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding that the
defendant is civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was
the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, and sentenced him to indemnify plaintiff-
appellants in the amount of P74,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas.

People of the Philippines vs. Carlos Feliciano

October 10, 2001
Facts: Accused-appellant Feliciano, a security guard, went to the guard post of Rodel
de la Cruz, the latter having the same occupation as the former, to ask for assistance in
going after a customer who did not pay the bill in the pub where he was working.
Appellant rented a tricycle for the said purpose. The appellant however decided to stop
the chase because the person he was looking for was nowhere in sight. As they pass by
Banga, New Washington, they saw a woman walking. Appellant ordered de la Cruz to
stop the vehicle and when he was close to the woman, he poked his gun at the
woman’s face. De la Cruz didn’t want to get involved of what was happening but
appellant told him that he already was so the former stayed until the intentions of the
latter were consummated. It ended up with appellant robbing the woman and putting
into his chaleco the contents of the woman’s pocket. One of the possessions robbed
was a necklace which appellant inserted in the pocket of De La Cruz as he went home.
In the morning of June 6, 1995, the day after the woman, Teresita Fuentes was found
dead, the police confiscated the wallet of De La Cruz which contained the necklace of
the deceased. The prosecution sought the discharge of accused Rodel de la Cruz so
that the latter could testify against his co-accused Carlos Feliciano. Such was granted
and de la Cruz, accused turned state witness, was stricken off from the information.
Carlos Feliciano denied the asseverations of the state witness de la Cruz claiming that
the accusations were motivated out of pure spite and revenge borne of the hostility
between them due to work-related differences. The accused Feliciano was convicted of
the crime Robbery with Homicide. On his appeal, he claimed that the trial court erred in
discharging de la Cruz to be state witness despite strong objections from the defense.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of de la Cruz be revoked and the same be tried for
conviction.

Held: No. Here, even while one might be convinced that state witness Rodel de la Cruz
would, on the basis of evidence ultimately submitted, appear to be equally as, and not
less than, guilty in conspiracy with appellant Carlos Feliciano, the hands of the State are
now stayed and the Court must assure the exemption of the witness from punishment. It
is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness has the
same effect as an acquittal. The impropriety of the discharge would not have any effect
on the competency and quality of the testimony, nor would it have the consequence of
withdrawing his immunity from prosecution.[16] A discharge, if granted at the stage
where jeopardy has already attached, is equivalent to an acquittal, such that further
prosecution would be tantamount to the state reneging on its part of the agreement and
unconstitutionally placing the state witness in double jeopardy. The rule, of course, is
not always irreversible. In an instance where the discharged accused fails to fulfill his
part of the bargain and refuses to testify against his co-accused, the benefit of his
discharge can be withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted for the same offense.

G.R. No. 124171. March 18, 2002

LETICIA R. MERCIALES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On August 12, 1993, Criminal Case Nos. 6307, 6308, 6309, 6310, 6311, and
6312, for rape with homicide, in connection with the death of one Maritess Ricafort
Merciales, were filed and consolidated in Branch 8, presided over by the respondent
judge. During the trial, after presenting seven witnesses, the public prosecutor filed a
motion for the discharge of accused Joselito Nuada, in order that he may be utilized as
a state witness. However, the prosecution contended that it was not required to present
evidence to warrant the discharge of accused Nuada, since the latter had already been
admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice.
Consequently, the respondent judge denied the motion for discharge, for failure of the
prosecution to present evidence as provided for by Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure. On December 22, 1993, the prosecution filed a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court, questioning the respondent judge's denial of the
motion to discharge the accused Nuada. Despite the fact that the petition did not
contain a prayer for a temporary restraining order, the trial judge did not set the case for
further hearing so as to give the prosecution time to secure such temporary restraining
order from the Supreme Court. Petitioner maintains that the reopening of the criminal
case will not violate the accuseds right to double jeopardy. More particularly, she
ascribes prosecutorial and judicial misconduct in the undue haste which attended the
prosecutions premature resting and the trial courts grant of the demurrer to evidence
when the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has not been completed.
Private respondent Ramon Flores filed his Memorandum, arguing that petitioner, being
the private complainant in the criminal case below, has no legal standing to appeal the
acquittal of private respondents; that there was no extrinsic fraud, abuse of discretion or
jurisdictional defect to warrant either a petition for annulment of judgment or certiorari;
and that the reopening of the criminal case will violate the accused right against double
jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation on right against double jeopardy.

HELD: No. By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition
does not violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. It is elementary that
double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the accused are
charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain
their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and
have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without
their consent. Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused
would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower
tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is,
in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.

Potot vs. People

Facts:
Petitioner Potot was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty
to the charge. Thereupon, the trial court convicted Potot of homicide. The petitioner filed
a manifestation with motion that he is not appealing from the Decision. However, the
wife of the victim, filed a motion for reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be
set aside and that the case be heard again because “there were irregularities committed
before and during the trial which caused miscarriage of justice.” The trial court granted
private complainant's motion and set aside its Decision and ordered that the records of
the case be remanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor “for re-evaluation of the
evidence and to file the corresponding charge”. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue the order as
the Decision had become final, and that the said order “would place the accused in
double jeopardy.” This was denied for the reason that the State is not bound by the
error or negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy does not attach.”

Issue: Whether or not the judgment has become final that the accused right against
double jeopardy will be violated upon re-trial of the same case.

Ruling: Yes. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified
or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation. Only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of
conviction. And this he must do before the said judgment becomes final or before he
perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of the following ways: (a) when
no appeal is seasonably filed by the accused, except in case of automatic review of the
decision imposing the capital penalty; (b) when he has partially or totally served his
sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right to appeal the judgment, except when
the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he applies for probation. When one of these
circumstances is present, the trial court which rendered the judgment of conviction loses
jurisdiction to alter, modify or revoke it. In this case, petitioner filed a manifestation
expressly waiving his right to appeal therefrom. Such waiver has the effect of causing
the judgment to become final and unalterable. Thus, it was beyond the authority of the
trial court to issue the order setting aside its Decision which had attained finality. A
judgment which has acquired the status of finality becomes immutable. Any error,
assuming one was committed in the judgment, will not justify its amendment except only
to correct clerical errors or mistakes. The assailed orders would violate the
constitutional right of the petitioner against double jeopardy. Such right prohibits any
subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been
acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever
at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and
anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. To invoke the defense of
double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to
the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent

People vs. Astudillo

401 SCRA 723

Facts: This is an appeal from the decision which convicted Clarence, Crisanto and
Hilario, all surnamed Astudillo, of the crime of murder. The prosecution presented its
witnesses who testified that the three accused were indeed the ones who killed
Silvestre Aquino, Clarence who stabbed the said victim, while the two others who held
the victim by the wrists. The version of the defense said it was Silvestre who did the
attacking first. Also, the stabbing of said victim was did as self-defense. The decision of
the trial court convicted the three Astudillos of the crime murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and, assuming that it
did, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not having been alleged
in the information, cannot be appreciated against them.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellants on the ground not
given in the information and rectifying the same violates their constitutional right against
double jeopardy.

Held: No. Anent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find no merit in appellants
contention that the trial cannot validly appreciate the same in its amended decision
because the attendance of treachery was not one of the issues raised in their motion for
reconsideration. Otherwise stated, appellants posit that the reconsideration of the
judgment of conviction should be limited only to the issues raised in their motion for
reconsideration, i.e., their guilt or innocence and/or the propriety of appreciating the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength which was not alleged in the
information. Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a
motion for reconsideration of a judgment of conviction may be filed by the accused, or
initiated by the court, with the consent of the accused. Likewise, under Rule 120,
Section 7,[25] a judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only upon motion
of the accused. These provisions changed the previous rulings of the Court to the effect
that such modification may be made upon motion of the fiscal, provided the same is
made before a judgment has become final or an appeal has been perfected.
It must be stressed, however, that the protection against double jeopardy in the
foregoing rules may be waived by the accused. Thus, when the accused himself files or
consents to the filing of a motion for reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy
cannot be invoked because the accused waived his right not to be placed therein by
filing such motion. His motion gives the court an opportunity to rectify its errors or to
reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of law and make them conformable
with the statute applicable to the case in the new judgment it has to render. The raison
detre is to afford the court a chance to correct its own mistakes and to avoid
unnecessary appeals from being taken. In effect, a motion for reconsideration or
modification filed by or with consent of the accused renders the entire evidence open for
the review of the trial court without, however, conducting further proceedings, such as
the taking of additional proof.
Having filed a timely motion for reconsideration asking the court to acquit, or in
the alternative, convict them of the lesser offense of homicide, appellants waived the
defense of double jeopardy and effectively placed the evidence taken at the trial open
for the review of the trial court. At any rate, the issue of the attendant qualifying
circumstance in the case at bar was squarely raised by the appellants in their alternative
prayer for conviction for the lesser offense of homicide in view of the erroneous
appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength which was not
alleged in the information. Hence, the court a quo is not only empowered but also under
obligation to rectify its mistake in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength instead of treachery.

REYNALDO R. BAYOT, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than
one hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents before the
Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed from his alleged involvement, as a
government auditor of the Commission on Audit assigned to the Ministry of Education
and Culture, together with some officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of
Treasury and the Teacher’s Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and encashment of
fictitious TCAA checks for non-existent obligations of the Teacher’s Camp resulting in
damage to the government of several million pesos. The first thirty-two (32) cases were
filed on July 25, 1978. In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of
Amadeo, Cavite in the local elections held in January 1980. He was elected. On May
30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting herein petitioner and
some of his co-accused in all but one of the thirty-two (32) cases filed against them.
Whereupon, appeals were taken to this Court and the cases are now pending review in
G.R. Nos. L-54645-76. However, on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was
passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. The said
section, as amended, reads — "Sec. 13. Suspension of and Loss of Benefits. — Any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any
law, but if acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings had been filed against him." Thereafter, in other cases
pending before the respondent court in which herein petitioner is one of the accused,
the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all the accused-public officers pendente lite
from their respective offices or any other public office which they may be occupying
pending trial of their cases.cOn July 22, 1982, respondent court issued an order
directing the suspension of all the accused including herein petitioner "from their public
positions or from any other public office that they may be holding . . ."

Issue: Whether or not to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein
accused would be violative of the constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex
post facto law.

Ruling: No. The petitioner’s contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer
charged therewith with suspension from office pending action in court, is a penal
provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post
facto law. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that
suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute
proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not
imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said
Article 24 are merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a penal
provision, therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial, of the public officer
charged with crimes mentioned in the amendatory provision committed before its
effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law. Further, the
claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a
position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory
provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense
involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or
as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. SIMEON. FERRER

Facts: On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-
Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary
investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government
prosecutors to file the corresponding information. That on or about May 1969 to
December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, feloniously
became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines
by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the
government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor
in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's
Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.
On May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the
respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. Both accuseds moved to quash
on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

Issue: Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

Ruling: Yes. Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder
or ex post facto law shall be enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial
determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to
implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to
rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial
function. History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular
causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional
prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on
it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill
of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a
"continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear,
present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the
trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial
magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards
of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined]
is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of
attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which
the accused can never hope to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify
the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy
for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in
section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist
Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies
not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization
having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on
conduct.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK

and MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK defendants-appellants.

Facts: These cases were certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals for resolution on
appeal, since the central issue involved is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379,
"An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found To Have Been
Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Proceedings therefor.
Civil Case No. 30823, instituted by the Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes
Katigbak. In their complaint they prayed that: (1) the Solicitor General be enjoined from
filing a complaint against them for forfeiture of property under the above mentioned R.A.
No. 1379; (2) said statute be declared unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes
forfeiture of properties acquired before its approval, or, alternatively, a new preliminary
investigation of the complaint filed against Alejandro Katigbak by NBI officers be
ordered; (3) properties acquired by Alejandro Katigbak when he was out of the
government service be excluded from forfeiture proceedings; and (4) the NBI officers
and the Investigating Prosecutor (Leonardo Lucena) be sentenced to pay damages.
Civil Case No. 31080, commenced by petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines
against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes, and his son, Benedicto, seeking the
forfeiture in favor of the State of the properties of Alejandro Katigbak allegedly gotten by
him illegally, in accordance with R.A. No. 1379. Said properties were allegedly acquired
while Katigbak was holding various positions in the government, the last being that of an
examiner of the Bureau of Customs; and title to some of the properties were supposedly
recorded in the names of his wife and/or son. The cases were jointly tried. The
judgment thereafter rendered (1) dismissed the complaint and the counterclaim in Civil
Case No. 30823, the first action; and (2) as regards Civil Case No. 31080, ordered "that
from the properties (of Katigbak) enumerated in this decision as acquired in 1953, 1954
and 1955, shall be enforced a lien in favor of the Government in the sum of
P100,000.00. The judgment also declared that the "impatience of the Investigating
Prosecutor" during the preliminary inquiry into the charges filed against Katigbak for
violation of R.A. No. 1379 did not amount to such arbitrariness as would justify
annulment of the proceedings since, after all, Katigbak was able to fully ventilate his
side of the case in the trial court; that R.A. No. 1379 is not penal in nature, its objective
not being the enforcement of a penal liability but the recovery of property held under an
implied trust; that with respect to things acquired through delicts, prescription does not
run in favor of the offender.
No less than 18 errors have been attributed by the Katigbaks to the Court a quo. They
concern mainly the character of R.A. No. 1379 as an ex-post facto law, principally
because it imposes the penalty of forfeiture on a public officer or employee acquiring
properties allegedly in violation of said R.A. No. 1379 at a time when that law had not
yet been enacted.

Issue: Whether or not RA 1379 is an ex post facto law.

Ruling: Yes. The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in
the nature of a penalty; and it being axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter
alia "makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent
when done, and punishes such an act," or, "assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for something which
when done was lawful," it follows that penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379
cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage without running afoul of the
Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder. But this is
precisely what has been done in the case of the Katigbaks. The Trial Court declared
certain of their acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to be illegal under R.A. No. 1379
although made prior to the enactment of the law, and imposed a lien thereon "in favor of
the Government in the sum of P100,000.00." Such a disposition is, quite obviously,
constitutionally impermissible.

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE
JOSE DE LA RAMA, RTC, BRANCH 139, MAKATI, M.M. and HON. FRANK DRILON,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for

indictable crimes in his country. Extradition proceedings were filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the deportation of petitioner.
Said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence, petitioner came to this
Court by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the order of deportation. Petitioner
contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty
amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. He assails the trial court's decision ordering his extradition, arguing that
the evidence adduced in the court below failed to show that he is wanted for
prosecution in his country. Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the petitioner
before this Court strike at the validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by the
government against him.

Issue: Whether or not the retroactive force and effect to the extradition treaty between
the republic of the Philippines and Australia amounts to an ex post facto law.

Ruling: No. The concept of ex post facto law was limited only to penal and criminal
statutes. As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that
make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed;
2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3)
statutes which prescribes greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws
which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it substantially easier to convict a
defendant. "Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition
applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the
accused." This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that
the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect
to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the
Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an
offense or a crime

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE

SANDIGANBAYAN respondent.

Facts: The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act
which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this
petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the
Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057
(for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In the early
morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a
spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in
Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group
(ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National
Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic
Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent
Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat
(PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central
Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the
Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief
Superintendent Romeo Acop.

Issue: Whether or not the retroactive application of RA 8249 which gives jurisdiction to
the Sandiganbayan on the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitute an ex post facto law for
the accuseds are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer
avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.

Ruling: No. This contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249.
In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one: (a) which makes an act done criminal
before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes
such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than
the law annexed to the crime when it was committed. (d) which alters the legal rules of
evidence and recieves less or different testimony that the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant. (e) Every law which, in
relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage. Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A.
8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature,
and provide for their punishment. R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one
which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A.
8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. Petitioner's and entervenors' contention
that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been
diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already
been rejected by the court several times considering that the right to appeal is not a
natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure
provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex
post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not
mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. Moreover, the
law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that
adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the
time of their passage. In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to
appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. On the removal of the
intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to
determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome.

Regina Ongsiako Reyes vs COMELEC and Joseph Tan

Facts: Petitioner Ongsiako-Reyes is assailing through a Petition for Certiorari with

prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary injunction the resolution of
COMELEC which ordered the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative in the lone district of Marinduque. The facts of the case show
that a petition to cancel Ongsiako-Reyes’ candidacy was filed on the ground her
Certificate of Candidacy contains material representations pertaining to her citizenship.
Petitioner Ongsiako-Reyes stated in her Certificate of Candidacy that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Looking into the events that led to the petition to cancel her COC,
respondent Joseph Tan submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that
Ongsiako-Reyes is a holder of US passport and that her status is a balikbayan.
Ongsiako-Reyes also failed to show that she had availed the privileges of RA 9225 by
becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen and thereafter made a valid sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship. Although she insisted that she renounced her
American citizenship as shown in her Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign citizenship,
Ongsiako-Reyes apparently failed to take the Oath of Allegiance as required by R.A.
9225. Ongsiako-Reyes, however, insisted that her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator will already suffice.

Issue: Whether or not Ongsiako-Reyes is ineligible to run as Representative of

Marinduque on the ground that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Ruling: Yes, Ongsiako-Reyes is ineligible to run as Representative of Marinduque on

the ground that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen for her failure to reacquire such
status under RA 9225. For Ongsiako-Reyes to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and
become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the
following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before
the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal
and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there was no showing that Ongsiako-Reyes complied with the
aforesaid requirements. She was not able to establish that she had availed of the
privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter,
made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an
American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office
in the Philippines.

Japzon vs. Comelec

Facts: Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty
(Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
Ø Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition to
disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material
misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born
Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani
Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses
Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
Ø Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen
thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his
Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a
resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year
before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign
country.
Ø While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he
never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for
a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under
Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991
Ø Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make
trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20
January 2007.
Ø Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he
continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He
had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related
laws.
Ø Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty
from running for public office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.

Issue: Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for
elective positions.

Ruling: Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective
position.
Ø It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a
natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite
acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such
circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch
on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions.
Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-
born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of
residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow
for dual citizenship.
Ø There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to
the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To
the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where
one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. The Court also notes, that even
with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the
14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily
determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only
consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ø To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that
Ty's ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case,
Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the
Municipality, the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.

CASAN CODE MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ROMMEL ARNADO

y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.

FACTS:Rommel Arnado, herein respondent, is a natural born Filipino citizen. He lost

his Filipino citizenship as a result of subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United
States of America. On 10 July 2008, respondent applied for repatriation under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso,
USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.On the same
day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in
his favor.

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 28 April 2010, respondent
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as “USA-American.”

COMELEC First Division ruled that the petition for disqualification be granted because
he is still using his US passport after his renunciation of his US citizenship which
negates his Affidavit of Renunciation.

Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioner
Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in
the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together
with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. The COMELEC
En Banc granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Arnado on the ground that the use
of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport
does not operate to “unrenounce” what he has earlier on renounced. Maquiling files a
petition before the Supreme Court to assail the decision of the COMELEC En Banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
cancels the renunciation of the said foreign citizenship

RULING: Between the day he renounced his foreign citizenship, and the day he filed his
COC, he used his US passport four times. By using his foreign passport, Arnado
positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American then availing rights and
privileges that came along with it. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not an empty
oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It
requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted
the citizenship. The act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively returned to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Ther reversion of his status took place the instant he represented himself
as an American citizen by using his US passport. The requirement of citizenship for
elective public office is a continuing one. Any action which tends to violate the oath of
renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack. The court held that Arnado, by using
his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath
of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his
situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections

BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ

FACTS:
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless
he is a natural-born citizen.”,Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US
Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA
No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.”Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in
the U.S. Marine Corps..In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship
by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was
elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections.
He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.,Subsequently,
petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming
that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.,HRET rendered
its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.

ISSUE:
WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD:
petition dismissed ,YES,Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3
modes by which R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.,Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance
to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows
him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Loida Nicolas Lewis et.al vs COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, sought
registration and certification as “overseas absentee voters” however they were advised
by the Philippine Embassy in the US that as per a COMELEC letter to DFA dated
September 23, 2003, they have no right yet to vote in such elections owing to their lack
of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by Sec. 1, Art. IV of the Constitution.

When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis clarified on said requirement, the COMELEC

replied its position that the OAVL was not enacted for the petitioners and that they are
considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency under the
Constitution. Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004
elections because of COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of
Absentee Voters, petitioners filed on April 1, 2004 a petition for certiorari and
mandamus.

On April 30, 2004 (a little over a week before Election Day), COMELEC filed a
Comment praying for the denial of the petition. Consequently, petitioners were not able
to register let alone vote in said elections. On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a
Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment) stating that“all qualified overseas Filipinos, including
dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so,” observing, however,
that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic.

Issue:
Must the Supreme Court still resolve said petition considering that under the
circumstances the same has already been rendered moot and academic?

Ruling:
The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered the petition moot and
academic, but only insofar as petitioners’ participation in such political exercise is
concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered in the petition is the
propriety of allowing dual citizens to participate and vote as absentee voter in future
elections, which however, remains unresolved.
The issues are thus reduced to the question of whether or not petitioners and
others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship
pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.

Facts: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome,Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and
native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the
age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. On June 27, 1952,
she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in
Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only
as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected
governor of Davao Oriental.

Issues: 1.) Whether or not the respondent is a Filipino citizen 2.) Whether or not the
respondent renounce her citizenship when she applied for an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19,
1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988

Ruling:1.)Yes. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus

sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet,
Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year
before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United
States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law. Under both
organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine
citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in
Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the
Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo
Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were
the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. The signing into law of
the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship.
2.) No. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. Petitioners contention that the application of private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was
put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and in the more recent case of Mercado
vs. Manzano and COMELEC. In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact
that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did
not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of
registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. And,
in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent
Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year
before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions
of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. Thus, the
mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must
be express. As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an
alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an
alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case
of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship
before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had
dual citizenship - she was an Australian and
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was
born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine
citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship,
petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not
hold water.

G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of
the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003)
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship
to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. On 23 January 2004, the
COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January
2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February
2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a
temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that
would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other
petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR
161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

ISSUE: Whether Poe was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the office
of the President of the Philippines.

HELD: The1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and
write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term
"natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August
1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of
acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been
in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
“natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and
the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering
the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that
could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The
parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20
August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time
of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties
during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier
has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove
whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and
willful. The petitions were dismissed.

Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, et al. vs. Commissioner Alipio Fernandez Jr., et al.

Facts: Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano
Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma
(Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, a Taiwanese,
and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. Records reveal that petitioners were all born
under aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957,
respectively. They were all raised and have resided in the Philippines for almost sixty
(60) years; received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do not
speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not
know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have
already raised their respective families in the Philippines. During their age of minority,
they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration
(ACRs). Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which
provides that (t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship are citizens of the Philippines. Thus,
petitioners executed their affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath
of allegiance. Having done this, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary
documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was
only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine
citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so.[9] On the other hand, there is no
showing that Valeriano complied with the registration requirement.

Issue: Whether or not the failure to immediately file the documents of election with the
nearest civil registry makes on a foreign national subject to deportation as
undocumented alien.

Held: The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of
election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the
Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the
nearest civil registry. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon
reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election
with the civil registry that was belatedly done. In Cue[n]co vs. Secretary of Justice, that
the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said: It is true that this clause has
been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority, and that
the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect
Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period
may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino.

Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to
elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and
substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the
election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The
lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate
administrative penalties, if any. The documents they submitted supporting their
allegations that they have already registered with the civil registry, although belatedly,
should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the
Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and
other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be
complied with within a reasonable time

Republic vs. Azucena Batugas

Facts: On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the
RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. The case was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 03-001
and raffled to Branch 29 of said court. After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated
by Section 9 of CA 473 had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is
engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. Finding the grounds
relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said
Motion. Thereafter, the hearing for the reception of Azucena’s evidence was then set on
May 18, 2004. Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on
the day of the hearing. Hence, Azucena’s counsel moved that the evidence be
presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted. Accordingly, the RTC designated its Clerk
of Court as Commissioner to receive Azucena’s evidence. During the November 5,
2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG appeared despite due notice.

Issue:Whether or not an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen can obtain

citizenship under CA 473?

Held: Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession
before she had to quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take on her role
as joint provider, together with her husband, in order to support her family. Together,
husband and wife were able to raise all their five children, provided them with education,
and have all become professionals and responsible citizens of this country. Certainly,
this is proof enough of both husband and wife’s lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a
professional and can resume teaching at anytime. Her profession never leaves her, and
this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to the only country
she has known since birth.
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity
that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment
of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s
interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form
part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot,
through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests.
Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition,
and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances
where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law.
We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no proceeding
authorized by the law or by the Rules of Court, for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. "Such judicial declaration of citizenship cannot even be
decreed pursuant to an alternative prayer therefore in a naturalization proceeding."
This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the
petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his
status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien,
and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen
based on requirements required under CA 473.Azucena has clearly proven, under strict
judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not
stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.

POE VS COMELEC GR. No. 221697

FACTS: Grace Poe declared, in her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections,
that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day
before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the
Philippines for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to
and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in
Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized
as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration granted her
petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She
registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming
her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino
citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were
Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc canceled her candidacy on the ground that she is in
want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material
misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a
candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born
citizenship issue.

ISSUE: WON Grace Poe is a natural born citizen

HELD: The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are
unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128: Sect. 4.
Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or noexistence. Evidence on collateral matters shall
not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino parents and is therefore a
natural-born Filipino. xxx. [T]here is a high probability that her parents are Filipinos. The
Solicitor General offered official Statistics from the Philippine Statistics office that from
1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,985. While
the Filipinos born in the country were more than 10 Million. On this basis, there is a 99%
chance that the child born in the Philippines would be a Filipino which in turn, would
indicate more than ample probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poe’s parents are the fact that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features.

There are disputable presumptions that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature. On this basis, it is safer to assume that Poe’s parents are Filipinos. To
assume otherwise is to accept the absurd.

Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr.

Associate Justice Velasco Junior concurred with the ponencia and added the following
only for emphasis.

On Residency
It is established that to acquire a new domicile one must demonstrate three things: ( 1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there
(animus manendi); and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non
revertendi). There is no issue as to Sen. Poe's actual bodily presence in the Philippines
since May 24, 2005, whence she, per her 2015 Certificate of Candidacy, reckons her
residency in the country.

On the issue of animus manendi, Associate Justice Velasco explained that as "intent" is
basically a "state of mind" that exists only in idea; its existence can only be determined
by the overt acts that translate it to fact. The fulfillment of the intent to change domicile
can be made via a series of steps through what the Court adverts in Mitra v. COMELEC
and Sabili v. COMELEC as an "incremental process" or the execution of "incremental
transfer moves." The facts of the case suggest that Sen. Poe's change of domicile and
repatriation from the US to the Philippines was accomplished, not in a single key move
but, through an incremental process" that started in early 2005. Indeed, the
foreknowledge of Sen. Poe's repatriation and her desire for it, i.e., her intent to go back
to and re-establish her domicile the Philippines, is readily discernible from her acts
executed even before her return to the country in May 2005. The foregoing indicia of
Sen. Poe's intent to re-establish her domicile in the country cannot be frivolously
dismissed as insufficient on the pretext that "this case involves relocation of national
domicile from the US to the Philippines by an alien, which requires much stronger proof,
both as to fact and intent. "

It has also been advanced that Sert. Poe has not positively shown an intent to abandon
the US, or animus non revertendi, prior to her formal renunciation of her American
citizenship in October 2010. To this is added that she even acquired a house in the US
in 2008 as proof of her alleged intent not to abandon that country. Proponents of this
argument cite Reyes v. Commission on Elections. However, Reyes was on a starkly
different factual milieu. The alleged fact that Sen. Poe acquired a house in the US in
2008, cannot be taken as an argument against her animus non revertendi vis-à-vis the
evidence of her manifest intent to stay, and actual stay, in the Philippines. Certainly, the
element of intent to abandon an old domicile does not require a complete and absolute
severance of all physical links to that country, or any other country for that matter. It is
simply too archaic to state, at a time where air travel is the norm, that ownership of a
secondary abode for a temporary visit or holiday negates an intent to abandon a foreign
country as a legal domicile.

On Citizenship
Associate Justice Velasco stated that there is no question that Sen. Poe has no known
biological parents and was found on September 3, 1968 in Jaro, Iloilo when she was but
a newborn. She was then adopted by spouses Ronald Allan Kelly and Jesusa Sonora
Poe in May 1974. The nagging question is: Is Sen. Poe a natural bom Filipino citizen?
He explained that the term "natural-born" Filipino does not even appear in the Article IV,
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution. He furthered that the Court, however, has construed
the term to refer to those falling under items one to four of the section, as opposed to
those who underwent naturalization under item number 5. But Sen. Poe was not born
before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution so that the first item is inapplicable. That
being said, her status as a foundling does not foreclose the likelihood that either or both
of her biological parents were Filipinos rendering her a natural-born Filipino under items
3 and/or 4 of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. Poe’s abandonment does
not obliterate the fact that she had biological parents and the private respondents had
not shown any proof that they were not Filipino citizens. Justice Velasco also advances
that the State cannot allow unconscionable interpretation of our laws which shift the
burden of proof to foundlings like, Sen. Poe, to prove the citizenship of their parents
who had abandoned them as it adds insult to injury. Moreso, the proposed explicit
inclusion of "children of unknown parentage" in the enumeration of jus sanguinis
Philippine Citizens in Section1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution was grounded not that
they are not Filipino citizens but because the cases of foundlings are "few and far in
between,” that citing a similar Spanish Law, they are already presumed to have been
born to Filipinos. And lastly, to consider abandoned children with no known parents as
stateless is a violation of the rights of a child recognized in the United Nation's
Convention on the Rights of a Child. Hence, Justice Velasco cannot subscribe to the
proposal that foundlings, like Sen. Poe, are not natural-born Filipino citizens.

Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe

Below are Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe submitted this dissent.

On COMELEC’s Jurisdiction

Justice Perlas-Bernabe disagreed at the ponencia positing that the COMELEC, in ruling
on a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC, is restrained "from going into the
issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue
is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority." Consequently, “the
COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack
thereof of the candidate." The COMELEC's power to deny due course to or cancel a
candidate's CoC stems from Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Based on
the text of the Constitution, and bearing in mind the import of cases on the matter, there
is no perceivable restriction which qualifies the exercise of the COMELEC's adjudicatory
power to declare a candidate ineligible and thus, cancel his/her CoC with the need of a
prior determination coming from a "proper authority." At any rate, the jurisdictional
boundaries have already been set: the COMELEC' s jurisdiction ends, and that of the
PET begins, only when a candidate therefor has already been elected, and thereafter,
proclaimed. She furthered that the ponencia's view is also inconsistent with its
declaration that petitioner is "QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National
and Local Elections of May 9, 2016."She said that if the COMELEC had no power to
determine the eligibility of petitioner, then the Court - which is only tasked to exercise its
power of review under the parameters of a petition for certiorari and, thus, should have
either nullified or affirmed the assailed rulings - could not proceed and assume
jurisdiction outside of the context of the case before it and make this ad hoc
pronouncement. The declaration not only serves to confuse the true powers of the
COMELEC, it also distorts the manner of their review.

On Residency
To successfully effect change of domicile, one must demonstrate animus manendi and
animus non rivertendi. To Justice Perlas-Bernabe’s mind, the COMELEC's reliance on
Coquilla case is apt. As the records disclose, petitioner (Grace Poe) returned to the
Philippines on May 24, 2005 under the Balikbayan Program, and therefore, only
obtained the status of a temporary resident. Specifically, Section 3 of RA 6768, as
amended by RA 9174, merely accorded her the benefit of visa-free entry to the
Philippines for a period of one ( 1) year. At any rate, the overt acts on which petitioner
premises her claims are insufficient to prove her animus manendi and animus non-
revertendi. While it is true that the visa-free entry of petitioner under the Balikbayan
Program should not automatically hinder her ability to – as the ponencia would say -
"reestablish her life here," it remains that the parameters of domicile reestablishment
under the auspices of political law have not been clearly proven. Hence, because all the
overt acts prior to that time had no impact in establishing her animus manendi and
animus nonrevertendi, the earliest date that petitioner could have reestablished her
residence was in July 2006. The overall conclusion of the COMELEC was therefore
correct. At such juncture, Justice Perlas-Bernabe expressed her assent to the view that
"stronger proof is required in the reestablishment of national domicile."

On Citizenship

Justice Perlas-Bernabe departed from the ponencia's stand that petitioner's blood
relationship with a Filipino citizen is demonstrable on account of statistical probability,
and other circumstantial evidence, namely, her abandonment as an infant as well as her
typical Filipino features. She likewise stated that petitioner has shown no evidence of
blood relation to a Filipino parent to prove that she acquired Filipino citizenship by birth
under the jus sanguinis principle and that ender Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, which governs petitioner's case, foundlings are not included in the
enumeration of who are considered as Filipino citizens. Justice Perlas-Bernabe
furthered that it should be pointed out that the 1935 Constitution, as it was adopted in its
final form, never carried over any proposed provision on foundlings being considered or
presumed to be Filipino citizens. Its final exclusion is therefore indicative of the framers'
prevailing intent. She also found no merit in petitioner's invocation of international
covenants on generally accepted principle in international law on foundlings’ citizenship,
since the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions consistently subscribe to the jus sanguinis
principle. In our legal hierarchy, treaties and international principles belong to the same
plane as domestic laws and, hence, cannot prevail over the Constitution. By parity of
reasoning, statistical probability as basis to presume natural-born citizenship in this
case, does not prove that petitioner was born to a Filipino: her abandonment in the
Philippines is just a restatement of her foundling status, while her physical features only
tend to prove that her parents likely had Filipino features and yet it remains uncertain if
their citizenship was Filipino.