A.

Concepts of separation & divorce

265. Benedicto v. FACTS:

De la Rama 3 Phil ● Agueda Benedicto and Esteban De la Rama were happily married for about a year until 1892 until
34 the plaintiff suddenly left his wife at his parents’ house for no reason.
● The wife alleged that the husband committed adultery and abandonment. The defendant suddenly
ARUGAY without any previous warning took his wife to the house of her parents, left her there and never
lived with her afterwards
● The plaintiff: complains that husband committed adultery with one GREGORIA BERMEJO in 1892
● Other two charges that the husband committed adultery in 1899 and 1901 but with insufficient
evidence
● The husband accused the wife of adultery also, which she denied.
● The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff-wife, granting her divorce and share of the conjugal
partnership. CFI: granted the divorce to plaintiff and 81, 042. 76 pesos as her share of the conjugal
property- court assumed that the provisions of the civil code relating to divorce contained in title 4
of book1 are still in force
● The husband objected the judgment filing a motion for new trial because the facts were not
justified by evidence which was denied, thus this appeal.

ISSUE:
● W/N they could avail of divorce a mensa et thoro under the existing laws -- NO. They are both guilty
of adultery

HELD:
● The Court of First instance erred in basing judgment on the provisions of the Civil Code relating to
divorce, contained in title 4 of book 1, thinking it still to be in force.
● By Royal Decree the civil code was extended to the Philippines on July 31, 1889. The part of the
Code referred to by the CFI was suspended by the Governor-General by cumplase as published in
the Gaceta de Manila on November 15, 1876. On the other hand, General Orders, No. 68,
promulgated by the Military Government on December 18, 1899, treats of marriage and nullity of
marriage, it says nothing about divorce. And lastly the canon which is administered both in Spain
and in the Philippines any part of the thereof which by proper action of the civil authorities had
become a civil law stood upon the same footing as any other law of Spain need not necessarily be
used.
● The fourth partida should be controlling which indicates that divorce may be obtained by two
reasons, first by religion and the second by an impediment between them. The partidas took effect
by virtue of the promulgation of the law which appears as Law 2, title 1, book 2, of the Recopilacion
de las Leyes Indias, the last part thereof reads:
“And as to all matters not provided for by the laws of this compilation, the laws of the
compilations and the partidas of these Kingdom of Castile shall be followed in the decision of
causes in accordance with the following law. (Law 1.)”
● The provisions of the substantive civil law were not repealed by the change of the sovereignty of
the Philippines to the Americans. The Courts of First Instance now have jurisdiction, by virtue of Act
No. 136. Section 56, of suit for divorce, wherein only adultery can be the ground and does not
dissolve the marriage bond but only separates the spouses by operation of law.
● Considering that the husband’s adultery was proven, the wife upon proper investigation of facts,
especially her letter which shows her remorse for her guilt of committing adultery, is also found
guilty. Law 8, title 2, partida 4 provides that:
“For the sin of each one of them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other.”
● Thus neither is entitled to a divorce.

1. Separation in fact/abandonment, FC 239, 100-101, 127-128

266. FACTS:
Villanueva ● Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been
v separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired Lot No. 997-D-1 situated at
Chiong, Poblacion, Dipolog City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)-2325, issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte.
GR 159889, June 5, ● Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners for P8,000,
2008 payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a
store, a shop, and a house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13,
1986, petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor.
Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
● On July 19, 2000, the RTC, annulled the deed of absolute sale dated May 13, 1992, and ordered
petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements therein. The RTC likewise dismissed Civil
Case No. 4460, but ordered Florentino to return to petitioners the consideration of the sale with
interest from May 13, 1992.

ISSUE:
1. W/N is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents?
2. W/N was its sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent valid?

HELD:
1. NO. Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced
Elisera’s interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband
and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal nature.

Florentino and Elisera categorically declared in the Memorandum of Agreement they executed that
the lot is a conjugal property. Moreover, the conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by Florentino in
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1992, where he declared his capacity to sell as a co-owner of
the subject lot.

2. No. In Vda. de Ramones v. Agbayani, 21 citing Villaranda v. Villaranda, we held that without the
wife's consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable.

“ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis
or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife's consent . . .”

This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date of
this Code.

Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary for the sale of a conjugal
property to be valid. In this case, the requisite consent of Elisera was not obtained when Florentino verbally
sold the lot in 1985 and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992. Accordingly, the contract
entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera's instance, during the marriage and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, conformably with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely questioned the sale when
she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991, perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and execution
of the deed.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
dated December 17, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 68383 affirming the Joint Decision
dated July 19, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 4460 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The order for the payment of interest is DELETED.

2. Agreements to separate, FC 1, NCC 221 (1)

267. Espinosa v FACTS:

Omaa, A.C. No. ● Complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa and Maximo A. Glindo (complainant) against
9081, October, 12, Atty. Julieta A. Omaa (respondent)
2011 ● November 17, 1997 - Espinosa and his wife (Elena Marantal) sought the respondent for legal advice
on whether they could legally be separated and dissolve their marriage.
RODOLFO A. ● The respondent prepared a document: Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay which included certain terms
ESPINOSA and and conditions which was signed by the complainant and his spouse and the defendant notarized
Maximo A. Glindo the said contract.
Vs. ● Glindo, one of the complainant of the case, with legal knowledge, informed Espinosa that the
ATTY. JULIETA A. contract was illegal, hence not valid. Then they filed a complaint to the IBP-CBD.
OMAA ● Respondent denied that she created the contract and that her office staff forged her signature and
notarized the said contract.
● IBP-CBD stated that the respondent had violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Kang Responsibility
○ Which provides: a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Also, IBP-CBD stated that the respondent had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of
her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law. Noted the
inconsistency of the respondent’s defense, where she claimed that it was her office staff (Arlene
Dela Pea) who signed without her knowledge, consent, and authority. But later it was found that
her house maid was the one who notarized it.
● IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two
years as a notary public. - IBP Board of Governors approved the recommendation.
● Respondent filed for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
● W/N the Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay (contract) valid to dissolve the marriage?

HELD:
● No. The contract signed by the spouses and notarized by Atty. Omaa was not valid to dissolve the
marriage of the spouses.
● The court adopted the findings and the recommendations of the IBP-CBD.
● Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. Also, notary
public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership which is exactly
what Omaa did in this case.
● The court agreed with the IBP-CBD that the respondent herself notarized the contract; which shows
her negligence in doing her notarial duties.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaa from the practice of law for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty.
Omaas notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let
a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all
courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

3. Absolute divorce
(a) Divorce under the Family Code
FC 26, paragraph 2

268. Gorayeb v FACTS:

Hashim, 50 Phil. 22

ISSUE:
 HELD:

269. Tenchavez v. FACTS:

Escaño, 15 SCRA · The case at bar is a Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of
355 First Instance of Cebu, denying the claim of the plaintiff/appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation
and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente,
PANISALES Mamerto and Mena, all surnamed “Escano” respectively.
· Vicenta Escano, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish
ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala") fell in love with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-
army officer and of undistinguished stock.
· On February 24, 1948, Vicenta Escano exchanged vows with Pastor Tenchavez, without the knowledge
of her of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the
said city. The marriage was the culmination of previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil
registrar.
· Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage indicate that the couple were deeply in
love. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the
engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao.
· Eventually, her love for Pastor was rekindled and they planned to get married and elope. However,
their elopement did not push through due to the interference and disapproval of Vicenta’s parents who
were disgusted with the clandestine marriage.
· Worrying about a scandal occurring, Vicenta’s parents sought priestly advice who suggested a re-
celebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage which lacked authority from the
Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage.
· The re-celebration did not take place because it was found out that there an amorous relationship
between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel.
· On June 24, 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, that she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that
she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States.
· On 22 August 1950, she led a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second
Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character". The petition was granted and a decree of divorce, "final and absolute",
was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
· In 1951, Mamerto and Mena Escaño led a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor. Likewise, in 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage.
· On September 13, 154, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She eventually
acquired American citizenship in 1958.
· On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Vicenta and
her parents, charging them with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
· Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband,
Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in anyway in influenced their daughter's acts and
counterclaimed for moral damages.

CA RULING:
· The CA did not decree a legal separation but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of
P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

ISSUE:
· W/N the foreign judgment dissolving the marriage of Tenchavez and Escano after the effectivity of the
New Civil Code is binding and should be recognized by Philippine laws
 HELD:
· NO. A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in the Philippines; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce entitled to validity in this country. The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in
force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact, it does not even use that
term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that
admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710).
Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation. For the Philippine courts to
recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens
would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, especially in view of the third
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified, as follows:
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant, Tenchavez the amount
of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorney's fee.

270. Van Dorn v. FACTS:

Romillo, 139 SCRA
139 ● 1979 - Alice Reyes Van Dorn (Alice), a Filipino Citizen and, Richard Upton (Richard), a US citizen, was
married in Hong Kong
● They established their residence in the Philippines
● The couple begot 2 children
● 1982 - They were divorced in Nevada, USA
● Alice remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn(Theodore)
● A suit against Alice was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the
Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Richard
● Richard prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be
declared as the administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue petitioner
to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should
not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

271. Somera v. FACTS:

Pilapil, 174 SCRA · Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a
663 German national, were married in Germany.
· About three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in
Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany.
 · The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.

· More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still
married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.”
· The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal
of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
· However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing
the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner.
· The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia” was assigned to the court
presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
· A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent.
· Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to
quash.
· As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for
adultery.

ISSUE:
W/N Geiling has legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was
done after obtaining a divorce decree?

HELD:

NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended
spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
he filed suit.

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

272. Fujiki v CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

Marinay, G.R. No. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
196049, June 26, parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact
2013 under the Rules of Court.

While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen
to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.

FACTS:
● Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on January 23, 2004. Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could not bring
respondent Marinay back to Japan and they eventually lost contact with one another. In 2008,
Marinay met Shinichi Maekara and they married without the earlier marriage being dissolved.
 ● Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and was able to reestablish contact with
Fujiki and rekindle their relationship. The couple was able to obtain a judgment in a Japanese court
that declared Marinay's marriage to Maekara void on the ground of bigamy in 2010. Fujiki then
filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage
● The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not meet standing and venue
requirements as prescribed on the Rule on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), specifically, only the
spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara) may file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Petitioner in a Motion for Reconsideration claimed that the case should not be dismissed as the
above rule applied only to cases of annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity and not in a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment.
● Notably, when the Solicitor General was asked for comment, it agreed with the Petitioner stating
that the above rule should not apply to cases of bigamy and that insofar as the Civil Registrar and
the NSO are concerned, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed.
Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro and Niñal v. Bayadog which declared that
“[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.”

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable. Yes.
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy. Yes.
3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Yes.

HELD:

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact
under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or
copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered.
When Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife” — it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage; The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage

273. Medina vs. FACTS:

Koike, G.R. No. ● Petitioner, Doreen Grace Parilla, a Filipino citizen, and respondent, Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a
215723, July 27, Japanese national, were married in Quezon City, Philippines.
2016 ● Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of
 Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the
AGUSTIN Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki
Koike.
● Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code before the RTC.
● At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.
● On the other hand, Doreen presented several foreign documents, namely, “Certificate of
Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce” and “Family Register of Michiyuki Koike” both
issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the
Philippines for Osaka, Japan.
● She also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled “Divorce Certificate” issued by
the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the
Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the
original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies
of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books
entitled “The Civil Code of Japan 2000” and “The Civil Code of Japan 2009” was likewise submitted
as proof of the existence of Japan’s law on divorce.
● RTC denied the petition. RTC ruled the following:

a.) The foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or
her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence; and
b.) While the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully proven to
be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the
national law of her husband. However, “The Civil Code of Japan 2000” and “The Civil
Code of Japan 2009” were not duly authenticated. Also, testimony made by Doreen
relative to the applicable provisions that may be found therein and its effect on the
matrimonial relations was insufficient. She was not presented as a qualified expert
witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws
of Japan, particularly those on family relations and divorce.

● Doreen filed a petition for review on certiorari DIRECTLY with the SC.
(Note: She directly filed it with the SC without first filing an appeal to CA. Hence, the ruling.)

ISSUE:

W/N RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.

HELD:

(This is an issue of jurisdiction. The SC referred the case to Court of Appeals for appropriate action.)

RATIO:

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code — which addresses foreign marriages or
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner — allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. The law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to
a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
In order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be
shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.

Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must
be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence
 requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like
any other fact.

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence
of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a reevaluation of the evidence
presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is
beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.

In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to
the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 41 of the rules of Court.

SC referred the case to the CA.

(b) Divorce under the Muslim Code, MC 45-55

274. Llave v FACTS:

Republic, G.R. No. ● 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice
169766, March 30, ○ under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City
2011 ○ under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,
1993
LUNA ● In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as “divorced”
● Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and
upon his death, his widow.
● Nov. 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib
Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate
children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.
● The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites
● That such marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

HELD: Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

RATIO: The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under
civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-
Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any
given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of
divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit
Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not
provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”

275. Zamoranos v ACTS: Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was
People, G.R. No. a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites
193902, June 1, before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
2011
A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their
marriage was confirmedy theShari'aCircuitDistrictCourt,which issued a Decree of Divorce.

Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously done in her first nuptial to De
Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs
where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order to strengthen the
ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before
Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to De Guzman,
the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam
Joon.

Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and the two
were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter
battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise
agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial
rights thereto.

As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against Zamoranos
including a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal and disbarment from
the civil service.

Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor
Quiones, issued a resolution, finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.
Consequently, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC.

On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the RTC, rendered a decision in
favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan
City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage,
whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Was the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum bigamous?

HELD: First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment
made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed
by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the
decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts.
The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Shari'a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the
subject matter thereof.

Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken
cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim,
whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact,
the same court further declared that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage
ties.

From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it
is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites.
Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasum's claim that
Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously
far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos' Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower
courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.

The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage while a
prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City,
 should haveuspendedtheproceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De
Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been
dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.

In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective participation of the National
Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in
the formulation and implementation of its policies."

Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense
defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition
bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.

Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable
talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and
Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her
to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try
Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.

GRANTED

276. Pacasum v FACTS:

Zamoranos, G.R.
No. 193719, ● Pacasum and Zamoranos were married on Dec. 28, 1992, however Pacasum discovered that Zamoranos was
March 21, 2017 previously married to De Guzman on July 30, 1982.
(en banc) ● Pacasum then filed an administrative complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against Zamoranos on
the ground that she had contracted a bigamous marriage.
● In her answer, Zamoranos raised as a defense the dissolution of her previous marriage under the Muslim Code.
JOSOL
And that prior to her marriage with De Guzman she converted to Islam. And that in 1983, she and Deguzman
divorced as evidenced by the Divorce decree issued by Judge Jainul the presiding Judge of the Sharia Court in
Basilan
● The CSC dismissed the complaint because Pacasum failed to assail the existence and validity of the Divorce
Decree. The CSC ruled further that the subsisting marriage with De Guzman was the sole basis for Pacasum’s
complaint the existence of the Divorce decree is fatal to her cause.
● On appeal, the CA initially granted her petition where the court relied on the judicial admission of Zamoranos
that she was a Roman Catholic.
● On Reconsideration, the CA corrected itself and admitted error in applying such admissions. The CA recognized
as the undisputed the fact that the previous marriage between Zamoranos and De Guzman was solemnized
and entered into under Muslim rites.
● The CA further held that“ a collateral attack against the Divorce Decree, much less one posed a an incident to
an admin complaint before a quasi-judicial tribunal such as the CSC cannot be allowed.”
● Pacasum then filed this petition for review on certiorari arguing that the Sharia court had no jurisdiction to
dissolve Zamoranos first marriage. As such her marriage to Pacasum was bigamous.

ISSUE:
W/N the Sharia courts have jurisdiction to dissolve the first marriage; YES.
W/N the second Marriage was bigamous; NO.

HELD:

● The Muslim Code recognizes divorce in marriages between Muslims, and mixed marriages wherein only the
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or the Muslim Code in
any part of the Philippines.
● Jurisdiction over actions for divorce is vested upon the Sharia Circuit Courts, whose decision may be appealed
to the Sharia Disctrict courts.
● Under the Special rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts, an appeal must be made within a reglementary period
 of 15 days, after which the Judgement shall become the final and executory.
● The effect of a final judgement is stated under Sec 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which applies suppletorily
to civil proceedings in sharia courts.
● Par (a) of Sec 47 Rule 39 states: (a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or
relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be
prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
● The provision embodies the principle of res judicata in judgements in Rem. Divorce falls under such category
and Divorce decrees are considered judgements in rem. Final Judgements in rem is binding upon the whole
world
● As a rule judgements could not be collaterally impeached or called in question if rendered in a court of
competent jurisdiction but must be attacked in a direct action
● With respect to the divorce decree issued by the presiding judge of the Sharia Circuit Court, It states that both
parties appeared for the hearing and the case further recites that both parties converted to Islam prior to their
marriage and it was Zamoranos who sought divorce by Tafwid(Method of Divorce) with De Guzman hgaving
previously delegated his authority to exercise Talaq(another method of divorce.
● Thus on its face, the divorce appears valid being issued for a cause recognized under the applicable law by a
competent court having jurisdiction over the parties an as no appeal was made, the divorce has attained
finality,
● The proscription against collateral attack similarly applies to matters involving the civil status of persons.
Zomoranos’ civil status as divorced belongs to the same category and Pacasum cannot impugn it in an
administrative case filed with
● The SC has already passed upon the same Decree of Divorce in the case of Zamoranos vs. People, which
involves a criminal charge for bigamy, the Sc granted Zamoranos motion to quash the information, holding
that based on the records, that the divorce is confirmed by an Ustads and the presiding judge of the sharia
District Court and attested by Judge Usman was valid and thus entitled her to remarry pacasum
● Following the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgement, the parties are now bound by this earlier finding.
● Conclusiveness of judgment is a species of res judicata and it applies where there is identity of parties in the
first and second cases, but there is no identity of causes of action. Any right, fact, or matter in issue directl
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter
of the two actions is the same.

B. Concept of legal separation

1. Grounds for legal separation – Art. 55 FC, RA 9262, compare with NCC 97

277. A.M. No. 02- Proposed Rule on Legal Separation

11-11-SC. March 4, Who may file:
2003 ● Husband
● Wife
**Not a case
Grounds:
● Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner
● Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation
● Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement
● Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned
● Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent
● Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent
● Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in or outside the
Philippines
● Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent
● Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent
● Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year
 Period:
● Within 5 years from the time of the occurrence of any of the causes

(a) Sexual infidelity or perversion

FC 55(8)
NCC 36
RPC 333 & 334
RPC 247

278. Kalaw v FACTS:

Fernandez, GR ● Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973,
166357, maintained a relationship, and eventually married on November 4, 1976. Their marriage bore them
September 19, four children.
2011 ● Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano
(Jocelyn), who also gave birth to four children. Malyn left the conjugal home, and her own four
children, to Tyrone.
● Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn and went to the US with her and their four children
from that affair. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle
Verde with only a househelp and a driver.
● On July 6, 1994, Tyrone came back from the US and filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, alleging that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of
their marriage.
● The petitioner presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses, a psychologist and a
canon law expert priest. They alleged that the respondent’s excessive mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, and going out with friends, were to the utter neglect of her duties as mother and
wife. The petitioner also alleged that he and the respondent’s brother caught Malyn with another
man in a hotel.
● Included in their reports were the interviews on the side of the petitioner, and a psychological
profile of the respondent, as prepared by the expert witnesses. They explained how the
respondent’s troubled family past, her responsibilities as a bread winner, among others, are
contributing factors to her psychological incapacity, in the form of Narcissistic Personality Disorder
(NPD), evident even prior to their marriage.
● The respondent, on the other hand, claims that she left to escape her physically abusive husband
who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, and was upset that the latter was working. She also
denied the accusation of adultery. She stated that the person in question checked her in the hotel
because she was so drunk from partying with friends, and that they were fully clothed, as
opposed to the petitioner’s narrative. She admits to playing mahjong, but maintained that it was
only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without
abandoning her children at home.
● As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from
psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and
physical violence, and presented her own psychologist as her expert witness.
● The trial court ordered a social worker to conduct a case study on the parties as well as the
children. Based on the interviews of the family members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more
available to the children and to exercise better supervision and care. The social worker commended
the fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home, she made efforts to visit her children and to
personally attend to their needs and to devote time with them.
● Trial Court Ruling - Parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity. Void ab initio.
● CA Ruling - Reversed the trial court’s ruling for lack of legal and factual basis.

ISSUE:
W/N the respondent suffers from psychological incapacity. -NO

HELD:
● Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner.
The petitioner must prove that the incapacitated party suffers a serious psychological disorder that
completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the
 marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage,
and must be incurable.
● However, the conclusions of the expert witnesses presented by the petitioner were heavily
premised on the alleged acts and behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. In
fact, the respondent presented contrary evidence refuting the allegations of the petitioner.
● The children corroborated the respondent’s story. Not once did the children state that they were
neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around
when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. This is also supported by the findings of the
court’s social worker. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her
children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that
shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to
the opposite conclusion.
● Anent the infidelity, assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove it, that one instance of
sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men.
Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity.
● Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision in reversing the
trial court’s decision is AFFIRMED.

279. Republic v FACTS:

Quintos, GR ● Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal
159594, Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalina's
November 12, hysterectomy following her second miscarriage.
2012 ● Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalina's
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. He testified that Catalina
always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she
constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with
neighbors instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she
squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she
abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.
● Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L.
Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina, Dr. Reyes opined that
Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes
found that Catalina's disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations.
● Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the
conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. She did not appear during trial but
submitted her Answer/Manifestation, whereby she admitted her psychological incapacity, but
denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardo's consent and flirting with different men. She
insisted that she had only one live-in partner; and that she would not give up her share in the
conjugal residence because she intended to live there or to receive her share should the residence
be sold.
● RTC ruled that the marriage be null and void. The RTC ruled that Catalina's infidelity, her spending
more time with friends rather than with her family, and her incessant gambling constituted
psychological incapacity that affected her duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Expert opinions were the best evidence. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
w/n Catalina’s sexual infidelity a ground for nullity of marriage under Art 36

HELD: NO
● As held in Suazo v. Suazo, “Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
 debilitating [...] sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.”
● The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment
of the conjugal home to live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for
the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological incapacity,
it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55 (10) of the Family Code. On the
other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a
manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of marriage. Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce such evidence,
rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the Court of Appeals
promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed
under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit.

(b) Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality

FCC 55 (5) and (6) compare with FC 46(4)

280. Almelor v Facts:

RTC, GR No. ● January 29, 1989 (FC marriage), Manuel G. Almelor (Petitioner;Manuel;Anesthesiologist) and
179620, Aug. 26, Leonida Trinidad (Respondent;Leonida;Pediatrician) were married at the Manila Cathedral. They
2008 had children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, (2) Napoleon Manuel, (3) Manuel Homer.
● After 11 years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC to annul their marriage on the
MASCARENAS ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
Leonida’s version:
● 1981, she first met Manuel at San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student clerks and
regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other people. They soon
became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.
● In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father, but at home, Leonida
described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered which is the
cause of their frequent fights as a couple. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his
dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.
● Manuel’s concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she
noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions (Indiscreet phone conversation with
male caller, homosexual porn materials, kissing Dr. Nogales a man on the lips). Manuel denied
everything. Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped
giving support to their children.
● Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr.
del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric
tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with
their eldest child. She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. Such incapacity is
marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel’s version:
● admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments, however, maintained that their marital
relationship was generally harmonious.
● Countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry that
began when he refused to heed the memorandum released by Christ the King Hospital, ordering
him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary hospital. Leonida's
family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as Manuel's clinic and
residence. In other words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
● Belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them. At
most, he only imposed the necessary discipline on the children.
● Defended his show of affection for his mother, that there was nothing wrong for him to return the
love and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings, which is
especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years.
 ● Leonida’s overly jealous behavior drove him to avoid the company of female friends, to avoid any
further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual
preference and fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his possession to cast doubt
on his masculinity.
● He presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at Manuel's house
during his weekly trips, a witness to the generally harmonious relationship between Manuel and
Leonida, and that there was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony, and that
he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He denied
that such an incident occurred. On that particular date, he and Manuel went straight home from a
trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except their driver.
● Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own
expert witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.

RTC Ruling: nullified the marriage, not on the ground of FC 36, but FC 45. Dissolving the regime of
community property between the same parties with forfeiture of defendant's share thereon in favor of the
same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children

Manuel filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA, contended that the assailed decision was
issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute
community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.

CA Ruling: WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court
AFFIRMS in toto the Decision of the RTC. No costs.

Issue:
W/N Manuel is a homosexual, and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage - NO

Held:
● No sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and
that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the
public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it
took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
● A marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as
concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of
evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid
such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that
vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to
defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
● Homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a
valid ground to annul a marriage. Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one
that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in
the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.

281. Campos v FACTS:

Campos, A.M. No. ● Aida and Eliseo, a Judge of MTC in Agusan del Sur, were married on September 9, 1981 and had two
MTJ-10-1761, Feb. children.
08, 2012 ● On 2008, Eliseo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
○ He and Aida were both psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
KO obligations.
○ He is a homosexual who could not be intimate with his wife unless he imagined he was
with another man.
○ As a result of his homosexuality, Aida had affairs with other men which he did not bother
to stop or question.
● Aida denied the allegations.
○ Eliseo wanted their marriage annulled so that he could marry another woman with whom
 he was having a relationship. Filed a petition for legal separation.
● Report of Investigating Judge:
○ Admission of homosexuality does not automatically make Eliseo immoral.
○ No evidence of Eliseo having a relationship with another woman.
○ No dishonesty as the fact that Eliseo had children with Aida is not proof that he was not a
homosexual and was lying in his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
● Case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and
recommendation.
● OCA: Complainants failed to prove the allegations of immorality and Eliseo’s relationship with
another woman. Recommended the dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE:
● W/N Eliseo’s alleged homosexuality is a ground for the nullification of the marriage

HELD:
The issue of Eliseo’s homosexuality is for the determination of the trial court where the petition for
declaration of nullity is pending.

The Court agrees with the investigating judge and OCA in the fact that Eliseo got married and had children is
not proof against his claim of homosexuality as it is possible that he was only suppressing or hiding his true
sexuality.

(c) Attempt on the life of the other spouse

FC 55(9) compare with NCC 97(2)
Rep. Act 9262

(d) Abandonment
FC Art. 55 (10)
FC 101 par. 3, compare with separation in fact

282. DOCTRINE: ABANDONMENT, EXPLAINED. — Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the
Partosa-Jo avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the
v. meantime providing in the least for one's family although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of
CA, marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. This idea is clearly expressed
in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he
G.R. No. 82606, or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning."
Dec. 18, 1992
FACTS:
● Private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen
children. The first of these women, the herein petitioner, claims to be his legal wife by whom he
begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The other two women and their respective offspring are not parties
to this case.
● In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property,
docketed as Civil Case No. 51, in addition to an earlier action for support, also against him and
docketed as Civil Case No. 36, in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35. The two
cases were consolidated and tried jointly. On November 29, 1983, Judge German G. Lee, Jr.
rendered an extensive decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing arguments and considerations, this court hereby holds that the
plaintiff Prima Partosa was legally married to Jose Jo alias Ho Hang, alias Consing, and, therefore, is entitled
to support as the lawfully wedded wife and the defendant is hereby ordered to give a monthly support of
P500.00 to the plaintiff Prima Partosa, to be paid on or before the 5th day of every month, and to give to the
plaintiff the amount of P40,000.00 for the construction of the house in Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental
where she may live separately from the defendant being entitled under the law to separate maintenance
being the innocent spouse and to pay the amount of P19,200.00 to the plaintiff by way of support in-arrears
and to pay the plaintiff the amount of P3,000.00 in the concept of attorney's fees.”

ISSUE:
 1. W/N the judicial separation of conjugal property sought was not allowed under Articles 175, 178
and 191 of the Civil Code?
2. W/N no such separation was decreed by the trial court in the dispositive portion of its decision?

HELD:
1. Yes. PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS;
DISSOLUTION THEREOF BY PETITION FOR JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTIES; GROUNDS. — Art. 178(3)
of the Civil Code has been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the aggrieved
spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if said
spouse does not leave the other spouse.

The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom
he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The
fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their
conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1988 until the final determination by this Court of the action for
support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical
separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the
petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property.

The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the finding of both the trial and
respondent courts that the private respondent is indeed their real owner. It is these properties that should
now be divided between him and the petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired during
coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half As the private respondent is a Chinese citizen, the
division must include such properties properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have been
registered in the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.

2. Yes. While admitting that no mention was made of Civil Case No. 51 in the dispositive portion of the
decision of the trial court, the petitioner argues that a disposition of that case was nonetheless made in the
penultimate paragraph of the decision reading as follows:
“It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the
defendant in this case, subject to separation of property under Article 178, third paragraph of the Civil Code,
which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein.”

The dispositive portion of the decision in question was incomplete insofar as it carried no ruling on the
complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property although it was extensively discussed in the body of
the decision. The drafting of the decision was indeed not exactly careful. The petitioner's counsel, noting
this, should have taken immediate steps for the rectification of the omission so that the ruling expressed in
the text of the decision could have been embodied in the decretal portion. Such alertness could have
avoided this litigation on a purely technical issue.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil
Case No. 51 is hereby decided in favor of the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the conjugal property of the
petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered divided between them, share and share alike. This
division shall be implemented by the trial court after determination of all the properties pertaining to the
said conjugal partnership, including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of other
persons.

283. Republic v FACTS:

Quintos, GR
159594,
November 12, ISSUE:
2012

HELD:
(e) Other grounds
FC 55 (1)

284. FACTS:
Goitia ● This is an appeal from the judgment of the lower court holding that the defendant, Jose Campos
v Rueda (Rueda), cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, Eloisa Goitia y de la Camara (Goitia),
Campos-Rueda,
except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or
35 Phils 252
separation from the defendant. (as per Art. 149, CC at the time of the case)
ZUÑO ● The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter they established their conjugal home and lived together.
● One month after their marriage, Rueda demanded of Goitia that she perform unchaste and
lascivious acts. Goitia rejected the demands of her husband and refused to perform any act other
than legal and valid cohabitation.
● Rueda had continually, on other successive dates, made similar demands of his wife, but Goitia
continued to reject such. The refusals exasperated the former and induced him to maltreat the
latter by word and deed, inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body.
● As Goitia was unable by any means to induce Rueda to desist from his demands and cease from
maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents.

ISSUE/S:
● WoN plaintiff Goitia has grounds to compel Rueda to provide separate maintenance. - YES

HELD:
● The complaint of the wife which alleges unbearable conduct and treatment on the part of the
husband is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for separate maintenance. (see: Art. 55(1),
FC)
● When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties, relief in some way should be obtainable, such as providing support. The nature of the duty
of providing support is compatible and enforceable in all situations, so long as the needy spouse
does not create any sort of illicit situation.
● The law will not permit the husband to terminate the marriage, and his obligations therein, by his
own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection outside the conjugal home - as in this case
where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting
her.
● Thus the wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode because of her husband without fault on
her part, may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no
other remedy.
● WHEREFORE, the Court holds in favor of the plaintiff.

285. Kalaw v CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

Fernandez, GR Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare
166357, that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other
September 19, perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
2011 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to
repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
FACTS:
● In the SC’s decision promulgated on September 19, 2011, the SC dismissed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination:
● “In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of 2 supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised
on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits
to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s
experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.
● But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of
his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting
these allegations of the petitioner.
● Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that
they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them,
was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made
real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There
was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While
petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level
despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyn’s actions.
● After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of
psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there
was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations,
testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of
these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court
did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological
incapacity.
● What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There
may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.

ISSUE: WON the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Yes.

HELD:
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to
a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is
permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she was about to assume.

"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse
 to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."

The allegation of the petitioner’s psychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan.

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because
she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the
psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed,
psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of
either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have already
accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the
law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also
to the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater injustice should we insist on still
recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their children to endure some more damage.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID
AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

2. Who can ask for legal separation

FC 55 compare with NCC 99

3. When may petition be filed

FC 57 compare with NCC 102, NCC 99

286. People v.
Zapata 88 Phil 688 FACTS:
● Andres Bondoc filed a complaint for adultery on March 14, 1947 against Guadalupe Zapata, his
wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse
from the year 1946 to March 14, 1947 – Dalmacio Bondoc knew that Guadalupe to be a married
woman
● The wife (defendant) pleaded guilty and was sentenced to suffer 4 months of arresto mayor which
she served.
● In the same court on Sept. 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adultery
against his wife and Dalmacio Bondoc from March 15, 1947 to Sept. 17, 1948
● On Feb. 21 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground that
they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
● The RTC ruled in favor of the defendants and said that adulterous acts charged in the 1 st and 2nd
complaints must be deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints being the
same identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having taking place continuously during
the years 1946, 1947, and part of 1948, and "that the acts or two sets of acts that gave rise to the
crimes of adultery complained of in both cases constitute one and the same offense, within the
scope and meaning of the constitutional provision that 'No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.' "

ISSUE: WoN the 2nd complaint for adultery constitutes double jeopardy?

HELD: NO. The court emphasized that adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the Supreme
Court of Spain has held; it is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at
 the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery.

True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the same person the
offended husband, the same status the union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and the same
community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this
identity of the offended party, status and society does not argue against the commission of the crime of
adultery as many times as there were carnal acts consummated, for as long as the status remain unchanged,
the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime.

After the last act of adultery had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the defendants again
committed adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and for which the second complaint was filed.
It was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that another crime of adultery was committed, if the defendants,
after their provisional release during the pendency of the case in which they were later on convicted, had
sexual intercourse up to the time when they were sent to prison to serve the penalty imposed upon them

There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there
were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime.

Mawis/Legarda book:
Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. There is no constitutional or legal provision which
bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each
constituting one crime.

4. Court procedure in legal separation

FC 58-60;
Sec. 19 and Sec. 33, RA 9262

287. A.M. No. 02- Note: Not a case per se. The rules provided below are quite similar to the rules on normal civil cases, so
11-11-SC. March 4, instead I’ve trimmed it down to what I feel are provisions pertinent to our discussion. Otherwise, only the
2003 subject matter embraced by the section is mentioned. Moderators, please let me know if I should go about
this in a different manner. Thanks!
ZUÑO

RESOLUTION
x x x Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the
Proposed Rule on Legal Separation, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.

RULE ON LEGAL SEPARATION

Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall govern petitions for legal separation under the Family Code of the
Philippines.

Section 2. Petition. -
(a) Who may and when to file. -
(1) A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the husband or the wife, as the case may be within
five years from the time of the occurrence of any of the following causes:
(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or
a child of the petitioner;
(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner,
to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in or outside the
Philippines;
(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;
(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or
(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

(b) [Contents and form of the petition]

(c) [Venue; where petitioner has been residing.]

Section 3. Summons.
Section 4. Motion to Dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties x x x.
Section 5. Answer.
Section 6. Investigation Report of Public Prosecutor. - [to prevent collusion]
Section 7. Social Worker. - The court may require a social worker to conduct a case study [also to prevent
collusion] x x x.
Section 8. Pre-trial.
Section 9. Contents of pre-trial brief.
Section 10. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial.
Section 11. Pre-trial conference.
Section 12. Pre-trial order.

Section 13. Prohibited compromise. - The court shall not allow compromise on prohibited matters, such as
the following:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;
(3) Any ground lor legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts; and
(6) Future legitime.

Section 14. Trial.

Section 15. Memoranda.

Section 16. Decision. -

(a) The court shall deny the petition on any of the following grounds:
(1) The aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of or has consented to the commission
of the offense or act complained of;
(2) There is connivance in the commission of the offense-or act constituting the ground for legal separation;
(3) Both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(4) There is collusion between the parties to obtain the decree of legal separation; or
(5) The action is barred by prescription.

(b) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the Decree of Legal
Separation shall be issued by the court only after full compliance with liquidation under the Family Code.

However, in the absence of any property of the parties, the court shall forthwith issue a Decree of
Legal Separation which shall be registered in the Civil Registry where the marriage was recorded and in the
Civil Registry where the Family Court granting the legal separation is located.
(c) The decision shall likewise declare that:
(1) The spouses are entitled to live separately from each other but the marriage bond is not severed;
(2) The obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases; and
(3) The offending spouse is disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession,
and provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse are revoked by
operation of law. x x x

Section 17. Appeal.

Section 18. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, and support of minor children. - Upon entry of
the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the
appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody and support of
common children, under the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.

Section 19. Issuance of Decree of Legal Separation. -

(a) The court shall issue the Decree of Legal Separation after:
(1) registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition tor legal separation in the Civil Registry where
the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry where the Family Court is located; and
(2) registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, in the proper
Register of Deeds where the real properties are located.

(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and attach to the
Decree the approved deed of partition.

Section 20. Registration and publication of the Decree of Legal Separation; decree as best evidence. -
(a) Registration of decree.-The prevailing party shall cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry
where the marriage was registered, in the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is situated, and
in the National Census and Statistics Office. He shall report to the court compliance with this requirement
within thirty days iron receipt of the copy of the Decree.
(b) Publication of decree.-- In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause the
publication of the Decree once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(c) Best evidence.-The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the legal separation of the
parties and shall serve as notice to third persons concerning the properties of petitioner and respondent.

Section 21. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. -
(a) In case a party dies at any stage of me proceedings before the entry of judgment, the court shall order
the case closed and terminated without prejudice to the settlement of estate proper proceedings in the
regular courts.
(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment, the same shall be binding upon the parties and their
successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular courts.

Section 22. Petition for revocation of donations. -

(a) Within five (5) years from the date the decision granting the petition for legal separation has become
final, the innocent spouse may file a petition under oath the same proceeding for legal separation to revoke
the donations in favor of the offending spouse.
(b)The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds of Deeds in the places where
the properties are located.
(c)Alienations, liens, and encumbrances registered in good faith. before the recording of the petition for
 revocation in the registries of property shall be respected.
(d)After the issuance of the Decree of Legal Separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the designation of
the offending spouse as a beneficiary in any insurance policy even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable. The revocation or change shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insurer.

Section 23. Decree of Reconciliation. -

(a) If the spouses had reconciled, a joint manifestation under oath, duly signed by the spouses, may be filed
in the same proceeding for legal separation.
(b) If the reconciliation occurred while the proceeding for legal separation is pending, the court shall
immediately issue an order terminating the proceeding.
(c) If the reconciliation occurred after the rendition of the judgment granting the petition for legal
separation but before the issuance of the Decree, the spouses shall express in their manifestation whether
or not they agree to revive the former regime of their property relations or choose a new regime.

The court shall immediately issue a Decree of Reconciliation declaring that the legal separation
proceeding is set aside and specifying the regime of property relations under which the spouses shall be
covered.

(d) If the spouses reconciled after the issuance of the Decree, the court, upon proper motion, shall issue a
decree of reconciliation declaring therein that the Decree is set aside but the separation of property and any
forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected subsists, unless the spouses have agreed to
revive their former regime of property relations or adopt a new regime.
(e) In case of paragraphs (b), (c), and (d). if the reconciled spouses choose to adopt a regime of property
relations different from that which they had prior to the filing of the petition for legal separation, the
spouses shall comply with Section 24 hereof.
(f) The decree of reconciliation shall be recorded in the Civil Registries where the marriage and the Decree
had been registered.

Section 24. Revival of property regime or adoption of another. -

(a) In case of reconciliation under Section 23, paragraph (c) above, the parties shall file a verified motion for
revival of regime of property relations or the adoption of another regime of property relations in the same
proceeding for legal separation attaching to said motion their agreement for the approval of the court.

(b) The agreement which shall be verified shall specify the following:
(1) The properties to be contributed to the restored or new regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separate properties of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses, and the amounts owing to each.

(c) The creditors shall be furnished with copies of the motion and the agreement.
(d) The court shall require the spouses to cause the publication of their verified motion for two consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
(e) After due hearing, and the court decides to grant the motion, it shall issue an order directing the parties
to record the order in the proper registries of property within thirty days from receipt of a copy of the order
and submit proof of compliance within the same period.

Section 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15,2003 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.

288. Araneta vs Facts:

Concepcion, 99 ● Luis Araneta (Luis) filed an action for legal separation on the ground of adultery against his wife
Phil 709 Emma.
● After the issues were joined, Emma filed an omnibus petition, supported by her Affidavit, to secure
LUNA custody of their three minor children, a monthly support for herself and said children, the return of
her passport, to enjoin Luis from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her.
● Luis opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that Emma had
abandoned the children.
● He prayed that the parties be required to submit their respective evidence.
● Judge Concepcion resolved the omnibus petition, granting the custody of the children to Emma and
a monthly allowance of P2,300 for support for her and the children, P300 for a house and P2,000 as
attorney’s fees.
● Upon refusal of the judge to reconsider the order, Luis filed a petition for certiorari against said
order and for mandamus to compel the respondent judge to require the parties to submit evidence
before deciding the omnibus petition.
● The main reason given by the judge, for refusing Luis’ request that evidence be allowed to be
introduced on the issues, is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, “ART. 103. An
action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition.” (now Art 58, Family Code)

Issue: Does the rule prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months
from the filing of the petition preclude the court from acting on an omnibus petition for support and
custody?

Held: It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein is evidently intended as a cooling off period
to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in
court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the
period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry
out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of
the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article
105, Civil Code, now Art. 49, Family Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the
court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank
injustice may be caused.

The rule is that all the provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and
given effect by reconciling them if necessary.

“The practical inquiry in litigation is usually to determine what a particular provision, clause or word means.
To answer it one must proceed as he would with any other composition — construe it with reference to the
leading idea or purpose of the whole instrument. A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections
and is animated by one general purpose and intend. Consequently, each part of section should be construed
in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus it is not proper to
confine interpretation to the one section to be construed.” (Southerland, Statutory Construction section
4703, pp. 336-337.)

Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go
to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the
separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience
during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which is best for
their custody.

“The writ prayed for is hereby issued and the Respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to
proceed on the question of custody and support pendente lite in accordance with this opinion. The court’s
order fixing the alimony and requiring payment is reversed. Without costs.”

289. Pacete v. FACTS:

Cariaga, 231 SCRA ● On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis (Conchita) filed with the court below a complaint for the
321 declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete (Pacete) and
one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Conchita and Pacete),
 accounting and separation of property.
○ In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938 and that
they had a child named Consuelo.
○ That Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato. She learned of such marriage only on 01
August 1979.
○ During her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts
of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles.
○ That he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or
in the names of his children with Clarita and other “dummies.”
○ That Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement.
○ That reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to
continue living with Clarita.
● The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979.
● They filed a motion for an extension of twenty (20) days from 30 November 1979 within which to
file an answer. The court granted the motion.
● On 18 December 1979, appearing through a new counsel, the defendants filed a second motion
for an extension of another thirty (30) days from 20 December 1979.
● On 07 January 1980, the lower court granted the motion but only for twenty (20) days to be
counted from 20 December 1979 or until 09 January 1980. The Order of the court was mailed to
defendants’ counsel on 11 January 1980.
● Still unaware of the court order, the defendants, on 05 February 1980, again filed another motion
(dated 18 January 1980) for an extension of “fifteen (15) days counted from the expiration of the
30-day period previously sought” within which to file an answer.
● The following day, or on 06 February 1980, the court denied this last motion on the ground that it
was “filed after the original period given x x x as first extension had expired.”
● The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted. The plaintiff was then directed to present her evidence.
● RTC Ruling:
○ On 17 March 1980, the court promulgated its decision granting the legal separation
between Conchita and Pacete and decision on division of their properties. The court also
ruled that the subsequent marriage between Pacete and Clarita is void ab initio.
● Hence, the instant special civil action of certiorari.

ISSUE:
W/N the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cotabato, Branch I, in Cotabato City, gravely
abused its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file their answer in Civil Case
No. 2518, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision of 17 March 1980 which, among
other things, decreed the legal separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent Concepcion
Alanis and held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la Concepcion. -
YES

HELD:
Under ordinary circumstances, the petition would have outrightly been dismissed, for, as also pointed out
by private respondents, the proper remedy of petitioners should have instead been either to appeal from
the judgment by default or to file a petition for relief from judgment. This rule, however, is not inflexible;
a petition for certiorari is allowed when the default order is improperly declared, or even when it is
properly declared, where grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. In these exceptional
instances, the special civil action of certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is available. In
the case at bench, the default order unquestionably is not legally sanctioned.

Article 101 reflects the public policy on marriages, and it should easily explain the mandatory tenor of the
law. In Brown v. Yambao, the Court has observed: “The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling
for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of
annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract;
that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption
cannot be made to depend upon the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs. Cheong Gee, 43
 Phil. 43; Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Goitia v. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy that
the inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether
the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.”

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal
separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,”
obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off’ period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the inclusion of the
following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court: “SEC. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of
marriage or for legal separation.—If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see
to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.”

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the proceedings below, including the Decision
of 17 March 1980 appealed from, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.

290. Ocampo v FACTS:

Florenciano, 107 ● Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in
Phil 35 Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had live thereafter as husband and wife.
● In March 1951, De Ocampo discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
RAMOS maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas.
● Having found Florenciano carrying marital relations with another man, De Ocampo sent her to
Manila to study beauty culture, where she stayed for 1 year. Again, De Ocampo discovered that
Florenciano was going out with several other men.
● In 1952, Florenciano left De Ocampo and since then they had lived separately
● On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man
by the name of Nelson Orzame.
● De Ocampo signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which Florenciano
manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action.
Accordingly, De Ocampo filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.
● CFI of Nueva Ecjia dismissed the case and the CA affirmed the previous ruling, holding there was
confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription.
● The Court of Appeals held that the husband's right to legal separation on account of the
defendant's adultery with Jose Arcalas had prescribed, because his action was not filed within one
year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity.
● As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, upon discovering the illicit connection, expressed his wish
to file a petition for legal separation and defendant readily agreed to such filing. And when she was
questioned upon orders of the court, she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation even as
she admitted having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these facts virtually to
mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art. 101, (refer to the
notes below) legal separation could not be decreed.

ISSUE: WON the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by
the family code? NO.

HELD:
● As we (the SC) understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession
made by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a
confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in
court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the
plaintiff's demand. This is not what occured.
● Even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of
judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the
 decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon
evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or
mainly on defendant's confession.
● The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated
from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action .

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the appealed
decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects. Costs of all
instances against Serafina Florenciano. So ordered.

NOTES: Art 100 & 101 (NCC)

ART. 100.—The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation
shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

ART. 101.—No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession
of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

291. Somosa vs FACTS:

Vamenta, Jr., 46 · On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 5274 in the sala of respondent Judge against
SCRA 110 respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation, concubinage on the respondent's part and an attempt by
him against her life being alleged. She also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
PANISALES injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then
under the administration and management of respondent Clemente Ramos.
· There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion, dated July 3, 1971, based on Article 103 of
the Civil Code.
· Respondent manifested in a pleading dated July 16, 1971, that if the motion asking for preliminary
mandatory injunction were heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become even
more dim.
· On September 3, 1971, respondent judge granted the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the
hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction.
· Respondents were required to answer according to the October 5, 1971 resolution. The answer was
filed December 2 of that year.
· On January 12, 1972, a manifestation from the parties in the case was filed submitting the matter
without further arguments.

ISSUE:
· W/N Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the
lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would preclude the court from acting on a motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit

HELD:
· NO. Art. 103 of the Civil Code which prohibits the hearing of an action for legal separation before the
lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion for
preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period. A suit for legal separation must be
distinguished from an ordinary suit. It involves a relationship in which the law for the best of reasons
would attach the quality of permanence. Hopefully, the guilty parties may mend his or her ways, and the
offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity. Hence, the interposition of a six-month period before an
action for legal separation is to be tried.
 However, Article 103 of the Civil Code remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to
assert itself during the six months ban on hearing. The question of management of the spouses' respective
property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be
appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from
which the court suffers under the preceding article is hereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be
heard.

In the case at bar, the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary injunction should not be
ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge,
considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in
the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphemal property, an
assertion that was not specifically denied by him. At any rate, from the time of the issuance of the order
complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus, there can be no more
impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the plea of petitioner for a writ of certiorari is GRANTED, and the order of respondent Court
of August 4, 1971, suspending the hearing on the petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is
SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is directed to proceed without delay to hear the motion for preliminary
mandatory injunction. Costs against respondent Clemente G. Ramos.

292. De la Viña v. Facts:

Villareal 41 Phil 13
· On September 17, 1917, Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the court of first instance
of the province of Iloilo against Diego de la Vina for divorce, partition of conjugal
property, and alimony pendente lite in the sum of P400/month.
· She alleged among others that since the year 1913 and up to the date of the complaint,
the defendant had been committing acts of adultery with one Ana Calog, sustaining
illicit relations with her and having her as his concubine, with public scandal and in
disgrace of the plaintiff.

· That because of said illicit relations, the defendant ejected the plaintiff from the
conjugal home for which reason she was obliged to live in the city of Iloilo, where she
had since established, her habitual residence.
· That the plaintiff, scorned by her husband, the defendant, had no means of support
and was living only at the expense of one of her daughters.

· Subsequent to the filing of the said complaint, Narcisa Geopano, the plaintiff therein,
presented a motion alleging, among other things, that since the filing of her complaint
she had personal knowledge that the defendant was trying to alienate or encumber
the property which belonged to the conjugal partnership between the plaintiff and the
defendant, to the prejudice of the plaintiff, and prayed the preliminary injunction be
issued against the defendant restraining and prohibiting him in the premises.

· CFI granted preliminary injunction but respondent appealed claiming that CFI Iloilo has
no jurisdiction since his wife should follow his domicile and that the judge has
exceeded his power in granting the preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

W/N Court of First Instance of Iloilo had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said action for divorce because
the defendant therein was a resident of the Province of Negros Oriental and the plaintiff, as the wife of the
defendant, must also be considered a resident of the same province
 Held:

This contention of the petitioner is not tenable. It is true, as a general of law, that the domicile of the wife
follows that of her husband. This rule is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest
between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of
the one is that of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation,
as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail. But the authorities are unanimous in holding that
this is not an absolute rule. "Under modern laws it is clear that many exceptions to the rule that the domicile
from of the wife is determined by that of her husband must obtain. Accordingly, the wife may acquire
another and separate domicile from that of her husband where the theoretical unity of husband and wife is
dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or where the husband has given cause for
divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by agreement, or a permanent separation due to
desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or where
there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husband's domicile."

If the wife can acquire a separate residence when her husband consents or acquiesces, there should be no
reason as to why the law will not allow her to do so when, as alleged in the present case, the husband
unlawfully ejects her from the conjugal home in order that he may freely indulge in his illicit relations with
another woman. Under no other circumstance could a wife be more justified in establishing a separate
residence from that of her husband. For her to continue living with him, even if he had permitted it, would
have been a condonation of his flagrant breach of fidelity and marital duty. Furthermore, in this case no
longer was there an "identity of persons and of interest between the husband and the wife." Therefore the
law allowed her to acquire a separate residence.

Ruling
Therefore, the petition should be and is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

293. Gandionco v. FACTS:

Peñaranda 155
SCRA 725 ● On 29 May 1986, Teresita Gandionco, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of
AGUSTIN concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages.
● On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed in Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City a
criminal case for concubinage against her husband.
● On 14 November 1986, private respondent filed for support of pendente lite which was granted on
10 December 1986.
● Petitioner contends that civil action for legal separation and its consequences should be suspended
in light of criminal charge of concubinage under Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. It is
said that after a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the same
offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered.

ISSUE:

W/N the civil action for legal separation be suspended to give room for the criminal action for concubinage.

HELD:

No. Legal separation on the grounds of concubinage does not require that the husband be found guilty of
the same.

RATIO:
 The Supreme Court held in negative. On the issue of separation: civil action for legal separation, based on
concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said
civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense. The governing rule is now Sec. 3,
Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which refers to civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising
from the offense."

The contention made by Froilan is a misapplication of the goal of Art 111, Sec 3 of the 1985 ROCP. That
provision is meant to cover only civil actions made during the pendency of a criminal case, when the victim
realizes that civil liability has also been incurred and would like to go after the culprit for the said liability.
That kind of civil action, which is to “enforce the civil liability arising from the offense”, must be suspended
because the criminal case has not been decided yet. Most of the time it is used when the victim wants to
invoke the right to live separately from the offender, and to enforce all the other legal consequences. Art
111, Sec 3 was very explicit in the kind of civil action to be suspended and no confusion must result from its
application.

The present case is different from the one mentioned in Art 111, Sec 3. The case was filed not to recover civil
liability, but to dissolve the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other. The petitioner
also cannot say that since the basis for the civil action is being determined in the criminal action, the
conviction for the criminal action must be first obtained. This is because a decree of legal separation on the
ground of concubinage may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal
separation, and no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.

The court also dismissed the claim that the judge was manifestly partial to his wife. Just because there is
divergence of opinion between his lawyer and the judge does not mean that there is foul play.

On the issue of support, it can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of
the judge. Hence, petition is dismissed.

Notes:

Pendente Lite: while the litigation is pending

1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure - Art. III. Sec. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. — Whenever the
offended party shall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense. As
contemplated in Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be observed: (a) After a criminal action has been
commenced the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it
may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.

294. Lapuz vs FACTS :

Eufemio, 43 SCRA Ø Petition for review by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
177 Court of Manila, dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the death of the therein
plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case, abated the cause of action as
(YNIGUEZ) well as the action itself.
Ø The dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff
(WASN’T ABLE TO (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final
PASTE SORRY!!) judgment
Ø On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio,
alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September
1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she
discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or
about March 1949.
Ø She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the
defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Ø Eufemio counterclaimed the declaration of nullity void ab initio of his marriage with petitioner on the
ground that his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese Law and customs, with Go
Hiok or Ngo Hiok.
 Ø Issues have been in the course of trial when petitioner died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969.
Counsel was notified of the death and on 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute
the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
Ø On 29 June 1969, petition was dismissed which was petitioned for reconsideration but was denied in 15
September 1969.
Ø Seeing the petition has been dismissed respondent-appellee did not pursue his counterclaims not even
his claim that his marriage shall be void ab initio.
Ø Petitioner then stated an issue to be as follows: "When an action for legal separation is converted by the
counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the
proceedings?"
Ø The SC stated that the issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal
separation suit to one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner
asserted that "the respondent has acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page
22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self
same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the
action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim, for legal
separation presupposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a
precondition. Hence the real issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the
action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
HELD: YES. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of
the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the
Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent s p o u s e (and no one else) to
claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that t h e s p o u s e s can, by their reconciliation,
stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being
personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself
— action personalis moritu cum persona
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in the
enumeration. A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even
if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of a decree of separation, their source
being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality
of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the
expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. As to the petition of
respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is
apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no
further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union.
Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of
the appellant.
Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the
lifetime of any one of the parties involved. The liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have
resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.
FALLO: ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is
hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to costs.

5. Effect of pendency of the petition, FC 61-62

6. Support and pendente lite

FC 62 cf. FC 49, FC 198

295. Yangco v. FACTS:

Rhode, 1 Phil 404 ● A complaint filed Victorina Obin against petitioner which prayed that she be declared the
lawful wife of Luis R. Yangco and that she be granted a divorce, an allowance for alimony,
JOSOL and attorney’s fees.
● Petitioner is now filing a case of prohibition against the said order because he claims she is
not his wife and that there is insufficient evidence to prove it.
● Respondent says that the SC has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter and that the
petition does not state facts sufficient to create a cause of action.
● Respondent claims that Victorina, as a married woman, by reason of divorce pending
litigation, she should be granted the said allowance.

ISSUE: W/N the alimony be granted to the person who claims to be Yangco’s wife; NO.

RULING:
● Respondent judge was in error when he enacted judgment for alimony because of lack of
evidence.
● There is no law or reason that allows the granting of alimony to a person who merely
claims to be a spouse, without supporting such a claim with evidence

296. Sabalones v. FACTS:

CA 230 SCRA 79 ● As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of
duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-
Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years.
● Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and
their children.
● Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at # 17
Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan Metro, Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He
claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that
his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical
treatment.
● Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at # 17
Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan Metro, Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He
claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that
his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical
treatment.
● She also informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his
legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate residence in Don Antonio Heights,
Fairview, Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and their three children.
● In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation
of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery.
She also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the
Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties.

RTC
● Petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage on October 5, 1981, with Thelma Cumareng,
to whom he had returned upon his retirement in 1985 at a separate residence. The court thus
decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the
conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife.
CA
● granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife--she will be the administrator (implied)

ISSUE:
w/n the CA erred in making the wife the administrator of the conjugal properties after the legal
separation has been filed

HELD:
● We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an administrator over the
whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue
 with her administration.
● It was also correct, taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the
petitioner from interfering with his wife’s administration pending resolution of the appeal. The law
does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly
provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code.
● However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation has been
filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint
either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator. While it is true that no
formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the
decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus
also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the
Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now
under challenge.

Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering
the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation
of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code. Cdpr

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. It is so ordered.

297. De la Viña v. Facts:

Villareal, 41 Phil 13 TAKE NOTE THIS WAS in 1920. Remember this info when reading through the facts and ratio
● On September 17, 1917, Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the court of first instance of the
province of Iloilo against Diego de la Vina for divorce, partition of conjugal property, and alimony
pendente lite in the sum of P400/month.
● She alleged among others that since the year 1913 and up to the date of the complaint, the
defendant had been committing acts of adultery with one Ana Calog, sustaining illicit relations with
her and having her as his concubine, with public scandal and in disgrace of the plaintiff.
● That because of said illicit relations, the defendant ejected the plaintiff from the conjugal home for
which reason she was obliged to live in the city of Iloilo, where she had since established, her
habitual residence.
● That the plaintiff, scorned by her husband, the defendant, had no means of support and was living
only at the expense of one of her daughters.
● Subsequent to the filing of the said complaint, Narcisa Geopano, the plaintiff therein, presented a
motion alleging, among other things, that since the filing of her complaint she had personal
knowledge that the defendant was trying to alienate or encumber the property which belonged to
the conjugal partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant, to the prejudice of the plaintiff,
and prayed the preliminary injunction be issued against the defendant restraining and prohibiting
him in the premises.
● CFI granted preliminary injunction but respondent appealed claiming that CFI Iloilo has no
jurisdiction since his wife should follow his domicile and that the judge has exceeded his power in
granting the preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the preliminary injunction, with regards to conjugal property, to
restrain a spouse from alienating such conjugal property during the pendency of the action?

HELD: Yes, an action of divorce brought about by one of the spouses, in which partition of the conjugal
property is concerned, in the case herein, the wife has the capacity and right to obtain a preliminary
injunction against the husband to prohibit him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal
property during the PENDENCY OF THE ACTION.

Ratio:
● The power of the husband to alienate and encumber a conjugal property without the consent of
the wife will only hold true as long as there exists a genuine and harmonious relationship
● If, however, such kind of relationship ceases, then the husband’s power of administration should
be curtailed during a pendency of a case (divorce, annulment etc) to protect the interests of the
wife.
 Therefore, the petition should be and is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

298. Araneta v. FACTS:

Concepcion, 99 ● Luis filed legal separation against Emma (his wife) on the grounds of adultery
Phil 709 ● Emma therein filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly
support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport
ARUGAY ● Luis opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that Defendant had
abandoned the children; alleging that conjugal properties were worth only P80,000, not one million
pesos as alleged by Defendant; denying the taking of her passport or the supposed vexation, and
contesting her right to attorney’s fees.
● Luis filed the present petition for certiorari against said order and for mandamus to compel the
Respondent judge to require the parties to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition.

ISSUE:
● WON the judge is correct for not proceeding on the question of custody and support pendente lite
because of Article 103.

HELD:
● NO, judge is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support pendente lite

RATIO:
● It may be noted that since more than six months have elapsed since the filing of the petition the
question offered may not be allowed. It is, however, believed that the reasons for granting the
preliminary injunction should be given that the scope of the article cited may be explained.

“Cooling-off” period:
● It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently
intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses.
● The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed
passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity
for dispassionate reflection.
● But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of
overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony
and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code.)
● The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the
circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may
be caused.

299. Lerma v. CA Facts:

61 SCRA 440 ● May 19, 1951 (NCC marriage), Teodoro Lerma (petitioner;husband) and Concepcion Diaz
(respondent;wife) was married.
MASCARENAS ● August 22, 1969, petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain
Teodoro Ramirez (CFI Ruling: Guilty)(CA Ruling: Pending).
Rule 61 Civil Procedure -
Support Pendente Lite
● November 18, 1969, respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner for legal separation and/or
separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with an urgent petition for support
It is a provisional remedy which
grants a person entitled to pendente lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory, based on concubinage and attempt against
support an amount enough for
his “sustenance, dwelling,
her life. petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent's application for support pendente lite, on
clothing, medical attendance, the defense of the adultery charge he had filed against the respondent.
education and transportation”
(FC 194) while the action is
pending in court. It may be
availed of by any of the parties
CFI Ruling: granted the respondent's application for support pendente lite. (1) the respondent was declared
in the action for support or in a entitled to support pendente lite from the date of the filing of the complaint; and (2) the amount of such
proceeding where one of the
reliefs sought is support for the monthly support was reduced from P2,250.00 to P1,820.00.
applicant. The capacity of the
person who will provide the
support and the needs of the ● March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
one entitled to be supported
are taken into consideration in injunction to annul the aforementioned orders to the CA on the ground that they were issued with
setting the amount of support
to be granted.
grave abuse of discretion.
Support pendente lite can be
availed of at the CA Ruling (October 8, 1970): issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano (CFI), to set aside
commencement of the action
or at any time before the
the assailed orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court in
judgment or final order is support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite.
rendered in the action or
proceeding.

The one claiming for support

● Respondent moved to reconsider the decision on the ground that the petitioner had not asked that
must establish before the court he be allowed to present evidence in the lower court.
the relationship between the
parties as to entitle one to
receive support from the other.
CA Ruling (January 20, 1971): set aside the decision of October 8 and rendered another, dismissing the
petition.

Issue:
W/N adultery is a good defense against the respondent's claim for support pendente lite. - YES

Ruling:
● NCC 292 During the proceedings for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children shall be supported from the
conjugal partnership property. After the final judgment of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage, the obligation of mutual support
between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the
innocent one, the judgment specifying the terms of such order.
● NCC 100 "the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage ... (and) where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them …"
● NCC 104 after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad
faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the
other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support.
● NCC 303 the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to
disinheritance;"
● NCC 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive
right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.

Held:
● NCC 292 is not in itself the source of the legal right to receive support. It merely states that the
support, not only of the spouses but also of the children, shall be taken from the conjugal property
during the pendency of the legal separation proceeding. It does not preclude the loss of such right
in certain cases, it contemplates the pendency of a court action and, inferentially at least, a prima
facie showing that the action will prosper. For if the action is shown to be groundless the mere filing
thereof will not necessarily set NCC 292 in operation.
● If legal separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact that an action
for that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be used as a means to obtain support
pendente lite, which, without such action, would be denied on the strength of the decisions of this
Court recognizing adultery as a good defense. Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all that
an erring spouse has to do to circumvent such defense would be to file a suit for legal separation no
matter how groundless.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of CA of January 20, 1971 and the orders of respondent Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court herein complained of, dated December 24, 1969 and February 15, 1970, all are set aside and
their enforcement enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending action
for legal separation between the parties. No pronouncement as to costs.

7. Defenses in actions for legal separation – FC Art. 56

(a) Consent
FC 56(2); NCC 100

300. People v. FACTS:

Sansano, 50 Phil 1. Ursula Sansano and Mariano Ventura were married in 1919 and had one child
73 2. After the birth of their child, Mariano Ventura left his wife to go Cagayan where he remained for
3 years without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of herself and their son.
3. Ursula Sansano was poor and illiterate and had no relatives to rely on.
4. She struggled for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal day when she met the accused
Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to live with him.
5. In 1924, the husband returned! Mariano Ventura filed a complaint for adultery against Sansano
 and Ramos. – GUILTY!
6. After completing her sentence, Sansano left her paramour Ramos.
7. Sansano begged for the pardon of her husband and promised to be a faithful wife it he would
take care her back.
8. Mariano Ventura refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where she wished,
that he would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased.
9. Abandoned for the 2nd time, she and her child went back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos and
they have lived with him ever since.
10. The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her co-defendant, did nothing to interfere
with their relations or to assert his rights as husband.
11. He later on left for Hawaii where he remained for seven years completely abandoning his said
wife and child.
12. Upon his return, he presented the second charge of adultery here involved with the sole purpose,
as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce under the provisions of Act No. 2710.

ISSUE: W/N Mariano Ventura’s complaint for adultery against wife may prosper despite the fact that (1)
he did nothing to interfere with the extra-marital affairs of his wife and had, instead, abandoned them for
7 years

HELD: NO! (1) It cannot prosper! Mariano consented to the adultertous acts of his wife
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he signed the
complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and
his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the
accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.
We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years of acquiescence on his part
in the adultery of his wife is explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which period it
was impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is no merit in the argument that it
was impossible for the husband to take any action against the accused during the said seven years.

301. People v. FACTS:

Schneckenberger, ● Accused Rodolfo married the Complainant Elena and after 7 years of marital life, they
73 Phil 413 agreed; for reason of incompatibility of character to live separately.
● Accused secured a decree of divorce from Mexico. He contracted another marriage with
co-accused Julia in Malabon.
● Complainant instituted 2 actions against accused for bigamy and concubinage.
○ 1st action (Bigamy) – convicted
○ 2nd action (Concubinage) – interposed plea of double jeopardy and the case was
dismissed but, upon appeal by the fiscal, this Court held the dismissal before the
trial to be premature this was under the former procedure and without deciding
the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on
the merits. Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence

ISSUE: W/N accused should be convicted of Concubinage; NO.

HELD:
● Upon the other hand, the Court believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted
of the crime of concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the
complainant in which they agreed to be "en completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto
y en todos conceptos," while illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes
nevertheless a valid consent to the act of concubinage within the meaning of section 344
of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party
clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other.
● We said before (People vs. Guinucod, 58 Phil., 621) that the consent which bars the
 offended party from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given
expressly or impliedly after the crime has been committed. We are now convinced that
this is a narrow view in way warranted by the language, as well as the manifest policy, of
the law. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
● The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders. (Emphasis ours.)
● As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent"
must have been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to
its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and
subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to
compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and
invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For instance, a husband who believers his
wife another man for adultery, is as unworthy, if not more, as where, upon acquiring
knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing. We, therefore,
hold that the prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party
from prosecuting the offense.
● In this arriving at this conclusion we do not want to be misconstrued as legalizing an
agreement to do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean
that an agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within
the plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from
prosecuting the offense. If there is anything morally condemnatory in a situation of his
character, the remedy lies not with us but with the legislative department of the
government. What the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits of our authority.

(b) Condonation
FC 56(1)

302. Ginez v. FACTS:

Bugayong 100 Phil
616 ● Plaintiff, Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy, was married to defendant, Leonila Ginez
on August 27, 1949, while on furlough leave.
AGUSTIN ● In July 1951, Benjamín began receiving letters from Valeriana (plaintiff’s sister-n-law) and some
from anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife.
● On cross-examination, he admitted that his wife also informed him by letter, which he claims to
have destroyed, that a certain “Eliong” kissed her.
● In August 1952, he went to Asingan and met her in the house of her godmother. Both went to the
house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiff-husband, where they stayed and lived for 2
nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they repaired to the plaintiff’s house and again passed
the night therein as husband and wife.
● On the second day, he tried to verify from his wife the truth of her adultery, but she merely left,
instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts of
infidelity.
● After that, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her but failed to do so.
● On November 18, 1952, plaintiff filed a complaint for legal separation against defendant, who
denied the averments.
● Court of First Instance dismissed the case on the ground of alleged condonation.
● As the questions raised in the brief were merely questions of law, the Court of Appeals certified the
case to Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

W/N there was condonation of the infidelity.

 HELD:

Yes. The act of plaintiff in persuading defendant to come along with him, and the fact that she went with
him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin and together slept there as husband and wife
and the further fact that in the second night they slept together in their house as husband and wife.

RATIO:

All these facts have no other meaning than that reconciliation between them was effected and that there
was condonation of the wife by the husband. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the
parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is
presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.

Article 97 of the Civil Code states that a petition for legal separation may be filed:

(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the
Penal Code; or
(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other.

Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses
are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to
obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

The court ruled that in defendant's answer she vehemently and vigorously denies having committed any act
of infidelity against her husband, and even if we were to give full weight to the testimony of the plaintiff,
who was the only one that had the chance of testifying in Court and link such evidence with the averments
of the complaint, We would have to conclude that the facts appearing on the record are far from sufficient
to establish the charge of adultery, or, as the complaint states, of "acts of rank infidelity amounting to
adultery" preferred against the defendant. Certainly, the letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his
sister-in-law Valeriana Polangco, which must have been too vague and indefinite as to defendant's infidelity
to deserve its production in evidence; nor the anonymous letters which plaintiff also failed to present; nor
the alleged letter that, according to plaintiff, his wife addressed to him admitting that she had been kissed
by one Eliong, whose identity was not established and which admission defendant had no opportunity to
deny because the motion to dismiss was filed soon after plaintiff finished his testimony in Court, do not
amount to anything that can be relied upon.

Notes:

CONDONATION is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation
“conditional forgiveness or remission, by a spouse of a matrimonial offense which the other has
committed”.

CONDONATION DEPRIVES OFFENDED SPOUSE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION. Granting that the
infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the wife, the act of the husband in persuading her to
come along with him, and the fact that she went with-him and together they slept as husband and wife,
deprives him, as the alleged offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the offending wife,
because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of New Civil Code. However, this
presumption may be rebutted by evidence.

(c) Recrimination
FC 56(4)

303. William FACTS:

Brown (appellant) Ø On July 14, 1955, Willian H. Brown led suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal
v. Juanita Yambao separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao.
(appellee) Ø He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University
October 18, 1957 of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she
begot a baby girl;
REYES, J.B.L., J. Ø Brown learned of his wife's misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that thereafter
the spouses lived separately and later executed a document their conjugal partnership and assigning certain
YNIGUEZ properties to the erring wife as her share.
Ø The complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of
the marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for other remedy as
might be just and equitable.
Ø Court of First Instance denied petition for legal separation on the grounds that while the wife's adultery
was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under
Article 100 and that there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown's action had prescribed
under Article 102 of the new Civil Code since the evidence showed that he learned of his wife's infidelity in
1945 but only led action in 1955.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the lower court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafael Jose of Manila to act as
counsel for the defendant, who defaulted.
2. Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that there was condonation of or consent to the
adultery.
3. Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.

HELD:
1. No. The appellant argues that that in cross-examining him with regard to his marital relations with
Lilia Deito, who was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as counsel for the defaulting wife, when
"the power of the prosecuting officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is collusion, and
if there is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, to intervene for the state which is not
the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he intervened for Juanita Yambao,
the defendant-appellee, who is private citizen and who is far from being the state." This argument I
untenable. Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act of married persons in procuring a divorce
by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by
failure, in pursuance of to defend divorce proceedings it was legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to
light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wife's default was calculated,
or agreed upon, to enable appellant to obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought without
regard to the legal merits of his case.
2. No. The CFI correctly held, that the appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did not
petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery,
which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code,
action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause
occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.
3. The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must necessarily fail with
them.
FALLO: The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

304. Ong vs Ong, FACTS:

G.R. No. 153206,
October 23, 2006 William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when Lucita filed a complaint for
Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code.

Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her husband William subjected her to physical
violence like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her head against the concrete wall.and been
violent towards their three children. He would scold them using his belt buckle to beat them. One day
after a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several different parts of her body, pointed a gun at
her and asked her to leave the house which she did.

Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim. Dr.
Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the day after she left her conjugal home also testified about her
 injuries.

The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal separation which the CA affirmed

William then filed this petition for review on certiorari

-On the decision denying all of Lucita’s allegations and that he never inflicted physical harm on her or their
children.

-He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the complaint is to deprive him of his
control and ownership over his conjugal properties with Lucita.

-That the CA overlooked some facts of the case which warrant an exception to the general rule that
questions of fact cannot be the subject for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

-The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and their parents’ doctor Dr. ElinZano since
their testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud and since Lucita abandoned the family home she
has also given a ground for legal separation and therefore should NOT- be granted one pursuant to Art. 56
par. 4 of The family code – Where both parties have given ground for legal separation

ISSUE: WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation

HELD:

The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take control of the conjugal
properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated physical violence and grossly abusive
conduct. That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon Lucita have
been duly established. He can derive no personal gain from pushing for the financial interests of her
family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and the companionship of her husband and children

The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses is given great respect. Relationship
alone is not enough to discredit and label a witness’ testimony as biased and unworthy of credence.
Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward testimonies the court finds that
their testimonies are not tainted with bias.

The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated in the said provision

PETITION DENIED: Lucita should be granted a decree of legal separation

(d) Collusion/Mutual Consent

FC 60
FC 56(3), (5), compare with NCC 101 and 221(2)

305. People v. FACTS:

Schneckenberger ● On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married the compliant Elena Ramirez
73 Phil 413 Cartagena and after seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of
character, to live separately each other
● On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree
of divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 11,
1936, he contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the justice of the peace
court of Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived together as husband and wife in the city of
Manila.
● Because of the nullity of the divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, complaint herein instituted two
actions against the accused, one for bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other
concubinage in the court of First Instance of Manila.
 RTC
● The first culminated in the conviction of the accused for which he was sentenced to penalty of two
months and one day of arresto mayor. On the trial for the offense of concubinage accused
interposed the plea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but, upon appeal by the fiscal,
this Court held the dismissal before the trial to be premature this was under the former procedure
and without deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial
on the merits. Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence and sentenced
to a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.

ISSUE:
w/n consent affects the charges of bigamy and concubinage

HELD: YES
● Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint in which
they agreed to be "en completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while
illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act
of concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no
doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other.
● We said before (People vs. Guinucod, 58 Phil., 621) that the consent which bars the offended party
from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime
has been committed. Thus according to Art 344, “The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.”
● As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must
have been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its
commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent,
for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor,
he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For
instance, a husband who believers his wife another man for adultery, is as unworthy, if not more, as
where, upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing.
We, therefore, hold that the prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended
party from prosecuting the offense.
● In this arriving at this conclusion we do not with to be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to
do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the
tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest
policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. If there is anything
morally condemnatory in a situation of his character, the remedy lies not with us but with the
legislative department of the government. What the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits
of our authority.

Judgment reversed. Accused acquitted.

306. Ocampo v. FACTS:

Florenciano 107 ● Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in
Phil 35 Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had live thereafter as husband and wife.
● In March 1951, De Ocampo discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
RAMOS maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas.
● Having found Florenciano carrying marital relations with another man, De Ocampo sent her to
Manila to study beauty culture, where she stayed for 1 year. Again, De Ocampo discovered that
Florenciano was going out with several other men.
● In 1952, Florenciano left De Ocampo and since then they had lived separately
● On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man
by the name of Nelson Orzame.
● De Ocampo signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which Florenciano
manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action.
 Accordingly, De Ocampo filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.
● CFI of Nueva Ecjia dismissed the case and the CA affirmed the previous ruling, holding there was
confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription.
● The Court of Appeals held that the husband's right to legal separation on account of the
defendant's adultery with Jose Arcalas had prescribed, because his action was not filed within one
year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity.
● As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, upon discovering the illicit connection, expressed his wish
to file a petition for legal separation and defendant readily agreed to such filing. And when she was
questioned upon orders of the court, she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation even as
she admitted having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these facts virtually to
mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art. 101, (refer to the
notes below) legal separation could not be decreed.

ISSUE: WON there is collusion between De Ocampo and florenciano? NO.

HELD:
● Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between husband and wife for one of
them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a
matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the
other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the
parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce.
● In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a
matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to
bring about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor.
● Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant
could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail
the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception
at such a personal risk.
● In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the
guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence
necessary to prove it.
● Proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion.

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the appealed
decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects. Costs of all
instances against Serafina Florenciano. So ordered.

NOTES: Art 100 & 101 (NCC)

ART. 100.—The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation
shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

ART. 101.—No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession
of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

307. Republic v CA, Facts:

November 12, · Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the
2012 Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan.
· The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas hysterectomy (surgical
 removal of the uterus. ) following her second miscarriage.
·On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage,
citing Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital
obligations.
· Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her
share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
· Eduardo testified that
o Catalina always left their house without his consent
o that she engaged in petty arguments with him
o that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs
o that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the
household chores and caring for their adopted daughter
o that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in
Qatar since 1993
o that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her
paramour.
RTC: Marriage nulled
CA: AFFIRMED
· Eduardo will pay Catalina an amount of 50000 PHP for her share of the conjugal
properties.
· Catalina does not oppose the petition.

Issue:
1. W/N Eduardo had colluded with Catalina

Held:

The payment to Catalina could not manifest a sign of collusion between Eduardo and Catalina.
Although she had not opposed the petition, she had denied a part of her psychological incapacity
by stating that she had not been leaving the conjugal home without Eduardo’s consent nor has she
been flirting with different men. In addition to that, she may have not opposed the petition but she
made it clear that she was unwilling to give up her share in the conjugal house. It is more believable
that Eduardo had given the 50000 PHP in recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to the
share instead of a collusion in order to get their marriage annulled.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the Court of
Appeals promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit.

(e) Prescription, FC Art. 57

8. Effects of decree of legal separation, FC Art. 68

(a) On personal relations, FC 63 (1), 68
(b) On the custody of children
FC 63(3); FC 213
NCC 106(3)
P.D. 603 (CYWC) Art. 17 par. 3

308. Matute v. FACTS:

Macadaeg, 99 Phil ● An action for legal separation was brought by Armando Medel against Rosario Matute on the
340, May 30, 1956 ground of adultery committed with his brother, Ernesto Medel.
○ Decision was rendered finding Rosario guilty.
KO ■ Granted the legal separation.
■ Awarded Armando with the custody of their 4 minor children.
 ● Afterwards, Armando went to the US, leaving the children under the care of his sister, Pilar, in
whose house Rosario subsequently lived in order to be with her children.
● After Armando returned to the Philippines, the children lived with him again.
● Rosario brought the children with her to Manila to attend the funeral of her father.
○ Armando alleges that he agreed on the condition that she would return the children within
2 weeks.
● Rosario did not return the children and instead filed a civil case praying for the custody of the
children be awarded to her in deference to the preference expressed by the children.
○ The children did not want to go back to Armando because he is living with a woman other
than Rosario.
● CFI: denied Rosario’s motion for the children’s custody and ordered her to deliver the children to
Armando
● Rosario instituted a petition for certiorari maintaining that:
○ She is the children’s legitimate mother and they wish to stay with her.
○ 3 of the children over 10 years old thus, pursuant to Rule 100, Sec 6 of the Rules of court,
their wish must be heeded unless “the parent chosen is unfit to take charge of them by
reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty”.
○ The act of infidelity that she had been found guilty of does not involve moral depravity.
■ It is a thing of the past and not a present reality.
○ Armando is now unfit to have the children under his case for he is living maritally with
another woman.
■ He went to the US to secure a divorce decree dissolving their marriage however,
such decree is null and void, thus he is guilty of bigamy.

ISSUE:
● W/N Rosario is unfit to take custody of the children –YES

HELD:
It is conceded that children over 10 years of age, whose parents are divorced or living separately, may
choose which parent they prefer to live with, unless the parent chosen is unfit to take charge of their care by
reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty.

The order which denied Rosario’s motion for the custody of the children declared that Rosario is without
means of livelihood and, according to her own admission, she lives on the charity of her brothers. She has no
home of her own to offer to her children but she would shelter them under the roof of her brothers.

The Court is not prepared to hold that a grave abuse of discretion was committed when the lower court
impliedly deduced, from these circumstances, that poverty, among other causes, rendered Rosario unfit to
take charge of her children or made it unwise to place them under her care.

Case dismissed.

(c) On property relations

FC 63(2), FC 64, FC Art. 102 (4), 129 (7), 43

309. Quiao v FACTS:

Quiao, G. R. No. · The case at hand is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by the
183622, July 4, petitioner Brigidio Quiao.
2012 · On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) led a complaint for legal separation
against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).
PANISALES
RTC RULING:
● The RTC declared the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido
B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55. It stated that the parties shall be entitled to live separately from
each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed. The plaintiff, who is the innocent spouse
was given custody of their three minor children. Except for the personal and real properties already
foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties which included coffee and corn mills in
 Agusan del Norte, parcels of land, and a Bashier Bon Factory in Butuan City were divided equally
between respondents and petitioner subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the
payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of P45,740.00.

However, net profits of the petitioner’s share of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children. He is further ordered to reimburse respondents, the sum of P19,000.00 as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.

· On December 12, 2005, the respondents led a motion for execution which the trial court GRANTED.
· Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution which ordered the petitioner,
Brigido Quiao to come up with the sums stated in the previous decision together with the lawful fees in
the service of the said Writ. However, if he was not able to satisfy the said terms, he is ordered to come up
with the sums through his lands and buildings in the manner required by law, specifically that of Section 9,
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court. After judgment has been satisfied in part or in full in consonance with
Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, he is thereby ordered to make a return of the said
proceedings immediately.
· On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents the amount
of P46,870.00 which covered the petitioner’s payment of the conjugal share, attorney’s fees, and litigation
expenses.
· On July 7, 2006, the petitioner led a Motion for Clarification assailing the RTC to define the term “Net
Profits Earned.”
· To resolve the petitioner’s Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an order which held that the phrase
"NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the
separate properties of each of the spouse and the debts." It further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending
spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and
43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
· On November 21, 2006, the respondents led a Motion for Reconsideration, praying for the correction
and reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006.
· On January 8, 2007, the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion
for Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated
August 31, 2006.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the dissolution and consequent liquidation of the common properties of the husband and wife by
the virtue of the decree of legal separation is governed by Art. 125 of the Family Code
2. W/N the Family Code can be given retroactive effect for purposes of determining the net profits
subject of forfeiture as a result of the decree of legal separation without impairing vested rights already
acquired under the civil code

HELD:
1. NO. Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property relation is
governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. From the foregoing facts
and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is
conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry." The
husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.
2. YES. Since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so
far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the
Family Code in relation to Article 63 (2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because
according to Article 256 of the Family Code "this Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law."

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is
AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order
 dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in accordance with the above
discussions.

310. Ocampo v. Facts:

Ocampo, G.R. No. ● January 16, 1978 (NCC Marriage), Virginia Sy Ocampo (Petitioner;Wife) and Deogracio Ocampo
198908, August (Respondent;Husband) got married.
03, 2015 ● September 10, 1990, Virginia filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with
Deogracio on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC.
MASCARENAS
RTC Ruling (January 22, 1993): petition is hereby GRANTED. The marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent is hereby declared null and void from the beginning under FC 36. The status of their children,
however, shall remain legitimate and their custody is hereby awarded to the petitioner. As to the couple's
property relations, their conjugal partnership of gains shall necessarily be dissolved and liquidated but since
the petitioner has not submitted any detailed and formal listing or inventory of such property, the court
cannot act now on the liquidation aspect. The parties are given thirty (30) days to submit an inventory of
their conjugal partnership for the purpose of liquidation.

● March 31, 1999, RTC directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried
properties, Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing
ensued where the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective stand.

RTC Ruling (January 13, 2004): the properties declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50
sharing.

● February 2, 2004, Virginia filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.

● February 13, 2004, Deogracio filed a Motion to Deny and/or Dismiss the Notice of Appeal and for
immediate execution
● February 20, 2004, RTC denied the aforesaid motion to deny and/or dismiss the notice of appeal for
lack of merit.
● March 4, 2004, Deogracio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, wherein RTC denied it on March 22,
2004.
● Virginia filed an appeal (August 11, 2010) and reconsideration (October 5, 2011) on the CA, but was
denied.

Issue:
W/N Deogracio (respondent) should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason
of bad faith and psychological perversity. - NO

Ruling:
● FC 105 the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
● FC 147. (1) When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
(2) In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares.
(3) For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party
of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
(4) Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
(5) When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong
to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to
 the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

Held:
● While their marriage was on January 16, 1978, it is still the Family Code provisions on conjugal
partnerships, however, which will govern the property relations between Deogracio and Virginia
even if they were married before the effectivity of the Family Code.
● Under the FC, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are
conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is
counterbalanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been
acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.
● In a void marriage, as in those declared void under FC 36, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by FC 147 (applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void) or FC 148.
● As in the instant case, for FC 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is
without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. The term "capacitated" in the first
paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any
impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the part of either Virginia or
Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage
was found to be void under FC 36 on the ground of psychological incapacity.
● All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the
properties are registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not
rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the
name of one of the spouses only. FC 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if
the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses." Thus, the failure of Virginia
to rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained by the spouses' joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Accordingly, the partition of the
former spouses' properties on the basis of co-ownership, as ordered by the RTC and the appellate
court, should be affirmed, and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 11, 2010 and the Resolution dated October
5, 2011 of the CA are AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the RTC for proper disposition.

(d) On support, FC 198

(e) On the use of surname, NCC 372

311. Laperal v. FACTS:

Republic 116 Phil ● On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp. Proc. No. 433) a
672 petition which permits her to resume her use of her maiden name ELISEA LAPERAL.
○ On March 24, 1939, she married Mr. Enrique B. Santamaria; that in a partial decision
entered on this Honorable Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court,
entitled 'Enrique B. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria,' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given
a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final.
○ During her marriage to Enrique B. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden
name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R.
Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now.
○ Her petition was granted by the court.
● The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates the
provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules
of Court.
● In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of
the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to
continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation.
● Upon petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for change of name,
reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a
 businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married name
would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
● Hence, this appeal by the State.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner can resume her use of her maiden name. – No

HELD:
The contention of the Republic finds support in the provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code which
reads:. "ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and
surname employed before the legal separation".

The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed,
shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her
married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be
the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for
the benefit of all concerned.

The appellee contends, however, that the petition is substantially for change of her name from Elisea L.
Santamaria, the one she has been using, since her marriage, to Elisea Laperal, her maiden name, giving as
reason or cause therefor her being legally separated from the husband, Enrique R. Santamaria, and the fact
that they have ceased to live together for many years.

It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as petitioner owns
extensive business interests, the continued use of her husband's surname may cause undue confusion in her
finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding is however without basis. In the first
place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was based; hence, obviously no evidence to this
effect had been adduced. Secondly, with the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal
partnership between petitioner and her husband had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. (Art.
106[2], Civil Code.) Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of December 1, 1960, granting the petition, is hereby set aside and
the petition dismissed. Without costs. So ordered.

(f) On hereditary rights, FC 63(4)

(g) Other Effects, FC 64, 198

(h) Solo Parents Act – RA 8972

9. Reconciliation, FC 65-67, cf 141

10. Effect of death of one of the parties

312. Lapuz vs. FACTS:

Eufemio 43 SCRA ● On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (Carmen) filed a petition for legal separation against
314 Eufemio S. Eufemio (Eufemio), alleging that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and
January 31, 1972 canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously
until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties
ZUÑO during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman
named Go Hiok.
● She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which would order the defendant
Eufemio be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
 ● In answer to the petition, Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of void ab initio of his
marriage with Carmen, on the ground that he has a prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok,
celebrated according to Chinese law and customs.
● Before the trial could be completed, petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on
31 May 1969.
● Respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" on two (2) grounds: that
the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of
the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
● On 26 June 1969 , counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by
her father, Macario Lapuz (Macario). Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
● On 29 July 1969, the court issued the assailed order dismissing the case. The court stated that the
motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution is hinged on whether or not the plaintiff's cause
of action has survived, to which the court held in the negative. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied.
● The petitioner then filed the case at bar. Respondent Eufemio, did not pursue his counterclaim for
the declaration of his marriage with Carmen void ab initio. Instead he prayed for the affirmance of
the challenged order to dismiss.

ISSUE/S:
● WoN the death of a spouse abates an action for legal separation, the death occurring before the
issuance of a final decree. - YES
● WoN Carmen can be substituted by her father Macario in an action for legal separation involving
property rights. - NO

HELD:
● An action for legal separation is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in
Art. 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in
Art. 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings,
or even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it
follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself - actio
personalis moritur cum persona.
● Resulting changes then in property relations between spouses are solely the effect of the decree of
legal separation, hence it will not produce any effects if the death occurs prior to its issuance. If
death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be issued, death producing a
more radical and definitive separation.
● Anent the declaration for nullity of marriage, the action became moot and academic upon the
death of one of the spouses, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same, as
death automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as
a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines could be resolved and determined in a
proper action for partition by either the surviving spouse or by the heirs of the deceased spouse.