SPECIAL PENAL LAW

ATTY. ROMMEL A. ABITRIA

2C - Assignment 4 Additional

Navia v. Pardico G.R. No. 184467 June 19, 2012 (DEYTO) - RA No. staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two
9851; Enforced disappearance uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately
asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could
RECIT-READY: ​Virginia Pardico filed a petition for writ of amparo so
answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with
that Navia, Dio, and Busing, would show the body of Ben Pardico who
them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged
was alleged to be last seen with them when they arrested Ben and Bong.
against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.
The petitioners argue that they released the two. Virginia however argues
that after they got arrested, she never saw Ben again and based on the
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security
story of Bong and Lolita, Ben was never release. The RTC issued the
department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision. The
writ of amparo. Petitioners argue that it was not proper and that the writ
supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also
is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the
arrived thereat. As to what transpired next, the parties respective versions
violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved party’s right to life,
diverge.
liberty and security are clear. They assert that in the case at bench,
Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. Issue is W/N the issuance
Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because
was proper.The SC held NO.
they received a report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, that she saw Bong and
Ben removing a lamp from a post in said subdivision. It was there where
DOCTRINE: ​For the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and
Dio and Buising were able to confirm who the suspects were. They thus
proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must
repaired to the house of Lolita where Bong and Ben were staying to invite
also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance
the two suspects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went with them.
was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The
the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing
suspects admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the
transferring it to a post nearer to the house of Lolita. Complainant was not
law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an
keen in participating in the investigation. Since there was no complainant,
amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a statement to
indispensable element of government participation.
the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury
Ponente: ​Justice Del Castillo to him. His mother Lolita also signed the logbook below an entry which
Petitioner: ​Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio, Andrew Busing states that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her house.
Respondent: ​Virginia Pardico in behalf of Benhur Pardico Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security office.
Facts:
On March 2008., a vehicle of Asia Land arrived at the house of Lolita M. Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might
Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, be involved in the reported loss of electric wires and lamps within the
Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas subdivision. After a brief discussion though, Navia allowed Ben to leave.
son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both
 SPECIAL PENAL LAW
ATTY. ROMMEL A. ABITRIA
2C - Assignment 4 Additional
Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation from the Malolos City
Police Station requesting them to appear thereat on April 17, 2008 relative
to the complaint of Virginia Pardico (Virginia) about her missing husband
Ben. In compliance with the invitation, all three petitioners appeared at the
Malolos City Police Station.
On April 22, 2008, Virginia attended the investigation. Petitioners informed
her that they released Ben and that they have no information as to his
present whereabouts. They assured Virginia though that they will cooperate
and help in the investigation of her missing husband.
Respondent say that hey were unlawfully arrested, shoved into the Asian
Land vehicle and brought to the security office for investigation. Upon
seeing Ben at the security office, Navia lividly grumbled Ikaw na naman?
and slapped him while he was still seated. Navia then took hold of his gun,
looked at Bong, and said, Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin
ko na si Ben.
Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guards logbook where
she undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her house anymore. Thereafter,
Navia again asked Lolita to sign the logbook. Upon Lolitas inquiry as to
why she had to sign again, Navia explained that they needed proof that they
released her son Bong unharmed but that Ben had to stay as the latters case
will be forwarded to the barangay.
Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their house, Buising arrived and
asked Lolita to sign the logbook again. Lolita asked Buising why she had to
sign again when she already twice signed the logbook at the headquarters.
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to
visit her husband Ben, but only to be told that petitioners had already
released him together with Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben,
asked around, and went to the barangay. Since she could not still find her
husband, Virginia reported the matter to the police.
In the course of the investigation on Bens disappearance, it dawned upon
Lolita that petitioners took advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete. They
made her sign the logbook as a witness that they already released Ben when
in truth and in fact she never witnessed his actual release. The last time she
saw Ben was when she left him in petitioners custody at the security office.
Virginia filed for a petition for writ of amparo and production of Ben’s
body before June 30, 2008
RTC ruled YES. Petitioners argue that that the writ of amparo is available
only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened
violation of the aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are clear.
Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to
establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to
state with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of
the petitioners constituting a violation of or a threat to Bens right to life,
liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence
Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his
alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which
bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners
released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit
that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible
for Bens disappearance.
Issue: ​W/N the issuance of writ of amparo is proper? NO.
Ratio:
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated
to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the
country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAW
ATTY. ROMMEL A. ABITRIA
2C - Assignment 4 Additional
Here, Bens right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties
do not dispute his identity as the same person summoned and questioned at
petitioners security office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such
uncontroverted fact ipso facto established Bens inherent and constitutionally
enshrined right to life, liberty and security.
The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Bens disappearance
as alleged in Virginias petition and proved during the summary proceedings
conducted before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.
It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs coverage, said Rules does
not, however, define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This
omission was intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of
Court which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve
through time and jurisprudence and through substantive laws as may be
promulgated by Congress.
The Court in other jurisprudence applied the generally accepted principles
of international law and adopted the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition of
enforced disappearances, as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other
form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups
of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which
place such a person outside the protection of the law.
Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC came about after Congress enacted ​Republic Act (RA) No.
9851 on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or
involuntary disappearances as follows:
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest,
detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate
or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo where Justice Arturo D. Brion
wrote in his Separate Opinion that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on
the constitutional rights to the rights to life, liberty and security, but on a
concrete statutory definition as well of what an enforced or involuntary
disappearance is. Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs reference to enforced
disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary
disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No. 9851.
Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851.
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive
the following elements that constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
(b)that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
 SPECIAL PENAL LAW
ATTY. ROMMEL A. ABITRIA
2C - Assignment 4 Additional
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d)that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to
issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are
not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that
the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal
to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of
said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, ​the
petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
In the present case, we do not doubt Bongs testimony that Navia had a
menacing attitude towards Ben and that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows
upon him. Given the circumstances and the pugnacious character of Navia
at that time, his threatening statement, Wala kang nakita at wala kang
narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben, cannot be taken lightly. It unambiguously
showed his predisposition at that time. In addition, there is nothing on
record which would support petitioners assertion that they released Ben on
the night of March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita sufficiently
explained how she was prodded into affixing her signatures in the logbook
without reading the entries therein. And so far, the information petitioners
volunteered are sketchy at best, like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis
who was never identified or presented in court and whose complaint was
never reduced in writing.
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance
alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such
disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of
State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain
any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend
to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens
disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were
impleaded or implicated in Virginias amparo petition whether as
responsible or accountable persons. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or
proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or
that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case,
the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as
responsible or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of
amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person
sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a
private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the
disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere
security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City
and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for
the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect
them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As
discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation
to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental
involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced
disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Malolos City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is hereby
DISMISSED.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAW
ATTY. ROMMEL A. ABITRIA
2C - Assignment 4 Additional
People v. Cabanada G.R. No. 221424 July 19, 2017 (HERNANDO)
PELINO NA- - General Inquiry; Custodial Investigation
RECIT-READY:
Cabanada was a stay-out housemaid at the residence of the Victoria
family. The family went out for almost the entire day and Cabana waited
up before leaving the house. The next day, as Catherine was asking for
money from his husband for household expenses, the latter discovered
that the money in their car compartment is short of 20k. He immediately
reported to his wife who later on went up to their bedroom only to find
out that some of the jewelries are missing as well. She immediately
called the Mandaluyong Police Station to report the incident.
RTC convicted Cabana of qualified theft. It held that the prosecution was
able to establish the continuous series of events which undoubtedly point
to Cabanada as the perpetrator of the crime charged.
CA affirmed.. It also ruled that Cabanada’s admissions were not obtained
under custodial investigation as it was established that she was not yet
arrested at that time. The uncounselled admissions were given freely and
spotaneously during a routine inquiry.
The Court upheld the contested CA decision. Cabanada’s confession at
the CIU office cannot be considered as having been done in a custodial
setting because the confession was made during the initial interview of
the police after Catherine called to report the missing money and
personal effects, and this was while they were still at the residence of the
employer which means that Cabanada was not yet taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of her freedom. The investigation was still a general
inquiry of the crime and has not focused on a particular suspect, thus at
this point in time, she did not need a counsel to assist her. Her admission
without the assistance of a counsel could not have impaired the
admissibility of such in evidence.
DOCTRINE:
Miranda Rights​ which requires that
(a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent;
(b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law;
(c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to
have his counsel present when being questioned; and
(d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any
questioning if he so desires.
The above rights are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion
by the State as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
Ponente: ​Justice Peralta
Petitioner: ​People of the Philippines
Respondent: ​Robelyn Cabanada
Facts:
Accused-appellant Cabanada was charged with the crime of Qualified
Theft, the accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of April 2009, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, being then employed as housemaid of complainant
Catherine Victoria y Tulfo, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of
the trust reposed upon her with intent to gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following to wit:
a) cash amounting to [P]20,000.00;
b) one (1) Pierre Cardin lady's watch worth [P]10,000.00;
c) one (1) white gold ring with diamonds and white gold earring with diamonds
worth [P]90,000.00;
d) one (1) Technomarine lady's watch worth [P]15,000.00;
e) one (1) Santa Barbara [lady's] watch worth [P]6,000.00;
f) one (1) Relic lady's watch worth [P]3,000.00;
g) one (1) pair of white gold with briliantitos earrings worth P10,000.00
 SPECIAL PENAL LAW
ATTY. ROMMEL A. ABITRIA
2C - Assignment 4 Additional
h) assorted ATM cards
in the aggregate amount of [P] 154,000.00 belonging to one Catherine Victoria y
Tulfo, without her knowledge and consent, to her damage and prejudice in the
aforementioned amount.
Contrary to law."
Prosecution established that about 9AM on April 12, 2009, private
complainant Catherine Victoria and her family visited her mother in
Bulacan. Cabanada left the house since she was not feeling well and would
rather clean the house. The family returned at 9:30PM on the same day.
The next day, Catherine asked her husband Victor for 47,000php for he was
he was supposed to give her household expenses. Victor went to his service
vehicle to get the money he kept in the glove compartment, and was
surprised that P20,000.00 was missing. When Victor informed her,
Catherine checked their room and discovered that several pieces of her
jewelry were also missing. She immediately called the Mandaluyong Police
Station to report the incident.
Defense on the other hand has a different version:
At around 9AM on April 12, 2009, Cabanada went to Catherine's house to
work as a stay-out housemaid, and left around 9PM upon arrival of the
Victoria family. On the same date, the plantsadora came around 9AM and
left at 3PM. In the morning of April 13, 2009, Cabanada returned to the
house to resume her work. She was washing clothes when Catherine called
her and asked about the missing items. She denied any knowledge of the
same. The police came and asked her and her sister Rose to board the police
mobile. For half an hour, Catherine was talking with the police, while
Cabanada and her sister stayed in the mobile. Thereafter, they were brought
to the police station, and while in a small room, she was asked thrice if she
mortgaged the missing jewelry, to which she denied. She was not assisted
by a lawyer at the police station nor was allowed to call her relatives.
RTC convicted her of the crime of qualified theft. It held that the
prosecution was able to establish the continuous series of events which
undoubtedly point to Cabanada as the perpetrator of the crime charged.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It also ruled that Cabanada’s
admissions were not obtained under custodial investigation as it was
established that she was not yet arrested at that time. The uncounselled
admissions were given freely and spotaneously during a routine inquiry.
Issue:
1.) W/N Cabanada’s extrajudicial confessions are admissible in
evidence (YES)
Ratio:
1.) YES.
Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution provide that:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
The above provision embodies the Miranda Rights which requires that (1)
any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b)
anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he
has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his
counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an
attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires. The
mentioned rights are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by
 SPECIAL PENAL LAW
ATTY. ROMMEL A. ABITRIA
2C - Assignment 4 Additional
the State as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent
him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
Cabanada alleges that her alleged admissions cannot be considered as done
in an ordinary manner, spontaneously, fully and voluntarily as it was
elicited through the questions of PO2 Cotoner. She was patently treated as a
suspect when she was being interviewed at the Victoria's residence. Thus,
her uncounselled admissions are inadmissible in evidence for having been
obtained without a valid waiver on her part.
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and
is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation
and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation
therein and which tend to elicit an admission. R.A. No. 7438 reinforced the
constitutional mandate and expanded the definition of custodial
investigation. This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered
before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights.
OSG argues that although Cabanada's confession may have been obtained
through PO2 Cotoner's interview, the same was given freely and
spontaneously during a routine inquiry and not while she was under
custodial investigation. She made the said admission in her employer's
residence wherein she was neither deprived of her liberty nor considered a
suspect. The OSG emphasizes that since the investigation had just begun, it
was entirely within the authority and discretion of the police officers to
question any person within the household who could have related any
unusual events that occurred on the day the Victoria family went to
Bulacan.
Applying the provisions, Cabanada was not under custodial investigation
when she made the confession, without counsel, to PO2 Cotoner that she
took the missing P20,000.00. The prosecution established that the
confession was elicited during the initial interview of the police after
Catherine called to report the missing money and personal effects. The
investigation was still a general inquiry of the crime and has not focused on
a particular suspect. Also, she admitted to the crime while at the residence
of her employer, thus, she was not yet taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of her freedom.
The records of the case reveal that Cabanada was brought to the CIU office
for further investigation after she admitted the crime and after Catherine
expressed her desire to pursue the case against her. However, prosecution
witness PO2 Cotoner admitted that Cabanada was not apprised of her
constitutional rights. He insisted that their investigation has not yet
concluded and that the accused was not yet arrested.
The circumstances surrounding Cabanada's appearance before the police
station falls within the definition of custodial investigation. Despite the
claim that she was not considered as a suspect at that time, the fact remains
that she confessed to having committed the crime and was able to produce
the money from her room. The investigation, therefore, ceased to be a
general inquiry even if they contemplated that she was covering for
someone.
The subsequent confession of Cabanada at the CIU office can be considered
as having been done in a custodial setting because (1) after admitting the
crime, Cabanada was brought to the police station for further investigation;
(2) the alleged confession happened in the office of the chief; (3) PO2
Cotoner was present during Cabanada's apology and admission to
Catherine. The compelling pressures of custodial setting were present when
the accused was brought to the police station along with Catherine.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 05585, affirming the Decision dated April 24, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No.
MC-09-12269, which found accused-appellant Robelyn Cabanada y
Rosauro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft, is
 SPECIAL PENAL LAW
ATTY. ROMMEL A. ABITRIA
2C - Assignment 4 Additional

hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICIATION. Cabanada is SENTENCED to

suffer the penalty of Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to Sixteen (16) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAW
ATTY. ROMMEL A. ABITRIA
2C - Assignment 4 Additional
Ladiana v. People G.R. No. 144293 December 4, 2002 (NUFUAR) -
Counter-affidavit voluntarily presented during the preliminary
investigation
RECIT-READY: ​The accused, a public officer, being then a member of
the Integrated National Police (INP now PNP) assigned at the Lumban
Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is
primarily to enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction, taking
advantage of his official position confronted Francisco San Juan why the
latter was removing the steel pipes which were previously placed to serve
as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street,
Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of
persons passing along the said street and when Francisco San Juan told
the accused that the latter has no business in stopping him, said accused
who was armed with a firearm, attacked and shot Francisco San Juan
with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head and neck inflicting
upon him fatal wounds thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan.
Petitioner admitted that he shot the victim while the latter was attacking
him. “Kaya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa
may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa
dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag
hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari
ay hindi ko alam na siya ay tinamaan” The issue is w/n the
Counter-Affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation of
this case is admissible proof showing his complicity in the crime? YES
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by
showing they were made by mistake. The party may also establish that
the response that formed the admission was made in a jocular, not a
serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the true
state of facts. Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such
admissions had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. Having
admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of
showing that the killing was justified, and that the latter incurred no
criminal liability therefor. Petitioner should have relied on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution.
Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused
has admitted the killing. Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that
indirectly raised the issue of self-defense. Hence, he could not be bound
by it. This argument deserves scant consideration. Therefore, petitioner
can no longer invoke his constitutional right to be presumed innocent of
the crime charged. As far as he is concerned, homicide has already been
established. The fact of death and its cause were established by his
admissions coupled with the other prosecution evidence including the
Certificate of Death, the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination and the
Medico-Legal Findings. The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the
fact of death.
The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender
made by petitioner are statements made by two (2) prosecution witnesses
that they were allegedly told by other people that he had already gone to
the police station. There is no showing that he was not actually arrested;
or that when he went to the police station, he surrendered himself to a
person in authority. Neither is there any finding that he has evinced a
desire to own to any complicity in the killing.
We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police
headquarters merely to report the shooting incident did not evince any
desire to admit responsibility for the killing. Thus, he could not be
deemed to have voluntarily surrendered. In the absence of sufficient and
convincing proof showing the existence of indispensable circumstances,
we cannot appreciate voluntary surrender to mitigate petitioner’s penalty.
DOCTRINE: ​In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their
untruth or by showing they were made by mistake. The party may also
establish that the response that formed the admission was made in a
jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in
ignorance of the true state of facts. Yet, petitioner never offered any
rationalization why such admissions had been made, thus, leaving them
unrebutted. In addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case at bar,
are evidence of great weight against the declarant. They throw on him the
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ATTY. ROMMEL A. ABITRIA
2C - Assignment 4 Additional
burden of showing a mistake.
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Petitioner: Josue Ladiana
Respondent: People of the Philippines
Facts:
The prosecution presented 5 witnesses:
1. CARIDAD MARGALLO SAN JUAN: she is the wife of Francisco San
Juan (victim). Caridad testified that Francisco was the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, until he was shot and killed by accused
Ladiana, who happens to be also a distant relative of the decedent.
She was in her house when an unidentified woman came and told her that
her husband was killed by accused Ladiana. She immediately went to
Jacinto St. where the incident happened
2. PO2 LEOPOLDO DE RAMOS CACALDA, JR.: he is a policeman
assigned at the Lumban Police Station in Lumban, Laguna.
Cacalda recounted that, on December 29, 1989, at around 11:00 oclock
a.m., somebody, whose name he could no longer recall, reported to him
about an existing trouble along Jacinto Street in Barangay Salac Cacalda
responded by going to the scene, where he was accompanied by Alberto
Mercado, a member of the CAGFIL. Thereat, Cacalda saw the lifeless body
of Francisco lying face up on the road. Cacalda did not examine the body of
Francisco. He left the place of the incident when [SPO2] Percival A.
Gabinete and other policemen subsequently arrived.
Cacalda had gathered from the people milling around the body of Francisco
that it was accused Ladiana who shot and killed Francisco. Cacalda
immediately left to look for accused Ladiana. However, he eventually saw
accused Ladiana already inside the jail of the police station and thereafter
learned that said accused had surrendered to the police authority.
3. DR. ROGELIO JAVAN y MAGRACIA: physician and the Municipal
Health Officer of Lumban, Laguna.
He was the one who performed the necropsy on the cadaver of Francisco.
According to Javan, the assailant must be behind the victim when he
inflicted Gunshot wound A. As regards Gunshot wound C (neck), the
assailant likewise must be behind the victim, at a distance of more than
twenty-four inches away. Javan testified that he was not able to retrieve any
bullet during the examination. However, judging from the size of the wound
and the point of entry, Javan opined that the firearm used was probably a
caliber 38.
4. SPO2 PERCIVAL AMBROSIO GABINETE : a police officer.
The testimony of Gabinete was subsequently dispensed with, upon the
admission of the defense that he was part of the group of policemen who
proceeded to the place of the subject incident and that he found the body of
Francisco lying along the road. Additionally, the defense admitted the
existence of the receipt issued by Funeraria de Mesa dated January 3, 1990
in the sum of P6,500.00.
5. MARIO TALAVERA CORTEZ : he is a retired Assistant Prosecutor of
Laguna.
Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief on Cortez, the defense
counsel made an admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and
voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana,
which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. In said counter-affidavit,
accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the fatal shots on Francisco.
However, accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense as Francisco was
then purportedly attacking accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already
inflicted a stab wound on the arm of accused Ladiana.
However, Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the
preliminary investigation of the complaint which led to the filing of the
subject case. Additionally, Cortez testified that he would not be able to
anymore recognize the face of the affiant in the said counter-affidavit, but
maintained that there was a person who appeared and identified himself as
Josue Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the counter-affidavit.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the
guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The court ​a quo held that his
Counter-Affidavit, in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots
that caused the victims death, may be used as evidence against him. It
underscored the admission made by the defense as to the authorship, the
 SPECIAL PENAL LAW
ATTY. ROMMEL A. ABITRIA
2C - Assignment 4 Additional
authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of the Counter-Affidavit.
In short, it ruled that the document had sufficiently established his
responsibility for the death of the victim. However, it found no evidence of
treachery; thus, it convicted him of homicide only.
Issue: ​Whether the Counter-Affidavit he executed during the preliminary
investigation of this case is admissible proof showing his complicity in the
crime? YES
Ratio:
Petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the
preliminary investigation, not during the custodial investigation. However,
he argues that the right to competent and independent counsel also applies
during preliminary investigations. We disagree. a person undergoing
preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be considered
as being under custodial investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally
declared that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not
under custodial interrogation.
There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions
made by petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his
constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts that it was not
exacted by the police while he was under custody or interrogation. Hence,
the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation as
embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not at issue
in this case.
However, the accused -- whether in court or undergoing preliminary
investigation before the public prosecutor -- unquestionably possess rights
that must be safeguarded. These include: 1) the right to refuse to be made
witnesses; 2) the right not to have any prejudice whatsoever imputed to
them by such refusal; 3) the right to testify on their own behalf, subject to
cross-examination by the prosecution; and 4) while testifying, the right to
refuse to answer a specific question that tends to incriminate them for some
crime other than that for which they are being prosecuted.
We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayans characterization of
petitioners Counter-Affidavit as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an
admission.
The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner
actually shot the victim when the latter was attacking him.
“[K]aya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may
leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang
hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag hanggang
magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko
alam na siya ay tinamaan”
Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which
eventually led to the latters death -- but denies having done it with any
criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless,
whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in
evidence against him. Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the
Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner himself submitted it to the public prosecutor to
justify his actions in relation to the charges hurled against him. It escapes
this Court how he can cavalierly deny a document that he has voluntarily
submitted and originally relied upon in his defense.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by
showing they were made by mistake. The party may also establish that the
response that formed the admission was made in a jocular, not a serious,
manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the true state of
facts. Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such admissions
had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In addition, admissions made
under oath, as in the case at bar, are evidence of great weight against the
declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a mistake.
 SPECIAL PENAL LAW
ATTY. ROMMEL A. ABITRIA
2C - Assignment 4 Additional

Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue Ruling:​​WHEREFORE, the Petition is ​DENIED a​ nd the assailed Decision
of self-defense. Hence, he could not be bound by it. This argument deserves ​ osts against petitioner.
and Resolution ​AFFIRMED. C
scant consideration. As discussed earlier, the declarations contained in his
Counter-Affidavit are admissions that may be used as evidence against
him.The Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he had indeed raised
the theory of self-defense, because this argument had already been laid out
in his Counter-Affidavit. No presumption was necessary, because the
admission was clear and unequivocal.

Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue
of self-defense. As discussed earlier, the declarations contained in his
Counter-Affidavit are admissions that may be used as evidence against him.
The Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he had indeed raised the
theory of self-defense, because this argument had already been laid out in
his Counter-Affidavit. No presumption was necessary, because the
admission was clear and unequivocal.

By itself, the Counter-Affidavit miserably fails to establish the requisites of

self-defense enumerated in the law. Had petitioner been more vigilant in
protecting his rights, he could have presented clear and cogent evidence to
prove those elements.But, as found by the court ​a quo,​ he not only failed to
discharge the burden of proving the existence of the justifying circumstance
of self-defense; he did not even bother to present any evidence at all. So, we
do not see how the Sandiganbayan could have been selective in its treatment
of his Counter-Affidavit.

Therefore, petitioner can no longer invoke his constitutional right to be

presumed innocent of the crime charged As far as he is concerned, homicide
has already bee established. The fact of death and its cause were established
by his admissions coupled with the other prosecution evidence including the
Certificate of Death, the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination and the
Medico-Legal Findings. The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the
fact of death.